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Winning bidderSpectrum wonBase priceEverything Everywhere Ltd2 x 5 MHz of 800 MHz and2 x 35 MHz of 2.6 GHz588,876,000Hutchison 3G UK Ltd2 x 5 MHz of 800 MHz225,000,000Niche Spectrum Ventures Ltd (a subsidiary of BT Group plc)2 x 15 MHz of 2.6 GHz and1 x 20 MHz of 2.6 GHz (unpaired)186,476,000Telefnica UK Ltd2 x 10 MHz of 800 MHz(coverage obligation lot)550,000,000Vodafone Ltd2 x 10 MHz of 800 MHz,2 x 20 MHz of 2.6 GHz and1 x 25 MHz of 2.6 GHz (unpaired)790,761,000Total2,341,113,000:Sponsored Search Auctions

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/ - liranzusman@gmail.com

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Exercise 1.4.12. Use revenue equivalence (Corollary 1.4.3) and the equilibrium of the k-unit Vickrey auction to determine the expected price at which the tickets sell for a venue that holds k people, assuming that each person's value is drawn independently from prior distribution F. (You may assume that the population of possible ticket-purchasers has size n > k.)