- for official use only - suspicious substance response

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- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Suspicious Substance Response

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Page 1: - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Suspicious Substance Response

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

Suspicious Substance Response

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Purpose

To review the response to suspicious substances in

North Carolina

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North Carolina State Laboratory of Public Health

• http://slph.state.nc.us/default.asp

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http://slph.state.nc.us/default.asp

• Bioterrorism

• Submission Criteria:For suspicious powders;

Link: Response guidelines for suspicious substance threats.

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North Carolina State Laboratory of Public Health

• North Carolina Suspicious Substance Response Guide (NCSSRG):

• For Public Health, Emergency Responders, and Law Enforcement.

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N.C. Department of Health and Human Services

State Laboratory of Public Health 4312 District Drive • P.O. Box 28047

Raleigh, NC 27611-8047 (919) 807-8765 (Main) (919) 807-8600 (24/7) (919) 310-4243 (Pager)

Suspicious Package or Bioterrorism Sample FOR LABORATORY USE ONLY Laboratory Accession Number:__________________________

SAMPLE INFORMATION (This Form Must Be Completed For Each Specimen or Sample Submitted)

Incident Report:___________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ Contents of Package:______________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________________ Package: Checked for Explosives

Checked for Radioactivity Checked for Drugs X-rayed

Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

LABORATORY FINDINGS WILL BE REPORTED ONLY TO THE SUBMITTING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

Submitting Agency:__________________________________

Address:__________________________________________

_________________________________________________

Point of Contact:____________________________________

Date Collected:________________

Date Submitted:________________

Telephone:____________________

Fax:_________________________

SAMPLES RELINQUISHED BY:

Printed Name: ______________________________________

Signature: _________________________________________

Date:________________________

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3.4.3.1 Field ScreeningField-screening techniques are employed to determine whether chemical or radioactive

characteristics could pose a threat to collectors and laboratory personnel, to assess the quality ofthe material collected, and to assist in proper packaging for transportation. Field screening resultswill also be used to verify the selection of the appropriate analytical laboratories. Screening results

should be documented and a copy provided to the laboratory or receipt facility. Furthermore, arecord should be made of the type and calibration status of each instrument. Field screening isused to detect radioactivity, flammability, toxicity, corrosivity, and oxidative potential of the

materials. Typically, radioactivity is assessed with alpha, beta, gamma survey meters and neutrondetectors, flammability with a combustible gas indicator (CGI) or equivalent, toxicity with an

appropriate detector, corrosivity with pH paper, and oxidizer with starch-iodide paper or equivalent.At the planning stage, appropriate field screening equipment should be identified. Typically,biological agents are hazardous well bellow levels that can be detected with field portable

technologies. Items that are potentially contaminated with biological agents should be consideredhazardous.

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FBI 14 Line

• 1) Incident Time• 2) Location• 3) Responding SA/TFO(s)• 4) Division• 5) Responding Agencies• 6) Synopsis• 7) Victim/Symptoms

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FBI 14 Line

• 8) Additional Factors• 9) Field Screening • 10) Credibility • 11) Resolution Time• 12) Resolution Synopsis • 13) Partner Agencies Notified• 14) Receiving Facility

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Development of ASTM E2458 and E2770

The Goal: Develop umbrella guidance for initial response to biothreats and revise E2458-06 to meet the community needs

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ASTM Committee E54

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HazMat Response

• Could be direct call to Fire Department/HazMat.

• Could be 911 call.• Could be call from Local Law

Enforcement.• Could be based upon Intelligence

provided for the IC.

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Importance of chain of Custody

• Any evidence introduced at trial must have a strong evidence Chain of Custody.

• When the Defense can not prove their client innocent – they attack the evidence, specifically the collection and handling.

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The importance of the chain of Custody

• The Defense does not have to develop an alibi or an alternate theory….they just have to raise doubt with the jury as to the veracity of the evidence.

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O.J. Simpson

• From the beginning, there were issues involving evidence collection. An important bloody fingerprint located on the gateway at Nicole Brown’s house was not collected, secured, and entered into the chain of custody when it was first located. Although it was documented by Fuhrman, one of the first detectives on the scene, in his notes, no further action was taken to secure it

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• The detectives who took over Fuhrman’s shift apparently were never aware of the print and eventually the print was lost or destroyed without ever being collected. Other items of evidence were also never logged or entered into the chain of custody, which gave the impression that sloppy forensic collection had been carried out at the scene.

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• Throughout the investigation, there were issues with how evidence was secured. There was about 1.5 mL of O.J. Simpson’s blood assumed to be missing from a vial of evidence. The reason this idea of “lost blood” could not be countered by the LAPD was because there was no documentation of how much reference blood was taken from Simpson as evidence. The person who drew the blood could only guess he had taken 8 mL; only 6 mL could be accounted for by the LAPD.

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• To add to the problem, the blood was not immediately turned over as evidence but was carried around for a few hours before it was entered into the chain of custody, allowing for speculation of when and how the 1.5 mL of blood may have disappeared.

• The security of LAPD storage and labs was also brought under scrutiny when it was found that evidence was altered or was given access to by unauthorized personnel. Simpson’s Bronco was entered at least twice by unauthorized personnel while in the impound yard; Nicole Simpson’s mother’s glasses had a lens go missing while it was in the LAPD facility.

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2 TYPES OF INVESTIGATIONS

• EPIDEMIOLOGICAL (Public Health)

• CRIMINAL (Law Enforcement)

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Benefits of Joint Investigations

• Access to Law Enforcement information which could be critical to Public Health accomplishing its mission (i.e. location of release, dispersal device utilized, targeted victims)

• Sharing of info assists Law Enforcement to apprehend perpetrator –resulting in access to additional critical info as well as prevention of additional attacks

• Access to infectious disease subject matter experts

• Access to relevant medical/health information

• FBI liaison with Public Health Department Operations Center

FOR PUBLIC HEALTH FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

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Where to start?

• Build Relationships• Create Joint Protocols

Notification ProcessThreat Assessment

• Develop an MOU

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Build Relationships

• Establish communication mechanism before the event Helps to create relationships Build credibility and trust

• Challenges Public health and law enforcement don’t typically

work together» Goals may overlap but methods are different

Barriers to information-sharing» Privacy of patient information» Law enforcement sensitive information

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Law Enforcement Sensitive Information

• Law-enforcement sensitive (LES)Defined as unclassified information of a sensitive and proprietary nature that if disclosed could cause harm to law enforcement activities by jeopardizing investigations, compromising operations, or causing life-threatening situations for confidential informants, witnesses, or law enforcement personnel

Examples: Informant and witness information; Investigative material; Law enforcement sources and undercover operations; and Law enforcement intelligence sources and methods

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Law Enforcement Sensitive Information

• Change classification to:

• For Official Use Only (FOUO)

• Sensitive But Unclassified

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Threat Assessment

Once a threshold is established, a process to evaluate the information should be established Informal (phone call)Formal (organized meeting)

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Threat Assessment

• Purpose of Threat Assessment To determine if a credible bioterrorism threat exists To identify next steps to address threat if one exists

• Protocols should specify how law enforcement and public health will conduct a joint threat assessment Each entity may have critical information that will

affect decisions Should be done when either agency meets the

defined triggers

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Criteria: Likely BT Threat

• Confirmation by laboratory testing• No known risk factors for disease

occurrenceNatural exposure is unlikely

• Law Enforcement intelligence suggestive

of bioterrorism

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Joint Criminology-Epidemiology Investigations

• With the advent of the Ebola virus reaching the United States, emergency responders must be prepared to conduct Joint Criminology-Epidemiology Investigations in order to effectively respond to these types of events.

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Summary

• In an ever increasing threat environment, all stakeholders; Public Health, Emergency Response, Fire Department/Hazardous Materials, and law enforcement must work together to ensure the safety of the citizens of North Carolina.

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Questions?

SA James J. Page Jr.WMD Coordinator

Charlotte Division/Raleigh Resident Agency(919) 608-8344

[email protected]