-duverger, epstein and the problem of the mass party the case of the parti québécois

8/4/2019 -Duverger, Epstein and the Problem of the Mass Party The Case of the Parti Qubcois

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Socit qubcoise de science politique

Duverger, Epstein and the Problem of the Mass Party: The Case of the Parti QubcoisAuthor(s): Harold M. AngellSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 20,No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 363-378Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Socit qubcoise de sciencepolitiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3228707

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Duverger, Epstein and the Problem of the MassParty: The Case of the Parti Quebecois

HAROLD M. ANGELL Concordia University

The Parti Quebecois as a Mass PartyThe distinction between "mass" and "cadre" parties was first made byMaurice Duverger in Les partis politiques (1951).1 Central to hisdistinction is the difference in their financial structures. Very little hasbeen done since to refine and build on this analysis. However, oneremarkable essay which has applied Duverger's categories to a politicalparty in Canada is that by Michael Stein.2 In this study Stein shows that"Duverger's analysis is admirably suited to the study of Creditistefinance since, in virtually every respect, the Ralliement des Creditistesfits his description of a mass party."3For Duverger, the major distinction between these two types ofparties is in their structure. The "cadre" party generally includes in its"membership" (if it can be said to have a defined membership at all)only a restricted group of the most active people sharing the samepartisan goals, while the "mass" party is open to all who care to join.The two factors which define the distinctive systems of membershipmost clearly are the method of political education of the members andfinancial organization. The "cadre" party does little or no politicaleducation of its own members, whereas the "mass" party generallycarries out an extensive programme of internal mass education. But it isin their financing that the distinction stands out most sharply.Financially, the "cadre" party relies on the contributions of a few large1 The edition used here is the 3rd English edition, Political Parties: Their Organizationand Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1964). trans. by Barbara andRobert North, esp. 60-71.2 Published as "The Structure and Function of the Finances of the Ralliement des

Creditistes," in Studies in Canadian Party Finance (Committee on ElectionExpenses; Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 405-57.3 Ibid., 408-09.

Harold M. Angell, Department of Political Science, Concordia University, Sir GeorgeWilliams Campus, Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, XX:2 (June/juin 1987).Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada


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HAROLD M. ANGELL

supporters,often from outside the party,whereasthe "mass" partyisessentiallybased on the fees paid by its members.4Duverger specified a numberof other majordifferencesbetweenthese two types of parties,includingclass, ideologicalorientation,anddegree of commitment.He gave most prominence,however, to thoseelementsrelateddirectlyto organizational tructure.5Theseincludethefollowingdifferences.(1)A massparty s inclinedto a "branch"unitasits local formof organization.This is "widerbased and less exclusive"thanthe "caucus" of a cadre party. In the mass party, moreover,thepoliticaleducationof memberssupplements lectoralactivity,andthereis anadministrative rganizationwithpermanentofficials. (2) Themassparty s stronglyarticulated,and(3) morecentralized hana cadreparty.(4) It has an even moreoligarchical eadershipthana cadreparty,and(5) a very largemembershipcomparedto a cadreparty. Finally, (6) ithasa much arger,evenpermanent,rangeof activitythana cadreparty,envelopingmuchof thecommunity ifeof the member; his compares othe electoralor specialpoliticalevent activity which characterizes hecadre party.Theonlyrealdifferencebetweenthe descriptionof thesecategoriesand the actualactivity of the PQ is in financing. Here we must add anuance.Insteadof thePQbeing"essentiallybasedon the feespaidby itsmembers," we must add to "fees" the contributionssolicited by itsmembersin an at least annualfund drive. Not that this is a wrinkleinvented by the PQ. Most of the socialist and communist-andfascist-parties of Europemade ormakecollectionsfromthepublicandgo door-to-door orthem.The differencehereis that thishasconstitutedthe major portion of the funds raised by the PQ since 1968. So inDuverger'sterms the PQ is certainlya mass party.6Membership, hen, is centralto a mass party,and "the concept ofmemberships a resultof theevolutionwhichledfromthe cadrepartytothe mass party."7The term "member"has scarcely any meaningorimportance or the cadreparty. It is linkedwith a particularnotion ofpartythatwas bornat the beginningof the twentiethcenturyalongwithsocialistparties,andthathas subsequentlybeen imitatedby others,forexamplethe PQand, later,the QuebecLiberalparty(QLP).It does notcorrespond o theconceptionofpartywhich flourished n thenineteenthcentury nparliamentaryystemswith a limitedfranchise,as in Canadaand Quebec, and which flourishestoday even with a wider franchise.4 Duverger, Political Parties, 63.5 Ibid., 27.6 For further argument on this point see H. M. Angell, "Le financement des partispolitiques provinciaux du Quebec," in V. Lemieux (ed.), Personnel et partis

politiques au Quebec (Montreal: Bor6al Express, 1982), 80.7 Duverger, Political Parties, 63.

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Abstract. With a theoretical framework based on Duverger and Epstein we examine themass party and compare it to the cadre party. The PartiQuebecois fits its criteria. In 1977 timposed its fund-raising methodology on other Quebec parties by barring donations frommoral persons. Only Quebec electors may now donate anything. Only the Quebec Liberalparty has adapted. The hypothesis is that a loss in popularity leads to a loss of membershipand a financial crisis. This may lead to a crise de conscience and a split in membership,leading to disintegration and defeat. Such a crisis shook the PQ from 1981 o 1985 and thedefeat of December 2, 1985, was an inevitable consequence.Resume. Sous l'angle de la theorie de Duverger et Epstein concernant les notions departi de masse et de parti cadre, le Partiquebecois est ici considere comme etant un partireunissant les criteres du party de masse. Dans cette perspective, en 1977 il impose auxautres partis son mode de financement notamment en interdisant tout don de < personnesmorales >>;utrement dit, seuls les electeurs queb6cois peuvent y contribuer ou faire undon. (Le Partiliberal du Quebec a d'ailleurs adhere a ce r6gime.) L'etude tend h demontrerqu'une perte de popularite entraine une perte du nombre de membres et par consequentune crise financiere. Ce phenomene peut aussi conduire h une crise de conscience, voireune scission parmis les membres menant h la desintegration et a la defaite. Une telle crise aebranli le Partiquebecois entre 1981et 1985et explique en partie la d6faite du 2 decembre1985.

As Duverger points out, the distinction between cadre and massparties is not so much based upon their dimensions, or the number oftheir members; the difference involved is not one of size.8 Consider, forexample, the PQ and the QLP. In their eyes the recruiting of members isa fundamental activity, in the QLP mainly for fund-raising purposes andin the PQ both from the political and the fund-raising standpoint. The PQaims at the political education of the nationalists of Quebec, just as forsocialist parties the aim is the political education of the working class9and selection from it of an elite capable of taking over the governmentand administration of the state. In the PQ the members are thus the verysubstance of the party, the stuff of its activity. As Duverger points out,without members, the party would be like a teacher without pupils.10Secondly, from the financial point of view, the PQ is almost entirelybased on the subscriptions paid by its members and the donations whichthey in turn solicit from the public. The scale of these fund-raising andrecruitment drives is shown by the fact that in 1982, 111,220 of Quebec's4.4 million eligible voters contributed $3.04 million to political parties.The average donation was $27.40.11In this way, the party gathers the funds needed for politicaleducation and its day-to-day activity. In the same way it is able tofinance its elections. But the financial and the political are here one.Duverger maintains that this point is fundamental, for every electioncampaign costs relatively enormous amounts of money. But the massparty technique in effect replaces the capitalist financing of elections (on8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 The Gazette, April 26, 1983.


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HAROLD M. ANGELLwhich the QLP and the Union nationale [UN] relied until 1977and thePQ's Bill 2) by democratic financing (the PQ from 1968 and the QLPafter 1978). Thus instead of appealing to a few big privatedonors-industrialists, bankers or contractors-for funds to meetelection expenses (which has always, in Canada as elsewhere, beensuspected of making the candidate, and the person elected, dependenton them12)the mass party spreads the burden over the largest possiblenumber of members and the largest possible number of members of thepublic, each of whom contributes a modest sum.This invention of the mass party is likened by Duverger to that ofTreasury Bonds in several countries in the First World War. Before thenthese were issued in large denominations to be taken up by a few largebanks from which the state borrowed. Then came the brilliant idea ofissuing many small bonds to be taken up by the general public. In thesame way, the mass party appeals to the paying public, who make itpossible for the election campaign to be free from capitalistpressures-but not, as we shall see, from more democratic pressures.This active public receives a political education and learns how tointervene in the life of the state.13In the cadre party, a few financiers provide the sinews of war. Whatthe mass party secures by numbers, the cadre party has always achievedby selection.14 If we define as a member one who signs an undertaking tothe party and thereafter regularly pays a subscription, then cadre partieshave no members.15The problem of the number of members belongingto the federal Liberal party or the federal Progressive Conservative partyof Canada is susceptible of no precise answer, because the problem itselfis meaningless. Their members cannot be enumerated because theseparties do not recruit members, strictly speaking, because they do notneed them for financial purposes. The Conservatives raised $21.2 millionin contributions in 198416but $11million of this was from 21,286 businessdonations. The bulk of the remainder was raised by an elaboratedirect-mailing system using computers. This is a far cry from themilitants of the PQ and QLP plodding door-to-door every spring. In 1984,a non-election year, the QLP raised $4.6 million in its fund-raisingcampaign through 54,120 individual contributions (89 per cent of whichwere of $100or less). Memberships added $874,679.17The PQ, although12 For a cogent argument on these lines for Canada, see K. Z. Paltiel, Political PartyFinancing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 161.13 Duverger, Political Parties, 64.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Report Respecting Election Expenses 1984,Ottawa, July 15, 1985, 1.17 Directeur-g6enral des elections du Quebec, Rapports Financiers pour 1984,Sainte-Foy, Quebec, mai 1985, 63-72 and 184.

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Problem of the Mass Partyalready in full decline, raised $2.05 million in its fund-raising drivethrough 44,963 individual donations, of which 93 per cent were of $100orless. Memberships added $421,843. This total of 99,083 individualQuebec contributions for the two parties is striking when compared tothe total of 93,199 individual contributions to the federal Conservativesin the whole of Canada, and still more to the 29,056 individualcontributions to the federal Liberal party in the whole of Canada, in1984.18 The Liberal and Conservative parties are cadre parties.19American parties and most European moderate and conservativeparties, as Duverger points out,20belong to the same category. Althoughclear in theory, this distinction is not always easy to make in practice:cadre parties sometimes admit ordinary members in imitation of massparties, for example, immediately prior to nominating conventions or forthe selection of delegates to leadership conventions in Canada. But theabsence of any system of registration of members or of any regularcollection of dues is a fairly reliable criterion. No true membership isconceivable in their absence. The vagueness of the figures put out bythese parties can also be considered presumptive evidence. In essence,cadre parties have no compelling reason to recruit large numbers ofmembers because their finances are much more easily provided for. Inany case, the larger the number of members, the smaller each one'sshare of the patronage and spoils when the party takes office.Canada has a social democratic party. The New Democratic party(NDP) has both personal and indirect members. Since its foundation in1961, t has had increased affiliation by trade unions over its predecessor,the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). From the financialpoint of view, the NDP is a mass party-election costs are partly met bytrade unions collectively. In 1984, trade unions contributed 33 per cent ofthe $6.5 million raised by the NDP.21 This collective membership,however, remains quite different from individual membership. Itinvolves no true political enrolment and no personal pledge to the party.It is well known that many of the members of the affiliated trade unionsdo not even vote for the NDP in either provincial or federal elections.This profoundly alters the nature of the party and of its membership. As18 Election Expenses 1984, 2.19 A good description of the activity of such a party in Canada is provided by CharlotteGray, "A Liberal Education," in SaturdaY Night, March 1986, 14. She writes: "InJanuary 1983Liberal party president Iona Campagnolo struck a committee to discussreform proposals. Its interim discussion paper, a year later, suggested that long yearsin office had made it 'progressively easier for the party to slip into the role of simply anelection machine, cranked up every four years. but largely dormant and ineffective ininter-election periods.' There was hostility between the parliamentary wing and therank and file."20 Duverger, Political Parties, 64.21 Election Expenses 1984, 3.

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HAROLD M. ANGELLa (financially) indirect mass party, the NDP would probably beclassified by Duverger as a "semi-mass party."22As Duverger points out,23 t was the Marxist conception of the classparty that led to such massive structures as the German SocialDemocratic Party(SPD). If the party is the political expression of a class,it must naturally try to rally the whole of the class, to form it politically,to recruit the elites capable of leadership and administration. It was asimilar-but nationalist-concept that led to the formation of the PQ in1968 n Quebec. The effort was to rally the "nation," to form it politicallyand to select elites capable of leadership and administration. But the"financiers" of Quebec were mostly English-speaking, with nosympathy for the PQ's "national project," nor for the social democraticpolicies it espoused at first. To become independent of this capitalistfinancing was possible only with alternative finances. To establish a PQpolitical press (Le Jour, 1973-1976),in opposition to the anglophone andfrancophone capitalist press, it was necessary to collect funds. Only amass party could make these things possible. The organization of the PQis also that of a mass party, having as its objective the political educationof its members. It is based on branches in all but name. Each ridingassociation (Association de comt6) is, in organization and activity, like abranch of a traditional mass party, and is required to be very active.There are regional associations as well as the "national" (provincial)organization, with a policy convention (Congres national) every twoyears.As in any mass party, the militants are of extreme importance.Duverger describes militants in mass parties as follows:... a specialclass of member. The militant s an active member: he militantsformthe nucleusof each of the party'sbasicgroups,on which its fundamentalactivitiesdepend.Within he branch, orexample,there is alwaysto be foundasmallcircle of members,markedlydifferent romthemass,whoregularly ttendmeetings, share in the spreadingof the party's slogans, help to organizeitspropaganda nd prepare ts electoral campaigns.24To this we may add, for the Quebec variant (PQ and QLP): those whoare mobilized to knock on doors and solicit donations in fund-raisingdrives. The other members do no more than provide a name for theregister and a little money for the chest; it is the militants who workeffectively for the party.Must mass parties rely entirely on their mass fund-raising methods?Certainly not. Epstein writes on this subject:Whatever ources eft-wingpartiesuse, there is no doubt the successfulones donot dependprimarily n dues. Even in Israel,wherepartymembership igures22 Duverger, Political Parties, 65.23 Ibid., 66.24 Ibid., 110.

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Problem of the Mass Partyare extremely high (as a proportion of the voting population) and where percapita dues are often high as well, additional financing is required.... Mapai ...Israel's largest single party, receives no more than half of even its regular budgetfrom dues. Another way in which parties of the left (i.e., mass) can seek paritywith the more easily financed conservative parties of the business community isthrough governmental intervention.23What Epstein means, of course, is that in Israel, as with Europeanleft-wing parties, parties control-and derive profits from-wholesectors of the economy. Mapai, together with the largest trade unionfederation, Histradrut, controls one of the largest circulation dailies inIsrael, the largest construction company in the country, as well as thelargest public bus line and other concerns.

What has become more relevant to Canadian parties, in the past 20years, is Epstein's last point. Governmental intervention in partyfinancing in Canada, as in much of the western world, has become thenorm since Quebec's pioneering Election Act of 1963. Indeed, theQuebec parties do not need to rely financially on their fund-raisingcampaigns alone. The provincial treasury provides two supplementarysources of income for them. One is the reimbursement of part of theircandidates' election expenses, which amounted to $845,042 for thecandidates of the PQ and $866,063 for the candidates of the QLP in1981.26The other source is a direct governmental inter-election subsidy,unique in Canada, which amounts to about $1 million per year. Thissubsidy is shared among the parties in the Assembly on the basis of theirpercentage of the vote at the last election.But judging by the amounts raised annually, it is obvious that theparties' fund-raising campaigns have provided, until now, the greatestpart of the budgets of the two largest Quebec parties. It seems that thebulk of the Quebec mass party's financing comes from large numbers ofmembers (dues, contributions) and sympathizers (contributions). Thiscan raise $2 million annually for one of these two parties even in badyears.The Crisis in the Parti QuebecoisIt has often been held that a mass party is peculiarly vulnerable in itssources of finance. For example, Serge Remillard, director ofadministration for the QLP in 1980, said prophetically: "If for somereason the PQ drops drastically in popularity one year it will not be ableto gather as much money in contributions. The party would becompletely paralysed."2725 L. D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967),246-47.26 Directeur general du financement des partis politiques, Rapports de depenseselectorales, elections generales di 13 avril, 1981, Montreal, a6ut 1981, 14.27 The Gazette, March 14, 1980.

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HAROLD M. ANGELLThe hypothesis of this article depends on this major problem-ornightmare-of the mass party. It is that when, for any reason, a massparty loses popularity with its contributing public, one of the first things

this public will do is to reduce or cease its contributions. Thefund-raising system will suffer a slowdown. If there is a continuing lossof popularity, the financial crisis may become a crise de conscience andthe party may undergo a split or splits in its membership. This again willaffect the fund-raising system, for one of the main functions of membersin such a party in Quebec is to be mobilized to go door-to-door to solicitcontributions. The present article attempts to show that that kind ofdeepening crisis took place in the PQ between 1981and 1985. We do thisby measuring popularity poll figures against the results (and objectives)of fund-raising campaigns.After the QLP's "Quiet Revolution" Election Act of 1963, thesecond wave in Quebec's reform of party financing came in March 1977with the PQ government's Bill 2, An Act to Govern the Financing ofPolitical Parties. 28This Act totally banned donations from corporations,trade unions or any association; all contributions from outside theprovince were banned; all donations of over $100 were to have theirdonors' names published; and a maximum of $3,000 was put on anyyear's total donations. Thus, only Quebec electors could make anydonation at all to Quebec provincial parties or candidates.This was a radical change, for until then all major Quebec parties,except the PQ (that is, all cadre parties), had been mainly financed by arelatively small number of large donations from corporations and otherbusiness sources. The PQ, from its beginnings, had had nothing to hopefor from such sources. It therefore made a virtue of necessity andinstituted for itself a mass party system of annual fund-raising drives inwhich it mobilized large numbers (15,000-20,000) of its members to godoor-to-door to solicit large numbers of small contributions. Once inpower it imposed this system on all Quebec parties, especially its mainopposition, the QLP. Only the QLP has successfully adapted itsorganization, membership and structures to this new mass party system.The PQ obviously made this move partly in the hope of cutting the headoff the QLP which, starved of funds from its traditional sources, shouldhave ended up like the carcass of a beached whale.The crisis in the PQ started in 1981.Until then the party had stayedon a rising curve from its foundation in 1968. In its first election, that of1970, it won 23.1per cent of the votes, which was a considerable increasefrom the total of 8.7 per cent obtained by the two separatist parties in theprevious election of 1966. In 1973 the PQ increased its vote to 30.2 percent and in 1976 to 41.4 per cent, taking power with 71 seats out of the 110then in the Quebec Assembly. In the 1980referendum, the PQ side, the28 R.S.Q., C.F-2.

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Problem of the Mass PartyOUI, won 40.4 per cent of the vote. This was hardly, in itself, a setbackfor the PQ in terms of the vote cast for it. And in the 1981 election itretained power with 49.2 per cent of the vote. From 1981,however, allthe indices pointed downhill for the PQ.With the economy in recession, the PQ government now turnedaway from the kind of social democratic policies favoured by most of itsmass membership and looked towards the business community. It thusalienated most of its most ardent members and supporters: publicservants, teachers at all levels, students, social service workers, in factmost of the "new class"29 to which most of its membership belonged.The PQ's loss of popularity was shown in the opinion polls. After itspeak of 49.2 per cent in the 1981election, the party stood mostly between20 and 30 per cent, with a low of 19per cent in the spring of 1983and ahigh of 39 per cent in January 1985(see Table 1). Spurred on by a poll inDecember 1984that suggested that the party might get 40 per cent (a gainof 9 points) if it dropped its main goal of Quebec sovereignty, the PQ helda special convention, on January 19, 1985, and did just that, for thecoming election. Predictably, the party split over this issue. Aboutone-third of the delegates walked out, to be followed out of the party bymany cabinet ministers, backbenchers, party officials at all levels andtens of thousands of ordinary members. Of course, the fund-raisingsystem suffered.The other main indicator of the PQ's disintegration was thereduction in the number of members (see Table 2). From November1976, when the PQ came to power, until June 1981,there was a sharp andconsistent rise in this number from 130,000to 302,000. But with the dropin popularity there was a loss of membership. In 1981, there began aprecipitous decline which ended with the party entering a leadershipcampaign in 1985(after its founding leader, Rene Levesque, had resignedin June 1985)with about 73,000 members. (The party claimed 117,000atthe time, but it turned out that 44,000 of these held expired cards.) Theleadership candidates were induced to mount membership drivesthrough the format of the leadership selection procedure.30About 55,000new and former members didjoin up before August 15.This gave the PQa possible membership of about 128,000, but only 97,389 of these actuallyvoted on September 29, 1985,according to La Presse the next day.31LaPresse said that a theoretical 160,342 might have voted (138,157 fullypaid-up members and 22,185 if they had renewed their cards). On thiswriter's estimate (97,389 voted out of a possible 128,000) this means a29 On Quebec's "new class" concept see for example. H. Guindon, "Social Unrest,Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution," Queen's Qluarterll 71 (1964),150-62.30 No delegate convention was held, but all the members on the register as of August 15,1985, would have the right to vote in a kind of general election of all PQ members.31 September 30, 1985.

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TABLE 1QUEBECPARTIES:OPINIONPOLLS

Polling Respon- QLDate organization Sponsor Period dentsMar 1981 CROPMar 1981 INCI La PresseLe SoleilGazetteCROP La PresseGENERAL ELECTIONCROP La PresseSORECOM CUIOLa PresseU. de Montreal La PresseCROP CEQN/A CJAD, Le Devoir,Radio QuebecCROP N/ASORECOM GazetteCROP N/ACROP La PresseSORECOM Le SoleilSORECOM N/A

CROP N/ASORECOM Southam NewsLe SoleilN/A N/ASORECOM Le SoleilCROP CP

Mar 13-20Mar 30-Apr 5Apr 1-5N/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ANov 14-26N/AFeb 24-26N/AFeb 14-28N/AMay 14-30N/ASep 14-25N/A

1,327 32.766 37.1,025 35.46.1,002 37.N/A N/N/A 51.N/A 41.N/AN/AN/AN/A1,036N/A1,0251,0361,260N/A1,201N/A

54.61.67.66.61.66.66.61.69.69.58.66

Apr 1981Apr 13/81Mar 1982Mar 1982Dec 1982Mar 1983Oct 1983Nov 1983Dec 1983Jan 1984Feb 1984Feb 1984Mar 1984Mar 1984May 1984Jun 1984Oct 1984Nov 1984


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TABLE 1-Continued

Polling Respon- QLDate organization Sponsor Period dents %Jan 1985 N/A N/A N/A N/A 53.Oct 1985 SORECOM Le Soleil, Gazette Oct 11-20 1,001 39.Oct 1985 CROP La Presse Oct 22-28 1,000 40.Oct 1985 IQOP Journal deMontreal; CJMS Oct 24-28 798 37.Oct 1985 SORECOM QLP Oct 28-31 720 37.Nov 1985 CREATEC QLP Nov 4-7 529 43.Nov 1985 SORECOM QLP Nov 4-11 1,001 39.Nov 1985 CROP La Presse Nov 8-10 1,007 42.Nov 1985 JOLICOEUR Le Dev'oirRadio Quebec Nov 6-18 1,598 37.Nov 1985 SORECOM QLP Nov 11-19 1,013 42.Nov 1985 IQOP Journal deMontreal; CJMS Nov 18-22 870 38.Nov 1985 CROP La Presse Nov 22-24 1,005 44.Nov 1985 SORECOM Le Soleil,Gazette, CHRC Nov 21-26 984 43.Nov 1985 CREATEC QLP Nov 25-27 603 47.Dec 2/85 GENERAL ELECTION 56.* Otherresponses:don't know, no response,will annulballot, will not vote.N/A: not available.Sources: General election of 1981 rom Elections Quebec 81 (Le Directeur gen6ral des elections, Quebec, OctRapport preliminaire des resultats du scrutin (DGEQ, Quebec, December 13, 1985);Le Devoir, LaMail; News Facts (1982, 1983, and 1984); and G. Lachapelle (Concordia University).


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HAROLD M. ANGELLturnout of 76 per cent, whereas with the La Presse figure of a possible160,342 the turnout was only 60.7 per cent, despite a long campaign and10regional all-candidate rallies. It seems therefore that our own estimateis far more realistic and more in line with the normal Quebec turnout inprovincial general elections.32 But in any case, from the 302,000members of June 1981,a great deal of blood had flowed out of the PQ.TABLE 2PARTI QUEBECOIS MEMBERSHIP, NOV. 1976 TO FEB. 1986Date Membership Paid up OverdueMid-Nov 1976May 1977Oct 1978Jun 1979Apr 1980Jun 1980Mar 1981Jun 1981Jan 1982Feb 1982Dec 1982Mar 1983May 1983Nov 1983Jun 1984Nov 1984Dec 1984Jan 1985Early Feb 1985Late Feb 1985not more thanSep 1985Feb 1986

over 130,000188,885190,000over 200,000238,220292,600302,000211,632

160,000150,319113,00085,00080,00075,000

Sources: GrahamFraser, PQ: Rene Levesque and the Parti Quebecois in Power (Toronto:Macmillan, 1984),370ff.; The Gazette, La Presse, Le Devoir, The Globe and Mail.These figures have not been checked by me in the party files and consequently areto be taken with some caution.Finally, in the "fundamental" of a mass party organization,according to Duverger,33that is, the amounts raised by the PQ's annual

32 In the 1981election 3.6 million valid votes were cast of a total of 4.4 million voters onthe lists-a turnout of 82.5 per cent.33 Duverger, Political Parties, 63.

196,082

239,500164,289154,52478,140

79,491

138,157153,148

42,138

73,17784,94689,294112,546

111,646

22,18569,249

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Problem of the Mass Party37fund-raising campaigns, again there was a sharp decline after 1981(seeTable 3). In 1982the target was lowered to $2.5 million (from $3 million in1981)and in 1983 down further to $2 million. In both cases the reducedtarget was only just passed, with a reduction of over $1.25 million from1981to 1982 in the total amount raised. From 1982to 1983 there was afurther reduction of over $500,000. In 1984 and 1985 the target wasstabilized at $2 million. In 1984this objective was only just reached (withsome $48,000 over the target); and in the election year of 1985, althoughthe drive continued for three months, much longer than is normal, re-sults were again disappointing:the PQ raised $2.2 million, while in aboutthe same time period the QLP raised $5.2 million-two and one-halftimes as much. The PQ ran a supplementary election fund-raising drivein the first two weeks of the 1985election campaign to raise $1million.34Campaign Chairman Rodrigue Biron announced that $1.26 million hadbeen raised, but "the drive is being extended because the party needsmore money for its campaign."35 On February 22, 1986, the "National"Council of the PQ met to discuss what Alain Marcoux, secretary-generalof the executive, called its most immediate problem, its financialposition.36 He announced a debt of $750,000. About $400,000 of thisapparently stemmed from the leadership race in the summer of 1985andonly $125,000 was due to the election campaign. Even before thecampaign began, Gilles Lesage, a very well-informed columnist for LeDevoir, wrote that the PQ's chest was empty.37 In January 1986 the PQwas laying off staff and cutting payments to its riding associations.38ConclusionMaurice Duverger's Les partis politiqlies was originally published in1951.Yet almost everything he had to say about the mass party fits thePQ very well. And almost everything he had to say about the cadre partywhich imitates the mass party fits the QLP very well after 1978, when itwas forced by the PQ's Bill 2 to become a mass party for fund-raisingpurposes. None of the other Quebec parties has adapted to the newregime, not even the Union nationale, which, before 1973,was one of thetwo major parties.The experience of the PQ since 1981clearly shows that a mass partywhich loses popularity and membership is in serious trouble, much moreso than a cadre party which loses an election would be. On both counts(popularity and membership) its fund-raising system will suffer as, in theexperience of both present major Quebec parties, the organization must34 Le Devoir, October 15, 1985.35 The Gazette, October 28, 1985.36 The Gazette, February 21, 1986, and The Globe and Mail, February 22, 1986.37 "La caisse est a sec," Le Devoir, October 2, 1985.38 The Gazette, January 14, 1986.

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HAROLD M. ANGELLmobilize from 15,000 to 20,000 of its militants to solicit contributionsfrom the public.TABLE 3PARTI QUEBECOIS FUND-RAISINGCAMPAIGNS 1970-1985Year Objective Total raised1970 None $ 145,042*1971 None 135,551*1972 $ 300,000 632,1541973 739,281*1974 823,868*1975 912,097*1976 1,000,000 1,120,4021977 1,000,000 1,387,3731978 1,300,000 2,059,9501979 2,000,000 2,620,4001980 3,000,000 4,006,6831981 3,000,000 3,940,5441982 2,500,000 2,647,0051983 2,000,000 2,053,3711984 2,000,000 2,048,2981985 2,000,000 2,200,000

total $27,472,019* Sums received as membership dues are notincluded.Source: Until 1984, letter from Jacques Despins,Directeur des communications, Parti

Qu6ebcois, Montreal, dated November 1,1984. For 1985total, Le Devoir, June 20, 1985.What are the possible alternative sources of income? One would befor the party to drastically raise its membership dues. However, thismight have the result of driving away many members. Another possiblesource of increased income would be to raise governmental subsidies,either indirectly (by way of increased tax credits for individualcontributions, or increased reimbursements for the election expenses ofcandidates-or of some party expenditures, such as those on theelectronic media) or even directly, by the increase in the partyinter-election subsidy. Any of these alternatives would be popular withthe parties but, except perhaps for the tax credits, not with the public.

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Problem of the Mass PartyDuring the campaign leading to the December 1985Quebec election, theLiberal leader, Robert Bourassa, let drop some hints about thepossibility of restoring the right of "moral persons"-corporations,trade unions and associations-to make contributions to political partiesand candidates. This would be the most radical step of all in the presentclimate of opinion in the province of Quebec. But it would go a long wayto solving the QLP's problem if it, in its turn, should suffer a drop inpopularity comparable to that of the PQ from 1981 to 1985.In its last four years in power, the PQ government turnedincreasingly towards the business community with its policy of"concertation," which the labour movement did not like at all. Yet evenif it had wanted-had needed-to accept contributions from business,the PQ was barred from doing so by its own legislation. As a mass party,it had only one string to its financial bow, having barred all Quebecparties, including itself, from the traditional source of financing of acadre party. When the mass party string was broken, the PQ fellapart-actually disintegrated. The crise de fitnancement caused by thedrop in popularity produced a crise de conscience, a political crisiswhich led directly to the party's disintegration, marked by a loss ofmembership, as well as the defections of many of its leading membersafter the special convention of January 1985. The result was a crushingdefeat, the first reversal of the PQ's history, with a loss of 10.6percentage points in its vote from the general election of 1981. Inaddition, the turnout fell dramatically, from the 1981election, by eightpercentage points. Thus, while the Liberal vote increased by some250,000, hundreds of thousands of former PQ voters abstained. Thisdefeat was saved from being a debacle only by the dumping of thefounding leader, Ren6 Levesque, and the highly personalized campaignof the new leader, Pierre Marc Johnson.Serge Remillard, director of administration for the QLP, felt in 1983that a couple of lean years in fund-raising could severely hurt the PQ andprevent it from recovering its previous momentum. He was right: the PQpassed through two relatively lean years in this area. Targets weredrastically lowered and the party had great problems in reaching them.The results were clear in the December 1985 election campaign. Johnsonjoked about the PQ's "Volkswagen Bug" campaign as compared to theQLP's "Cadillac" campaign. The PQ's financial stringency waseverywhere apparent until its crushing defeat.Between June 1981and February 1985 the PQ suffered a loss of227,000 members (see Table 2). That averages over 5,000 per month. Nomass party, like the PQ, can tolerate such a haemorrhage for long. By thetime of the December 1985 election the PQ was clearly out of funds. Thedues and contributions of all these deserters were decisive. Their $5 peryear dues alone would have brought in over $1 million a year. Was thatthe margin between victory and defeat?

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HAROLD M. ANGELLIt may be argued that the PQ's financial crisis was only a symptomof the PQ's disintegration, and that the real cause of its loss in popularityand membership, and the resulting financial crisis, was its radical change

in policies-especially the virtual dropping of the party's raison d'etre,its Quebec sovereignty project. This may well be the case. But what issure is that in a mass party the fund-raising system is a surethermometer: though unlike an invalid's, the higher this thermometerrises, the healthier is the party. But when it drops, it is a sure sign ofimpending disaster. A cadre party can survive occasional droughts incontributions, as did the federal Conservatives under Meighen (in 1921)and Manion (in the late 1930s). But in a mass party its membership is itsfundamental resource to produce the sinews of war. If the party gives upits raison d'etre and does not find a new one, its membership-itsmilitants-will desert it, and the whole fund-raising machinery slowsdown. The thermometer drops, and unless the party finds an alternativesource of income, the whole structure will grind to a halt. But if it doesfind another source, then it is no longer a mass party-for the massparty's fund-raising machinery is the mobilization of its membership. Itcan no longer mobilize the class or-in the case of the PQ-the nation.

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-duverger, epstein and the problem of the mass party the case of the parti québécois

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