3901f12-notes

Intro What makes a government authoritarian? Is there only one kind of authoritarian? How do authoritarian systems differ from democracies? How do authoritarian systems govern? What instruments and institutions do they use? Are authoritarian systems a stop on the road to democracy or do they represent a durable regime

type? What do we mean by regime?

Authoritarian Now any non-democratic government Democratic = electoral democracy

Minimal definition (Schumpeterian) Benefits and costs of this view

Dichotomous Older version: 1 Democrats v. Totalitarians

Totalitarians: total control of economy, society, polity Aspired to more than achieved

Police state; state terror Often mobilizational party Examples: Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini (lesser degree), Mao, the Kims, some satellites

(DDR? Romania?), Pol Pot, José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia (much earlier), the Brothers Casto…

Older version 2: Non-democrats = authoritarians + totalitarians Authoritarians

Less totalizing: Some sectors remain relatively independent Business and religion

Party to limit mobilization Examples: Franco, Salazar, Pinochet, Mugabe, Bongo. Saudis, pre-’94 South Africa, many

others; far more common than totalitarians

From 1950s and 1960s Totalitarianism, see Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1956) For authoritarianism, see Juan Linz (1964)

Moved from dichotomous to continuous Not all non-democrats the same Some less/more selectively repressive

Have done this again more recently by adding semi-authoritarian and hybrid regimes to mix What does this suggest about how we conceptualize? What are the advantages of dichotomies? What are their limitations? Same thing from continua (pl. of continuum)

Regime Current uses

Popular Political science

IR Public Policy

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Comp. Pol/Pol Theory What makes a regime a regime? Five things:

Structure of power Basis of claim to rule legitimately Accountable to whom Influentials State-society relations Could be other indicators

Per Brooker, students of non-democratic regimes have looked at Who ruled: absolute monarch, personal dictator, military ruler, institutional military

dictatorship, party dictatorship, party dictator How they ruled: totalitarian, authoritarian, traditional monarch, short term military,

transformational military List of what makes up a regime leans a little more toward how than who, but has both. Brooker also describes in some detail the key works of several different approaches to studying

authoritarians Syntheses of arguments and how views have evolved

Totalitarians Start, Arendt, lots on personal dictatorship Later, F&G, more on propaganda and indoctrination Still later, Shapiro, stress mobilization Most recent: more on how they govern; see mobilization and propaganda as not very

effective Meaning two things

Over time incorporated new concepts Behaviour of supposed totalitarians changed

Authoritarians Juan Linz on Spain Demobilizing populous (populist authoritarians are exceptions) Some limited pluralism More forms, incl. military rule Guillermo O’Donnell on bureaucratic authoritarianism -- technocrats

Military regimes: quite good How do they rule: Role for civilians? Transformational? Juntas and institutional military

dictatorships v. one-man military dictators – who often become just dictators The one-party state

Some allusion to licensed opposition; too little Basic question has been whether it is direct rule by one party or rule under the auspices or

one party; latter have ano official party but govt is by one man Personal rule

Literally by one person Various options, as personal rule takes various forms

We will see that Jennifer Gandhi says a lot about these various dictatorial alternatives. So what? What does this tell us?

Study of non-democratic politics is varied and has evolved That it has been taken seriously by PS, though sometimes is falls well back behind the

flavour of the month

FH & EIU What they are

Classifications of countries by regime type

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FH uses a measure of freedom: free, partly free, unfree EIU’s more conventional: democracies, flawed democracies, hybrids, authoritarians

Each has strengths and weaknesses And there’s substantial overlap

Exercises in classification and comparison What are the attributes of different regimes? How can regimes be classified?

Have policy impact Was especially true of FH – rankings used to isolate and castigate leftist governments

who were arguably more democratic than rightists who scored higher; cold war stuff Show how PS can move out of the academy and have an applied side

Methods This is important How do they get their information? What information do they use? How do they use it? What, in short, is the methodology of each? Does one seem better than the other; more likely to yield more accurate results or are both

essentially similar?FH-FIW

Big advantage Been around: can trace back to1972 And can trace individual countries Both may take some work but it can be done

What it measures: Freedom, not democracy But has a special sub-category for electoral democracies Focus is “real-world rights and freedoms” for individuals Score on political rights and civil liberties Three classes: Free, partly free, not free Relies on experts, in-house + consultants

EIU-DI About democracy

Breaks results into four classes: Full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrids, and authoritarians

Categories scored include: political culture and participation, and functioning of govt Only gives scores for last two years Use public opinion data where available Like FH, use in-house experts. Do give a more thorough treatment of what they mean by democracy; more contested

than freedomDemocracy

Minimum: Contested elections But minimum has prereqs, per G. O’Donnell

Free media, freedom of expression, political culture that encourages participation and not just permits it.

Practically means Free elections + prerequisites + broad personal rights effectively enforced + govt able to

deliver policies benefitting most citizens + real possibility for marginalized to gain benefits (legal, material, social, cultural) via politics + govt accountability & responsiveness

Former easier to measure; latter more durable

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Both give a sense of where different govts stand on measure related to freedom and democracy Both have relatively subtle methods and both rely on expert opinion for scoring One tries to assess govt effectives, pol. culture and participation Both present a continuum and explain why they break at the points they do Both are useful; FH is more used because it’s older

Military Rule Not all forceful seizures of power are military coups

Coups d’état not all military But all take state power by force

Can argue that not all rule by some armed force = military rule Can put warlords, caudillos or Big Men in a different category (personal rule) if they did

not use formal military to take power What this leaves: Military as a formal organization; especially a professional military

Professional military: One based on specialized training, in which a career is possible and open to any qualified person, in a permanent force, and which is supposedly subject civilian control and not used as partisan instrument

Commissions not bought; not mercenaries for hire; Product of 19th century

Coups Per definition, coups become military coups only with a professional military

Latin America, around 1870 Asia: most after independence; Thailand by late 1880s Africa: most after independence; Ethiopia, 1899 Mid-East: most after independence; Turkey, 2 quarter, 19th c,

Professional armies aren’t supposed to politically active but many are. Why? Often better educated and better traveled than many, even most politicians more sophisticated Have sense of duty and service to country; see pols as self-serving or serving party interests at

best Also loyal to military institution and will defend it if it seems threatened

Have strong distaste for disorder; if pols, self-serving and not as well educated, can’t even keep order military steps in

And they have the guns and tanks and troops… Without a strong democratic tradition coups become a real option Since 1900 there have been around 300 successful coups in the world Few in developed countries and few in consolidated democracies, regardless of development

New model coup Honduras, 2009

Mel Zelaya Military ousts Mel but doesn’t take power Hands it over to Micheletti, representative of anti-Zelaistas Who governs until the next election and stands down Hondo elite has history of asking military to sort out its problems

This time military didn’t assume power New model? Consistent with (quasi-)democracy?

Old-style coup: Mali 2012 Capt. Amadou Sanogo overthrows Pres. Amadou Toumani Toure Army felt it wasn’t getting troops & equipment it needed to fight separatist Touareg rebels of

Azawad Natl Liberation Movement (MNLA) Result has been instability, more loss of territory to MNLA, and many displaced people

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A typical coup because it grew from army’s discontent

Military rule Often short-lived; musical coups;

Short term military govts make few big changes Toss a few pols out; boost military budget

Longer term can big changes (and vice-versa) Zia al Haq, Pakistan, 1978-88 Islamicization Pinochet, Chile, 1973-89 shift to right; hobble democracy Both leaders eclipsed institution In Brazil (1964-85) and Argentina (1976-83) military leaders rotated through presidency.

Individual military rulers Can (should?) include any ruler who takes power at the head of an organized military force. If the ruler is representative of and dependent on the support of the military it is military

government with one public face. Brazil, Argentina Any place where a countercoup brings another military ruler

If he has his own base of support outside military it is personal government. Amin, Bokassa, Banzer (Bolivia),

Mixed Probably most Pakistani military presidents Maybe the Thais, too

One-party rule Most literal: only one party is permitted More flexible: only one party is permitted to win

By law or by practice Don’t confuse with one-party dominant

One regularly wins but can lose legally and does not resort to systematic fraud Lots of examples: Alberta, 1935-71, (Socred) 1971- present; (PC); Sweden, 1936-78

(Social Democrats); Italy, 1947-52 (CD); US, Solid South, 1876-1964 (Dem) One-party dominant (also called one-party predominant) found in democracies; product of

particular patterns of party competition The others are authoritarian Party = organizational weapon

Used to control society, not just state More pluralistic if licensed opposition

One-party dominant (also called one-party predominant) found in democracies; product of particular patterns of party competition

The others are authoritarian Party = organizational weapon

Used to control society, not just state More pluralistic if licensed opposition

Vanguard parties Lead revo/independence know the correct line of march only group ever qualified

to lead Currently eight: PRC, Viet Nam, Laos, North Korea, Cuba, Turkmenistan, Eritrea, Sahwari Arab

Democratic Republic [ex-Spanish Sahara] (Polisario Front) Ex: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, São Tome e Prncipe, all

ex-Soviet Bloc; Somalia

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Non-CP examples Nkrumah, Ghana, CPP, 1956- FSLN, Nicaragua; dropped after three years Not all do: ANC. South Africa Sometimes allow licensed opposition: compete but not win These are sometimes also called hegemonic parties

Other rationales Unity: Post-Independence Sub-Saharan Africa Why? To counter potential for inter-ethnic conflicts

Only internal competition was rationale How many? At least 25

Many turned into plain one-party dictatorships Lots in Arab world, also Burma; Longest-lived one-party state: Liberia, 1878-1980, True Whig Party

Hegemonic party rule Competition allowed within limits Classic case: Mexico under the PRI, 1929-1997, 2000

Fraud became main instrument Power-sharing pacts

Opposition accepts defeat in return for “quotas of power” = seats in legislature, a share of judicial and other appointments = patronage

Common in Latin America, late 19th and early 20th c. Nicaragua, 1950-79, 2000-2011.

Authoritarian? Yes, competition not free; not accountable One-party rule fairly common Can be democratic: one-party dominant (predominant)

Need to distinguish from rest; e.g., Alberta, 1935-71; 1971-now Can be authoritarian but allow opposition to exist but not win (one-party hegemonic), Mexico,

PRI, 1929-97. Or can have a total ban on other parties

Many vanguards Other one-party dictatorships: Franco’s Spain, Baathists in Syria and Iraq, ex-Burma, ex-

Gabon, ex-Malawi, ex-Liberia

Personal Rule Probably the most common form throughout history Tyrants and dictators

Trujillo, Amin, Bokassa and Macias go here; many more, too Monarchs

Not the modern constitutional kind Personal rulers not necessarily abusive if constrained

Law, custom or countervailing force But most are constrained only by own reading of what they can get away with

Still lots, despite Third Wave of democracy In fact, there are new opportunities within hybrids and re-styled authoritarian

systems Can & should be compared to executive-centred democratic states

Precisely because the two are not the same Need to discover points of convergence and divergence

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And are still first choice among many aspiring authoritarians They matter

We want to know What forms do they take. ?

How many career paths are open to a wannabe dictator? How important are personal regimes?

One person can’t really rule a modern state. Shouldn't one-person rule be on the decline?

Has one-person rule changed over time? Is the tyrant passing from the scene? Do they take and lose power as before?

Forms Generic

Power officially in one person’s hands; may be delegated Political choices determined by leader There is, though, a clique of personal advisors No autonomous state institutions, though some routinely function without

interference; e.g. lower courts No/few autonomous media No checks on leader No independent parties or civic organizations

Business may have some autonomy; religion too Security forces under leader’s control

Can be benign or malign; depends on leader and his needs This produces certain outcomes; more below Absolute (Ruling) Monarchy

Pharaohs, Roman emperors, divine right monarchs; Shah or Iran, Emperor of Ethiopia

Today: monarchs of oil states, Persian Gulf, SA, Brunei; + Morocco, Jordan; not traditional

Traits Hereditary succession Officially one-man rule, though with modern bureaucracy Minimally limited by legislature (if present) or courts Monarch determines what limits he accepts

Not many; not likely to be more Residual category

Do add to list of authoritarians Some liberalization in Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco Point of interest is how earlier absolutist monarchies were transformed

A good few were overthrown: France, Russia, Iran and probably England (1688) Some legislated out of existence: Germany, Portugal and Spain

Sultanistic rulers Chehabi and Linz, eds, 1998, Sultanistic Regimes

Exercise power without restraint and usually without a guiding ideology Most likely in more underdeveloped states

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Tend to be patrimonial; i.e., treat state as their property Private property not secure Paternalistic and clientelistic

Patron-client relations Examples

Trujillo, Batista (Cuba), Marcos (Philippines,), Somozas – two generations (Nicaragua), Duvaliers – two generation (Haiti), Pahlavis – two generations (iran)

All of these had an official political party that never lost but might share trappings of power

Others Nkrumah or Castro, want to restructure society Some rely more on force than on clientelism

Those who came up through military And a few use terror as main governing instrument: Francia or Amin

How they rule Political Science always interested in this question Renewed since about 2000 Always known:

Corruption Factionalism and playing factions off against one another Clientelism Purges and rehabilitations Assassinations

More recently discovered and confirmed Personal dictatorships more robust, harder to change, than party or military

dictatorships The elites in personal dictatorship depend on the leader

Do not have an institutional base, as they would in military or party dictatorships

Harder to organize, easier to repress

Three more dictators: Amin, Bokassa & Macias Nguema

These fit best with Trujillo and probably Gairy, though the latter was a labour leader who was instrumental in Grenada’s independence, and Gadhafi

But Trujillo was a very able businessman and Gairy not as cruel A bit with Francia and Mugabe, though both of them were well educated

individuals Not so much with Ho or Franco And Bokassa would find lots of friends in 19th c. Latin America

And Fidel Castro has had his share of nutty ideas So there is a class of dictators who are not emotionally or intellectually (or both) well

equipped to govern They would have a hard time in an electoral democracy

Recent misfortune of GOP, for example: Peter Principle

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How did the three Africans get a chance to be dictators? And how did they differ from RLT?

Trujillo From modest but not impoverished background Had criminal record: fraud, robbery and gang leader Still able to enter new Natl. Guard, formed by US, in 1918; military school;

general by 1927 Coup in 1930 31 years of dictatorship by the Goat

Personality cult + patrimonialism – treats country as private domain The three Africans

Origins? Conditions for rise? How they got power? As rulers? Their ends?

Where are they the least like RLT? Where are they the most like him?

Analyzing Personal Rule Lots of descriptions of dictators Some attempts to classify them

Jackson and Rossber, 1982, Personal Rule in Black Africa. Chirot, 1994, Modern Tyrants Chehabi and Linz, Sultanistic Regimes

Most recent stuff tries to look at all authoritarian regimes Far more general and abstract Case studies, grouped case studies, and macro analyses Nothing really mid-range

Gandhi and Franz & Ezrow take the macro route. F & E are nearly entirely macro in the reading you have – in other stuff they

aren’t Gandhi starts with case studies to show where her research questions come from

and what evidence underlies her hypotheses. Jennifer Gandhi Looks at use of usual democratic institutions by dictatorships

Not just for show Serve to include potential opponents in regime JG asks if opting to include opponents helps dictators survive longer

Focuses on parties and legislatures tests a series of hypotheses Interested that dictatorships have different sets of institutions

Monarchs rely on kin Military dictators have the armed forces Civilians have or create an official regime party

How they use these institutions is one question How these institutions help the dictator is another. Two important things here

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Dictatorships aren’t all alike; seen in their institutions A dictatorship using parties and legislatures is not necessarily doing so for show

Erika Frantz and Natasha Ezrow Elites in dictatorships Dictatorships have elites

People in top positions May have real responsibilities or not May or may not have influence with dictator But they are there

Two questions Do different types of dictatorships – personal, military and party – produce different elite

structures? Yes. Military mainly from military and are influenced by command and control

structures; first loyalty to the service Party dictators draw their elites principally from the ranks of the party. So elites

will be loyal to party in the sense that the good of the party > good of leader Personal, loyal to leader, depend on leader; leader is the “one what brung ‘em.”

Does this make a difference to a dictator’s survival? NB: Dictator’s survival not necessarily the same as a dictatorship’s survival.

Yes Military dictators most likely to fall; usually to a countercoup Second most likely to fall are party dictators; again to an internal coup Least likely to fall are personal dictators

Why? Presence or absence of unifying institution Do elites have some source of power outside govt?

Note that both studies are interested in the survival of dictators and dictatorships And both centre their examinations on elements regularly studied in democracies So they’re bringing dictatorships inside the PS tent.

Oligarchy What it is Broadest definition

Rule by an elite In its own interest Elite can be

Economic Religious Ethnic Whatever

Corrupt regimes: Ruler governs in own interest Virtuous regimes: Ruler governs in public interest For Aristotle oligarchs govern in interest of a specific minority

Not just any minority but their minority Implies that rule will be authoritarian

Unaccountable and unresponsive to many

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Opaque in its dealings Disregards law when convenient

And were propertied Oligarchy here parallels institutional dictatorships

Represent the interests of a definable group So would fit military or party dictatorships Presumably oligarchs could substitute for their representative Could govern through proxy

Manchurian Candidate option Or in coalition with other institution

Military or official party Military not unusual: Honduras, 2009 Party: Maybe the Colorados of Paraguay

Winters’s take Oligarchy always class-based

Takes this back to Aristotle Also much conventional usage assume this

Costs and benefits of his position Clarity and simplicity, plus wide acceptance Excludes other self-interested ruling minorities

Whites in Rhodesia or apartheid South Africa Religious minorities: Saddam’s Iraq, Assads’ Syria, Bahrain Power elite, C, Wright Mills (1956): Business + Military + Politics

And oligarchy can exist within a democracy. Not direct rule, though conceivable Rather influence One of JW’s key points But it means maintaining dramatic inequalities of wealth

Not just any elite=people in top positions. But an elite with great material resources that belongs to those in this class

Not linked to job, as with soldiers, state managers, or all but a few corporate executives

Key Points Wealth defence

JW sees this as “central political dynamic” for oligarchs Use their wealth to defend their wealth Use the resource they have the most of

Can be direct: active involvement in ruling Where oligarch has to defend property directly

Or indirect Where property is secure Through other institutions

Power capacity—familiar concept; Oligarchs have material power Others can have rights, positional, coercive, mobilizational Argues the advantages of material power

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Does not always carry the day Not Winters but Fred Block, 1977, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule” Not repeated this time round – oligarchs stronger?

Comment In practical terms – about what the 1% do to preserve their wealth and the system of

inequality that generated their position JW takes pains to underline that this conventionally happens in democracies

Thus democracy doesn’t disable oligarchy civil oligarchies Term used in other ways by other authors

Only some forms of oligarchy are authoritarian – warring, ruling and sultanistic – but all resolutely anti-egalitarian

Hatfields and McCoys How dominant they were How they preserved their dominance Their social origin:

Were they really feudin’ mountain boys? They also existed within a relatively, for its time, democratic order

Should that worry us?Ruling Oligarchies

Most interesting are Greeks and Romans Note the Material Power Index (78, 92)

Relative wealth Cf. the Athenians 2.4k times to Romans 400k And to US (217) 109k

Coercion Who threatens oligarchs? Who protects them?

In Athens? Slaves threatened; oligarchs protected selves In Rome? Slaves and urban poor; oligarchs against slaves on farms; the

state against urban poor In US and similar: state is both Income Defence Industry

JW stresses that oligarchy is a political system used by the extremely wealthy to defend their wealth

Keep this in mind when reading his book Also when looking at Gandhi and Levitsky & Way

Keep asking how what the latter two describe differs from the former Are the tools used all dictators open to oligarchs? Certain classes of

oligarch? Can oligarchs be competitive authoritarians?

Finally, ask how you get rid of oligarchs Has anybody done it?

Who? How?

With what results?

Authoritarians and Institutions How we (PS + History + other SS + journalism + independent researchers) have studied

non-democratic G&P

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Treated as case apart Totalitarians Tendency to dichotomize democratic and non-democratic Focused on policies and policy instruments

How the governed, with what tools, to what ends Partly because that was obvious

Everything else hard to detect We didn’t know a lot

Except by anecdote and rumour Think of what Vargas Llosa tells us about Trujillo

Still don’t One difference

Try understand not just what authoritarians do But also how they do it Frantz and Ezrow on what lets dictatorships persist or makes them fail Gandhi on the specific role of institutions

Institutions What are they? Some attributes – conventional connotative definition

Bricks & mortar: physical presence Legal charter Table of organization: formal internal structure

Informal, too; not a concern for us now Stable and long-lived – designed to be around when everyone now part of the

institution has left Examples

MUN, House of Assembly, Royal Bank, General Motors, etc. Formal social science denotative definition

A repeated pattern of interactions Very abstract What does it call attention to?

Any of the stuff we normally think of? Actually a lot of what makes up the observable constitutive parts

What this has to do with authoritarian regimes NB: Gandhi (and F&E) limit focus to dictatorships

No hybrids or semi-authoritarian/semi-democratic Simplifies; minimizes fuzzy cases; makes a clear answer more likely

Formal social science denotative definition A repeated pattern of interactions Very abstract What does it call attention to?

Any of the stuff we normally think of? Actually a lot of what makes up the observable constitutive parts

What this has to do with authoritarian regimes NB: Gandhi (and F&E) limit focus to dictatorships

No hybrids or semi-authoritarian/semi-democratic

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Simplifies; minimizes fuzzy cases; makes a clear answer more likely Maintain a functioning economy

Beyond material sustenance Jobs Produce material rewards Various forms of infrastructure

Money for government ≠ functioning economy or $ for people Control a valuable resource—coltan, diamonds, rubber, oil + monopolize trade Rent seeking

Keep most/enough people happy Unless ruling by utter terror Then it’s only the security forces

Still want to limit opposition/discontent Co-opt: cheaper in mid-term

Long run: Gaddafi? Benefits/mobility for key groups

No sure prescription for how Lots of ways have worked Some overtly authoritarian Some beneficent but not democratic Some democratic Democracy is not the only answer For many & for a long time it was not the best answer We know what authoritarians do

Concentrate power Unaccountable Disregard law Limit civil society and opposition

Monist > pluralist Prone to use coercion

What institutions do they need to rule like this? Sometimes very few

Guns and people ready to use them Failed states, power vacuum

Fairly common in 18th c. Lat Am Also appears to apply to Samuel Doe’s coup in Liberia in 1980 First African failed state

More often need administrative structure Formal security forces Financial administration Public health—or else foreign investment flees Public works “ “

Can be minimum needed to keep $ in country Open airport—may have to leave…quickly

As time passes need more

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Especially if ruler needs to win support of critical groups More complex, developed country

More groups with political interests More diversity harder for govt to meet demands Harder to generate support

But that may not be enough to save a leader or regime Egypt Chile, Pinochet; Brazil, military regime, 1964-85 But cf. PRC or VN

Readings Gandhi

What she focuses on: parties and legislatures Why not elections or courts?

Both can figure in power-sharing pacts that leave dictator in place Link to clientelism – co-optatation How she defines dictatorship and why

Her three cases What does she show with them? What determines the use of standard democratic institutions in dictatorships?

Note: Legislatures and parties (as organized factions)=pre-democratic Elections too

Institutions to co-opt What does this mean? Does it occur in democracies?

Latter matters Granting concessions: Quotas of power

Why these matter to opponents Why these matter to dictators

Argues that personal dictators may have greater need to co-opt, Why? Develops model, 82-100, to predict when dictators co-opt

What she says in formal terms is basically a set of common sense hypotheses about how dictators act and how and why they use parties and legislatures

Based on her 3 cases Winters Sultanism, (135-136): Personal ruler; uses control over access to material rewards to

control; also controls state coercive instruments as ultimate ruling instrument Would this fit Trujillo? Institutions Suharto, Indonesia, and Marcos, Philippines, used to govern.

Need not be formal, official institutions Sultans, caudillos and big men all like to concentrate power in own person Don’t build conventional institutions

Think Trujillo, his party and the DR’s Congress Suharto –Breaks down old legal system: Why? result? Building support: How?

Is this like what F&E are getting at about elites? Is this a co-opting mechanism?

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An unarmed oligarchy Why this matters Are there elements of clientelism?

Suharto’s kids: A “loaded dice” faction What did they do to the relation Suharto had with the oligarchs? What did the oligarchs do? What happened to Suharto

What happened to Indonesia and the oligarchs? Marcos – different story (193): 2 reasons First: Philippine oligarchs armed and used to defending selves

Even worked under electoral democracy Turns in office Not unique; Spain, 1878-1923; many LA countries had one-term limits for

presidency, Second, Marcos violated non-re-election norm

Imposed martial law & had main opponent assassinated Used army to check oligarchs

Overthrown, 1986, by popular movement led by widow of man he had killed What happened next? See Table 4.3, p. 205

Different style of sultanistic ruleLevitsky & Way

JG and F&E don’t look at elections; JW does Non-competitive elections have been studied for a while

More in last 12-15 yrs than before L&W’s hypothesis: successful democratic transition w/fully competitive elections more

likely when Linkage to democracies is high Democracies have significant leverage over govt Authoritarians’ organizational strength is relatively low*

What’s behind their research Transitions producing flawed democracies or hybrids, even new authoritarians Look for an explanation that combines domestic + international factors

Central concept: Competitive Authoritarianism Elections held – only way to gain power legitimately Oppositions compete actively But odds favour govt: playing with loaded dice

Case study chapters test hypothesis Give background about specific transitions. Compare their stories to Gandhi’s and Winters’s

Vargas Llosa II• Put Trujillo into context as personal ruler• Recall the attributes:• Power in one person’s hands; may be delegated

• Practically, always; officially, sometimes• Political choices determined by leader

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• There is, though, a clique of personal advisors• Dictator doesn’t trust them and keeps them insecure

• No checks on leader• No autonomous state institutions, though some routinely function without interference;

• e.g. lower courts or routine bureaucratic tasks• May use elections, parties, legislature to co-opt or for show• No independent parties or civic organizations

• Unless licensed• Business may have some autonomy; religion too

• No/few autonomous media• Security forces under leader’s control

• Police and military• Secret police• Paramilitary• Party thugs

• Use force freely• May use terror to maintain control

• Generally patrimonial – state is theirs to loot• Often paternalistic and clientelistic• Sultanistic• Official political party that never lost

• But might share trappings of power • e.g., the Somozas and their pacts

• How does Trujillo, as depicted by Vargas Llosa, fit the model?• The model is abstract and doesn’t cover every dictator perfectly

• How does reading this novel help us understand personal dictators?• Your Job:

• Tell readers that• Plot and fictional characters

• To the extent that they help explain dictators• Vargas Llosa’s depictions of Trujillo et al

• To the extent that they help explain dictators• Not a book review for English• Not an academic book review – as for a journal• It’s a political book review•

Authoritarians and Institutions – 2Readings – Gandhi

Gandhi Remember that she says Dictators “hold power w/o the legitimacy of having been chosen by their citizens” thus

need to “thwart challenges to their rule” Is this latter point different from elected officials? Other forms of legitimacy?

Autocrats need cooperation & compliance Any surprises?

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To “organize policy concessions” need a forum Parties and legislatures

Not elections, as they don’t facilitate deal-making P&L aid dictator in co-opting needed support

May not apply to “totalitarians” like the Kims or Castros We don’t know Presumably they make deals inside the party

Recall further that JG Argues P&L do NOT make dictatorships more democratic; Just more open

They are inclusive authoritarians Others have used term in similar way

And recall that her definition of a dictatorship is any government whose head – however styled – is not elected by the people

Too narrow? Too broad? Why would she choose this?

But Do dictators need to make policy concessions? Do legislatures in dictatorships make policy? Would it make more sense to let co-opted MPs tend to pork and pocket-lining than to

policy? What are the benefits of having a opposition voice in policy-making?

Better policy less discontent? Being able to blame opposition for negative results?

JG, ch. 4 JG tests more hypotheses Dictatorships w/legislatures and parties produce different policies than those w/o Reasons that opponents would not participate if they had no impact on anything

Political survival? Patronage? Remember what we said about pacts

Look at where her data come from and how she constructs her indicators Her findings re-influence of oppositions in authoritarian legislatures Looks at

Rights and freedoms—free expression Your hypothesis?

Military spending Your hypothesis?

Social spending Your hypothesis?

More freedoms, less defence spending, but not more social spending Tries to figure out why and get hypotheses for next study Very typical of social research

Frequently don’t get everything right Try to puzzle out what some alternative “right” answers could be

JG, ch. 5

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Economic outcomes Inclusive, “broadened”, dictatorships will produce better economic results

Institutions provide mechanisms to smooth relations between govt and non-govt groups

Yields more stability conditions more favourable to economic growth Intuitively sensible: Where there is instability investors won’t invest and economy won’t grow Hypothesis is sustained Finding suggests institutions help produce compromise

Overall do better than single-party dictatorships JG thinks that leadership/other non-institutional factors count in single party

regimes econ fate Spain, post-1958– no functioning legislature S. Korea

How would we take non-institutional factors into account? What would we look at? Could we devise a strategy that would apply to many cases?

JG, ch, 6 Regime survival This is what she wants to know about Does adopting institutions to include some opponents of the regime contribute to the

regime’s survival? She predicted it would

Inst let dictator manage key parts of society Relay information about state of pub. opinion

So can even rigged elections Let dictator adjust behaviour But she was wrong – they don’t stay in power longer – and her hypothesis was

disconfirmed She asks why the initially plausible explanation did not hold – What social research does. What she proposes as possible explanations and starting points for future research

Maybe L&P don’t count for much in survival Dictators who offer L&P may face more problems than those who don’t, thus

more prone to fall But there is the counter-example of Ecuador

If junta had built institutions it might well have lasted longer Problem of survival of dictatorships is more complex than JG initially thought

Further Thoughts Parties & what they can do Official or Regime Parties (aka Parties of Power)

Mobilize citizens Can warn opponents off – see high public support

Distribute patronage Two-way info transmission mechanism Jobs for militants: MPs + staff + officials

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Spending – campaigns money distributed Opposition – Govt’s viewpoint

Legitimacy Co-opt Monitor

Opposition’s viewpoint Access to resources Patronage Survival Especially true if there is some freedom to act

Legislatures and Authoritarians Assume small policy role; i.e., like Canada Patronage: MPs, staff, people who keep the building up Legitimacy: especially if there is some debate and oversight – don’t have to change

legislation Membership in IPU and regional PU Can host foreign parliamentary delegations

Way to keep contact with opponents who tolerate the regime: co-opt or just have friendly contacts

Competitive/Authoritarian Elections Three options Without competition – mobilize voters to show support for dictator or single party With licensed opposition: Can compete but cannot win

Proscribed either by law (vanguards) or practice Opposition victory possible/imaginable but improbable

Loaded dice: electoral system manipulation Do all these belong together? Is one concept – competitive or electoral authoritarianism – enough? Would more be too much? So what?

Elections in authoritarian regimesBarbara Geddes, 2005, found that authoritarians that held elections lived longer

Regular elections(years)

Some elections(years)

No electionsYears

Military dictatorship 20 9 6Personal dictatorship 21 10 121-Party dictatorship 33 N<4 N<4

Why elections matter so much Follows Geddes Can’t judge these like democratic elections Though they look much the same

Parties Big expenditures Intense voter mobilization

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Even though the winner is nearly always pre-determined Elections give govt a chance to mobilize its members This shows strength Even if support is bought Being able to mobilize a lot of people send message to opponents Even potential coupsters Why For civilian opponents lots of mobilized says govt hard or impossible to beat For military opponents lots of mobilized says a coup will meet mass opposition Will military risk mass casualties and even civil war? Will soldiers fire on civilians? This explains why parties of authoritarian govt roll up big margins in elections

Even if they are often manufactured Can even apply to turnout, as mass participation seen as mass support

Starting a party is expensive and if there are elections costs rise more But a party lots of jobs and lots chances to link more citizens to the govt May be totally opportunistic But allying with govt to get jobs or contracts identifies you with govt you’re theirs

Overall Parties and elections work for authoritarians; elections do too. It makes sense for a dictator to invest in these even if they won’t be used as they are in

democracies That’s a good thing, because electoral authoritarianism, with accompanying parties and

legislatures, is a hard system to manage. Lots can go wrong but longer life expectancy seems to justify investment in time, money

and energy

CasesBrazil

Nature of the system Military

Rotate leadership Transformational – long-term changes

Part of autocratic wave in ‘60s and ‘70s in South America Grouped with Argentina (1966-73, 1976-83);Uruguay (1973-84) and Chile (1973-89) Bureaucratic authoritarians These last three all suspended parties, legislatures and elections

Though there were referendums in Chile (2) and Uruguay (1) Brazil was different Authorizes two parties in 1966

ARENA – Official, government, Natl Renewal Alliance Created by govt

MDB – official opposition: Brazilian Dem. Movement Pre-existing party

Legislative elections every 4 years, 66-82 (86=free) ARENA won handily, 66-70; very tight 78-82

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When MDB started to show strength military govt changed rules and reduced legislature’s powers to protect ARENA

Starting in ‘79L Distensão: relaxing restraints Indirect presidential elections, 1985

Govt candidate loses 73-27 1986 free legislative elections 1988: democratic constitutions 1989 free presidential elections Why would military govt allow parties and elections? Nigeria tried the same thing under Babangida, 1989

National Republican Convention & Social Democratic Party Abolished under next mil govt—Abacha, 1993

Mexico, 1929-1994 (2000) The Official Party: 1928-38 – PNR; 1938-46 – PRM; now PRI

Lost first state in 1989, Baja Califonia; los control of Federal Chamber of Deputies in 1997; lost presidency, 2000; regainde presidency, 2012.

BeaPRI = hegemon: used fraud

But until 1977, at least, not to win but to roll up margin Show strength to

Opposition Voters who need party

Patronage Value stability Unhappy party elites

They also used patronage Huge state sector + friendly private sector firms Stops after 1982 massive, open fraud in 1988 presidential election

Managed the electoral business cycle Spending + infrastructure Reminded voters of PRI’s power

Huge campaigns Mobilize voters Link them to party

Big vote margins leg. majorities big enough to amend constitution w/o others’ support Naming judges and the electoral commission, too

Breakdown starts in ‘82 Structural adjustment sale of state firms less patronage

Grows after ‘88 and especially after ‘94 Peso crisis voters see PRI not such a good econ mgr Assassination of PRI presidential candidate + Zapatistas PRI not so great at

security and stability Post-94: Deals with opposition parties independent electoral commission

Opposition parties growing stronger Deal to keep them from protesting election results

Why it fell Poor management since 1982

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Opposition disposed to cooperate to some extent to oust PRI Why it’s back

PAN governments not astonishing successful Other alternative party, PRD, had leader who didn’t inspire confidence So Enrique Peña Nieto is president-elect – only got 38% of vote New ball game?

Nicaragua, 1979-present Evolution Somocismo, 1936-79: Hegemonic; official party of dictators = PLN – Nationalist Liberal

Party; licensed opposition parties – could run but never win; if a boycott entered its own opposition party

Sandinistas, 1979-90, 2006-: FSLN – Sandinista National Liberation Front; 5 stages 1 st, 1979-82 : Leninist, licensed opposition 2 nd , 1982-1990 : Dominant; free competition; loses 3 rd , 1990-2000 : Opposition; effective mix of parliamentary, electoral, and mobilizational

opposition; 4 th , 2000-2011 : Junior members in pact with PLC, Constitutional Liberals; dominate

courts, controller’s, electoral commission; electoral engineering to exclude 3rd parties; still competed electorally and often opposed each other in National Assembly (NA)

5 th , 2007-now : Hegemonic; May have stolen 2008 municipal elections; final tally never published; won in

places party was weak; used violence by party toughs to “defend the vote” Probably inflated tally in 2011; enough seats in NA to amend constitution on own

Evolution: Functional One-Party to Dominant to Competitive to Pacted Dominance to Hegemonic

Thus from sure wins to possible losses to probable losses with some power assured back to sure wins

Electoral democracy not a good thing if you can lose!

Two More Backsliders: Ukraine and Zambia Ukraine: 2012 legislative election declared tainted by international observers. Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe said it reversed democracy

In 2010 the same bunch declared the presidential vote “transparent, unbiased and an ‘impressive display’ of democracy” (BBC 2012)

What happened? 1991-2004: Independent again

Kravchuk and Kuchma First rapid economic decline (Kravchuck) Recovery but with cronyism, restrictions on freedom and government

power grabs (Kuchma) 2004: Orange Revolution to 2010

Mass protests, media revolt against controls, electoral fraud rerun election, Kuchma’s party loses, Yukashenko wins

Yukashenko, president, and Tymoshenko, PM, squabble gridlock 2010, Yankulovych, loser in 2004, wins cleanly Then jails Tymoshenko

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Strengthens ties to Russia Fraud Control legislature and electoral process Does he have enough resources to keep buying and winning? Zambia 1964-1991: Era of Kenneth Kaunda

1972-91: one-party state, United National Independence Party 1990: rise of Movement for Multiparty Democracy; strong enough to convince

Kaunda to hold competitive vote in’91 1991-2001: Frederick Chiluba

Used massive parliamentary majority to engineer exclusion of Kaunda and UNIP in 1996 and win massively

2001: moots const amdt to permit a 3rd term – bad idea Stands down; backsliding halted at least temporarily

2001: MMD narrowly wins presidency (controverted) and narrowly loses parliament; retakes via by-elections

New president, Levy Mwanawasa, allows Chiluba to be charged with corruption; died in office; emergency election returns his VP, Rupiah Banda

But in 2011 a new party, Patriotic Front wins elections marred by violence Michael Sata, 74, populist and admirer of Mugabe is president Defected from MMD

In Zambia there seems to have been enough room for opposition forces, parties and civil society to form and manoeuvre.

Govt control less sure and extensive, at least ostensibly And cost of defection from governing party not too high Should we expect backsliding? Or be surprised? Or see it as possible under some

conditions? If the last then what sorts of conditions?

A govt or leader that likes governing? An opposition that is either too weak to win or so strong it worries govt/leader? And with a govt that controls enough resources to pull off fraud? A majority able to amend constitution to extend partisan control?

How much structure? How much agency?

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