[ 1946-47 ] part 1 chapter 3 the security...

SECURITYCOUNCIL

III. The Security Council

A. THE CHARTER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL1

The Charter of the United Nations providesthat a Security Council shall be establishedas a principal organ consisting of eleven mem-bers, and that the Council, acting on behalfof all of the Members of the United Nations,shall have the primary responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and secur-ity.

China, France, the U.S.S.R., the UnitedKingdom and the United States are the per-manent members of the Security Council. TheGeneral Assembly elects the non-permanentmembers of the Council, due regard beingespecially paid, in the first instance, to thecontribution of Members of the United Na-tions to the maintenance of international peaceand security and to other purposes of theUnited Nations, and also to equitable geo-graphical distribution.

The non-permanent members of the Secur-ity Council are elected for a term of two years.In the first election of the non-permanentmembers, however, three were elected for aterm of one year. A retiring member is noteligible for immediate re-election.

Each member of the Security Council hasone representative.

If the General Assembly is the deliberativeorgan of the United Nations, the SecurityCouncil is its executive organ. Broadly speak-ing, while the General Assembly may discussany international disputes or situations, it isthe Security Council which recommends appro-priate procedures or actual terms for thepacific settlement of disputes and takes pre-ventive or enforcement measures with respectto threats to the peace, breaches of the peaceor acts of aggression.

In discharging its duties the Security Coun-cil is required to act in accordance with thePurposes and Principles of the United Nationsas set forth in the United Nations Charter.The Members of the United Nations haveagreed on their part to carry out the decisions

of the Council in accordance with the Charter.In order to promote the establishment and

maintenance of international peace and secur-ity with the least diversion for armaments ofthe world's human and economic resources,the Security Council has been made respon-sible for formulating plans to be submitted tothe Members of the United Nations for theestablishment of a system for the regulationof armaments.

The Security Council is to submit annualand, when necessary, special reports to theGeneral Assembly for its consideration.

The General Assembly may call the atten-tion of the Security Council to situationswhich are likely to endanger internationalpeace and security. Likewise the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of theSecurity Council any matter which in hisopinion may threaten the maintenance of in-ternational peace and security.

The specific functions and powers of theSecurity Council fall into four categories:pacific settlement of disputes, preventive orenforcement action, regional arrangementsand strategic areas in Trust Territories.

The Security Council may recommend pro-cedures or terms of pacific settlement of dis-putes.

The parties to a dispute the continuance ofwhich is likely to endanger the maintenance

1 This section is a summary of the Charterprovisions relating to the Security Council. Themain provisions are to be found in Chapter V,Articles 23-32, which defines the composition,functions and powers, voting and procedure ofthe Council; Chapter VI, Articles 33-38, whichdeals with pacific settlement of disputes; ChapterVII, Articles 39-51, which treats of action withrespect to threats to the peace, breaches of thepeace and acts of aggression; Chapter VIII,Articles 52-54, relating to regional arrangements;Chapter XII, Articles 76, 82-84, relating to strate-gic areas in trust territories. Other provisionsare to be found in Articles 1-2, 4-7, 10-12, 15,18, 20, 65, 93-94, 96, 106-09 of the Charter, andArticles 4, 7-8, 10, 12, 14, 35, 41, 69 of the Statuteof the Court.

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of international peace and security are first ofall, to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry,mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicialsettlement, resort to regional agencies or ar-rangements, or other peaceful means of theirown choice. When it deems it necessary, theSecurity Council is to call upon the partiesto settle their dispute by such means.

The Security Council may investigate anydispute, or any situation which might giverise to a dispute, in order to determinewhether the continuance of the dispute orsituation is likely to endanger the mainte-nance of international peace and security.

Any Member of the United Nations maybring any such dispute or situation to theattention of the Security Council or of theGeneral Assembly. A State which is not aMember of the United Nations may bring tothe attention of the Security Council or of theGeneral Assembly any dispute to which itis a party if it accepts in advance the obliga-tions of pacific settlement under the Charter.The General Assembly may discuss any suchdispute or situation, but may not make recom-mendations with respect to such dispute orsituation if that dispute or situation is on theagenda of the Security Council.

At any stage of a dispute the continuanceof which is likely to endanger the mainte-nance of international peace and security theSecurity Council may recommend appropriateprocedures or methods of adjustment. It isrequired to take into consideration any pro-cedures which have already been adopted bythe parties and, as a general rule, is to referany legal dispute to the International Courtof Justice.

If the Security Council deems that the con-tinuance of a dispute is in fact likely to en-danger the maintenance of international peaceand security, it is to decide on such proceduresor recommend such terms of settlement as itmay consider appropriate.

The Security Council is to determine theexistence of any threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace or act of aggression and is to makerecommendations or decide to take enforce-ment measures in order to maintain or restoreinternational peace and security.

Before making any recommendations or de-ciding to take any enforcement measures, theSecurity Council may call upon the partiesconcerned to comply with such provisionalmeasures as it deems necessary or desirable,

and it is duly to take account of failure tocomply with such provisional measures.

There are two categories of enforcementaction the Security Council may take: "meas-ures not involving the use of armed force,"and "action by air, sea or land forces." TheSecurity Council may call upon the Members ofthe United Nations to apply such measures ascomplete or partial interruption of economicrelations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tele-graphic, radio and other means of communi-cation, and the severance of diplomatic rela-tions. If it considers that these measures areor have proved to be inadequate, the SecurityCouncil may take such action by air, sea orland forces as may be necessary to maintainor restore international peace and security.Such action may include demonstrations, block-ade and other operations by air, sea or landforces of Members of the United Nations.

All Members of the United Nations under-take to make available to the Security Coun-cil, on its call and in accordance with a specialagreement or agreements, armed forces, as-sistance and facilities, including rights ofpassage, necessary for the purpose of main-taining international peace and security. Suchagreement or agreements are to govern thenumbers and types of forces, their degree ofreadiness and general location, and the natureof the facilities and assistance to be provided.The agreement or agreements are to be con-cluded between the Security Council and Mem-bers or groups of Members of the UnitedNations.

When the Security Council decides to useforce it must, before calling upon a Membernot represented on it to provide armed forces,invite that Member, if the Member so desires,to participate in the decisions of the SecurityCouncil concerning the employment of con-tingents of the Member's armed forces.

A Military Staff Committee consisting ofthe Chiefs of Staff of the permanent mem-bers of the Security Council or their repre-sentatives is established to advise and assistthe Security Council on all questions relatingto the Security Council's military requirementsfor the maintenance of international peace andsecurity, the employment and command offorces at its disposal, the regulation of arma-ments and possible disarmament. The Commit-tee is responsible under the Security Councilfor the strategic direction of any armed forcesat the disposal of the Security Council.

The Security Council 325

The Military Staff Committee may inviteany Member not permanently represented onit to be associated with it when the efficientdischarge of the Committee's responsibilitiesrequires the participation of that Member.The Military Staff Committee, with the au-thorization of the Security Council and afterconsultation with appropriate regional agen-cies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Nothing in the Charter, however, is toimpair the inherent right of individual orcollective self-defence, if an armed attackoccurs against a Member of the United Na-tions, until the Security Council has takenthe measures necessary to maintain interna-tional peace and security. Measures taken byany Member in self-defence are to be reportedimmediately to the Security Council andare not in any way to affect the authority andresponsibility of the Security Council to takeat any time such action as it deems necessaryin order to maintain international peace andsecurity.

The establishment of the United Nationsdoes not preclude the existence of such re-gional arrangements or regional agencies asare consistent with the Purposes and Prin-ciples of the United Nations.

The Security Council is to encourage the de-velopment of pacific settlement of local dis-putes through such regional arrangements orby such regional agencies either on the initia-tive of the States concerned or by referencefrom the Security Council. This provision,however, does not impair the functions andpowers of the Security Council in dealingwith any international dispute or situationwhich might endanger the maintenance ofinternational peace and security.

The Security Council is to utilize, whereappropriate, such regional arrangements oragencies for enforcement action under itsauthority. But no enforcement action maybe undertaken under regional arrangements orby regional agencies without the authorizationof the Security Council, except against therenewal of aggressive policy by ex-enemyStates.

The Security Council is at all times to bekept fully informed of activities undertakenor in contemplation under regional arrange-ments or by regional agencies for the main-tenance of international peace and security.

All functions of the United Nations relatingto strategic areas in Trust Territories, includ-

ing the approval of the terms of TrusteeshipAgreements and of their alteration or amend-ment, are exercised by the Security Council.The Security Council is to avail itself of theassistance of the Trusteeship Council to per-form those functions of the United Nationsunder the trusteeship system relating topolitical, economic, social and educationalmatters in the strategic areas. The Adminis-tering Authority of a Trust Territory maymake use of volunteer forces, facilities andassistance from the Trust Territory in carry-ing out the obligations toward the SecurityCouncil undertaken by the authority.

In addition to these four main categoriesof functions and powers—pacific settlementof disputes, preventive or enforcement action,regional arrangements and strategic areas inTrust Territories—the Security Council exer-cises certain functions and powers of anorganizational or constitutional nature.

The Security Council may request the con-vening of special sessions of the GeneralAssembly. It may ask the assistance of theEconomic and Social Council with respect toeconomic and social information.

The Security Council and the General As-sembly, voting independently, elect the judgesof the International Court of Justice. Upon therecommendation of the Security Council, theGeneral Assembly determines the conditionson which a State which is not a Member ofthe United Nations may become a party tothe Statute of the Court, and the SecurityCouncil lays down the conditions under whichthe Court may be open to a State which is aparty to a dispute but not a party to theStatute. If any party to a dispute fails tocomply with a decision of the Court, the otherparty may have recourse to the SecurityCouncil, which may make recommendations ordecide upon measures to be taken to give effectto the decision. The Security Council mayrequest the Court to give an advisory opinionon any legal question.

The Secretary-General is appointed by theGeneral Assembly upon the recommendationof the Security Council. The Secretary-Gen-eral acts in that capacity in all meetings ofthe Security Council. He may assign a per-manent staff to the Security Council, if re-quired.

The admission of new Members to theUnited Nations is effected by a decision of theGeneral Assembly upon the recommendation


of the Security Council. A Member of theUnited Nations against which preventive orenforcement action has been taken by theSecurity Council may be suspended from theexercise of the rights and privileges of mem-bership by the General Assembly upon therecommendation of the Security Council. Theexercise of these rights and privileges maybe restored by the Security Council. A Mem-ber of the United Nations which has per-sistently violated the Principles of the Chartermay be expelled from the United Nations bythe General Assembly upon the recommenda-tion of the Security Council.

Any amendment to or any alteration of theCharter is to come into force when it is adop-ted by a two-thirds vote of the General As-sembly or of the General Conference providedfor in Article 109 of the Charter and ratifiedby two-thirds of the Members of the UnitedNations, including the permanent membersof the Security Council.

The voting and procedure of the SecurityCouncil are defined as follows:

Each member of the Council is to haveone vote. Decisions of the Council on pro-cedural matters are to be made by an affirma-tive vote of seven members. Decisions on allother matters are to be made by an affirmativevote of seven members, including the concur-ring votes of the permanent members, pro-vided that a party to a dispute shall abstainfrom voting in decisions with respect to thepacific settlement of that dispute.1

The Security Council is organized to func-tion continuously. Each member of the Council,is represented at all times at the seat of theUnited Nations. The Council holds periodicmeetings at which each of its members may berepresented by a member of its government orby some other specially designated representa-tive. The Security Council may hold meetings;at places other than the seat of the UnitedNations.

The Security Council may establish suchsubsidiary organs as it deems necessary forthe performance of its functions.

The Security Council adopts its own rulesof procedure, including the method of selectingits President.

Any Member of the United Nations whichis not a member of the Security Council mayparticipate, without vote, in the discussion ofany question brought before the SecurityCouncil whenever the latter considers thatthe interests of that Member are speciallyaffected.

Any Member of the United Nations which isnot a member of the Security Council or anyState which is not a Member of the UnitedNations, if it is a party to a dispute underconsideration by the Security Council, is tobe invited to participate, without vote, in thediscussion relating to the dispute. The SecurityCouncil is to lay down such conditions as itdeems just for the participation of a Statewhich is not a Member of the United Nations.

B. ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

By Article 23 of the Charter, China, France,the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and theUnited States are permanent members of theSecurity Council, and the General Assemblyelects six other Members of the United Nationsas non-permanent members of the Council.

At its fourth and fifth plenary meetings, onJanuary 12, 1946, the General Assembly elec-ted as non-permanent members of the SecurityCouncil the following States: Australia, Brazil,Egypt, Mexico, Poland and the Netherlands.The General Assembly, by a further vote, de-cided that Australia, Brazil and Poland shouldsit as non-permanent members of the Security

Council for a term of two years, and Egypt,Mexico and the Netherlands for a term of oneyear.

The Preparatory Commission of the UnitedNations had drafted the provisional agendafor the first meeting of the Security Counciland had drawn up Provisional Rules of Pro-cedure. The Commission had also recommended

1 See pp. 23ff. for the interpretation of thevoting procedure by the delegations of the foursponsoring Governments (China, the U.S.S.R.,the United Kingdom and the United States) ofthe San Francisco Conference and the discussionat the Conference on the voting procedure.


that the representative of the first memberof the Security Council, in the English alpha-betical order of the names of the members ofthe Council, should act as temporary Chair-man.

The Security Council held its first meetingon January 17, 1946, at Church House, Dean'sYard, Westminster, London. After the 23rdmeeting on February 16, the Council adjournedfor transfer to New York. The meetings ofthe Council were held at Hunter College, NewYork, from March 25 to the early part ofAugust 1946, and at Lake Success, New York,beginning on August 28, 1946.

Article 30 of the Charter authorizes theSecurity Council to adopt its own rules ofprocedure. At its first meeting on January 17,the Council set up a Committee of Experts toexamine and report on the Provisional Rulesof Procedure recommended by the PreparatoryCommission.

Article 4 of the Charter authorizes theSecurity Council to recommend to the GeneralAssembly new Members of the United Nations.At its 42nd meeting the Council set up a Com-mittee on the Admission of New Members.Up to June 30, 1947, the Council had receivedeleven applications for membership, whichwere referred to the Committee on the Admis-sion of New Members for examination. TheCouncil recommended four of the applicants

to the General Assembly for membership inthe United Nations.

At its second meeting on January 25, theCouncil adopted a directive to the MilitaryStaff Committee, which first assembled inLondon on February 3, 1946. The Committeewas transferred to New York in March 1946.

The Atomic Energy Commission, which wasestablished by a resolution of the GeneralAssembly at its seventeenth meeting on Janu-ary 24, 1946, and was to receive directionsfrom the Security Council in matters affectingsecurity and submit its reports and recom-mendations to the Security Council, held itsfirst meeting on June 14, 1946, at HunterCollege, New York.

The Commission for Conventional Arma-ments, composed of representatives of allmembers of the Security Council, was estab-lished by the Security Council on February13, 1947, to make proposals for the generalregulation and reduction of armaments andarmed forces, and proposals for practical andeffective safeguards in this connection. TheCommission may propose studies to be under-taken by the Military Staff Committee andother organs of the United Nations, but itmay not deal with matters that are beingdealt with by the Atomic Energy Commission.The Commission for Conventional Armamentsheld its first meeting at Lake Success onMarch 24, 1947.

C. POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS

In fulfilling its primary responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace andsecurity, the Security Council from January1946 to June 1947 considered the followingmajor political and security questions:1

The Iranian QuestionThe Greek Question (Soviet Complaint)The Indonesian QuestionThe Syrian and Lebanese QuestionThe Spanish QuestionThe Greek Question (Ukrainian Complaint)The Greek Question (Greek Complaint)The General Regulation and Reduction of

Armaments and Information on ArmedForces of the United Nations

Free Territory of TriesteIncidents in the Corfu ChannelTrusteeship of former Japanese Mandated

IslandsSpecial Agreements under Article 43 of the

Charter and Organization of the UnitedNations Armed Forces

1. THE IRANIAN QUESTION

a. Consideration of the Iranian Communica-tion dated January 19, 1946

By a letter dated January 19, 1946, addressedto the Acting Secretary General, the head ofthe Iranian delegation to the United Nationsstated:

(1) that owing to interferences of theU.S.S.R., through the medium of its officialsand armed forces, in the internal affairs ofIran a situation had arisen which might leadto international friction, and

(2) that in accordance with Article 33 of

1 For fuller accounts of these questions, seethe Report of the Security Council to the GeneralAssembly (Document S/172); for completeaccounts, see the Journal of the Security Council,Nos. 1-42; Security Council Official Records, Nos.1-22; and Verbatim Records of the Security Coun-cil (Documents S/P.V. 81-149).


the Charter the Iranian Government had re-peatedly tried to negotiate with the Govern-ment of the U.S.S.R., but had met with nosuccess. He therefore requested the ActingSecretary-General, in accordance with Article35 (1) of the Charter, to bring the matter tothe attention of the Council so that the Councilmight investigate the situation and recom-mend appropriate terms of settlement.

At the second meeting of the Security Coun-cil, on January 25, it was agreed withoutobjection to include the Iranian application inthe Council's agenda.

The representative of Egypt considered thatthe right of a complainant to participate in theCouncil's discussions followed from Article31. He moved that the three States which hadat that time presented complaints should beinvited to participate in the discussions of theSecurity Council concerning these complaints.This resolution was adopted unanimously.

The position of the representative of Iranwas expressed in a letter dated January 26,1946, addressed to the President of the Council,in speeches at the third and fifth meetingsand in a memorandum submitted at the thirdmeeting.

The representative of Iran contended thatthe U.S.S.R. authorities had interfered inthe internal affairs of Iran in breach of inter-national law, the Tripartite Treaty of Alliancebetween the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdomand Iran, dated January 29, 1942, and theThree-Power Declaration of December 1943by the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and theUnited States, and in violation of the prin-ciples set out in the Preamble of the Charter.Article IV (1) of the Tripartite Treaty pro-vided that:

The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranianterritory land, sea and air forces in such num-ber as they consider necessary. . ..

It is understood that the presence of theseforces on Iranian territory does not constitutea military occupation and will disturb as littleas possible the administration and the securityforces of Iran, the economic life of the country,the normal movements of the population andthe application of Iranian laws and regulations.

Nevertheless, the Iranian Government hadbeen prevented from exercising any powerwhatsoever in Azerbaijan; the security forcesof Iran had been prevented from exercisingtheir proper function of suppressing dis-orders; the Soviet authorities had disrupted

the economic life of the country by setting up,at the frontier of the so-called Soviet zone,internal barriers which merchandise and civil-ians were allowed to pass only at the dis-cretion of the Soviet authorities; no armedforces of the Iranian Government were allowedto proceed beyond these limits. The Sovietauthorities had prevented the Iranian authori-ties from applying Iranian laws in theseareas, and had encouraged and supported dis-loyal agitators who were launching the so-called movement for autonomy in Azerbaijan.On November 18, 1945, the Iranian Govern-ment dispatched infantry and gendarmes asreinforcements to Azerbaijan. On November19, 1945, Soviet army authorities had pre-vented this contingent from proceeding fur-ther than Sharif Abad.

By two notes dated November 22 and 23,1945, the Iranian Government requested thatthe Soviet authorities be immediately instruc-ted to give the Iranian contingents freepassage. On November 26, 1945, the SovietGovernment's reply stated that arrival ofadditional Iranian armed forces at that timewould cause disturbances and bloodshed. TheSoviet note denied allegations of interferencemade by the Iranian Government. As interpre-ted by the Iranian representative, it statedthat similar interferences would not takeplace. On December 1, 1945, the IranianGovernment addressed a reply to the Govern-ment of the U.S.S.R. expressing satisfactionat this and other assurances. As interpretedby the Iranian representative, this note didnot agree that there had been no Soviet inter-ferences; it did not conclude negotiations, butmaintained the request that Iranian forcesshould be given free passage. On December15, 1945, the Iranian Government, in notesaddressed to the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdomand the United States Ambassadors, askedthat foreign military forces should not inter-fere with the free movement of Iraniansecurity forces. In December 1945 the IranianPrime Minister offered to visit Moscow toarrive at a settlement.

In conclusion the Iranian representative sub-mitted that his Government had sought asolution by negotiation, in accordance withArticle 33, but the Government of the U.S.S.R.had either failed to reply or had refused toadmit that the Iranian Government's com-plaints were well founded. Accordingly, thematter had properly been brought to the


Council's attention under Article 35. If theCouncil so recommended, the Iranian Govern-ment was willing to enter into direct negotia-tions. However, the matter must remain onthe agenda, progress reports should be madeand results reported within a reasonable time.

The position of the U.S.S.R. was set forthin a letter dated January 24, 1946, addressedto the President of the Council, and in speechesat the second, third and fifth meetings onJanuary 25, 28 and 30, 1946.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. deniedinterference in the internal affairs of Iranand stated that events in the province ofAzerbaijan resulted from popular aspirationsfor national autonomy within the limits ofthe Iranian State. These events had nothingto do with the presence of the Soviet forces.He contended that successful negotiations hadtaken place between the U.S.S.R. and IranianGovernments. According to the Iranian noteof December 1, 1945, the Iranian Governmentwas satisfied with the results of the negotia-tions of November 1945. Negotiations hadnot been continued after December 1, 1945,because the Iranian Government did notdesire them. The Iranian notes of December13 and 15, 1945, did not deal with the earlierclaims, but raised entirely new questions.

In conclusion the representative of theU.S.S.R. argued that there was no foundationfor consideration by the Council of the sub-stance of the Iranian communication. TheCharter required Members to attempt tosettle disputes by negotiations, etc., and itwas stated that the Council might call uponparties to settle disputes by the means indi-cated in Article 33. It was apparent that theCouncil could not call on the U.S.S.R. to takeany steps provided for in Article 33. Article34 related to a dispute or situation of quitea different order. Article 36 was inapplicable,since the U.S.S.R. considered bilateral nego-tiations the only acceptable means of settlingsuch questions between neighboring countries.Article 37 applied only where the parties hadbeen unable to come to an agreement. TheU.S.S.R. was willing to resume direct negotia-tions with the Iranian Government.

After hearing views expressed by the repre-sentatives of Australia, China, France, theNetherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom andthe United States, the Council on January 30adopted unanimously a resolution introduced

by the representative of the United Kingdomand amended by the representative of theU.S.S.R. The resolution, in its final form, read:

THE COUNCIL,Having heard the statements by the repre-

sentatives of the Soviet Union and Iran inthe course of its meetings of 28 and 30 Janu-ary, and

Having taken cognizance of the documentspresented by the Soviet and Iranian delega-tions and those referred to in the course ofthe oral debates;

Considering that both parties have affirmedtheir readiness to seek a solution of the matterat issue by negotiations; and such negotiationswill be resumed in the near future,

REQUESTS the parties to inform the Councilof any results achieved in such negotiations.The Council in the meanwhile retains the rightat any time to request information on theprogress of the negotiations.

b. Iranian Communication dated March 18,1946

By a letter dated March 18, 1946, addressedto the President of the Council, the IranianAmbassador to the United States stated that,pursuant to Article 35 (1), Iran brought tothe attention of the Council a dispute betweenIran and the U.S.S.R., the continuance ofwhich was likely to endanger the maintenanceof international peace and security. This dis-pute had arisen by reason of new developmentssince the adoption by the Council of the reso-lution of January 30, 1946. The U.S.S.R. wasmaintaining troops in Iranian territory afterMarch 2, 1946, contrary to the provisions ofArticle V of the Tripartite Treaty of Allianceof January 29, 1942. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R.was continuing to interfere in the internalaffairs of Iran through the medium of itsagents, officials and armed forces. These actswere in violation of the Tripartite Treaty,the Three-Power Declaration and the Charter.

c. Proposal by the Representative of theU.S.S.R. that the Iranian Communicationshould not be placed on the Council'sAgenda

At the 25th meeting of the Security Councilon March 26, 1943, the representative of theU.S.S.R. stated that, pursuant to the Council'sresolution of January 30, negotiations betweenthe U.S.S.R. and Iranian Governments hadresulted in an understanding regarding theevacuation of Soviet troops still in Iran. It wasalready known that the evacuation of thesetroops had begun on March 2, 1946. As regardsthe evacuation of troops still remaining in


certain zones of Iran, in accordance with anunderstanding reached between the U.S.S.R.and Iranian Governments, the evacuation hadbegun on March 24, 1946, and would probablyend within five or six weeks from that date,unless unforeseen circumstances arose.

The effect of Articles 34 and 35 was thatany Member of the United Nations mightbring to the Council's attention any disputeor situation which was considered to threatenthe maintenance of international peace andsecurity. It could not be suggested that thesituation in Iran could be regarded as a threatof that nature. Therefore, the conditions neces-sary for the inclusion of the Iranian questionin the agenda had not been satisfied.

Several representatives expressed the viewthat the Iranian representative should beheard before the Council decided the matter.

At the 26th meeting of the Security Councilon March 26, 1946, the above mentioned pro-posal by the representative of the U.S.S.R.was rejected by 9 votes to 2 and the Iranianquestion placed on the Council's agenda.

d. Proposal by the Representative of theU.S.S.R. to postpone until April 10, 1946,consideration of the Iranian Communica-tion dated March 18, 1946

By a letter dated March 19, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General, the representativeof the U.S.S.R. had requested that the Securi-ty Council postpone consideration of the Ira-nian communication of March 18, 1946, toApril 10, 1946. He stated that the Iraniancommunication was not expected by the SovietGovernment, since its negotiations with theIranian Government were being conducted atthat time. For this reason the Soviet Govern-ment was not then prepared to take part inthe discussion of the Iranian communication;and some time was required to enable theSoviet Government to make the necessarypreparations concerning this question.

By a letter dated March 20, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General, the Iranian Ambas-sador to the United States stated that it washis Government's earnest hope that considera-tion of its communication would not be delayed.He pointed out that negotiations under theresolution of January 30, 1946, had failed.Meanwhile, March 2, 1946, the date fixed bythe Tripartite Treaty, had passed, and theSoviet troops had not been withdrawn. Thesituation was very grave, and further delay

would inevitably result in increased harm tothe interests of Iran.

At the 27th meeting, the proposal of therepresentative of the U.S.S.R. to postpone con-sideration of the Iranian communication untilApril 10, 1946, received two votes and wasdeclared lost. The representative of theU.S.S.R. stated that he was unable to partici-pate further in the Council's discussion of theIranian question, since his proposal had notbeen accepted. He then left the Council Cham-ber. The representative of the U.S.S.R. didnot attend the next three meetings (the 28th,29th and 30th) at which the Council discussedthe Iranian question. He resumed participationin the Council's discussions of the Iranian ques-tion at the 32nd meeting on April 15, 1946.

The following proposal of the representativeof Egypt was adopted by 8 votes at the 27thmeeting of the Security Council:

That the Council receive the complaint of theIranian Government embodied in its letterdated March 18th addressed to the Secretary-General and ask the Iranian representative toappear before the Council to hear his point ofview concerning the question of postponementrequested by the Soviet representative, andsubsequently that the Council take such actionas it deems fit.

Pursuant to the above resolution, the IranianAmbassador was invited to participate inthe discussion. He reported that, pursuant tothe resolution of January 30,1946, the IranianGovernment had sent a delegation to Moscow,headed by the Prime Minister. The delegationhad requested the Soviet Government to re-frain from interference in the internal affairsof Iran and to ensure the prompt evacuationof Soviet troops. The Soviet officials did notagree to these requests and proposed: (1) thestationing of Soviet troops in Iran for an in-definite period; (2) the recognition of theinternal autonomy of Azerbaijan; and (3) thesetting up of a Soviet-Iranian joint stockoil company.

The Iranian Prime Minister rejected thesedemands and the U.S.S.R. officially withdrewits proposals.

In conclusion the Iranian Ambassador in-formed the Council that, to his knowledge,no positive results had been achieved in nego-tiations under the resolution of January 30,1946. He stated that he had no instructionsto agree to postponement.


e. Request by the Secretary-General forInformation Concerning Soviet-IranianNegotiations and Replies

At the 28th meeting of the Security Coun-cil on March 29, 1946 the representativespresent unanimously endorsed the suggestionof the representative of the United States thatthe President of the Council request theSecretary-General to ascertain at once fromthe U.S.S.R. and Iranian Governments,through their representatives, and report tothe Council at its meeting on Wednesday, April3, the existing status of the negotiations be-tween the two Governments, and particularlywhether or not the reported withdrawal ofSoviet troops was conditioned upon the con-clusion of agreements between the two Govern-ments on other subjects.

In accordance with the President's instruc-tions, the Secretary-General requested fromthe Iranian Ambassador and the representa-tive of the U.S.S.R. the above information.

By a letter dated April 3, 1946, addressed tothe Secretary-General, the representative ofthe U.S.S.R. stated on behalf of his Govern-ment that negotiations had already led toan understanding concerning the withdrawalof Soviet troops from Iran; the withdrawalwas renewed on March 24, 1946, and wouldbe completed within a period of one and ahalf months. Thus the question concerning theevacuation of Soviet troops raised beforethe Council by the Iranian Government onMarch 18 was solved by the understandingreached between the U.S.S.R. and IranianGovernments. As to the other questions, theywere not connected with the question of thewithdrawal of Soviet troops. As was known,the question concerning an oil concession ora joint stock company was raised in 1944,independently of the question of the evacuationof Soviet troops.

By a letter dated April 2, 1946, addressed tothe Secretary-General, the Iranian Ambassa-dor stated that, with regard to Soviet inter-ference in the internal affairs of Iran, negotia-tions pursuant to the resolution of January30, 1946, had achieved no positive results. In-terference had continued, and the IranianGovernment was still prevented from exercis-ing any authority in the province of Azerbai-jan. Regarding the withdrawal of Soviettroops, there had been and could be no negotia-tions.

As to the question whether withdrawal wasconditional upon the conclusion of other agree-ments, the Iranian Ambassador gave a detailedaccount of conversations in Teheran since thearrival of the new Soviet Ambassador. Theseconversations referred, inter alia, to the for-mation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil corpora-tion, and to the formation of an autonomousgovernment in Azerbaijan. After these sub-jects had been discussed, the Soviet Ambassa-dor confirmed the promise to evacuate Iran,but on the condition that no unforeseen cir-cumstances should occur.

In conclusion the Iranian Ambassador statedthat, according to the latest information fromhis Government, despatched on April 1, 1946,no understanding had been reached. The Ira-nian Prime Minister stated that he could notaccept any conditions attached to the completewithdrawal of Soviet forces.

The Soviet and Iranian replies were readat the 29th meeting on April 3, 1946, and inanswer to a question the Iranian Ambassadorstated that if the representative of theU.S.S.R. withdrew the condition concerningunforeseen circumstances, Iran would not atthat time press the matter, provided that thecommunication remained on the Council'sagenda.

f. Resolution of April 4, 1946After discussion, the following resolution

proposed by the representative of the UnitedStates was adopted by 9 votes at the 30thmeeting held on April 4, (the representativeof the U.S.S.R. did not attend this meeting):

Taking note of the statements by the Ira-nian representative that the Iranian appeal tothe Council arises from the presence of Soviettroops in Iran and their continued presencethere beyond the date stipulated for theirwithdrawal in the Tripartite Treaty of 29January 1942;

taking note of the replies dated 3 April ofthe Soviet Government and the Iranian Gov-ernment pursuant to the request of the Secre-tary-General for information as to the stateof the negotiations between the two Govern-ments and as to whether the withdrawal ofSoviet troops from Iran is conditional uponagreement on other subjects;

and in particular taking note of and relyingupon the assurances of the Soviet Govern-ment that the withdrawal of Soviet troopsfrom Iran has already commenced;

that it is the intention of the Soviet Govern-ment to proceed with the withdrawal of itstroops as rapidly as possible;


that the Soviet Government expects thewithdrawal of all Soviet troops from the wholeof Iran to be completed within five or sixweeks;

and that the proposals under negotiationbetween the Iranian Government and theSoviet Government "are not connected withthe withdrawal of Soviet troops";

being solicitous to avoid any possibility ofthe presence of Soviet troops in Iran beingused to influence the course of the negotiationsbetween the Governments of Iran and theSoviet Union; and recognizing that the with-drawal of all Soviet troops from the wholeof Iran cannot be completed in a substantiallyshorter period of time than that within whichthe Soviet Government has declared it to beits intention to complete such withdrawal;

RESOLVED that the Council defer furtherproceedings on the Iranian appeal until 6 May,at which time the Soviet Government and theIranian Government are requested to reportto the Council whether the withdrawal of allSoviet troops from the whole of Iran has beencompleted and at which time the Council shallconsider what, if any, further proceedings onthe Iranian appeal are required;

PROVIDED, however, that if in the meantimeeither the Soviet Government or the IranianGovernment or any member of the SecurityCouncil reports to the Secretary-General anydevelopments which may retard or threatento retard the prompt withdrawal of Soviettroops from Iran, in accordance with the assur-ances of the Soviet Union to the Council, theSecretary-General shall immediately call tothe attention of the Council such reports,which shall be considered as the first item onthe agenda.

The representative of Australia abstainedfrom voting. He pointed out that the resolutiondid not deal with the first Iranian communica-tion concerning interference by Soviet troopsand agents in the internal affairs of Iran.

g. Proposal by the Representative of theU.S.S.R. that the Iranian Question beremoved from the Council's Agenda

By a letter dated April 6, 1946, addressed tothe President of the Council, the representa-tive of the U.S.S.R. proposed that the Iranianquestion be removed from the agenda of theCouncil. He pointed out that, as was knownfrom the joint U.S.S.R.-Iranian communiquepublished on April 4, 1946, an understandingon all points had been reached between theSoviet and the Iranian Governments. TheCouncil had no reason further to consider theIranian question on May 6 and the resolutionadopted on April 4 was incorrect and illegal,being in conflict with the Charter.

By a letter dated April 9, 1946, addressed tothe Secretary-General, the Iranian Ambassa-dor stated that it was his Government's desirethat the question remain on the Council'sagenda, as provided by the resolution adoptedon April 4. By a letter dated April 15, 1946,addressed to the President of the Council,the Iranian Ambassador stated that on April14 his Government had instructed him tomake the following statement before theCouncil:

As a result of the signature of the agree-ment between the Iranian Government andthe Government of the Soviet Union, it hasbeen agreed that the Red Army evacuate allPersian Territory by the 6th May 1946. TheIranian Government has no doubt that thisagreement will be carried out, but at the sametime has not the right to fix the course theSecurity Council should take.

On April 15, 1946, he had received a furthertelegram from his Government, reading asfollows:

In view of the fact that the Soviet Ambas-sador has again today 14 April, categoricallyreiterated that the unconditional evacuationof Iranian territory by the Red Army willbe completed by 6th May 1946 it is necessarythat you immediately inform the SecurityCouncil that the Iranian Government hascomplete confidence in the word and pledgeof the Soviet Government and for this reasonwithdraws its complaint from the SecurityCouncil.

At the 33rd meeting, held on April 18, 1946,the Secretary-General submitted a letter tothe President of the Council, setting out hisviews with respect to the legal aspects ofthe retention of the Iranian question on theagenda. He recalled that the powers conferredon the Council under Chapter VI of the Char-ter were defined in Articles 33, 34, 36, 37 and38. He noted that the Council could be seizedof a dispute or situation in one of three ways:

(1) under Article 35, by a State;(2) under Article 34, by the Council itself;(3) under Article 99, by the Secretary-

General.In the Iranian case, Article 99 was not

applicable. Article 34 was not applicable,since the Council had not ordered an investi-gation, which was the only action possibleunder that Article.

The Council had originally been seized ofthe dispute under Article 35 (1). Since Iranhad withdrawn its complaint, the Council could


not take action under Articles 33, 86, 37 or 38,as the necessary conditions for applying theseArticles (namely, a dispute between two ormore parties) did not exist.

It was therefore arguable that, followingwithdrawal by the Iranian representative, thequestion was automatically removed from theagenda, unless:

(1) the Council voted an investigationunder Article 34; or

(2) a member brought it up as a situa-tion or dispute under Article 35; or

(3) the Council proceeded under Article36 (1), which appeared to require a pre-liminary finding that a dispute existed underArticle 33, or that there was "a situationof like nature."An argument which could be made against

the view of automatic removal from the agendawas that once a matter was brought to theattention of the Council, it was no longer amatter solely between the original parties,but one in which the Council collectively hadan interest, as representing the whole of theUnited Nations. However, it appeared that theonly way in which, under the Charter, theCouncil could exercise that interest, was underArticle 34, or under Article 36 (1). Sincethe Council had not chosen to invoke Article34 in the only way in which it could be invoked,that is, through voting an investigation, andhad not chosen to invoke Article 36 (1), bydeciding that a dispute existed under Article33 or that there was a situation of like nature,it might well be that there was no way inwhich it could remain seized of the matter.

The Council referred the Secretary-General'sletter to the Committee of Experts, and thereport of the Chairman of the Committee ofExperts was considered at the 36th meetingon April 23, 1946. The report stated that theCommittee of Experts had decided, by reasonof the technical nature of its competence, tostudy from an abstract point of view the prob-lem whether the Council could remain seizedof a matter if the interested parties had re-quested its withdrawal.

There was agreement in principle that,when a matter had been submitted to theCouncil by a party, it could not be withdrawnfrom the list of matters of which the Councilwas seized without a decision by the Council.

In the discussions of the Committee of Ex-perts, the representatives of Australia, Brazil,China, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, the

United Kingdom and the United States hadconsidered that the Secretary-General's letterhad put the problem on too narrow a basis,since it referred only to a dispute and sinceit treated such a dispute merely as a law suitbetween two parties. Such a definition impliedan inexact understanding, in the first place,of the functions of the Council (which wasnot a court of justice), and in the second placeof the nature of its competence, which includedthe consideration of situations, and which inany case far exceeded the narrow frameworkwithin which the letter would tend to confineit. Some of these representatives observedthat, for the Council to drop the matter, itwas not enough for the parties to the disputeto have come to an agreement. The problemshould not be regarded from a purely legalisticpoint of view. In view of Articles 1 and 24,the Council might hold that even after anagreement had been reached between theparties, circumstances might continue to exist(for example, the conditions under which theagreement had been negotiated) which mightstill leave room for fears regarding the main-tenance of peace and which justified the ques-tion being retained among the matters en-trusted to its care. The Council might findit necessary to remain seized of the matteruntil the whole or part of the agreement hadbeen executed, or even longer. The decision bywhich the Council was seized of a question wasabsolutely independent of and distinct fromthe measures which it might decide to takeunder Article 34. Several representativesquestioned the argument in the letter whichseemed to imply that unless the Council tooka decision under Article 34 or 36, it couldnot remain seized of a dispute the withdrawalof which had been requested. Several repre-sentatives considered that Article 35 (1)proved that the action of the Council in itsrole as guardian of the peace was quite inde-pendent of the strictly legal circumstances inwhich a dispute occurred, since, according tothat text, it was not necessarily a party to adispute which had to bring it to the Council.

On the other hand, the representatives ofFrance, Poland and the U.S.S.R. had con-sidered that the rules governing the procedurefor the withdrawal of a question submittedto the Council varied according to whethera dispute or a situation were involved. Thenotion of a dispute was of a subjective nature,and it was essentially a conflict between two


or more States, which existed only by virtueof the opposition between the interested par-ties. If all of the parties to a dispute hadreached an agreement, the threat to the main-tenance of peace from the prolongation ofsuch a dispute thereby disappeared, and ifthey asked the Council to drop the dispute, theCouncil was bound to do so. On the other hand,a situation had an objective character, existingindependently of the Member which hadbrought it to the Council's attention. TheCouncil could remain seized of a situationeven if that Member declared its desire towithdraw its communication. If the disputeoriginally submitted to the Council hadreached the point where other parties wereconcerned, or if a new situation had arisenout of the original dispute, the question be-came a different one from that originally sub-mitted to the Council. It could be brought tothe attention of the Council by a Member ofthe United Nations under Article 35 (1), orelse the Council itself might take it up underArticle 34.

Accordingly, the Committee of Experts wasunable to formulate a common opinion on thequestion put to it by the Council.

At the 36th meeting of the Council, therepresentative of France said that it wouldbe unwise to establish the precedent that aMember of the United Nations which hadsubmitted a communication to the Council

could not withdraw its communication. Hetherefore proposed the following resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,Having again considered at its meetings of

15 and 16 April the question which it hadplaced on its agenda on 26 March at the re-quest of the Government of Iran and whichformed the subject of its resolution of 4 April;

TAKES NOTE of the letter dated 14 Apriladdressed to it by the representative of theGovernment of Iran in which the latter in-forms the Security Council of the withdrawalof his complaint;

NOTES that an agreement has been reachedbetween the two Governments concerned;

REQUESTS the Secretary-General to collectthe necessary information in order to completethe Security Council's report to the Assembly,in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter,on the manner in which it dealt with the caseplaced on its agenda on 26 March last at therequest, now withdrawn, of the Governmentof Iran.

The representatives of Poland and theU.S.S.R. supported the French proposal, whilethe representatives of Australia, Brazil, China,Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, the UnitedKingdom and the United States maintainedthat the Council was master of its own agendaand had power to keep the Iranian questionon the agenda despite the Iranian withdrawalof its complaint. The resolution submitted bythe representative of France received threevotes and was declared lost.

In connection with this vote, the representa-tive of the U.S.S.R. stated that, in view ofthe existence of the agreement between theSoviet and Iranian Governments on all ques-tions in dispute, and in view of the IranianGovernment's withdrawal of its appeal to theCouncil, the Soviet delegation considered thatthe Council's decision to retain the Iranianquestion on its agenda was contrary to theCharter. For these reasons, the Soviet dele-gation did not consider it possible to takeany further part in the discussion of theIranian question in the Council.

h. Report by the Representative of Iran un-der Resolution of April 4, 1946

By a letter dated May 6, 1946, addressed tothe President of the Council, the Iranian Am-bassador stated that, pursuant to the Council'sresolution of April 4, 1946, investigationsmade by responsible officials of the IranianGovernment showed that Soviet troops hadbeen completely evacuated from the provincesof Khorassan, Gorgan, Mazanderan and Gilan.Because of the interference previously com-plained of, the Iranian Government had beenunable to exercise effective authority withinAzerbaijan since November 7, 1945, and fromthat time had had no opportunity to ascertainconditions in Azerbaijan through its ownofficials. The Iranian Government had beenunable to verify by direct observation reportsthat the evacuation from Azerbaijan had beenproceeding and would be completed by May 7,1946.

The Soviet Government made no report pur-suant to the resolution of April 4, 1946.

i. Resolution of May 8, 1946At the 40th meeting held on May 8, 1946,

the Council considered the above report ofthe Iranian Ambassador. The representativeof the U.S.S.R. was absent from this meeting.In view of the incomplete nature of the report,


the representative of the United States pro-posed the following resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLVES,in view of the statement made by the Ira-

nian Government in its preliminary report of6 May, submitted in compliance with theresolution of 4 April 1946, that it was notable as of 6 May to state whether the with-drawal of all Soviet troops from the whole ofIran had been completed,

to defer further proceedings on the Iranianmatter in order that the Government of Iranmay have time in which to ascertain throughits official representatives whether all Soviettroops have been withdrawn from the wholeof Iran;

that the Iranian Government be requested tosubmit a complete report on the subject tothe Security Council immediately upon thereceipt of the information which will enableit so to do; and that in case it is unable toobtain such information by 20 May, it reporton that day such information as is availableto it at that time;

and that immediately following the receiptfrom the Iranian Government of the reportrequested, the Council shall consider whatfurther proceedings are required.

The resolution was adopted by ten votes.

j. Report by the Representative of Iran underResolutions of April 4, 1946, and May8, 1946

By letters dated May 20 and May 21, 1946,addressed to the President of the Council, theIranian Ambassador submitted reports incompliance with the resolutions of April 4 andMay 8, 1946. In his letter dated May 20, 1946,the Iranian Ambassador stated that the infor-mation then available to him was to the effectthat, as a consequence of the interferencepreviously complained of, the Iranian Govern-ment was still prevented from exercising anyeffective authority in the province of Azerbai-jan, and that Soviet interferences in the in-ternal affairs of Iran had not ceased. There-fore, it had not been possible to make suchinvestigation as was required to establish thatall Soviet troops had been withdrawn fromthe whole of Iran.

In his letter dated May 21, 1946, the IranianAmbassador communicated the text of a tele-gram received by him that afternoon fromthe Iranian Prime Minister. The telegramstated that the Iranian Prime Minister haddispatched a commission of investigation,which in the course of one week had investi-gated carefully regions of Azerbaijan such

as the following important centres: Tabriz andits suburbs, Marand, Jolfa, Khoy, Salmas,Maju, Rezacyeh and Mianduab. Telegraphicreports were to the effect that no trace what-ever of Soviet troops, equipment or meansof transport was found, and that, according totrustworthy local people who were questionedin all these places, Soviet troops evacuatedAzerbaijan on May 6, 1946.

k. Resolution of May 22, 1946At the 43rd meeting held on May 22, 1946,

the Iranian Ambassador participated in thediscussion.

The Council adopted by 9 votes to 1 the fol-lowing resolution proposed by the representa-tive of the Netherlands:

The discussion of the Iranian question isadjourned until a date in the near future,the Council to be called together at the requestof any of its members.

The Council remained seized of the Iranianquestion.

I. Report by Iranian AmbassadorBy a letter dated December 5, 1946, ad-

dressed to the Secretary-General, the IranianAmbassador in Washington, D. C., forwardeda report concerning the state of affairs in theProvince of Azerbaijan: The letter stated:

My Government has instructed me to submitthis report in connection with the complaintspreviously made to the Security Councilagainst interferences in the internal affairsof Iran. It will be recalled that a result ofthese interferences is that the Central Govern-ment has been denied the exercise of effectivecontrol in the Province of Azerbaijan. Unfor-tunately, in spite of every effort to remove byconciliatory means the consequences of theseinterferences, the Central Government hasnot yet been able to re-establish its authorityin that Province.

Elections to provide for the selection of theMadjless, our National Legislature, have beencalled to take place throughout Iran beginningDecember 7th. In order to assure that theelection procedures are duly followed, it hasbeen arranged that military forces shall bestationed in all the provinces of Iran. Thosein control of affairs in Azerbaijan have ob-jected to the entry of such Government forcesinto that Province. The Soviet Ambassadorat Teheran, acting under instructions from hisGovernment, has given friendly admonitionthat the movement of Government forces intothis part of Iran may result in disturbances


within that Province and on the Persian bor-ders adjacent to Russia, and advised that theGovernment's plans be abandoned.

It is, of course, the duty of my Governmentto exercise its sovereign responsibilities, andto assure that the elections are carried outimpartially, in Azerbaijan as well as in therest of Iran; and my Government for thatpurpose must station its troops in Azerbaijanno less than in other parts of the Country. Itis hoped that this will not be used as a pretextfor hostile demonstrations, but my Govern-ment will not fail to take the action necessaryto maintain law and order throughout Iraneven though disturbances may be threatened.

The decision of the Security Council toremain seized of the questions raised by thecomplaints of Iran has demonstrated its con-cern regarding the consequences of the inter-ferences that have occurred in the past. MyGovernment has, therefore, felt it to be itsduty to furnish the information contained inthis report in order that the Council may bein a position better to interpret the courseof events in the Northwestern portion of myCountry.

2. THE GREEK QUESTION (SOVIET COMPLAINT)a. Communication of the U.S.S.R. dated

January 21, 1946By a letter dated January 21, 1946, the act-

ing chief of the Soviet delegation, under Article35 of the Charter, requested the SecurityCouncil to discuss the situation in Greece onthe grounds that the presence of British troopsin Greece after the termination of the warmeant interference in the internal affairs ofGreece and caused extraordinary tensionfraught with grave consequences both for theGreek people and for the maintenance ofpeace and security.

The Greek question was considered at thesixth meeting of the Security Council onFebruary 1, 1946. A representative of Greecewas asked to participate, without vote, in thediscussions.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. was firstasked to make an oral statement. He recalledthat in a memorandum submitted by theSoviet delegation on January 21, 1946, duringthe Berlin Conference there were four mainquestions of substance: (1) a very tense situ-ation prevailed in Greece, which might havevery unhappy consequences not only for theGreek population, but also for peace andsecurity; (2) the presence in Greece of Brit-ish troops was not necessitated by circum-stances, because there was no need to protectthese communications as in the case of troops

in defeated countries; (3) the presence ofBritish troops in Greece had become a meansof pressure on the political situation in thecountry; and (4) these circumstances hadresulted very often in support of reactionaryelements in the country against democraticones.

The Soviet representative reminded theCouncil that in September 1945, during thefirst session of the London meeting of Min-isters of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Govern-ment had submitted a second memorandumon the situation in Greece. Finally, duringthe Moscow Conference of Ministers for For-eign Affairs in December 1945, the situationin Greece was brought up again and linkedwith the presence of British troops in Greece.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. describedthe activities of the Monarchist-Fascist or-ganization known as "X" and stated that theMonarchists, helped by foreign elements, hadcreated a reign of terror directed against thedemocratic population of the country.

He argued that there were no reasons forthe presence of British troops in Greece andinsisted upon the quick and unconditionalwithdrawal of British troops from thatcountry.

The representative of the United Kingdomstated that the Greek question was discussedat Yalta and Marshal Stalin had expressed hiscomplete confidence in the British policy inGreece. At Potsdam the U.S.S.R. circulateda memorandum and the attacks on Britishpolicy in Greece were really started. On July31, 1945, Mr. Molotov, after reading a mem-orandum circulated by Mr. Eden, agreed todrop the matter. But it was significant thatwhenever the problem of Greece arose in anynegotiations with the U.S.S.R. it had alwayscome about when the problem of Roumania,Bulgaria or Poland had been under discussion.

Early in 1944 there was a meeting of Greekpolitical leaders in the Levant and an all-partyGovernment was formed. It was agreed thatas there were no police, no army and no civilservice list, British administrators and troops,with Marshal Stalin's agreement, should goto Greece to help revive the country, turn theGermans out and seek to get order and civilgovernment in operation.

When the British went into Greece, a civilwar broke out. From information received,the war was started primarily by the Commu-nists seeking to obtain a minority government


to control the country. The British Govern-ment could have put in a minority govern-ment, but it had asked Greece to find its owngovernment; Great Britain hoped that, out ofits difficulties and experience, Greece wouldbe able to reach its proper position. The BritishGovernment was anxious that the electionsshould be fair and not one-sided.

If the Greek Government decided that theBritish troops were not wanted, they wouldnot impose themselves upon the country. Assoon as they had carried out the obligationsthat they had undertaken with the GreekGovernment, those troops would be withdrawn.

The representative of the United Kingdomdemanded that the Council give an answer asto whether the British Government, acting inresponse to the request of the Greek Govern-ment in lending some of its forces to help toget order and economic reconstruction in thatcountry, endangered peace.

The representative of Greece stated that thepeople of Greece had not at any time regardedthe presence of British troops in Greece asa condition imposed upon them from outsideor as an act imputable to British initiative.They had regarded it as a consequence of arequest made by the Greek Government andan agreement concluded in Italy and signedby representatives of all political parties, towhich agreement the extreme Left was alsoa signatory.

The representative of Greece also statedthat neither the civil nor the military author-ities of Great Britain had at any time soughtto intervene in any manner whatsoever inthe internal affairs of Greece, or to impose anyrestrictions upon the free democratic Govern-ment of the country. He added that theGreek people regarded the continued presenceof British military forces in Greece as indis-pensable, inasmuch as it constituted an ex-tremely important factor in the consolidationof public order and security and the full re-storation of normal political conditions, en-suring equal rights for all.

6. Suggestions and ProposalsThe representative of the United States

stated that the Government of the UnitedStates was satisfied that there was no reason-able ground for belief that the presence ofBritish troops in Greece could be regardedas constituting a situation which was likelyto endanger international peace and security.

The Government of the United States wastherefore convinced that the Council wouldnot be justified under Chapter VI in makinga finding to that effect. Without such a findingthe Council had no authority to recommendappropriate procedures or methods of ad-justment. He believed that it would be unwisefor the Council to take a formal action inthis case and, therefore, suggested that theGovernments of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain,and Greece be thanked for the statementsthat had been made in explanation of theposition and that no further action be taken.

The representative of France could notagree that the presence of British troops inGreece was likely to constitute a threat topeace and security. The representatives ofChina and the Netherlands associated them-selves with the opinion expressed by the rep-resentative of the United States that no rec-ommendation or formal action be taken bythe Council on this question.

The representative of Poland proposed thefollowing resolution:

The Security Council takes note of thestatements set forth in the declarations of theSoviet Union, Great Britain and Greece and ofthe assurance given by the delegate for theUnited Kingdom that British troops in Greecewill be withdrawn as soon as possible and con-siders the question is closed.

The representative of Egypt proposed thefollowing resolution:

After having heard the declarations of thedelegates for the Soviet Union, the UnitedKingdom and Greece, the Council notes withsatisfaction the spirit of frankness and sin-cerity which has animated these declarationsand will contribute to the maintenance of in-ternational peace and good understanding be-tween nations. And while appreciating thatthe presence of British troops in Greece doesnot constitute a threat to international peaceand security, takes note of the declaration ofthe delegate for the United Kingdom thatBritish troops will be withdrawn from Greeceas soon as the reasons for their presence havedisappeared.

The President put the Polish proposal tovote and it was lost. The representative ofthe U.S.S.R. declared himself against theEgyptian resolution because he was not ofthe opinion that the presence of British troopsdid not constitute a threat to internationalpeace and security.


c. Statement of the PresidentAt the tenth meeting, on February 6, 1946,

the President then summed up the views ofthe members in the following statement:

I feel we should take note of the declarationsmade before the Security Council by the rep-resentatives of the Soviet Union, the UnitedKingdom and Greece, and also the views ex-pressed by representatives of the followingMembers of the Security Council: The UnitedStates of America, France, China, Australia,Poland, the Netherlands, Egypt and Brazil inregard to the question of the presence ofBritish troops in Greece, as recorded in theproceedings of the Council and consider thematter as closed.

This statement was found satisfactory andthe Greek question was considered as closed.

3. THE INDONESIAN QUESTIONa. Consideration of the Ukrainian Communi-

cation dated January 21, 1946By a letter dated January 21, 1946, the

Ukrainian representative, under Articles 34and 35 of the Charter, drew the attention ofthe Security Council to the fact that militaryaction had allegedly been directed against thelocal population by the British and Japaneseforces in Indonesia, and it was the opinionof his Government that this situation threat-ened the maintenance of international peaceand security. He felt the Security Councilshould carry out the necessary investigationand take measures provided for in the Charter.

The communication was considered on Feb-ruary 7, 1946, at the twelfth meeting of theSecurity Council. The representative of theUkrainian delegation was invited to the tableto take part in the discussion of the SecurityCouncil.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.stated that the Netherlands troops on March9, 1942, surrendered to the superior armedforces of Japan and the Japanese occupied un-armed Indonesia. For three and one-half yearsthe Indonesian people suffered under theJapanese regime, and, by all the means attheir disposal, resisted the measures of theJapanese invaders. As a result of the successof the Allied armies, the Japanese troops werecompelled to surrender on August 17, 1945.The defeat of Japan encouraged the Indone-sians in the hope that their national aspira-tions would at last be realized.

After the surrender of Japan, the Japanesemilitary authorities were empowered to keeporder pending the arrival of the British troops.On September 29, 1945, British and Indiantroops arrived in Batavia. The British author-ities began to employ ever more extensively allkinds of modern armies against the poorlyarmed Indonesians. Thus, it was quite evidentthat after the defeat of Japan, and the endof the war, there was a situation in Indonesiawhich, under the terms of Article 34 of theCharter, threatened the maintenance of in-ternational peace and security. It was beyonda doubt that such intervention by British andIndian troops in the internal affairs of In-donesia was in direct contradiction to Article1 (2) of the Charter. This intervention wasalso in contradiction to Article 73 of the Char-ter.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.recognized that the British troops remained inIndonesia with the consent of the UnitedNations for the purpose of accepting the sur-render of the Japanese troops and disarmingthem. He stated that he did not raise thequestion of the withdrawal of British troopsfrom Indonesia, but considered it inadmissiblethat the British troops were used for the sup-pression of the national movement of the In-donesian people and that Japanese forces wereused for participating in those operationsagainst the Indonesian people.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.asked the Council to take the necessary meas-ures to put an end to the existing situation.The most appropriate settlement would be thecreation by the Council of a special commis-sion for the investigation of the situation onthe spot and the establishment of peace.

In his statement before the Council, therepresentative of the United Kingdom statedthat since the representative of the UkrainianS.S.R. had said he did not ask for the with-drawal of British troops from Indonesia, hesupposed their presence there was not adanger to peace and security. The questionwas, therefore, whether there should be acommission.

The point as to who was the sovereignauthority in Indonesia should also be madeclear. It was the definite decision of theAllies to restore the territory taken by theenemy to the sovereign authority.

At the time of the Japanese surrender theBritish had been planning to launch a large


attack on the Japanese in Malaya and otherplaces. After the surrender of Japan, Britainwas given the task by the Allied SupremeCommand of rounding up Japanese troops inIndonesia and rescuing more than 200,000 in-ternees who had been placed in confinement bythe Japanese.

General Christianson had a conference withMr. Soekarno explaining Britain's purpose inIndonesia. General Mallaby had brought theleaders of the nationalist movement togetherand arranged a truce, but he had been assassi-nated. To forestall wholesale assassinationthroughout the country Admiral Mountbattenhad made the Japanese responsible for seeingthat this did not occur.

The representative of the United Kingdomdenied that British troops had attacked localinhabitants but said that they had been com-pelled to defend themselves against attackand obliged to take security measures to en-able them to carry out tasks assigned to them.

The representative of the United Kingdomsaid that, if the United Nations wished tohelp, it could do so, not by sending a commis-sion there, but by trying to bring about asettlement. However, Britain was only carry-ing out the orders of the Allied Supreme Com-mand and the question of sending commis-sions should be dealt with by the sovereignPower—the Netherlands.

The representative of the Netherlandsstated that the task of the British was toaccept the surrender of the Japanese and dis-arm them. In addition, part of their task wasto rescue prisoners of war and some 200,000Europeans. Regarding the behavior of theBritish troops, he wanted to bear testimonyto the extreme restraint and forbearance ofthe British troops in Java and other areas inthe Netherlands Indies. It was not the aim ofthe British troops to wage military actionsagainst the local population, but the horribledeeds which had occurred in Indonesia justi-fied the continued presence of the Alliedtroops.

Looking at this matter from the point ofview of the Charter, the Netherlands repre-sentative observed, first that there was no"dispute"; second, there was no "situation"threatening to endanger international peaceand security; third, there was no interna-tional friction which might lead to infringe-ment of the peace; fourth, there was no in-fringement of Article 1, because apart from

Article 1, Paragraphs 2 and 3, there was alsoChapter XI in the Charter. Fifth, there was,therefore, no case for the Security Council todeal with.

So far as sending a commission was con-cerned he would make no difficulty if theparties to the discussion both wanted a com-mission to be sent in order to inquire intothe point they were discussing. But sincethe representative of the United Kingdomappeared to be against that, he need not gointo this point any further.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.,in reply, pointed out that three points seemedto be incontestable: (1) that British troopshad been used in Java for some months pastagainst the Indonesian population; (2) thatin the course of these military operations,Japanese troops were used against the In-donesian population; (3) that none of thefacts which he adduced were contested eitherby the representative of the United Kingdomor by the representative of the Netherlands.The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.ther formulated his proposals under fourheads:

(1) That the use of British troopsagainst the Indonesian population was notjust and not right.

(2) That it was inadmissible that Jap-anese troops were used against the Indone-sian population.

(3) That the Indonesian populationshould be granted privileges and rightsestablished in the Charter.

(4) That a commission be sent on behalfof the Security Council to Indonesia to dealwith the abnormal situation existing there.The representative of the United Kingdom

stated that the sovereignty of the Netherlandswas not questioned in all the statements heard.After pointing out the provision of Paragraph7 of Article 2 of the Charter he declared that,when internal trouble arose, he could not agreethat a commission should be sent to investi-gate and deal with the problems arising withinthe territory of a sovereign power.

The representative of the Netherlands re-minded the Council of the fact that accordingto the Charter the internal matters of anygiven State were not for the United Nationsto deal with.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. sup-ported the statement of the Ukrainian delega-tion. He considered it necessary to point


this out loudly and clearly and to say thatthe events which were taking place in Indone-sia contained a threat to peace and to securityand that it was the duty of an internationalorganization to prevent this danger and putan end to the tragedy. He insisted that acommission be sent which would objectivelystudy the situation and outline the measureswhich it was imperative to take.

6. Discussion on the Appointment of a Com-mission of InquiryAt the sixteenth meeting on February 11,

1946, the representative of the UkrainianS.S.R. appealed to the members of the Councilto adopt the following resolution:

After hearing the statement made by thedelegation of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on the situ-ation which in Indonesia threatens inter-national peace and security, a situation inwhich British troops are being used in militaryaction against the National Movement ofLiberation, and in which enemy Japanesetroops are also being used for the same pur-pose;

After hearing the statements made by theForeign Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr.Bevin, and of the Netherlands, Mr. VanKleffens;

After exchanging views on the questionraised, THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDES:

to set up a commission consisting of repre-sentatives of the United States, the SovietUnion, China, the United Kingdom and theNetherlands which should carry out aninquiry on the spot, establish peace in Indo-nesia, and report to the Security Councilon the result of their work.

The President questioned whether the re-presentative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. had theright of proposition in the Security Council.He stated that Articles 31 and 32 of theCharter gave to States which were not mem-bers of the Security Council the right to par-ticipate without a vote in the discussion ofthe Council.

The representatives of China, Egypt andFrance observed that under Article 35 therepresentative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. wasentitled to full participation in the discussion,and that he should be accorded freedom tomake suggestions or proposals. The represen-tative of the Netherlands moved that the rep-resentative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. should begiven an opportunity to make a proposal.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. thoughtthat neither Article 31, nor Article 35, nor yetArticle 32 provided a solution. Article 35 didnot say how the Security Council was to pro-vide a solution to the matter brought to itsnotice. As to Article 31, the right to partici-pate in the discussion was allowed, but thelimits of discussion were not determined. Itwas also made clear that only when the in-terests of the Member were especially affecteddid it apply. He thought that the interests ofthe Ukrainian S.S.R. were not especiallyaffected. Article 32 referred to "disputes";the Council was faced with a "situation"which required study and treatment. Thus noneof these three Articles applied. He thoughtthe members of the Council must not limitthemselves to the text of the Charter butapply logic and common sense. It was incon-ceivable that they could give the representa-tive of the Ukrainian S.S.R. the right to par-ticipate in the discussion and draw their atten-tion to a situation but withhold from him theright to propose a solution for the situation.

There was no objection to the right ofproposition of the representative of theUkrainian S.S.R.

The representatives of the U.S.S.R., Mexicoand Poland were in favor of sending a com-mission to Indonesia. The representative ofthe United Kingdom declared that he wouldrefuse to be a party to the commission, andthe representative of the Netherlands reiter-ated his position that he would not stand inthe way of having a commission in regard tothe question only of the conduct of Britishtroops in Indonesia, but refused to accept acommission which would busy itself withmatters within domestic jurisdiction.

c. Decision of the Council

The Ukrainian proposal was put to a vote atthe eighteenth meeting on February 13, 1946,and was lost.

Before the Ukrainian S.S.R. proposal wasput to a vote, the representative of Egypt hadmade the following proposal:

After hearing the declarations of the rep-resentatives for the Ukraine, the UnitedKingdom, the Netherlands and the SovietUnion,

THE SECURITY COUNCILRegarding the presence of British troops

in Indonesia;


DECLARES that it is clearly understood thatBritish troops shall not be used in any circum-stances against the national Indonesian move-ment, and that they will be withdrawn fromIndonesia as soon as the strictly limited pur-poses which have brought about their presence,that is:

1. the surrender of Japanese troops,2. the liberation of Allied prisoners of war

and Allied nationals who are still internedhave been accomplished.

Regarding the situation created by the In-donesian national movement;

While hoping that the negotiations whichhave started between the Netherlands Govern-ment and the chiefs of the Indonesian move-ment will rapidly be concluded by a happysolution inspired by the aims and principles ofthe Charter and principally by the right ofself-determination of peoples,

THE COUNCIL expresses its will to be in-formed in a very short time of the results ofthese negotiations.

THE COUNCIL also reserves its right to takesuch further action as it thinks proper.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. proposedan amendment to the resolution proposed bythe representative of Egypt as follows:

With a view to clarifying the situation inIndonesia and the re-establishment of peace, acommission should be dispatched to Indonesiaconsisting of the representatives of China, theNetherlands, the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union.

This amendment obtained three votes andwas not carried.

The Egyptian resolution also did not obtainthe required number of votes.

The President then declared that the matterwas closed.

4. THE SYRIAN AND LEBANESE QUESTIONa. Syrian and Lebanese Communication dated

February 4, 1946

By letter dated February 4, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General, the heads of theLebanese and Syrian delegations to the UnitedNations, in accordance with Article 34 of theCharter, brought to the attention of the Secur-ity Council the presence of French and Britishtroops in Syria and Lebanon. The letterstated that the Governments of Syria andLebanon had expected that these foreigntroops would be withdrawn immediately onthe cessation of hostilities with Germany andJapan, but that a Franco-British Agreementof December 13, 1945, made the withdrawal of

troops subject to conditions which were incon-sistent with the spirit and letter of theCharter.

The communication was considered at the19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd and 23rd meetings, heldon February 14, 15 and 16, 1946.

b. Discussion of Procedural QuestionsAt the 19th meeting the President sug-

gested that it was unnecessary at that timeto decide whether Article 32 applied. Syriaand Lebanon were manifestly States whoseinterests were specially affected by the dis-cussion of the question before the SecurityCouncil. He proposed that the Council shouldinvite Syria and the Lebanon to participate,without vote, under Article 31. He furtherproposed that the representatives of Syriaand Lebanon should have the right of propo-sition. The President's proposal was adoptedwithout objection.

The representative of Egypt suggested thatan immediate decision be taken on the type ofvote required to determine whether a disputeor a situation existed; and he moved that thisdecision be considered a procedural matter.The representatives of Australia, Brazil, Mex-ico, the Netherlands and the United Kingdompreferred to proceed first with the oral state-ments of the parties concerned, and the repre-sentative of China suggested that the motionof the representative of Egypt be referred tothe Committee of Experts for study and re-port. The representative of the U.S.S.R. feltthat the Council should take an immediatedecision on the point. The representative ofthe Netherlands moved that "no vote shall betaken at this stage in the proceedings of theCouncil upon the proposal that has been madeby the delegate for Egypt," and this motionwas carried with 8 votes.

The representative of Egypt argued thatif one permanent member of the SecurityCouncil was enabled to decide whether a caseconstituted a dispute or a situation, that is,whether a procedural or a substantive issuewere involved, then Article 27 (3) would bevirtually inoperative. It would mean that apermanent member could exercise the right ofveto on every question that came before theCouncil, which was contrary to the letter andspirit of the Charter.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. sub-mitted that procedural questions were ques-tions of the order in which, or the methods by


which, the business of an organ was conduc-ted. He referred to a decision made in SanFrancisco on June 7, 1945, in the discussionof a report of the Third Committee. He con-sidered that this decision was authority forthe principle that the question whether a caseconstituted a dispute or a situation was aquestion of substance and not of procedure;so that any decision on such a question wouldhave to be taken under Article 27 (3).

The representative of the Netherlandsstated that the mere fact that a Member Statecontended that a dispute existed did not bindthe Council to the conclusion that a disputeexisted in the technical sense of the term.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. agreedthat, regardless of the terminology used byany party, it was for the Council, in everycase, to determine the question. He consideredthat a dispute existed whenever one partymade claims or accusations which were deniedby the other party.

The representatives of the United Kingdomand France stated that they would refrainfrom voting during consideration of the pres-ent question.

The Council took no formal decision on theprocedural issues raised.

c. Discussion of Substantive Questions

The representatives of Syria and Leba-non were invited to participate, without vote,in the discussion of the question which theyhad brought before the Security Council. Theyargued that the presence of foreign troops onthe territory of a sovereign State against itswill constituted a dispute and threatened themaintenance of international peace and secur-ity; that the Franco-British Agreement of De-cember 13, 1945, was a violation of the sover-eignty of States Members of the United Na-tions, contrary to the terms of Article 2 of theCharter; that the presence of the troops couldnot be justified on any pretence of conductingmilitary operations or of protecting lines ofcommunication, or on the grounds that theirterritory was a menaced area; and that in-ternational security was clearly organized bythe Charter and was not a function of any onegreat power. The representatives stated thatSyria and Lebanon had made constant unsuc-cessful representations to the Governmentsconcerned, asking for the withdrawal oftroops, and felt that the dispute had reached

the stage where it should be brought beforethe Council.

In reply, the representative of Francepointed out that the state of war had notended, and as a result troops of many nation-alities were stationed on the territory of everybelligerent country; that the independenceproclaimed in 1941 by the Government of Gen-eral de Gaulle had become a reality in spiteof the difficulties of the time; that the existingsituation in Syria and Lebanon could notin good faith be regarded as likely to menacethe maintenance of international peace andsecurity under Article 34 of the Charter andcould be settled by negotiations or other appro-priate means under Article 33; that France,in full agreement with the United Kingdom,had given evidence of its good will in takingthe initiative for the conclusion of an agree-ment relating to the evacuation of Syria andLebanon and was disposed to proceed bysubmitting the matter to the Council with aview to making the international arrange-ments necessary for the maintenance of secur-ity in that part of the world. He made itclear that in the absence of a decision by theSecurity Council the French Government didnot interpret the Agreement of December 13,1945, as implying the maintenance of troops inthe Levant indefinitely, and that he was pre-pared to negotiate with the Syrian and Leban-ese Governments as to the methods by whichthe French troops should be evacuated.

In replying to the statements of the Syrianand Lebanese representatives, the represent-ative of the United Kingdom stated thathis Government was in sympathy with theSyrian and Lebanese Governments in theirdesire to see British troops withdrawn fromtheir two countries. He said that Britishtroops were in the two Levant States as aheritage of the needs of war; that at theinvitation of the Syrian authorities Britishtroops had intervened to restore order in adispute between French troops and the Syrianpopulation in May 1945; that in view of thepossibility of further disorders, the local gov-ernments had asked for an assurance thatBritish troops would not withdraw from theLevant so long as other foreign troops re-mained; that his delegation associated itselfwholeheartedly with the declaration by therepresentative of France to the effect that theAgreement of December 13, 1945, implied nointention on their part to maintain effectives


in the Levant without limitation of time andin the absence of a discussion by the SecurityCouncil.

d. Resolutions Presented to the CouncilThe representative of the Netherlands pro-

posed the following resolution:

The Council should take note of the state-ments made by the four parties; express ourconfidence that as a result of negotiations orotherwise the foreign troops in Syria and theLebanon will be withdrawn at no distant date;request the parties to inform the Council whenthis has been done, in order that the Councilmay at any time revert to it, and pass on tothe next item of the agenda.

This resolution was modified by a subse-quent resolution submitted by the represen-tative of the United States, and was laterwithdrawn by the representative of the Neth-erlands.

The representative of Mexico proposed thefollowing resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DECIDE:1. That the claim of the Syrian and Leba-

nese Governments to the effect that the Brit-ish and French troops should be withdrawnsimultaneously and at the earliest possibledate is justified.

2. That the date for the evacuation of suchtroops should be fixed by negotiations betweenthe parties in this case, it being understoodthat such negotiations will be concerned ex-clusively with the military technical arrange-ments necessary for the adequate evacuationof such troops,

3. To request the parties to inform theCouncil when these arrangements have beenmade.

The Mexican representative subsequentlyamended his resolution by deleting the word"exclusively" in the second paragraph. Fourrepresentatives voted in favor of the resolu-tion, which was declared lost.

The representative of Egypt proposed thefollowing resolution:

After hearing the statements by the dele-gates for the Lebanon, Syria, France and theUnited Kingdom, and after having exchangedviews on the case which is submitted tothem . . .

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, considering thatthe presence of British and French troops onLebanese and Syrian territory is incompatiblewith the principle of the sovereign equality ofall Members laid down in the Charter;

Believing that this principle, the intangi-bility of which is fully recognized by all the

parties concerned, should receive its full appli-cation by the immediate and simultaneouswithdrawal by all British and French troopsstill in the territories referred to;

RECOMMENDS the British and French Gov-ernments on the one hand, and the Lebaneseand Syrian Governments on the other hand,to enter into negotiations as soon as possiblewith a view to establishing exclusively thetechnical details of the said withdrawal, in-cluding the fixing of the date of its comple-tion, and REQUESTS them to keep the Councilinformed of the result of these negotiations.

The last paragraph was later amended byits author by changing the word "recom-mends" to read "recommend"; and by deletingthe word "exclusively."

Four representatives voted in favor of thisresolution, which also was declared lost.

The representative of the United Statesproposed the following resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTE of thestatements made by the four parties and bythe other members of the Council;

EXPRESSES its confidence that foreign troopsin Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn assoon as practicable; and that negotiations tothat end will be undertaken by the partieswithout delay;

AND REQUESTS the parties to inform it ofthe results of the negotiations.

The representatives of Syria and Lebanonsuggested that the second and third para-graphs be amended to read:

EXPRESSES its confidence that the foreigntroops in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawnas soon as practicable and that technical nego-tiations exclusively to that end will be under-taken by the parties without delay;

AND REQUESTS the parties to inform it ofthe.results of the negotiations as well as thefinal date of withdrawal.

The representative of the United Kingdomhowever, stated that he could not agree to thisamendment, since it would prevent negotia-tions from taking place on other matters.The representatives of France and the UnitedKingdom accepted the addition by the repre-sentative of the United States of the words"independently of other issues" after "nego-tiations" in the second paragraph of theresolution.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. proposedthe following amendments to the resolutionof the representative of the United States:


1. The first amendment would be, instead ofthe words in the second paragraph "expressesits confidence that the foreign troops in Syriaand Lebanon will be withdrawn," to say"recommends to the Governments of GreatBritain and France to withdraw their troopsfrom the territories of Syria and Lebanon."(The latter was further changed to read,"takes note of the statements made by theFrench and British Governments of their in-tention to withdraw their troops from Syriaand Lebanon" as suggested by the representa-tive of Egypt.)

2. The second amendment would be to say"immediately," in place of the words "as soonas possible."

3. The third amendment would be to insertthe word "technical" before the word "negotia-tions."

These amendments were declared lost afterhaving received the following affirmativevotes: 1st amendment, 3; 2nd amendment, 2;3rd amendment, 5.

e. Decision of the CouncilSeven representatives voted in favor of the

resolution of the representative of the UnitedStates, but it was not carried since the repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R., a permanent mem-ber, voted against it. In accordance with theirprevious statements, the representatives ofFrance and the United Kingdom abstainedfrom voting.

The representatives of France and theUnited Kingdom stated that although theUnited States resolution had not been legallyadopted, their Governments would give effectto the majority decision of the Council. TheCouncil then passed on to the next item onthe agenda and was no longer seized of theSyrian and Lebanese question.

f. Further Communications to the Councilon the Syrian and Lebanese Question

By letter dated April 30, 1946, addressedto the President of the Council, the representa-tive of France reported that as regards Syria,the French and British Governments hadjointly made the arrangements necessary forthe full evacuation of Syrian territory byApril 30, 1946. After negotiations betweenBritish and French experts and between theFrench and Lebanese Ministers for ForeignAffairs, and in view of the promise by theLebanese Government to give certain assist-ance in matters of transport, etc., the FrenchGovernment had stated that the withdrawalof French troops as a whole could be com-

pleted by August 31, 1946. A small groupremaining for the control and transport ofmaterials would be evacuated not later thanDecember 31, 1946. The French Governmentstressed its desire to ensure the withdrawalof the bulk of its fighting forces before June30, 1946. In conclusion, the letter referred tothe exchange of letters between the Frenchand Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairson March 23, 1946, noting the happy outcomeof the negotiations recommended in the aboveproposal of the representative of the UnitedStates.

By a letter dated May 1, 1946, addressed tothe President of the Council, the representa-tive of the United Kingdom reported that,pursuant to the above proposal of the repre-sentative of the United States, the followingagreements had been reached between theBritish and French Governments:

(1) All British troops to be withdrawnfrom Syria by April 30, 1946.

(2) The first thousand British troopsto be withdrawn from Lebanon with asimilar number of French troops by March31, 1946.

(3) The remainder of British troops, ex-cept for a small liquidation party, to bewithdrawn from Lebanon by June 30, 1946.

This plan had been communicated to theSyrian and Lebanese Governments, which hadsuggested no modifications.

As regards item (1) above, British troopshad actually been withdrawn from Syria byApril 15, 1946. The movement required underitem (2) above had been carried out by thedate mentioned.

By telegram dated May 19, 1946, addressedto the President of the Council, the SyrianPrime Minister and Minister for ForeignAffairs stated that the evacuation of foreigntroops from Syrian territory had been com-pleted during the first two weeks of April,1946.

By a letter dated May 9, 1946, addressed tothe Secretary-General, the Lebanese Ministerfor Foreign Affairs stated that his negotia-tions with the French Foreign Minister con-cerning the evacuation of French troops fromLebanon had resulted in an agreement es-tablished by an exchange of letters datedMarch 23, 1946. He enclosed copies of theseletters, which contained the full text of theagreement summarized in the above letter


from the representative of France to the necessary to compel compliance with the prin-President of the Security Council datedApril 30, 1946. In conclusion, the LebaneseMinister for Foreign Affairs stated his Gov-ernment's satisfaction with the outcome of thenegotiations.

5. THE SPANISH QUESTION

a. Polish Communications dated April 8 and9, 1946.

By letters dated April 8 and 9, 1946, ad-dressed to the Secretary-General, the represen-tative of Poland, under Articles 34 and 35 ofthe Charter, requested the Security Councilto place on its agenda the situation arisingfrom the existence and activities of the Francoregime in Spain, for consideration and foradoption of such measures as were providedfor in the Charter.

The matter was considered at the 34th, 35th,37th, 38th, 39th, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48thand 49th meetings of the Council.

The Polish representative pointed out thatthe Franco regime could not be regarded asan internal affair of Spain, but was of concernto all of the United Nations for the followingreasons:

(1) The Franco regime had been putinto power with the support of FascistItaly and Nazi Germany;

(2) The Franco regime was an activepartner of the Axis in the war against theUnited Nations;

(3) The Franco regime had caused astate of international friction by compellingFrance to close her border to Spain and bymassing troops on the borders of France;

(4) The Franco regime had allowedSpain to become a refuge for German assets,for German personnel and for German scien-tists engaged in pursuits dangerous for thepeace of mankind. The France governmentgave refuge and encouragement to a largenumber of war criminals, nazi leaders andagents who were using Spain as a base ofoperation for their activities and for theirplans of reconquest.

The Polish representative stated that thesituation, due to the existence and activitiesof the fascist Franco regime in Spain, was ofthe nature referred to in Article 34 of theCharter. Therefore, it was the duty of theorganization to take the appropriate steps

ciples and purposes of the United Nationsaccording to paragraph 6 of Article 2 of theCharter.

The representative of Poland then movedthe following resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECLARES that theexistence and activities of the Franco regimein Spain have led to international frictionand endangered international peace andsecurity.

In accordance with the authority vested init, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter,THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS upon all Mem-bers of the United Nations who maintaindiplomatic relations with the Franco Govern-ment to sever such relations immediately.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESSES its deepsympathy to the Spanish people. It hopes andexpects that the people of Spain will regainthe freedom of which they have been deprivedwith the aid and connivance of Fascist Italyand Nazi Germany. The Security Council isconvinced that the day will come soon whenit will be able to welcome the Spanish nationinto the community of the United Nations.

The representative of France defined hisGovernment's position concerning the Spanishproblem as set forth in the different notesaddressed to the Washington, London andMoscow Governments, namely, that the con-tinuance of the existing situation in Spainconstituted a danger for international peaceand security. He said that the French Govern-ment in taking these steps had had two aims:firstly, to persuade the United Nations totake a stand on a problem which was ofprimary importance to the international com-munity, and secondly, to ensure that suchaction as might be taken should be as promptand effective as possible. He accordingly hopedthat the Polish proposal would receive theunanimous approval of the members of theCouncil.

The representative of Mexico stated thatMexico neither maintained nor had ever main-tained any relations whatsoever with theFranco regime, which Mexico had alwaysregarded as the creature of an armed inter-vention by foreign Powers. He said he wasprepared to vote in favor of the motion pre-sented by the representative of Poland.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. stressedthe following points: (1) the Franco regimewas the result of outside intervention on the


part of the Axis Powers which imposed Fran-co's fascist regime on the Spanish people;(2) during the Second World War Francowas the faithful ally of Hitler and Mussolini;(3) the Franco regime in Spain was a nestof fascism fraught with dangerous complica-tions for the cause of peace.

The representative of the Netherlands, how-ever, considered that there were not sufficientgrounds for the Council to take any measuresand that the matter was essentially withinSpain's domestic jurisdiction.

The representative of the United Statesstressed the two objectives of his Government—namely, the elimination of the Francoregime and the restoration of a democraticregime without a resumption of a civil war.

At the 35th meeting of the Security Councilon April 18, 1946, the representative of theUnited Kingdom maintained that before theCouncil embarked on collective action it mustbe sure that it would not interfere withmatters which were essentially within domesticjurisdiction. In his opinion, the case so farmade against the Spanish Government hadnot been established as such a threat to peaceor act of aggression as to justify a collectiveseverance of diplomatic relations.

The representative of China considered thatuntil the Council was convinced beyond doubtthat the relevant facts did constitute a threatto peace it should not resort to any immediatecollective action.

The representative of Brazil supported theview that the matter was a national affairwhich belonged essentially within the nationalcompetence of the State.

6. Appointment of a Sub-CommitteeThe Australian representative proposed a

resolution as an amendment to the Polishresolution which, as revised by the Australianrepresentative himself and submitted at the37th meeting of the Security Council onApril 25, 1946, read as follows:

The attention of the Security Council havingbeen drawn to the situation in Spain by aMember of the United Nations acting inaccordance with Article 35 of the Charter,and the Security Council having been askedto declare that this situation has led to inter-national friction and endangers internationalpeace and security,THE SECURITY COUNCIL HEREBY RESOLVES:

To make further studies in order to deter-mine whether such a situation does exist.

To this end, the Security Council appointsa sub-committee of five of its members andinstructs this sub-committee to examine thestatements made before the Security Councilconcerning Spain, to call for further state-ments, documents and evidence and to conductsuch inquiries as it may deem necessary inorder that the sub-committee may report tothe Security Council on 31 May 1946 on theresults of such studies and especially the factsbearing on the following questions:

(1) Is the existence of the Franco regimea matter of international concern and notone essentially within the jurisdiction ofSpain?(2) Is the situation in Spain one whichmight lead to international friction or giverise to a dispute?(3) If the answer to question (2) is "Yes,"is the continuance of the situation likely toendanger the maintenance of internationalpeace and security?

The representative of France submittedthree amendments to the text proposed by theAustralian representative, the aims of whichwere:

(1) to place on record the unanimity ofthe members of the Council in condemningthe Franco regime, in saluting the Spanishpeople, and in expressing the hope that theywould soon be welcomed among the UnitedNations.(2) to omit the three questions at theend of the Australian resolution.(3) to ask that the proposed workingcommittee should submit proposals on thepractical measures which might be takenby the Council in regard to the presentsituation in Spain.

At the 39th meeting the Australian resolu-tion was read as revised. The amended textwas as follows:

The attention of the Security Council hasbeen drawn to the situation in Spain by aMember of the United Nations acting in ac-cordance with Article 35 of the Charter, andthe Security Council has been asked to declarethat this situation has led to internationalfriction and endangers international peaceand security.

THEREFORE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL, keep-ing in mind the unanimous moral condemna-tion of the Franco regime in the SecurityCouncil and the resolutions concerning Spainwhich were adopted at the United NationsConference on International Organization atSan Francisco and at the first General As-sembly of the United Nations and the views


expressed by members of the Security Councilregarding the Franco regime, HEREBY RE-SOLVES :

To make further studies in order to deter-mine whether the situation in Spain has led tointernational friction and does endanger inter-national peace and security, and if it so finds,then to determine what practical measuresthe United Nations may take.

To this end, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AP-POINTS a sub-committee of five of its mem-bers and instructs this sub-committee to ex-amine the statements made before the SecurityCouncil concerning Spain, to receive furtherstatements and documents, and to conductsuch inquiries as it may deem necessary andto report to the Security Council before theend of May.

The resolution was adopted by 10 votes,the representative of the U.S.S.R. abstaining.

Before the vote was taken, the representa-tive of the U.S.S.R. observed that the Aus-tralian proposal was made in spite of thefact that the discussion in the Security Coun-cil had fully confirmed that the existingFascist regime in Spain constituted a seriousthreat to the maintenance of internationalpeace and security. The adoption of theAustralian draft resolution would mean thatthe Security Council, instead of taking effec-tive measures, would take the path of delaysand inaction in regard to Fascism in Spain.In view of this fact, the representative of theU.S.S.R. continued in his strongly negativeattitude toward the draft resolution proposedby the representative of Australia.

Bearing in mind, however, that some mem-bers were still dissatisfied with the informa-tion at the disposal of the Council and that hisvoting against the Australian draft resolutionwould make its adoption impossible, the repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R. said he would ab-stain from voting. He declared that his absten-tion from voting on this matter, however,might in no way be regarded as a precedentcapable of influencing in any way the questionof the abstention of permanent members ofthe Security Council.

The representative of Poland said that hedid not withdraw his earlier resolution de-manding the collective breaking of diplomaticrelations with Spain. He understood that hisearlier resolution would again be consideredafter the sub-committee had presented itsreport.

c. The Sub-CommitteeIt was agreed that the Sub-Committee

should be formed of the representatives ofAustralia (Chairman), Brazil, China, Franceand Poland.

The Sub-Committee held nineteen meetingsand completed its report on May 31, 1946.The report was unanimously adopted by thefive members of the Sub-Committee, subject totwo reservations.

At the 44th meeting of the Security Councilon June 6, 1946, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee submitted the Sub-Committee's re-port to the Council and a supplementary mem-orandum containing its factual findings con-cerning the Spanish situation.

The Sub-Committee's examination of thefacts of the case had been based mainly upondocuments received from Members of theUnited Nations in response to a request tosupply all relevant information and also inresponse to inquiries on specific questions. Apublic announcement was made that the Sub-Committee would welcome information fromany source.

The Sub-Committee came to the conclusionthat in origin, nature, structure and generalconduct, the Franco regime was a fascistregime patterned on and established largelyas a result of aid received from Hitler's NaziGermany and Mussolini's Fascist Italy.

In the opinion of the Sub-Committee theSecurity Council could not, on the presentevidence, make the determination requiredby Article 39. No breach of the peace had yetoccurred. No act of aggression had beenproved. No threat to the peace had been estab-lished. Therefore, none of the series of enforce-ment measures set out in Articles 41 and 42could at the present time be directed by theSecurity Council.

The Sub-Committee found, however, thatthe present situation in Spain, although notan existing threat within the meaning ofArticle 39, was a situation the continuanceof which was, in fact, likely to endanger themaintenance of international peace andsecurity. The situation in Spain thus was tobe dealt with by the Secretary Council underChapter VI of the Charter, which coveredmeasures of peaceful settlement and adjust-ment.

The Sub-Committee declared that the Secur-ity Council was empowered under Article 36


to recommend appropriate procedures or meth-ods of adjustment of such a situation.

The Sub-Committee added that while theSecurity Council exercised a primary dutyin regard to the maintenance of internationalpeace and security, the General Assembly wasalso vested by the Charter with the power todeal with such situations.

The conclusions of the Sub-Committee wereas follows:

(a) Although the activities of the Francoregime do not at present constitute an exist-ing threat to the peace within the meaning ofArticle 39 of the Charter and therefore theSecurity Council has no jurisdiction to director authorize enforcement measures underArticle 40 or 42, nevertheless, such activitiesdo constitute a situation which is a potentialmenace to international peace and securityand which therefore is a situation "likely toendanger the maintenance of internationalpeace and security" within the meaning ofArticle 34 of the Charter.

(b) The Security Council is therefore em-powered by Article 36 (1) to recommendappropriate procedures or methods of adjust-ment in order to improve the situation men-tioned in (a) above.The Sub-Committee also recommended:

(a) The endorsement by the Security Coun-cil of the principles contained in the declara-tion by the Governments of the United King-dom, the United States and France, dated4 March 1946.

(b) The transmitting by the Security Coun-cil to the General Assembly of the evidenceand reports of this sub-committee, togetherwith the recommendation that unless theFranco regime is withdrawn and other con-ditions of political freedom set out in thedeclaration are, in the opinion of the GeneralAssembly, fully satisfied, a resolution bepassed by the General Assembly recommend-ing that diplomatic relations with the Francoregime be terminated by each Member of theUnited Nations.

(c) The taking of appropriate steps bythe Secretary-General to communicate theserecommendations to all Members of the UnitedNations and all others concerned.

d. Amended RecommendationsAt the 45th meeting of the Security Council

on June 13, 1946, the representative of theUnited States suggested a modification of thesecond recommendation of the Sub-Committee.The five representatives on the Sub-Committeeagreed with the change in the text and theChairman of the Sub-Committee then formallymoved the adoption of the following reso-lution :

IT Is HEREBY RESOLVED that the SecurityCouncil adopt the three recommendations ofthe sub-committee set out above, subject tothe addition to the recommendation (b) afterthe words "each Member of the United Na-tions" of the following words "or alternative-ly such other action be taken as the GeneralAssembly deems appropriate and effective un-der the circumstances prevailing at the time."

At the 46th meeting of the Council onJune 17, 1946, the representative of the UnitedKingdom put forward the following view:

(1) His Government had grave doubtsas to the juridical rights of the SecurityCouncil to take corporate action to bear onSpain unless there was a clear threat to themaintenance of international peace andsecurity.(2) The Sub-Committee was of the opin-ion that the Security Council could not,under present evidence, make the determina-tion required by Chapter VII, but declaredthat the "situation in Spain was likely toendanger the maintenance of internationalpeace and security." The finding was underChapter VI. The representative of theUnited Kingdom had grave doubts as towhether this was correct and whether thatchapter was, in fact, suitable for dealingwith a case of this kind.(3) Having invoked Chapter VI, how-ever, the Sub-Committee recommended thatthe Member Governments of the UnitedNations should break diplomatic relationswith the Government of Spain. This wasone of the so-called sanctions provided forin Chapter VII of the Charter. It was forthat reason that his Government had verygrave doubts as to the juridical validity ofthe reasoning of the Sub-Committee and therecommendations based on that reasoning.The representative of the United Kingdom

then proposed an amendment which read asfollows:

IT Is HEREBY RESOLVED that the SecurityCouncil adopt the three recommendations ofthe Sub-Committee set out above, subject tothe deletion of paragraph (b) after the words"reports of this sub-committee," and the addi-tion of the words "together with the minutesof the discussion of the case by the SecurityCouncil."

The representative of the Netherlands saidthat he was not in favor of the recommenda-tion by the Sub-Committee because it was the


Council which had primary responsibility totake action. Appreciating the importance ofan agreed decision, he would not oppose thedraft resolution, but would reserve perfectfreedom for his Government if and when thematter came up before the General Assembly.

At the 47th meeting of the Council, on June18, 1946, the representative of the U.S.S.R.said that he found the conclusions of the Sub-Committee incorrect for the following reasons:

(1) The Sub-Committee came to the con-clusion that the situation in Spain consti-tuted merely a potential threat to peace.Introducing the idea of a potential threat topeace, the Sub-Committee renounced the pre-cise sense of Article 39 of the Charter. Theoutcome would be that a real threat topeace would exist only if Fascist Spain tookpractical action of a warlike nature, butthis would be not merely a threat to peace,it would already be an act of aggression.(2) For the Security Council not to takea decision regarding the severance of diplo-matic relations with Franco, but to recom-mend instead the taking of such action bythe General Assembly, would have two draw-backs :

(a) Such action would be of a con-tradictory nature. On the one hand, theSub-Committee considered that the Secur-ity Council had no right to take a decisionregarding the severance of diplomaticrelations with Franco; on the other hand,it considered it necessary that severanceshould be effected by the General As-sembly.(b) The Sub-Committee seemed to haveconfused the functions of the SecurityCouncil and the General Assembly. TheSecurity Council had many responsibili-ties for the maintenance of peace andwas the organ which should take thedecision concerning this question.

After the representative of Australia hadmade a final appeal to adopt the recommenda-tions of the Sub-Committee, votes were taken,first on the British amendment and then onthe Sub-Committee's recommendations. TheBritish amendment received 2 affirmative votes(the United Kingdom and the Netherlands),6 negative (Australia, Brazil, China, France,Poland and the U.S.S.R.) and there were 3abstentions (the United States, Egypt andMexico).

The President then put the three recommen-dations of the Sub-Committee to a vote. Thefirst recommendation received 10 affirmativevotes and 1 negative (U.S.S.R.). The secondand third recommendations received 9 affirma-tive votes and 1 negative (U.S.S.R.), with oneabstention (the Netherlands).

In explaining why he had voted for therecommendations the representative of theUnited Kingdom stated that because of theoverwhelming majority of the Council infavor of the resolution proposed by the Chair-man of the Sub-Committee, his Governmentwould not wish, by his single veto, to goagainst the will of the majority. He addedthat his Government reserved the right toraise the whole juridical issue at the forth-coming meeting of the General Assembly.

The whole recommendation of the Sub-Com-mittee was then put to a vote; 9 votes werecast in favor of its adoption, with 1 againstand 1 abstention.

The President declared that the three recom-mendations of the Sub-Committee were notcarried, as there was the opposing vote ofone permanent member.e. Resolutions of the Representative of Poland

At the 48th meeting on June 24, 1946, therepresentative of Poland called the attentionof the Council to his resolution of April 29.He stated that the original resolution stillstood before the Council. Since the Councilfailed to agree upon the particular steps tobe taken, he asked the Council on behalf ofhis Government to reconsider the steps pro-posed originally by him before the Council.

After discussion the Polish resolution wasput to a vote. It was defeated by 7 negativevotes to 4 affirmative votes.

The representative of Poland then urgedthe Council not to drop its interest in the caseof the Fascist government of Spain. He there-fore submitted the draft of a new resolutionin order to take the matter up again wheneverconditions warranted it. The text read asfollows:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTICE ofthe report of the sub-committee on the Spanishquestion appointed on 29 April 1946. Theinvestigation of the sub-committee confirmsfully the facts which have led to the condemna-tion of the Franco regime by the Conferencesin San Francisco and Potsdam, by the GeneralAssembly in London, and by the SecurityCouncil in its resolution of 29 April 1946. Theinvestigation also establishes beyond any


doubt that Franco's Fascist regime is a seri-ous danger to the maintenance of internationalpeace and security.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEREFORE, DE-CIDES to keep the situation in Spain undercontinuous observation and keep the questionon the list of matters of which it is seized, inorder to be able to take such measures asmay be necessary in the interests of peaceand security,

The Security Council will take up the matteragain not later than 1 September, 1946, inorder to determine what appropriate practicalmeasures provided by the Charter should betaken. Any member of the Security Councilhas a right to bring the matter up beforethe Security Council at any time before thementioned date.

After this resolution had been discussed,the representative of Poland suggested that adrafting committee be appointed to preparea text which would be agreeable to the Council.This was agreed upon, and the Presidentappointed the representatives of Australia,Poland and the United Kingdom as membersof the Committee.

At the 49th meeting on June 26, 1946, theCommittee reported that it had not been pos-sible for the three members of the Committeeto reach an agreement. The following textwas submitted to the Council by two membersof the Committee, namely Australia and theUnited Kingdom:

WHEREAS the Security Council on 29 April1946 appointed a sub-committee to investigatethe situation in Spain,

AND WHEREAS the investigation of the sub-committee has fully confirmed the facts whichled to the condemnation of the Franco regimeby the Potsdam and San Francisco Con-ferences, the General Assembly at the firstpart of its first session and by the SecurityCouncil by resolution of the date above men-tioned,

AND WHEREAS the sub-committee was ofopinion that the situation in Spain is one thecontinuance of which is likely to endangerthe maintenance of international peace andsecurity,

IT Is HEREBY RESOLVED that without preju-dice to the rights of the General Assemblyunder the Charter, the Security Council keepsthe situation in Spain under continuous obser-vation and maintains it upon the list of mat-ters of which it is seized in order that it willbe at all times ready to take such measuresas may become necessary to maintain inter-national peace and security. Any member ofthe Security Council may bring the matter upfor consideration by the Council at any time.

After discussion the representative of theU.S.S.R. held that the Polish proposal shouldbe voted upon first and the proposal of therepresentative of the United Kingdom andAustralia should be voted on afterwards, asthe latter was an independent proposal.

The President, however, considered thedraft resolution of the Drafting Committee asan amendment to the original proposal pre-sented by the representative of Poland. ThePresident's ruling was agreed to by a majorityvote, with the U.S.S.R. and Poland dissenting.

A vote was taken on the amendment withthe following results: 9 affirmative and 2negative (Poland and the U.S.S.R.).

The President announced that the amendedresolution was carried. The representativesof the U.S.S.R. and France objected to thePresident's ruling, pointing out that part ofthe resolution was of a procedural characterand part of it was a question of substance.The President maintained that the main ques-tion was that the item be kept on the agenda.It was a question of procedure.

The President's ruling that the aboveamendment was a procedural question wasput to vote. The results were: 8 for the ruling,2 against the ruling (France and theU.S.S.R.), 1 abstention (Poland). As twopermanent members had voted against thePresident's ruling, the amended resolutionwas not carried.

Votes were then taken on the amendmentsproposed by the representative of the U.S.S.R.to the text submitted by the Drafting Com-mittee. The final text adopted by the Councilwas as follows:

WHEREAS the Security Council on 29 April1946 appointed a sub-committee to investigatethe situation in Spain,

AND WHEREAS the investigation of the sub-committee has fully confirmed the facts whichled to the condemnation of the Franco regimeby the Potsdam and San Francisco Confer-ences, the General Assembly at the first partof its first session, and by the Security Councilby resolution of the date above mentioned,

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDES to keepthe situation in Spain under continuous obser-vation and maintain it upon the list of mattersof which it is seized in order that it will beat all times ready to take such measures asmay become necessary to maintain inter-national peace and security. Any member ofthe Security Council may bring the matter upfor consideration by the Council at any time.


f. The Australian ResolutionThe representative of Australia then pro-

posed the following resolution:

That in the opinion of the Security Council,the carrying of the resolution on the SpanishQuestion dated 26 June does not in any wayprejudice the rights of the General Assemblyunder the Charter.

As the representative of the U.S.S.R., apermanent member, voted against it, thePresident ruled that the resolution was notcarried.

The Council remained seized of the Spanishquestion.

g. Resolution of the CouncilAt the 78th meeting of the Security Council

on October 30, 1946, the Polish representativestated that during discussions in the GeneralAssembly at its fall session great interest wasshown in the Spanish question. He pointedout that according to Article 12 of the Charter,however, the General Assembly was not free tomake recommendations on a matter on whichthe Council was exercising its functions. Inorder that there should be no doubt that theGeneral Assembly was free to make recom-mendations on the matter, he proposed thatthe Spanish question be taken off the list ofmatters of which the Council was seized.

The Polish representative said it was hisunderstanding that the adoption of such aresolution would not affect in any way therights and privileges of the Security Council.

The proposal made by the representative ofPoland was placed on the agenda of the 79thmeeting of the Council on November 4 and,after some discussion, the Council unani-mously adopted the following resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLVES that thesituation in Spain is to be taken off the listof matters of which the Council is seized, andthat all records and documents of the case beput at the disposal of the General Assembly.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS the Secre-tary-General to notify the General Assembly ofthis decision.

Referring to the observation of the Polishrepresentative at the previous meeting as tothe effect of the resolution upon the rights ofthe Security Council, the Chairman expressedthe view that it would be open to any mem-ber, with good reason, to put the question backon the Security Council agenda.

6. THE GREEK QUESTION (UKRAINIANCOMPLAINT)

a. Ukrainian Communication dated August24, 1946

By a telegram dated August 24, 1946, ad-dressed to the Secretary-General, the Ministerof Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.stated:

(1) that as a result of the irresponsiblepolicy of the present Greek Government asituation had arisen in the Balkans whichrepresented a grave danger to peace andsecurity in this part of Europe;(2) that numerous border incidents werebeing provoked by Greek armed units withthe connivance and encouragement of Greekauthorities;(3) that Greek armed troops penetratedinto Albanian territory with the obviousobject of provoking an armed conflict withAlbania which would serve as a pretext forthe wresting of the southern part of Albaniain favor of Greece;(4) that the situation was rendered stillmore tense by the repeated statements ofrepresentatives of the present Greek Gov-ernment concerning the alleged state ofwar between Greece and Albania;(6) that persecution by the Greek Gov-ernment of national minorities in Mace-donia, Thrace and Epirus threatened to con-vert the Balkan Peninsula into a centre ofbitter conflicts; and(6) that the principal factor conduciveto the situation in the Balkans as createdby this policy of the present Greek Govern-ment was the presence of British troopsin Greece and the direct intervention ofBritish military representatives in the in-ternal affairs of Greece in behalf of agres-sive monarchist elements, especially in thepreparation of the referendum set for Sep-tember 1, 1946.Accordingly the Ukrainian representative,

pursuant to Article 35, Paragraph 1, of theCharter, asked the Security Council to placethe Greek situation on its agenda and toconsider without delay what measures itshould adopt in order to eliminate this threatto the peace.

The communication from the UkrainianS.S.R. was placed on the provisional agendafor the 54th meeting of the Security Councilon August 28, 1946. The representative of


the Netherlands questioned whether theUkrainian complaint, which was, he said, aseries of unsubstantiated accusations againsttwo Members of the United Nations, could beadmitted on the agenda in the form in whichit had been presented. If the Security Councilwere allowed to become a sounding board ofunsubstantiated grievances, its position wouldsink rapidly in the esteem of the world. Therepresentative of the United Kingdom sug-gested that the representative of the Ukrain-ian S.S.R. be requested to recast his commun-ication in a different and better form.

Meanwhile, by a telegram dated August 28,1946, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ofGreece requested that the Security Councilgrant an adjournment of ten days for thediscussion of the Ukrainian statement ofAugust 24, 1946. Previously, by a telegramof August 26, 1946, the permanent representa-tive of Greece to the United Nations had in-formed the Security Council that in accordancewith Article 31 of the Charter, Greece wishedto participate in the Security Council's debateconcerning the Ukrainian statement.

By a letter dated August 29, 1946, theMinister of Foreign Affairs of the UkrainianS.S.R. informed the Security Council that hewas available in New York to give additionalinformation and necessary explanations onhis Government's application.6. Discussion of Procedural Questions

At the 58th meeting on August 30, 1946,the President proposed that the Council invitethe representatives of Greece and the Ukrain-ian S.S.R. to come to the Council table toanswer any points upon which information wasdesired by the members of the Council.

The representative of the United Kingdomraised the question whether it was proper toinvite the representatives of Greece and theUkrainian S.S.R. to come to the Council tablebefore it was decided whether to put theUkrainian complaint on the agenda. The repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R. remarked that therepresentatives of the Netherlands and theUnited Kingdom had said that the Ukrainiancharges required substantiation and that hecould not understand the objection to invitingthe Ukrainian representative to make supple-mentary statements.

A vote was then taken on the President'sproposal. Australia, Brazil, Mexico, the Nether-lands, Poland and the U.S.S.R. voted in theaffirmative; France, the United Kingdom and

the United States voted in the negative; Chinaand Egypt abstained.

The representative of the Netherlands con-tended that a question should not be takenup by the Council so long as some sufficientprima facie evidence had not been made out.The representative of Australia questionedwhether the Ukrainian charges representeda dispute or a situation as defined in Articles34 and 35 of the Charter. The representativeof the United Kingdom said that not a singleargument or fact had been adduced in supportof the allegation that the situation in theBalkans was to be attributed to the presenceof British troops in Greece. His Government,he stated, was perturbed by the procedureadopted in this case of using the SecurityCouncil for the purpose of obtaining wide dis-semination of unsupported charges.

At the outset of the 59th meeting of theSecurity Council on September 3, 1946, thePresident of the Council read a letter datedSeptember 1, 1946, from the Ukrainian For-eign Minister protesting against attempts topreclude discussion of his statement. He hadarrived in New York from the Paris PeaceConference, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministerstated, in order to explain the point of viewof his Government and to substantiate withfacts and documents his statement of August24.

The representative of the United Statesstated that the position of his Government hadconsistently been that the Council could notdeny an opportunity to present its case to anyMember of the United Nations which statedthat a condition existed which was likely tothreaten international peace and security. Aminimum of technical requirements shouldbe placed in the way of consideration ofsituations brought to the Council's attention.

The representatives of China and Mexicoendorsed the general principle that any com-plaints should be heard by the SecurityCouncil. The representatives of the Nether-lands and the United Kingdom stated that theyopposed the inclusion of the Ukrainian paperin the Council's agenda in its present form.

The Council voted 7 to 2 to include theUkrainian telegram of August 24, 1946, inthe agenda. China, Egypt, France, Mexico,Poland, the U.S.S.R. and the United Statesvoted in the affirmative; the Netherlands andthe United Kingdom voted in the negative;Australia and Brazil abstained.


c. Discussion of Substantive QuestionsAt the 60th meeting on September 4, 1946

the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.stated that in February the representativeof the U.S.S.R. on the Security Council hadwarned that aggressive monarchist elementsin Greece were making use of the presenceof British troops for the purpose of internalstrife against EAM and other democraticparties and unions and to facilitate the reali-zation of their aggressive plans toward othercountries. On February 4 Mr. Bevin hadpromised in the meeting of the SecurityCouncil that the British Government wouldwithdraw its troops from Greece and that hewould use his influence with the Greek Gov-ernment with a view to putting an end tofrontier incidents. Seven months had elapsedand the situation in Greece was worse thanin February.

The elections of March 31, the representa-tive of the Ukrainian S.S.R. charged, werecarried out with the help of terrorist meas-ures. Immediately after the elections theGreek Government began to remove republi-can elements and replace them with aggressivemonarchist elements. A month before theplebiscite of September 1, 1946, the tradeunions were dissolved. Punitive expeditionswere carried out against the national minori-ties. The British authorities were implicatedin these expeditions. Special military courtswere active in Greece trying, not Fascistcollaborators, but Greek patriots who tookpart in the resistance movement. Many of thejudges were persons who had collaboratedwith the Germans. Notorious collaboratorshad prepared and carried out the plebisciteof September 1, 1946.

The results of this plebiscite arose froma long intervention by the British authorities.The interference of the British Governmentin the internal affairs of Greece was a viola-tion of Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.further stated that the question of theplebiscite ceased to be a purely internalquestion for Greece from the moment whenthe present Greek Government made thisplebiscite an instrument for the carrying outof aggressive plans against other peoples. TheGreek Government was demanding the dis-memberment of Albania, and had publishedclaims upon about one-third of the Albanianterritory. In the light of these facts the inten-

sification of frontier incidents assumed themost sinister significance. The provocationson the part of aggressive Greek elements,furthermore, were becoming a regular systemapplied to Greece's frontiers with other Bal-kan States.

The representative of Greece replied to thestatement of the representative of the Ukrain-ian S.S.R. at the 61st and 62nd meetings ofthe Security Council on September 5, 1946.He stated that the Greek contribution to theAllied cause had been publicly recognized evenby the U.S.S.R., Greece, therefore, expectedhelp and aid in its efforts to obtain the satis-faction of its just claims and the impositionof sanctions against certain neighbors whohad been the common enemies of Greece andof the U.S.S.R. The Greek people today werefeeling a certain bitterness not only becausethis help had been refused, but also because itwas under the impression that its neighbors,whether friends or enemies, were findingencouragement in the favor of the U.S.S.R.in going so far as to threaten or undertake awar of nerves against Greece.

The very modest demand expressed byGreece that northern Epirus be incorporatedin the national territory and that Greece'sfrontiers with Bulgaria should be rectifiedwere represented as a threat directed atGreece's neighbors.

If one could speak of a threat to peace inthe Balkans, the representative of Greeceasserted, this threat must be sought outsidethe confines of Greece. Both Bulgaria andAlbania were maintaining military establish-ments larger and more powerful than those ofGreece.

British troops had come to Greece in Novem-ber 1940 and again at the time of the libera-tion at the request of the Greek Government.These troops had remained in Greece at thewish and with the free consent of all thesuccessive Greek Governments.

The Greek representative stated that theelection of March 31, 1946, as well as theplebiscite of September 1, 1946, had beencarried out "in complete order, with everyguarantee of authenticity and in conditionssuch as to render incontestable the popularjudgment."

Albania, the representative of Greecestated, had been provoking incidents on theGreco-Albanian frontier with a view to con-tinuing the extermination of Greek elements


in northern Epirus. It was impossible, further-more, to believe certain of Greece's neighborsand their mouthpieces, when they denouncedthe persecution supposedly carried out againstnational minorities. So-called refugees whohad crossed the border between Greece andneighboring countries were Slavophobes com-promised by their criminal co-operation withthe Bulgarians and Germans, or Bulgariansbrought from Bulgaria by the Bulgarianauthorities during the occupation. Bulgariawas laying claim to Thrace and Macedonia,which it had occupied in 1941 when it struckat the back of the peoples of Greece andYugoslavia, who were fighting heroically, andopened the door to the German hordes. Todaythe Bulgarians were changing their mask.They were trying to obtain from the Allieswhat they were unable to obtain from Hitler.

The Albanians had acted in the same way.The representative of Greece mentioned anattack by members of a communist bandaimed at the overthrow of the regime inGreece, which, he said, had been carried outwith the help of the Albanian authorities.It appeared, moreover, that Russian militaryengineers were constructing a strategic routein Albania by which troops coming fromYugoslavia could be sent more rapidly to theGreek frontier. The Russians had reorganizedand equipped the Albanian army. There wasa Macedonian movement in northern Greece,the representative of Greece stated further,which had the support both of the Greek Com-munists and of the Macedonians born inGreece and which received propagandist sup-port from Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria.If the British armies were withdrawn fromeastern Macedonia, it was doubtful whetherthe Greek Government could prevent a coupby the leftists in that region.

The representative of Greece denied thatthe judges of the special tribunals were collab-orationists, and protested against accusationslevelled against the Greek army, the gendar-merie and the police. As regards the workers'unions the representative of Greece statedthat the measures taken by the Greek Gov-ernment were due to the protests of the greatmajority of the working class, who asked thatthe tribunals proceed to the verification ofthe lists of trade union members because ithad been proved that thousands of membershaving no connection with the working classhad got themselves entered as trade unionists.

The Greek representative criticized Greekextremists who desired to create disorderswith a view to using these disorders as aweapon for their revolutionary plans to obtainpower. The Government was obliged to repressvigorously these attempts against public order.EAM was trying to break the links betweenGreece and the great Allies, and to establisha dictatorship in Greece controlled fromabroad which would deprive the Greeks oftheir freedom.

The whole of the Yugoslav press and radio,the representative of Greece remarked, hadbeen showering insults upon Greece. Recentlysemi-official organs of the Yugoslav press hadbeen carrying on a campaign against the na-tional claims of Grece, which they representedas manifestations of a Greek chauvinismissuing from reactionary circles and endanger-ing peace in the Balkans.

The representative of Greece stated thatthe representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R.was inspired by a desire to support the Greekanarchists in their subversive campaign andto intimidate the Government of Greece andthe Greek patriots who did not desire the de-struction of their country. The Ukrainian rep-resentative would only have to give a fewpieces of advice to the right quarters, andthe incursions of bands into Greek territorywould cease immediately.

At the 62nd meeting on September 5, 1946,the representative of the United Kingdomstated that the policy of his Government hadbeen explained to the Soviet Government atYalta and Potsdam and in Moscow in Decem-ber 1945. On none of these occasions did theSoviet Government have any proposals tomake or objections to raise. The chargesbrought against the United Kingdom weresimply a rehash of the charges previouslypresented in London. At that time Mr. Bevinhad proposed a four-power commission toinvestigate Greek frontier incidents, but therewas no response from the Soviet Governmentto the suggestion. The U.S.S.R. had beenasked to join the United Kingdom, Franceand the United States in supervising theelections. As they refused they had no rightto criticize from a distance.

The representative of the United Kingdomstated that Article 2, Paragraph 7, of theCharter did not say that no Member of theUnited Nations might maintain troops in theterritory of another Member. Actually the


Article provided that "nothing contained inthe present Charter shall authorize the UnitedNations to intervene in matters which areessentially within the domestic jurisdictionof any State."

d. Statement of the Representative of AlbaniaBy a letter dated September 5, 1946, the

representative of the People's Republic ofAlbania and Minister of State asked that onthe basis of Article 32 of the Charter he beinvited to the Council table for the purpose ofpresenting a factual statement in connectionwith the Ukrainian charges against Greece.

The representative of Australia agreed witha statement by the President of the SecurityCouncil that Albania could not be admittedunder Article 82 of the Charter, which pro-vides that States not Members of the UnitedNations may participate in the discussion of adispute, as the case before the Council had beenclassified as a situation under Article 34 ofthe Charter by the representative of theUkrainian S.S.R., and not as a dispute. Accord-ing to Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure, how-ever, the Council could "invite members of theSecretariat or other persons whom it considerscompetent for the purpose of supplying itwith information or to give other assistancein examining matters within its competence."The next stage in the proceedings of theCouncil, however, was to decide whether theCouncil should undertake an investigation ofthe Greek situation in accordance with Article34 of the Charter. Only after this decision hadbeen taken should the Council apply Rule 39in regard to the making of the statement ofthe representative of Albania.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. con-sidered that the request of Albania to makea statement to the Council was absolutelyjustified.

At the 64th meeting on September 9, 1946,the representative of the United Kingdomstated that it was quite clear that underArticle 32 the Council could not invite Albaniato the table. He considered that it was notintended that Rule 39 should override a pro-vision of the Charter and that under it arepresentative of a government not a Mem-ber of the United Nations could not be calledto the Council table.

The representative of China expressed doubtas to whether the phrase "other persons" inRule 39 included representatives of States. He

also stated that permission to supply informa-tion might not necessarily mean an invitationto the Council table. If some suitable methodor rule could be found, however, he would beglad to hear the representative of Albania.

The representative of the Netherlandsstated that Rule 39 did not seem applicablebecause in drafting the rule the representa-tives of the Council were thinking of experts.The representative of Albania had announcedhimself in his letter not as an expert but asthe "delegate of the People's Republic ofAlbania and Minister of State." As a matterof common sense, however, he did not see whythe Council should not hear an interestingwitness.

The representative of the United Statesstated that on a strict and technical interpre-tation of the Charter and the Rules of Proce-dure he was inclined to accept the opinion ofthe representative of the United Kingdom, buthe considered that the admission of the requestof the representative of Albania to the tablewas within the spirit of the Charter.

The Security Council voted 9 to 1 to invitethe representative of Albania to make a fac-tual statement before the Council, the UnitedKingdom voting in the negative, and the rep-resentative of Australia abstaining fromvoting.

The representative of Albania stated at the64th meeting on September 9 that he refutedthe "absurd" Greek charge that Albaniawas in a state of war with Greece. TheGovernment of the People's Republic of Al-bania was not, and did not wish to be in astate of war with Greece.

During the war Albania had collaboratedin fraternal harmony with the resistanceforces of the people of neighboring countries,including those of Greece. After the war, be-cause of the changed situation in Greece, therehad come into power the kind of men whotried with every means at their disposal tocreate enmity between Greece and Albania.The results of this policy were as follows: (1)Greek provocations on the Albanian border,(2) systematic extermination of the Albanianminority in Greece, (3) absurd Greek claimsto southern Albania and (4) accusations, fab-rications and unbridled lies against Albania.

Greek terrorists were continuing to causefrontier provocations. The Albanian minorityin Greece had been savagely persecuted andstill was being most inhumanly persecuted.


The Greek Government was aiming to grabsouthern Albania.

The Albanian representative, therefore,asked that the Security Council should putan end to the present situation by obligingthe Greek Government to cease its provoca-tions on the Albanian border and to stop itsinhuman persecution of the Albanian minorityin Greece.

In answer to the representative of Albaniathe representative of Greece repeated that,technically speaking, a state of war existed be-tween Albania and Greece because after thedeclaration of war by Albania on Greece therewas no peace treaty and no armistice. He citedtwo documents to show that there had beenno Albanian resistance movement at the timeof the Axis attack on Greece. ConcerningGreek territorial claims the Greek represen-tative stated that no one in Greece thought ofusing force in this connection. Greece hadbrought its case before the Paris Peace Con-ference, where it was discussed.e. Continuation of the Discussion of Sub-

stantive QuestionsThe representative of the United States

stated that there were three major questionson which there seemed to be conflicting views:(1) the question of border incidents alongthe Greco-Albanian border, (2) the treatmentof national minorities and (3) the questionrelating to the presence and activities of theBritish military forces in Greece. He saidthat certain specific Ukrainian charges couldbe disposed of as not having been substanti-ated. These were as follows: (1) that theGreek elections and referendum were falsi-fied, (2) that Greece was threatening the peacebecause she claimed that a state of war existedwith Albania, (3) that Greece was threaten-ing the peace because she had put forwardclaims for northern Epirus and (4) that un-bridled propaganda of the Greek monarchistextremists was endangering the peace.

The Australian representative stated thatin spite of its contribution to the Allied causeGreece had twice been charged before theSecurity Council almost as if she were anex-enemy country. One was compelled to askwhether the charges were real or whetherthey were to be regarded merely as a speciesof propaganda designed to place the Greekpeople and British troops in an unfavorableposition irrespective of the real merits ofthe case.

At the 65th meeting of the Security Coun-cil on September 10 the Ukrainian represen-tative quoted Generalissimo Stalin as havingsaid that every bankrupt Government triedto justify its weakness or failure by attrib-uting it to Soviet propaganda. He warnedthat the shadows of Munich were risingagain as if there had not been the greatestwar of all, in which the U.S.S.R. and theUkrainian S.S.R. suffered such enormoussacrifices. He stated that the essence of thequestion before the Security Council was this:the aggressive policy of the extreme Greekmonarchists had ceased long ago to be aninternal affair of Greece. He requested theSecurity Council to take measures withoutdelay to put an end to the situation whichhad arisen on the Greek-Albanian boundary,as this situation was threatening peace andsecurity and consequently fell under Articles34 and 35 of the Charter of the UnitedNations.

The representative of Brazil stated thatthe question of the presence of British troopsin Greece had been dealt with by the Secur-ity Council at the beginning of the year inLondon. The matter the Security Council hadto deal with now, therefore, was the Ukrain-ian representative's indictment of the GreekGovernment.

At the 66th meeting the representative ofthe U.S.S.R. said that the question discussedin London was the question of the withdrawalof British troops from Greece, but the mainquestion raised in the Ukrainian letter wasthe problem of the aggressive policy of thepresent Greek Government with regard toAlbania. This was a very serious questionand the Security Council had no right toignore the fact that on the Greco-Albanianfrontier there were systematic provocationsfrom the Greek military clique and systema-tic incursions into Albanian territory.

The representative of the United Kingdomsaid that at Yalta Marshal Stalin had ex-pressed complete confidence in the Britishpolicy in Greece; at Potsdam Foreign Com-missar Molotov, after reading a British mem-orandum, had agreed to drop the matter; afterdiscussion in London in September 1945, theSoviet Foreign Commissar had said that theBritish Foreign Secretary would hear nomore from the U.S.S.R. about Greece. InDecember 1945 the British Foreign Secretaryhad given a full explanation about Greece to


the Soviet Foreign Commissar, who hadagreed not to press the matter further andhad not asked that any specific action be taken.At the session of the Security Council ofFebruary 1946, the representatives of eightmembers of the Council had declared theirview that the presence of British troops inGreece did not constitute a situation likely toendanger the maintenance of internationalpeace and security. The representative of theUnited Kingdom repeated that in his viewthe representative of the Ukraine had failedentirely to substantiate his charges.

The representative of Greece assured theSoviet representative that if the Soviet Gov-ernment would advise the Albanian Govern-ment to cease the provocations by armed bandsentering Greek territory and the attacks ofregular and irregular Albanian forces, thesefrontier incidents would cease immediately.

At the 67th meeting of the Security Councilon September 16 the President of the Coun-cil submitted to the members a telegramfrom the Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairsdrawing the attention of the Security Councilto the situation created on the Greco-Albanianfrontier by the continual provocations due tothe action of Greek soldiers and requestingthe Security Council to use its influence toput an end to the Greek provocations.

At the same time the President of the Coun-cil received from the World Federation ofTrade Unions a letter which stated thatGreece did not guarantee the syndicalist rightsand social freedoms that other democratic andvictorious nations assured their workers andasked the Security Council to consider the ad-visability of an investigation of the infringe-ments of democratic rights in Greece.

f. Proposals and Resolutions

At the 67th meeting on September 16, 1946,the representative of the Netherlands, with-out making a formal proposal, said he won-dered whether it would not be an excellentthing if henceforth a complaint submitted tothe Security Council was placed in the firstinstance in the hands of a sub-committee ofthree members of the Council which wouldexamine it in a preliminary way and publisha preliminary report on the subject. If sucha report showed that there appeared to be agood case, then the matter would be takenup by the Security Council as a whole.

The representative of Australia repeatedthat the Australian Government did not be-lieve that the Ukrainian complaint had beenbrought in good faith. He moved a resolu-tion that the Security Council pass to thenext item of business.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. thensubmitted the following resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL ESTABLISHES) THEFACT:

That on the Greco-Albanian border therehave recently been an increasing number offrontier incidents provoked by aggressiveGreek monarchist elements, who are thusstriving to bring about an armed conflict be-tween Greece and Albania with the purposeof detaching southern Albania for the benefitof Greece;

That the persecution of national minoritiesin Greece by the Greek Government, by pro-voking national strife, is bringing strain inthe relations between Greece and her otherneighbours;

That the unbridled propaganda of the ag-gressive Greek monarchist elements demand-ing the annexation of territories belonging tothese neighbours, threatens to complicate thesituation in the Balkans, where for the firsttime, as the result of the victory won by thearmed forces of the United Nations, the foun-dation has been laid for the democratic devel-opment of the Balkan countries, and for theirclose collaboration in the cause of establish-ing a firm and lasting peace;

That in their policy of aggression the ag-gressive Greek monarchist elements are striv-ing to exploit the results of the falsified pleb-iscite held on 1 September under terroristicconditions, in which all the democratic partiesof various trends were removed from politicallife. They are likewise exploiting the pres-ence of British troops on Greek territory, whoin spite of the repeated declarations by theMinister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britainthat these troops would be withdrawn afterthe elections of 31 March 1946, continue to re-main even at the present time on the territoryof Greece;

That all these circumstances create a situa-tion envisaged by Article 34 of the Charter ofthe United Nations and endanger peace andsecurity.

For the above-mentioned reasons THE SE-CURITY COUNCIL RESOLVES to call upon theGreek Governments

(1) to take measures in accordance withArticle 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of theUnited Nations for immediate cessation ofthe provocative activities of the aggressivemonarchist elements on the Greco-Albanianfrontier;

(2) to call upon the Greek Governmentto put an end to the agitation regarding


the state of war which is said to exist be-tween Greece and Albania, in spite of thefact that Albania is endeavouring to establishnormal peaceful relations with Greece;

(3) to terminate the persecution of na-tional minorities in Greece, as contrary toArticle 1, Paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Charterof the United Nations;

(4) to retain on the agenda of the Secur-ity Council the question of the menacing situ-ation brought about as the result of theactivities of the Greek Government so longas the latter fails to carry out the recommen-dations proposed by the Security Council.

At the 68th meeting on September 17 therepresentative of Poland said that severalfactors in the internal situation of Greeceseemed to him rather alarming: (1) the par-ticipation of nazi collaborationists in thepresent administration and police force ofthe Greek Government, (2) the destruction ofthe free trade union movement under thepresent Greek regime and (3) the internalterror against the opponents of monarchistrestoration. He considered that the resolutionpresented by the representative of the U.S.S.R.provided a means of avoiding immediate in-ternational conflict. The resolution, essen-tially, contained only two very modest andmoderate demands: (1) that the Greek Gov-ernment stop considering itself in a state ofwar with Albania, and (2) that the persecu-tion of national minorities be stopped.

At the 69th meeting on September 18 therepresentative of the United States saidthat under instructions from his Governmenthe would vote against the Soviet resolution.He proposed that the Security Council shouldmake a further examination of the borderdifficulties between Greece and all three of hernorthern neighbors, not overlooking the prob-lem of national minorities insofar as itaffected international peace and security. Ifa sub-committee were established for thispurpose, it would have authority to examineincidents alleged to have taken place on bothsides of the border, with power to call uponAlbania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece forinformation regarding these incidents.

The representative of the United Kingdommaintained that the basis of the main Ukrain-ian charge was patently absurd. He supportedthe proposal of the representative of Aus-tralia, which would simply dismiss the case.

The representative of the Netherlands pre-sented the following resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,Having been informed that a number of

frontier incidents have taken place on thefrontier between Greece on the one hand andYugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, on the otherhand,

INVITES the Secretary-General to notify theGovernments of the said countries on behalfof the Security Council, that the Council, with-out pronouncing any opinion on the questionof responsibility, earnestly hopes that theseGovernments, each in so far as it is concerned,will do their utmost, in as much as that shouldstill be necessary, to stop those regrettableincidents by giving appropriate instructions totheir national authorities and by making surethat these instructions be rigidly enforced.

At the 70th meeting on September 20 therepresentative of the United States submittedhis proposal in the form of a resolution asfollows:

RESOLVED, That the Security Council, actingunder Article 34 of the Charter, establish acommission of three individuals to be nomi-nated by the Secretary-General, to representthe Security Council on the basis of their com-petence and impartiality, and to be confirmedby the Security Council,

That the Security Council instruct the Com-mission :

(1) To investigate the facts relating tothe border incidents along the frontier be-tween Greece on the one hand and Albania,Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other,

(2) To examine the statements submittedto the Security Council concerning these inci-dents and such further information fromother sources as it deems necessary; and

(3) To submit to the Security Council assoon as practicable a report on the facts dis-closed by its investigation.

That the Commission shall have authorityto conduct its investigation in the area and.to call upon Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and.Yugoslavia for information relevant to its:investigation.

That the Security Council request the Secre-tary-General to communicate with the appro-priate authorities in the countries involved inorder to obtain permission for the Commissionto conduct its investigation in these coun-tries.

Before the Council proceeded to vote on theresolutions presented, the Secretary-Generalmade a statement concerning his own positionand the rights under the Charter of the Sec-retary-General. If the proposal of the UnitedStates representative should not be carried,he hoped that the Council would understandthat the Secretary-General must reserve hisright to make such inquiries or investigations


as he might think necessary in order to deter-mine whether he would consider bringing anyaspect of this matter to the attention of theCouncil under the provisions of the Charteror not.

g. Decision of the CouncilThe representative of Australia agreed that

the Council should vote on his resolution afterall other resolutions had been voted upon. TheCouncil, therefore, proceeded to vote on theother resolutions in the order in which theywere presented.

Upon the suggestion of the Soviet represen-tative the Council first voted on the first partof the Soviet resolution containing a descrip-tion of the situation in Greece, and then votedseparately on each of the four recommenda-tions contained in the second part of the reso-lution. The vote in each instance was asfollows: affirmative—Poland and the U.S.S.R.;negative—Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt,France, Mexico, the Netherlands, the UnitedKingdom and the United States.

The Netherlands resolution was rejected bya vote of 6 to 3. Brazil, China, Mexico, theNetherlands, the United Kingdom and theUnited States voted in the affirmative. Egypt,Poland and the U.S.S.R. voted in the negative.Australia and France abstained.

The representative of France remarked thatthe United States proposal to create a com-mission of inquiry fell under Article 29 ofthe Charter and therefore came under theheading of procedure. The representative ofthe U.S.S.R. considered that the United Statesproposal recommended the taking of measureswhich dealt with the substance of the ques-tion examined. France, China, the UnitedKingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R.had agreed at San Francisco to consider suchmatters, including investigations, as points ofsubstance and not procedure. The represen-tative of the United States considered thatfrom the text of the statement of June 7, 1945,by the four sponsoring Governments on votingprocedure, there was no doubt that the Sovietrepresentative's statement of the situationwas correct. The representative of Australiasaid that, if the commission to be establishedwas a subsidiary organ as defined in Article29, as indeed it was, then there was not theleast doubt that a procedural vote could gov-ern its establishment.

The representative of France did not press

his point, and the United States resolution wastherefore voted on as a matter of substance.The vote was as follows: affirmative—Brazil,China, Egypt, France, Mexico, the Nether-lands, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates; negative—Poland and the U.S.S.R.;abstaining—Australia. Although the resolu-tion obtained 8 affirmative votes, it was notcarried, as a result of the negative vote of theU.S.S.R.

The representative of Poland stated thathe would regret it if the Council finished con-sideration of the Greek case without arrivingat least some positive result. His Govern-ment had always attached great importanceto achieving positive, and if possible, unani-mous action. He, therefore, proposed thefollowing resolution:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, having consideredthe situation brought to its attention by theUkrainian S.S.R. decides to keep it on thelist of the matters with which the Council isseized.

The vote on the Polish resolution was asfollows: affirmative—Poland and the U.S.S.R.;negative—Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt,France, Mexico, the Netherlands, the UnitedKingdom and the United States.

The representative of Australia stated thathe considered some formal decision necessaryin order to remove an item from the agendaof the Council. He asked, therefore, that avote be taken on his resolution.

The representative of China pleaded withthe representative of Australia to withdrawhis resolution as the Council had been dividedoften enough in voting on previous resolu-tions. If the Australian resolution were con-sidered to be one of substance, and if, forexample, China should vote against it, thenthe situation would remain unsolved withno decision.

The representative of Australia said that, ifthere were a clear understanding that thevotes on the Polish and Soviet resolutionswere understood to be a decision by 9 votes to2 dismissing this item from the agenda ofthe Security Council, he would not press hismotion.

The representative of the U.S.S.R., as Presi-dent of the Council, then stated the followingruling:

That in view of the negative vote on thefourth point of my (U.S.S.R.) draft resolu-tion and in view of the negative vote taken on


the Polish resolution, there is no need to takea vote on the proposal to retain the matteron the agenda or to exclude the matter fromthe agenda. Further, since the Security Coun-cil has no other proposals on the substanceof the matter beside those which have alreadybeen voted upon the Security Council is readyto pass on to the next item on the agenda.

It was decided to ask the Secretary-Generalfor an additional explanation. The Secretary-General stated that in his opinion the Councilwas no longer seized of the Greek case andthat it was automatically taken off the agenda.

The representative of France agreed thatit was not necessary to vote on the Australianproposal, as the Council had already answeredthe question it raised in rejecting the Polishproposal.

In view of these three statements the Aus-tralian representative agreed to withdraw hisresolution.

7. THE GREEK QUESTION (GREEK COMPLAINT)

A communication from the acting Chair-man of the delegation of Greece dated Decem-ber 3, 1946, was sent to the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations asking him to bringto the attention of the Security Council underArticles 34 and 35 of the Charter a situationleading to friction between Greece and itsneighbors. The letter stated that the latterwere lending their support to the violentguerrilla warfare then being waged in North-ern Greece against public order and the terri-torial integrity of Greece. The situation, con-tinued the, letter, if not promptly remedied,was, in the opinion of the Greek Government,likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-national peace and security.

The Greek Government desired to draw theattention of the Security Council to the urgentnecessity for an investigation to be under-taken on the spot, in order that the causesof the situation might be brought to light.The Greek Government was confident that inthis way the charges brought by it might beconfirmed authoritatively, and means providedfor the settlement of the question.

A detailed memorandum in support of thisrequest was submitted with the letter, whichwas placed on the agenda of the SecurityCouncil at its 82nd meeting on December 10,1946. The representative of the United States,as President of the Council, reminded the

members that that was the third time in lessthan eleven months that the Security Councilhad been called upon to consider a matter inwhich the Greek Government was involved andhad a deep and intimate concern. As Presidentof the Council, he felt it his duty to state thatthe new complaint required the members ofthe Council to search with the utmost dili-gence for methods or devices which mightassist in eliminating the causes of what ap-peared to be a friction-laden situation, andto aid in providing for settled conditions inthat part of the Balkan area.

At that meeting the Council resolved toinvite the representatives of Greece and ofYugoslavia to participate in the discussionwithout vote. The representatives of Albaniaand Bulgaria, whose countries were non-mem-bers of the United Nations, were invited toenable the Security Council to hear such dec-larations as they might wish to make. It wasfurther resolved that should the SecurityCouncil find at a later stage that the matterunder consideration was a dispute, the repre-sentatives of Albania and Bulgaria would beinvited to participate in the discussion with-out vote.

At the 83rd meeting of the Council on De-cember 10, the representative of Greece stated,among other things, that acts of aggressionagainst Greece were being committed on thebasis of a systematic plan, worked out in mi-nutest detail, which had two tactical aspects:(1) intensive propaganda in favor of the in-corporation of Greek Macedonia in the Feder-al Yugoslav State of Macedonia, and (2) ac-tive assistance to the insurgent bands whichused the territory of Yugoslavia, Albania andBulgaria as operational bases for their raidsinto Greek territory.

The representative of Yugoslavia arguedthat the accusations against Albania, Bulgariaand Yugoslavia had no basis in fact. He con-tended that they were false and invidious, in-tended only to confuse the long-sufferingpeople of Greece and mislead democratic pub-lic opinion throughout the world. There wereno grounds for an inquiry based upon allega-tions that Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgariawere interfering in the internal affairs ofGreece. That would be a misleading way inwhich to approach this problem, he stated.As a positive solution to the problem, he pro-posed an investigation of conditions insideGreece at the earliest possible moment. This,


he was confident, would show where the causesof the present violent civil strife withinGreece lay.

Statements of the interested parties werecontinued at the 84th meeting of the Councilon December 16. The representative of Al-bania rejected the accusations made by theGreek Government and argued that the con-stant provocations of Greek soldiers alongthe Albanian frontier were arranged by theGreek Government for the purpose of pavingthe way for expansionist designs on Albania.

The representative of Bulgaria called to theattention of the members of the SecurityCouncil the present status of Bulgaria, a factwhich by itself, he said, disqualified the Greekaccusations entirely. He stated that ever sinceSeptember, 1944, Bulgaria had been and con-tinued to be under direct supervision of anAllied Control Commission, which, by meansof numerous organs, effectively exercisedimmediate, absolute and strict control overall Bulgarian territory. The fact remainedthat the Bulgarian Government, he continued,had not been notified by this Allied ControlCommission of any violations or irregularitiesalong any of the frontiers.

After hearing the statements of the fourGovernments directly involved in the case, theSecurity Council decided that the case wasof such a nature as made it appropriate forthe Council to invite Albania and Bulgaria toparticipate without vote in future discussionson the matter. The Council resolved to do soon the condition that Albania and Bulgariaaccept in advance, for the purposes of thecase, the obligations of pacific settlement pro-vided in the Charter. This condition was ac-cepted by both countries.

a. Commission of InvestigationAt the 85th meeting of the Security Coun-

cil on December 18 the representative ofthe United States proposed that the Secur-ity Council, without passing any judgment,establish a commission to ascertain the factsrelating to alleged border violations, withauthority to conduct on-the-spot investigationsin such areas of Albania, Bulgaria, Greeceand Yugoslavia as the Commission might con-sider necessary, and to report the results tothe Security Council. This draft resolution,modified and expanded by amendments pro-posed by the representatives of Mexico, Po-land and the United Kingdom, was adopted

unanimously at the 87th meeting of the Secur-ity Council on December 19, 1946.

The text of the resolution establishing aCommission of Investigation was as follows:

WHEREAS, there have been presented tothe Security Council oral and written state-ments by the Greek, Yugoslav, Albanian andBulgarian Governments relating to disturbedconditions in northern Greece along the fron-tier between Greece on the one hand andAlbania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other,which conditions, in the opinion of the Coun-cil, should be investigated before the Coun-cil attempts to reach any conclusions regard-ing the issues involved.

RESOLVES:That the Security Council under Article 34

of the Charter establish a Commission of In-vestigation to ascertain the facts relating tothe alleged border violations along the fron-tier between Greece on the one hand andAlbania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on theother.

That the Commission be composed of arepresentative of each of the members of theSecurity Council as it will be constituted in1947.

That the Commission shall proceed to thearea not later than January 15, 1947, andshall submit to the Security Council at theearliest possible date a report of the facts dis-closed by its investigation. The Commissionshall, if it deems it advisable or if requestedby the Security Council, make preliminary re-ports to the Security Council.

That the Commission shall have authorityto conduct its investigation in northern Greeceand in such places in other parts of Greece,in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as theCommission considers should be included inits investigation in order to elucidate thecauses and nature of the above-mentionedborder violations and disturbances.

That the Commission shall have authorityto call upon the Governments, officials and na-tionals of those countries, as well as suchother sources as the Commission deems neces-sary for information relevant to its investi-gation.

That the Security Council request the Sec-retary-General to communicate with the ap-propriate authorities of the countries namedabove in order to facilitate the Commission'sinvestigation in those countries.

That each representative on the Commis-sion be entitled to select the personnel neces-sary to assist him and that, in addition, theSecurity Council request the Secretary-Gen-eral to provide such staff and assistance tothe Commission as it deems necessary for theprompt and effective fulfilment of its task.

That a representative of each of the Gov-ernments of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and


Yugoslavia be invited to assist in the workof the Commission in a liaison capacity.

That the Commission be invited to makeany proposals that it may deem wise foraverting a repetition of border violations anddisturbances in these areas.

Soon after the adoption of the resolutionby the Security Council, the Secretariat ofthe United Nations began making prepara-tions for operations and transport of theCommission, and the eleven members of theSecurity Council appointed their representa-tives.

The representatives to the Commission ofInvestigation were as follows:

AustraliaRepresentative John D. L. Hood,

External Affairs Officer, LondonBelgium

Representative Lt.-Gen. Delvoie,former Military Attache, Paris

BrazilRepresentative Antonio Vianna,

First Secretary, BrazilianEmbassy, Madrid(Because of illness, GeneralSantos was unable to serve)

ChinaRepresentative

ColombiaRepresentative

Dr. Wunsz King,Ambassador to Belgium

Francisco Urrutia,Minister to Belgium

FranceRepresentative Georges Daux,

Professor of History, Uni-versity of Paris

PolandRepresentative

SyriaRepresentative

U.S.S.R.Representative

Jerzy Putrament,Minister to Switzerland

United KingdomRepresentative

Ihsan el-Sherif,Minister to Turkey

A. A. Lavrishchev,Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Moscow

R. T. Windle,Chief National Agent of theBritish Labour Party

United StatesRepresentative Mark Foster Ethridge,

Publisher, Courier-Journaland Louisville Times

The following liaison representatives wereappointed by their respective Governmentsto serve with the Commission pursuant tothe resolution of the Security Council:

AlbaniaRepresentative

BulgariaRepresentative

Col. Nesti Kerenxhi

George Kulishev,Former Minister of ForeignAffairs

GreeceRepresentative Alexander Kyrou,

Ministry of Foreign AffairsYugoslavia

Representative Josip Djerdja,Minister to Albania

The Commission assembled in Athens onJanuary 29, 1947, where it held 32 meetingsbetween January 30 and February 18. Itssecond main base of operations in Greecewas established in Salonika, where it held28 meetings from February 25 to March 22.

The main body of the Commission alsoundertook a number of field trips out of Salon-ika, during the period March 15 to 19. Themain body of the Commission left Salonika onMarch 24 - 25 for Sofia, Bulgaria, where itheld six meetings between March 26 andMarch 28. The Commission then proceededto Belgrade, Yugoslavia, where it held sevenmeetings between March 30 and April 2.

It soon became apparent to the Commissionthat in order to cover as wide an area aspossible in its investigation and to hear themaximum number of witnesses, it would benecessary for it to send out investigatingteams which could operate while the mainbody was functioning in its headquarters inAthens, Salonika, Sofia and Belgrade. Sevensuch investigating teams were established bythe Commission. The itineraries of the teamsand the categories of witnesses to be heardwere determined in a general way by theCommission.

The Commission received varying types ofevidence during the course of its work, in theform both of direct evidence from witnessesand of written and oral statements from theliaison representatives of the Albanian, Bul-garian, Greek and Yugoslav Governments, aswell as from individuals and from non-gov-ernmental organizations whose representa-tives were invited to appear before the Com-mission.


During the early meetings of the Commis-sion, there was considerable discussion as toits competence to request the Greek Govern-ment, informally and without publicity,to suspend the execution of death sentences.The Commission on February 6 decided torefer the question to the Security Council.Accordingly, a cable was sent to the SecurityCouncil of the United Nations in which theCommission requested that the Security Coun-cil deal with this matter immediately and in-form the Commission whether the action bythe Commission in requesting the Greek Gov-ernment to postpone the executions to becarried out for political offences was coveredby the terms of reference of the resolutionadopted by the Security Council on December19, 1946, which, inter alia, empowered theCommission to call on any national who mightassist the Commission with information rele-vant to its inquiry. The Commission was in-forming the Greek Government of its referenceto the Security Council for guidance on theaction and procedure adopted hitherto.

By a letter dated February 7, 1947, therepresentative of Greece to the United Na-tions stated that the Greek Government haddirected him to lodge the most emphatic pro-test in regard to the interference of theCommission of Investigation in the domesticaffairs of his country, contrary to Article 2,Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the UnitedNations and the terms of reference of theCommission.

The Security Council discussed the prob-lem on February 19, and declared that theCommission, acting under the resolution ofDecember 19, 1946, was not empowered to re-quest appropriate authorities in Albania, Bul-garia, Greece and Yugoslavia to postponeexecution of any persons sentenced to deathunless the Commission had reason to believethat examination of any such person as awitness would assist the Commission in itswork, and made its request on this ground.

On the basis of the resolution of the Secur-ity Council, a team of the Commission interro-gated some fourteen condemned persons witha view to ascertaining whether they had evi-dence of value to present to the Commission.Some were subsequently heard by the Com-mission, and some by teams.

It was agreed that the Commission shouldwrite its report in Geneva, Switzerland, wherethe first meeting took place on April 7.

In the meantime, however, the deputyUnited States representative on the SecurityCouncil, addressed a letter on March 25 tothe Secretary-General requesting that theGreek question to be placed on the provisionalagenda of the next meeting of the SecurityCouncil. This letter was placed on the agendaof the Council at its 123rd meeting on March28.

b. Proposal for Establishment of SubsidiaryGroup

The United States representative, speakingat that meeting, expressed the belief that theCommission of Investigation should continueits work, including its investigations alongthe northern Greek border, until the SecurityCouncil itself had disposed of the Greek case.He stated that it was necessary that the Com-mission members, following the preparationof its first report, come to the seat of theUnited Nations and be available for the Secur-ity Council until the termination of the Coun-cil's consideration of the Greek complaint.

He went on to state that because of theapproach of spring in northern Greece, itwas reasonable to expect an intensification ofthe activities of guerilla bands operating inthat area. In those circumstances, the UnitedStates was of the opinion that it was of theutmost importance that the Commission leaverepresentatives in the border area during thetime of the preparation of its report in Genevaand of the Security Council's consideration ofits report in New York. Such representativeswould be able to report immediately any vio-lations of the border and to furnish the Com-mission and the Security Council with anyadditional information which might come tolight or be needed in dealing with the case.The presence of representatives of the UnitedNations on the spot would also inevitably havethe effect of stabilizing the situation pendingSecurity Council action.

The United States representative statedthat on March 3 the Government of Greeceaddressed to the Government of the UnitedStates an urgent appeal for immediate addi-tional economic, financial and expert assist-ance. On March 12 the President of theUnited States, he continued, proposed to theCongress a program of assistance which thePresident believed would result in meeting theimmediate requirements of Greece and would


materially contribute to that country's eco-nomic and political recovery. The proposed pro-gram of assistance by the United States wasdirectly related to the act of the UnitedNations in creating a Commission of Investi-gation, he argued. A continuing Commission,combined with the proposed emergencyprogram of assistance by the United States,would advance the prospects of peace andsecurity in the northern area of Greece.Neither action would be effective if takenalone, for those were complementary and notconflicting proposals, the United States repre-sentative declared.

At the Security Council's 126th meetingon April 7, the representative of the U.S.S.R.stated, among other things, that the measurestaken by the Government of the United Statesin respect to Greece and Turkey seriouslyundermined the authority of the United Na-tions organization and inevitably produceddistrust in relations among the Members ofthe United Nations. He went on to state thatthe attempt of the United States Governmentto connect post-factum its action in regard tothe above countries with the work of theSpecial Commission of the Security Council inGreece was unfounded and only emphasizedthe danger of the blow to the authority of theUnited Nations which was dealt by a unilater-al move of the United States Government. Heconcluded by stating that the actual materialaid which the Greek people were in need of,could and must be real aid, and must not serveas a screen for purposes which had nothingin common with aid at all. Aid must berendered through the United Nations, inwhich case it would exclude all possibilitiesof any foreign influence on Greece.

At the same meeting, the representative ofthe United States submitted a draft resolu-tion, amended by the representative of France,requesting the Commission of Inquiry, pend-ing a new decision of the Security Council, tomaintain in the area concerned a subsidiarygroup composed of a representative of each ofthe members of the Commission.

The U.S.S.R. representative also formallyproposed that a committee should be set upto ensure that the help given to Greece shouldbe used exclusively in the interests of theGreek people.

At the 131st meeting of the Council onApril 18, the Security Council, by 9 votes infavor and with Poland and the U.S.S.R. ab-

staining, adopted the following United Statesresolution as amended by the representativeof France:

RESOLVED, that pending a new decision ofthe Security Council, the Commission, estab-lished by the resolution of the Council of De-cember 19, 1946, shall maintain in the areaconcerned a subsidiary group composed ofa representative of each of the members ofthe Commission to continue to fulfil such func-tions as the Commission may prescribe inaccordance with its terms of reference.

In pursuance of the resolution of the Secur-ity Council, the Commission of Investigationestablished a Subsidiary Group with head-quarters at Salonika on April 30, composedof a representative of each of the members ofthe Commission. The terms of reference ofthe Subsidiary Group were those set out inthe resolution of the Security Council of De-cember 19, 1946, with the following qualifica-tions: (1) it was to investigate such incidentsas might be brought to its attention which hadoccurred since March 22, 1947; (2) it was notto hear evidence which had been or could havebeen available to the main Commission; (3)no incident was to be investigated nor evi-dence heard except by formal decision of theSubsidiary Group. Members of the SubsidiaryGroup left Geneva for Salonika on May 6 and10, 1947, to begin their work.

By cablegram dated May 5, 1947, the Chair-man of the Commission informed the Presi-dent of the Security Council that the Com-mission had decided to refer to the SecurityCouncil the question arising from the refusalof Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to ap-point liaison representatives to the SubsidiaryGroup. By cablegram dated May 6, 1947, theChairman of the Commission requested theopinion of the Security Council concerning theappearance of the Commission in New Yorkfor presenting its report. By letter dated May7, the representative of the U.S.S.R. requestedthe Secretary-General to place the Greek Ques-tion on the agenda for the next meeting ofthe Security Council. Discussion of the abovecommunications took place at the 133rd meet-ing on May 12.

At that meeting, the representative of theU.S.S.R., repeating the objections of the So-viet representative on the Commission ofInvestigation, drew attention to the fact thatit was quite impossible for the Commissionmechanically to transfer the functions and


powers which it had received from the Secur-ity Council to a Subsidiary Group; that if theCommission attempted to do this, the verysense and existence of a Subsidiary Groupwould lose all meaning. The Subsidiary Groupwould not, in fact, be a Subsidiary Group butwould be a commission. In other words, hecontinued, there would be not one commissionbut two commissions acting along parallellines. He went on to state that the Commis-sion adopted a resolution regarding thepowers and functions of the Subsidiary Groupwithout the participation of the representa-tives of Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia.Such a situation could not be approved.

It was decided at the 133rd meeting of theCouncil that the Commission of Investiga-tion as a body should appear in New York topresent its report to the Security Council.

At subsequent meetings of the SecurityCouncil, representatives of Yugoslavia, Al-bania and Bulgaria spoke against the termsof reference of the Subsidiary Group.

The Security Council at its 137th meetingon May 22, 1947, resolved to postpone furtherdiscussion of the Greek question until suchtime as the report of the Commission wassubmitted to the Security Council.c. Report of Commission of Investigation

The report of the Commission of Investiga-tion was made public on June 25, and theSecurity Council began its consideration ofthe document at its 147th meeting on June27, 1947.

The Commission's report consisted of threevolumes containing a total of 767 pages. Itwas divided into four parts and had nineannexes; it represented the work of 84 meet-ings held by the full Commission and 95 meet-ings held by its nine investigating teams.

Part I, which included a narrative accountof the work of the Commission, was approvedunanimously by the members of the Commis-sion. Part II, which included a survey of theevidence submitted to the Commission, wasapproved unanimously but with reservationson the part of the United Kingdom and theU.S.S.R. delegations.

Part III was divided into three Chapters.Chapter 1 consisted of the conclusions sub-scribed to by the delegations of Australia,Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, theUnited Kingdom and the United States. Thedelegations of Poland and the U.S.S.R. didnot approve these conclusions. The French

delegation abstained from approving Chapter1 and submitted a statement embodying itsviews. Chapter 2 consisted of the conclusionssubscribed to by the delegation of the U.S.S.R.The delegation of Poland supported theseconclusions. Chapter 3 set out the attitudeof the delegations to the conclusions con-tained in Chapters 1 and 2. Part IV, whichincluded proposals to be submitted to theSecurity Council, was approved by the delega-tions of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China,Colombia, France, Syria, the United Kingdomand the United States. The delegations ofPoland and the U.S.S.R. did not approve theproposals set out in Part IV, Chapter 1, andmade statements setting forth their attitudeon them.

Annex I contained the composition of theCommission; Annex II, the terms of referenceof the Commission; Annex III, the list of wit-nesses heard by the Commission and its teams;Annex IV, the bibliography of Commissiondocumentation; Annex V, field investigationsof the Commission and its teams. Annex VIcontained comments and oral statements madeby the liaison representative of Albania onParts II and III of the report. Annex VIIcontained comments and oral statements madeby the liaison representative of Bulgaria onParts II and III of the report. Annex VIIIcontained comments and oral statements madeby the liaison representative of Greece onParts II and III of the report. Annex IX con-tained comments and oral statements made bythe liaison representative of Yugoslavia onParts II and III of the report.

The survey of evidence submitted to theCommission covered the following:

(1) Charges by Greece that Albania, Bul-garia and Yugoslavia supported the guerrillamovement in Greece, and refutations by Al-bania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

(2) Greek charges that the neighboringcountries interfered in the internal affairs ofGreece, aiming at detaching from Greeceparts of its territories (Aegean Macedoniaand Western Thrace) and refutations byBulgaria and Yugoslavia.

(3) Greek charges in respect of provoca-tion of border incidents by Albania, Bulgariaand Yugoslavia; counter-accusations and refu-tations by Albania and Bulgaria; refutationsby Yugoslavia.

(4) Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav con-tentions that the present Greek regime was


responsible for a state of civil war in Greeceand for the disturbances in the northerncharges that a state of civil war existedtions. Contentions were the following:charges that a state of civil war existedthroughout the whole territory of Greeceand not only in the northern districts of thecountry; charges of persecution of the demo-cratic forces in Greece by the gendarmerie,regular troops and fighting bands; chargesthat persecution of national minorities (Mace-donians and Tchams) was one of the causesof the tense situation in Greece.

(5) Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslavcontentions that the Greek Government con-ducted a policy of provocations on the bordersof those countries, and Greek refutations.

(6) Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav con-tentions that the Greek Government con-ducted in respect of those countries a policyof provocation by the maintenance in Greekterritory of quislings and subversive activi-ties of these quislings in respect of Albania,Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and Greek refuta-tions.

(7) Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav con-tentions that the Greek Government conductedan expansionist foreign policy which was aprovocation to those countries, and Greekrefutations.

d. Summary of ConclusionsFollowing is a summary of the conclusions

reached by both the majority and the minoritygroup of the Commission:

Eight of the eleven delegations to the Bal-kan Commission—Australia, Belgium, BrazilChina, Colombia, Syria, the United Kingdom,and the United States—subscribed to the con-clusions contained in the Commission's report.The delegations of Poland and of the U.S.S.R.did not approve these conclusions.

The report also included conclusions whichwere approved by the U.S.S.R. and Polandbut were not accepted by the other nine dele-gations.

The French delegation abstained fromapproving the majority conclusions.

It was a majority conclusion that Yugoslaviaand, to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria,had supported the guerrilla warfare inGreece. Although the liaison representativesof Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia re-peatedly denied the Greek charges to thiseffect, and attacked the credibility of the

witnesses who testified in support of thecharges, little direct evidence was broughtforward to disprove them, the majority re-port stated.

The Soviet conclusions questioned the credi-bility of the evidence presented on behalf ofGreece. In many cases, the Soviet statementsaid, the Greek authorities selected their wit-nesses from fascist and criminal elements.There was evidence that threats, torture, andblackmail were used in the prisons of Greecein order to obtain appropriate statements forthe Commission. Repressive measures weretaken by the Greek authorities against per-sons and organizations who appealed to theCommission. There was evidence that a numberof statements contained in the White Bookentitled "Evidence in Confirmation of theGreek Complaint to the Security Council"were falsified.

Further, the Soviet statement declared, thegiving of shelter and medical treatment topolitical refugees was not contrary to theuniversally recognized standards of inter-national law.

YUGOSLAVIA.—In the case of Yugoslavia,the majority conclusions cited evidence thatassistance was rendered in that country tothe guerrillas in the form of training refugeesfrom Greece, recruiting and dispatching themto Greece for action with the guerrilla unitsthere, supplying them for this purpose witharms, supplies, transport, guides, hospitaliza-tion, etc., and providing an avenue of escapefor guerrillas fleeing from Greek Governmentforces.

In regard to the refugee camp at Bulkes,In Yugoslavia, the report stated that evidencewas received that a special course for guerrillaleaders was established there in the springof 1946, and that subsequently actual trainingin partisan warfare was given to selectedpersonnel among the refugees.

At the time of the Commission's visit tothe camp on April 2, 1947, it was unable tofind evidence of military activities or training,but there was no doubt that refugees fromGreece were subjected to political indoctrina-tion and propaganda looking toward the over-throw of the Greek Government, the reportsaid.

The Soviet statement, in turn, concludedthat all the charges brought against Yugo-slavia by the Greek Government must be con-sidered as unfounded. By the use of bribery,


blackmail and compulsion, the Greek authori-ties induced witnesses to give false statements.The documents and witnesses submitted bythe Yugoslav representative refute these "con-coctions," it said.

ALBANIA.—The majority conclusions found,in the case of Albania, that Greek refugees ina camp at Rubig received political instructionas well as practical and theoretical militarytraining, but not after October 1945, whenthey were transferred to Bulkes, in Yugo-slavia.

The evidence indicated, however, that, aslate as November, 1946, Albanian assistanceto the Greek guerrillas continued in the formof providing arms and ammunition, as wellas making available routes of entry, guides,and liaison assistance for guerrilla groupsreturning to Greece from both Albania andYugoslavia.

Witnesses testified that, after the VarkizaAgreement of February 12, 1945, formermembers of ELAS (the military arm of EAM,the National Liberation Front) were advisedby KKE (the Communist Party of Greece)or by their ELAS comrades to cross intoAlbania, as well as into Bulgaria and Yugo-slavia, to avoid persecution.

The Soviet statement, on the other hand,contended that it was clearly shown to theCommission that the real cause of the massemigration of the former combatant-membersof ELAS and of democratically-minded citi-zens of Greece was, in general, the terrorismand persecution carried on against this cate-gory of citizens.

It should be considered as established, theSoviet statement declared, that Greek demo-crats and former participants in the resis-tance movement fled in thousands to Albaniaand other countries bordering on Greece fromthe terrorism carried on by Rightist bands,the police, and the gendarmerie in order tosave their lives and not in order to organizeany hostile actions directed against Greece.

BULGARIA.—In the case of Bulgaria, themajority conclusions stated that the Commis-sion felt that the weight of the evidence indi-cated that aid was provided to the Greekguerrillas by the Bulgarian Government, inthe form of assistance in entering and leavingBulgarian territory, provision of transporta-tion for guerrillas crossing Bulgaria to andfrom Yugoslavia, and hospitalization of guer-rillas wounded in Greece. Less evidence was

provided, however, on the arming and equip-ping of guerrillas.

In this case, too, the Soviet statement de-clared that it was clear from the documentsexamined that the evidence submitted onbehalf of Greece—evidence founded on thecontradictory and false statements of wit-nesses—in no way confirmed the accusationsbrought against Bulgaria of aiding the Greekguerrillas.

The next charge dealt with in the majorityconclusions was the Greek Government's alle-gation that support was being given by theYugoslav and Bulgarian Governments, throughpropaganda and otherwise, looking towardthe detachment of the province of Macedoniafrom Greece and its incorporation, togetherwith Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonia, intothe Federated Peoples's Republic of Yugo-slavia.

The Commission stated as its majorityopinion that unrest and discontent on thepart of the Slavic minority in Greek Mace-donia resulted from the treatment accordedby Greece, and that this situation provideda fertile breeding ground for separatist move-ments. This did not, of course, absolve thenorthern neighbors from their responsibilityfor their support of the Macedonian move-ment, the report stated.

It continued: "Although it is undoubtedlytrue, as pointed out by the Yugoslav liaisonrepresentative, that during the war the Axisoccupying authorities had themselves sup-ported a Macedonian autonomist movement inan effort to create controversy among theBalkan states, it seems equally clear thatsince the war the Yugoslav and BulgarianGovernments, by speeches of responsibleofficials and articles in the press, have them-selves revived and promoted a separatistmovement among the Slavo-Macedonians inGreece."

The Soviet conclusion, on the other hand,stated that it was evident that the so-calledMacedonian autonomy movement was aimedagainst Yugoslavia, that its object was to com-plicate the relations between the Balkanstates, and that the leaders of this movementwere in touch with reactionary circles inGreece.

The Greek representative's statement thatBulgaria allegedly was carrying on intensivepropaganda to annex Greek Macedonia toYugoslavia, and his surmise that Bulgaria


was doing this in order to get Yugoslavia tosupport its claims to Western Thrace, wereentirely uncorroborated, the Soviet statementsaid. The representatives of Yugoslavia andBulgaria had clearly stated that their coun-tries had no aggressive intentions in regardto Greece.

The territorial aspects of Macedonian andAegean questions, the Soviet statement con-tinued, did not come under the terms of refer-ence of the Commission, and therefore couldnot be considered by it.

It was obvious, it concluded, that the GreekGovernment raised the Macedonian questionin order to conceal the real causes of the civilwar in Greece, and to disclaim responsibilityfor the tense situation inside the country.

The majority conclusions pointed out thatthe Greek Government charged that Albania,Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were deliberatelyprovoking incidents on their common frontiers,and that in turn Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugo-slavia made similar accusations againstGreece. The incidents brought to the Commis-sion's attention ranged from penetrations ofa few yards across the border to sheep-steal-ing and exchanges of shots between frontierguards.

The evidence showed clearly that since thewar there had been a large number of viola-tions on each side. On the other hand, no evi-dence of probative value was introducedwhich tended to indicate that the frontierviolations not connected with guerrilla activi-ties were deliberately provoked either by theGovernments of the northern neighbors orby the Government of Greece, or that therewas any policy of systematic provocation oneither side, or that the incidents themselveswere evidence of the aggressive intentionsof either country.

The conclusion was inevitable, however, thereport continued, that the large number ofincidents, the accusations, and counter-accu-sations made by the Governments against oneanother, and the willingness of the authoritieson both sides to magnify minor incidents intoimportant skirmishes, accompanied by shoot-ing and bloodshed, were evidence of thestrained relations between the countries.

In regard to these frontier incidents, theSoviet statement submitted that, in view of thegreat number of important discrepancies andcontradictions between the Greek Govern-ment's memorandum to the Security Council

of December 3, 1946, and the White Book on"Greek Frontier Incidents," and also betweenthe English and French texts of the WhiteBook itself, these documents could not be ac-cepted as proof of the Greek assertions.

Also cited were contradictory statements bywitnesses and the fact that several sectors ofthe frontier were entirely unguarded by theGreek frontier authorities, who thus wereunable to observe, far less to describe, theincidents in detail.

There could be no doubt, it continued, thatthere were crossings of the frontier intoneighboring countries from Greece, but thepersons involved were escaping from persecu-tion and terrorism in Greece. The Govern-ments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslaviacould not be charged with unfairness towardsGreece for giving shelter to these refugees.

The conclusion drawn in the Soviet state-ment was that there had been no violations ofthe Greek frontiers on the part of Albania,Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia which could causedisorder and civil war in Greece.

The majority conclusions stated that it wasfelt by the Commission that insofar as itmight constitute a factor contributing to thedisturbed conditions in northern Greece alongthe Greek frontier, the Greek internal situa-tion could not be ignored, despite the GreekGovernment's position. This position was thatan investigation of the Albanian, Bulgarian,and Yugoslav charges that the present re-gime was responsible for a state civil warin Greece and for the disturbed conditions inthe northern provinces would involve theinternal affairs of Greece, which were notwithin the Commission's competence. On thesegrounds the Greek Government did not pre-sent evidence in refutation, and in consequencethe evidence before the Commission was one-sided.

The evidence revealed that the great major-ity of the clashes between the guerrillas andthe forces of the Greek Government hadoccurred in the northern Greek provinces ofEpirus, Macedonia, and Thrace.

Yet, while conditions in northern Greecewere far more acutely disturbed than else-where, there was a general condition of un-rest in Greece as a whole. The Commission didnot find, however, that this condition amountedto a state of civil war. An important factorin this unrest was the persistent effort of theGreek Communist Party, which directed the


EAM coalition and the operations of theGreek guerrillas, to participate in the Gov-ernment without elections.

Although there was some testimony indi-cating political activities against Albania,Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the part of Al-banian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav "war crimin-als and quislings" interned in Greece, theCommission did not feel that the GreekGovernment itself encouraged it. The Com-mission was of the majority opinion that thecharge that the internees received preferentialtreatment was refuted.

Further, the majority view was that the dis-crimination and persecution to which minori-ties and political opposition groups were sub-jected by the Greek Government in the atmo-sphere of bitterness and reprisal after thecivil war of 1944-45, as well as Communistpropaganda, had caused several thousand per-sons to flee to the mountains or take refugeon the soil of Greece's three northern neigh-bors, where they formed groups actively hos-tile to the Greek regime.

To this extent, it was the Commission'sopinion that the present general disturbedconditions in Greece, which had existed sincethe beginning of the war, were factors whichhelped to explain, and thus bore an indirectrelation to, the situation investigated by theCommission.

On the other hand, the existence of dis-turbed conditions in Greece in no way relievedthe three northern neighbors of their dutyunder international law to prevent and sup-press subversive activity in their territoryaimed against another government, nor didit relieve them of direct responsibility fortheir support of the Greek guerrillas.

A contrary view was taken in the Soviet con-clusions, which declared that the present situa-tion in Greece was one of civil war throughoutthe whole country. The situation and civilwar were the result of internal causes and,above all, of the persecution and terrorismcarried on against the democratically-mindedcitizens and national minorities by the gen-darmerie, regular troops, and Rightist bands.

The assertions of the Greek Government re-garding the alleged interference of Albania,Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia in the internalaffairs of Greece were absolutely unfounded,the Soviet delegation contended.

The Commission did not regard the settle-ment of territorial claims raised before appro-

priate international bodies as coming withinthe scope of its work. It nevertheless felt thatthe continued reiteration of Greece's claimsagainst Bulgaria (regarding strategic fron-tier rectifications), and Bulgaria's claim tothe province of Western Thrace, after theyhad been rejected at the Peace Conference, aswell as Greece's claim against Albania (fornorthern Epirus), were factors which tend toincrease the tension between the countries.The Commission noted that the EAM coalitionsupported Greek territorial claims, bothagainst Albania and Bulgaria, and was there-fore in the same position as the Greek Gov-ernment in this regard, the report stated.

The Soviet conclusion relative to territorialclaims was linked with the charges of Greekprovocations on its northern borders and ofthe harboring of war criminals and collabora-tionists who fled from the neighboring coun-tries into Greece.

It was evident, the Soviet statement said,that after the expulsion of the occupationforces from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugo-slavia, and after establishment of democraticregimes in these countries, the former agentsand direct accomplices of the occupationauthorities and all kinds of war criminals fledfrom these countries to Greece. They werenot only welcomed by the Greek authorities,but were also used in the struggle againstthe democratic elements of Greece. Theiractivities were directed against Albania, Bul-garia, and Yugoslavia and against the demo-cratic regimes of those countries.

The "expansionist tendencies of the presentruling circles of Greece" in regard to theirnorthern neighbors should also be noted, theSoviet statement declared.

In a declaration in which it supported theconclusions subscribed to by the U.S.S.R., thePolish delegation stated that the Commissiondid not determine that the Albanian, Bul-garian, and Yugoslav Governments had pro-voked or supported the civil war in Greece;did not determine the existence in Greek Mace-donia of a separatist movement inspired byBulgaria or Yugoslavia; and did not determinethat the three Governments were responsiblefor the frontier incidents investigated pur-suant to the Greek appeal to the SecurityCouncil.

Regarding the internal situation in Greece,the Polish delegation concluded that the civil


war taking place on the whole of Greek terri-tory constituted the principal cause of dis-orders in northern Greece and originateddirectly from the abnormal internal politicalsituation; and that the disturbed situation innorthern Greece and along the frontier wasconsiderably increased by the persecutions onthe part of the Greek "Government againstnational minorities.

The Commission was not competent to ex-amine territorial claims, but the existence inGreece of jingoist propaganda must be ob-served, the Polish declaration stated. Pat-terned on the model of racial propaganda anddirected particularly against the Slavs, it didnot encounter any hindrance from the GreekGovernment, and was sometimes linked withfrontier incidents directed against the threeneighboring countries, the statement con-cluded.

A statement by the delegations of Belgiumand Colombia was also included in the Com-mission's report. This declared that, despite thenumerous presumptions which fitted in witheach other, tending to substantiate the chargesbrought by Greece against its northern neigh-bors, the Belgian and Colombian delegationsconsidered that it was not for the Commis-sion, which was set up in the spirit of concilia-tion of Chapter VI of the Charter of theUnited Nations (the chapter which dealt withthe pacific settlement of disputes), to give anydecision as to the possible responsibility ofthe Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav Gov-ernments.

In abstaining from approving the majorityconclusions, the delegation of France alsomade a statement in which it expressed doubtas to the necessity, and apprehension as tothe advisability, of including formal conclu-sions in the report.

The French delegation contended that theCommission was instructed to verify facts,not to pronounce judgment on those facts, atask which the Security Council envisagedfor itself.

Further, the Commission could propose defi-nite recommendations to the Council withoutbasing them on formal conclusions. The pro-posals had infinitely more chance of beingadopted by the Council and put into practicewillingly by the States in question if they didnot come as a corollary to a formal divisionof responsibility.

Conditions under which the inquiry wascarried out were probably not such as to allowthe Commission to draw from it any conclu-sions based on sound juridical principles, andit therefore seemed unjustified to base con-clusions on incomplete evidence.

No conclusions implying condemnation, inmost of the cases dealt with in the report,could be formulated except in the light ofwhat had happened in Greece and elsewhere inthe Balkans since 1940, the statement con-tinued. To give a correct interpretation tothe heated but contradictory statements ofthe various witnesses, and also to their reti-cences, a number of events not covered by theinvestigation must be taken into account.

The task of the Commission should aimat pacification and reconciliation, the state-ment declared. The future was of more con-sequence than the past. "It is to be feared thatin reaching conclusions with insufficient legalfoundations, we might only aggravate analready critical situation and do unnecessaryharm to perfectly natural sensitivities. . . .The problem which has to be solved was initi-ated before the birth of the United Nations;a summary decision and a simple solution areequally impossible."

e. Proposals of the CommissionThe Commission made the following pro-

posals in pursuance of the final paragraphof the Security Council's resolution of Decem-ber 19, 1946:

CHAPTER IProposals

Before coming to its actual proposals theCommission feel it would be useful to recapitu-late in brief the situation along Greece'snorthern border which these proposals aredesigned to alleviate and remedy. First thereare the allegations by the Greek Governmentthat its three northern neighbors are assistingthe guerrilla warfare in Greece. Secondly,there is the present disturbed situation inGreece which is a heritage from the pastand the causes of which are to be found inGreece's tragic experience during the war,in her occupation by the Italians, Germansand Bulgarians, in the guerrilla warfarewaged during the occupation and the. politicalbitterness and economic difficulties to whichthis war gave rise.

Next to be mentioned is the refusal ofmost of the countries concerned to accept asfinal their frontiers as at present defined.Some of these claims have been advanced ina perfectly legitimate manner before the forumof the United Nations or other competent


international instances but their reiterationhas undoubtedly exacerbated an already dan-gerous situation.

Furthermore in the case of the Macedonianquestion, claims have been ventilated not be-fore the United Nations but in speeches byrepresentatives of individual Governments orin government controlled organs of press. Theexploitation of the Macedonian question inthis manner is in the Commission's opiniona positive threat to the tranquillity of theBalkans and can only add to existing tensionand suspicion and increase national passionswhich, far from being decreased as the resultof the experience of the war, have been sharp-ened by their identification in many caseswith political ideas.

Also to be mentioned is the presence inGreece on the one hand and Yugoslavia, Bul-garia and Albania on the other, of politicalrefugees from each other's territory, many ofwhom have taken part in the political strug-gles which have raged in their own countriesboth during and since the war. Some of theserefugees have been quartered near the fron-tier of the country from which they came.Some again have, during their exile, engagedin political and military activity, and all toomany live in hope that there will be someviolent turn of the tide which will enablethem to return to their homes on the con-ditions they choose. Other of these refugeeshave been victims of panic flight and would,if given a free choice, gladly return to theirhomes. The continued presence of all of themunder the conditions in which they live atpresent is however all too clearly a seriouscontributory factor to the present situation.

Lastly the violence and scale of the propa-ganda used by some of the protagonists intheir relations with each other could notescape the notice of the Commission duringits stay in the four countries. Such propa-ganda always serves to inflame passions whichare already too high.

In such a set of circumstances it would beidle to believe that the situation in northernGreece could be cured by a stroke of the penbut the proposals which now follow have beenframed in the spirit of Chapter VI of theCharter of the United Nations with a viewfirst to preventing any aggravation of the sit-uation, and secondly to alleviating it and even-tually restoring it to normal.

The Commission has not made any sug-gestions in matters which are essentially with-in the domestic jurisdiction of the countriesconcerned as they would be contrary to theprovisions of Paragraph 7 of Article 2 ofthe Charter. However, in the event the GreekGovernment decides to grant a new amnestyfor political prisoners and guerrillas, theCommission suggests that the Security Coun-cil make known to the Greek Government itswillingness, if that Government so requests,

to lend its good offices in order to secure byall possible means the realisation of thismeasure.

The following are the Commission's pro-posals :

A. The Commission proposes to the Secur-ity Council that it should recommend to theGovernments of Greece on the one hand andAlbania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on theother, to do their utmost to establish normalgood-neighborly relations, to abstain fromall action direct or indirect which is likely toincrease or maintain the tension and unrestin the border areas, and rigorously to re-frain from any support, overt or covert, ofelements in neighboring countries aimingat the overthrow of the lawful governmentsof those countries. Should subjects of com-plaint arise these should be made not theobject of propaganda campaigns, but refer-red either through diplomatic channels tothe government concerned, or should thisresource fail, to the appropriate organ ofthe United Nations. In the light of thesituation investigated by it the Commissionbelieves that, in the area of its investigationfuture cases of support of armed bandsformed on the territory of one State andcrossing into the territory of another State,or of refusal by a government in spite ofthe demands of the State concerned to takeall possible measures on its own territoryto deprive such bands of any aid or pro-tection, should be considered by the SecurityCouncil as a threat to the peace within themeaning of the Charter of the United Na-tions.

B. With a view to providing effective ma-chinery for the regulation and control oftheir common frontiers, the Commissionproposes that the Security Council recom-mend to the governments concerned thatthey enter into new conventions along thelines of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention of1931, taking into account the needs of thepresent situation.

C. For the purpose of restoring normalconditions along the frontiers between Greeceon the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria andYugoslavia on the other, and thereby as-sisting in the establishment of good neigh-bourly relations, the Commission recommendsthe establishment of a body with the follow-ing composition and functions:

1) The body should be established by theSecurity Council in the form of either a smallCommission or a single Commissioner. Ifthe body is a small Commission it should becomposed of representatives of Govern-ments. If the body is to consist of a Com-missioner he and his staff should be nation-als of States who are neither permanentmembers of the Security Council nor haveany direct connection or interest in the af-fairs of the four countries concerned.


2) The Commission or Commissioner shouldhave the staff necessary to perform theirfunctions, including persons able to act asborder observers and to report on the observ-ance of the frontier conventions referred toin recommendation B, the state of thefrontier area, and cognate matters.

3) The Commission or Commissioner shouldhave the right to perform their functions onboth sides of the border and the Commissionor Commissioner should have the right ofdirect access to the four Governments ofAlbania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece.

The functions and duties of the Commis-sion or the Commissioner should be:

(i) To investigate any frontier violationsthat occur;(ii) To use its good offices for the settle-ment, by the means mentioned in Article33 of the Charter, of:

a. Controversies arising from frontierviolations;6. Controversies directly connected withthe application of the Frontier Conven-tions envisaged in B;c. Complaints regarding conditions on theborder which may be brought by onegovernment against another,

(iii) To use its good offices to assist thegovernments concerned in the negotiationand conclusion of the frontier conventionsenvisaged in recommendation B.(iv) To study and make recommendationsto the governments concerned with respectto such additional bilateral agreements be-tween them for the pacific settlement ofdisputes relating to frontier incidents orconditions on the frontier, as the Commis-sion considers desirable,(v) To assist in the implementation ofRecommendation D below; to receive reportsfrom the four Governments with respect topersons who have fled from any one of suchcountries to any of the others; to maintaina register for their confidential use of allsuch persons and to assist in the repatria-tion of those who wish to return to theirhomes, and in connection with these func-tions to act in concert with the appropriateagency of the United Nations,(vi) To report to the Security Council everythree months, or whenever they think fit.It is recommended that this body should

be established for a period of at least twoyears, before the expiry of which the necessityfor its continued existence should be reviewedby the Security Council.

D. The Commission recognises that owingto the deep-rooted causes of the present dis-turbances and to the nature of the frontiersit is physically impossible to control the pas-sage of refugees across the border. As thepresence of these refugees in any of the four

countries is a disturbing factor each govern-ment should assume the obligation to removethem as far as it is physically and practicallypossible.

These refugees should be placed in camps orotherwise segregated. The governments con-cerned should undertake to ensure that theyshould not be permitted to indulge in any po-litical or military activity.

The Commission would also strongly recom-mend that if it is practicable the camps con-taining the refugees should be placed underthe supervision of some international body au-thorised by the United Nations to undertakethe task.

In order to ensure that only genuine refu-gees return, their return to their country oforigin shall not take place except after (1) ar-rangement with the government of such coun-try and (2) notification to the Commission orCommissioner or to the international UnitedNations body if such is established. The Com-mission would here point out the desirabilityof the governments concerned encouraging thereturn of refugees to their homes.

E. The Commission proposes that the Se-curity Council recommend to the governmentsconcerned that they study the practicability ofconcluding agreements for the voluntary trans-fer of minorities. In the meantime minoritiesin any of the countries concerned desiring toemigrate should be given all facilities to doso by the government of the State in whichthey at present reside. The arrangements ofany such transfers could be supervised by theCommission or Commissioner who would actas a registration authority for any persondesiring to emigrate.

CHAPTER IIThe Delegations of Australia, Belgium,

Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Syria, theUnited Kingdom and the United States sub-scribed to the proposals set out in Part IV,Chapter I.

The Delegation of U.S.S.R. did not approvethese proposals and made the following state-ment:

The Soviet Delegation objects to the pro-posals put forward by the Delegations ofthe United States, United Kingdom, France,China, Brazil, Belgium, Colombia, Australiaand Syria on the Greek Question for thefollowing reasons:

1. The above-mentioned proposals in no wayproceed from the facts and documents gatheredby the Commission during the investigation ofthe situation in Northern Greece and on hernorthern frontiers, but are based merely onthe unfounded assertions of the Greek Govern-ment regarding aid to the guerrillas by thenorthern neighbors of Greece.

2. The proposals admit the possibility offrontier incidents, conflicts and even acts of


aggression in the future in the relations be-tween Greece on the one hand and Yugoslavia,Bulgaria and Albania on. the other, althoughthe Commission has no grounds whatever forproposals of such a nature.

3. The proposals contemplate measures con-cerning not only Greece but Yugoslavia, Bul-garia and Albania as well, although it is evi-dent from the documents at the disposal of theCommission that there is a tense situation inGreece and that disorders are taking placethere, not only in the northern part butthroughout the country, and that the tense sit-uation and disorders in Greece are due to in-ternal causes.

4. The establishment of a permanent fron-tier commission or body representing theSecurity Council, as contemplated in the pro-posals, and also the conclusion of conventionsand agreements between Greece, Yugoslavia,Bulgaria and Albania is tantamount to a limi-tation of the sovereign rights of these Statesin settling their relations among themselves.

The Delegation of Poland did not approvethe proposals set out in Part IV Chapter I andmade the following statement:

The Polish Delegation cannot approve of themeasures proposed by some delegations inPart IV for the solution of the problem whichhave formed the object of the investigation ofthe Commission.

The Polish Delegation makes the followingobjections:

1. The measures as a whole seem ineffectual,since they take into account only the symptomsand not the causes of the troubles existing innorthern Greece and along her northern fron-tiers. The fact that the measures proposed areineffectual could easily prejudice the prestigeof the United Nations.

2. Some of the measures proposed do notseem to take into account the fact that diplo-matic relations do not exist between Greece onthe one hand and Bulgaria and Albania on theother.

3. Concerning proposal C, which suggeststhe establishment of a permanent body of con-trol, this measure appears inadequate for thefollowing reasons:

(i) such a body of control would prejudicethe sovereign rights of Greece as well asthose of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia,(ii) it would constitute a measure of coer-cion toward Albania, Bulgaria and Yugo-slavia. This measure would be in no wayjustified by the results of the Commission'sinvestigation. Therefore, instead of improv-ing the existing difficulties it could quite welldo the opposite.

The Polish Delegation considers that thechoice of recommendations for the solution ofthe problems which form the object of the in-quiry should be left to the Security Council.

f. Resolution by United States RepresentativeThe Security Council began discussing the

report of the Commission at its 147th meet-ing on June 27, 1947. At that meeting therepresentative of the United States statedthat in the opinion of his Government thematter before the Security Council was oneof the most serious which the United Nationsup to that time had been called upon to con-sider. The action which the Security Counciltook in the case, he continued, would be ofvital importance to all Member States ofthe United Nations and might be a decisivefactor in strengthening the confidence of theworld in the effectiveness of the Council todeal with situations such as the one beforeit. He summarized the phases leading to theestablishment of the Commission, its workand its report. He went on to state that thefacts elicited had substantiated without adoubt the conclusions subscribed to by themajority of eight of the Commission's elevenmembers with respect to the Greek charges. Heargued that in supporting guerrillas in north-ern Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albaniahad been using force against the territorial in-tegrity and political independence of Greece.They had in fact, he stated, been committingthe very kind of acts which the United Na-tions was designed to prevent, and had vio-lated the most important of the basic prin-ciples upon which the organization wasfounded.

The United States representative statedthat his Government was convinced that theSecurity Council should at that stage in thecase continue to act under Chapter VI of theCharter, bearing in mind that if the actsand practices found by the Investigation Com-mission should continue, the Council wouldbe compelled to consider that there was nolonger a dispute, but that there existed athreat to the peace, a breach of the peace, oran act of aggression within the meaning ofChapter VII of the Charter. For those rea-sons, he proposed that the Security Counciladopt the substance of the proposals of theCommission. He submitted for the considera-tion of the Council the following resolution,which, he maintained, followed closely the textof the proposals:

The Security Council, having received andconsidered the report of the Commission of In-vestigation established by resolution of theCouncil dated 19 December 1946;


Convinced, on the basis of the Commission'sreport, that further action is required by theSecurity Council;

RESOLVES THAT:1. The Security Council adopts the proposals

made by the majority of the Members of theCommission;

2. In giving effect to proposals contained inparagraphs A, B, D and E the Security Councilhereby recommends to the Governments ofGreece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgariaand Yugoslavia on the other, that they takethe action proposed therein;

3. In giving effect to paragraph C of theseproposals, the Security Council for the purposeof restoring normal conditions along the fron-tiers between Greece on the one hand and Al-bania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other,and thereby assisting in the establishment ofgood neighborly relations, establishes a Com-mission as a subsidiary organ.

The Commission shall be composed of arepresentative of each of the Nations Membersof the Security Council as they may be fromtime to time.

The duties and powers of the Commissionshall be:

(1) To use its good offices for the settle-ment, by the means mentioned in Article 33of the Charter, of:

(a) Controversies arising from frontierviolations;(b) Controversies directly connected withthe application of the frontier conven-tions recommended to the four Govern-ments under this resolution;(c) Complaints regarding conditions onthe border which may be brought to theattention of the Commission by one gov-ernment against another;

and in order to carry out these tasks theCommission is empowered to make an inves-tigation of any frontier violations that occurand of any complaints brought by one gov-ernment against another in connection withthe application of the frontier conventions orregarding conditions on the border.(2) To use its good offices to assist the gov-ernments concerned in the negotiation andconclusion of the frontier conventions rec-ommended under this resolution.(3) To study and make recommendations tothe governments concerned with respect tosuch additional bilateral agreements betweenthem for the pacific settlement of disputesrelating to frontier incidents or conditionson the frontier as the Commission considersdesirable.(4) To assist in the implementation of therecommendations made to the four Govern-ments under this resolution with respect to

refugees; to receive reports from the fourGovernments with respect to persons whomay cross or have crossed from the territoryof any one of such countries to any of theothers; to maintain a register for its confi-dential use of all such persons and to assistin the repatriation of those who wish to re-turn to their homes; and in connection withthese functions to act in concert with the ap-propriate agency of the United Nations.(5) If called upon by any of the gov-

ernments concerned to supervise the ar-rangements for the transfer of minoritiesrecommended to such governments underthis resolution and to act as a registrationauthority for any persons desiring to emi-grate.(6) To have such other duties and powers asthe Security Council may determine fromtime to time.The Commission shall have its headquarters

in Salonika and shall have authority to performits functions on either side of the frontier.

The Commission shall have the right ofdirect access to the Governments of Albania,Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia and shall haveauthority to call upon the nationals and officialsof those Governments to testify before it onany matters coming within its competence.

The Commission shall establish its own rulesof procedure and methods of conducting itsbusiness.

The Commission shall render regularly quar-terly reports to the Security Council, or morefrequently if it thinks fit.

The Commission shall commence its work assoon as practicable and shall remain in exist-ence until 31 August 1949, before which datethe necessity for its continued existence afterthat date shall be reviewed by the SecurityCouncil.

The Commission shall have the staff neces-sary to perform its functions, including per-sons able to act as border observers and toreport on the observance of frontier conven-tions recommended under this resolution, thestate of the frontier area, and cognate matters.

After the representative of the United Stateshad completed his remarks, the Security Coun-cil, on the suggestion of the President, agreedto hear statements by the representatives ofthe four Governments concerned.

The representative of Greece was the firstspeaker. He stated that the Commission of In-vestigation had made certain recommendations.So far as those recommendations went, and inthe light of the powers of the Commission, therecommendations were good. Greece, he said,favored their adoption by the Security Council


and pledged itself to carry out its part inthem fully and in good faith. He went on tostate that the adequacy of those recommenda-tions, however, was open to serious question.

The representative of Albania, the nextspeaker, stated that the disturbed situation onthe Albanian frontier with Greece—whichAlbania regretted—was a situation provokedby Greece, which was prompted by an expan-sionist policy and which did not take accountof the desires of the peoples to live in peace.He went on to state that there was abundantdocumentation which showed that the causesof the civil war then in full swing throughoutthe territory of Greece were of an internalcharacter. He argued that Greek Governmentcircles provoked the civil war which was tak-ing place throughout Greece by their policy ofterrorism toward the democratic masses, andby their policy of uprooting national minori-ties. He claimed that there were Greek wit-nesses who by their false statements to theCommission of Investigation gained not onlyliberty but also the protection of the Greekauthorities. It had been found, he continued,that the Greek Government authorities hadexerted physical and moral pressure upon wit-nesses in order to bring false statements be-fore the Commission.

The Albanian representative concluded byasserting that the report of the Commissionsuffered from a marked incertitude. Five coun-tries had not wished the neighboring countriesof Greece to be declared responsible, he con-tinued, and, accordingly, Albanian responsi-bility had been declared by only six represen-tatives of the Commission. The result wasrather meager; it was not of a binding char-acter, he maintained.1

8. THE GENERAL REGULATION AND REDUCTIONOF ARMAMENTS AND INFORMATION ON ARMEDFORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By a letter dated December 27, 1947, ad-dressed to the Secretary-General, the repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R. submitted a proposalregarding the implementation of the resolutionadopted by the General Assembly on December14, 1946, on the "Principles Governing theGeneral Regulation and Reduction of Arma-ments". The letter advocated the establishmentof a commission, to be composed of the repre-sentatives of countries members of the Secur-ity Council, which should be charged with

preparing and submitting to the Council, with-in a period of not later than three months,proposals for the general regulation and re-duction of armaments and armed forces.

At its 88th meeting on December 31, 1946,the Security Council placed the U.S.S.R. pro-posal on its agenda, but discussion of the sub-stance of the question was postponed to a laterdate. The United States representative, how-ever, submitted a draft resolution at the meet-ing which proposed that the Security Councilgive first priority to the establishment of in-ternational control over atomic energy by con-sidering and acting on the report of the AtomicEnergy Commission to the Council. There-after, the proposal continued, the Council wouldconsider what further measures it should take,and in what order of priority, for the imple-mentation of the General Assembly resolution.

At the 90th meeting of the Security Councilon January 9, 1947, the U.S.S.R. representativecontended that the United States draft resolu-tion required the Council to consider at thepresent time only one question envisaged bythe General Assembly, namely, the control ofatomic energy, and left to the future the con-sideration of other questions. This procedurewas not in conformity with, but was rather acontradiction of the General Assembly resolu-tion. He argued that the Assembly resolutiondid not give any priority to consideration ofany questions involved but he emphasized thenecessity for the Security Council to proceedwithout delay with the working out of meas-ures on both questions—the general reductionof armaments and armed forces and the controlof atomic energy. The resolution did not pro-vide for postponement of consideration of anyof the questions set forth in it nor for post-ponement of adoption by the Council of appro-priate measures. The United States proposal,he contended, would lead to delay in the work-ing out of practical measures in the generalregulation and reduction of armaments andarmed forces, since it artificially made thesolution of this task dependent on the progressand results of the consideration of the reportof the Atomic Energy Commission.

1 The Yearbook of the United Nations coversevents only through July 1, 1947. The GreekQuestion continued to be discussed by the Coun-cil, and it should be noted that other viewpointsregarding the conclusions and the proposals ofthe Commission were subsequently expressed atthe Security Council, but are not here presented.


The United States representative felt thateffective international control of atomic energywas the key to the whole problem and mustcome first. He found it difficult to believe thatregulation of armaments generally could beeffectively achieved without general agreementon the fundamental problems relating to thecontrol of atomic energy. He felt that substan-tial progress in the crucial field of interna-tional atomic energy control was a prerequisiteto success in the general field of the regulationof armaments. Establishment of a system ofeffective regulation was fundamentally a prob-lem of devising effective international controlsand safeguards which would protect complyingStates against the hazards of violations andevasions.

In the view of the United States, he con-tinued, the field of atomic energy was a testcase. Unless the Council was able to devisesafeguards which the nations of the worldwould feel were adequate to protect themagainst the use of atomic weapons, they wouldhave no security. On the other hand, if theCouncil could devise an international systemwith the necessary safeguards to protect thenations from atomic weapons, the problem ofapplying these same principles to the lesserweapons should not prove of insurmountabledifficulty.

The Australian and French representativesexpressed the belief that simultaneous actionwas possible in both fields—atomic energyand armaments generally. In the opinion ofthe Australian representative, neither theU.S.S.R. nor the United States proposal ex-cluded the other. The representative of Francebelieved that the Security Council could com-bine the two studies and find a procedure en-abling the Council simultaneously to startwork on the report on atomic energy and tocreate a committee on disarmament and set itto work. He presented to the Council a draftresolution embodying those ideas.

The representative of Poland suggested thatthe Security Council adopt formally the resolu-tion of the General Assembly. He advanced alegal and a political reason for such action.With respect to the legal aspect, he stated thatalthough the Security Council was not boundautomatically to accept recommendations of theGeneral Assembly, by doing so it would helpto remove all legal doubts of the Council's be-ing bound to the recommendations containedin the resolution. From the political viewpoint,

it was important to take such action in orderthat the Council might manifest to the worldthat the purposes and recommendations con-tained in the resolution coincided with the ob-jectives which the Council wished to attain.

After these remarks, the President of theCouncil announced the Council's formal accept-ance of the resolution of the General Assembly.

At the 92nd meeting of the Security Councilof January 15 the representative of Australiasubmitted a resolution to the Council. He ex-plained that although the Australian delegationwas in general agreement with the purpose ofboth the United States and the U.S.S.R. reso-lutions, he did not think that either of them,taken by itself, would be sufficient to give effectto the recommendation which the SecurityCouncil had accepted. The Australian resolu-tion had therefore been drafted in an attemptto combine both the United States and theU.S.S.R. viewpoints, and to bring about actionwhich would meet the main purpose of bothof those countries and which would be likely tolead to concerted and co-operative action by allof the powers concerned in discharging thegreat responsibility placed upon the SecurityCouncil in respect of disarmament. It was theview of Australia that if its resolution were ac-cepted by the Council, then the new disarma-ment committee—proposed in the resolution—should commence work on general disarma-ment immediately, and the Atomic EnergyCommission should also continue its workwithout waiting for the formal endorsement bythe Security Council of its first report. Co-or-dination of the two bodies could be ensured bythe fact that their membership would be almostidentical with each other and with the SecurityCouncil. Moreover, their work would be underconstant review by the Security Council.

The representative of Colombia, at the 93rdmeeting of the Council on January 15, sub-mitted an alternative proposal which, he be-lieved, gave the constructive suggestions madeby the Australian and French delegations moreflexibility, and allowed a little more time to theSecurity Council to consider the various pro-posals.

At the same meeting the representative ofthe United States asked that a decision on thevarious proposals submitted be postponed fora period of approximately three weeks, inorder to allow himself—a newcomer to the de-liberations of the Council—and the new Secre-tary of State expected shortly in the United


States Government, as well as the Council itselfmore time to arrive at a decision deliberately.

At the 95th meeting on January 20, theCouncil adopted by 9 votes to 2 (Poland andthe U.S.S.R. voting against) a resolution sub-mitted by the representative of the UnitedStates to postpone discussion on the GeneralAssembly resolution on general regulation andreduction of armaments to February 4, 1947.

Discussion was resumed at the 98th meetingon February 4, when a new draft resolutionwas submitted by the representative of theUnited States. It proposed that the SecurityCouncil should establish a commission, com-posed of the members of the Council, whosefunction would be to make recommendationsto the Council regarding the practical meas-ures for the general regulation and reductionof armaments and armed forces. These meas-ures would include the provision of effectivesafeguards, but would not relate to thosematters which fell within the competence ofthe Atomic Energy Commission as determinedby the General Assembly resolutions of Jan-uary 24, 1946, and December 14, 1946.

The draft resolution further proposed thatthe Council should establish a committee ofthe Council consisting of a representative ofeach of its members, to make recommenda-tions regarding the terms or reference ofthe proposed commission, including its rela-tions with the Council, the Military StaffCommittee and the Atomic Energy Commis-sion.

At its next meeting after adoption of thedraft resolution, the proposal continued, theCouncil would begin consideration of the firstreport of the Atomic Energy Commissiondated December 31, 1946, with particularreference to the recommendations containedin Part III thereof.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. thenexplained why he was opposed to the newdraft resolution presented by the UnitedStates. Among other things, he stated thatthe proposal that the Council set up a com-mission of the representatives of countriesmembers of the Security Council repeated aproposal made in a Soviet motion on December27, 1946. The reference to the Atomic EnergyCommission, he contended, added nothingwhatever to what had already been agreedupon. Regarding the proposal to establish acommittee to determine the terms of refer-ence of the proposed commission, he said he

could see no need for such a committee. Thetask of the commission, he contended, wasdefined precisely and exhaustively in the Gen-eral Assembly resolution. It was the task ofthe commission to work out its own program,to work out the conduct of its own proceed-ings and, therefore, to set up such a com-mittee, as proposed in the new draft resolu-tion, would mean a delay in the considerationand preparation of practical measures to im-plement the Assembly resolution.

At the 99th meeting of the Council onFebruary 4, the representative of Australiastated that his Government could not supportthe United States resolution as it stood. Inits present form, it would give priority to theconsideration of the Atomic Energy Commis-sion's report, and it was quite plain, he argued,that the Council was not going to make anyprogress if it tried to establish priorities inthat way. Such action would defer the com-mencement of work directed toward the gen-eral reduction and regulation of armaments.He went on to state that he could see no neces-sity for establishing a committee to makepreliminary studies regarding the work tobe done by the proposed commission, as itshould be possible for the Security Councilitself to establish the commission, to decideon its membership and to agree on its termsof reference. He added that the Americandraft resolution omitted any reference toother urgent matters, particularly matters re-quiring the attention of the Military StaffCommittee, which was referred to in theAssembly resolution. He agreed that thematters relating to the control of atomicenergy should be proceeded with immediately,but he also believed that action to that endshould not in any way delay the considerationconcurrently and on parallel lines of othermatters which the General Assembly hadasked the Security Council to examine.

At the suggestion of the Australian repre-sentative, the Security Council agreed thatthe authors of the various draft resolutions—that is to say the representatives of theU.S.S.R., the United States, France, Colombiaand Australia respectively—should meetunofficially with the President of the Council(the representative of Belgium) to try towork out a common text upon which unani-mous agreement of the Council could be ob-tained.


The Conferees met on February 5, 6 and 7.Although their deliberations resulted in alarge measure of agreement, they were unableto achieve unanimous agreement on all pointsand therefore decided to submit to the Councila text consisting of a preamble and fourparagraphs and embodying two different ver-sions of paragraph 3. Disagreement on thepoint concerned the question of jurisdiction asbetween the Atomic Energy Commission andthe proposed new commission. One versioncontained specific limitations to the proposedcommission's field of activity; the other con-tained no such limitations. Concerning thetext upon which full agreement was reached,paragraph 1 defined the general tasks whichwere incumbent upon the Security Councilafter it had accepted the resolution of theGeneral Assembly of December 14, 1946;paragraph 2 pointed to the necessity of theCouncil's considering, as soon as possible,the report submitted by the Atomic EnergyCommission, and the importance of the Coun-cil's taking a suitable decision to facilitatethe work of that Commission; the last para-graph called upon the Military Staff Commit-tee to submit to the Council, as soon as pos-sible, the recommendations for which it hadbeen asked by the Security Council on Febru-ary 15, 1946, in pursuance of Article 43 ofthe Charter.

The Security Council at its 102nd meetingon February 11, decided to link the examina-tion of the following two items on its agenda:(1) the resolution of the General Assemblyon the principles governing the general regu-lation and reduction of armaments and pro-posals regarding its implementation, and (2)the resolution of the General Assembly con-cerning information on the armed forces ofthe United Nations.

In the general debate that ensued, theUnited States representative pressed his sup-port of the proposal to exclude from the jur-isdiction of the new commission those matterswhich fell within the competence of theAtomic Energy Commission. He wanted theresolution to leave no doubt as to the Coun-cil's intention in this regard. He was certainthat the General Assembly would never haveagreed that the Council should set up a newcommission which would have authority toencroach on the jurisdiction of the AtomicEnergy Commission. The United States in-sisted that the Council should not delegate

any such authority to the new commission.He went on to state that the work of theAtomic Energy Commission should be ex-pedited; it was a matter of principle not topermit the overlapping or derogation of itsfunctions.

With respect to information on armedforces of the United Nations, the UnitedStates representative contended that the de-bate in the General Assembly leading up tothe adoption of that particular resolution re-vealed that the kind of information compre-hended by the resolution was information onarmed forces and not on weapons and arma-ments. He believed that the intent of theSecurity Council in that connection should bemade clear by excluding from the competenceof the proposed commission those matters re-lating to atomic weapons. He submitted thatthe terms of reference of the new commis-sion should be so clear that it could not legallycall for information regarding weapons andarmaments and those other matters which fellwithin the competence of the Atomic EnergyCommission, as determined by the GeneralAssembly resolutions of January 24 and De-cember 14, 1946.

At the same meeting the U.S.S.R. repre-sentative argued that the Security Councilmust be guided in its decisions by the resolu-tions of the General Assembly and must carryout carefully the tasks contained and definedin those resolutions. The resolutions adoptedby the General Assembly on the general regu-lation and reduction of armaments and armedforces did not speak separately of provisionsgoverning atomic weapons, on the one hand,and other conventional weapons, on the other,he stated. Atomic arms were mentioned withinthe general framework of arms and arma-ments, and there was no opposition in thoseresolutions of the General Assembly, as therewas in the United States proposals, betweenatomic arms, on the one hand, and armamentsof other kinds, on the other. He went on tostate that the United States proposals createdan artificial opposition between the AtomicEnergy Commission and the proposed newcommission. Such opposition diverted the at-tention of the Security Council from the fun-damental task lying before it to secondaryorganizational and procedural matters anddid not contribute to the rapid implementa-tion of the resolutions adopted by the Gen-eral Assembly.


On the question of information on armedforces, the representative of the U.S.S.R.summarized the attitude of his Governmentin the matter during the discussion in theGeneral Assembly. He reiterated that infor-mation only on forces, without information onarmaments, would be useless; but informationon forces and armaments would be useful toboth the Security Council and the MilitaryStaff Committee.

Discussion was continued at the 103rd and104th meetings of the Council on February12. The French representative felt that inorder to carry out the General Assembly'srecommendation, it was the duty of the Secur-ity Council to define a method of work whichwould enable the Atomic Energy Commissionto carry on a task that had had a very en-couraging beginning, which would providefor the establishment of a disarmament com-mission that should in no case encroach onthe sphere of the Atomic Energy Commission,and which would most urgently remind theMilitary Staff Committee of the task en-trusted to it on February 15, 1946,—a taskwhich, so far as the Council was aware, ithad not begun to carry out.

The representative of Colombia consideredit necessary to limit and define the new com-mission's terms of reference in some way orother.

The representative of the United Kingdomwas convinced that it was not the intentionof the General Assembly to give the new com-mission the full task of implementing thewhole of the General Assembly resolution, butreserved, and rightly so, certain ground forthe Atomic Energy Commission.

The representative of Brazil considered thatthe jurisdiction of the two commissions mustbe kept separate.

The Australian representative in what hetermed as a last attempt to find some way outof the present impasse, submitted the follow-ing amendment dealing with the jurisdictionof the new commission:

Those matters which fall within the com-petence of the Atomic Energy Commission, asdetermined by the General Assembly resolu-tions of January 24 and December 14, 1946,shall be dealt with in accordance with suchresolutions, and the jurisdiction of the com-mission hereby established shall be withoutprejudice to the competence and jurisdictionof the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Australian representative admittedthat the draft amendment did not settle thequestion of jurisdiction once and for all butthat it did allow a certain amount of flexi-bility.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. proposedthe following amendment to replace the pro-visions on jurisdiction:

The results of the work of this commission,and also the results of the work of the AtomicEnergy Commission, must be a basis forworking out the measures for general regu-lation and reduction of armaments.

After the general debate was closed, theSecurity Council proceeded to vote paragraphby paragraph on the draft disarmament reso-lution submitted to it by the sponsors of thefive separate proposals. It was understoodthat each amendment would be considered inrelation to the paragraph to which it referred,and that after a decision on each of the indi-vidual paragraphs was taken, there would bea final vote on the resolution as a whole.

The preamble and the first and second para-graphs of the resolution were adopted with-out discussion.

Two votes (Australia and Syria) were castin favor of the Australian amendment to pro-vide less precise terms of reference; 5 against(Belgium, Brazil, China, the United King-dom and the United States); and there were4 abstentions (Colombia, France, Poland andthe U.S.S.R.).

Two votes (Poland and the U.S.S.R.) werecast in favor of the U.S.S.R. amendments; 8against (Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia,France, Syria, the United Kingdom and theUnited States); and there was 1 abstention(Australia).

A vote was then taken on the proposal ofthe U.S.S.R. to vote on paragraph 3 by sub-paragraphs. Australia, Colombia, France, Po-land, Syria and the U.S.S.R. voted for; Braziland the United States voted against; and Bel-gium, China and the United Kingdom ab-stained. As the proposal failed to obtain theaffirmative vote of seven members of theCouncil, it was not adopted.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. then pro-posed that paragraph 3 be divided into andvoted upon two parts. The first part of theparagraph which he favored would includethat part of paragraph 3 not limiting the


jurisdiction of the new commission; thesecond part included the limitations on itsjurisdiction. On the proposal to divide para-graph 3 into two parts, Australia, Colombia,Poland, Syria and the U.S.S.R. voted in favor;Brazil and the United States voted against;and Belgium, China, France and the UnitedKingdom abstained.

A vote was then taken on the whole ofparagraph 3. Australia, Belgium, Brazil,China, Colombia, France, Syria, the UnitedKingdom and the United States voted for;and Poland and the U.S.S.R. abstained.

Explaining his absention, the U.S.S.R. rep-resentative stated that it was clear that theU.S.S.R. delegation supported and voted infavor of that part of the text which envisagedthe establishment, of a commission, for thatwas proposed in the original Soviet proposal;in favor of that part which referred to thecomposition, as that was also proposed by theU.S.S.R.; and, finally, in favor of the provisionthat the commission should formulate pro-posals to ensure the implementation of theGeneral Assembly resolution of December 14.He went on to state that he abstained fromvoting on the first part only because in hisopinion it was artifically and incorrectly tiedto the second part as a result of the erroneousprocedure adopted by the Council.

The Security Council concluded voting onthe draft disarmament resolution at its 105thmeeting on February 13. At the meeting, thelast paragraph of the draft was disposed ofand then a vote on the resolution as a wholewas taken. The last paragraph as originallydrafted was as follows:

To request the Military Staff Committeeto submit to it, as soon as possible, the recom-mendations for which it has been asked by theSecurity Council on February 15, 1946, inpursuance of Article 43 of the Charter.

The United Kingdom submitted an amend-ment to the last paragraph which consisted ofadding the following words:

and as a first step to submit to the SecurityCouncil, not later than April 30, 1947, therecommendations with regard to the basicprinciples which should govern the organ-ization of the United Nations Armed Force.

A vote was taken on the United Kingdomamendment and it was adopted by 9 votes,with 2 abstentions. Australia, Belgium, Brazil,China, Colombia, France, Syria, the United

Kingdom and the United States voted infavor; Poland and the U.S.S.R. abstained.

The Australian representative's amendment,which consisted of adding the words "and asa matter of urgency" after the words, "torequest the Military Staff Committee to sub-mit to it, as soon as possible," was then votedupon. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China,Colombia, France, Syria, the United King-dom and the United States voted for; Polandand the U.S.S.R. abstained.

A vote was then taken on the draft resolu-tion as a whole. Australia, Belgium, Brazil,China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, theUnited Kingdom and the United States votedfor and the U.S.S.R. abstained.

The final text of the resolution of the Securi-ty Council concerning the implementation ofthe resolutions of the General Assembly re-garding the principles governing the generalregulation and reduction of armaments andinformation on armed forces of the UnitedNations was as follows:

The Security Council, having accepted theresolution of the General Assembly of 14December 1946 and recognizing that the gen-eral regulation and reduction of armamentsand armed forces constitute a most importantmeasure for strengthening international peaceand security, and that the implementation ofthe resolution of the General Assembly onthis subject is one of the most urgent andimportant tasks before the Security Council,

RESOLVES:1. to work out the practical measures forgiving effect to the resolutions of the Gen-eral Assembly on 14 December 1946 con-cerning, on the one hand, the generalregulation and reduction of armaments andarmed forces, and the establishment ofinternational control to bring about thereduction of armaments and armed forces,and, on the other hand, information concern-ing the armed forces of the United Nations;2. to consider as soon as possible the reportsubmitted by the Atomic Energy Commis-sion and to take suitable decisions in orderto facilitate its work;3. to set up a Commission consisting ofrepresentatives of the Members of theSecurity Council with instructions to pre-pare and to submit to the Security Councilwithin the space of not more than threemonths, the proposals:

(a) for the general regulation and reduc-tion of armaments and armed forces, and

(b) for practical and effective safeguardsin connection with the general regulationand reduction of armaments which the Com-


mission may be in a position to formulateIn order to ensure the implementation ofthe above-mentioned resolutions of the Gen-eral Assembly of 14 December 1946, in sofar as these resolutions relate to armamentswithin the new Commission's jurisdiction.The Commission shall submit a plan ofwork to the Council for approval.Those matters which fall within the com-petence of the Atomic Energy Commissionas determined by the General AssemblyResolution of 24 January 1946 and 14December 1946 shall be excluded from thejurisdiction of the Commission hereby es-tablished.The title of the Commission shall be theCommission for Conventional Armaments.The Commission shall make such proposalsas it may deem advisable concerning thestudies which the Military Staff Committeeand possibly other organs of the UnitedNations might be asked to undertake.4. to request the Military Staff Committeeto submit to it, as soon as possible and asa matter of urgency, the recommendationsfor which it has been asked by the SecurityCouncil on 16 February 1946 in pursuanceof Article 43 of the Charter, and as a firststep, to submit to the Security Council notlater than 30 April 1947, its recommenda-tions with regard to the basic principleswhich should govern the organization ofthe United Nations Armed Force.

The Commission for Conventional Arma-ments held its first meeting at Lake Successon March 24, 1947.1

9. FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTEa. Consideration of Annexes to Peace Treaty

with ItalyAt the 88th meeting of the Security Council

of December 31, 1946, the President of theCouncil—the representative of the UnitedStates—notified the members of a letter fromthe Chairman of the Council of Foreign Mini-sters to the Secretary-General, dated Decem-ber 12, 1946, and received by the Secretary-General on December 20, dealing with thedecisions of the Council of Foreign Ministersregarding Trieste. The letter was not includedin the provisional agenda of that meeting,however, as the President felt that the Gov-ernments represented on the Council woulddesire to send instructions to their representa-tives, and that it would be better to have theitem considered at an early meeting in thenew year.

The letter explained that the Council ofForeign Ministers had prepared a peace treaty

with Italy which would come into force whenratified by the four powers—France, theU.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates.

The treaty would establish a Free Territoryof Trieste whose independence and integritywould be ensured by the Security Council. Thepermanent statute and the provisional statuteof the Territory appeared as an annex to thetreaty, as did an instrument on the Free Portof Trieste.

In order to permit the Security Council tostudy the texts in question, the relevant arti-cles and annexes of the draft peace treaty withItaly were transmitted with the letter, whichadvised that the Ministers of Foreign Affairshad instituted a Committee which would holditself at the disposal of the Security Councilfor the purpose of furnishing it with allnecessary information concerning the FreeTerritory, its statute and the provisions con-cerning the Free Port of Trieste.

The letter stated that the Ministers ofForeign Affairs were desirous that the textssubmitted on the terms of the treaty for ap-proval by the Security Council should bedecided on by the Council before January 15,1947, as the signing of the treaty of peacewith Italy was to occur at the beginning ofFebruary.

Transmitted with the letter were the follow-ing: Description of Frontiers, General Pro-visions Concerning the Status of the FreeTerritory of Trieste, Property and Debt Pro-visions Relating to the Free Territory ofTrieste, Technical Guarantees, Instrument forthe Provisional Regime of the Free Territoryof Trieste, Permanent Statute for the FreeTerritory of Trieste and Instrument for theFree Port of Trieste.

The item was placed on the agenda of theSecurity Council at its 89th meeting of Janu-ary 7, 1947. At the meeting the representa-tive of Australia stated that the proposalsbefore the Security Council were to the effectthat the Council should accept various newresponsibilities and, in particular, the respon-sibility of assuring the integrity and theindependence of the Free Territory. Theacceptance of such responsibilities was clearlynot authorized by the Charter, he stated. No

1 See sections of Yearbook on Commission forConventional Armaments, Atomic Energy Com-mission and Military Staff Committee.


amendment of the Charter had yet been pro-posed, and to accept these responsibilities inthe absence of such an amendment would bea grave precedent affecting all Members ofthe United Nations. He asked further whatcountries would be bound by the obligation toensure the integrity and independence of theFree Territory.

In reply to the representative of Australia,the representative of the U.S.S.E. stated thatthe power to assume responsibility in respectof the execution of the task outlined in thedocuments was given to the Council by awhole series of articles contained in theCharter and in particular by Article 24.

The representative of the United Statesstated that the particular problem of Triestehad been rightly brought to the Security Coun-cil by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Hecontended that the only possible solution forthe Trieste Territory was internationalization,and that it seemed far more in keeping withthe spirit of the world organization that theSecurity Council, representing the United Na-tions, should be the body charged with the re-sponsibility for guaranteeing that Territory,rather than the principal powers which wereengaged in the war, or any single power arbi-trarily chosen as a so-called trustee. He thenpresented the following draft resolution:

The Security Council having received andexamined the Annexes to the proposed PeaceTreaty with Italy relating to the creation andgovernment of the Free Territory of Trieste(including an arrangement for a Free Port),hereby records its approval of the said Annex-es, and its acceptance of the responsibilitiesdevolving upon it under the same, and directsthe Secretary-General to notify the UnitedStates of America, France, the United King-dom and the U.S.S.R., of its action.

As a matter of clarification, the representa-tive of the U.S.S.R. explained to the membersof the Council that the Council was not askedto approve all the documents passed to it bythe Council of Foreign Ministers, but only thefollowing documents: (1) the instrument forthe Free Port of Trieste; (2) the instrumentfor the provisional regime of the Free Terri-tory of Trieste; (3) the permanent Statutefor the Free Territory of Trieste. The otherdocuments were submitted to the SecurityCouncil for its information.

Discussion of the item was continued atthe 91st meeting of the Council on January10, 1947. At that meeting, the Assistant Sec-

retary-General in charge of Security Councilaffairs, by direction of the Secretary-General,submitted to the Council a statement withregard to the legal issues raised in connectionwith the question of Trieste. The legal ques-tions raised were: (1) the authority of theSecurity Council to accept the responsibilitiesimposed by the three instruments relating tothe Free Territory of Trieste, and (2) theobligation of Members of the United Nationsto accept and carry out the decisions of theSecurity Council pursuant to these instru-ments. With respect to (1), the AssistantSecretary-General stated that in paragraph 1of Article 24 the words "primary responsi-bility for the maintenance of internationalpeace and security," coupled with the phrase,"acts on their behalf," constituted a grant ofpower sufficiently wide to enable the SecurityCouncil to approve the documents in questionand to assume the responsibilities arisingtherefrom. Furthermore, he continued, therecords of the San Francisco Conferencedemonstrated that the powers of the SecurityCouncil under Article 24 were not restrictedto the specific grants of authority containedin Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII. It wasrecognized in the discussion at San Franciscothat the responsibility to maintain peace andsecurity carried with it a power to dischargethis responsibility.

With respect to the second legal questionraised, the Assistant Secretary-General statedthat Article 24 provided that in carrying outits duties, the Security Council acted on be-half of Members of the United Nations. More-over, Article 25 expressly provided that "theMembers of the United Nations agree toaccept and carry out the decisions of theSecurity Council in accordance with thepresent Charter". Further, at the San Fran-cisco Conference, there was a proposal inCommittee III/l to limit the obligation ofthe Security Council solely to those decisionsof the Council undertaken pursuant to thespecific powers enumerated in Chapters VI,VII, VIII and XII of the Charter. This amend-ment was put to a vote in the Committee andrejected. The rejection of this amendment,he concluded, was clear evidence that theobligation of the Members to carry out thedecisions of the Security Council appliedequally to decisions made under Article 24and to the decisions made under the grant ofspecific powers.


At the same meeting, the representativeof the United States asked for leave to revisethe resolution he had submitted to the Councilat the last meeting. After a number of ob-servations had been offered concerning therevised draft and after the part directing theSecretary-General to notify the Council ofForeign Ministers of its action had beendeleted in order to meet objections of certainmembers of the Council who felt that it wasentirely unnecessary, the following resolutionwas put to a vote:

The Security Council, having received andexamined the Annexes to the proposed PeaceTreaty with Italy relating to the creation andgovernment of the Free Territory of Trieste(including an arrangement for a Free Port),hereby records its approval of the three fol-lowing documents:

1. The instrument for the provisional re-gime of the Free Territory of Trieste;2. The permanent Statute for the FreeTerritory of Trieste;3. The instrument for the Free Port ofTrieste;

and its acceptance of the responsibilities de-volving upon it under the same.

Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France,Poland, Syria, the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates and the U.S.S.R. voted for the resolu-tion. Australia abstained from voting.

The text of the three documents approvedfollows:

INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROVISIONALREGIME OF THE FREE TERRITORY

OF TRIESTE1

ARTICLE 1The present provisions shall apply to the ad-

ministration of the Free Territory of Triestepending the entry into force of the PermanentStatute.

The Governor shall assume office in theFree Territory at the earliest possible momentafter the entry into force of the present PeaceTreaty. Pending assumption of office by theGovernor, the Free Territory shall continueto be administered by the Allied militarycommands within their respective zones.

ARTICLE 2On assuming office in the Free Territory of

Trieste, the Governor shall be empowered toselect from among persons domiciled in theFree Territory, and after consultation withthe Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy, aProvisional Council of Government. The Gov-ernor shall have the right to make changes inthe composition of the Provisional Council

of Government whenever he deems itnecessary. The Governor and the ProvisionalCouncil of Government shall exercise theirfunctions in the manner laid down in theprovisions of the Permanent Statute, as andwhen these provisions prove to be applicableand in so far as they are not superseded bythe present Instrument. Likewise, all otherprovisions of the Permanent Statute shallbe applicable during the period of the pro-visional regime as and when these provisionsprove to be applicable and in so far as theyare not superseded by the present Instrument.The Governor's actions will be guided mainlyby the needs of the population and its well-being.

ARTICLE 3The seat of Government will be established

in Trieste. The Governor will address hisreports directly to the President of theSecurity Council and will, through that chan-nel, supply the Security Council with allnecessary information on the administrationof the Free Territory.

ARTICLE 4The first concern of the Governor shall be

to ensure the maintenance of public orderand security. He shall appoint, on a provisionalbasis, a Director of Public Security, who willreorganize and administer the police forceand security services.

ARTICLE 5(a) From the date of the coming into

force of the present Treaty, troops stationedin the Free Territory shall not exceed 5,000men for the United Kingdom, 5,000 men forthe United States of America and 5,000 menfor Yugoslavia.

(6) These troops shall be placed at the dis-posal of the Governor for a period of ninetydays after his assumption of office in the FreeTerritory. As from the end of that period,they will cease to be at the disposal of theGovernor and will be withdrawn from theTerritory within a further period of forty-five days, unless the Governor advises theSecurity Council that, in the interests of theTerritory, some or all of them should not,in his view, be withdrawn. In the latter event,the troops required by the Governor shallremain until not later than forty-five daysafter the Governor has advised the SecurityCouncil that the security services can main-tain internal order in the Territory withoutthe assistance of foreign troops.

(c) The withdrawal prescribed in para-graph (6) shall be carried out so as to main-tain, in so far as possible, the ratio prescribedin paragraph (a) between the troops of thethree Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 6The Governor shall have the right at any

time to call upon the commanders of such

1 Annex VII of the Peace Treaty.


contingents for support, and such supportshall be given promptly. The Governor shall,whenever possible, consult with the militarycommanders concerned before issuing his in-structions but shall not interfere with themilitary handling of the forces in the dis-charge of his instructions. Each commanderhas the right to report to his Governmentthe instructions which he has received fromthe Governor, informing the Governor of thecontents of such reports. The Governmentconcerned shall have the right to refuse theparticipation of its forces in the operation inquestion, informing the Security Councilaccordingly.

ARTICLE 7The necessary arrangements relating to the

stationing, administration and supply of themilitary contingents made available by theUnited Kingdom, United States of Americaand Yugoslavia shall be settled by agreementsbetween the Governor and the commanders ofthose contingents.

ARTICLE 8The Governor, in consultation with the

Provisional Council of Government, shall beresponsible for organizing the elections ofmembers of the Constituent Assembly in ac-cordance with the conditions provided for inthe Statute for elections to the popular As-sembly.

The elections shall be held not later thanfour months after the Governor's assumptionof office. In case this is technically impossible,the Governor shall report to the SecurityCouncil.

ARTICLE 9The Governor shall, in consultation with

the Provisional Council of Government, pre-pare the provisional budget and the provision-al export and import programmes and shallsatisfy himself that appropriate arrangementsare made by the Provisional Council of Gov-ernment for the administration of the financesof the Free Territory.

ARTICLE 10Existing laws and regulations shall remain

valid unless and until revoked or suspendedby the Governor. The Governor shall havethe right to amend existing laws and regula-tions and to introduce new laws and regula-tions in agreement with the majority of theProvisional Council of Government. Suchamended and new laws and regulations, as wellas the acts of the Governor in regard to therevocation or suspension of laws and regula-tions shall be valid unless and until they areamended, revoked or superseded by acts ofthe popular Assembly or the Council of Gov-ernment within their respective spheres afterthe entry into force of the Constitution.

ARTICLE 11Pending the establishment of a separate

currency regime for the Free Territory, theItalian lira shall continue to be the legal ten-der within the Free Territory. The ItalianGovernment shall supply the foreign exchangeand currency needs of the Free Territoryunder conditions no less favourable than thoseapplying in Italy.

Italy and the Free Territory shall enterinto an agreement to give effect to the aboveprovisions as well as to provide for anysettlement between the two Governmentswhich may be required.

PERMANENT STATUTE FOR THE FREETERRITORY OF TRIESTE1

ARTICLE 1Area of Free Territory

The area of the Free Territory of Triesteshall be the territory within the frontiersdescribed in Articles 4 and 22 of the presentTreaty as delimited in accordance with Article5 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2Integrity and independence

The integrity and independence of the FreeTerritory shall be assured by the SecurityCouncil of the United Nations. This responsi-bility implies that the Council shall:

(a) Ensure the observance of the presentStatute and in particular the protection ofthe basic human rights of the inhabitants;(6) Ensure the maintenance of public orderand security in the Free Territory.

ARTICLE 3Demilitarization and neutrality

1. The Free Territory shall be demilitarizedand declared neutral.

2. No armed forces, except under directionof the Security Council, shall be allowed inthe Free Territory.

3. No para-military formations, exercisesor activities shall be permitted within theFree Territory.

4. The Government of the Free Territoryshall not make or discuss any military ar-rangements or undertakings with any State.

ARTICLE 4Human rights and fundamental freedomsThe Constitution of the Free Territory shall

ensure to all persons under the jurisdictionof the Free Territory, without distinction asto ethnic origin, sex, language or religion, theenjoyment of human rights and of the funda-mental freedoms, including freedom of re-ligious worship, language, speech and publica-tion, education, assembly and association.Citizens of the Free Territory shall be assuredof equality of eligibility for public office.

1 Annex VI of the Peace Treaty.


ARTICLE 5Civic and political rights

No person who has acquired the citizenshipof the Free Territory shall be deprived of hiscivic or political rights except as judicialpunishment for the infraction of the penallaws of the Free Territory.

ARTICLE 6Citizenship

1. Italian citizens who were domiciled on10 June 1940 in the area comprised withinthe boundaries of the Free Territory, andtheir children born after that date, shallbecome original citizens of the Free Territorywith full civil and political rights. Upon be-coming citizens of the Free Territory theyshall lose their Italian citizenship.

2. The Government of the Free Territoryshall, however, provide that the persons re-ferred to in paragraph 1 over the age ofeighteen years (or married persons whetherunder or over that age) whose customarylanguage is Italian shall be entitled to optfor Italian citizenship within six months fromthe coming into force of the Constitutionunder conditions to be laid down therein. Anyperson so opting shall be considered to havere-acquired Italian citizenship. The option ofthe husband shall not constitute an option onthe part of the wife. Option on the part ofthe father, or if the father is not alive, on thepart of the mother, shall, however, auto-matically include all unmarried children underthe age of eighteen years.

3. The Free Territory may require thosewho take advantage of the option to move toItaly within a year from the date on whichthe option was exercised,4. The conditions for the acquisition of

citizenship by persons not qualifying fororiginal citizenship shall be determined bythe Constituent Assembly of the Free Terri-tory and embodied in the Constitution. Suchconditions shall, however, exclude the acqui-sition of citizenship by members of the formerItalian Fascist Police (OVRA) who have notbeen exonerated by the competent authorities,including the Allied military authorities whowere responsible for the administration ofthe area.

ARTICLE 7Official languages

The official languages of the Free Territoryshall be Italian and Slovene. The Constitutionshall determine in what circumstances Croatmay be used as a third official language.

ARTICLE 8Flag and coat-of-arms

The Free Territory shall have its own flagand coat-of-arms. The flag shall be the tra-ditional flag of the City of Trieste and thearms shall be its historic coat-of-arms.

ARTICLE 9Organs of government

For the government of the Free Territorythere shall be a Governor, a Council of Gov-ernment, a popular Assembly elected by thepeople of the Free Territory and a Judiciary,whose respective powers shall be exercisedin accordance with the provisions of thepresent Statute and of the Constitution ofthe Free Territory.

ARTICLE 10Constitution

1. The Constitution of the Free Territoryshall be established in accordance with demo-cratic principles and adopted by a ConstituentAssembly with a two-thirds majority of thevotes cast. The Constitution shall be madeto conform to the provisions of the presentStatute and shall not enter into force priorto the coming into force of the Statute.

2. If in the opinion of the Governor anyprovisions of the Constitution proposed bythe Constituent Assembly, or any subsequentamendments thereto, are in contradiction tothe Statute, he may prevent their entry intoforce, subject to reference to the SecurityCouncil if the Assembly does not accept hisviews and recommendations.

ARTICLE 11Appointment of Governor

1. The Governor shall be appointed by theSecurity Council after consultation with theGovernments of Yugoslavia and Italy. He shallnot be a citizen of Yugoslavia or Italy or ofthe Free Territory. He shall be appointed forfive years and may be re-appointed. His salaryand allowances shall be borne by the UnitedNations.

2. The Governor may authorize a personselected by him to act for him in the event ofhis temporary absence or temporary inabilityto perform his duties.

3. The Security Council, if it considers thatthe Governor has failed to carry out his duties,may suspend him and, under appropriate safe-guards of investigation and hearing, dismisshim from his office. In the event of his sus-pension or dismissal, or in the event of hisdeath or disability, the Security Council maydesignate or appoint another person to actas Provisional Governor until the Governorrecovers from his disability or a new Governoris appointed.

ARTICLE 12Legislative authority

The legislative authority shall be exercisedby a popular Assembly consisting of a singlechamber elected on the basis of proportionalrepresentation, by the citizens of both sexesof the Free Territory. The elections for theAssembly shall be conducted on the basis ofuniversal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.


ARTICLE 13Council of Government

1. Subject to the responsibilities vested inthe Governor under the present Statute, execu-tive authority in the Free Territory shall beexercised by a Council of Government whichwill be formed by the popular Assembly andwill be responsible to the Assembly.

2. The Governor shall have the right to bepresent at all meetings of the Council ofGovernment. He may express his views on allquestions affecting his responsibilities.

3. When matters affecting their responsi-bilities are discussed by the Council of Gov-ernment, the Director of Public Security andthe Director of the Free Port shall be invitedto attend meetings of the Council and to ex-press their views.

ARTICLE 14Exercise of judicial authority

The judicial authority in the Free Territoryshall be exercised by tribunals established pur-suant to the Constitution and laws of the FreeTerritory.

ARTICLE 15Freedom and independence of JudiciaryThe Constitution of the Free Territory

shall guarantee the complete freedom andindependence of the Judiciary and shall pro-vide for appellate jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 16Appointment of Judiciary

1. The Governor shall appoint the Judiciaryfrom among candidates proposed by the Coun-cil of Government, or from among other per-sons, after consultation with the Council ofGovernment unless the Constitution providesfor a different manner for filling judicialposts; and, subject to safeguards to be estab-lished by the Constitution, may remove mem-bers of the Judiciary for conduct incompatiblewith their judicial office.

2. The popular Assembly, by a two-thirdsmajority of votes cast may request the Gov-ernor to investigate any charge broughtagainst a member of the Judiciary which, ifproved, would warrant his suspension orremoval.

ARTICLE 17Responsibility of the Governor to the

Security Council1. The Governor, as the representative of

the Security Council, shall be responsible forsupervising the observance of the presentStatute including the protection of the basichuman rights of the inhabitants and for en-suring that public order and security aremaintained by the Government of the FreeTerritory in accordance with the presentStatute, Constitution and laws of the FreeTeritory.

2. The Governor shall present to the Secur-ity Council annual reports concerning theoperation of the Statute and the performanceof his duties.

ARTICLE 18Rights of the Assembly

The popular Assembly shall have the rightto consider and discuss any matters affectingthe interests of the Free Territory.

ARTICLE 19Enactment of legislation

1. Legislation may be initiated by membersof the popular Assembly and by the Councilof Government, as well as by the Governor,in matters which in his view affect the respon-sibilities of the Security Council as defined inArticle 2 of the present Statute.

2. No law shall enter into force until itshall have been promulgated. The promulga-tion of laws shall take place in accordancewith the provisions of the Constitution of theFree Territory.

3. Before being promulgated, legislationenacted by the Assembly shall be presentedto the Governor.

4. If the Governor considers that such legis-lation is in contradiction to the present Stat-ute, he may, within ten days followingpresentation of such legislation to him, returnit to the Assembly with his comments andrecommendations. If the Governor does notreturn the legislation within such ten days,or if he advises the Assembly within suchperiod that it calls for no comments or recom-mendation on his part, the legislation shallbe promulgated forthwith.

5. If the Assembly makes manifest itsrefusal to withdraw legislation returned tothe Assembly by the Governor, or to amend itin conformity with his comments or recom-mendations, the Governor shall, unless he isprepared to withdraw his comments or recom-mendations—in which case the law shall bepromulgated forthwith—immediately reportthe matter to the Security Council. The Gov-ernor shall likewise transmit without delayto the Security Council any communicationwhich the Assembly may wish to make to theCouncil on the matter.

6. Legislation which forms the subject ofa report to the Security Council under theprovisions of the preceding paragraph shallonly be promulgated by the direction of theSecurity Council.

ARTICLE 20Rights of Governor with respect to

administrative measures1. The Governor may require the Council

of Government to suspend administrativemeasures which in his view conflict with hisresponsibilities as defined in the presentStatute (observance of the Statute; main-tenance of public order and security; respectfor human rights). Should the Council ofGovernment object, the Governor may suspendthese administrative measures and the Gov-ernor or the Council of Government may referthe whole question to the Security Councilfor decision.


2. In matters affecting his responsibilitiesas defined in the Statute the Governor maypropose to the Council of Government theadoption of any administrative measures.Should the Council of Government not acceptsuch proposals the Governor may, withoutprejudice to Article 22 of the present Statute,refer the matter to the Security Council fordecision.

ARTICLE 21Budget

1. The Council of Government shall beresponsible for the preparation of the budgetof the Free Territory, including both revenueand expenditure, and for its submission tothe popular Assembly.

2. If the Assembly should fail to vote thebudget within the proper time limit, theprovisions of the budget for the precedingperiod shall be applied to the new budgetaryperiod until such time as the new budgetshall have been voted.

ARTICLE 22Special powers of Governor

1. In order that he may carry put hisresponsibilities to the Security Council underthe present Statute, the Governor may, incases which in his opinion permit of no delay,and which threaten the independence or in-tegrity of the Free Territory, public order orrespect of human rights, directly order andrequire the execution of appropriate measuressubject to an immediate report thereon beingmade by him to the Security Council. In suchcircumstances the Governor may himself as-sume, if he deems it necessary, control of thesecurity services

2. The popular Assembly may petition theSecurity Council concerning any exercise bythe Governor of his powers under paragraph1 of this Article.

ARTICLE 23Power of pardon and reprieve

The power of pardon and reprieve shall bevested in the Governor and shall be exercisedby him in accordance with provisions to belaid down in the Constitution.

ARTICLE 24Foreign relations

1. The Governor shall ensure that theforeign relations of the Free Territory shallbe conducted in conformity with the Statute,Constitution, and laws of the Free Territory.To this end the Governor shall have authorityto prevent the entry into force of treaties oragreements affecting foreign relations which,in his judgment, conflict with the Statute,Constitution or laws of the Free Territory.

2. Treaties and agreements, as well as ex-equaturs and consular commissions, shall besigned jointly by the Governor and a repre-sentative of the Council of Government.

3. The Free Territory may be or become aparty to international conventions or become

a member of international organizations pro-vided the aim of such conventions or organiza-tions is to settle economic, technical, cultural,social or health questions.

4. Economic union or associations of anexclusive character with any State are incom-patible with the status of the Free Territory.

6. The Free Territory of Trieste shallrecognize the full force of the Treaty ofPeace with Italy, and shall give effect to theapplicable provisions of that Treaty. TheFree Territory shall also recognize the fullforce of the other agreements or arrangementswhich have been or will be reached by theallied and associated Powers for the restora-tion of peace.

ARTICLE 25Independence of Governor and staff

In the performance of their duties, theGovernor and his staff shall not seek orreceive instructions from any Government orfrom any other authority except the SecurityCouncil. They shall refrain from any actwhich might reflect on their position as inter-national officials responsible only to theSecurity Council.

ARTICLE 26Appointment and removal of administrative

officials1. Appointments to public office in the Free

Territory shall be made exclusively on theground of ability, competence and integrity.

2. Administrative officials shall not be re-moved from office except for incompetence ormisconduct and such removal shall be subjectto appropriate safeguards of investigationand hearing to be established by law.

ARTICLE 27Director of Public Security

1. The Council of Government shall submitto the Governor a list of candidates for thepost of Director of Public Security. The Gov-ernor shall appoint the Director from amongthe candidates presented to him, or fromamong other persons, after consultation withthe Council of Government. He may also dis-miss the Director of Public Security afterconsultation with the Council of Government.

2. The Director of Public Security shallnot be a citizen of Yugoslavia or Italy.

3. The Director of Public Security shallnormally be under the immediate authority ofthe Council of Government from which he willreceive instructions on matters within hiscompetence.

4. The Governor shall:(a) Receive regular reports from theDirector of Public Security, and consultwith him on any matters coming withinthe competence of the Director;(6) Be informed by the Council of Gov-ernment of its instructions to the Directorof Public Security and may express hisopinion thereon.


ARTICLE 28Police force

1. In order to preserve public order andsecurity in accordance with the Statute, theConstitution and the laws of the Free Terri-tory, the Government of the Free Territoryshall be empowered to maintain a police forceand security services.

2. Members of the police force and securityservices shall be recruited by the Director ofPublic Security and shall be subject to dis-missal by him.

ARTICLE 29Local government

The Constitution of the Free Territory shallprovide for the establishment on the basis ofproportional representation of organs of localgovernment on democratic principles, includ-ing universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

ARTICLE 30Monetary system

The Free Territory shall have its ownmonetary system.

ARTICLE 31Railways

Without prejudice to its proprietary rightsover the railways within its boundaries andits control of the railway administration, theFree Territory may negotiate with Yugoslaviaand Italy agreements for the purpose of en-suring the efficient and economical operationof its railways. Such agreements would de-termine where responsibility lay for theoperation of the railways in the direction ofYugoslavia or Italy respectively and also forthe operation of the railway terminal ofTrieste, and of that part of the line which iscommon to all. In the latter case such opera-tion may be effected by a special commissioncomprised of representatives of the FreeTerritory, Yugoslavia and Italy under thechairmanship of the representative of theFree Territory.

ARTICLE 32Commercial aviation

1. Commercial aircraft registered in theterritory of any one of the United Nationswhich grants on its territory the same rightsto commercial aircraft registered in the FreeTerritory, shall be granted international com-mercial aviation rights, including the rightto land for refueling and repairs, to fly overthe Free Territory without landing and touse for traffic purposes such airports as maybe designated by the competent authoritiesof the Free Territory.

2. These rights shall not be subject to anyrestrictions other than those imposed on abasis of non-discrimination by the laws andregulations in force in the Free Territory andin the countries concerned, or resulting fromthe special character of the Free Territory asneutral and demilitarized.

ARTICLE 33Registration of vessels

1. The Free Territory is entitled to openregisters for the registration of ships andvessels owned by the Government of the FreeTerritory or by persons or organizationsdomiciled within the Free Territory.

2. The Free Territory shall open specialmaritime registers for Czechoslovak andSwiss ships and vessels upon request of theseGovernments as well as for Hungarian andAustrian ships and vessels upon the requestof these Governments after the conclusion ofthe treaty of peace with Hungary and thetreaty for the re-establishment of the inde-pendence of Austria respectively. Ships andvessels entered in these registers shall fly theflags of their respective countries.

3. In giving effect to the foregoing pro-visions, and subject to any international con-vention which may be entered into concerningthese questions, with the participation of theGovernment of the Free Territory, the lattershall be entitled to impose such conditions gov-erning the registration, retention on andremoval from the registers as shall preventany abuses arising from the facilities thusgranted. In particular as regards ships andvessels registered under paragraph 1 above,registration shall be limited to ships andvessels controlled from the Free Territoryand regularly serving the needs or the in-terests of the Free Territory. In the caseof ships and vessels registered under para-graph 2 above, registration shall be limitedto ships and vessels based on the port ofTrieste and regularly and permanently servingthe needs of their respective countries throughthe port of Trieste.

ARTICLE 34Free Port

A Free Port shall be established in theFree Territory and shall be administered onthe basis of the provisions of an internationalinstrument drawn up by the Council ofForeign Ministers, approved by the SecurityCouncil, and annexed to the present Treaty.1

The Government of the Free Territory shallenact all necessary legislation and take allnecessary steps to give effect to the provisionsof such instrument.

ARTICLE 35Freedom of transit

Freedom of transit shall, in accordance withcustomary international agreements, be as-sured by the Free Territory and the Stateswhose territories are traversed, to goodstransported by railroad between the FreePort and the States which it serves, withoutany discrimination and without customs dutiesor charges other than those levied for servicesrendered.

1 Annex VIII of the Peace Treaty.


ARTICLE 36Interpretation of Statute

Except where any other procedure is spe-cifically provided under any Article of thepresent Statute, any dispute relating to theinterpretation or execution of the Statute,not resolved by direct negotiations, shall,unless the parties mutually agree upon anothermeans of settlement, be referred at the requestof either party to the dispute to a commissioncomposed of one representative of each partyand a third member selected by mutual agree-ment of the two parties from nationals of athird country. Should the two parties failto agree within a period of one month uponthe appointment of the third member, theSecretary-General of the United Nations sha l lbe requested to make the appointment. Thedecision of the majority of the members ofthe commission shall be the decision of thecommission, and shall be accepted by the par-ties as definitive and binding.

ARTICLE 37Amendment of Statute

This Statute shall constitute the permanentStatute of the Free Territory, subject to anyamendment which may hereafter be madeby the Security Council. Petitions for theamendment of the Statute may be presentedto the Security Council by the popular Assem-bly upon a vote taken by a two-thirds majorityof the votes cast.

ARTICLE 38Coming into force of Statute

The present Statute shall come into forceon a date which shall be determined by theSecurity Council of the United Nations.

INSTRUMENT FOR THE FREEPORT OF TRIESTE1

ARTICLE 11. In order to ensure that the port and

transit facilities of Trieste will be availablefor use on equal terms by all internationaltrade and by Yugoslavia, Italy and the Statesof Central Europe, in such manner as is cus-tomary in other free ports of the world:

(a) There shall be a customs-free portin the Free Territory of Trieste within thelimits provided for by, or established inaccordance with, Article 3 of the presentInstrument;(b) Goods passing through the Free Portof Trieste shall enjoy freedom of transitas stipulated in Article 16 of the presentInstrument.2. The international regime of the Free

Port shall be governed by the provisions ofthe present Instrument.

ARTICLE 21. The Free Port shall be established and

administered as a State corporation of theFree Territory, having all the attributes of

a juridical person and functioning in accord-ance with the provisions of this Instrument.

2. All Italian State and para-statal propertywithin the limits of the Free Port which,according to the provisions of the presentTreaty, shall pass to the Free Territory shallbe transferred, without payment, to the FreePort.

ARTICLE 31. The area of the Free Port shall include

the territory and installations of the freezones of the port of Trieste within the limitsof the 1939 boundaries.

2. The establishment of special zones in theFree Port under the exclusive jurisdiction ofany State is incompatible with the status ofthe Free Territory and of the Free Port.

3. In order, however, to meet the specialneeds of Yugoslav and Italian shipping in theAdriatic, the Director of the Free Port, onthe request of the Yugoslav or Italian Govern-ment, and with the concurring advice of theInternational Commission provided for inArticle 21, may reserve to merchant vesselsflying the flags of either of these two Statesthe exclusive use of berthing spaces withincertain parts of the area of the Free Port.

4. In case it shall be necessary to increasethe area of the Free Port such increase maybe made upon the proposal of the Director ofthe Free Port by decision of the Council ofGovernment with the approval of the popularAssembly.

ARTICLE 4Unless otherwise provided for by the

present Instrument, the laws and regulationsin force in the Free Territory shall be applic-able to persons and property within the boun-daries of the Free Port and the authoritiesresponsible for their application in the FreeTerritory shall exercise their functions withinthe limits of the Free Port.

ARTICLE 51. Merchant vessels and goods of all coun-

tries shall be allowed unrestricted access tothe Free Port for loading and discharge bothfor goods in transit and goods destined for orproceeding from the Free Territory.

2. In connexion with importation into, ex-portation from, or transit through the FreePort, the authorities of the Free Territoryshall not levy on such goods customs dutiesor charges other than those levied for servicesrendered.

3. However, in respect of goods, importedthrough the Free Port for consumption withinthe Free Territory or exported from thisTerritory through the Free Port, appropriatelegislation and regulations in force in theFree Territory shall be applied.

ARTICLE 6Warehousing, storing, examining, sorting,

packing and repacking and similar activitieswhich have customarily been carried on in

1 Annex VIII of the Peace Treaty.


the free zones of the Port of Trieste shallbe permitted in the Free Port under the gen-eral regulations established by the Directorof the Free Port.

ARTICLE 71. The Director of the Free Port may also

permit the processing of goods in the FreePort.

2. Manufacturing activities in the FreePort shall be permitted to those enterpriseswhich existed in the free zones of the port ofTrieste before the entry into force of thepresent Instrument. Upon the proposal ofthe Director of the Free Port, the Councilof Government may permit the establishmentof new manufacturing enterprises within thelimits of the Free Port.

ARTICLE 8Inspection by the authorities of the Free

Territory shall be permitted within the FreePort to the extent necessary to enforce thecustoms or other regulations of the FreeTerritory for the prevention of smuggling.

ARTICLE 91. The authorities of the Free Territory

will be entitled to fix and levy harbour duesin the Free Port.

2. The Director of the Free Port shall fixall charges for the use of the facilities andservices of the Free Port. Such charges shallbe reasonable and be related to the cost ofoperation, administration, maintenance anddevelopment of the Free Port.

ARTICLE 10In the fixing and levying, in the Free Port,

of harbour dues and other charges underArticle 9, as well as in the provision of theservices and facilities of the Free Port, thereshall be no discrimination in respect of thenationality of the vessels, the ownership ofthe goods or on any other grounds.

ARTICLE 11The passage of all persons into and out of

the Free Port area shall be subject to suchregulations as the authorities of the FreeTerritory shall establish. These regulations,however, shall be established in such a manneras not unduly to impede the passage into andout of the Free Port of nationals of any Statewho are engaged in any legitimate pursuitin the Free Port area.

ARTICLE 12The rules and by-laws operative in the Free

Port and likewise the schedules of chargeslevied in the Free Port must be made public.

ARTICLE 13Coastwise shipping and coastwise trade

within the Free Territory shall be carriedon in accordance with regulations issued bythe authorities of the Free Territory, theprovisions of the present Instrument not being

deemed to impose upon such authorities anyrestrictions in this respect.

ARTICLE 14Within the boundaries of the Free Port,

measures for the protection of health andmeasures for combating animal and plantdiseases in respect of vessels and cargoesshall be applied by the authorities of theFree Territory.

ARTICLE 15It shall be the duty of the authorities of

the Free Territory to provide the Free Portwith water supplies, gas, electric light andpower, communications, drainage facilitiesand other public services and also to ensurepolice and fire protection.

ARTICLE 161. Freedom of transit shall, in accordance

with customary international agreements, beassured by the Free Territory and the Stateswhose territories are traversed to goods trans-ported by railroad between the Free Port andthe States which it serves, without any dis-crimination and without customs duties orcharges other than those levied for servicesrendered.

2. The Free Territory and the States as-suming the obligations of the present Instru-ment through whose territory such trafficpasses in transit in either direction shall doall in their power to provide the best possiblefacilities in all respects for the speedy andefficient movement of such traffic at a reason-able cost, and shall not apply, with respectto the movement of goods to and from theFree Port, any discriminatory measures withrespect to rates, services, customs, sanitary,police or any other regulations.

3. The States assuming the obligations ofthe present Instrument shall take no measuresregarding regulations or rates which wouldartificially divert traffic from the Free Portfor the benefit of other seaports. Measurestaken by the Government of Yugoslavia toprovide for traffic to ports in southern Yugo-slavia shall not be considered as measuresdesigned to divert traffic artificially.

ARTICLE 17The Free Territory and the States assum-

ing the obligations of the present Instru-ment shall, within their respective territoriesand on non-discriminatory terms, grant, inaccordance with customary internationalagreements, freedom of postal, telegraphicand telephonic communications between theFree Port area and any country for suchcommunications as originate in or are destinedfor the Free Port area.

ARTICLE 181. The administration of the Free Port

shall be carried on by the Director of theFree Port who will represent it as a juridical


person. The Council of Government shall sub-mit to the Governor a list of qualified candi-dates for the post of Director of the FreePort. The Governor shall appoint the Directorfrom among the candidates presented to himafter consultation with the Council of Gov-ernment. In case of disagreement the mattershall be referred to the Security Council. TheGovernor may also dismiss the Director uponthe recommendation of the International Com-mission or the Council of Government.

2. The Director shall not be a citizen ofYugoslavia or Italy.

3. All other employees of the Free Portwill be appointed by the Director. In all ap-pointments of employees preference shall begiven to citizens of the Free Territory.

ARTICLE 19Subject to the provisions of the present

Instrument, the Director of the Free Portshall take all reasonable and necessary meas-ures for the administration, operation, main-tenance and development of the Free Port asan efficient port adequate for the prompt hand-ling of all the traffic of that port. In particular,the Director shall be responsible for the execu-tion of all kinds of port works in the FreePort; shall direct the operation of port instal-lations and other port equipment; shall estab-lish in accordance with legislation of the FreeTerritory, conditions of labour in the FreePort; and shall also supervise the execution inthe Free Port of orders and regulations of theauthorities of the Free Territory in respectto navigation.

ARTICLE 201. The Director of the Free Port shall issue

such rules and by-laws as he considers neces-sary in the exercise of his functions as pre-scribed in the preceding Article.

2. The autonomous budget of the Free Portwill be prepared by the Director, and will beapproved and applied in accordance withlegislation to be established by the popularAssembly of the Free Territory.

3. The Director of the Free Port shall sub-mit an annual report on the operations of theFree Port to the Governor and the Council ofGovernment of the Free Territory. A copy ofthe report shall be transmitted to the Inter-national Commission.

ARTICLE 211. There shall be established an Interna-

tional Commission of the Free Port, herein-after called "the Commission," consisting ofone representative from the Free Territoryand from each of the following States:France, United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland, Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, United States of America, Feder-ated People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Italy,Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, Austriaand Hungary, provided that such State has as-sumed the obligations of the present Instru-ment.

2. The representative of the Free Territoryshall be the permanent Chairman of the Com-mission. In the event of a tie in voting, thevote cast by the Chairman shall be decisive.

ARTICLE 22The Commission shall have its seat in the

Free Port. Its offices and activities shall beexempt from local jurisdiction. The membersand officials of the Commission shall enjoy inthe Free Territory such privileges and immu-nities as are necessary for the independentexercise of their functions. The Commissionshall decide upon its own secretariat, proce-dure and budget. The common expenses of theCommission shall be shared by member Statesin an equitable manner as agreed by themthrough the Commission.

ARTICLE 23The Commission shall have the right to in-

vestigate and consider all matters relating tothe operation, use and administration of theFree Port or to the technical aspects of transitbetween the Free Port and the States which itserves, including unification of handling pro-cedures. The Commission shall act either onits own initiative or when such matters havebeen brought to its attention by any State orby the Free Territory or by the Director ofthe Free Port. The Commission shall commu-nicate its views or recommendations on suchmatters to the State or States concerned, orto the Free Territory, or to the Director ofthe Free Port. Such recommendations shall beconsidered and the necessary measures shallbe taken. Should, the Free Territory or theState or States concerned deem however thatsuch measures would be inconsistent with theprovisions of the present Instrument, the mat-ter may at the request of the Free Territory,or any interested. State be dealt with as pro-vided in Article 24.

ARTICLE 24Any dispute relating to the interpretation

or execution of the present Instrument, notresolved by direct negotiations shall, unlessthe parties mutually agree upon another meansof settlement, be referred at the request ofeither party to the dispute to a commissioncomposed of one representative of each partyand a third member selected by mutual agree-ment of the two parties from nationals of athird country. Should the two parties fail toagree within a period of one month upon theappointment of the third member, the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations shall berequested to make the appointment. The de-cision of the majority of the members of thecommission shall be the decision of the com-mission, and shall be accepted by the partiesas definitive and binding.

ARTICLE 25Proposals for amendments to the present

Instrument may be submitted to the Security


Council by the Council of Government of theFree Territory or by three or more States rep-resented on the International Commission. Anamendment approved by the Security Councilshall enter into force on the date determinedby the Security Council.

ARTICLE 26For the purposes of the present Instrument

a State shall be considered as having assumedthe obligations of this Instrument if it is aparty to the Treaty of Peace with Italy or hasnotified the Government of the French Re-public of its assumption of such obligations.

b. Appointment of a GovernorBy a letter dated June 13, 1947, addressed to

the Secretary-General, the representative ofthe United Kingdom requested that an earlydate be fixed for the discussion by the Secur-ity Council of the question of the appointmentof a Governor of the Free Territory of Trieste.The question was placed on the provisionalagenda at the 143rd meeting of the SecurityCouncil.

At the 143rd meeting of the Security Coun-cil on June 20, 1947, the representative of theU.S.S.R. spoke against the inclusion of thisquestion in the agenda of the Security Council.He argued that the Security Council couldnot discuss the matter until the peace treatywith Italy had been ratified. The discussionof the question in the Security Council beforea corresponding previous decision had beentaken by the representatives of the four pow-ers which participated in the decision of theForeign Ministers' Conference of December12, 1946, would only be a loss of time inasmuchas no decision could possibly be taken by theSecurity Council until agreement had beenreached by the representatives of the fourpowers.

The representative of Australia stated,among other things, that it seemed clear that:(1) it was not necessary for the PermanentStatute to come into force before the appoint-ment of the Governor; and (2) it was neces-sary for the Instrument for the ProvisionalRegime to come into force before the Govern-or was formally appointed. He went on tostate that the Security Council was notconcerned at the moment with the formalappointment of the Governor. All it wasconcerned with was making the selection anddeciding who he should be so that immedi-

ately the Treaty entered into force, the formalappointment could be made. If the Council didnot take this anticipatory action, the assump-tion of office by the Governor would be in-definitely delayed; and until he assumed of-fice, the Free Territory would continue to beadministered by the Allied Military Com-mands within their respective zones. It wasessential, therefore, that the Security Councilproceed at once to discuss possible candidatesfor the Governorship.

By a vote of 9 in favor, with 1 vote against(U.S.S.R.) and with France abstaining, theSecurity Council admitted the discussion ofthe appointment of a Governor of Trieste toits agenda, and decided, further, to hold aclosed meeting while discussing possible can-didates.

A private meeting of the Security Councilwas held on the afternoon of the same day.In a communique released by the Councilafter the meeting it was stated that the mem-bers of the Council exchanged their views anddecided to meet on that matter in a few days.The President of the Council, who was author-ized by the Council to speak with the repre-sentatives of the press after the meeting,stated that no new names of candidates wereintroduced at the private meeting.

10. INCIDENTS IN THE CORFU CHANNELOn January 10, 1947, the Secretary-General

received a communication from the Govern-ment of the United Kingdom requesting theSecurity Council to take up, under Article35 (1) of the Charter, a dispute between GreatBritain and Albania. The matter concernedthe damaging by mines of the British destroy-ers Volage and Saumarez in the Corfu Chan-nel, close to the Albania shores, on October22, 1946. As a result of explosions, 44 sailorswere killed, 42 were injured, and the twoships were crippled, one becoming a totalloss.

The United Kingdom in a communicationto the Albanian Government had requestedan apology and compensation for the loss oflife and property involved. As the Albanianreply to the British communication was con-sidered unsatisfactory by the United King-dom, the case was submitted to the SecurityCouncil.

The Security Council on January 20, 1947,by a vote of 10 in favor and 1 abstention (theU.S.S.R.), admitted the dispute to its agenda.


The Albanian Government was advised onJanuary 20, 1947, that the Security Councilhad decided to invite it to participate withoutvote in the proceedings on condition that itaccept in this case all the obligations whicha Member of the United Nations would haveto assume in a similar case. A reply fromColonel General Enver Hoxha, President ofthe Council of Ministers of the People's Re-public of Albania and Minister of ForeignAffairs of Albania, dated January 24, statedthat the Albanian Government accepted theSecurity Council's decision.

On February 18 the representative of theUnited Kingdom presented the case for hisGovernment in support of the charges againstAlbania. He sought to place responsibility forthe incident on Albania, stating that the lay-ing of a clandestine minefield in the CorfuChannel was a violation of the rules of con-duct set out in the Hague Convention of 1907and a crime against humanity.

The Albanian representative presented thecase for his Government to the Security Coun-cil on February 19. He stated that his Govern-ment did not lay the mines and that it didnot know who laid them. It did not knowwhether or not there were mines in thosewaters, and it was not responsible for thesafety of navigation in its territorial watersor in the Strait.

On February 24 the Australian repre-sentative on the Security Council proposed theappointment of a small sub-committee to ex-amine the material which had been presentedto the Council regarding the incidents and toreport to the Council on its findings. Such asub-committee composed of the representa-tives of Australia, Colombia and Poland, wasappointed by the Security Council on Febru-ary 27.

The Sub-Committee held ten meetings andsubmitted its report on March 15. A minorityreport by the representative of Poland wasincluded as an appendix.

With regard to the damage and loss of lifesuffered by British ships the Sub-Committeereported that it had ascertained that no con-flicting evidence existed. Concerning the ex-istence of an unnotified minefield in the CorfuChannel on October 22, the report stated thatno agreement could be reached as to whetherthe mines which damaged the British destroy-ers were part of the minefield which was locat-

ed in sweeping operations which took placeafter the incident.

The Polish representative in his report ex-pressed the opinion that the Sub-Committee'sreport did not represent a report "on the factsof the case" and therefore did not fulfil thetask set by the Security Council.

The Security Council continued the discus-sion of the dispute, including the report ofthe Sub-Committee, at the 120th, 121st and122nd meetings. On March 25 a United King-dom proposal asking the Council to find thatan unnotified minefield was laid in the CorfuStrait with the knowledge of the AlbanianGovernment was defeated because of the ad-verse vote of the U.S.S.R., one of the five per-manent members. The vote was as follows: Infavor of the resolution—Australia, Belgium,Brazil, China, Colombia, France, UnitedStates; against the resolution—Poland andthe U.S.S.R.; abstention—Syria. Being a partyto the dispute, the United Kingdom did notvote.

The case was continued on the Council'sagenda and on April 3 the representative ofthe United Kingdom moved to have the dis-pute referred to the International Court ofJustice.

In presenting his resolution the UnitedKingdom representative argued that the factthat seven out of nine voting representativessupported the previous British resolution,showed that in the opinion of the majoritythe United Kingdom had established its caseagainst Albania.

The representative of Australia stated thatthe issue concerned not only the United King-dom and Albania; it went deeper than that.The first United Kingdom resolution had de-clared that "the laying of mines in peace timewithout notification is injustified and an of-fence against humanity." When there hadbeen a crime against humanity, the SecurityCouncil should pursue it or make a recommen-dation so that that crime would be punished.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. statedthat it was not possible for the Council to cometo a decision that a country had committed acrime or was at fault merely on the basis ofsuppositions such as those which had been pre-sented before the Council. It would have beenbetter, he said, for the Council to come to theconclusion that the question should be refer-red to the International Court of Justice at


the beginning of the discussion rather thanat the end of it.

The representative of China observed thatseveral delegations had referred to the factthat the case could have been taken to the In-ternational Court in the first place, but hereminded those delegations that, since Albaniawas not a member of the United Nations, itcould not have been compelled to appear be-fore the Court. However, since it had acceptedthe obligations of the Members of the UnitedNations when it accepted the Council's in-vitation to participate in the discussion, itwas now, like any Member of the United Na-tions, obliged to comply with both the provis-ions of the Charter and the Statute of theInternational Court.

A vote was taken on April 9, 1947, on theUnited Kingdom proposal to recommend "thatthe United Kingdom and the Albanian Gov-ernments should immediately refer the disputeto the International Court of Justice in ac-cordance with the provisions of the Statuteof the Court."

The result of the voting was as follows:Affirmative—Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chi-na, Colombia, France, Syria and the UnitedStates. Abstention—Poland and the U.S.S.R.Being a party to the dispute, the United King-dom did not vote. The President of the Councilannounced that the resolution was carried.

On May 23, 1947, the Secretary-Generalreceived notification that the United Kingdomhad filed with the International Court of Jus-tice its applications against the Albanian Peo-ple's Republic in the Corfu Channel Case.

11. TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE FORMERJAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS

On February 17, 1947, the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations received from theUnited States representative on the SecurityCouncil a letter enclosing the text of a draftTrusteeship Agreement for the former Jap-anese mandated islands. The Secretary-General was requested to submit the draftAgreement to the Security Council for itsapproval, and he was further requested toplace this matter on the agenda of the Se-curity Council at an early date. The area in-cluded in the Agreement took in the Marshall,Mariana and Caroline Islands—a total of 98islands with a population of some 48,000.

The draft Trusteeship Agreement differedfrom the eight United Nations Trusteeship

Agreements already in effect by its designa-tion of the former Japanese mandated islandsas a strategic area. Article 82 of the Charterprovides that there may be designated in anyTrusteeship Agreement a strategic area orareas to include part or all of the Trust Ter-ritory. Under Article 83, all functions of theUnited Nations relating to such strategicareas, including the approval of the terms ofthe Trusteeship Agreements and of their alter-ation or amendment, are exercised by the Se-curity Council. Subject to the provisions ofthe Trusteeship Agreements and without pre-judice to security considerations, the SecurityCouncil is to avail itself of the assistance ofthe Trusteeship Council on political, economic,social and educational matters in the strategicareas.

The letter and the enclosed draft Trustee-ship Agreement were placed on the agendaof the Security Council at its 113th meetingheld on February 26, 1947.

In explaining the purpose of the draftAgreement, the United States representativeto the Security Council reiterated the declara-tion made by President Truman on November6, 1946, that "the United States is prepared toplace under trusteeship, with the United Statesas the Administering Authority, the Japanesemandated islands and any Japanese islandsfor which it assumes responsibility as a resultof the Second World War."

Final disposition of islands which were un-der Japanese sovereignty before the war mustawait the peace settlement with Japan, theUnited States representative went on to state.The draft Trusteeship Agreement submittedto the Security Council for its approval relatedonly to the former Japanese mandated islands,which had never belonged to Japan but werepart of the League of Nations mandatessystem.

The United States representative describedthe strategic value of the mandated islands toJapan in its campaign of aggression. Thepurpose of the United States, he maintained,was to defend the security of these islands ina manner that would contribute to the build-ing up of genuine, effective and enforceablecollective security for all Members of theUnited Nations.

He stated that in conformity with the pro-visions of the Charter for strategic areas,the Trust Territory would contain bases, andthat the United States might from time to


time specify certain areas as closed for secur-ity reasons. The Council was assured that theUnited States would faithfully support theprinciple of effective supervision by the UnitedNations within the limits imposed by itsobligation to administer that area in such away as to preserve the security of the UnitedStates and to strengthen collective securityunder the United Nations. The United Statesrepresentative concluded by stating that itwas the profound belief of the Government ofthe United States and of the American peoplethat the administration of those islands bythe United States in accordance with the termsof the draft Agreement would contribute bothto the maintenance of international peace andsecurity and to the well-being and advance-ment of the inhabitants of the islands.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. consider-ed that the question of the former Japanesemandated islands was within the competenceof the Security Council, that the Council wasempowered to take & decision upon it andthat it was not required to observe any delayin such a decision. He stated that it was theopinion of the Soviet delegation that it wouldbe right and proper to place the area of theformer Japanese mandated islands under thetrusteeship of the United States, as the SovietGovernment considered that the United Statesforces played a decisive role in the victoryover Japan.

The discussion of the matter was continuedat the 116th meeting of the Council on March7, 1947. At that meeting the representative ofthe United Kingdom stated that while hisGovernment was entirely agreeable in princi-ple to the United States Government's ulti-mately becoming the Administering Authorityin respect of the mandated area, his Govern-ment had doubts, on a strictly legal basis,as to the propriety of the Security Councilconsidering the draft Trusteeship Agreementfor the mandated islands pending final dis-posal of the islands under the peace treatywith Japan. He continued that if, however,the majority of the members of the Councilwished to proceed in the sense requested bythe United States representative, he wouldnot oppose the adoption of such a course.

The Australian representative stated thatthe decision made by the Security Councilshould be finally confirmed at the Peace Con-ference settling the Pacific war, and thatStates not members of the Security Council

who were belligerents in that war should havean opportunity to discuss the terms of trustee-ship.

At the 118th meeting of the Council onMarch 12, it was agreed to extend an invita-tion to the Governments of India and NewZealand, as well as to those members of theFar Eastern Commission1 not already repre-sented on the Security Council, to participatein the discussions of the United States DraftTrusteeship Agreement.

At the same meeting, the representativeof Australia proposed to add a new articleas Article 17) which read as follows:

This Agreement is subject to confirmationin the interim or final treaty of peace betweenJapan and the Allied Powers, victorious inthe war against Japan, it being understoodthat by such treaty Japan shall be requiredto surrender all its rights, if any, relating tothe control and administration of the presentterritories, and such territories shall be for-mally detached from any form of control byJapan.

At the meeting of the Security Council onMarch 17, representatives of Canada, India,the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Philip-pines—as Governments interested in the dis-cussion of the draft Agreement—took theirplaces at the Council table.

At that meeting, the President of the Coun-cil—the representative of Brazil—gave hisopinion on the constitutional aspects of theAustralian amendment. He thought it difficultto accept the idea that a decision by the Councilon matters relating to trusteeship for stra-tegic areas should require confirmation by anyother international body, whether linked withthe United Nations or not. It was his opinionthat if the Council approved the TrusteeshipAgreement, that decision was final so far as

1 The Par Eastern Commission, with head-quarters in Washington, D.C., was established bythe Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow onDecember 16 to 26, 1946, to replace the Far East-ern Advisory Commission (established in October1945), but to be composed of the same members:Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain,India, Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines,the U.S.S.R. and the United States. The functionsof the Commission, limited, inter alia, with regardto the conduct of military operations and terri-torial changes, are to formulate policies for thecarrying out of the terms of the Japanese sur-render, to review directives within its jurisdictionto and from the Supreme Commander of Japan,and to discuss such other matters as may be pro-posed by a majority of its members with ChinaGreat Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United Statesconcurring.


the United Nations was concerned and couldbe revoked only by another decision of theSecurity Council itself. On the other hand,he stated, it seemed highly undesirable forthe Council to give a directive, so to speak,to a conference not held under the auspices ofthe United Nations.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding asto the position of Australia, the first line ofthe Australian amendment was redrafted toread:

This agreement will enter into force on thedate on which the interim or final treaty ofpeace between Japan and the Allied Powers,victorious in war against Japan, becomes bind-ing on Japan.

The Australian representative submitted thatnothing in the Charter precluded the inclusionin the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement ofa provision that the Agreement should becomeeffective on a date later than that on which theSecurity Council approved the Agreement. Infact, Article 16 of the Draft Agreement statedthat "the present agreement shall come intoforce" when approved by the Security Counciland "by the Government of the United Statesafter due constitutional process."

He submitted that the amendment did notintend nor did it in fact impair or lessen thejurisdiction of the Council. It simply proposedto postpone the entry into force of an Agree-ment in order to recognize the relationshipbetween the approval of the Agreement and thedisposal of the Japanese mandated islands atthe Peace Conference. He denied that theamendment attempted to lay down any directiveas to how the other conference should proceed.

The representative of the United Stateschallenged the legality of the Australianamendment. He stated that the United Na-tions had the sole, exclusive and supremeauthority over trusteeship and that no otherauthority equalled it. It was, therefore, thefirst duty of the Security Council to protectand save the authority and effectiveness of theUnited Nations. Furthermore, he argued, theUnited Nations had no authority under theCharter to make the peace terms. It was notgiven any commitment with respect to thetreaty of peace between Japan and the victor-ious Powers.

With respect to the position of Japan, theUnited States representative stated that bysigning the act of surrender that country hadforfeited any rights to the mandated islands.

The document of surrender, signed individu-ally or through General Douglas MacArthur,Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers,showed that Japan had there accepted thePotsdam Declaration, which stated:

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shallbe carried out and Japanese sovereignty shallbe limited to the Islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands aswe determine.

Finally, he continued, the United States,if it should accept the trusteeship, would haveto do so according to its constitutional forms.It would not be reasonable to ask the UnitedStates to take a trusteeship responsibility onan Agreement that contained a provision thatwould make the effectiveness of the Agreementcontingent upon the signing of a peace treatywith Japan at some future date.

At the 123rd meeting of the Council onMarch 28, the representative of Australiastated that it was the intention of his Govern-ment to approve the proposed draft Agree-ment, but to postpone its operation until thesuccessful belligerent nations had met formal-ly together for the making of a peace settle-ment with Japan. In view of the fact that theSecurity Council agreed to Australia's sugges-tion that the nations which fought againstJapan be admitted to the Council itself for thepurpose of stating their views on the UnitedStates trusteeship proposal, Australia had de-cided not to press the proposal to amend theDraft Agreement by adding a new article. Forthe above reason, he stated, the Australiandelegation would fully endorse and support theUnited States proposal.

The representatives of the other interestedStates—non-members of the Security Council—then expressed their viewpoints on thedraft Trusteeship Agreement.

The Netherlands representative said thatin respect to both the immediate future andlong-term aspect of the great problem of avoid-ing war in the Pacific, his country unreserved-ly approved the United States proposal.

The representative of New Zealand statedthat his Government had no thought of op-posing or obstructing the substance of theproposal made by the Government of theUnited States, but it was his Government'sview that no disposition of the mandated is-lands could be final until it was endorsed bythe terms of the peace settlement.

The representatives of Canada, India andthe Philippine Republic were in favor of


United States administration of the mandatedislands.

At the 124th meeting on April 2, the Secur-ity Council voted on the draft Agreementarticle by article, and in that way disposed ofthe various amendments that had been offered.

The preamble and the majority of the arti-cles as originally proposed by the UnitedStates were approved unanimously. There wasextensive debate, however on some of thearticles.1

In connection with Article 8, there was aUnited Kingdom proposal to delete from theend of paragraph 1 the words "except the Ad-ministering Authority." These words, statedthe United Kingdom representative, gave apreferential position to the United States thatdid not seem to be in strict accordance withthe Charter. He argued that according to theCharter there should be equal treatment insocial, economic and commercial matters forall Members of the United Nations and theirnationals in the strategic area as in any otherterritory under trusteeship.

The United States representative repliedthat the proposal made by his Government wasfor the designation of the former Japanesemandated islands as a strategic area. In suchan area, the security objective must be anover-riding consideration. Such a provisionin a strategic area was justified, in the viewof his Government, by Article 76 (d) andArticle 83 (2) of the Charter. Article 76 (d),he stated, provided for equal treatment of allMembers of the United Nations and theirnationals, "without prejudice to the attain-ment of the foregoing objectives," one ofwhich was the furtherance of internationalpeace and security. Article 83 (2) providedfor the manner in which Article 76 should becarried out in a strategic area, by stating thatthe provisions of Article 76 should be appli-cable to the people of the territory, rather thanto the people outside. He continued by statingthat those islands, in the light of experience,were an economic liability and were not as-sets to the Administering Authority, and there-fore did not present an opportunity for im-portant economic development. The questionwould have to be determined by the othermembers of the Security Council, as theUnited States representative would not vote.On the question of whether the amendmentshould be taken or not, if the United Stateshad a vote, it would vote "no," he continued,

but the United States was not going to usethat vote to exercise the veto. On such ques-tions as this, he concluded, it was perfectlyclear that the United States, where it mightbe obliged in view of its responsibilities towithdraw the tender of an Agreement, shouldcertainly not exercise a veto in the SecurityCouncil.

When the vote was taken on Article 8, Po-land, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.voted in favor of the amendment; Australia,Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, France and Syriaagainst it, and China and the United Statesabstained. The amendment therefore failedto pass. As there were no further amend-ments to Article 8, it was approved withoutfurther discussion.

There was a United Kingdom proposal tore-draft Article 13. The United Kingdomrepresentative expressed the hope that someprovision might be inserted for notifying theSecurity Council when areas were closed, ifpossible giving reasons.

To this the United States representativereplied that his Government considered thisarticle of such great importance that it couldnot accede to the suggested change. He asked,however, if the United Kingdom representa-tive would be satisfied if the records shouldshow that the United States contemplatedthat notification would be made to the SecurityCouncil whenever the proviso contained inArticle 13 came into use. The act of specifi-cation was an act of notification, he added, andit was the purpose of the United States tokeep the Security Council notified.

The United Kingdom representative ex-pressed satisfaction at the declaration madeby the United States representative and with-drew his amendment, whereupon the originalarticle was approved.

Article 15 in its original draft form read:The terms of the present agreement shall

not be altered, amended or terminated with-out the consent of the administering author-ity.

The U.S.S.R. proposed that the article bere-drafted so as to read:

The terms of the present agreement maybe altered and amended or the term of itsvalidity discontinued by the decision of theSecurity Council.

The United States indicated willingness toaccept the following wording:

1 For text of Trusteeship Agreement see pp.398 ff.


The terms of the present agreement shall notbe altered, amended or terminated except byagreement of the Administering Authority andthe Security Council.

The U.S.S.R. representative contended thatthe original text did not give full recognitionto the rights and powers of the Council, andthat the second United States draft dimin-ished these rights and powers still further.

The United States representative repliedthat inasmuch as the United States was aparty to the Agreement, it probably could notaccept an amendment of the nature of thatproposed by the U.S.S.R. representative, as theamendment would be in violation of the Char-ter. He went on to state that the whole theoryof the trusteeship system was that there mustbe at least two parties to any TrusteeshipAgreement, and it would be an astonishing in-terpretation of the Charter to assume thatthat party which, by the Charter, had only thefunction of approval should be given exclus-ively the function of determining the terms ofthe Agreement. For an amendment, he con-tinued, determined the terms of an agreement,and certainly the power of termination, givenover to the Security Council alone, was inviolation of the spirit of the Charter and ofthe theory of agreement. He stated that thatwas an occasion when he could not vote,because he would have to vote against theamendment. Such an action would constitutea veto, and he was not going to exercise aveto. He concluded by stating that the positionof the United States would be that of refrain-ing from voting, and the whole matter mightresult in a withdrawal by the principal partyto the performance of the trust, that was, theUnited States.

The President of the Council—the repre-sentative of China—suggested the followingas an alternative for Article 15:

The terms of the present agreement shallnot be altered or amended except in accord-ance with the provisions of the Charter.

The President's proposal was not acceptedby the United States, and the Presidenttherefore did not press it. The Polish repre-sentative, however, submitted formally anamendment equivalent to the unsustainedamendment of the President.

The U.S.S.R. amendment and the Polishamendment respectively were put to a vote

and lost. The United States representativethen stated that his revised draft had beenoffered only as a compromise and was there-fore not pending in view of the decision on theother amendments. The original Article 15was then approved with 8 favorable votes;Poland, Syria and the U.S.S.R. abstained.

The text of the Trusteeship Agreement asfinally approved unanimously by the SecurityCouncil on April 2, 1947, was as follows:

PreambleWHEREAS Article 75 of the Charter of

the United Nations provides for the establish-ment of an International Trusteeship Systemfor the administration and supervision ofsuch territories as may be placed thereunderby subsequent agreements; and

WHEREAS under Article 77 of the saidCharter the trusteeship system may be appliedto territories now held under mandate: and

WHEREAS on 17 December 1920 the Coun-cil of the League of Nations confirmed amandate for the former German islands northof the equator to Japan, to be administered inaccordance with Article 22 of the Covenantof the League of Nations; and

WHEREAS Japan, as a result of the SecondWorld War, has ceased to exercise any au-thority in these islands;NOW, THEREFORE, the Security Councilof the United Nations, having satisfied itselfthat the relevant articles of the Charter havebeen complied with, hereby resolves to ap-prove the following terms of trusteeship forthe Pacific Islands formerly under mandate toJapan.

Article 1The Territory of the Pacific Islands, con-

sisting of the islands formerly held by Japanunder mandate in accordance with Article 22of the Covenant of the League of Nations, ishereby designated as a strategic area andplaced under the Trusteeship System estab-lished in the Charter of the United Nations.The Territory of the Pacific Islands is herein-after referred to as the Trust Territory.

Article 2The United States of America is designated

as the administering authority of the TrustTerritory.

Article 3The administering authority shall have full

powers of administration, legislation, andjurisdiction over the territory subject to theprovisions of this agreement, and may applyto the Trust Territory, subject to any modi-fications which the administering authoritymay consider desirable, such of the laws ofthe United States as it may deem appropriateto local conditions and requirements.


Article 4The administering authority, in discharg-

ing the obligations of trusteeship in the TrustTerritory, shall act in accordance with theCharter of the United Nations, and the pro-visions of this agreement, and shall, as speci-fied in Article 83 (2) of the Charter, applythe objectives of the International TrusteeshipSystem, as set forth in Article 76 of the Char-ter, to the people of the trust territory.

Article 5In discharging its obligations under Article

76 (a) and Article 84, of the Charter, theadministering authority shall ensure that theTrust Territory shall play its part, in accord-ance with the Charter of the United Nations,in the maintenance of international peace andsecurity. To this end the administering au-thority shall be entitled:

1. to establish naval, military and air basesand to erect fortifications in the Trust Ter-ritory;2. to station and employ armed forces inthe territory; and3. to make use of volunteer forces, facilitiesand assistance from the Trust Territory incarrying out the obligations towards theSecurity Council undertaken in this regardby the administering authority, as well asfor the local defense and the maintenanceof law and order within the Trust Territory.


76 (b) of the Charter, the AdministeringAuthority shall:

1. foster the development of such politicalinstitutions as are suited to the Trust Terri-tory and shall promote the development ofthe inhabitants of the Trust Territory to-ward self-government or independence asmay be appropriate to the particular cir-cumstances of the Trust Territory and itspeoples and the freely expressed wishes ofthe peoples concerned; and to this end shallgive to the inhabitants of the Trust Terri-tory a progressively increasing share in theadministrative services in the Territory;shall develop their participation in govern-ment; shall give due recognition to the cus-toms of the inhabitants in providing a sys-tem of law for the Territory; and shall takeother appropriate measures toward theseends;

2. promote the economic advancement andself-sufficiency of the inhabitants, and tothis end shall regulate the use of naturalresources; encourage the development offisheries, agriculture, and industries; pro-tect the inhabitants against the loss oftheir lands and resources; and improve themeans of transportation and communica-tion;

3. promote the social advancement of theinhabitants and to this end shall protectthe rights and fundamental freedoms ofall elements of the population without dis-crimination; protect the health of the in-habitants; control the traffic in arms andammunition, opium and the other dangerousdrugs, and alcohol and other spirituous bev-erages; and institute such other regulationsas may be necessary to protect the inhabi-tants against social abuses; and4. promote the educational advancement ofthe inhabitants, and to this end shall takesteps toward the establishment of a generalsystem of elementary education; facilitatethe vocational and cultural advancementof the population; and shall encouragequalified students to pursue higher educa-tion, including training on the professionallevel.


76 (c), of the Charter, the AdministeringAuthority shall guarantee to the inhabitantsof the Trust Territory freedom of conscience,and, subject only to the requirements of publicorder and security, freedom of speech, of thepress, and of assembly; freedom of worship,and of religious teaching; and freedom ofmigration and movement.

Article 81. In discharging its obligations under

Article 76 (d) of the Charter, as defined byArticle 83 (2) of the Charter, the Admin-istering Authority, subject to the require-ments of security, and the obligation to pro-mote the advancement of the inhabitants, shallaccord to nationals of each Member of theUnited Nations and to companies and associ-ations organized in conformity with the lawsof such Member, treatment in the Trust Terri-tory no less favourable than that accordedtherein to nationals, companies and associ-ations of any other United Nation except theadministering authority.

2. The Administering Authority shall en-sure equal treatment to the Members of theUnited Nations and their nationals in theadministration of justice.

3. Nothing in this Article shall be so con-strued as to accord traffic rights to aircraftflying into and out of the Trust Territory.Such rights shall be subject to agreementbetween the administering authority and thestate whose nationality such aircraft pos-sesses.

4. The administering authority may nego-tiate and conclude commercial and othertreaties and agreements with Members of theUnited Nations and other States, designed toattain for the inhabitants of the Trust Terri-tory treatment of the Members of the UnitedNations and other States no less favorablethan that granted by them to the nationals of


other States. The Security Council may recom-mend, or invite other organs of the United Na-tions to consider and recommend, what rightsthe inhabitants of the trust territory shouldacquire in consideration of the rights obtainedby Members of the United Nations in theTrust Territory.

Article 9The administering authority shall be en-

titled to constitute the Trust Territory into acustoms, fiscal, or administrative union orfederation with other territories under UnitedStates jurisdiction and to establish commonservices between such territories and theTrust Territory where such measures are notinconsistent with the basic objectives of theInternational Trusteeship System and withthe terms of this agreement.

Article 10The administering authority, acting under

the provisions of Article 3 of this agreement,may accept membership in any regional ad-visory commission regional authority, or tech-nical organization, or other v o l u n t a r yassociation of States, may co-operate withspecialized international bodies, public orprivate, and may engage in other forms ofinternational co-operation.

Article 111. The Administering Authority shall take

the necessary steps to provide the status ofcitizenship of the Trust Territory for the in-habitants of the Trust Territory.

2. The administering authority shall afforddiplomatic and consular protection to inhabi-tants of the Trust Territory when outside theterritorial limits of the Trust Territory or ofthe territory of the administering authority.

Article 12The Administering Authority shall enact

such legislation as may be necessary to placethe provisions of this agreement in effect inthe Trust Territory.

Article 18The provisions of Articles 87 and 88 of

the Charter shall be applicable to the TrustTerritory, provided that the AdministeringAuthority may determine the extent of theirapplicability to any areas which may from timeto time be specified by it as closed for securityreasons.

Article 14The Administering Authority undertakes to

apply in the Trust Territory the provisions ofany international conventions and recommen-dations which may be appropriate to the par-ticular circumstances of the Trust Territoryand which would be conducive to the achieve-ment of the basic objectives of Article 6 ofthis agreement.

Article 15The terms of the present agreement shall

not be altered, amended or terminated withoutthe consent of the administering authority.

Article 16The present agreement shall come into force

when approved by the Security Council of theUnited Nations and by the Government of theUnited States after due constitutional process.

12. SPECIAL AGREEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 43OF THE CHARTER AND THE ORGANIZATION OFTHE UNITED NATIONS ARMED FORCES

By a letter dated April 30, 1947, the DeputyRepresentative of the United States on theSecurity Council requested that the Secretary-General place the report of the Military StaffCommittee1 on the provisional agenda of thenext meeting of the Security Council.

The item was placed on the agenda at the138th meeting of the Council on June 4. Inthe general discussion that followed, the UnitedStates representative stated that one vital taskremained undone in the organizational struc-ture of the United Nations. That was to con-clude and put into force the special agreementscalled for in Article 43 of the Charter whichwould enable the Security Council to fulfil itsresponsibilities as the enforcement agency ofthe United Nations. He stated that the conceptof the nature and strength of the United Na-tions armed forces was based to a very con-siderable extent on the experience of the lastwar.

The representative of Belgium asked thatnote should be taken of Belgium's reservationsregarding the proposals of the Military StaffCommittee which tended to neglect threats topeace, breaches of the peace, and acts of ag-gression, when those were directly or indirectlythe act of a Great Power.

At the 139th meeting on June 6 the repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R. stated that it fol-lowed from the report of the Military StaffCommittee that that organ had not succeededin solving the question as to what principleshould govern the determination of contribu-tions in armed forces to be made available tothe Security Council by States. He went on tostate that the U.S.S.R. insisted on the preser-vation of the equal position of all of the per-manent members of the Security Council inthe contribution of armed forces by them.That equal position would be secured, he con-

1 See pp. 424 ff.


tinned, if all permanent members contributedarmed forces on the principle of equality ratherthan on the principle of comparable contribu-tions as proposed by other delegations. Heargued that the principle of equality in the con-tribution of armed forces by the five perma-nent members of the Security Council wasbased on the provisions of the United NationsCharter, which laid the main responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace on thepermanent members of the Council. In additionto the serious divergence on the principle gov-erning the determination of contributions inarmed forces, the U.S.S.R. representativestated, a number of less serious divergencesappeared in the report of the Military StaffCommittee on the question of bases, on thelocation of armed forces, on the withdrawal offorces, on the logistical support of armed forcesand on the question of air forces.

The representative of Australia stated thatthe Charter made it abundantly clear that thefunctions of the Military Staff Committee werelimited to advising and assisting the SecurityCouncil, and that even in the case of strategicdirection the ultimate responsibility and theultimate decision rested with the SecurityCouncil as a whole, including of course thenon-permanent members. The "most extraor-dinary doctrine" put before the Council by therepresentative of the U.S.S.R. placing the fivepowers in a special position in comparisonwith other Member States of the United Na-tions was not, he contended, in strict conform-ity with the Charter, but rather a direct con-tradiction of everything contained in it. Heargued that the past practices of the MilitaryStaff Committee in not making informationavailable to the non-permanent members of theCouncil as to the matters under discussionmade it impossible for the non-permanentmembers to discharge their obligations underthe Charter. He asked that the latter shouldbe associated with the Military Staff Commit-tee during their term of office.

After the general discussion of the reportof the Military Staff Committee had termi-nated, the Security Council at its 141st meet-ing on June 16 adopted a Syrian resolutioncalling for a consideration of the report, arti-cle by article, by the full Council. This resolu-tion was adopted by 9 votes, with 2 abstentions(Poland and the U.S.S.R.).

The Security Council began its detailed dis-cussion of the report of the Military StaffCommittee at its 142nd meeting on June 18.At the suggestion of the President, the Coun-cil agreed to discuss the report chapter bychapter with a view to reaching agreement onall articles on which unanimity had beenachieved in the Military Staff Committee. Thearticles of the report on which unanimitycould not be achieved in the Military StaffCommittee would be taken up by the Councilsubsequently.

Deferring the adoption of the whole of thereport of the Military Staff Committee to alater date, the Security Council adopted, with-out changes, Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of thereport.

Speaking on Article 5, the Australian repre-sentative stated that there was no substanceto "moral weight" (used in the article) as aprinciple on which the size of the forces wasto be determined. He desired, therefore, thatthe article be further reconsidered by theMilitary Staff Committee with a view toamending it. At a subsequent meeting of theSecurity Council (145th meeting), the Coun-cil, by a vote of 8 in favor, and with 3 absten-tions (China, Poland and the U.S.S.R.),adopted the following text for Article 5:

As the moral weight and the potential powerbehind any decision to employ the ArmedForces made available to the Security Councilby Member Nations of the United Nations inenforcement action will be very great, thisfact will directly influence the size of theArmed Forces required to be made availableunder the special agreements.

The representative of Belgium suggested anamendment to Article 6 for the purpose ofbringing the terminology used in the report ofthe Military Staff Committee into harmonywith that used in the Charter. Explaining hisamendment, he stated that according to Arti-cle 43 of the Charter of the United Nations,it was the function of the Security Council totake the initiative in the negotiation of specialagreements between itself and States Mem-bers. Under these agreements, the Members ofthe United Nations would be obliged to holdin reserve certain armed forces which theyhad undertaken to place in that manner at thedisposal of the Security Council on its call;that was to say, upon a definite hypothesis.This hypothesis was realized when the Secur-ity Council made a call for the armed forces,


compulsorily held in reserve for the purposeunder the terms of the special agreements, tobe made available to it. The Security Councilcould make this call only in conformity withspecial agreements which had already beenduly concluded.

He went on to state that the obligation tomake armed forces available to the SecurityCouncil thus presupposed not only the conclu-sion of special agreements, but also a call fromthe Security Council. So long as the call hadnot been made, there was not, in the sense ofthe Charter, any armed force available to theSecurity Council. There were only armed forcesobligatorily held in reserve in anticipation ofa case, which might never arise, in which theSecurity Council would make a call to havethose forces, effectively placed at its disposal,made available to it. This distinction was ofpractical importance, he said. He went on tosay that before a call was made by the Se-curity Council, the armed forces envisaged inthe special agreements remained under thecommand of the States to which they belonged.They could pass under the authority of theSecurity Council only after the Council hadrequested that they be made available to it.

The Belgian amendment was put to a voteat the Council's 145th meeting and approved.The text of Article 6 as amended was asfollows:

The Armed Forces specified in the specialagreements and which are to be made avail-able to the Security Council, on its call, byMembers of the United Nations shall be lim-ited to a strength sufficient to enable the Se-curity Council to take prompt action in anypart of the world for the maintenance or therestoration of international peace and securityas envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter.

Article 9 was approved without change.

As a consequence of the amendment of Arti-cle 6, Article 10, with an amendment also pro-posed by the representative of Belgium, wasapproved by the Council. Its text was asfollows:

In order to facilitate the early establishmentof the Armed Forces which, in accordancewith the special agreements, are to be madeavailable to the Security Council, OH its call,the permanent members of the Security Coun-cil shall contribute initially the major portionof these forces. As the contributions of otherMembers of the United Nations become avail-able they shall be added to the forces alreadycontributed.

Article 11 of the report of the MilitaryStaff Committee was discussed by the SecurityCouncil at its 146th meeting on June 23. Atthat meeting the representative of Syria sup-ported the principle of comparable contribu-tion of the armed forces. The capability of aMember nation must serve as a basis for themeasurement of the contribution of the armedforces, he said. He pointed out that if theprinciple of equality was accepted for thegreat powers, the same principle must beadopted for the small nations as well.

The representative of Australia stated thatthe proposition that all of the Members of theUnited Nations ought to make equal contribu-tions seemed completely unsound. It was quitedevoid of the reality of the international situa-tion and the reality of what one would callthe military situation of the Members of theUnited Nations at the present time. He arguedthat there should be a comparable contribu-tion, not an equal one.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. arguedthat the principle of comparable contributionscould not be approved, because such a solutionwould mean that some of the powerful andinfluential Member States of the United Na-tions would be placed in a privileged positionwith respect to the armed forces to be madeavailable to the Security Council. He went onto state that since the armed forces to bemade available to the Security Council shouldnot be numerous there should be no difficultyon the part of the States Members in makingtheir contributions on the principle of equalcontributions.

The representative of the United Kingdomstated that on the strict interpretation of theprinciple of equality of contributions, the Se-curity Council would have the weakest possibleforce at its disposal.

The United States representative stated thatthe spirit and purpose of the military clausesof the Charter were to put into the hands ofthe United Nations an effective force for quickand immediate use in case there was any realdanger to peace. He argued that if from thatoverall force, as a practical result, there wereto be excluded, through the principle of equal-ity, all of the advantages of modern techno-logical development in transport, weapons andother instruments which might be very quick-ly effective in stopping the attempted aggres-sion, the force at the disposal of the UnitedNations might not even have the mobility to


accomplish its task, much less the means, theweapons and the numbers.

On the suggestion of the representative ofthe United Kingdom, the Security Council de-cided to request the Military Staff Committee:

(1) to prepare and submit to the Council,. . . on the basis of Articles 5 and 6 of itsreport, an estimate of the overall strength ofthe Armed Forces which should be made avail-able to the Security Council, indicating theapproximate strength and composition of theseparate components, land, sea, and air;

(2) to indicate if possible ... the proportionof this overall strength that in its opinionshould be provided on the basis of equality bythe five permanent members of the SecurityCouncil.

The Military Staff Committee discussed thequestions and submitted to the Security Coun-cil on June 30 a report on the matter. Sincethe Military Staff Committee was unable toachieve a common view, and in view of theinsufficient time available for the discussion,the report included the views of the variousdelegations of the Military Staff Committeeon the subjects taken up. The text of the re-port follows:

REPORT FROM THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEETO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Concerning question (1) of the letterfrom the President of the Security Councildated 26 June 1947, the following table showsthe proposals made by the French, UnitedKingdom and United States delegations re-garding the provisional estimate of overallstrength and composition of the Armed Forceswhich should be made available to the SecurityCouncil. The Chinese delegation agreed withthe United Kingdom proposal.

GROUND FORCESDivisions 16

Armored (3)Airborne (3)Motorized or

Mountain (10)

8-12 20

FRANCE U.K.1 U.S.

AIR FORCESBombers

StrategicMediumLight

Fighters

775(225)(150)(400)

NAVAL FORCESBattleshipsCarriersCruisersDestroyersEscort VesselsMinesweepersSubmarinesAssault shipping

and craft fornumber ofdivisions shown

300

600 1250(Includes onlystrategic and

tactical bombers)

400 2250(Includes fighter

bombers)

Reconnaissance 200Miscellaneous 200 300

TOTAL 1275 1200 3800

(does not includeair transportrequirements)

369

18-24303012

36

1584

90

246

24482412

Two-thirds(2 regimentalcombat teams

or brigadegroups)

NOTE: All proposals provide for appropriatenaval auxiliaries without specifying ex-act numbers.

2. The opinions of the various delegationsin the Military Staff Committee regarding thethree estimates shown in paragraph 1 are asfollows:

a. The Chinese delegation is in full agree-ment with the Provisional Estimate pro-posed by the United Kingdom delegation.b. The French delegation adheres to itsProvisional Estimate but points out that itsestimate is in close agreement to that of theUnited Kingdom delegation.c. The U.S.S.R. delegation was unable atthe present time to present any ProvisionalEstimate for reasons stated below in itsposition (p. 405).d. The United Kingdom delegation adheresto its Provisional Estimate shown in para-graph 1 above.e. The United States delegation adheres toits Provisional Estimate shown in paragraph1 above.f. The Chinese, French, United Kingdomand United States delegations agree thatthe figures which they support are tenta-tive and do not constitute a commitment oftheir respective Governments but are sub-mitted in accordance with the expresseddesire of the Security Council that an es-timate be submitted to the Council by Mon-day 30 June 1947.

3. Concerning question (2) of your letterthe opinions of the various delegations are asfollows:

a. The Chinese delegation considers thatpractically no fraction of the overall1 The Chinese delegation supported the provi-sional estimate of the United Kingdom delegation.


strength can be supplied on a basis of equal-ity by the five Permanent Members of theSecurity Council.b. The French delegation considers thatthree-fourths of the initial overall strengthshould be provided jointly by the five Per-manent Members of the Security Council,but considers it difficult to assess what per-centage of that fraction should be providedon the basis of equality.c. The U.S.S.R. delegation finds it possibleand necessary to answer the second ques-tion of the Security Council. The U.S.S.R.delegation, on the basis of Article 10 andArticle 11 (in the U.S.S.R. wording) of theGeneral Principles, considers that the majorportion of the Armed Forces should becontributed by the five Permanent Mem-bers of the Security Council on the prin-ciple of equality.d. The United Kingdom delegation does notconsider it possible for the Military StaffCommittee to reply to question (2) untilquestion (1) has been resolved and until adecision has been reached on the percentageof the overall strength to be furnishedjointly by the five Permanent Members ofthe Security Council.e. The United States delegation considersthat no appreciable fraction of the overallstrength could be supplied on a basis ofequality by the five Permanent Members ofthe Security Council.

4. The positions of the various delegationswith regard to both question (1) and ques-tion (2) are set forth in detail below.

POSITION OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION

Since certain factors are unknown, theChinese delegation can only base its prelim-inary estimate of the overall strength on thefollowing factors:

I. The requirements of the Security Coun-cil which fall into two parts:

(1) Early establishment of the UnitedNations Armed Forces.(2) Possible military tasks consistingof:

(a) Independent strategic employmentof air forces as envisaged in Article 45of the Charter.(b) Measures as mentioned in Article42 of the Charter.(c) Strategic consideration in the geo-graphical distribution of the forces.

II. Capabilities of the Member Nations:(1) Their present military strength (asfar as is known to the Chinese delega-tion).(2) Possible contributions by the fivePermanent Members of the SecurityCouncil as estimated by the Chinese dele-gation.

Using the above factors as the basis of itscalculation the Chinese delegation has ar-rived at figures in its own estimate somewhatclose to those proposed by the United King-dom delegation. Hence, in order to facilitatethe draft of the report to the Security Counciland to minimize the number of divergent views,the Chinese delegation is prepared to give itsfull support to the U.K. proposal. However,the Chinese delegation desires to make itclear that these are but figures of a provi-sional estimate of the overall strength of theArmed Forces made available to the SecurityCouncil by the Member Nations of the UnitedNations.

As regards question (2), the Chinese dele-gation considers that practically no fractionof the overall strength can be supplied on abasis of equality by the five Permanent Mem-bers of the Security Council.

POSITION OF THE FRENCH DELEGATIONThe French delegation, in order to arrive

at the estimate set out on Page 31, as abasis, specially took Articles 42 and 46 ofthe Charter which stipulate that forces ca-pable of maintaining or restoring the peaceshould be made available to the Security Coun-cil. Article 45, which refers to air forces, wasalso taken into consideration.

Moreover, the French delegation was in-fluenced by the same rules which guided itduring the discussion of the General Princi-ples. These ideas are set out clearly in the com-ments which appear with the General Prin-ciples. The French delegation, in addition,based its calculations on the following:

1. Unofficial information in its possession,on the military strength of Nations otherthan the five Permanent Members.2. The present state of disarmament.

3. Factors of economic and military powerwhich back up the forces made availableto the Security Council.4. Special measures proposed by the Frenchdelegation during the discussion on Gen-eral Principles, i.e., the location and dis-tribution of the Armed Forces made avail-able to the Security Council, depending uponthe various contingencies and plans set upby the Military Staff Committee.Finally, in this estimate it was attempted

to provide that forces made available to theSecurity Council would be sufficient to haltany conflict, though not too large to constitutetoo heavy a burden, especially for the Perma-nent Members who would, according to theFrench Plan, supply three quarters of theseforces.

It suffices to compare these figures withthose in effect during the landing operationsin the last war to observe that they correspondto actual necessity.

1 See p. 403 of this Yearbook.


After having seen the figures furnished bythe United Kingdom delegation the Frenchdelegation stresses that the air forces in thetwo estimates are almost identical; it was de-liberately proposed that the land forces shouldbe of considerable importance because theywould undoubtedly be partly contributed bythe other Member Nations. As concerns thenaval forces, the French delegation considersthat they should be flexible and include sizeableair strength to enable them to operate in anypart of the world. That is why the Frenchdelegation considered that it would be neces-sary to have the elements for the assemblingof three "task forces" provided with a certainnumber of aircraft carriers.

Concerning the second question, the Frenchdelegation considered that the reply embodiesthree factors:

1. Estimate of the overall strength.2. Estimate of the percentage of thisstrength to be provided by the five Perma-nent Members.3. Estimate of the percentage which couldbe provided by the five Permanent Mem-bers on the principle of equality.Considering that, at the present stage of

work, only an approximation of the first factorand even remoter approximation of the secondfactor has been reached, the French delega-tion considered that it was not possible at thepresent stage of work to give a reply on thethird factor. For this reason the French dele-gation replied to the second question asfollows :

1. 75% of the total forces will be providedby the Permanent Members.2. It is difficult to assess, at present, whatproportion of that 75% could be providedon the principle of equality.

The French delegation stresses that theseestimates are of an unofficial character andare in no way binding on its Government.They constitute a form of estimate as theresult of discussions, and having only as ob-ject to give some information to the membersof the Security Council.

The U.S.S.R. delegation considers it im-possible for the Military Staff Committee topresent even a preliminary estimate of theoverall strength of the Armed Forces to bemade available to the Security Council untilthe Security Council has taken decisions onthe General Principles for the organization ofthe Armed Forces.

The U.S.S.R. delegation also considers thatbefore proceeding with the actual determina-tion of the estimates of the overall strengthof the Armed Forces the Military Staff Com-mittee should agree upon what factors (condi-tions) should determine the strength andcomposition of the Armed Forces to be madeavailable to the Security Council.

The preparation of any recommendation onthe question of the overall strength requiredtime in view of the complexity of this mattereven if agreed Principles were to be had.

Concerning Question (2), the U.S.S.R. dele-gation on the basis of Article 10 and Article11 (in the Soviet wording) of the GeneralPrinciples, considers that the major portionof the Armed Forces should be contributed bythe five Permanent Members of the SecurityCouncil on the principle of equality.

POSITION OF THE U.K. DELEGATION

With regard to question (1) of the letterof the President of the Security Council, theUnited Kingdom delegation submits a provi-sional estimate of the United Nations Forcesas shown in the table in paragraph 1. TheUnited Kingdom delegation wishes to make itclear that its estimate is strictly provisionaland that it has not received approval of HisMajesty's Government. The figures musttherefore be viewed in this light. In makingthis estimate, the U.K. delegation has takeninto account the relevant General Principlesgoverning the Organization of the United Na-tions Forces contained in the Report of theMilitary Staff Committee.

The United Kingdom delegation does notconsider it possible to answer question (2)of the President of the Security Council untilquestion (1) has been resolved, and until adecision has been reached on the percentage ofthe overall strength to be furnished jointly bythe Permanent Members of the Security Coun-cil. In the opinion of the U.K. delegation, it isnot necessary to explore the possible or prob-able individual contributions of the five Perma-nent Members to appreciate that the overallstrength provisionally estimated by any oneof the four delegations could not be madeavailable to the Security Council if the fivePermanent Members were required to makeidentical contributions.

POSITION OF THE U.S. DELEGATION

Concerning question (1), the estimate ofoverall strength submitted by the U.S. dele-gation is based on the following funda-mentals :

a. That the overall strength of the Forcesto be made available to the Security Coun-cil should enable the Security Council toconstitute balanced, effective forces able totake prompt action in any part of the worldfor the maintenance of international peaceand security, including urgent military mea-sures envisaged in Article 45 of the Char-ter.6. That the forces made available to theSecurity Council should be sufficient to en-able the Security Council to carry out thetasks envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter.In presenting its provisional estimate, the

U.S. delegation emphasizes that it does notconsider that any useful or authoritative es-timate of the overall strength can be made

POSITION OF THE U.S.S.R. DELEGATION


by the Military Staff Committee until theSecurity Council resolves the divergences inthe General Principles. Moreover, the figuressubmitted by the U.S. Delegation are tenta-tive, do not commit the U.S. Government inany way, nor prejudice the U.S. proposal ofopposition to the principle of equality. TheMembers of the U.S. Delegation have sub-mitted these figures because of the expresseddesire of a majority of the Delegations tosubmit an estimate to the Security Councilin conformity with the request of the Presi-dent of the Security Council.

Concerning question (2), the U.S. Delega-tion considers that no appreciable fraction ofthe overall strength could be supplied on thebasis of equality by the five Permanent Mem-bers of the Security Council.

When the report of the Military Staff Com-mittee was discussed at the Council's 149thmeeting on June 30, the representative of theU.S.S.R. stated that a series of proposals re-garding the general principles governing theoverall strength and the organization of thearmed forces to be made available to theSecurity Council was still the subject of diver-gences among the members of the Council.For that reason, he argued, it was not possibleto elaborate any estimates regarding the over-all strength of the armed forces to be madethe composition of armed forces. He went onto state that the delegations which submittedestimates submitted them not as having beenapproved by their governments, not as officialestimates, but only as provisional, unofficial,tentative estimates. The Security Councilwas an official organ of the United Nations,he continued. How, therefore, he asked, couldit study proposals which were submitted to itunofficially? He concluded by saying that hewas not able to discuss the question ofwhether the proposals submitted by variousdelegations on the Military Staff Committeewere right or not, nor was he able to discussthe question of whether or not they met therequirements of the Security Council or therequirements of the maintenance of interna-tional peace and security.

The representative of Poland stated thathe was rather puzzled as to how, from thefigures presented in the report of the MilitaryStaff Committee, the conclusion could bedrawn that the principle of equality in theprovision of armed forces was impractical andinapplicable.

On the initiative of the representative ofAustralia, the Council decided to ask the Mili-tary Staff Committee the following two ques-tions: 1) When they spoke about the overallstrength, did they mean the contributions ofthe Permanent Members? 2) Did the Mili-tary Staff Committee mean the contributionsby all the Members of the United Nationsunder the special agreements?

Discussion on Article 11 was to be contin-ued by the Security Council.

Article 12 was approved without change.Article 13, with an amendment by the rep-

resentative of Belgium, was approved by theCouncil. Its text was as follows:

No Member of the United Nations shall beurged to increase the strength of its ArmedForces or to create a particular componentthereof for the specific purpose of making acontribution to the Armed Forces which inaccordance with the special agreements areto be made available to the Security Council,on its call, by Members of the United Nations.

Articles 14 and 15 were adopted withoutchange.

Article 18 was discussed at the 145th meet-ing of the Security Council on June 24. Therepresentative of Belgium submitted anamendment to the article which resulted ina lengthy debate. Several alternative amend-ments and sub-amendments were suggestedand finally the representative of Belgiumagreed to accept an amendment suggested bythe representative of the United States andthe representative of Poland. This amend-ment would leave the original text of Article18 unchanged, except for adding at the endof the first line the words "as a result of itscall," making the first line read: "The ArmedForces made available to the Security Coun-cil as a result of its call." As several mem-bers of the Council raised doubts as to theinterpretation of Article 18, asking whetherthis article applied to the overall strength ofthe armed forces or only to a force madeavailable to the Security Council on its call,the Council agreed to request the MilitaryStaff Committee for an interpretation ofArticle 18.

The reply of the Military Staff Committeewas discussed at the 149th meeting of theCouncil. The text of the reply was as follows:

In reply to your letter of June 24, 1947, Ihave the honor to inform you that at the


49th meeting of the Military Staff Commit-tee on June 26, 1947, the Military Staff Com-mittee unanimously agreed to the followinginterpretation of Article 18 of the report ofthe Military Staff Committee:

Article 18 of the General Principles was in-tended to establish the principle that theArmed Forces specified in the special agree-ments may be called for in whole or in partonly by decision of the Security Council foremployment under Article 42 of the Char-ter. When so called for, they may be employ-ed by the Security Council only for the periodnecessary for the fulfillment of the tasksenvisaged in Article 42 of the Charter.Article 18 of the General Principles cannotbe interpreted to impair the right of aMember Nation to use all or any part ofits armed forces under Article 51 of theCharter, nor can Article 18 of the GeneralPrinciples be interpreted to impair theexercise of exclusive command by a Mem-ber Nation over its armed forces whichhave been pledged to the Security Councilin the special agreements but not yet calledup for employment by the Security Council.

The representative of the United Statesthen proposed that the original text of Article18 be deleted and be replaced by part of thefirst paragraph of the reply from the MilitaryStaff Committee. This proposal was put to avote but failed to carry, and the Presidentof the Council ruled that Article 18 in itsoriginal form would be maintained. Afterfurther discussion, it was decided that theexplanation contained in the first paragraphof the reply of the Military Staff Committeeshould be added to the report with the under-standing that the interpretation would be con-sidered as the one accepted by the SecurityCouncil.

Article 19 was adopted without change.

Article 22 was amended by the representa-tive of Belgium and adopted by the SecurityCouncil. Its text was as follows :

The degree of readiness of the ArmedForces which are to be made available tothe Security Council, on its call, by individualMember Nations of the United Nations isfixed by the Security Council, on the advice ofthe Military Staff Committee, as a result ofthe negotiations in concluding the SpecialAgreements with those Member Nations underArticle 43 of the Charter.

Article 23 was subjected to a slight draft-ing amendment to read as follows:

The degree of readiness of the ArmedForces should be maintained at a level whichwill enable these Forces to start in good timeto fulfill the Security Council's measures en-visaged in Article 42 of the Charter.

Article 24 was also subjected to a slightdrafting amendment to read as follows :

These Armed Forces shall be either main-tained in readiness for combat or brought upto readiness for combat within the time-limitsto be specified in the Special Agreements.

Articles 29, 30 and 35 were adopted withoutchange.

Article 36 as amended by the representa-tive of Belgium and adopted by the SecurityCouncil reads as follows :

The Armed Forces specified in the specialagreements shall remain under the exclusivecommand of the respective contributingStates, except when operating under the Se-curity Council, having been made available toit on its call.

Articles 37, 38, 39 and 40 were adopted bythe Security Council without any changes.

The Security Council continued to be seizedof the matter.1

13. QUESTIONS NOT PLACED ON THE AGENDAa. The Polish Army in Italy

By a letter dated February 15, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General, the representativeof the U.S.S.R. drew the attention of the mem-bers of the Security Council to the facts setforth in an enclosed memorandum of the Gov-ernment of the Federated People's Republicof Yugoslavia on the question of the Polishémigré army in Italy. The letter stated thatthe Yugoslav Government regarded the eventsreferred to in its memorandum as a possiblefuture threat to peace, calm and order onthe Yugoslav-Italian frontier and had re-quested the Government of the U.S.S.R. tobring the matter to the knowledge of themembers of the Security Council.

The Yugoslav memorandum presented in-formation on a continuing movement of unitsof the Polish Army in Italy, under the com-mand of General Anders, towards the northand northeast so as to approach closer tothe frontier of Yugoslavia. It was noted thatthe state of mind of these units was hostileto the Yugoslav Government, as evidenced by

1 See Military Staff Committee, pp. 422 ff.


the aggressive and ostensibly threatening tonethat this Army was recruiting troops fromYugoslav quisling groups and supporting thesegroups in Italy.

In a letter dated February 17, 1946, ad-dressed to the Secretary-General, the Secre-tary of State for Foreign Affairs of theUnited Kingdom stated that the abovemen-tioned letter of the Soviet Government hadbeen the first communication received by hisGovernment concerning movements of thePolish forces in Italy and that he felt theproper course of the Yugoslav Governmentshould have been to bring the matter to hisnotice through diplomatic channels. The letterfurther stated that Polish troops in Italywere widely distributed and that those in thearea mentioned in the Yugoslav memorandumwere performing guard duties only; nonewere, or would be, employed east of the pro-vince of Udine, and, as their guard duties di-minished, they would be moved south of theRiver Po and east of Bologna. It was notedthat all recruiting had been forbidden forseveral months and that there was no informa-tion to confirm the statement that the Polishforces were in close touch with Yugoslav dis-sident elements.

This question was not placed on the Coun-cil's agenda.

6. Franco-Siamese RelationsIn a memorandum submitted to the Secre-

tary-General on May 31, 1946, the SiameseChargé d'Affaires in Washington, D.C., statedthat he was bringing incidents occurring onthe Siam-Indo-China border to the knowledgeof the United Nations, hoping to serve thegeneral interests in making every effort forthe maintenance of peaceful and friendly re-lations between the nations of the world. Thememorandum noted the deterioration of rela-tions between Siam and France since thetermination of the war in the Pacific and thedeclaration by the French Government thatit considered that a state of hostilityexisted between the two countries; as proofof a desire to maintain friendly relations withFrance, the Siamese Government had con-tinued to welcome and aid French refugees,to allow French nationals complete freedom,and had opened negotiations with a view tobringing about a satisfactory solution to thequestion of territories retroceded to Siam in1941.

In spite of these marks of good will, thememorandum continued, a tense situation hadall along prevailed on the border area wherethe Mekong River separated the two countries.The memorandum cited incidents which haddeveloped since the end of the last war, classi-fied into the following five categories:

(1) arbitrary arrest of Siamese na-tionals;

(2) wanton fusillade;(3) plunder and looting;(4) violation of Siamese territory;(5) arbitrary control of the Mekong

River traffic, search of Siamese boats andconfiscation of properties belonging toSiamese nationals.It was stated that in a recent case the

Siamese Government had considered it advis-able to seek the good offices of the Britishand American Governments in persuading theFrench Government, and thereby the Frenchauthorities in Indo-China, to discontinue theuse of force in a question which could besolved through normal and peaceful proce-dure; however, the French authorities in theborder region continued to create trouble.

This question was not placed on the Coun-cil's agenda.1

Subsequently the Secretary-General re-ceived two letters dated November 28, 1946,from the French and Siamese Governmentsrespectively, advising that the dispute be-tween these two countries which was broughtto the attention of the Security Council hadbeen settled by negotiation and that the Sia-mese representative had been instructed byhis Government to withdraw its complaint.

The letters were discussed at the 81st meet-ing of the Security Council on November 29,1946. The President of the Council — therepresentative of the United States — speak-ing on behalf of all members of the Council,expressed deep satisfaction that the Frenchand Siamese Governments had reached asettlement of their difficulties by means ofnegotiations directly between themselves inaccordance with the spirit and principles ofthe Charter. He went on to state that sincethe original Siamese complaint had neverbeen placed on the agenda of the Council, theCouncil could now consider the matter closedand that no further action by the Council wasnecessary.

1 See pp. 418, 419.


c. Presence of Foreign Troops in Non-EnemyCountriesAt the 57th meeting of the Security Council,

on August 29, 1946, the representative of theU.S.S.R. presented a statement concerning thepresence of Allied troops on the territory ofStates which were Members of the UnitedNations, or other States, not including formerenemy countries. The representative of theU.S.S.R. stated that "the presence of Alliedarmies over a long period after the conclusionof the war, which is not called for by thenecessities of war, cannot fail to provoke awholly natural anxiety among the peoples ofthese countries in which until now these for-eign armies are still situated. At the sametime, world public opinion, which is interestedin the speedy establishment of peace and themaintenance of universal security, is follow-ing with unconcealed anxiety the situationcreated in these countries." The representa-tive of the U.S.S.R., therefore, requested thatthe Council should adopt a decision bindingStates Members of the United Nations to sub-mit to the Security Council within a period oftwo weeks information on the followingpoints :

(1) In what places in the territory ofthe United Nations or other States not in-

cluding ex-enemy territories and in whatnumbers the armed forces of other UnitedNations were situated.

(2) At what places in the abovemen-tioned territories air or sea bases were es-tablished and what was the size of the garri-son of these bases belonging to the armedforces of other States Members of theUnited Nations.

The information to be provided under thesetwo heads was to refer to the situation as itexisted on August 1, 1946.

The question of admitting this statementto the agenda of the Security Council wasdiscussed on September 23 and 24. Afterprotracted discussion, during which the rep-resentatives of Australia, Brazil, China,Egypt, France, Mexico, the Netherlands,Poland, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates each presented the views of their Gov-ernments, the Council decided not to includeon the agenda the statement made by therepresentative of the U.S.S.R. on August 29.Poland and the U.S.S.R. voted affirmatively forthe Soviet proposition; Egypt and France ab-stained; and Australia, Brazil, China, Mexico,the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and theUnited States voted against.

D. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

1. ELECTION OF OFFICERS OF THE UNITEDNATIONS

a. Nomination of the Secretary-General

At its fourth meeting (private) on Janu-ary 30, 1946, pursuant to Article 97 of theCharter, the Security Council decided to recom-mend to the General Assembly that TrygveLie be appointed Secretary-General of theUnited Nations.

At its 20th plenary meeting on February 1the General Assembly, upon this recommen-dation, appointed Mr. Lie as Secretary-General.

b. Election of Members of the InternationalCourt of JusticeIn accordance with the Statute of the In-

ternational Court of Justice, the Council, atits ninth meeting on February 6, 1946, andthe General Assembly, at the 23rd, 24th and

25th plenary meetings on February 6, 1946,elected the following members of the Inter-national Court of Justice:

For a nine-year term:Dr. Alejandro Alvarez (Chile)Dr. José Philadelpho de Barros Azevedo

(Brazil)Professor Jules Basdevant (France)Dr. José Gustavo Guerrero (El Salvador)Sir Arnold Duncan McNair (United

Kingdom)

For a six-year term:

Dr. Isidro Fabela Alfaro (Mexico)Green H. Hackworth (United States)Dr. Helge Klaestad (Norway)Professor Sergei Borisovich Krylov

(U.S.S.R.)Dr. Charles de Visscher (Belgium)


For a three-year term:Dr. Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha (Egypt)Dr. Hsu Mo (China)John E. Read (Canada)Dr. Bogdan Winiarski (Poland)Dr. Milovan Zoricic (Yugoslavia)

2. PROCEDURAL MATTERSa. Committee of Experts

At its first meeting held in London on Janu-ary 17, 1946, the Security Council appointeda Committee of Experts, to be composed ofa representative of each of the eleven mem-bers of the Council, for the purpose of revis-ing the Provisional Rules of Procedure, whichthe Council had adopted upon recommendationof the Preparatory Commission.

6. Rules of Procedure of the Security CouncilAs instructed by the Council at its first,

sixth and 23rd meetings, the Committee ofExperts drafted Provisional Rules of Pro-cedure and recommendations concerning com-munications from private individuals andnon-governmental bodies. After minor amend-ments the Council adopted these ProvisionalRules of Procedure and recommendations atthe 31st meeting and agreed that the Com-mittee of Experts should formulate additionalprovisional rules for submission to theCouncil.

Additional Provisional Rules of Proceduredrafted by the Committee of Experts wereadopted by the Council at its 41st, 42nd, 44thand 48th meetings. At the 138th meetingthe Council adopted a rule on the election ofMembers of the International Court ofJustice.1

c. Letter Addressed by the Secretary-Generalto the President of the Security Councilregarding the Iranian Case.

The Committee of Experts had been re-quested by the Security Council at its 33rdmeeting on April 16, 1946, to study the letteraddressed by the Secretary-General to thePresident of the Council regarding the ques-tion of the retention of the Iranian case onthe agenda of the Security Council. The Com-mittee examined this question but was unableto formulate a common opinion; the reportwhich it submitted to the Council at its 36thmeeting on April 23, 1946, summarized thearguments advanced during the discussion inthe Committee.

d. Rules of Procedure of the Atomic EnergyCommission.

At its fourth meeting on July 3, 1946, theAtomic Energy Commission adopted Pro-visional Rules of Procedure submitted by theCommittee on Rules of Procedure of theAtomic Energy Commission. By a letter ofJuly 5, 1946, the Chairman of the AtomicEnergy Commission2 in accordance with theional Rules of Procedure to the Security Coun-cil for approval. The Security Council at its50th meeting on July 10, 1946, approved theProvisional Rules of Procedure of the AtomicEnergy Commission2 in accordance with theresolution of January 24, 1946, of the GeneralAssembly.

e. Draft Statute and Draft Rules of Proce-dure of the Military Staff CommitteeAt the 23rd meeting of the Security Council

it was agreed to postpone consideration of theReport of the Military Staff Committee con-cerning its Statute and Rules of Procedure.The Committee of Experts was instructed toexamine the Report. It was agreed that, pend-ing the approval of the Report by the Council,the Military Staff Committee was authorizedto carry out its business along the lines sug-gested in its Report.

At the 25th meeting consideration of theReport was further postponed pending exam-ination by the Committee of Experts. Up toJune 30, 1947, the Committee was still exam-ining the Report.

f. Definition of Conditions under which theInternational Court of Justice shall beopen to States not Parties to the Statute

By a letter dated May 1, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations, the President of the InternationalCourt of Justice brought to the attention ofthe Security Council Article 35, Paragraph 2,of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, which specifies that the conditionsunder which the Court shall be open to Statesnot parties to the Statute shall be laid downby the Security Council. He requested that

1 Text of Provisional Rules of Procedure is tobe found in Annex VI.

2 The text of the Provisional Rules of Proce-dure of the Atomic Energy Commission is repro-duced in Annex VII.


the Court be informed of any decisions theCouncil saw fit to take in this matter. At its50th meeting the Council referred this letter,together with a memorandum of the Secre-tary-General in regard to it, to the Committeeof Experts and instructed the Committee toprepare a draft resolution for the Council.

At its 76th meeting on October 15, 1946,the Security Council considered the reportsubmitted by the Committee of Experts atthe end of September. The draft resolutionsubmitted by the Committee of Experts pro-vided :

(1) The International Court of Justice shallbe open to a State which is not a party tothe Statute of the International Court ofJustice, upon the following condition, namely:that such State shall previously have depositedwith the Registrar of the Court a declarationby which it accepts the jurisdiction of theCourt, in accordance with the Charter of theUnited Nations and with the terms and sub-ject to the conditions of the Statute andRules of the Court, and undertakes to complyin good faith with the decision or decisionsof the Court and to accept all the obligationsof a Member of the United Nations underArticle 94 of the Charter.

(2) Such declaration may be either particu-lar or general. A particular declaration is oneaccepting the jurisdiction of the Court in re-spect only of a particular dispute or disputeswhich have already arisen. A general declara-tion is one accepting the jurisdiction generallyin respect of all disputes or of a particularclass or classes of disputes which have alreadyarisen or which may arise in the future.

The representative of the Netherlands, whowas then Chairman of the Committee of Ex-perts, explained that the principles underlyingthe draft resolution were:

(1) to give the freest possible access tothe Court to States not parties to the Statute.

(2) Not to put any new obligations on theparties to the Statute. The parties to theStatute would have the advantage of bringingbefore their own Court any State non-partywilling to appear, but under no conditionwould the parties to the Statute be forcedto appear before the Court against their ownwill and consent.

The text of the resolution was adoptedunanimously.

The representatives of Poland then sub-mitted the following resolution:

In accordance with the spirit of the reso-lutions adopted by the General Assembly in

London on 9 February and 10 February 1946,the above resolution does not apply to Stateswhose regimes have been installed with thehelp of armed forces of countries which havefought against the United Nations so longas these regimes are in power.

After lengthy discussion of the merits ofthe Polish proposal, particularly in relation tothe Franco regime in Spain, the SecurityCouncil by a vote of 7 to 4 rejected the reso-lution. France, Mexico, Poland and theU.S.S.R. voted in favor of the proposal;Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, the Nether-lands, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates voted in the negative.

g. Conditions on which Switzerland may be-come a Party to the Statute of the Inter-national Court of Justice

Max Petitpierre, Chief of the Swiss FederalPolitical Department, in a letter forwardedto the Secretary-General of the United Na-tions on October 26, 1946, by F. Gygax, SwissCónsul-General in New York, expressed thedesire of the Swiss Federal Council to ascer-tain the conditions on which Switzerlandcould, in pursuance of Article 93, Paragraph2, of the Charter, become a party to theStatute of the International Court of Justice.

Article 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter pro-vides that a State which is not a member ofthe United Nations may become a party tothe Statute of the Court on conditions to bedetermined in each case by the GeneralAssembly upon the recommendation of theSecurity Council.

The letter from the Swiss Federal PoliticalDepartment was placed on the agenda of theSecurity Council at its 78th meeting onOctober 30, 1946. At that meeting the Councildecided to turn the matter over to its Com-mittee of Experts for consideration as soonas possible and to report back to the SecurityCouncil.

The report and recommendation of theCouncil's Committee of Experts were con-sidered and adopted by the Security Councilat its 80th meeting, held on November 15,1946. The recommendation was as follows:

The Security Council recommends that theGeneral Assembly, in accordance with Article93 (2) of the Charter, determine the con-ditions on which Switzerland may become aparty to the Statute of the International Courtof Justice, as follows:


Switzerland will become a party to theStatute on the date of the deposit with theSecretary-General of the United Nations ofan instrument, signed on behalf of the Gov-ernment of Switzerland and ratified as maybe required by Swiss constitutional law, con-taining:

(a) Acceptance of the provisions of theStatute of the International Court of Jus-tice;(b) acceptance of all obligations of a Mem-ber of the United Nations under Article94 of the Charter; and(c) an undertaking to contribute to theexpenses of the Court such equitable amountas the General Assembly shall assess fromtime to time after consultation with theSwiss Government.The report, containing the recommendation,

was forwarded to the President of the GeneralAssembly. The Assembly on December 11,1946, adopted the recommendation.

h. Application of Articles 11 and 12 of theStatute of the International Court ofJustice

At the ninth meeting held on February 6,1946, it had been agreed, on the motion ofthe representative of the United Kingdom,that the Council should propose to the Assem-bly that both the Assembly and the Council asseparate bodies, or the Assembly alone, shouldask the International Court of Justice foran advisory opinion on the interpretation ofthe word "meeting" as used in Articles 11and 12 of the Statute of the InternationalCourt of Justice. The question had arisen inconnection with the election of judges forthe International Court of Justice.

Acting Secretary-General A.D.K. Owen ina letter dated January 28, 1947, transmittedto the President of the Security Council forconsideration the resolution of the GeneralAssembly of November 19, 1946, on the rulesof procedure with respect to the election ofmembers of the Court.

The resolution and the letter were broughtto the attention of the Security Council atits 97th meeting on January 3, 1947, and wereplaced on the agenda of the Security Councilat its 138th meeting on June 4, 1947. TheUnited States representative submitted thefollowing draft resolution to the Council:

THE SECURITY COUNCILHAVING CONSIDERED the Resolution of the

General Assembly of 19 November 1946,adopted provisionally and subject to the con-

currence of the Security Council the followingRule of Procedure:

RULE 99AAny meeting of the General Assembly heldin pursuance of the Statute of the Inter-national Court of Justice for the purposeof the election of members of the Courtshall continue until as many candidates asare required for all the seats to be filledhave obtained in one or more ballots anabsolute majority of votes.

RESOLVES :1. To concur in the Rule of Procedurequoted above; and2. To adopt the following Rule of Pro-cedure :

CHAPTER 11Relations with Other United

Nations OrgansRULE 61

Any meeting of the Security Council heldin pursuance of the Statute of the Inter-national Court of Justice for the purposeof the election of members of the Courtshall continue until as many candidates asare required for all the seats to be filledhave obtained in one or more ballots anabsolute majority of votes.

TRANSMITS :this Resolution to the General Assembly

for its information.

The President of the Council stated thatthe Council could either examine the draftresolution immediately or it could transmitit to the Council's Committee of Experts forstudy and recommendation. He believed thatthe second alternative would be more in con-formity with the tradition of the Council.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. sug-gested that if a single member of the Councilfelt that the matter should be referred tothe Committee of Experts, then it should beso ordered; otherwise the Council could pro-ceed to deal immediately with the matter.

The Council decided unanimously to ex-amine the draft resolution immediately.

The representative of Australia stated thatfor lack of a rule such as the one now pro-posed, there had been in the past hopelessconfusion between the Security Council andthe General Assembly. It had happened, hecontended, that the President of the SecurityCouncil gave one ruling and the President ofthe General Assembly gave another ruling.Adoption of the draft resolution would obviatethe difficulty.

The Security Council 41 3

The draft resolution was then put to a voteand adopted unanimously by the Council.

3. ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THEUNITED NATIONS

a. Rules of ProcedureAt the 41st and 42nd meetings of the Secur-

ity Council on May 16 and 17, 1946, the Com-mittee of Experts recommended the followingrules of procedure concerning the admission ofnew Members:

Rule 55Any State which desires to become a Member

of the United Nations shall submit an applica-tion to the Secretary-General. This applicationshall be accompanied by a declaration of itsreadiness to accept the obligations containedin the Charter.

Rule 56The Secretary-General shall immediately

place the application for membership beforethe representatives on the Security Council.Unless the Security Council decides otherwise,the application shall be referred by the Presi-dent to a committee of the Security Councilupon which each member of the Security Coun-cil shall be represented. The committee shallexamine any application referred to it andreport its conclusions thereon to the Councilnot less than thirty-five days in advance of aregular session of the General Assembly, or,if a special session of the General Assembly iscalled, not less than fourteen days in advanceof such session.

Rule 57The Security Council shall decide whether in

its judgment the applicant is a peace-lovingState and is able and willing to carry out theobligations contained in the Charter, andaccordingly whether to recommend the appli-cant State for membership.

In order to assure the consideration of itsrecommendation at the next session of theGeneral Assembly following the receipt of theapplication, the Security Council shall make itsrecommendations not less than twenty-fivedays in advance of a regular session of theGeneral Assembly, nor less than four days inadvance of a special session.

In special circumstances, the Security Coun-cil may decide to make a recommendation tothe General Assembly concerning an applica-tion for membership subsequent to the expir-ation of the time limits set forth in the pre-ceeding paragraph.

The representative of Australia opposed theadoption of these rules and reserved the de-cision of the Australian Government on thismatter. He argued that membership in theUnited Nations involved obligations far wider

than the obligations in respect to security, andfitness for membership must be judged inregard to the total obligations under the Char-ter; that the Security Council's recommenda-tion could only concern matters relating tosecurity; and that, in general, the initiativefor the admission of new Members rested withthe General Assembly. The representative ofAustralia suggested, as a possible procedurefor the organization as a whole, that applica-tions for membership should be first placedbefore the General Assembly, which woulddecide whether or not to transmit them to theSecurity Council; the Security Council wouldmake its report to the General Assembly andthe General Assembly would then take the finaldecision. He therefore proposed the followingresolution :

That the consolidation of Chapter X of theproposed rules of procedure be deferred; thatthe President of the Security Council be askedto discuss with the President of the GeneralAssembly the best method of consultation be-tween the appropriate representatives of theGeneral Assembly and the Security Councilwith a view to bringing about the adoption byboth the General Assembly and the SecurityCouncil, early in September 1946, of rules ap-propriate to each organ regarding the admis-sion of new Members,

The representative of the United Kingdomstated that although the Assembly grantedadmission to a new Member, the recommenda-tion of the Security Council was required;its responsibility was, therefore, not limited,nor should its recommendation concern onlymatters in relation to security. He supported,therefore, the adoption of the rules recom-mended by the Committee of Experts.

The representative of China stated thatRule 106 of the General Assembly made it evi-dent that the Assembly interpreted Article 4of the Charter in the sense that the decisionof the General Assembly regarding the ad-mission of a proposed Member, while notprejudiced on the merits of the case by therecommendation of the Security Council, wasnevertheless subsequent to such a recom-mendation being made by the Council.

The representative of Mexico stated thatArticle 4 (2) of the Charter made the powerof the General Assembly to decide on thequestion of admission of new Members de-pendent upon the recommendation of theSecurity Council. He did not think that the


text submitted by the Committee of Expertsinvolved an encroachment by the SecurityCouncil on the powers of the General Assem-bly, whose important part in the United Na-tions organization the Government of Mexicowas ever anxious to protect and even in-crease.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. sup-ported the recommendation of the Committeeof Experts. He stressed the words "upon therecommendation of the Security Council" inArticle 4 (2), and drew the conclusion thatthe General Assembly could not take a de-cision without the recommendation of theSecurity Council.

The resolution proposed by the representa-tive of Australia received one vote and wasrejected. The rules proposed by the Committeeof Experts were then adopted by ten votes.

6. Resolutions of May 17 and July 24, 1946At the 42nd meeting of the Security Council

on May 17, 1946 the following resolution, sub-mitted by the representative of the UnitedStates, was adopted:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,Taking into account the fact that, under

Article 4 of the Charter, membership in theUnited Nations is open to all peace-lovingstates which accept the obligations containedin the Charter, and, in the judgment of theOrganization, are able and willing to carryout these obligations; and

Taking into account the fact that the Gen-eral Assembly, which acts to admit applicantStates to membership on the recommendationof the Security Council, will meet for thesecond part of its first session on 3 September1946;

RESOLVES THAT:1. Applications for membership which have

been or may be received by the Secretary-General shall be considered by the SecurityCouncil at a meeting or meetings to be heldin August 1946 for this specific purpose.

2. Applications for membership which havebeen or may be received by the Secretary-General before 15 July 1946 shall be referredto a committee composed of a representativeof each of the members of the Security Coun-cil for examination and report to the Councilnot later than 1 August 1946.

As a result of the postponement of thesecond part of the first session of the GeneralAssembly, which had been scheduled to con-vene on September 3, 1946, the Security Coun-

cil, at the 51st meeting on July 24, 1946,resolved to modify the dates mentioned inthe above resolution by as many days lateras the interval between September 3, 1946,and the day on which the General Assemblywould actually be convened.c. Applications for Membership

The applications for membership receivedby the Secretary-General were as follows :

(a) People's Republic of Albania, receivedJanuary 25, 1946.

(b) Mongolian People's Republic, datedJune 24, 1946.

(c) Afghanistan, dated July 2, 1946.(d) The Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-jor-

dan, dated June 26, 1946.(e) Ireland, dated August 2, 1946.(f) Portugal, dated August 2, 1946.(g) Republic of Iceland, dated August 2,

1946.(h) Siam, dated August 3, 1946.(i) Sweden, dated August 9, 1946.(j) Hungary, dated April 22, 1947.(k) Italy, dated May 7, 1947.The applications were referred to the Com-

mittee on the Admission of New Members,which consisted of one representative fromeach member of the Security Council. TheCommittee was convened on July 31, 1946, andsubmitted its first report on the first nineapplications to the Security Council. TheSecurity Council considered the report of theCommittee on August 28 and 29, 1946.

During the general discussion of the Com-mittee's report the representative of theUnited States proposed that the SecurityCouncil recommend to the General Assemblythe admission of all applicants "to accelerateadvancement of the universality of member-ship." This proposal was supported by the Sec-retary-General, who pointed out that thefounding Members of the United Nationsand all of the great powers had agreed onnumerous occasions that the United Nationsmust be as universal as possible. The repre-sentatives of Brazil, Egypt and Mexico sup-ported the United States proposal.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. statedthat the Council should not simply apply ageneral standard to a block of countries, butmust study each application separately in thelight of the circumstances and the facts rele-vant to each case. In this contention he wassupported by the representative of Australia.As a result of the opposition which the United


States proposal encountered, the representa-tive of the United States agreed to withdrawhis proposal without a vote.

The Council then decided to discuss theapplications one by one in chronological orderand to defer voting on each application untilthe discussion of all applications had beencompleted.

(1). Application of the People's Republicof Albania

By a letter received on January 25, 1946, ad-dressed to the Executive Secretary of theUnited Nations, the Vice-Premier of Yugo-slavia requested that the Security Councilrecommend to the General Assembly the admis-sion of the People's Republic of Albania. Theletter enclosed a telegram from the Presidentof the People's Republic of Albania, addressedto the President and Vice-Présidents of theGeneral Assembly, renewing the applicationmade to the President of the Preparatory Com-mission on December 20, 1945, for the admis-sion of Albania as a Member of the United Na-tions. In the telegram the President calledattention to the immense sacrifice made bythe Albanian people during the long andarduous struggle against the Axis powers,and he declared on behalf of his Governmentthat his country was prepared to assume allthe obligations arising from the Charter ofthe United Nations.

At the Council's third meeting on January28, 1946, it was agreed without objection thatthis application be placed on the agenda.

By a letter dated February 9, 1943. addressedto the Secretary-General, the Yugoslav DeputyMinister for Foreign Affairs requested thathis delegation be allowed to be heard at themeeting of the Security Council at which theAlbanian application would be examined.

By letter dated February 12, 1946, ad-dressed to the President of the SecurityCouncil, the Greek Minister for ForeignAffairs stated that in view of the fact thatAlbania had joined the Axis Powers by send-ing fifteen battalions against Greece in 1941,the Greek Government felt that the admissionof Albania should be postponed until the nextsession of the Assembly, in the hope thatmeanwhile normal relations would be estab-lished between the two countries. He furtherstated that the admission of Albania especiallyaffected the interests of Greece and asked theSecurity Council to invite Greece to partici-

pate, in accordance with Article 31 of theCharter, in the discussions of the SecurityCouncil regarding this matter.

At the Council's eighteenth meeting onFebruary 13, 1946, it was agreed to receivethe letter from the Greek Foreign Minister,but the question of consideration of the letterwas deferred. At the same meeting, the follow-ing resolution submitted by the representa-tive of the United States was adopted byseven votes:

I move that this item be kept on our agenda,but disposition be deferred pending furtherstudy until the Security Council convenes atthe temporary headquarters.

The Albanian application was the subjectof lengthy discussion in the Committee onthe Admission of New Members. The repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R. stated that in hisopinion the Albanian people and the presentRepublican Government could not be blamedfor the declaration of war on Greece in 1940,which was made by the Italian Governmentand the quisling government of Albania. Hestressed the contribution of the Albanian un-derground movement to the Allied war effortand expressed his belief that Albania pos-sessed all the capacities of a stable, independ-ent and democratic State and was able andwilling to carry out the obligations of theCharter. The representatives of the UnitedKingdom and the United States pointed tothe fact that their Governments did not main-tain diplomatic relations with the Govern-ment of Albania and expressed doubt as towhether the Albanian Government was peace-loving and able and willing to carry out theobligations of the Charter of the UnitedNations.

On August 5, 1946, the representative ofGreece to the united Nations sent to theActing Secretary-General a memorandum re-garding the admission of Albania. This memo-randum reproached the Albanians with havingjoined forces with the Italians and havingfought with fanaticism with them againstGreece. It called attention to the unsettledborder situation between Greece and Albaniaand declared the Greek Government's oppo-sition to the admission of Albania to member-ship in the United Nations pending a settle-ment between the two countries. A secondmemorandum was submitted by the Greekrepresentative on August 15, 1946.


The representative of Yugoslavia to theUnited Nations sent a memorandum, datedAugust 10, 1946, to the Acting Secretary-General, urging that Albania was worthy tobecome a Member of the United Nations.

The Committee on the Admission of NewMembers decided to present a questionnaireto the Albanian representative in New Yorkto obtain additional information on variouspoints as requested by several of the repre-sentatives. The list of questions was submittedto the representative of Albania on August9, 1946. A reply was received under date ofAugust 14, 1946.

On August 20, 1946, the Albanian repre-sentative sent a memorandum to the Chairmanof the Committee on the Admission of NewMembers in reply to the Greek memorandumof August 5, 1946.

When the application for membership ofthe People's Republic of Albania came beforethe Security Council for discussion, the argu-ments presented in the Committee on theAdmission of New Members were reiteratedby the representatives of the respective Gov-ernments. A proposal by the representativeof the United States to postpone considera-tion of the application of the Republic ofAlbania until a later date was not adopted.

(2). Application of the MongolianPeople's Republic

By a telegram dated June 24, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General, the Prime Ministerand Foreign Minister of the MongolianPeople's Republic requested the admissionof the Mongolian People's Republic as a Mem-ber of the United Nations. He drew attentionto the fact that the people of the MongolianPeople's Republic took part on the side of theUnited Nations in the struggle against thefascist States. They had declared war againstJapan on August 10, 1945, and had taken partin military operations against that country.In the name of the Mongolian People's Re-public, the Prime Minister and ForeignMinister declared that his country was pre-pared to undertake all the obligations arisingout of the United Nations Charter and toobserve all provisions of the Charter.

The Representative of China proposed tothe Committee on the Admission of New Mem-bers that consideration of the application ofthe Mongolian People's Republic be postponedfor a year, as the Mongolian People's Republic

had exchanged diplomatic representativeswith the U.S.S.R. only.

The representative of the U.S.S.R., in sup-porting the application of the MongolianPeople's Republic, stressed the contributionof the Mongolian Republic "in the commonstruggle of the democracies against fascist ag-gressors and the Axis powers." The represen-tatives of Australia, Egypt, the Netherlands,the United Kingdom and the United Statesstated that the available information was notsufficient to show whether the MongolianPeople's Republic was capable of fulfilling theobligations of the United Nations Charter.

On July 31, 1946, the Secretary-General,upon the Committee's request, sent a telegramto the Government of the Mongolian People'sRepublic asking it to appoint, a representative,available in New York, to whom a requestfor information could be addressed. As noreply to this telegram was received, the Com-mittee, on August 12, 1946, telegraphed alist of questions to the Government of theMongolian People's Republic to obtain ad-ditional information as requested by severaldelegates. On August 16, 1946, the Committeedecided to approach the Government of theU.S.S.R. to inquire of the Mongolian People'sRepublic whether it had received the twotelegrams.

A reply to the questionnaire was receivedon August 28, 1946. The representative ofChina declared that his Government foundthe replies of the Mongolian People's Republicsatisfactory and was now prepared to supportthe application of the Mongolian People'sRepublic for membership in the United Na-tions. Other representatives, however, main-tained their original objections. A proposal bythe representative of the United States that theSecurity Council postpone voting on the appli-cation of the Mongolian People's Republic waswithdrawn in view of the adverse decisionof the Security Council on a like resolutionin regard to the admission of Albania.

(3). Application of Afghanistan

By telegram dated July 2, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General, the Prime Ministerof Afghanistan transmitted the applicationfor the admission of Afghanistan to member-ship in the United Nations. He stated thatAfghanistan had long shown itself to be apeace-loving State constantly devoted to the


ideals of international co-operation, and de-clared that his country was prepared to acceptthe obligations contained in the Charter.

The application of Afghanistan was sup-ported by all of the members of the Committeeon the Admission of New Members. No oppo-sition to Afghanistan's application was voicedat the meetings of the Security Council onAugust 28 and 29, 1946.

(4). Application of the Hashemite Kingdomof Trans-jordan

By letter dated June 26, 1946 addressedto the Secretary-General, the Minister forForeign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdomof Trans-jordan requested, on behalf of hisGovernment, admission to membership in theUnited Nations, and stated that, being apeace-loving nation, his country was preparedto undertake the obligations embodied in theCharter of the United Nations.

In the Committee on the Admission of NewMembers, the representatives of the UnitedKingdom and Egypt supported the applicationof Trans-jordan for membership in theUnited Nations. The Egyptian representative,however, pointed out that the treaty betweenTrans-jordan and Great Britain, concludedon March 22, 1946, contained an agreementconcerning the stationing of British forcesin Trans-jordan. Such a provision, he stated,could be considered contrary to the principleof sovereign equality of all United NationsMembers provided for in Article 2 (1) of theCharter. The United Nations, at a later date,should examine the relationship of the pro-visions of the treaty of March 22, 1946, tothe Charter of the United Nations.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. statedthat he could not support the application ofTrans-jordan, as the U.S.S.R. did not main-tain diplomatic relations with Trans-jordan.The representative of Poland questionedwhether Trans-jordan had de jure and defacto attained independence. He stated thathe did not consider the way in which theBritish mandate was terminated to be inconformity with the procedure adopted bythe Council of the League of Nations in re-gard to other mandates; nor had the require-ments of the United Nations Charter beenmet when the mandate was terminated. Therepresentative of Poland suggested that theapplication of Trans-jordan be postponed forone year.

The Committee on the Admission of NewMembers decided to prepare a questionnairebased on the statement by the Polish delegate,to be sent to the representative of Trans-jordan in New York. The questionnaire wasdespatched to the representative of Trans-jordan on August 15, 1946. A reply was re-ceived on August 20, 1946.

When the application of Trans-jordan wasdiscussed by the Security Council, the repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R. stated that hisGovernment could not consider that a countrywhich had no diplomatic relations with theU.S.S.R. satisfied the requirements imposedby the Charter of the United Nations upon aState applying for membership in the UnitedNations. This statement was criticized bythe representatives of Australia, Brazil,Egypt, France, the United Kingdom and theUnited States as raising a condition of mem-bership not contained in Article 4 of theUnited Nations Charter, which article aloneshould govern the admission of new Members.The representative of France pointed to thefact that the U.S.S.R. had supported theapplication of the Mongolian People's Repub-lic, although that country maintained diplo-matic relations with only two other StatesMembers of the United Nations.

(5). Application of IrelandBy a telegram dated August 2, 1946, the

Minister for External Affairs of Irelandapplied for the admission of Ireland to mem-bership in the United Nations. He declaredthat Ireland was prepared to accept theobligations contained in the United NationsCharter.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. opposedthe application of Ireland on the ground thatthe U.S.S.R. did not maintain diplomatic rela-tions with Ireland. No other member of theSecurity Council opposed the application.

(6). Application of PortugalBy a telegram dated August 2, 1946, the

Portuguese Ambassador in Washington in-formed the Acting Secretary-General "that thePortuguese Government, having decided toparticipate in the United Nations and agree-ing to carry out the obligations imposed bytheir Charter, have instructed me to submitPortugal's application for membership, underthe provisions of Chapter II, Article 4, of theCharter." The representative of Australia ex-pressed doubt whether Portugal's application


contained categorical and formal acceptanceof the obligations under the Charter. TheCommittee on the Admission of New Mem-bers therefore decided to authorize the Sec-retariat to approach the Ambassador of Por-tugal with a request for a clearer acceptanceof the obligations. By a letter of August 15,1946, the Ambassador of Portugal confirmedthat Portugal accepted fully all obligationsunder the Charter, and that the originalapplication was intended to have that mean-ing.

Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Nether-lands, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates supported Portugal's application formembership in the United Nations. The.rep-resentative of the United Kingdom, as well asthe representatives of the United States,France, China, Brazil and the Netherlandsstressed the help Portugal had given to theUnited Nations during the war by permittingthe use of the Azores to British and Americanair forces and by assisting refugees fromFrance and other European countries underfascist control. The representative of theUnited States stated that at the PotsdamConference the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdomand the United States had agreed to supportthe applications for membership from thoseStates which had remained neutral during thewar and which fulfilled the qualificationsset forth in Article 4 of the Charter.

The representative of Poland expresseddoubts concerning the admission of Portugalin view of its close relations with Spain andthe former German Government. Further-more, he considered Portugal's "ideology"close to that of fascism, which the UnitedNations fought for more than five years.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. declaredthat he could not support the application ofPortugal because there were no diplomaticrelations between the U.S.S.R. and Portugal.

(7). Application of IcelandBy a letter dated August 2, 1946, the Minis-

ter of Iceland in Washington informed theSecretary-General that the Icelandic Parlia-ment had on July 25, 1946, passed a resolutionauthorizing the Icelandic Government to applyfor membership in the United Nations. Insubmitting Iceland's application, the Ministerof Iceland declared his country's willingnessto assume the obligations embodied in theCharter of the United Nations.

No member of the Security Council voicedany objections to the admission of Iceland tomembership in the United Nations.

(8). Application of SiamBy a letter dated May 20, 1946, addressed to

the Secretary-General, the Siamese Ministerfor Foreign Affairs expressed the earnestdesire of his country and people to join theUnited Nations. He called attention to thefact that Siam was an original and faithfulmember of, and fervent believer in, theformer League of Nations and that duringthe Japanese occupation an attempt was madeto form a Siamese Government-in-Exile withthe ultimate aim of participating in the UnitedNations. He declared that Siam and theSiamese people were ready to assume theirfull responsibility in carrying out the obliga-tions as set forth in the Charter of theUnited Nations.

In a letter of July 9, 1946, to the Siameserepresentative in New York the Acting Secre-tary-General inquired whether the SiameseGovernment desired that the letter of May20 be submitted to the Membership Committeeof the Security Council. The Siamese repre-sentative requested in a reply of July 11that the letter of May 20 be not submittedto the Membership Committee until he hadreceived further instructions from Bangkok.

By a letter dated August 3, 1946, theSiamese Chargé d'Affaires in Washingtontransmitted a formal request from the Sia-mese Minister of Foreign Affairs for theadmission of Siam to membership in theUnited Nations. The message from theSiamese Government restated "the earnestdesire of Siam to join the other democraciesin the task of upholding the lofty idealswhich have inspired the founders of theUnited Nations."

In the Committee on the Admission of NewMembers, France expressed opposition to theadmission of Siam on the ground that Siamin 1941, by a treaty signed in Tokyo, obtainedcession of territories which had belonged toFrench Indo-China. Until current negotiationsbetween France and Siam for the restitutionof these territories were completed, Francewould continue to consider herself, de facto,in a state of war with Siam.

In a letter of August 19, 1946, the Siameserepresentative in New York confirmed the


French representative's statement that dis-cussions concerning the French-Siamese terri-torial dispute were under way, and expressedconfidence that an agreement would be reachedat an early date.

The French representative subsequentlyannounced to the Committee on the Admissionof New Members that negotiations betweenSiamese and French representatives scheduledto take place in Washington had not material-ized as a result of serious incidents which hadoccurred on August 7, 1946, in the territoryof Cambodia, which was under French sov-ereignty.

By a letter of August 24, the Siamese repre-sentative pointed to the fact that Siam, inprinciple, had agreed to a French proposalto submit the border dispute to the Inter-national Court of Justice. Siam previouslyhad called the attention of the Security Coun-cil to the French-Siamese dispute and hadexpressed its willingness to accept the rulesof the Charter of the United Nations con-cerning the pacific settlement of disputes. Inview of this evidence of Siam's determinationto settle its differences with France by peace-ful means, the Siamese representative hopedthat Siam's application would be consideredfavorably.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. statedthat he could not support Siam's applicationas the U.S.S.R. did not maintain diplomaticrelations with Siam.

By a letter dated August 28, 1946, addressedto the Secretary-General the representativeof Siam in the matter of Siam's applicationto the United Nations requested that con-sideration by the Security Council be ad-journed until a settlement of the territorialdispute between Siam and France had beensettled. For this reason, Siam's applicationwas not voted on when the Council consideredthe first report of its Committee on the Ad-mission of New Members.

On November 29, 1946, the representativeof Siam — Prince Wan Waithayakon — ad-dressed a further letter to the Secretary-General. He stated that a settlement of theterritorial dispute with France had beeneffected and he therefore requested that con-sideration by the Security Council of Siam'sapplication be proceeded with in due course.

The Security Council placed the applicationof Siam on the agenda of its 83rd meeting

on December 12, 1946. The representative ofChina at that meeting proposed the followingresolution :

The Security Council, having taken noteof the unanimous approval by its members ofthe application of Siam for Membership in theUnited Nations, recommends to the GeneralAssembly that it admit Siam to Membershipin the United Nations.

The resolution was accepted unanimouslyby the Council and forwarded immediatelyto the General Assembly.

(9) Application of SwedenBy a telegram of August 9, 1946, the Min-

ister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, on behalfof the Swedish Government acting with theconsent of the Riksdag, submitted his coun-try's application for membership in the UnitedNations and declared that Sweden was readyto accept the obligations contained in theCharter of the United Nations.

No member of the Security Council voicedany objections to the admission of Swedento membership in the United Nations.

d. Voting on Individual ApplicationsAfter the Security Council had discussed

all eight applications for membership in theUnited Nations, the representative of Mexicorecalled the United States proposal for theadmission of all eight applicants. He statedthat no objection to the admission of anyone of the applicant States had been raisedwhich could be considered insurmountable.He proposed, therefore, the adoption of aresolution embodying the admission of allapplicant States. As the representatives of theU.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and Australiastated that they could not support the Mexi-can proposal, the representative of Mexicowithdrew his resolution.

The Security Council voted separately oneach application for membership in the UnitedNations. The representative of Australia ab-stained from voting on any of the applica-tions, because of the view taken by the Aus-tralian Government that the procedure adoptedby the Security Council in regard to the ad-mission of new Members was incorrect andthat applications should be dealt with in thefirst instance by the General Assembly. Therepresentative of Australia stated that his


abstention was made for reasons relating toprocedure and not for reasons relating to themerits of any application. The AustralianGovernment would be prepared at a propertime to support the applications of Ireland,Sweden, Trans-jordan, Afghanistan and Ice-land. This statement, however, should not betaken as an indication that at the proper timeAustralia would not support the applicationof any or all of the other applicant states.

By ten affirmative votes, with the repre-sentative of Australia abstaining, the SecurityCouncil decided to recommend the followingthree States to the General Assembly formembership in the United Nations:

AfghanistanThe Republic of IcelandSweden

The result of the voting on the other fiveStates, whose applications were not carried,were as follows:

People's Republic of AlbaniaAffirmative: Brazil, France, Mexico, Poland,

U.S.S.R.Negative: Netherlands, United Kingdom,

United StatesAbstaining: Australia, China, Egypt

Mongolian People's RepublicAffirmative: Brazil, China, France, Mexico,

Poland, U.S.S.R.Negative: Netherlands, United Kingdom,

United StatesAbstaining: Australia, Egypt

Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-jordanAffirmative: Brazil, China, Egypt, France,

Mexico, Netherlands, United Kingdom, UnitedStates

Negative: Poland, U.S.S.R.Abstaining: Australia

IrelandAffirmative: Brazil, China, Egypt, France,

Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom,United States

Negative: U.S.S.R.Abstaining: Australia

PortugalAffirmative: Brazil, China, Egypt, France,

Mexico, Netherlands, United Kingdom, UnitedStates

Negative : Poland, U.S.S.R.Abstaining : Australia

e. Recommendations of the Security Councilto the General AssemblyAt its 57th meeting, on August 29, 1946,

the Security Council unanimously decided (the

representative of Australia abstaining) torecommend to the General Assembly, the ad-mission of Afghanistan, the Republic of Ice-land and Sweden to membership in the UnitedNations. The text of the resolution read asfollows :

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,Having received and considered the report

submitted by the Committee on the Admis-sion of New Members regarding applicationfor membership in the United Nations pre-sented by the People's Republic of Albania,the Mongolian People's Republic, Afghanistan,the Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-jordan,Ireland, Portugal, the Republic of Iceland,Siam, Sweden;

Having considered in the course of its de-bates each of the above-mentioned applica-tions; and

Having taken due notice of the statementsof opinions of the members of the SecurityCouncil in regard to those applications;

RECOMMENDSTo the General Assembly that it admit to

membership in the United Nations the fol-lowing applicants;

Afghanistan, Republic of Iceland, andSweden.

The resolution was transmitted by the Presi-dent of the Security Council, by a telegramdated August 30, 1946, to the President ofthe General Assembly of the United Nations.

f. Application of HungaryAldar Szegedy Maszak, Minister of Hun-

gary to the United States, addressed a letter,dated April 22, 1947, to the Secretary-General concerning the application of Hun-gary for admission to membership in theUnited Nations. The Minister declared Hun-gary's readiness to accept the obligationscontained in the Charter. He drew attention tothe fact that the treaty of peace with Hungaryhad already been signed at Paris on February12, 1947, and that, therefore, the limitationsimposed on his country's sovereignty by theArmistice Agreement were of a temporarycharacter and would lose their effect on thecoming into force of the peace treaty.

Hungary's application for membership inthe United Nations was admitted to the agen-da of the Security Council's 132nd meeting,held on April 30, 1947. Before asking mem-bers of the Council to make observations, thePresident—the representative of China—stated that the matter had been considered


by the Legal Department of the Secretariat,who saw no objection to placing this applica-tion on the agenda of the Security Council.

The representative of Australia consideredthe application to be premature and out oforder. He argued that the Security Councilhad limited jurisdiction, jurisdiction specifi-cally laid down and defined in the Chartermainly for the maintenance of peace andsecurity; the question of the admission of anew Member did not affect only the SecurityCouncil, because the General Assembly itselfhad to decide whether in its judgment theState could comply with all the obligations ofmembership. Some of the obligations wereof an economic and social character. He con-tended that the Council had no right toarrogate to itself the right to decide all thosequestions and recommend accordingly.

He went on to state that the Peace Treatyfor Hungary would come into effect on theratification of three of the permanent mem-bers of the Security Council (the U.S.S.E.,the United Kingdom and the United States),and only one State had up to then ratified theTreaty (the United Kingdom). Hungary wastherefore still bound by the terms of theArmistice, which imposed limitations on itssovereignty. Consequently, he argued, the ap-plication was from a State which was not asovereign body, and the whole principle ofthe United Nations was the sovereign equalityof all the Members. He moved that the Se-curity Council defer the application of Hun-gary for consideration at a more appropriatetime.

The President of the Council emphasizedthat in regard to the admission of new Mem-bers, the Charter required the General As-sembly to reach a decision only "upon therecommendation of the Security Council." Ifthe Security Council did not make such re-commendation as provided by the Charter, itwould not be fulfilling its functions.

The Australian resolution was put to avote and lost. A Syrian resolution, amendedby the representative of the U.S.S.R., was thenvoted upon and approved by the Council by10 votes in favor and 1 against (Australia).The resolution provided that the applicationof Hungary should be referred to the Council'sMembership Committee for study and a re-port at the appropriate time.

g. Application of ItalyCount Carlo Sforza, Minister of Foreign

Affairs of Italy, in a letter dated May 7, 1947,addressed to the Secretary-General appliedfor Italy's admission to membership in theUnited Nations. The Minister stated that theItalian Government fully accepted the princi-ples laid down in the United Nations Charterand was willing to assume the obligationsderiving from membership. He went on tostate that "the Italian Government is con-fident that the United Nations will appreciatethe willing contribution which will be made toits activities by Italy—who by her sacrificeshas already given proof of her will to co-operatein the common cause, in particular by her con-tribution to the United Nations in the warduring two years of co-belligerency."

The Security Council first discussed theapplication at its 136th meeting on May 22,1947. The Australian representative, forreasons similar to those he gave previously inconnection with the application of Hungaryfor admission into the United Nations feltthat the application was out of order andthat it should not be received nor entertainedby the Council.

At its 137th meeting on May 22, 1947, theSecurity Council adopted a Chinese proposalby ten votes, Australia abstaining, which re-ferred Italy's application to the Council'sMembership Committee for study and report.

h. Sub-Committee of the Security Council onRules Concerning the Admission of NewMembers

By a letter dated November 25, 1946, theSecretary-General requested the President ofthe Security Council to bring to the attentionof the Council the resolution of the GeneralAssembly requesting the Security Council toappoint a committee to confer with a commit-tee on procedures of the General Assemblywith a view to preparing rules governing theadmission of new Members which would beacceptable both to the General Assembly andto the Security Council.

At the 81st meeting on November 29, 1946,the Council instructed the Committee of Ex-perts to name a small committee from its ownnumber to meet with the committee whichwould be appointed by the Assembly, and toreport any proposals back to the Council forfurther instructions.


At the 83rd meeting on December 12, thePresident of the Security Council announcedthat the Chairman of the Committee of Ex-perts had informed him that a Sub-Committeehad been appointed, consisting of the repre-sentative of China as Chairman, and therepresentatives of Brazil and Poland. ThePresident went on to state that the Presidentof the General Assembly would be informedthat this Sub-Committee was ready to meetwith a committee of the Assembly.

The terms of reference of the Council'sSub-Committee as decided by the SecurityCouncil on November 29 were "to listen tothe proposals which the Committee appointedby the Assembly may have to make, and to

report those proposals back to the Council forfurther instructions."

The General Assembly Committee on Pro-cedure for the Admission of New Membersheld its first meeting at Lake Success on May26, 1947. The Committee decided to inviterepresentatives of Brazil, China and Poland,the three countries designated by the SecurityCouncil, to attend its meetings.

The General Assembly and the SecurityCouncil Committees held a series of fourconferences between May 28 and June 11,1947. The General Assembly Committee thendrafted its proposals and transmitted themto the Security Council Committee with anexplanatory letter dated June 30, 1947.

E. THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Article 47 of the United Nations Charterprovides for the establishment of a MilitaryStaff Committee to advise and assist the Se-curity Council on all questions relating tothe Council's military requirements for themaintenance of international peace and se-curity, the employment and command of forcesplaced at its disposal, the regulation of arma-ments, and possible disarmament.

To enable it to discharge its responsibilityfor maintaining international peace and se-curity, the Security Council is vested withpowers not only for the peaceful settlement ofinternational disputes but for taking enforce-ment measures to deal with threats to thepeace, breaches of peace and acts of aggres-sion. These enforcement measures may in-clude the taking of action by air, sea or landforces in order to maintain or restore inter-national peace and security. Military demon-strations, blockade and other operations byair, sea or land forces of Member States arealso within the scope of these powers of theSecurity Council.

In order to enable the Security Council totake such action Member States have under-taken under Article 43 of the Charter to makeavailable to the Security Council, on its call,armed forces, assistance and facilities.

These forces are to be placed at the disposalof the Security Council on terms to be laiddown in agreements to be negotiated betweenthe Council and Member States or groups ofStates. The agreements will determine thenumbers and types of forces, their degree of

readiness and general location, and the natureof the facilities and assistance to be pro-vided.

Further, Article 45 of the Charter providesthat in order to enable the Security Councilto take urgent military measures, Membersare to hold immediately available national airforce contingents for combined internationalenforcement action.

It was in order to equip the Security Councilwith the most authoritative military adviceand assistance for exercising these powersthat the Charter created the Military StaffCommittee.

The Military Staff Committee is composedof the Chiefs of Staffs or their representativesof China, France, the United Kingdom, theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. — the fivepermanent members of the Security Council.The Committee can invite any other Membercountry to be associated with it whenever itconsiders that the efficient discharge of itsduties renders such participation desirable.

In general, the Committee is to assist theSecurity Council on all questions relating tothe Council's military requirements, the em-ployment and command of forces placed atthe Council's disposal, the regulation of arma-ments and possible disarmament. The Com-mittee is responsible under the SecurityCouncil for the strategic direction of the arm-ed forces to be placed at the disposal of theCouncil. It is also to assist the Security Coun-cil in determining the strength and readinessof air force contingents which Members are


to hold immediately available and the plansfor their combined action.

At the second meeting of the SecurityCouncil of January 25, 1946, the Council de-cided to request the permanent members ofthe Security Council to direct their Chiefs ofStaff to meet, or to appoint representativeswho were to meet for the purpose of consti-tuting the Military Staff Committee anddrawing up proposals for its organization.

In response to this directive the representa-tives of the Chiefs of Staff of Armed Forcesof China, France, the United Kingdom, theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. assembled inLondon on February 3, 1946, and the MilitaryStaff Committee was established. The Com-mittee adjourned on February 14, pendingthe move of the Security Council to New York,met again in New York on March 25 andhas been functioning continuously since then.

The Security Council at its 23rd meetingon February 16, 1946, directed the MilitaryStaff Committee, as its first task, to examinefrom the military point of view the provisionsof Article 43 of the Charter, i.e., the provis-ions relating to Member States making armedforces, assistance and facilities available tothe Council.

The Military Staff Committee decided thatas a first step towards the accomplishment ofits task it should formulate recommendationsto the Security Council as to the basic prin-ciples which should govern the organizationof the United Nations forces, further actionto be postponed until its report to the Secur-ity Council had been approved. Accordingly,it formed a Sub-Committee to formulate recom-mendations.

The Sub-Committee first met on March 28,1946. Views submitted by the delegations ofChina, France, the United Kingdom, theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. were studied.

The Military Staff Committee formed asecond Sub-Committee for the purpose of pre-paring a standard form of agreement betweenthe Security Council and the Member nationsof the United Nations concerning the provis-ion of armed forces.

The General Assembly in its resolution ondisarmament of December 14, 1946, had recom-mended that the Security Council accelerateas much as possible the placing at its dis-posal of the armed forces mentioned in Article43 of the Charter. On February 13, 1947, theSecurity Council requested the Military Staff

Committee, as a first step towards the imple-mentation of Article 43, to submit to theCouncil not later than April 30, 1947, itsrecommendations with regard to the basicprinciples which should govern the organiza-tion of the United Nations armed forces.In accordance with this directive the MilitaryStaff Committee prepared its report and sub-mitted it on April 30 to the Security Councilfor consideration.

The report included both recommendationsagreed upon by all of the delegations repre-sented on the Military Staff Committee andthe proposals of individual delegations onwhich unanimous decision was not achieved inthe Committee. The question of financial ex-penditures which might arise in connectionwith the fulfilment by countries—Members ofthe United Nations—of measures envisagedin Article 4-2 of the Charter, was not reflectedin the recommendations prepared.

The report set forth the recommendationsin the form of 41 articles and was dividedinto ten chapters. Chapter I, containing twoarticles, dealt with the purpose of armed forcesmade available to the Security Council ofMember nations of the United Nations; Chap-ter II, containing 2 articles, dealt with thecomposition of armed forces; Chapter III,containing 4 articles, dealt with the overallstrength of armed forces; Chapter IV, con-taining nine articles, dealt with the contribu-tion of armed forces by Member Nations;Chapter V, containing four articles, dealt withthe employment of armed forces; Chapter VI,containing four articles, dealt with the degreeof readiness of armed forces; Chapter VII,containing three articles, dealt with the pro-vision of assistance and facilities, includingrights of passage, for armed forces; ChapterVIII, containing three articles, dealt with thelogistical support of armed forces; ChapterIX, containing four articles, dealt with thegeneral location of armed forces; Chapter X,containing six articles, dealt with the strategicdirection and command of armed forces.

Appended to the report were two annexes.Annex "A" discussed the positions of the dele-gations of the Military Staff Committee onthe articles of the general principles govern-ing the organization of armed forces on whichthe Military Staff Committee did not reachunanimity. Annex "B" contained general com-ments by the French delegation.


Among the sixteen articles on which una-nimity was not reached Articles 26 and 32contained three alternative proposals; theremaining 14 articles each contained two alter-native proposals. The text of the report follows.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNINGTHE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMEDFORCES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE

SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBERNATIONS OF THEUNITED NATIONS

REPORT BY THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEECHAPTER I

Purpose Of Armed Forces

Article 1Armed Forces made available to the Secur-

ity Council by Member Nations of the UnitedNations are intended for the maintenance ofthe restoration of international peace andsecurity in cases:

a. of existence of any threat to interna-tional peace;

b. of any breach of international peaceand security;

c. of any act of aggression,when measures undertaken by the SecurityCouncil in accordance with Article 41 of theUnited Nations Charter would be inadequateor have proved to be inadequate and when thethreat to international peace and security issuch that it necessitates the employment ofthese armed forces.

Article 2These Armed Forces may not be employed

for purposes inconsistent with the purposes,principles and spirit of the United NationsCharter as defined in its Preamble andChapter I.

CHAPTER IIComposition of Armed Forces

Article 3Armed Forces made available to the Secur-

ity Council by Member Nations of the UnitedNations in accordance with Article 43 of theCharter shall be composed of units (forma-tions) of national armed forces, land, seaand air which are normally maintained ascomponents of armed forces of Member Na-tions of the United Nations.

Article 4These Armed Forces shall be made available

to the Security Council from the best trainedand equipped units (formations) of MemberNations of the United Nations.

CHAPTER IIIOverall Strength of Armed Forces

Article 5The moral weight and the potential power

behind any decision to employ the ArmedForces made available to the Security Coun-cil by Member Nations of the United Nationsin enforcement action will be very great, andthis fact will directly influence the size ofthe Armed Forces required.

Article 6The Armed Forces made available to the

Security Council by Member Nations of theUnited Nations shall be limited to a strengthsufficient to enable the Security Council totake prompt action in any part of the worldfor the maintenance or the restoration ofinternational peace and security as envisagedin Article 42 of the Charter.

Article 7Accepted by the Chinese, French, U.K. andU.S. Delegations:

An estimate of the overall strength of theArmed Forces and the strength of the Serv-ices, land, sea and air, constituting thoseforces will be made by the Security Councilwith the assistance of the Military Staff Com-mittee, and used as a basis for negotiatingthe Special Agreements referred to in Article43 of the Charter. The final decision regardingthe overall strength required will be made bythe Security Council as a result of thesenegotiations.[The U.S.S.R. Delegation accepts Article7 conditionally. The final acceptance of Article7 by the U.S.S.R. Delegation will dependon the acceptance by the other Delegations ofthe Principle of Equality regarding strengthand composition of Armed Forces contributedby the five Permanent Members of the Secur-ity Council, as stated in the proposal by theU.S.S.R. Delegation for Article 11.]


In order to adapt the overall strength ofthe Armed Forces to international conditions,this overall strength and the strength of theServices constituting these Forces, may bechanged on the initiative of the SecurityCouncil by additional agreements between theSecurity Council and the Member Nations ofthe United Nations.[The U.S.S.R. Delegation accepts Article8 conditionally. The final acceptance of Article8 by the "U.S.S.R. Delegation will dependon the acceptance by other Delegations of thePrinciple of Equality regarding strength andcomposition of Armed Forces contributed bythe five Permanent Members of the Security


Council, as stated in the proposal by theU.S.S.R. Delegation for Article 11.]

CHAPTER IV

Contribution of Armed Forces byMember Nations

Article 9All Member Nations shall have the oppor-

tunity as well as the obligation to place armedforces, facilities and other assistance at thedisposal of the Security Council on its calland in accordance with their capabilities andthe requirements of the Security Council.

Article 10In order to facilitate the early establishment

of the Armed Forces made available to theSecurity Council, the Permanent Members ofthe Security Council shall contribute initiallythe major portion of these Forces. As thecontributions of other Nations of the UnitedNations become available they shall be addedto the forces already contributed.


Each of the five Permanent Members of theSecurity Council will make a comparable ini-tial overall contribution to the Armed Forcesmade available to the Security Council byMember Nations of the United Nations. Inview of the differences in size and compositionof national forces of each Permanent Memberand in order to further the ability of the Secur-ity Council to constitute balanced and effectivecombat forces for operations, these contribu-tions may differ widely as to the strength ofthe separate components, land, sea and air.Accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation :

Permanent Members of the Security Coun-cil shall make available armed forces (land,sea and air) on the Principle of Equalityregarding the overall strength and the com-position of these forces. In individualinstances, deviations from this principle arepermitted by special decisions of the SecurityCouncil, if such a desire is expressed by aPermanent Member of the Security Council.

Article 12The size and composition of contributions

of individual Member Nations will be deter-mined on the initiative of the Security Council,and on the advice of the Military Staff Com-mittee, in the process of negotiations witheach Member Nation in accordance withArticle 43 of the Charter.

Article 13No Member Nation of the United Nations

shall be urged to increase the strength of itsarmed forces or to create a particular compon-ent thereof for the specific purpose of making

a contribution to the Armed Forces madeavailable to the Security Council by MemberNations of the United Nations.

Article 14Contributions by Member Nations of the

United Nations, other than the PermanentMembers of the Security Council, may notnecessarily be represented by armed forces.Such other Member Nations which may be un-able to furnish armed forces may fulfil theirobligation to the United Nations by furnishingfacilities and other assistance in accordancewith agreements reached with the SecurityCouncil.

Article 15Proposals for changes in the size or com-

position of contributions of a Member Nationor a group of Nations may be initiated by theSecurity Council or by the Member Nationor group of Nations. Any change in contri-butions will be effected by additional agree-ments between the Security Council and therespective Member Nation or group of Nations.


The strength and composition of nationalair force contributions made available to theSecurity Council shall be determined as setforth in Article 12 above taking into accountthe obligations arising from Article 45 ofthe Charter.Accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation:

The strength and composition of nationalair force contingents made available to theSecurity Council by Member Nations foraction envisaged in Article 45 of the Charterare determined by the Security Council, withthe assistance of the Military Staff Commit-tee, within the limits of a Special agreementor Agreements referred to in Article 43 ofthe Charter.

Article 17Accepted by the Chinese and French Delega-tions :

In case of self-defense (Article 51 of theCharter) and of national emergencies, Mem-ber Nations will have the right to make useof Armed Forces, which they have madeavailable to the Security Council in conformitywith the terms of special agreements. Theyundertake, however, to assume anew all oftheir obligations within the shortest possiblespace of time.[Not accepted by the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.Delegations.]

CHAPTER VEmployment of Armed Forces


Security Council by Member Nations of the


United Nations will be employed, in wholeor in part, only by the decision of the SecurityCouncil and only for the period necessary forthe fulfilment of the tasks envisaged in Arti-cle 42 of the Charter.

Article 19In view of the military advantages which

would accrue, the employment of the ArmedForces under Article 42 of the Charter should,whenever possible, be initiated in time toforestall or to suppress promptly a breachof the peace or an act of aggression.


After the Armed Forces, including line ofcommunication forces, made available to theSecurity Council have carried out the taskswith which they have been entrusted by theSecurity Council under Article 42 of theCharter, they shall be withdrawn as soon aspossible to the general locations governed bythe Special Agreement or Agreements pro-vided for by Article 43 of the Charter. Thetime for the beginning and completion of thewithdrawal shall be fixed by the SecurityCouncil.Accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation:

The Armed Forces will be withdrawn totheir own territories and territorial waterswithin a time-limit of thirty to ninety daysafter they have fulfilled the measures envis-aged in Article 42 of the Charter, unlessotherwise decided by the Security Council.This time-limit should be provided for inAgreements concluded under Article 43 ofthe Charter.

Article 21Accepted by the U.S.S.R. delegation:

If for any reasons these Armed Forcesremain in territories or territorial watersgranted for the use of such forces, underagreements between the Security Council andother Member nations of the United Nationsfor the passage, stationing or action of theseforces, they should be withdrawn to their ownterritories or territorial waters not later thanthirty days after the expiration of the periodindicated in Article 201 unless otherwise de-cided by the Security Council. This time-limitshould be provided for in Agreements con-cluded under Article 43 of the Charter.[Not accepted by the Chinese, French, U.K.and U. S. Delegations.] Accepted by theU.S.S.R. Delegation.

CHAPTER VIDegree of Readiness of Armed Forces

Article 22The degree of readiness of the Armed

Forces made available by individual MemberNations of the United Nations is fixed by theSecurity Council, on the advice of the Military

Staff Committee, as a result of the negotiationsin concluding the Special Agreements withthose Member Nations under Article 43 of theCharter.

Article 23The degree of readiness of the Armed

Forces should be maintained at a level whichwill enable these Forces to start in good timewith the fulfillment of the Security Councilmeasures envisaged in Article 42 of the Char-ter.

Article 24These Armed Forces should be either main-

tained in readiness for combat or brought upto readiness for combat within the time-limitsto be specified in the Special Agreements.


The degree of readiness of national airforce contingents should be maintained ata level which will enable the United Nations totake urgent military measures in accordancewith the provisions of Article 45 of theCharter.Accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation:

The degree of readiness of national airforce contingents made available to the Se-curity Council by Member Nations for actionenvisaged in Article 45 of the Charter are de-termined by the Security Council, with theassistance of the Military Staff Committee,within the limits of a Special Agreement orAgreements referred to in Article 43 of theCharter.

CHAPTER VIIProvision of Assistance and Facilities,

Including Rights of Passage,For Armed Forces

Article 26Accepted by the Chinese, U.K. and U.S. Dele-gations :

The Special Agreements between the Secur-ity Council and Member Nations under Article43 of the Charter shall include the following:

a. A general guarantee of rights of pas-sage and of the use of such of the MemberNation's available bases as are required byArmed Forces operating under the SecurityCouncil;

b. Specific provisions covering details ofbases and other assistance and facilities, in-cluding rights of passage, which Member Na-tions agree to make available to the SecurityCouncil on its call. Such specific provisionsmay be contained in the original agreement orin subsequent agreements under Article 43of the Charter to be concluded at the appro-priate time.Accepted by the French Delegation :

Special Agreements envisaged in Article 43of the Charter will indicate bases, assistance

1 See proposal by the U.S.S.R. Delegation.


and facilities, including the right of passage,which the Member Nations will put at the dis-posal of the Security Council on its call.

In case of necessity, Member Nations under-take, on call of the Security Council andthrough additional Special Agreements, tomake available to it, other bases, assistanceand facilities which would have proved neces-sary to the operations undertaken.

Specific Agreements, concluded at the ap-propriate time, between the Security Counciland the Member Nation concerned, will indi-cate the duration and the other conditions in-volved in the exercise of rights thus extendedto the Armed Forces operating under the di-rection of the Security Council.Accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation:

Special Agreements envisaged in Article43 of the Charter will indicate assistance andfacilities, including the rights of passage,which the Member Nations will make avail-able to the Security Council on its call andin accordance with specific agreements con-cluded between the Security Council and theMember Nations concerned.

Specific Agreements, concluded at the ap-propriate time between the Security Counciland the Member Nation concerned, will indi-cate the duration and the other conditionsinvolved in the exercise of rights thus ex-tended to the Armed Forces operating underthe direction of the Security Council.


A Member Nation will retain its nationalsovereignty, and its control and command,over bases and other facilities placed at thedisposal of the Security Council.[Not accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation.]


If additional contributions from Perma-nent Members of the Security Council arerequested when enforcement action underChapter VII of the Charter is under consid-eration, those contributions should also be ofcomparable size taking into account the valueof assistance and facilities as well as armedforces which any of the above Member Na-tions may provide.[Not accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation.]

CHAPTER VIII

Logistical Support; of Armed ForcesArticle 29

Member Nations of the United Nationswhich, in accordance with Special Agreements,have placed armed forces at the disposal of theSecurity Council on its call for the carryingout of measures envisaged in Article 42 of theCharter, will provide their respective forces

with all necessary replacements in personneland equipment and with all necessary suppliesand transport.

Article 30Each Member Nation will at all times main-

tain a specified level of reserves to replaceinitial personnel, transport, equipment, spareparts, ammunition and all other forms ofsupply for the forces which it has agreed toplace at the disposal of the Security Councilon its call. This reserve level will be prescribedin the Special Agreements under Article 43of the Charter.


Member Nations, in the event of inabilityto discharge to the full extent their respon-sibilities under Article 29 above, may invokethe aid of the Security Council, which, on theadvice of the Military Staff Committee, willnegotiate with other appropriate MemberNations for the provision of such assistance asit deems necessary. The agreement of MemberNations concerned must be obtained by theSecurity Council before the deficiencies inthe contribution of one Member Nation canbe made up by transfers from the contributionof another Member Nation.Accepted by the French and U.S.S.R. Dele-gations:

Deviations from the principle stated inArticle 29 above shall be permitted in indi-vidual instances at the request of a MemberNation, by special decisions of the SecurityCouncil on the advice of the Military StaffCommittee, if this Member Nation desiresto have supplies and transport made availableto it for the proper provision of the ArmedForces placed by this Member Nation at thedisposal of the Security Council.

CHAPTER IXGeneral Location of Armed Forces


Armed Forces made available to the Secur-ity Council by Member Nations when not em-ployed by the Security Council will, within theterms of Special Agreements referred to inArticle 43 of the Charter, be based at thediscretion of Member Nations in any terri-tories or waters to which they have legalright of access.Accepted by the French Delegation :

When they are not employed by the SecurityCouncil, the Armed Forces which the MemberNation undertakes to make available to theSecurity Council, on its call, are stationed inthe general locations governed by the SpecialAgreement or Agreements concluded betweenthe Security Council and the Member Nationunder Article 43 of the Charter:

(1) either within the national borders ofthe Member Nation or the territories or watersunder its jurisdiction;


(2) or within the territory or waters ofex-enemy nations under Article 107 of theCharter or under the terms of the PeaceTreaties;

(3) or within the territory or waters ofother Nations where Armed Forces haveaccess under international agreements regis-tered with the United Nations Secretariatand published by it in accordance with Article102 of the Charter;

(4) or in certain strategic areas specifiedby the Security Council and which have beenthe subject of specific agreements between theSecurity Council and the Member Nationunder Articles 82 and 83 of the Charter.Accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation :

Armed Forces made available to the Secur-ity Council by Member Nations of the UnitedNations shall be garrisoned within the fron-tiers of the contributing Member Nations'own territories or territorial waters, exceptin cases envisaged in Article 107 of theCharter.


The locations of these Armed Forces shouldbe so distributed geographically as to enablethe Security Council to take prompt action inany part of the world for the maintenance orrestoration of international peace and secur-ity.[Not accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation.]


Any displacement of forces likely to modifytheir availability as governed by the SpecialAgreement or Agreements shall be broughtto the notice of the Security Council.[Not accepted by the U.S.S.R. Delegation.]


Security Council by Member Nations of theUnited Nations, on its call, for the fulfillmentof measures envisaged in Article 42 of theCharter will be based, during the carryingout of these measures, in areas designated bythe Security Council.

CHAPTER XStrategic Direction and Command of

Armed Forces

Article 36The Armed Forces which Member Nations

of the United Nations agree to make avail-able to the Security Council shall be under theexclusive command of the respective contrib-uting Nations, except when operating underthe Security Council.

Article 37When these forces are called upon for the

fulfilment of measures envisaged in Article

42 of the Charter, they shall come under thecontrol of the Security Council.Note: The word "control" is translated intoFrench as "autorite" and into Russian as

Article 38During the period these armed forces are

employed by the Security Council, the Mili-tary Staff Committee shall be responsible,under the Security Council, for their strate-gic direction. The time and place at whichthe Military Staff Committee will assume orrelinquish strategic direction will be desig-nated by the Security Council.

Article 39The command of national contingents will

be exercised by Commanders appointed by therespective Member Nations. These contin-gents will retain their national character andwill be subject at all times to the disciplineand regulations in force in their own nationalarmed forces.

Article 40The Commanders of national contingents

will be entitled to communicate directly withthe authorities of their own country on allmatters.

Article 41Accepted by the Chinese, U.S.S.R. and U.S.Delegations :

An overall Commander or overall Com-manders of Armed Forces made available tothe Security Council may be appointed by thelatter, on the advice of the Military Staff Com-mittee, for the period of employment of theseforces by the Security Council.Accepted by the French and the U.K. Dele-gations :

A supreme Commander or supreme Com-manders of Armed Forces made available tothe Security Council may be appointed bythe latter, on the advice of the Military StaffCommittee, for the period of employment ofthese forces by the Security Council.

Commanders-in-Chief of land, sea or airforces acting under the supreme Commanderor Commanders mentioned above may be ap-pointed by the Security Council on the adviceof the Military Staff Committee.

ANNEX "A"

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE ON THE ARTICLESOF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THEORGANIZATION OF ARMED FORCES ON WHICHTHE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE HAS NOT

REACHED UNANIMITYCHAPTER III

Overall Strength of the Armed ForcesArticle 7

Position of the Chinese DelegationThe Chinese Delegation accepts the Article

because it considers that in determining the

POSITIONS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE


overall strength of the Armed Forces madeavailable to the Security Council, both therequirements of the Security Council and theconditions of Member Nations concernedshould be taken into account.

Regarding the principle of equality as pro-posed by the U.S.S.R. Delegation, see theChinese position on Article 11.

Position of the French DelegationSee French position on Article 11 below.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe U.S.S.R. Delegation conditionally ac-

cepts Article 7. The final acceptance of Article7 by the U.S.S.R. Delegation will depend onthe acceptance by the other Delegations of theprinciple of equality regarding the strengthand composition of Armed Forces made avail-able by the five Permanent Members of theSecurity Council as stated in the U.S.S.R. pro-posal on Article 11.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe arguments of the U.K. Delegation

against the principle of equality are containedin full in the U.K. position for Article 11.

Position of the U.S. DelegationSee the U.S. position on Article 11 below.

Article 8Position of the Chinese Delegation

The Chinese Delegation considers that sincethe Security Council has been entrusted, underArticle 24 of the Charter, with the respon-sibility for the maintenance of internationalpeace, it is only logical that the Security Coun-cil should be given the authority to initiateproposals to change the overall strength ofthe Armed Forces in accordance with the pre-vailing international situation. Hence, thistext is acceptable to the Chinese Delegation.

Regarding the principle of equality as pro-posed by the U.S.S.R. Delegation, see theChinese position on Article 11.

Position of the French DelegationSee French position on Article 11 below.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe U.S.S.R. Delegation conditionally ac-

cepts Article 8. The final acceptance of Article8 by the Soviet Delegation will depend on theacceptance by the other Delegations of theprinciple of equality regarding the strengthand composition of Armed Forces made avail-able by the five Permanent Members of theSecurity Council as it stated in the U.S.S.R.proposal on Article 11.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe arguments of the U.K. Delegation

against the principle of equality are containedin full in the U.K. position for Article 11.

Position of the U.S. DelegationSee the U.S. position on Article 11 below.

CHAPTER IV

Contribution of Armed ForcesBy Member Nations


The Chinese Delegation feels that the spiritof the Charter emphasizes throughout aboveall else the importance of maintenance or res-toration of international peace. It is withsuch an object in view that the Armed Forcesare going to be organized. Hence, it seems tothe Chinese Delegation that how these ArmedForces are organized matters less than thefact that the United Nations do have aneffective police force that would be powerfulenough to guard the peace.

The Chinese Delegation is by no means un-aware of the fact that the Permanent Mem-bers of the Security Council in a sense shareequal responsibility in maintaining interna-tional peace and security, and does not denythat it would be an ideal to make the contri-butions of the Permanent Members absolutelyequal down to the smallest detail. On theother hand, however, the Military Staff Com-mittee should not blind itself to the realitiesof the present situation. The military condi-tions of the Permanent Members differ widelyfrom one another and the strengths of theirthree different Services, land, sea and air, arenot of the same level. Hence, it seems to theChinese Delegation that it would be highly in-advisable to allow scrupulous regard to anideal impractical at least at the present stageto prejudice the efficiency and effectiveness ofthe international force, thereby weakening theguardian of universal peace.

For the above reasons, the Chinese Dele-gation prefers the text accepted by the fourDelegations.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation considers that con-

tributions from Members of United Nationsshould be determined on the basis of thefollowing principles:—

A. With regard to the comparison betweenthe contributions by each of the five Per-manent Members, the French Delegation isin favour of equality of responsibility aswell as equality of sacrifice and equality ofrights among the five Permanent Membersof the Security Council, but considers thatit would be Utopian to insist that each ofthem provide contributions equal in quan-tity and in quality.That is why the French Delegation pro-poses that the Armed Forces envisaged inthe initial Special Agreements should beprovided on the principle of equivalent con-tributions by the five Permanent Membersof the Security Council. On this assumption,the French Delegation waives the obliga-tion that the five Permanent Members


should provide forces of identical composi-tion with regard to land, sea and air com-ponents, and insists solely on a comparableoverall strength of the contingents.The French Delegation foresees, should theoccasion arise to appreciably increase theoverall strength of the United NationsArmed Forces, the provision by the fivePermanent Members, to the extent of theircapacity, of additional equivalent contribu-tions, taking into account bases, assistanceand facilities.B. With regard to the comparison of con-tributions by Permanent Members and byother Member Nations of United Nations,the French Delegation considers that, inspirit, the Charter entrusts the five Per-manent Members with the major portion ofresponsibilities. The proof of this can befound in two of its main provisions:

i. Article 27 of the Charter requires theconcurring votes of the five PermanentMembers to adopt any decision by theSecurity Council on any question otherthan a matter of procedure.The greater the responsibility, the greatershould be the liabilities.ii. Article 106 of the Charter entruststhe five Permanent Members with theresponsibility of maintaining internation-al peace and security, pending the cominginto force of Special Agreements referredto in Article 43 of the Charter.

As long as the Charter remains in force,without amendments, this main responsibilityof the five Permanent Members will be thedecisive factor of the system.

Moreover, the French Delegation considersthat, in practice, the vast superiority of thePermanent Members, viewed from every angle(population, economic and financial strength,area of territories, geographical distributionof these territories), is such that the greaterpart of the Armed Forces of United Nationswill always be provided by the five PermanentMembers.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe principle of equality in the contribution

of armed forces by the five Permanent Mem-bers of the Security Council proposed by theU.S.S.R. Delegation is based on the provisionsof the United Nations Charter which lay themain responsibility for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security on thoseStates and that corresponds to their equalstatus in the Security Council.

The overall size of the armed forces madeavailable to the Security Council will not betoo large. Therefore the five States can makearmed forces available on the principle ofequality, that is they can contribute armedforces, land, sea and air, which would beequal in strength and composition. The prin-ciple of equality does not permit advantagesin the position of any Permanent Member ofthe Security Council in the contribution ofarmed forces by that Member.

The principle of "comparable contributions"proposed by the other Delegations permits asituation when certain of the five States may,for instance, contribute the major portion ofthe Armed Forces chiefly in air forces, otherschiefly in sea forces, and a third group chieflyin land forces, and so on. That would lead toadvantages in the positions of certain Statesin the contribution of armed forces by theseStates and therefore would be in contradictionwith the equal status of these States as Perma-nent Members of the Security Council.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation considers that the

existing variation in the size and compositionof the three Services amongst the five Per-manent Members of the Security Council mustbe a major consideration in determining theircontributions to the United Nations Forces.It seems essential to maintain as far as pos-sible equality of sacrifice amongst the fivePermanent Members and at the same time en-sure that the Security Council is providedwith armed forces, from which it can select abalanced force for a specific operation.

In the opinion of the U.K. Delegation, arigid rule of equality would not in practicebe capable of implementation and in fact theproposal of the U.S.S.E. Delegation has had torecognize the need for deviations from such aprinciple. Furthermore by accepting devia-tions from this principle, an equality of sac-rifice amongst the five Permanent Memberswould not necessarily be maintained. On theother hand, the U.K. Delegation considersthat the principle of comparable overall con-tributions is the only realistic one, and thatgiven goodwill, common sense and militaryknowledge it could be implemented among theFive Permanent Members of the SecurityCouncil without particular advantage to anyspecific Member. Thus the U.K. Delegation isfirmly convinced that the principle of com-parable overall contributions is the only prac-tical one.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation believes that the funda-

mental and dominant aim of the GeneralPrinciples is the establishment and organiza-tion of effective United Nations ArmedForces. The contributions of all Member Na-tions will and should, in large measure, bebased upon the capability and willingness ofthe Member Nations and the requirements ofthe Security Council. Every Member Nationshould have the right to offer as its own con-tribution such forces as it considers reason-able and proper. Each Permanent Membershould have the right to contribute armedforces equal to those contributed by any otherPermanent Member, but these contributionsshould not be limited or restricted by thisright. The Security Council will, of course,determine the acceptability of contributionsoffered. It is desirable that these forces shouldresult from contributions of the Permanent


Members which are comparable or not greatlydisproportionate in overall strength. However,no principle governing national contributionsshould jeopardize the all-important goal ofeffective United Nations Armed Forces.

The U.S.S.R. "Principle of Equality" is in-consistent with the goal of effective UnitedNations Armed Forces and with Article 9, andis, therefore, unacceptable to the UnitedStates. This principle has been interpreted bythe U.S.S.R. Delegation to mean that each ofthe five Permanent Members of the SecurityCouncil must make available identical forces.The military power of each of the five Perma-nent Members does not rest on equal militaryforces or on equal services, land, sea and air,and probably never will. Hence, the Perma-nent Members should not be expected to pro-vide equal forces. Under the "Principle ofEquality" as defined by the U.S.S.R. Dele-gation, every component and every element ofevery component, contributed by the Perma-nent Members would be limited so that it mustbe equal in strength and composition to theweakest corresponding component or elementprovided by any Permanent Member.

It is recognized that the Soviet proposalprovides that deviations from the "Principle ofEquality" may be made by special decision ofthe Security Council. However, the U.S. Dele-gation believes that, if the goal of effectiveforces is to become a reality, the deviationswould of necessity become the rule.

In the discussions leading to the formula-tion of this Article, there arose the questionas to whether or not the Permanent Membersof the Security Council should contribute, forall time, the major portion of the ArmedForces made available to the Security Coun-cil. Certain Delegations indicated the beliefthat the major portion of these Armed Forcesshould always be provided by the PermanentMembers of the Security Council. Whereasthis concept is no longer implicit in the pro-posals for this Article, the U.S. Delegationnevertheless desires to state its position onthis principle.

The U.S. Delegation agrees that the Per-manent Members of the Security Councilshould contribute initially the major portion ofthe Armed Forces in order to facilitate theearly establishment of these forces as in-dicated in Article 10. It may be that the con-tributions of the other nations will never over-take those of the five Permanent Members.However, the U.S. Delegation cannot agreethat this condition necessarily will govern forall time. It may be that the collective ca-pabilities of the members of the United Na-tions, other than the Permanent Members ofthe Security Council, might at some time inthe future exceed the capabilities of the fivePermanent Members of the Security Council,in which case the U.S, Delegation conceivesof no reasons why the contributions of thoseother Members of the United Nations shouldnot exceed those of the Permanent Membersof the Security Council.

Therefore, in recognition of the national in-terests of all Members of the United Nations,the U.S. Delegation is opposed to expressingas a permanent principle that the five Perma-nent Members would, for all time, contributethe major portion of the Armed Forces.


In view of the fact that the Air Force isessential to prompt military action, the Chi-nese Delegation believes that in determiningthe strength of national air force contribu-tions of the Member Nations, the obligationsarising out of Article 45 of the Charter shouldbe taken into consideration. Hence, it prefersthe text agreed upon by the four Delegations.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation considers that the

responsibilities under Article 45 of the Char-ter should be taken into consideration at thetime when the Special Agreements envisagedin Article 43 of the Charter will be negotiated.The French Delegation considers that thenational contingents referred to in Article 45of the Charter represent only a portion of theair forces made available to the SecurityCouncil, in fulfilling the terms of the SpecialAgreements to which reference is made above.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe General Principles for the Organization

of the Armed Forces should refer to all theprincipal Services, land, sea, and air, andshould be based on the provisions of Article43 of the Charter.

The examination of Article 45 of the Char-ter can take place only after the completionof the study of Article 43 of the Charter andthe conclusion of Special Agreements. Afterthe conclusion of such Agreements, the Secur-ity Council, with the assistance of the Mili-tary Staff Committee, shall determine, underArticle 45 of the Charter, what portion ofthe overall number of national air forcecontingents made available to the SecurityCouncil under the Agreements should be heldimmediately available for the taking of urgentmilitary measures in case of necessity.

The proposals of the other Delegationsstated in Article 16 of the General Principleson the furnishing of national air force con-tributions concern Article 45 of the Charter,and therefore, for reasons stated above, theseproposals cannot be justified.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation does not agree with

the U.S.S.R. Delegation that the provisions ofArticle 45 of the Charter should not be re-flected in the General Principles, since inthe opinion of the U.K. Delegation these pro-visions must be taken into consideration atthe time when the Special Agreements en-visaged in Article 43 of the Charier are nego-tiated.

Article 45 of the Charter deals with thestrength and composition and the state of


readiness of national air force contingents. Inthe opinion of the U.K. Delegation, any refer-ence to these factors should be made separate-ly under the appropriate Chapters of the Gen-eral Principles.

The U.K. Delegation considers the imple-mentation of Article 45 of the Charter wouldbe carried out by the following processes :

a. In determining the strength and composi-tion of the total national air force contribu-tions, the obligations arising from Article 45of the Charter would be taken into account.b. The air force contingents for action en-visaged in Article 45 of the Charter wouldbe selected from amongst the national airforce contributions made under Article 43of the Charter.c. The Security Council, advised by theMilitary Staff Committee, would requestMember Nations to maintain at a highdegree of readiness the air force contin-gents selected for this purpose.The U.K. Delegation considers that the pro-

posal of the U.S.S.R. Delegation, being phrasedin the exact wording of Article 45 of theCharter, does not give the full military inter-pretation of this Article.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation interprets Article 45

of the Charter as making available to the Se-curity Council specific contingents of nationalair force contributions for the special pur-pose of providing the United Nations with ameans of taking urgent military measures. Itwill be necessary to establish these particularcontingents as a part of the overall nationalair force contributions. This requirement willbe a major consideration in determining thestrength and composition of the national airforce contributions. The U.S. Delegation con-siders it most appropriate to include, in theChapter concerned with the principles govern-ing national contributions under Article 43of the Charter, an article which will ensurerecognition of these obligations arising fromArticle 45 of the Charter.

The U.S.S.E. proposal in this Article dealsonly with the strength and composition of thespecific air force contingents envisaged inArticle 45 of the Charter. Whereas this limitedconsideration will be highly important at thetime of the actual establishment of these con-tingents, it is not considered appropriate inthe Chapter dealing with overall national con-tributions of armed forces.


The Chinese Delegation upholds this Articlebecause of the following considerations:

1. It cannot be disputed that a Member Na-tion, when the existence of its legitimategovernment is threatened, should have the

right to use for self-defense its armed forcesmade available to the Security Council.2. Some internal disturbances might de-velop into world conflagrations. For exam-ple, an illegal act of force to overthrowa legitimate government might, if notchecked immediately, endanger internation-al peace and security. The use by a Mem-ber Nation of its armed forces made avail-able to the Security Council in cases likethese would be no more than an actiondesigned to nip in the bud a disturbanceof international peace, and as such is inperfect consonance with the purpose of theArmed Forces.3. If in case of national emergency MemberNations are allowed to make use of theArmed Forces which they have made avail-able to the Security Council, the totalstrength of the armed forces normallymaintained in peacetime by some MemberNations may be somewhat reduced, andsuch possible reduction would be more inconformity with the universally desiredideal of world disarmament.4. In addition to the cases mentioned above,the Chinese Delegation shares the view ofthe French Delegation that national emer-gency likewise covers cases of catastrophessuch as floods, fires or others that call forimmediate succor from the Armed Forcesnearby.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation considers that it

would be impossible to employ large bodiesof forces, required for operations, without afairly accurate knowledge on the part of theorgan responsible for strategic direction, ofeither the location of units constituting theseforces and their state of readiness, or thedate on which they would be moved in combatreadiness to a pre-determined location.

Armed Forces to be made available to theSecurity Council must, obviously, not deviatefrom this elementary strategic rule. We wouldbe completely defenceless if Member Nationsdid not conform to this rule and if they con-templated the use, as they saw fit, of the forcesthey had ear-marked to be made available,on call, to the Security Council, until the daywhen these forces had been placed at the dis-posal of the Security Council. The FrenchDelegation considers, therefore, that any moveof these forces likely to modify their generallocation or the time limit of their interven-tion as stipulated by the Special Agreements,should be submitted for the approval of theSecurity Council. This represents, obviously, acertain surrender of sovereignty with whichthe French Government is ready to agree, ifother Governments act likewise, in order togive to the desired system of security its fullmeasure of effectiveness.

But the above cited provisions should ac-quire a measure of flexibility in certain casesof emergency when there would be insufficient


time for the Security Council to give its con-sent. These are:—

a. The case of self-defence, adequately cov-ered by Article 51 of the Charter which con-sequently deserves, like all others, to be in-cluded in the body of our document insofaras its military implementation is concerned.b. The case of national emergency by whichis understood:

1. Serious natural cataclysms such asfloods, fires, or extraordinary atmosphericoccurrences, which might compel a Mem-ber Nation for a while to immediatelymake use of the Armed Forces nearestto the cataclysm, it being impossible togive the Security Council any advancenotice. Those are all exceptional cases,but which should be envisaged.2. National emergency likewise coversthe case when the Government of a Mem-ber Nation, that is by definition, a demo-cratic and legitimate government, whoselegal powers and responsibilities to itspeople or its peoples are derived from itsnational constitution, would be threatenedby a faction which would attempt toseize power by illegal means. It seems im-possible not to recognize that this govern-ment has the same absolute right ofself-defense against an armed aggressionfrom within as that which is grantedto it by Article 51 of the Charter againstan armed aggression coming from with-out, and consequently, to employ all thenecessary means, and, possibly, theArmed Forces which it intends to makeavailable to the United Nations.

To deny this right would be contrary to allthe provisions of Public Law in force incivilized nations. To deny such a possibilitywould be contrary to actual facts; to fail toenvisage frankly the bearing it has on theemployment of the Armed Forces to be madeavailable to the Security Council would benot to fulfill adequately our duty to the Secur-ity Council.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThere is no necessity to include Article 17

in the General Principles since Article 51 ofthe Charter adequately protects the rights ofMember Nations of the United Nations touse their armed forces for self defense incase of an armed attack.

The United Nations Charter does not giveany statement on the cases of "emergencies"as set out in the proposal of the Chinese andFrench Delegations. The introduction of theidea of "an emergency" might give rise tosuch an interpretation of Article 51 of theCharter which might differ from its actualmeaning.

The U.S.S.R. Delegation considers that theidea reflected in Article 51 of the Charter doesnot need any additional interpretation.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation maintains that, in case

of self-defense, the position of Member Na-tions is adequately safeguarded under Article51 of the Charter. It is unable to agree tothe inclusion of this Article in the GeneralPrinciples for the following reasons:—

(a) The United Nations Charter makesno specific provision for the release of aMember Nation from its obligations underthe Charter in the event of a NationalEmergency.(b) It is impossible to define precisely theterm "National Emergency"; its inclusionmight therefore leave a loophole for Mem-ber Nations to evade their responsibilities.The U.K. Delegation believes that if in the

event of an emergency, not strictly within theterms of Article 51 of the Charter, a MemberNation was obliged to commit forces whichit had earmarked for the Security Council,that Member Nation should have no difficultyin justifying its action.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation believes that cases of

self-defense are adequately covered by Article51 of the Charter. The term "national emer-gencies" is indefinite and is difficult to define.This Article, if adopted, presumably wouldpermit a Member Nation in many cases notenvisaged in the Charter to withhold armedforces it has agreed to make available to theSecurity Council on call. In fact the proposedArticle would permit unilateral abrogation ofan agreement by a Member Nation, since theother party to the treaty, the Security Council,would not have to be consulted. The U.S.Delegation considers that the Security Coun-cil and other Member Nations will recognizecases in which a Member Nation might berequired to utilize all of its armed forces,including those made available to the SecurityCouncil, for the purpose of individual orcollective self-defense if an armed attackfrom any source occurred against a MemberNation. The same would apply if extraor-dinary and temporary conditions within thedomestic jurisdiction of the Member Nationrequired a nation to make use temporarilyof its entire armed forces.

Therefore, the U.S. Delegation cannotagree to the inclusion of this Article in theGeneral Principles.

CHAPTER V

Employment of Armed ForcesArticle 20

Position of the Chinese DelegationThe Chinese Delegation cannot accept the

U.S.S.R. texts for Articles 20 and 21 becauseof the following considerations:—

(1) After the Armed Forces have accom-plished their task, they should be withdrawnto the "general location" which will be


defined in the special agreements providedfor in Article 43 of the Charter.(2) The time-limit for the withdrawal ofthe Armed Forces after operation cannotbe predetermined. It should be determinedby the Security Council according to theprevailing situation at the time.

Hence, the Chinese Delegation accepts thetext as agreed upon by the four Delegationssince the term "General Location" is con-sistent with Article 43 of the Charter andthe time for withdrawal is left to the SecurityCouncil to decide.


best way to define the locations to whichArmed Forces would be withdrawn would beby referring to the wording used in Para-graph 2 of Article 43 of the Charter. Thetroops shall be withdrawn to the "generallocations" which will be defined in the SpecialAgreements provided for in Article 43 of theCharter.

Such a wording presents the advantage ofavoiding any confusion and any differences ofinterpretation since this "general location"will be accurately defined in the Special Agree-ments.

The French Delegation, whilst agreeing onthe advantage that would accrue from thestating of a precise time-limit for the with-drawal of the Forces, is of the opinion, how-ever, that it is practically impossible to deter-mine such a time-limit in advance, either nowor at the time of the conclusion of the SpecialAgreements, in view of the lack of knowledgeof the conditions that would prevail at theconclusion of a determined operation.

The French Delegation considers, underthese circumstances, that it would be sufficientto state that the Armed Forces should be with-drawn as soon as possible after the fulfillmentof their task. The Member Nations wouldundertake to comply with the time-limitswhich would be fixed by the Security Council.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe proposal of the U.S.S.R. Delegation

with regard to the question of the withdrawalof Armed Forces of Member Nations afterthe fulfillment of measures undertaken underArticle 42 of the Charter provides for con-crete time-limits within which these ArmedForces should be withdrawn so that theseforces would again be at the disposal of theirMember Nations.

Indications in Special Agreements con-cluded in accordance with Article 43 of theCharter concerning the time-limits for thewithdrawal of Armed Forces would serve asa guarantee to Member Nations that ArmedForces which they have made available wouldnot be kept for a longer time than is requiredby the necessity for their employment by theSecurity Council.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation considers that in the

principle of withdrawal the following twofacts should be established:—

(a) that the Armed Forces after they haveaccomplished their task must be withdrawnto their general locations as governed bySpecial Agreements;(b) that the Security Council should de-termine the time-limit for their withdrawal.The U. K. Delegation cannot accept the

U.S.S.R. text because it considers that itestablishes too rigidly the places to whichArmed Forces may be withdrawn, and goesbeyond the principles which the U.K. Delega-tion is prepared to accept under Chapter IX—General Location of Armed Forces.

With regard to the time-limit for with-drawal, the U.K. Delegation considers thatit is impracticable now or even when SpecialAgreements are being drawn up to indicatethe precise period in which Armed Forcesmust be withdrawn. It is essential to leavethe determination of this time-limit to theSecurity Council, whose decisions will betaken according to the prevailing circum-stances.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U. S. Delegation believes that Armed

Forces should be withdrawn to the placesspecified in the Special Agreements, whichplaces may well be other than a Nation'sown national territories if the stationing ofthe Armed Forces in other areas is specifiedin the Special Agreements. If it is stated thatthe Armed Forces must return to the generallocation governed by the Special Agreementor Agreements under Article 43 of the Char-ter, these areas certainly will be satisfactoryto the Security Council and to the MemberNations concerned.

This Article is in conformity with theprinciples of the United Nations as the word-ing is derived from the Charter. It is impos-sible, either now or at the time the SpecialAgreements are being negotiated, to set atime-limit for the withdrawal of ArmedForces, as this will depend on the prevailingsituation in each case, which cannot be fore-seen. The decision regarding the time-limitis a prerogative of the Security Council. TheU.S. Delegation feels that the Military StaffCommittee should not adopt any principlewhich might tend to place a restriction onthis authority of the Security Council.


See the Chinese position on Article 20.Position of the French Delegation

See the French position on Article 20 above.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe principle set out in the proposal by

the U.S.S.R. Delegation establishing the time-limit for the withdrawal of Armed Forces


from the territories or territorial waters ofMember Nations will serve as a guarantee forthese Member Nations that Armed Forcesof other Member Nations will be withdrawnfrom their territories and territorial waterswithin the established time-limit and thatthese forces would not be held for a longer timethan is required by the necessity for thefulfillment of their tasks under Article 42 ofthe Charter.

The reduction of these time-limits wouldmean the elimination of extra difficulties forcountries—Members of the United Nationsin connection with the stationing of ArmedForces of other Member Nations in theirterritories beyond the required period.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation cannot accept the

U.S.S.R. text for this Article for the samereasons that it cannot accept the U.S.S.R.text for Article 20. The U.K. Delegation alsoconsiders the U.S.S.R. Article 21 is not neces-sary for the following reasons:—

(a) A guarantee for the withdrawal ofArmed Forces within a time to be decidedby the Security Council has already beengiven in Article 20 accepted by the U.K.Delegation.(b) It is artificial and redundant to makea rigid distinction between the withdrawalfrom the territory of the aggressor nationor nations on the one hand and on the otherhand from territory or territories in whichfacilities for the United Nations ArmedForces have been offered by Member Na-tions.(c) The whole process of withdrawal willbe watched by the Security Council withthe advice of the Military Staff Committeeto ensure that it takes place as speedily aspossible.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation feels that the pro-

visions of this Article are already cared forin Article 20, which is agreed to by fourDelegations. The wording of Article 20 doesnot specify the territory from which theArmed Forces will withdraw but the wordingincludes not only the territory of a Statewhich has violated the peace but also theterritories of other Member Nations in whichthe Armed Forces may have been stationedfor the purpose of carrying out their task.

CHAPTER VIDegree of Readiness of Armed Forces


The Chinese Delegation is of the opinionthat in view of the characteristics of the airarm, the principle of the Degree of Readinesswould be incomplete without mention of theair force which is particularly dealt with byArticle 45 of the Charter.

Hence, the Chinese Delegation believes thatthe part of the said Article in connectionwith the degree of readiness of the air forcecontingents should be given a separate Article,dealing with urgent military measures.

The Chinese Delegation prefers this tothe U.S.S.R. text as its wording emphasizesthe fact that the degree of readiness of thesecontingents should be such as to be able tocope with urgent military measures, andtherefore it is more in conformity with theidea of immediate availability that is con-tained in Article 45 of the Charter.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation, during the discus-

sion on Article 16, indicated its position withregard to strength and composition of air forcecontributions by Member Nations. The FrenchDelegation considers that the degree of readi-ness of that portion of the air forces intendedto carry out the measures envisaged in Article45 of the Charter must be determined takinginto account the obligations arising from thisArticle.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe General Principles for the Organization

of the Armed Forces should refer to all theprincipal Services, land, sea, and air, andshould be based on the provisions of Article43 of the Charter.

The examination of Article 45 can takeplace only after the completion of the studyof Article 43 and the conclusion of SpecialAgreements. After the conclusion of suchAgreements, the Security Council, with theassistance of the Military Staff Committee,shall determine, under Article 45, what por-tion of the overall number of national airforce contingents made available to the Secur-ity Council under the Agreements should beheld immediately available for the taking ofurgent military measures in case of necessity.

The proposals of the other Delegationsstated in Article 16 of the General Principleson the furnishing of national air force contri-butions concern Article 45 of the Charter,and therefore, for reasons stated above, theseproposals cannot be justified.

Position of the U.K. DelegationFor the reasons given in the position of

the U.K. Delegation on Article 16, the U.K.Delegation considers that special referenceshould be made in Chapter VI to the degreeof readiness of national air force contingentsin accordance with the provisions of Article45 of the Charter.

Position of the U.S. DelegationAs previously stated under Article 16, the

U.S. Delegation interprets Article 45 of theCharter as an agreement on the part of theMember Nations to hold immediately avail-able to the Security Council specific contin-gents of their national air force contributions


in order to enable the United Nations to takeurgent military measures. Implicit in thisArticle of the Charter is the immediate avail-ability of these particular contingents, asdistinguished from the state of readinesswhich would govern the remainder of thenational air force contributions. The U.S.Delegation considers it essential that a cleardistinction be made as to the special degreeof readiness required of the air force contin-gents provided by Article 45 of the Charter.The U.S. Delegation considers that this dis-tinction is appropriately made in the Chapterdealing with the state of readiness of armedforces.

The proposal by the U.S.S.R. Delegation inthis Article fails to distinguish clearly thespecial state of readiness required of the airforce contingents under Article 45 of theCharter. Neither does the U.S.S.R. proposalproperly recognize the immediate availabilityof these contingents as essential in meetingthe urgency of the military measures en-visaged in Article 45 of the Charter.

CHAPTER VII

Provision of Assistance and Facilities,Including Eights of Passage,

For Armed Forces


The Chinese Delegation believes that basesshould be mentioned in the General Principlesfor two reasons:

(1) The term "bases" is implied in themeaning of the term "assistance and facili-ties" in Article 43 of the Charter, accordingto the interpretation of the Chinese Delega-tion.(2) Land, sea and air bases are essentialin modern operations.

Further, the Chinese Delegation acceptsthis text because it embodies the followingpoints :(1) It gives a general guarantee to furnishavailable bases and rights of passage, there-by operating as a legal basis on which rele-vant special agreements in accordance withArticle 43 of the Charter are made.(2) It has more flexibility because it coversboth cases in which Member Nations wouldlike to list bases in the original agreementand in which they would not.(3) It provides for requirements of chang-ing world conditions in accordance withwhich subsequent agreements dealing withall details of bases and other assistance andfacilities, including rights of passage, maybe more appropriately entered into.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation considers that bases

are a vitally important factor in the employ-ment of armed forces. It therefore feels that

it is impossible to omit mention of this ques-tion in the General Principles.

With regard to the substance of Article 26,the French Delegation considers that:—

1. The Special Agreements should list thebases placed at the disposal of the SecurityCouncil by Member Nations.

The Charter does not impose the obligationon Member Nations to place at the disposaiof the Security Council their total resourcesand, particularly, all of their bases. Article43 of the Charter stipulates that MemberNations of the United Nations undertake tomake available to the Security Council, inaccordance with a special agreement or specialagreements, armed forces, assistance andfacilities required for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security.

Member Nations should, obviously, havean exact knowledge of bases which theyshould maintain in a state of preparedness, inorder not to dissipate their efforts. If thebases were not listed in the special agree-ments, it would be essential to conclude specificagreements at the time of an emergency andthe negotiation of such agreements wouldentail a loss of time which would be to theaggressor's advantage.

However, in the event that the above-men-tioned bases, assistance and facilities willprove insufficient for the conduct of operationsin a given zone, a guarantee will be given tothe Security Council that it will be able toobtain such bases, assistance and facilitieswhich it finds indispensable, in additionalspecial agreements to be concluded with theMember Nations.

The French proposal is consistent with thespirit of Chapter II (Composition of theArmed Forces). All Delegations have, indeed,considered at the time of the consideration ofthis Chapter, that the overall strength of theUnited Nations Armed Forces should be lim-ited to a size necessary to carry out success-fully measures ordered by the SecurityCouncil. Obviously, such a considerationapplies to bases and facilities as well as toArmed Forces themselves.

2. The special agreements should not con-tain detailed provisions with regard to assist-ance and facilities granted by the MemberNations. The provisions concerning the dura-tion and other conditions in the exercise ofrights thus granted to Armed Forces operat-ing under the direction of the SecurityCouncil should be included in specific agree-ments concluded at the appropriate time.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationArticle 43 of the Charter obliges Member

Nations to make available Armed Forces,assistance and facilities including rights ofpassage to the Security Council, but thisArticle does not contain provisions obligingMember Nations to make bases available.The U.S.S.R. Delegation considers that thequestion of the provision of bases by Member


Nations of the United Nations is not con-nected with the General Principles.

Position of the U.K. DelegationIn the opinion of the U.K. Delegation, this

Article should include:—(a) a general guarantee to furnish avail-able bases and rights of passage, and(b) a provision that details regardingbases and other assistance and facilities,including rights of passage, should be in-cluded either in the original agreement orin subsequent agreements to be concludedat the appropriate time.The U.K. Delegation cannot accept the

view of the U.S.S.R. Delegation that thequestion of provision of bases should not beincluded in General Principles because basesare not mentioned specifically in Article 43of the Charter. In the opinion of the U.K.Delegation, the ability of the United NationsForces to use bases of Member Nations underagreed conditions is one of the essentialfacilities referred to in Article 43 of theCharter "as necessary for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security", since theUnited Nations Force would be incapable ofeffective action unless assured of suchfacilities.

The U.K. Delegation also cannot acceptthe proposal of the French Delegation becauseit envisages an obligation to indicate, in theoriginal agreements, assistance, facilities in-cluding right of passage and bases.

Since the assessment of the full require-ments of the United Nations Force can onlybe studied in detail in the light of a specificsituation, the U.K. Delegation considers thatthe original agreements under Article 43 ofthe Charter should contain a general guaran-tee with regard to rights of passage andbases but that specific details and conditionsof provision could be left to subsequent agree-ments made at the appropriate time.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe initial special agreements between the

Security Council and Member Nations, underArticle 43 of the Charter, should includegeneral guarantees providing for rights ofpassage and for the use of available basesrequired by the United Nations Armed Forces.This is necessary in order that the SecurityCouncil may have the freedom of action inplanning for the employment of Armed Forcesresulting from assurance as to the availabilityof existing bases. The guarantee in sub-para-graph a of Article 26, refers only to availablebases and does not require a nation to pro-duce any facility which it does not normallyhave. Any such additional facilities wouldbe covered in sub-paragraph b regardingspecific provisions.

Details regarding the providing of assist-ance, facilities and rights of passage, includ-ing lists of specific bases, may be specified

either in the original agreements or insubsequent agreements, concluded at theappropriate time. Such subsequent agreementsmay be necessary from time to time as worldconditions change. The U.S. Delegation em-phasizes the fact that all such agreements,including the subsequent agreements, will bemade under Article 43 of the Charter. TheSecurity Council must be assured of the useof available bases of Member Nations by ageneral guarantee in the initial agreements.

The U.S. Delegation not only considersthat bases are included in the term "assist-ance and facilities" but also considers thatbases constitute the major element of thisterm. Minor elements would be such as com-munications facilities, weather services, andthe like. Therefore, the U.S. Delegation be-lieves that this major element should beclearly and specifically stated in the principlegoverning assistance and facilities.


The Chinese Delegation believes that it isnecessary to have an article dealing withthe sovereignty of bases and other facilitiesthat are made available to the Security Coun-cil. This article accepted by the ChineseDelegation recognizes the right of a MemberNation to retain its sovereignty, commandand control over bases and other facilitiesthat it has placed at the disposal of theSecurity Council.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation considers that it is

necessary to introduce this Article in thedocument on General Principles because itconsiders that the preservation of nationalsovereignty is indispensable if it is desiredthat Member Nations agree to place basesand other facilities at the disposal of theSecurity Council.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe U.S.S.R. Delegation cannot agree to

accept Article 27 for the reasons set out inits position on Article 26.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation supports this Article

because it considers it necessary to safeguardthe overall rights of sovereignty and controlof a Member Nation when it places bases andother facilities at the disposal of the SecurityCouncil.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation considers that it is

important that each Member Nation is assuredthat it retains its sovereignty, control, andcommand over bases and other facilitiesplaced at the disposal of the Security Counciland that it is essential that this Article beincluded in the General Principles.


In view of the fact that facilities and


assistance play an important part in opera-tions, their value should be taken into accountby the Security Council, on the advice of theMilitary Staff Committee when additional con-tributions from the Permanent Members ofthe Security Council are requested in connec-tion with an enforcement action under Chap-ter VII of the Charter.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation had already taken

a position by accepting Article 8 (Chapter III,Overall Strength of Armed Forces) on thepossibility of a considerable increase of theinitial contributions provided by MemberNations, should the situation demand it.

It is obvious that the principle of equivalentcontributions of Armed Forces might beapplied when a comparatively small force isconcerned. But the vastly different resourcesof the five Permanent Members of the Secur-ity Council do not allow them to adhere tothe same principle, should the extent of thesecontributions be very appreciably increased.

For this reason, the French Delegationconsiders that the equivalence of possibleadditional contributions among the PermanentMembers of the Security Council could onlybe arrived at taking into account togetherarmed forces, bases, assistance and facilities.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe U.S.S.R. Delegation cannot accept Arti-

cle 28 since it does not take into accountthe Principle of Equality in the Contributionof Armed Forces by the Permanent Membersof the Security Council as set out in itsproposal for Article II of the General Prin-ciples.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation has recommended in

Article 26 that a Member Nation should givea general guarantee to provide available basesas required by the Security Council butrealises that it is not practicable to estimatethe value of bases and other facilities whenassessing the initial contributions of the FivePermanent Members of the Security Council.The U.K. Delegation however considers thattheir value should be taken into account ifand when additional contributions are re-quested by the Security Council when aspecific operation is under consideration, inorder to apportion the burden amongst theFive Permanent Members of the SecurityCouncil as equitably as possible.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation is in agreement with

the principle that assistance and facilitiesshould be taken into account when assessingthe contributions of all Member Nations.However, the U.S. Delegation is not awareof a practical method of accomplishing thisuntil such time as the actual need for specificassistance and facilities would arise whenenforcement action is either under considera-

tion or taken by the Security Council. TheArticle to which the U.S. Delegation hasagreed states this principle adequately.

CHAPTER VIIILogistical Support of Armed Forces


The Chinese Delegation feels that Article49 of the Charter emphasizes the importanceof mutual assistance by Member Nations inthe execution of measures designed for thepurpose of maintaining universal peace. Itseems to the Chinese Delegation that in viewof the destructiveness of modern warfare,it is more than probable that some MemberNations may be incapacitated in continuingto supply their troops adequately in opera-tions. When such exigencies occur it is onlyreasonable that both the Security Counciland other Member Nations should do all intheir power to succor such unfortunate fellowmembers in the interest of internationalpeace. It is with such an object in view thatthis Article is framed. Moreover, the ChineseDelegation believes that the Article ought tobe so worded as to give a more definite methodof procedure in rendering such mutual assist-ance.

Hence, the Chinese Delegation accepts thetext as agreed upon by the three Delegations.


rules set out in Articles 29 and 30 should berendered more flexible by introducing a para-graph providing for the inability of a MemberNation to fulfil its obligations.

The French Delegation considers it un-reasonable to extend this assistance to thedefaulting Nation by also providing it withreserves of personnel. Numerous disadvan-tages would follow and in particular the lossof the national character of contingents madeavailable to the Security Council by MemberNations.

For these reasons the French Delegationprefers the statement of a broad principle,which would leave the Security Council, afterit had been notified by a Member Nation, thefull initiative of solving on the advice ofthe Military Staff Committee any special prob-lems which might arise by the default of aMember Nation.

The text favored by the French Delegationappears to express in a satisfactory mannerthe role of the Security Council in such acase.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationArticle 13 of the General Principles states

that no Member Nation of the United Nationsshall be urged to increase its armed forcesfor the specific purpose of placing a contribu-tion at the disposal of the Security Council.The Security Council shall also not demand


of a Member Nation to make armed forcesavailable of a size which that Member Nationwould not be in a position to furnish. There-fore, it is inadvisable to mention beforehandin the General Principles the "inability" ofa Member Nation to provide the armed forceswhich that Member Nation has made availablewith everything necessary.

The proposal of the U.S.S.R. Delegationmakes it possible in individual instances fora Member Nation to request the SecurityCouncil for assistance regarding the provisionof that Member Nation with supplies andtransport of which he is deficient. Such assist-ance may be rendered by special decision ofthe Security Council if that Member Nationexpresses such a desire.

Position of the U.K. DelegationAll Delegations recognize the possibility

that any Member Nation may, for reasonsbeyond its control, require assistance in orderto maintain the effectiveness of its contribu-tions to the United Nations Armed Forces.It is logical therefore, that principles shouldbe established to cover such circumstances.

The U.K. Delegation considers that on re-ceipt of a request for assistance by a MemberNation, the Security Council, with the adviceof the Military Staff Committee, would decidewhether the application was justifiable and,if so, to what extent assistance should beprovided. Following a decision to assist theapplicant, the Security Council, being itselfunable to provide material assistance, wouldnormally help the Member Nation by actingas initiator and intermediary in negotiationswith other Member Nations, or, in certaincircumstances, by concluding agreements withappropriate Member Nations.

At the same time the U.K. Delegation alsorecognizes that the integrity of a MemberNation's contribution should not be disturbedwithout the free consent of the MemberNation.

The U.K. Delegation considers that theArticle accepted by the Chinese and U.S.Delegations incorporates all the above prin-ciples, whereas the Article accepted by theFrench and U.S.S.R. Delegations does notindicate the responsibilities of the SecurityCouncil following a decision to provide suchassistance as it has deemed necessary.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation believes that cases of

a Member Nation's inability to discharge itsresponsibilities under Article 29 must be pro-vided for. It might be, for example, thatduring the time a Member Nation has armedforces operating under the Security Council,that Nation may be over-run by hostile forcesor may suffer severe damage to its industries.Such a condition might make it impossiblefor that Nation to continue to furnish suppliesto its contingents in the United Nations

Armed Forces. The Article agreed to by theU.S. Delegation is intended to provide forsuch a condition.

The U.S. Delegation particularly stressesthe importance of the second sentence of theArticle agreed to by the Chinese, U.K. andU.S. Delegations. This sentence serves toprotect the tactical integrity of units ofarmed forces made available to the SecurityCouncil. There must be assurance that suchunits will not be unbalanced by any transferfrom the contributions of one Member Nationto make up deficiencies in the contributions ofanother Member Nation without the agree-ment of the Member Nations concerned.

The proposal of the U.S.S.R. Delegationprovides for deviations from Article 29 byspecial decisions of the Security Council, butdoes not provide for the agreement of theMember Nation furnishing the assistance, andis therefore unacceptable to the U.S. Dele-gation.

CHAPTER IXGeneral Location of Armed Forces


The Chinese Delegation considers that theobject of the Armed Forces made availableto the Security Council is to maintain orrestore international peace. This fact shouldbe kept constantly in mind when the "generallocation" of such Forces is considered. Gen-erally speaking, therefore, these Forces shouldbe so located that prompt action could betaken by the Security Council in the interestof peace. It follows that the Security Councilwill have a wider choice of locations for theseArmed Forces to achieve this purpose ifMember Nations are allowed to base theirArmed Forces made available to the SecurityCouncil in places where they have legal rightof access. Hence, the U.S.S.R. proposal isunacceptable as its interpretation of the term"general location" is too restrictive, and,therefore, prejudiced to the effective func-tioning of the Armed Forces. Further, it isthe belief of the Chinese Delegation that thephrase "any territories or waters to whichthey have legal right of access" in the textis more all-embracing and already inclusiveof the list of possible locations as suggestedby the French Delegation.

Finally, since the Military Staff Committeehas agreed that Armed Forces made availableto the Security Council are from the unitswhich form an integral part of the armedforces of Member Nations (Article 3, Gen-eral Principles) and are under the "exclusivecommand" of the contributing Nations whennot employed by the Security Council (Arti-cle 36, General Principles), and since Article51 of the Charter recognizes the "inherentright" of self-defence in case of an armedattack, it seems logical to the Chinese Delega-tion that Member Nations should have the


right to exercise "discretion", within theterms of Special Agreements under Article43 of the Charter, in the choice of locationsfor these Forces.

For the above reasons, the Chinese Delega-tion accepts the texts for Articles 32 and 33.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation cannot accept either

the U.S.S.R. proposal or the proposal sup-ported by the U.S., U.K. and Chinese Dele-gations.

In the opinion of the French Delegation,the U.S.S.R. proposal or the proposal sup-It takes into consideration the legal and geo-graphical point of view of the U.S.S.R. only,which is territorially and constitutionallyunited, and the provision of Article 107 ofthe Charter only, relative to the occupationof ex-enemy territories, to the exclusion ofother Articles of the Charter dealing withsimilar measures, such as Articles 102, 82or 83. It does not in any way take into con-sideration the entirely different geographicand legal factors of other federations as, forexample, the French Union, in which areassociated under various juridical acts—Metropolitan France, its Departments andterritories overseas, its associated territoriesand States geographically spread out through-out the world. In limiting their stationingonly in their national territories, the U.S.S.R.proposal also does not take into account theabsolute necessity for the strategic worlddistribution of Armed Forces to be madeavailable to the United Nations, if it isdesired that their intervention be speedy andconsequently effective.

In the opinion of the French Delegation,the proposal supported by the U.S., U.K. andChinese Delegations is not sufficiently explicit.The expression "right of legal access" mightlead both to misunderstanding and to possiblesuspicion. This could have been the casebefore the existence of the United NationsCharter, which deals, in Articles 82-83, 102and 107, with the legal conditions of occupa-tion of territories outside national boundaries.It appears to the French Delegation not onlyappropriate but indispensable to refer tothem.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationProposals of other Delegations on the gen-

eral location set out in Articles 32 and 33 ofthe General Principles permit the stationingof armed forces of Member Nations whichthey make available to the Security Councilin any territories or waters to which theyhave the "legal right" of access. Such a prin-ciple of location of Armed Forces made avail-able to the Security Council cannot be justifiedby the interests of maintenance of peace anddevelopment of friendly relations amongcountries. Moreover, experience has shownthat the presence of foreign troops on terri-tories of other Member Nations without

sufficient grounds does not facilitate thestrengthening of international peace and thedevelopment of good neighborly relationsamong states. On the contrary, it gives riseto a feeling of anxiety among Member Nationsfor their national independence. It is for thesereasons that the proposal by the U.S.S.R.Delegation in Article 32 provides for the gar-risoning of Armed Forces only in their ownterritories or territorial waters.

Regarding the stationing of Armed Forcesof Member Nations during the fulfillment ofmeasures under Article 42 of the Charter,it will be carried out under the direction ofthe Security Council and that is spoken ofin Article 35 of the General Principles.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation considers that, pro-

vided a Member Nation's Armed Forces, whennot employed by the Security Council arelocated or based in the territories or watersto which the Member Nation has legal rightof access, there can be no valid objection onthe part of any other Member Nation. TheU.K. Delegation therefore cannot accept therigid interpretation contained in the Sovietproposal.

The U.K. Delegation also objects to theFrench proposal since it attempts to definein detail the "legal right of access", whichis not the task of the Military Staff Com-mittee.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation believes that it is

essential to the effectiveness of the ArmedForces that they may be based wherever theMember Nation has the legal right of access.The General Principles governing the locationof the Armed Forces should be broad andgeneral. The U.S. Delegation does not agreethat a special list of authorized locationsshould be included. Such a list of locationsmight form part of the Special Agreementsunder Article 43 of the Charter, but wouldbe out of place in the General Principles,consequently, the U.S. Delegation does notagree with the French Article.

The U.S.S.R. Article restricts the locationswhere a nation can station its armed forcesin time of peace. The U.S. Delegation cannotagree to the incorporation in the GeneralPrinciples of any restriction upon the legalright which a nation may have to base forcesin areas other than its own national terri-tories and consequently cannot accept theU.S.S.R. proposal.


See Chinese position on Article 32.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation considers that an

appropriate geographical distribution of


Armed Forces made available to the SecurityCouncil will enable the latter to undertakeprompt action in any part of the world. Sucha provision will undoubtedly increase theefficiency of the United Nations ArmedForces.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationProposals of other Delegations on the gen-

eral location set out in Articles 32 and 33 ofthe General Principles permit the stationingof armed forces of Member Nations whichthey make available to the Security Councilin any territories or waters to which theyhave the "legal right" of access. Such aprinciple of location of Armed Forces madeavailable to the Security Council cannot bejustified by the interests of maintenance ofpeace and development of friendly relationsamong countries. Moreover, experience hasshown that the presence of foreign troops onthe territories of other Member Nations with-out sufficient grounds does not facilitate thestrengthening of international peace and thedevelopment of good neighborly relationsamong states. On the contrary, it gives riseto a feeling of anxiety among Member Nationsfor their national independence. It is forthese reasons that the proposal by theU.S.S.R. Delegation in Article 32 provides forthe garrisoning of Armed Forces only in theirown territories or territorial waters.

Regarding the stationing of Armed Forcesof Member Nations during the fulfillment ofmeasures under Article 42 of the Charter, itwill be carried out under the direction of theSecurity Council and that is spoken of inArticle 35 of the General Principles.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation has accepted this para-

graph since it will provide useful guidanceto the Security Council and the MilitaryStaff Committee when assessing the overallstrength of the armed forces and when draw-ing up the Special Agreements under Article43 of the Charter.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation believes that it is

necessary that the locations of the UnitedNations Armed Forces should be so distribu-ted geographically that the Security Councilcan take prompt action in any part of theworld. All Delegations have approved a word-ing similar to this Article in Article 6 relatingto Overall Strength. Both factors of Strengthand Location are equally important in enablingthe Security Council to initiate action prompt-ly, and therefore the U.S. Delegation considersthe inclusion of this Article essential.


The object of the Article on "General Loca-tion" is to enable the Security Council to knowwhen and where the Armed Forces are avail-

able so that plans of operations could beaccordingly made when action is considereddesirable. It follows, therefore, that anydisplacement of these Forces that modifiestheir availability as specified by SpecialAgreements under Article 43 of the Chartershould be brought to the notice of theSecurity Council. For the above reasons, theChinese Delegation accepts this text.

Position of the French DelegationThe French Delegation had specified the

reasons for the inclusion of such a specialArticle dealing with movements of Forces,likely to change their delay in intervention,when stating its position with regard toArticle 17 above,

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationThe proposal of the other Delegations pro-

vides that Member Nations which have madetheir Armed Forces available to the SecurityCouncil should inform the Security Councilof any displacement of these forces whichmight change their availability.

The proposal of the U.S.S.R. Delegation onArticle 32 permits the stationing of ArmedForces made available by Member Nationsonly within the limits of their own territoriesor territorial waters with the exception ofcases envisaged in Article 107 of the Charter.Within those territories Armed Forces ofMember Nations have the full right to changethe areas of their garrisoning at the discre-tion of the Member Nations without inform-ing the Security Council of such changes.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe availability of contributions of Mem-

ber Nations includes two elements, namely,the time taken to mobilize and the time takento concentrate in a given area. The U.K. Dele-gation considers that a Member Nation willundertake to produce its contributions, whencalled for by the Security Council within agiven time. The U.K. Delegation recognizesthat a Member Nation will from time to timewish to make changes in location of its forcesmade available to the Security Council. Whensuch changes affect the time taken to con-centrate, the U.K. Delegation considers thatthe Member Nation should be under anobligation to inform the Security Councilimmediately.

Although it may be held that such anobligation would exist under the SpecialAgreements, Article 34 emphasizes this re-quirement and the U.K. Delegation thereforefavors inclusion of this Article.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation is of the opinion that

customary international procedure requiresa nation which is a party to a treaty or agree-ment to notify promptly other signatories tothe instrument when that nation is unable


to comply fully with the terms of the treatyor agreement. For this reason the U.S. Dele-gation does not consider that Article 34 isessential.

However, since several Delegations have ex-pressed the view that this Article is neededto insure that the Security Council will beinformed of any change in the availability ofa Member Nation's contribution of ArmedForces, the U.S. Delegation has no objectionto the inclusion of Article 34 in the GeneralPrinciples.

CHAPTER X

Strategic Direction and Command ofArmed Forces


The Chinese Delegation considers eitherthe word "supreme" or the word "overall"acceptable. Further, it is the opinion of theChinese Delegation that while it is desirableto have an Article dealing in a general waywith the supreme command of the ArmedForces, it is premature to lay down the chainof command in detail. The text agreed to bythe Chinese Delegation is adequate enoughas a statement of a general principle sinceit covers the cases of Overall Commandersof different theatres of operations.


experience gained in the last war with regardto the organization of Command, should notbe ignored in the General Principles govern-ing the organization of the Armed Forces.

Actually, the problems which confrontedthe Allied Governments at that time are of asimilar character to those which will haveto be solved by the United Nations in thenear future. It would therefore appear profit-able to bring to the attention of the SecurityCouncil the advisability of adopting a pro-cedure which, from the point of view of theFrench Delegation, has given proof of itsvalue.

The French Delegation likewise considers itessential that it be clearly stated in the textof the Article that Commands will be dele-gated by the Security Council on the adviceof the Military Staff Committee. Indeed, onlyan international authority, with the adviceof a technical body, has both governmentaland military knowledge as well as the imparti-ality required to make such decisions.

It seems impossible to the French Delega-tion to uphold in the face of public opiniona procedure which would invest the SupremeCommander of an operational theatre, what-ever may be his authority and capabilities,with the authority of personally nominatingthe Commander-in-Chief of the land, sea andair forces which will come under his com-mand. It would be difficult to reconcile such

an eventuality with the international charac-ter which should be retained, from the Frenchpoint of view, both by the Armed Forces madeavailable to the Security Council as well asto the Command of these Forces.

Position of the U.S.S.R. DelegationIn the view of the U.S.S.R. Delegation at

the present stage of the study of Article 43of the Charter from the military point ofview, it is sufficient to provide for in the Gen-eral Principles that the Security Council onthe advice of the Military Staff Committeemay appoint an overall Commander or over-all Commanders of Armed Forces made avail-able to the Security Council. A detailed studyof the questions of Organization of Commandcan take place at a later stage.

Position of the U.K. DelegationThe U.K. Delegation considers that provi-

sion should be made for the appointment by,the Security Council of a Supreme Comman-der of Armed Forces made available to theSecurity Council or Supreme Commandersshould there be more than one theatre ofoperations.

In addition, the U.K. Delegation considersthat circumstances may also require the ap-pointment of Commanders-in-Chief of Land,Sea or Air Forces acting under the SupremeCommander or Commanders and that the pro-visions of Article 41 should make this possi-bility clear.

The fact that Article 41 provides for theseCommanders does not make their actual ap-pointment mandatory, neither does it antici-pate the ultimate structure of command whichmay be set up to meet a particular situation.The U.K. Delegation, however, considers itessential to state in the General Principlesthat the Security Council has the power toappoint Supreme Commanders or Comman-ders-in-chief without prejudice to the provi-sions of Article 47 of the Charter.

Position of the U.S. DelegationThe U.S. Delegation believes that the de-

signation of the Commanders for a specificoperation under the Security Council cannotbe subject to rigidly established criteria. Itis sound from the military point of view, andin accordance with the provisions of the Char-ter, that the Security Council, with the assist-ance of the Military Staff Committee, shouldbe empowered to appoint the Overall Com-mander for such an operation. However, addi-tional fixed rules concerning the actual num-ber of component Commanders to be appointedby the Security Council might be detriment-al to the formation of an efficient Commandechelon.

The operation in hand might be one whichdid not employ all the components of forces,land, sea, and air, made available to the Se-curity Council or simultaneous operations in


different regions might present altogether dif-ferent command situations. It might be de-sirable at the time to follow the procedureas set out in the wording accepted by theFrench and U.K. Delegations or it might bemore desirable for a component Commanderto be designated by the Overall Commander.It is impractical to prejudge all situationswhich might arise, and to formulate exact andinflexible rules for their solution.

For these reasons, the U.S. Delegation be-lieves that the method of designation of Com-manders of mixed contingents of forces madeavailable to the Security Council, other thanthe overall Commander, must be resolved whenthe occasion arises. Therefore, the U.S. Dele-gation adheres to the wording of this Articleaccepted by the Chinese, U.S.S.R. and U.S.Delegations.

With regard to the minor divergence inwording between the respective first para-graphs of this Article, the U.S. Delegation isagreeable to the use of either wording, "over-all commander (s)" or "supreme comman-der (s)."

ANNEX "B"

GENERAL COMMENTS BY THEFRENCH DELEGATION

The French Military Delegation considersthat the Principles of Organization of theArmed Forces to be made available to theUnited Nations have been formulated in thespirit of the Charter of the United Nationsin that, in the opinion of the French Mili-tary Delegation, they imply unanimity amongthe five Permanent Members of the SecurityCouncil regarding the employment of theseForces. Although the security system whichwill emerge from those Principles may bestrictly limited in its objective and in itsmeans, the French Military Delegation con-siders that it is not without a positive valuefor the collective security, because conflictswould thus be confined to their original sourceand consequently their expansion prevented.

The French Military Delegation considersthat some of the Principles of Organizationtend to limit the strength of the Armed Forcesmade available to the Security Council. TheFrench Military Delegation deliberately ap-proved these Principles, thus anticipating inparticular the results which would follow withregard to disarmament, and which would en-dow the Armed Forces made available to theSecurity Council with a relatively more im-portant position in the entire existing modemarmed forces.

It was also considered that "the moralweight and the potential power behind anydecision to employ the Armed Forces madeavailable to the Security Council by MemberNations of the United Nations in enforce-ment action will be very great and this factwill directly influence the size of the ArmedForces required."

In the course of its work the Military StaffCommittee did not consider it appropriate totackle certain problems of a politico-militarycharacter, the solutions of which are, however,considered as indispensable by the FrenchMilitary Delegation, indeed, on their solutionrests all hope of the effectiveness of ArmedForces to be raised by implementing the Gen-eral Principles which are the subject of thisReport. It follows that the two major prob-lems of determining the aggressor and thesetting in motion of measures, takes in pur-suance of Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter,must, in the opinion of the French MilitaryDelegation, be solved before any action bythe Armed Forces made available to the Se-curity Council can be contemplated.

From a purely military viewpoint, the factorof speed in the setting in motion of thesemeasures is imperative for the success of theaction undertaken. The chances of successfulintervention will be relatively all the greaterin that the comparable strength of the Forcesweighs more heavily in favor of the UnitedNations. Therefore, the French Military Dele-gation considers that it is of paramount im-portance that action by the Security Councilshould be swift and energetic, and with thisobject in view:

1. The determination of the aggressor mustbe decided as soon as possible.2. Economics and political actions envisagedin Articles 40 and 41 of the Charter mustbe so combined as to prepare and supportthe military intervention which might ensue.3. The plans drawn up by the SecurityCouncil for the employment of the ArmedForces must provide for the immediate en-forcement of measures envisaged in Article42 of the Charter and may thus prevent anyaggression.In the opinion of the French Military Dele-

gation only under these conditions will it bepossible for the Security Council to take reallyeffective measures which will enable it tomaintain or restore international peace andsecurity.

Furthermore, the French Military Delega-tion notes that one of the important problemswhich the Military Staff Committee did notconsider came within its province is the finan-cial problem raised as to the manner ofsettling the expenses devolving on MemberNations in carrying out the directives of theSecurity Council. The solution of this problemby the Security Council will undoubtedly havea bearing on the importance of the contribu-tion which each Nation will agree to provideto the Security Council.

The solutions of the problems aforemen-tioned, should, from the viewpoint of theFrench Military Delegation, be undertakenimmediately in order that the negotiation ofSpecial Agreements envisaged in Article 43 ofthe Charter be commenced.


F. THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Mr. Harry S. Truman, President of theUnited States; Mr. C. R. Attlee, Prime Min-ister of the United Kingdom; and Mr. W. L.Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada,met in Washington, D.C., in November 1945"to consider the possibility of internationalaction: (a) To prevent the use of atomic en-ergy for destructive purposes, and (b) topromote the use of recent and future advancesin scientific knowledge, particularly in theutilization of atomic energy, for peaceful andhumanitarian ends."1

On November 15, 1945, the three heads ofGovernments issued a declaration which stat-ed, among other things, that "in order to attainthe most effective means of entirely eliminat-ing the use of atomic energy for destructivepurposes and promoting its widest use forindustrial and humanitarian purposes, we areof the opinion that at the earliest practicabledate a Commission should be set up underthe United Nations Organization to preparerecommendations for submission to the Or-ganization."2

Discussion of this problem took place atthe meeting of the Foreign Ministers of theU.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and theUnited States held in Moscow in December1945. On December 27 the three Foreign Min-isters issued a communique which stated, interalia, that "the Ministers of Foreign Affairsof the U.S.S.E., the United States, and theUnited Kingdom have agreed to recommend,for the consideration of the General Assemblyof the United Nations, the establishment bythe United Nations of a commission to con-sider problems arising from the discovery ofatomic energy and related matters."3 TheForeign Ministers agreed to invite the otherpermanent members of the Security Council—France and China—together with Canada, tojoin with them in assuming the initiative insponsoring a resolution, drafted in Moscow,relating to the establishment of a commissionfor the control and use of atomic energy.

Pursuant to the agreement reached in De-cember 1945 at the Moscow Conference, andto subsequent negotiations, the British Gov-ernment, acting on behalf of the five perman-ent members of the Security Council andCanada, on January 4, 1946, proposed thatthe resolution drafted at Moscow relating tothe establishment of a commission for the

control and use of atomic energy be addedto the agenda of the General Assembly atthe first part of the first session, scheduledto take place in London.

The General Assembly referred the estab-lishment of the proposed commission to itsFirst Committee (Political and Security),which considered the proposed resolution atits second and third meetings on January 21and 22, 1946. At the end of the meeting ofJanuary 21, the resolution was approved with-out change by 46 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.After a further brief debate on the followingday, the First Committee on January 23 ap-proved unanimously the report of the Rappor-teur on the establishment of the commission.

On January 24 the report and resolutionauthorizing the Commission on Atomic Energywere approved in the General Assembly withno dissenting votes. According to the resolu-tion, the Commission was to be composed ofone representative from each of the Statesrepresented on the Security Council, and Can-ada when that State was not a member of theSecurity Council.

The Commission was required to inquirewith the utmost despatch into all phases ofthe problems, and to submit its reports andrecommendations to the Security Council. Inthe appropriate cases, the Security Councilwas required to transmit these reports tothe General Assembly and to the Members ofthe United Nations as well as to the Economicand Social Council and other organs within theframework of the United Nations.

The resolution set forth the terms of refer-ence of the Commission as being to make spe-cific proposals:

(a) for extending between all nations theexchange of basic scientific information forpeaceful ends;

(b) for control of atomic energy to theextent necessary to ensure its use only forpeaceful purposes;

(c) for the elimination from national arma-ments of atomic weapons and of all other ma-jor weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(d) for effective safeguards by way ofinspection and other means to protect com-plying States against the hazards of viola-tions and evasions.

1 Department of State Bulletin (United States),Vol. XIII, #334, November 18, 1945. p. 7812 Ibid, p. 7823Ibid, Vol. XIII, #340, December 30, 1945.p. 1032


By May 28, 1946, all States entitled to repre-sentation on the Commission had appointedtheir representatives. The Secretary-Generalconvened the first meeting of the Commissionon June 14, 1946. A Committee on Rules ofProcedure was appointed, at the first meeting.The draft Rules submitted by it were ap-proved by the Commission on July 3 and bythe Security Council on July 10; they wereofficially adopted by the Commission at itsfifth meeting on July 18.

At the first meeting of the Atomic EnergyCommission, the representative of the UnitedStates presented a plan for the creation ofan International Atomic Development Author-ity entrusted with all phases of the develop-ment and use of atomic energy. Under thisplan the Authority would conduct continuoussurveys of world supplies of uranium andthorium, and would bring the raw materialsunder its control. It would possess the exclusiveright to conduct research in the field of atomicexplosives, and all other research would beopen only to rations under license of the Au-thority, which would provide them with de-natured materials. Dangerous activities ofthe Authority and its stockpiles would be de-centralized and strategically distributed. Allnations would grant the freedom of inspectiondeemed necessary by the Authority. The rep-resentative of the United States stressed theimportance of immediate punishment for in-fringements of the rights of the Authority.He urged that "there must be no veto to pro-tect those who violate their solemn agreementsnot to develop or use atomic energy for de-structive purposes."

At the second meeting of the Commissionon June 19, 1946, the representative of theU.S.S.R. suggested that the first measure tobe adopted should be the conclusion of an in-ternational agreement to prohibit the pro-duction and use of atomic energy weapons.Within three months from the entry into forceof the agreement, he urged, all atomic wea-pons should be destroyed. Violation of theagreement should be severely punished underthe domestic legislation of the contractingparties. The agreement should be of indefiniteduration, coming in force after approval bythe Security Council and ratification by theCouncil's permanent members. All States,whether or not Members of the United Na-tions, should be obliged to fulfil all provisionsof the agreement.

After various delegations had expressedtheir views on the two proposals, it was de-cided to establish a Working Committee toconsider the proposals made and to establish,if necessary, sub-committees.

The Working Committee set up: (1) Sub-Committee 1 to study all proposals put for-ward by the delegations to the Commissionand to prepare the framework of a workingplan by presenting to the Working Committeea list of headings or topics to be considered;(2) Committee 2 to examine questions as-sociated with the control of atomic energyactivities and to make specific recommenda-tions for such control; (3) a Legal AdvisoryCommittee to examine the legal aspects ofatomic energy control; (4) a Scientific andTechnical Committee to advise on the scien-tific aspects of the problem.

Sub-Committee 1 held three informal meet-ings from July 1 to 11, and presented a reportto the Working Committee on the results ofits discussions. Committee 2 continued thework began in the Working Committee andSub-Committee 1 and examined at length theproposals made. At its fourth meeting on July31, it decided that before proceeding withfurther discussions it was advisable to clarifythe scientific and technical facts underlyingcontrol of atomic energy. It therefore request-ed the Scientific and Technical Committee toprepare a report on the question of whethereffective control of atomic energy was pos-sible, together with an indication of themethod by which that Committee consideredthat effective control could be achieved. OnAugust 2, Committee 2 deferred further meet-ings until it had received the report of theScientific and Technical Committee.

After eight weeks of intensive study, theScientific and Technical Committee, on Sep-tember 26, 1946, unanimously adopted a re-port for submission to Committee 2. Thereport stated that the Committee did not finda basis in the available scientific facts forsupposing that effective control of atomic en-ergy was not technologically possible. Whetheror not it was politically feasible was for theAtomic Energy Commission to decide.

At its sixth meeting on October 2, Com-mittee 2 considered the Report of the Scien-tific and Technical Committee and decided tocontinue its discussions on the basis of thereport. At its seventh meeting on October 8,


Committee 2 unanimously decided to examineand report on the safeguards required at eachstage in the production and use of atomicenergy for peaceful purposes to prevent thepossibility of misuse. In accordance with thisdecision, a program of work was outlined bythe Secretariat and adopted by Committee 2at an informal meeting on October 14. Underthis outline. Committee discussions on safe-guards to prevent diversions of materials wereto follow a seven-step plan: uranium andthorium mines, concentration plants, refin-eries, chemical and metallurgical plantsprimary reactors and associated chemicalseparation plants, isotope separation plantsand secondary reactors.

On October 15, at an informal meeting ofCommittee 2, the representative of theU.S.S.R. proposed that atomic energy controlshould begin at the most basic stage—un-mined mineral resources—and he called for aworld-wide report on uranium deposits. Fromthat date informal conversations were heldabout twice weekly to discuss in detail thetypes of necessary safeguards and to hearstatements by experts. The discussions re-sulted in a draft report, completed on Decem-ber 13, dealing with safeguards against diver-sions and clandestine activities.

In the meantime the Legal Advisory Com-mittee held three meetings on June 18 and 30and August 2. With the assistance of theSecretariat, it drew up a provisional list oftopics under these headings: (1) drafting,including ultimately the preparation of adraft treaty or treaties; (2) the study ofspecific legal questions arising in the courseof the work of the Commission and its com-mittees; (3) the study of the relationshipbetween the system of measures of controlrecommended by Committee 2 and the UnitedNations. This was submitted to the WorkingCommittee, with a request for a guidance onthe next stage of the Committee's work sothat it might be co-ordinated with the work ofother committees. The Working Committeeconsidered the matter on August 9, and decidedthat it was not necessary for the Legal Ad-visory Committee to make recommendationson topics on the provisional list until furtheradvised by the Working Committee.

At its sixth meeting on November 13, 1946,the Atomic Energy Commission decided by 10affirmative votes, with 2 abstentions, to sub-mit to the Security Council before December

31, 1946, a report on its work, its findings andrecommendations. Committee 2 was requestedto draft the report.

While this report was being prepared, thesecond part of the first session of the GeneralAssembly was considering various proposalsconcerning the regulation and reduction ofarmaments, including atomic weapons. At theAtomic Energy Commission's seventh meet-ing on December 5, the Chairman of theCommission stated that he had thought itadvisable to ask the First Committee to trynot to encroach on the work of the AtomicEnergy Commission, and not to prejudice thefuture course or outcome of that work. TheChairman's action was generally approved bythe members of the Commission.

At the same meeting the United States rep-resentative offered a resolution on the prin-ciples to be included in the findings andrecommendations of the report of the Com-mission to the Security Council. These propos-als, based, as were the first United Statesproposals, on the prospective establishment ofan International Atomic Development Author-ity, were discussed at the eighth and ninthmeetings of the Commission on December 17and 20 respectively.

Meanwhile, the General Assembly on De-cember 14, 1946, approved unanimously aresolution on the principles governing thegeneral regulation and reduction of arma-ments, which, among other things, urged theexpeditious fulfilment by the Atomic EnergyCommission of its terms of reference. It alsorecommended that the Security Councilexpedite consideration of the reports made toit by the Atomic Energy Commission, thatit facilitate the work of the Commission andthat the Security Council expedite considera-tion of a draft convention or conventions forthe creation of an international system ofcontrol and inspection, these conventions toinclude the prohibition of atomic and all othermajor weapons adaptable now and in thefuture to mass destruction and the control ofatomic energy to the extent necessary to en-sure its use only for peaceful purposes.

On December 20 the United States draftresolution was modified by a Canadian amend-ment, slightly revised at the suggestion ofthe Mexican representative. According to theCanadian amendment, the Commission resolv-ed that, for drafting purposes, the principles


on which the United States resolution wasbased should be incorporated by the WorkingCommittee in the report and should notnecessarily follow the exact text of the UnitedStates resolution, in order to conform thewording to the relevant parts of the text ofthe General Assembly resolution of December14 on the principles governing the generalregulation and reduction of armaments. Ac-cording to the amendment proposed by theMexican representative, it was stated in theresolution that these proposals had been madeby the United States representative. TheUnited States resolution, as amended, wasadopted by the Commission. Poland abstainedfrom voting and the representative of theU.S.S.R. did not participate. The WorkingCommittee was instructed to include theseproposals in the draft of the Commissionreport to be submitted to the Security Council.

A draft report was approved by Committee2 at a meeting on December 26 and by theWorking Committee on December 27. TheU.S.S.R. representative did not participatein the Working Committee's meeting ofDecember 27 because, as had been statedat the Commission's meeting of December20, he was unable to be a party to any decisionon the substance of the United States proposal.Furthermore, at the meeting of December 27,the Polish representative had accepted theportion of the draft report as agreed uponby the Working Committee, but had reiteratedthe view of the Polish delegation that it wasnot beneficial to proceed with any report be-fore complete agreement on principle had beenreached among the permanent members of theSecurity Council. On December 30 the Com-mission, with 10 votes in favor and absten-tions on the part of the U.S.S.R. and Poland,adopted the draft report of its Working Com-mittee as the report of the Commission andsubmitted it to the Security Council on De-cember 31, 1946.

The report described the work of the Com-mission, approved the report of the Scientificand Technical Committee on scientific andtechnical aspects of control and the report ofCommittee 2 on safeguards to ensure the useof atomic energy only for peaceful purposes,and made recommendations. In its generalfindings it stated that scientifically, technicallyand practically it was feasible: to extendamong all nations the exchange of basicscientific information on atomic energy for

peaceful ends; to control atomic energy tothe extent necessary to ensure its use onlyfor peaceful purposes; to accomplish the elim-ination from national armaments of atomicweapons; and to provide effective safeguardsby way of inspection and other means to pro-tect complying States against the hazards ofviolations and evasions. It was also statedthat an effective system for control of atomicenergy must be international and must beestablished by an enforceable multilateraltreaty or convention which in turn must beadministered and operated by an internationalorgan or agency within the United Nations.An international agreement to outlaw nationalproduction, possession or use of atomic weap-ons was considered as essential for an inter--national system of control or inspection butwould not be sufficient to ensure the use ofatomic energy for peaceful purposes or toprovide effective safeguards to protect com-plying States against the dangers of violationsand evasions.

On the basis of its findings, the Commissionrecommended the creation of a strong andcomprehensive international system of controland inspection by a treaty or convention inwhich all Members of the United Nationswould participate on fair and equitable terms.

This treaty, it was urged, should includeprovisions establishing an international au-thority possessing power and the responsi-bility necessary and appropriate for theprompt and effective discharge of its dutiesimposed upon it by the terms of the treatyor convention. The treaty should also providethat the rule of unanimity of the permanentmembers which governed all substantive de-cisions of the Security Council should haveno relation to the work of the Authority.

The Authority would promote among allnations the exchange of basic scientific infor-mation on atomic energy and should havepositive responsibilities as regards researchand development in order to promote thebeneficial uses of atomic energy and eliminatethe destructive ones. It would establish safe-guards against the dangerous use of atomicenergy but would not interfere with the pros-ecution of pure scientific research or the pub-lication of its results.

Decisions of the Authority should, however,govern the operations of national agencies foratomic energy with the minimum interference.


The treaty or convention would also providethe representatives of the Authority with un-impeded rights of ingress, egress and accessfor the performance of their inspections. Itwould prohibit the manufacture, possession,and use of atomic weapons by all nationswhich were parties to the treaty and wouldprovide for the disposal of any existing stocksof atomic weapons and for the proper use offissionable materials.

The treaty would also specify the methods ofdetermining violations of its terms and wouldestablish the measures of enforcement orswift and certain punishment for violators.Enforcement and punishment of violatorswould not be subject to veto.

Finally, the treaty should provide a schedulefor the completion of the transitional processleading step by step to the full and effectiveestablishment of international control of atom-ic energy.

On February 13, 1947, the Security Counciladopted a resolution on disarmament whichprovided, inter alia, that the Council consideras soon as possible the report submitted bythe Atomic Energy Commission and take suit-able decisions in order to facilitate the Com-mission's work.

At a meeting of the Security Council onFebruary 18 the representative of the U.S.S.R.proposed twelve specific amendments and addi-tions to the general findings and recommenda-tions contained in the first report of the AtomicEnergy Commission. The U.S.S.R. proposalsincluded a provision that inspection, super-vision and management by an internationalagency should apply to all existing atomicplants immediately after the entry into forceof an appropriate convention or conventions.Another proposal suggested that an effectivesystem of control of atomic energy must beinternational in scope and established by anenforceable multilateral convention adminis-tered within the framework of the SecurityCouncil. Further amendments would providefor the destruction of stocks of manufacturedand unfinished atomic weapons, and for elimi-nation of the recommendation in the Com-mission's report that in case of violationthere should be no legal right, by veto orotherwise, whereby a wilful violator of theterms of the treaty or convention should beprotected from the consequences of violationof its terms.

On March 10 the Security Council adoptedunanimously a resolution which, among otherthings, stated that the Council would transmitthe record of its consideration of the firstreport of the Atomic Energy Commission tothe Commission; urged the Commission to con-tinue its enquiry into all phases of the problemof the international control of atomic energy;and requested the Commission to submit a sec-ond report to the Security Council beforethe next session of the General Assembly.

In order to facilitate its work, the Commis-sion on March 19 resolved that its committeesshould consider the questions resulting fromthe Security Council resolution of March 10and should, in particular, consider the ques-tions relating to the establishment of inter-national control of atomic energy on which thenecessary agreement among its members hadnot yet been reached.

On March 31, 1947, the Working Committeeof the Atomic Energy Commission, by a voteof 10 in favor, with Poland and the U.S.S.R.abstaining, adopted the following resolutionregarding its future procedure and that ofCommittee 2 of the Commission:

The Working Committee resolves to con-sider at its meetings the points of disagree-ment outlined in the statements of therepresentative of the U.S.S.R. in the SecurityCouncil.

At the same time the Working Committeerequests Committee 2 to proceed on its partby means of formal or informal meetingsand conversations with the study of the vari-ous questions following from the resolutionsof the Atomic Energy Commission and theSecurity Council, in particular, questions out-lined in the last paragraph of Part I of thefirst report of the Atomic Energy Commis-sion and new questions not studied before, inorder to implement the requirements of theGeneral Assembly resolutions dated January24 and December 14, 1946.

The last paragraph of Part I of the AtomicEnergy Commission report, referred to in theresolution, as adopted on last December 31,1946, read as follows:

Many important questions, which have beenconsidered only in broad outline, during thecourse of its (the Commission's) deliberationsremain to be further studied by the Commis-sion. These questions include: the detailedpowers, characteristics, and functions of theInternational Control Agency for which theneed is expressed in the 'First Report onSafeguards Required to ensure the use ofatomic energy only for peaceful purposes,'


including such matters as organization, financ-ing, and staffing; the relationships betweenthe agency, the various organs of the UnitedNations, and the participating states; powersof the agency in matters of research, develop-ment, and planning; the provisions fortransition to the full operation of the inter-national system of control; and other specificmatters which should be included in the inter-national treaty or convention establishingcontrol over atomic energy.

On April 16, Committee 2 adopted thefollowing resolution on definition of terms :

Resolved: that a standing Sub-Committeebe established consisting of the representa-tives of the U.S.S.R., the United States,China, Colombia and Belgium, representingthe five official languages, to assist the com-mittee in the formulation of definitions.

Initially, the Sub-Committee will examinedefinitions which have been used in the firstreport of the Atomic Energy Commission,with a view to reaching agreement, and re-port thereon to the Committee.

Subsequently, the Sub-Committee will exam-ine and define such terms as are used, orlikely to be used, in negotiation, along withsuch other terms as may be specifically referredto it by the Committee.

Further, the Sub-Committee may co-opt anyrepresentative to serve on the Sub-Committee.

Committee 2 on June 4 received four work-ing papers which had been drafted by workinggroups composed mostly of scientific andtechnical experts of different delegations. Theexperts were members of the working groupsin their individual capacity and not as repre-sentatives of their respective Governments.Their findings, therefore, as laid down in thefour working papers, in no way prejudgeddecisions to be eventually taken by the AtomicEnergy Commission and did not in any waycommit their Governments.

The four working papers dealt with thefollowing subjects :

(1) Functions of the International Agencyin relation to research and development ac-tivities;

(2) Functions of the International Agencyin relation to location and mining of ores;

(3) Functions of the International Agencyin relation to processing and purification ofsource material;

(4) Functions of the International Agencyin relation to stockpiling, production anddistribution of nuclear fuels and the design,construction and operation of isotope separa-tion plants and of nuclear reactors.

The Committee, before considering theindividual working papers, agreed to enterinto a discussion on the general principlesunderlying the papers—ownership, operationand management of dangerous facilities byan international agency. The general discus-sion on the underlying principles of the fourworking papers, however, would be confinedto such principles as contained a deviationfrom or a modification of the first report ofthe Atomic Energy Commission to the Secur-ity Council.

On June 10, the Working Committee agreedon the principle of using the wording of theSecurity Council's resolution on the first re-port of the Atomic Energy Commission—"treaty or treaties, or convention or conven-tions"—by which the functions and the scopeof the international system of control ofatomic energy should be defined. The originalwording of the first report spoke in the rele-vant section of "a treaty or convention."

The representative of the United Statesentered a reservation, stating that in hisopinion the Atomic Energy Commission hadalready taken the decision that there shouldbe only one treaty or convention.

At the twelfth meeting of the full AtomicEnergy Commission on June 11 the repre-sentative of the U.S.S.R. submitted eightnew proposals for the control of atomic en-ergy. The Commission agreed to refer theU.S.S.R. proposals to the Working Committeefor further study.

Following is a list of the proposals :

1. For ensuring the use of atomic energyonly for peaceful purposes, in accordance withthe international convention on the prohibitionof atomic and other major weapons of massdestruction and also with the purpose ofpreventing violations of the convention onthe prohibition of atomic weapons and forthe protection of complying States againsthazards of violations and evasions, there shallbe established strict international controlsimultaneously over all facilities engaged inmining of atomic raw materials and in pro-duction of atomic materials and atomicenergy.

2. For carrying out measures of control ofatomic energy facilities, there shall be estab-lished, within the framework of the SecurityCouncil, an international commission foratomic energy control to be called the Inter-national Control Commission.

3. The International Control Commissionshall have its own inspectorial apparatus.

4. Terms and organizational principles ofinternational control of atomic energy, and


also composition, rights and obligations ofthe International Control Commission, as wellas provisions on the basis of which it shallcarry out its activities, shall be determinedby a special international convention on atomicenergy control, which is to be concluded inaccordance with the convention on the pro-hibition of atomic weapons.

5. With the purpose of ensuring the effec-tiveness of international control of atomic en-ergy, the convention on the control of atomicenergy shall be based on the following funda-mental provisions:

(a) The International Control Commissionshall be composed of the Representatives ofStates Members of the Atomic EnergyCommission established by the GeneralAssembly decision of 24 January 1946, andmay create such subsidiary organs whichit finds necessary for the fulfillment of itsfunctions.(b) The International Control Commissionshall establish its own rules of procedure.(c) The personnel of the InternationalControl Commission shall be selected on aninternational basis.(d) The International Control Commissionshall periodically carry out inspection offacilities for mining of atomic raw mate-rials and for the production of atomicmaterials and atomic energy.6. While carrying out inspection of atomic

energy facilities, the International ControlCommission shall undertake the followingactions :

(a) Investigates the activities of facilitiesfor mining atomic raw materials, for theproduction of atomic materials and atomicenergy as well as verifies their accounting.(b) Checks existing stocks of atomic rawmaterials, atomic materials, and unfinishedproducts.(c) Studies production operations to theextent necessary for the control of the useof atomic materials and atomic energy.(d) Observes the fulfillment of the rules oftechnical exploitation of the facilities pre-scribed by the convention on control as wellas works out and prescribes the rules oftechnological control of such facilities.(e) Collects and analyses data on the min-ing of atomic raw materials and on theproduction of atomic materials and atomicenergy.(f) Carries on special investigations incases when suspicion of violations of theconvention on the prohibition of atomicweapons arises.(g) Makes recommendations to Govern-ments on the questions relating to produc-tion, stockpiling and use of atomic materialsand atomic energy.(h) Makes recommendations to the Secu-rity Council on measures for prevention andsuppression in respect to violators of theconventions on the prohibition of atomic

weapons and on the control of atomicenergy.7. For the fulfillment of the tasks of control

and inspection entrusted to the InternationalControl Commission, the latter shall have theright of:

(a) Access to any facilities for mining,production, and stockpiling of atomic rawmaterials and atomic materials, as well asto the facilities for the exploitation ofatomic energy.(b) Acquaintance with the production op-erations of the atomic energy facilities, tothe extent necessary for the control of useof atomic materials and atomic energy.(c) The carrying out of weighing, meas-urements, and various analyses of atomicraw materials, atomic materials, and un-finished products.(d) Requesting from the Government ofany nation, and checking of, various dataand reports on the activities of atomicenergy facilities.(e) Requesting of various explanations onthe questions relating to the activities ofatomic energy facilities.(f) Making recommendations and presen-tations to Governments on the matters ofthe production and use of atomic energy.(g) Submitting recommendations for theconsideration of the Security Council onmeasures in regard to violators of the con-ventions on the prohibition of atomicweapons and on the control of atomicenergy.8. In accordance with the tasks of interna-

tional control of atomic energy, scientific re-search activities in the field of atomic energyshall be based on the following provisions:

(a) Scientific research activities in thefield of atomic energy must comply withthe necessity of carrying out the conventionon the prohibition of atomic weapons andwith the necessity of preventing its use formilitary purposes.(b) Signatory States to the convention onthe prohibition of atomic weapons musthave a right to carry on unrestricted scien-tific research activities in the field of atomicenergy, directed toward discovery of methodsof its use for peaceful purposes.(c) In the interests of an effective fulfillmentof its control and inspectorial functions,the International Control Commission musthave a possibility to carry out scientific re-search activities in the field of discoveryof methods of the use of atomic energy forpeaceful purposes. The carrying out of suchactivities will enable the Commission to keepitself informed on the latest achievementsin this field and to have its own skilled inter-national personnel, which is required by theCommission for practical carrying out ofthe measures of control and inspection.(d) In conducting scientific research in thefield of atomic energy, one of the most im-portant tasks of the International Control


Commission should be to ensure a wideexchange of information among nations inthis field and to render necessary assist-ance through advice, to the countries partiesto the convention, which may request suchassistance.(e) The International Control Commissionmust have at its disposal material facilitiesincluding research laboratories and experi-mental installations necessary for theproper organization of the research activi-ties to be conducted by it.The question of the rule of unanimity of

the five permanent members of the SecurityCouncil in relation to the operations of aninternational control agency for atomic ener-gy was discussed at the 21st meeting of theWorking Committee on June 19.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. declar-ed that the so-called veto should not apply tothe day-to-day activities and operations of acontrol commission. Such a commission could,he explained, only make recommendations tothe Security Council in respect to violationsof any convention that should be drawn up.Punishments for serious violations shouldalways be subject to decisions of the SecurityCouncil. He emphasized that the rule of unan-imity was a basic principle of the UnitedNations Charter and that he could neveragree to the violation of such a principle.

He went on to discuss the research func-tions of a control agency, questioning why,if it was the intention of such a body toprohibit the production of atomic weapons,that same body should carry on research fordestructive purposes. If all delegations feltthat all members of a convention should beenabled to carry on research for peaceful

purposes, then, he added, there was not toogreat a divergence between the views of oth-ers and those of the U.S.S.R. on the subject.

The representative of the United Statesproposed that both questions raised by therepresentative of the U.S.S.R. should be takenup by Committee 2 of the Atomic EnergyCommission. He declared that he thoughtmost delegations had intended that the con-trol commission should deal only with atomicenergy research for destructive purposes,while there should be no limit on research forpeaceful uses.

The representative of Prance stated thatthere were two questions with regard to theveto: whether the veto should apply to anatomic energy agency, and whether the Secur-ity Council should be empowered to exerciseits veto over day-to-day operations of thatorgan of control. He expressed the view thatone government, by applying the veto in theSecurity Council, should not be able to para-lyze the operations of an inspection agency.

The representative of Australia argued thatany control agency should be autonomous andnot in any way subject to the veto. Further-more, he continued, the Charter of the UnitedNations provided for the sovereign equalityof all nations, while the rule of unanimitywas not a principle of the United Nations butapplied only to one organ, the SecurityCouncil.

Further discussion of the control of atomicenergy was to be continued in subsequentmeetings of the full Commission and its var-ious committees.

G. COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

Article 26 of the United Nations Charterstates that in order to promote the establish-ment and maintenance of international peaceand security with the least diversion for arm-aments of the world's human and economicresources, the Security Council shall be re-sponsible, with the assistance of the MilitaryStaff Committee referred to in Article 47,for formulating plans to be submitted to theMembers of the United Nations for the estab-lishment of a system for the regulation ofarmaments.

Although the Security Council has beenvested with the primary responsibility for the

maintenance of international peace and secur-ity, Article 11 of the Charter permits theGeneral Assembly to consider the generalprinciples of co-operation in the maintenanceof international peace and security, includingthe principles governing disarmament and theregulation of armaments. The General As-sembly may make recommendations withregard to such principles to the Members orto the Security Council or to both.

In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charterand with a view to strengthening internation-al peace and security in conformity with thePurposes and Principles of the United


Nations, the General Assembly on December14, 1946, on the initiative of the U.S.S.R.delegation, adopted a resolution on the prin-ciples governing the general regulation andreduction of armaments. This resolution,among other things, recommended that "theSecurity Council give prompt consideration toformulating the practical measures, accordingto their priority, which are essential to pro-vide for the general regulation and reductionof armaments and armed forces and to assurethat such regulation and reduction of arma-ments and armed forces will be generally ob-served by all participants and not unilaterallyby only some of the participants."

In order to work out the practical measuresfor giving effect to the General Assembly'sresolution and also to implement Article 26of the Charter, the Security Council at its105th meeting held on February 13, 1947,established a Commission for ConventionalArmaments. The Commission, consisting ofrepresentatives of the members of the SecurityCouncil, was instructed to submit to theCouncil, within the space of not more thanthree months, proposals for :

(a) the general regulation and reductionof armaments and armed forces; and

(b) practical and effective safeguards inconnection with the general regulation and re-duction of armaments which the Commissionmight be in a position to formulate in order toensure the implementation of the abovemen-tioned resolution of the General Assembly ofDecember 14, 1946, insofar as this resolu-tion related to armaments within the newCommission's jurisdiction.

The Security Council directed that thosematters which fell within the competence ofthe Atomic Energy Commission as determinedby the General Assembly resolutions of Jan-uary 24 and December 14, 1946, should be ex-cluded from the jurisdiction of the Commis-sion for Conventional Armaments. It also di-rected the new Commission to make suchproposals as it might deem advisable concern-ing the studies which the Military Staff Com-mittee and possibly other organs of the UnitedNations might be asked to undertake.

The Commission for Conventional Arma-ments held its first meeting at Lake Successon March 24, 1947.

At its second meeting, held on March 28,the Commission set up a Sub-Committee, con-

sisting of the representatives of Poland, Bel-gium and France, to examine the Rules of Pro-cedure of the Atomic Energy Commission andmake any necessary modifications with a viewto using them as rules of procedure for theCommission. At the fifth meeting of the Com-mission on April 9, the report of the Sub-Committee was approved. The report stated,inter alia, that the text of the rules of pro-cedure proposed for the Commisison for Con-ventional Armaments was the same as that forthe Atomic Energy Commission. The onlymodifications made concerned the title of theCommission and (in Rules 4 and 50) the ref-erence to the resolution creating the Com-mission.

The Commission at its fifth meeting alsoapproved a Colombian resolution for the crea-tion of a Sub-Committee to prepare a draftof the plan of work which the Commissionwould submit for the approval of the Council.The Sub-Committee was to be composed ofthe representatives of the five permanentmembers of the Security Council.

The Sub-Committee held its first meetingon April 21. It decided that the Secretariatshould prepare a draft plan of work for theCommission on Conventional Armaments andalso a tabulation of different proposals madeby various representatives of the Commis-sion in connection with the plan.

At its fifth meeting, on June 6, 1947, theSub-Committee submitted two draft plans ofwork, together with the suggestions of theSecretariat for the approval of the Commis-sion. The first plan had been presented bythe United States delegation and amendedduring the course of the meetings. The secondplan had been presented by the delegation ofthe U.S.S.R. A proposal concerning the or-ganization of the work of the Commission wasalso submitted.

During the sixth meeting of the Commis-sion, on June 11, 1947, the Belgian represent-ative proposed a resolution to the Commis-sion to submit the draft plan of work of theUnited States for the approval of the Secur-ity Council.

At the seventh meeting, on June 13, theFrench representative submitted one amend-ment, and the Polish representative severalamendments, to the United States draft planof work. At the eighth meeting, on June 18,the Commission rejected the French andPolish amendments. It adopted the Belgian


motion and rejected the draft plan of worksubmitted by the delegation of the U.S.S.R.

The plan of work adopted by the Commis-sion was submitted for the approval of theSecurity Council and the proposal for organi-zation of the work of the Commission wassubmitted for purposes of information.

PLAN OF WORK ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSIONFOB CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

The text of the plan of work was as follows :1. Consider and make recommendations to

the Security Council concerning armamentsand armed forces which fall within the juris-diction of the Commission for ConventionalArmaments.

2. Consideration and determination of gen-eral principles in connection with the regula-tion and reduction of armaments and armedforces.

3. Consideration of practical and effectivesafeguards by means of an international sys-tem of control operating through special or-gans (and by other means) to protect comply-ing States against the hazards of violationsand evasions.

4. Formulate practical proposals for theregulation and reduction of armaments andarmed forces.

5. Extension of the principles and proposalsset forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above toStates which are not Members of the UnitedNations.

6. Submission of a report or reports to theSecurity Council including, if possible, aDraft Convention.

It is proposed that under the six headingslisted above all of the references by the vari-ous Delegations suggested for the Plan ofWork will be considered.

It is also understood that this Plan of Workdoes not limit the freedom of individual Dele-gations to make additional suggestions at alater time.PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF

THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONALARMAMENTS

At its ninth meeting 25 June 1947 the Com-mission for Conventional Armaments agreedto the following proposal concerning the or-ganization of its future work:

Establishment of a working committee ofthe whole to formulate proposals for thegeneral regulation and reduction of arma-ments and armed forces and to co-ordin-ate the work of the sub-committees to beestablished to deal with various aspects ofthe work including the political aspect ofsecurity. These sub-committees shall reportto the working committee, which shall sub-mit its proposals to the Commission forconsideration.

A N N E X IREPRESENTATIVES ON THE

SECURITY COUNCIL(as of June 30, 1947)

AustraliaRepresentative H. V. Evatt (absent)Acting Representative

Lt.-Colonel W. R. HodgsonBelgium

Representative Fernand van LangenhoveAlternate Joseph Nisot

BrazilRepresentative Oswaldo Aranha (absent)Acting Representative João Carlos Muniz

Alternate Henrique de Souza GómezChina

Representative Quo Tai-chiAlternate C. L. Hsia

ColombiaRepresentative Dr. Alfonso López

AlternateDr. Alberto Gonzalez Fernández

FranceReprésentative Alexandre Parodi

Alternate Guy de la TournellePoland

Representative Dr. Oscar LangeSyria

Representative Faris el-KhouriAlternate Dr. Costi K. Zurayk.Alternate Rafik Asha

Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsReprésentative Andrei A. Gromyko

United KingdomRepresentative Sir Alexander Cadogan

Alternate Sir Charles DarwinUnited States of America

Representative Warren R. AustinAlternate Herschel V. Johnson

A N N E X IIREPRESENTATIVES ON THE

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE(as of June 30, 1947)

ChinaAir Representative

Lt.-General Pong-Tsu MowArmy Representative

General of the Army Ying-Chin HoNaval Representative (Temp.)

Captain Ying-Tsung ChowFrance

Army Representative (Head of Delegation)Lt.-General P. Billotte

Naval Representative (Temp.)Commander V. Marchai

Air RepresentativeBrig.-General P. Fay


Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsAir Representative

Lt.-General A. R. SharapovArmy Representative

Lt.-General A. P. VasillevNaval Representative

Vice-Admiral V. L. BogdenkoUnited Kingdom

Naval RepresentativeAdmiral Sir Henry Moore

Army RepresentativeLt.-General Sir Edwin L. Morris

Air RepresentativeAir Chief Marshal Sir Guy Garrod

United States of AmericaArmy Representative

Lt.-General M. B. RidgwayNaval Representative

Admiral H. K. HewittAir Representative

General J. T. McNarney

A N N E X I I IREPRESENTATIVES ON THE

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION(as of June 30, 1947)

AustraliaRepresentative H. V. Evatt (absent)Acting Representative

Lt.-Colonel W. R. HodgsonBelgium

Representative Fernand van LangenhoveAlternate Joseph Nisot

BrazilRepresentative Captain Alvaro Alberto

Alternate Lt.-Colonel Orlando RangelCanada

RepresentativeGeneral A. G. L. McNaughton

ChinaRepresentative Quo Tai-chi

Alternate C. L. HsiaColombia

Representative Dr. Alfonso LópezAlternate

Dr. Alberto Gonzalez FernándezAlternate Dr. Emilio Toro

FranceRepresentative Alexandre Parodi

Alternate Professor Frederic Joliot-CurieAlternate Professor Pierre Auger

PolandRepresentative Dr. Oscar Lange

Alternate Dr. Ignacy ZlotowskiSyria

Representative Faris el-KhouriAlternate Dr. Costi K. ZuraykAlternate Rafik Asha

Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsRepresentative Andrei A. Gromyko


Alternate Sir Charles Darwin

United States of AmericaRepresentative Warren R. Austin

Alternate Frederick H. Osborn

A N N E X I VREPRESENTATIVES ON THE

COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS(as of June 30, 1947)

AustraliaRepresentative Lt.-Colonel W. R. Hodgson

BelgiumRepresentative Fernand van Langenhove

Alternate Joseph NisotBrazil

Representative Oswaldo Aranha (absent)Alternate João Carlos Muniz

ChinaRepresentative Quo Tai-chi

ColombiaRepresentative Dr. Alfonso López

AlternateDr. Alberto Gonzalez Fernández

FranceRepresentative Alexandre Parodi

PolandRepresentative Dr. Oscar Lange

SyriaRepresentative Faris el-Khoury

Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsRepresentative Andrei A. Gromyko


United States of AmericaRepresentative Warren R. Austin

Alternate Ralph A. Bard

A N N E X VREPRESENTATIVES ON THECOMMITTEE OF EXPERTS(as of June 30, 1947)

AustraliaRepresentative A. H. Body

BelgiumRepresentative Joseph Nisot

BrazilRepresentative H. de Souza-Gomes

ChinaRepresentative Shuhsi Hsü

ColombiaRepresentative E. de Holte-Castello

FranceRepresentative Pierre Ordonneau

PolandRepresentative Dr. A. Rudzinski

SyriaRepresentative R. Asha

U.S.S.R.Representative A. N. Krasilnikov

United KingdomRepresentative V. G. Lawford

United StatesRepresentative C. P. Noyes


ANNEX VIPROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE

OF THE SECURITY COUNCILAdopted by the Security Council at its First

Meeting and Amended at its Forty-eighthMeeting, 24 June 1946.

CHAPTER I: MeetingsRule 1

Meetings of the Security Council shall, withthe exception of the periodic meetings re-ferred to in Rule 4, be held at the call ofthe President at any time he deems necessary,but the interval between meetings shall notexceed fourteen days.

Rule 2The President shall call a meeting of the

Security Council at the request of any memberof the Security Council.

Rule 8The President shall call a meeting of the

Security Council if a dispute or situation isbrought to the attention of the Security Coun-cil under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3)of the Charter, or if the General Assemblymakes recommendations or refers any ques-tion to the Security Council under Article 11(2), or if the Secretary-General brings to theattention of the Security Council any matterunder Article 99.

Rule 4Periodic meetings of the Security Council

called for in Article 28 (2) of the Chartershall be held twice a year, at such times asthe Security Council may decide.

Rule 5Meetings of the Security Council shall nor-

mally be held at the seat of the United Na-tions.

Any member of the Security Council orthe Secretary-General may propose that theSecurity Council should meet at another place.Should the Security Council accept any suchproposal, it shall decide upon the place, andthe period during which the Council shallmeet at such place.

CHAPTER II : AgendaRule 6

The Secretary-General shall immediatelybring to the attention of all representatives onthe Security Council all communications fromStates, organs of the United Nations, or theSecretary-General concerning any matter forthe consideration of the Security Council inaccordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7The Provisional Agenda for each meeting

of the Security Council shall be drawn up bythe Secretary-General and approved by thePresident of the Security Council.

Only items which have been brought to theattention of the representatives on the Secur-ity Council in accordance with Rule 6, itemscovered by Rule 10, or matters which theSecurity Council has previously decided todefer, may be included in the ProvisionalAgenda.

Rule 8The Provisional Agenda for a meeting shall

be communicated by the Secretary-General tothe representatives on the Security Councilat least three days before the meeting, but inurgent circumstances it may be communicatedsimultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9The first item of the Provisional Agenda for

each meeting of the Security Council shall bethe adoption of the Agenda.

Rule 10Any item of the Agenda of a meeting of

the Security Council, consideration of whichhas not been completed at that meeting, shall,unless the Security Council otherwise decides,automatically be included in the Agenda ofthe next meeting.

Rule 11The Secretary-General shall communicate

each week to the representatives on the Secur-ity Council a summary statement of mattersof which the Security Council is seized andof the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12The Provisional Agenda for each periodic

meeting shall be circulated to the membersof the Security Council at least twenty-onedays before the opening of the meeting. Anysubsequent change in or addition to the Pro-visional Agenda shall be brought to the noticeof the members at least five days before themeeting. The Security Council may, however,in urgent circumstances, make additions tothe Agenda at any time during a periodicmeeting.

The provisions of Rule 7, paragraph 1, andof Rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

CHAPTER in: Representation and CredentialsRule 13

Each member of the Security Council shallbe represented at the meetings of the SecurityCouncil by an accredited representative. Thecredentials of a representative on the SecurityCouncil shall be communicated to the Secre-tary-General not less than twenty-four hoursbefore he takes his seat on the Security Coun-cil. The Head of Government or Minister ofForeign Affairs of each member of the Secur-ity Council shall be entitled to sit on the Se-curity Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14Any Member of the United Nations not a

member of the Security Council and any Statenot a Member of the United Nations, if in-


vited to participate in a meeting or meetingsof the Security Council, shall submit creden-tials for the representative appointed by itfor this purpose. The credentials of such arepresentative shall be communicated to theSecretary-General not less than twenty-fourhours before the first meeting which he isinvited to attend.

Rule 15The credentials of representatives on the

Security Council and of any representativeappointed in accordance with Rule 14 shallbe examined by the Secretary-General whoshall submit a report to the Security Councilfor approval.

Rule 16Pending the approval of the credentials of

a representative on the Security Council inaccordance with Rule 15, such representativeshall be seated provisionally with the samerights as other representatives.

Rule 17Any representative on the Security Council,

to whose credentials objection has been madewithin the Security Council, shall continue tosit with the same rights as other represen-tatives until the Security Council has decidedthe matter.

CHAPTER IV : Presidency

Rule 18The Presidency of the Security Council

shall be held in turn by the members of theSecurity Council in the English alphabeticalorder of their names. Each President shallhold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19The President shall preside over the meet-

ings of the Security Council and, under theauthority of the Security Council, shall repre-sent it in its capacity as an organ of theUnited Nations.

Rule 20Whenever the President of the Security

Council deems that, for the proper fulfillmentof the responsibilities of the Presidency, heshould not preside over the Council duringthe consideration of a particular question withwhich the member he represents is directlyconnected, he shall indicate his decision tothe Council. The presidential chair shall thendevolve, for the purpose of the considerationof that question, on the representative of themember next in English alphabetical order, itbeing understood that the provisions of thisRule shall apply to the representatives on theSecurity Council called upon successively topreside. This Rule shall not affect the repre-sentative capacity of the President as statedin Rule 19 or his duties under Rule 7.

CHAPTER V: SecretariatRule 21

The Secretary-General shall act in that ca-pacity in all meetings of the Security Council.The Secretary-General may authorize a deputyto act in his place at meetings of the SecurityCouncil.

Rule 22The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting

on his behalf, may make either oral or writtenstatements to the Security Council concerningany question under consideration by it.

Rule 23The Secretary-General may be appointed by

the Security Council, in accordance with Rule28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24The Secretary-General shall provide the

staff required by the Security Council. Thisstaff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25The Secretary-General shall give to repre-

sentatives on the Security Council notice ofmeetings of the Security Council and of itscommissions and committees.

Rule 26The Secretary-General shall be responsible

for the preparation of documents required bythe Security Council and shall, except in ur-gent circumstances, distribute them at leastforty-eight hours in advance of the meetingat which they are to be considered.

CHAPTER VI : Conduct of BusinessRule 27

The President shall call upon representa-tives in the order in which they signify theirdesire to speak.

Rule 28The Security Council may appoint a com-

mission or committee or a rapporteur for aspecified question.

Rule 29The President may accord precedence to

any rapporteur appointed by the SecurityCouncil.

The Chairman of a commission or commit-tee, or the rapporteur appointed by the com-mission or committee to present its report,may be accorded precedence for the purposeof explaining the report.

Rule 30If a representative raises a point of order,

the President shall immediately state hisruling. If it is challenged, the President shallsubmit his ruling to the Security Council forimmediate decision and it shall stand unlessoverruled.


Rule 31Proposed resolutions, amendments and sub-

stantive motions shall normally be placed be-fore the representatives in writing.

Rule 32Principal motions and draft resolutions

shall have precedence in the order of theirsubmission.

Parts of a motion or of a draft resolutionshall be voted on separately at the requestof any representative, unless the originalmover objects.

Rule 33The following motions shall have precedence

in the order named over all principal motionsand draft resolutions relative to the subjectbefore the meeting:

1. to suspend the meeting;2. to adjourn the meeting;3. to adjourn the meeting to a certain dayor hour;4. to refer any matter to a committee, tothe Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;5. to postpone discussion of the question toa certain day or indefinitely; or6. to introduce an amendment.Any motion for the suspension or for the

simple adjournment of the meeting shall bedecided without debate.

Rule 34It shall not be necessary for any motion or

draft resolution proposed by a representativeon the Security Council to be seconded be-fore being put to a vote.

Rule 35A motion or draft resolution can at any

time be withdrawn, so long as no vote hasbeen taken with respect to it.

If the motion or draft resolution has beenseconded, the representative on the SecurityCouncil who has seconded it may require thatit be put to the vote as his motion or draftresolution with the same right of precedenceas if the original mover had not withdrawn it.

Rule 36If two or more amendments to a motion or

draft resolution are proposed, the Presidentshall rule on the order in which they are tobe voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Coun-cil shall first vote on the amendment furthestremoved in substance from the original pro-posal and then on the amendment next fur-thest removed until all amendments havebeen put to the vote, but when an amendmentadds to or deletes from the text of a motionor draft resolution, that amendment shall bevoted on first.

Rule 37Any member of the United Nations which is

not a member of the Security Council maybe invited, as the result of a decision of theSecurity Council, to participate, without vote,

in the discussion of any question brought be-fore the Security Council when the SecurityCouncil considers that the interests of thatMember are specially affected, or when aMember brings a matter to the attention ofthe Security Council in accordance withArticle 35 (1) of the Charter.

Rule 38Any member of the United Nations invited

in accordance with the preceding Rule or inapplication of Article 32 of the Charter toparticipate in the discussions of the SecurityCouncil may submit proposals and draft reso-lutions. These proposals and draft resolutionsmay be put to a vote only at the request ofa representative on the Security Council.

Rule 39The Security Council may invite members

of the Secretariat or other persons, whom itconsiders competent for the purpose, to supplyit with information or to give other assistancein examining matters within its competence.

CHAPTER VII: VotingRule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be inaccordance with the relevant Articles of theCharter and of the Statute of the Internation-al Court of Justice.

CHAPTER VIII : LanguagesRule 41

Chinese, English, French, Russian andSpanish shall be the official languages of theSecurity Council, and English and French theworking languages.

Rule 42Speeches made in either of the working

languages shall be interpreted into the otherworking language.

Rule 43Speeches made in any of the three other

official languages shall be interpreted intoboth working languages.

Rule 44Any representative may make a speech in a

language other than the official languages.In this case he shall himself provide forinterpretation into one of the working lan-guages. Interpretation into the other workinglanguage by an interpreter of the Secretariatmay be based on the interpretation given inthe first working language.

Rule 45Verbatim records of meetings of the Secur-

ity Council shall be drawn up in the workinglanguages. At the request of any representa-tive a verbatim record of any speech made inan official language other than the workinglanguages shall be drawn up in the originallanguage.


Rule 46All resolutions and other important docu-

ments shall forthwith be made available in theofficial languages. Upon the request of anyrepresentative any other document shall bemade available in any or all of the officiallanguages.

Rule 47Documents of the Security Council shall, if

the Security Council so decides, be publishedin any language other than the official lan-guages.

CHAPTER IX: Publicity of Meetings, Records.Rule 48

Unless it decides otherwise, the SecurityCouncil shall meet in public. Any recommenda-tion to the General Assembly regarding theappointment of the Secretary-General shallbe discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 49Subject to the provisions of Rule 51, the

verbatim record of each meeting of the Secur-ity Council shall be made available in theworking languages to the representatives onthe Security Council and to the representa-tives of any other States which have partici-pated in the meeting not later than 10 A.M.of the first working day following the meet-ing. The verbatim record of any speech madein any other of the official languages, whichis drawn up in accordance with the provisionsof Rule 45, shall be made available in thesame manner to any of the above mentionedrepresentatives at his request.

Rule 50The representatives of the States which

have participated in the meeting shall, withintwo working days after the time indicated inRule 49, inform the Secretary-General of anycorrections they wish to have made in theverbatim record.

Rule 51The Security Council may decide that for

a private meeting the record shall be madein a single copy alone. This record shall bekept by the Secretary-General. The represent-atives of the States which have participatedin the meeting shall, within a period of tendays, inform the Secretary-General of anycorrections they wish to have made in thisrecord.

Rule 52Corrections that have been requested shall

be considered approved unless the Presidentis of the opinion that they are sufficientlyimportant to be submitted to the representa-tive on the Security Council. In the lattercase, the representatives on the Security Coun-cil shall submit within two working days anycomments they may wish to make. In theabsence of objections in this period of time,the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 58The verbatim record referred to in Rule 49

or the record referred to in Rule 51, in whichno corrections have been requested in theperiod of time required by Rules 50 and 51respectively or which has been corrected inaccordance with the provisions of Rule 52,shall be considered as approved. It shall besigned by the President and shall become theofficial record of the Security Council.

Rule 54The official record of public meetings of the

Security Council, as well as the documentsannexed thereto, shall be published in theofficial languages as soon as possible.

Rule 55At the close of each private meeting the

Security Council shall issue a communiquethrough the Secretary-General.

Rule 56The representatives of the Members of the

United Nations which have taken part in aprivate meeting shall at all times have theright to consult the record of that meetingin the office of the Secretary-General. TheSecurity Council may at any time grant accessto this record to authorized representativesof other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 57The Secretary-General shall, once each year,

submit to the Security Council a list of therecords and documents which up to that timehave been considered confidential. The Secur-ity Council shall decide which of these shallbe made available to other Members of theUnited Nations, which shall be made public,and which shall continue to remain confiden-tial.

CHAPTER X: Admission of New Members.Rule 58

Any State which desires to become a Mem-ber of the United Nations shall submit anapplication to the Secretary-General. Thisapplication shall be accompanied by a declara-tion of its readiness to accept the obligationscontained in the Charter.

Rule 59The Secretary-General shall immediately

place the application for membership beforethe representatives on the Security Council.Unless the Security Council decides otherwise,the application shall be referred by the Presi-dent to a committee of the Security Councilupon which each member of the SecurityCouncil shall be represented. The committeeshall examine any application referred to itand report its conclusions thereon to the Coun-cil not less than thirty-five days in advanceof a regular session of the General Assemblyor if a special session of the General Assemblyis called, not less than fourteen days in ad-vance of such session.


Rule 60The Security Council shall decide whether

in its judgment the applicant is a peace-lovingState and is able and willing to carry out theobligations contained in the Charter, andaccordingly whether to recommend the appli-cant State for membership.

In order to assure the consideration of itsrecommendation at the next session of theGeneral Assembly following the receipt ofthe application, the Security Council shallmake its recommendations not less thantwenty-five days in advance of a regularsession of the General Assembly, nor lessthan four days in advance of a special session.

In special circumstances, the Security Coun-cil may decide to make a recommendation tothe General Assembly concerning an applica-tion for membership subsequent to the ex-piration of the time limits set forth in thepreceding paragraph.

ANNEXPROVISIONAL PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITHCOMMUNICATIONS PROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODIESA. A list of all communications from pri-

vate individuals and non-governmental bodiesrelating to matters of which the SecurityCouncil is seized shall be circulated to allrepresentatives on the Security Council.

B. A copy of any communication on thelist shall be given by the Secretariat to anyrepresentative on the Security Council at hisrequest.

CHAPTER XI : Relations with Other UnitedNations Organs

Rule 61Any meeting of the Security Council held

in pursuance of the Statute of the Inter-national Court of Justice for the purpose ofthe election of members of the Court shallcontinue until as many candidates as arerequired for all the seats to be filled haveobtained in one or more ballots an absolutemajority of votes.

ANNEX VIIProvisional Rules of Procedure for the

Atomic Energy CommissionAdopted by the Atomic Energy Commission

on 3 July 1946 andApproved by the Security Council on

10 July 1946

CHAPTER I: MeetingsRule 1

Meetings of the Atomic Energy Commis-sion shall be held at the call of the Chairmanat any time he deems necessary.

Rule 2The Chairman shall call a meeting of the

Atomic Energy Commission at the requestof any Member of the Atomic Energy Com-mission.

Rule 3Meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission

shall as a rule be held at the seat of theUnited Nations.

CHAPTER II : AgendaRule 4

The Secretary-General shall immediatelybring to the attention of all representatives onthe Atomic Energy Commission all directionsand other communications from the SecurityCouncil, all communications from States, otherorgans of the United Nations, or the Secre-tary-General himself, falling within theframework of the terms of reference of theAtomic Energy Commission as contained inthe Resolution of the General Assembly of24 January 1946.


of the Atomic Energy Commission shall bedrawn up by the Secretary-General and ap-proved by the Chairman of the Atomic EnergyCommission.

Rule 6The Provisional. Agenda for a meeting shall

be communicated by the Secretary-Generalto the representatives on the Atomic EnergyCommission at least three days before themeeting, but in urgent circumstances it maybe communicated simultaneously with thenotice of the meeting.

Rule 7The first item of the Provisional Agenda

for each meeting of the Atomic Energy Com-mission shall be the adoption of the Agenda.


the Atomic Energy Commission, considerationof which has not been completed at thatmeeting, shall, unless the Atomic EnergyCommission otherwise decides, automaticallybe included in the Agenda of the next meeting.

CHAPTER III: Representation andCredentials

Rule 9Each Member of the Atomic Energy Com-

mission shall be represented at the meetingsof the Atomic Energy Commission by anaccredited representative. The credentials ofa representative on the Atomic Energy Com-mission shall be communicated to the Secre-tary-General not less than twenty-four hoursbefore he takes his seat on the Atomic EnergyCommission.


Member of the Atomic Energy Commissionand any State not a Member of the UnitedNations, if invited to participate in a meetingor meetings of the Atomic Energy Commis-sion, shall submit credentials for the repre-


sentative appointed by it for this purpose.The credentials of such a representative shallbe communicated to the Secretary-Generalnot less than twenty-four hours before thefirst meeting which he is invited to attend.


Atomic Energy Commission and of any rep-resentatives appointed in accordance withRule 10 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to theAtomic Energy Commission for approval.

Rule 12Pending the approval of the credentials

of a representative of a State Member onthe Atomic Energy Commission in accordancewith Rule 11, such representative shall beseated provisionally with the same rights asother representatives of States Members onthe Atomic Energy Commission.

Rule 18Any representative of a State Member on

the Atomic Energy Commission, to whosecredentials objection has been made withinthe Atomic Energy Commission, shall con-tinue to sit with the same rights as otherrepresentatives until the Atomic Energy Com-mission has decided the matter.

CHAPTER IV : ChairmanRule 14

The Chairmanship of the Atomic EnergyCommission shall be held in turn by theStates represented on the Atomic EnergyCommission in the English alphabetical orderof their names. Each Chairman shall holdoffice for one calendar month.

Rule 15The Chairman shall preside over the meet-

ings of the Atomic Energy Commission and,under the authority of the Atomic EnergyCommission, shall represent it in its capacityas an organ of the United Nations.


The Secretary-General shall act in thatcapacity in all meetings of the Atomic EnergyCommission. The Secretary-General mayauthorize a deputy to act in his place atmeetings of the Atomic Energy Commission.


staff required by the Atomic Energy Commis-sion. This staff shall form a part of theSecretariat.


sentatives on the Atomic Energy Commissionnotice of meetings of the Atomic EnergyCommission and of its committees and sub-committees.


for the preparation of documents required bythe Atomic Energy Commission and shall,except in urgent circumstances, distributethem at least forty-eight hours in advanceof the meeting at which they are to beconsidered.

Rule 20The Secretary-General or his Deputy acting

on his behalf may make either oral or writtenstatements to the Atomic Energy Commissionconcerning any question under considerationby it.

CHAPTER VI: Conduct of BusinessRule 21

The Chairman shall call upon representa-tives in the order in which they signify theirdesire to speak.

Rule 22The Atomic Energy Commission may ap-

point such committees or sub-committees asit deems necessary and refer to them anyquestion falling within the framework of theterms of reference of the Atomic EnergyCommission for study and report.

Committees and sub-committees may beauthorized to sit when the Atomic EnergyCommission is not in session.


the Chairman shall immediately state hisruling. If it is challenged, the Chairman shallsubmit his ruling to the Atomic Energy Com-mission for immediate decision and it shallstand unless over-ruled.


stantive motions shall as a rule be placedbefore the representatives in writing.



Parts of a motion or of a draft resolutionshall be voted on separately at the request ofany representative, unless the original moverobjects.


draft resolution proposed by a representativeof a State Member on the Atomic EnergyCommission to be seconded by the representa-tive of another State Member before beingput to a vote.

Rule 27If two or more amendments to a motion

or draft resolution are proposed, the Chairmanshall rule on the order in which they are tobe voted upon. As a rule, the Atomic EnergyCommission shall first vote on the amendment


furthest removed in substance from theoriginal proposal and then on the amendmentnext furthest removed until all amendmentshave been put to the vote but when an amend-ment adds to or deletes from the text of amotion or draft resolution, that amendmentshall be voted on first.

Rule 28Any Member of the United Nations which

is not a Member of the Atomic Energy Com-mission or any State not a Member of theUnited Nations may be invited, as the resultof a decision of the Atomic Energy Commis-sion, to participate, without vote, in thediscussion of any question brought before theAtomic Energy Commission when the AtomicEnergy Commission considers that the in-terests of that State are specially affected.The Atomic Energy Commission may alsoinvite representatives of other States forinformation purposes.

The representative of a State not a Memberof the Atomic Energy Commission may par-ticipate in the meetings of the Atomic EnergyCommission as soon as his credentials havebeen approved by the Atomic Energy Com-mission.

Rule 29Any State invited in accordance with the

preceding Rule to participate in the discus-sions of the Atomic Energy Commission maysubmit proposals and draft resolutions. Theseproposals and draft resolutions may be putto a vote only at the request of a representa-tive of a State Member on the Atomic EnergyCommission.

Rule 30The Atomic Energy Commission may invite

members of the Secretariat or other persons,whom it considers competent for the purpose,to supply it with information or to give otherassistance in examining matters within itscompetence.

CHAPTER VII: Quorum and VotingRule 31

Each Member of the Atomic Energy Com-mission shall have one vote.

Rule 32At any meeting, a majority of the Members

of the Atomic Energy Commission shall con-stitute a quorum.

Rule S3All decisions of the Atomic Energy Com-

mission shall be made by a majority of theMembers of the Atomic Energy Commission.

CHAPTER VIII: LanguagesRule 34

Chinese, English, French, Russian andSpanish shall be the official languages of theAtomic Energy Commission, and English andFrench the working languages.





Rule 37Any representative may make a speech in

a language other than the official languages.In this case he shall himself provide forinterpretation into one of the workinglanguages. Interpretation into the other work-ing language by an interpreter of theSecretariat may be based on the interpreta-tion given in the first working language.

Rule 88Verbatim records of meetings of the Atomic

Energy Commission shall be drawn up in theworking languages. At the request of anyrepresentative, a verbatim record of anyspeech made in an official language otherthan the working language shall be drawnup in the original language.

Rule 39All decisions and other important docu-

ments shall forthwith be made available inthe official languages. Upon the request ofany representative, any other document shallbe made available in any or all of the officiallanguages.

Rule 40Documents of the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion shall, if the Atomic Energy Commissionso decides, be published in any language otherthan the official languages.

CHAPTER IX: Publicity of Meetings—RecordsRule 41

Unless it decides otherwise, the AtomicEnergy Commission shall meet in public.


verbatim record of each meeting of the AtomicEnergy Commission shall be made availablein the working languages to the representa-tives on the Atomic Energy Commission andto the representatives of any other Stateswhich have participated in the meeting notlater than 10 a.m. of the first working dayfollowing the meeting. The verbatim recordof any speech made in any other of the officiallanguages, which is drawn up in accordancewith the provisions of Rule 38 shall be madeavailable in the same manner to any of theabove mentioned representatives at hisrequest.

The Atomic Energy Commission shall de-termine the extent of circulation of therecords of its private meetings.



have participated in the meeting shall, withintwo working days after the time indicatedin Rule 42, inform the Secretary-General ofany corrections they wish to have made inthe verbatim record.

Rule 44The Atomic Energy Commission may de-

cide that for a private meeting the recordshall be made in a single copy alone. Thisrecord shall be kept by the Secretary-General.The representatives of the States which haveparticipated in the meeting shall, within aperiod of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to havemade in this record.


be considered approved unless the Chairmanis of the opinion that they are sufficientlyimportant to be submitted to the representa-tives on the Atomic Energy Commission. Inthe latter case, the representatives on theAtomic Energy Commission shall submitwithin two working days any comments theymay wish to make. In the absence of objectionsin this period of time, the record shall becorrected as requested.

Rule 46The verbatim record referred to in Rule

42, or the record referred to in Rule 44, inwhich no corrections have been requested inthe period of time required respectively byRule 43 and Rule 44 or which has been cor-rected in accordance with the provision ofRule 45, shall be considered as approved. Itshall be signed by the Chairman and shallbecome the official record of the AtomicEnergy Commission.

Rule 47The official record of public meetings of

the Atomic Energy Commission, as well asthe documents annexed thereto, shall be pub-lished in the official languages as soon aspossible.

Rule 48At the close of each private meeting, the

Atomic Energy Commission shall issue acommunique through the Secretary-General.


United Nations which have taken part in aprivate meeting shall at all times have theright to consult the record of that meetingin the offices of the Secretary-General. TheAtomic Energy Commission may at any timegrant access to this record to authorizedrepresentatives of other Members of theUnited Nations.

Rule 50The Secretary-General shall, at suitable

intervals but at least once each year, submitto the Atomic Energy Commission a list of therecords and documents which up to that timehave been considered confidential. The AtomicEnergy Commission shall decide, subject tothe provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Resolu-tion of the General Assembly of 24 January1946, which of these shall be made availableto other Members of the United Nations,which shall be made public, and which shallcontinue to remain confidential.

ANNEXPROVISIONAL PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH

COMMUNICATIONS FROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALSAND NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODIES

1. A list of all communications from privateindividuals and non-governmental bodies re-lating to the Atomic Energy Commission shallbe circulated to all representatives on theAtomic Energy Commission.

2. A copy of any communication on the listshall be given by the Secretariat to any repre-sentative on the Atomic Energy Commissionat his request.

ANNEX VIICOMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURECHAPTER I: Meetings

Rule 1Meetings of the Commission for Conven-

tional Armaments shall be held at the callof the Chairman at any time he deemsnecessary.

Rule 2The Chairman shall call a meeting of the

Commission for Conventional Armaments atthe request of any Member of the Com-mission.

Rule 3Meetings of the Commission for Conven-

tional Armaments shall as a rule be held atthe seat of the United Nations.

CHAPTER II: AgendaRule 4

The Secretary-General shall immediatelybring to the attention of all representativeson the Commission for Conventional Arma-ments all directions and other communicationsfrom the Security Council, all communica-tions from States, other organs of the UnitedNations, or the Secretary-General himself,falling within the framework of the terms ofreference of the Commission for Conven-tional Armaments as contained in the Resolu-tion of the Security Council of 13 February1947.



of the Commission for Conventional Arma-ments shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the Chairman of theCommission.

Rule 6The Provisional Agenda for a meeting shall

be communicated by the Secretary-Generalto the representatives on the Commission forConventional Armaments at least three daysbefore the meeting, but in urgent circum-stances it may be communicated simultane-ously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 7The first item of the Provisional Agenda

for each meeting of the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments shall be the adoptionof the Agenda.


the Commission for Conventional Armamentsconsideration of which has not been completedat that meeting, shall unless the Commissionotherwise decides, automatically be includedin the Agenda of the next meeting.

CHAPTER III: Representation andCredentials

Rule 9Each Member of the Commission for Con-

ventional Armaments shall be represented atthe meetings of the Commission by an accred-ited representative. The credentials of a rep-resentative on the Commission shall becommunicated to the Secretary-General notless than twenty-four hours before he takeshis seat on the Commission.


Member of the Commission for ConventionalArmaments, and any State not a Member ofthe United Nations, if invited to participatein a meeting or meetings of the Commission,shall submit credentials for the representativeappointed by it for this purpose. The creden-tials of such a representative shall becommunicated to the Secretary-General notless than twenty-four hours before the firstmeeting which he is invited to attend.


Commission for Conventional Armaments andof any representative appointed in accordancewith Rule 10 shall be examined by the Secre-tary-General who shall submit a report to theCommission for approval.

Rule 12Pending the approval of the credentials of

a representative of a State Member on theCommission for Conventional Armaments inaccordance with Rule 11, such representativeshall be seated provisionally with the samerights as other representatives of States Mem-bers on the Commission.

Rule 13Any representative of a State Member on

the Commission for Conventional Armaments,to whose credentials objection has been madewithin the Commission, shall continue to sitwith the same rights as other representativesuntil the Commission has decided the matter.

CHAPTER IV: ChairmanRule 14

The Chairmanship of the Commission forConventional Armaments shall be held in turnby the States represented on the Commissionin the English alphabetical order of theirnames. Each Chairman shall hold office forone calendar month.

Rule 15The Chairman shall preside over the meet-

ings of the Commission for ConventionalArmaments and, under the authority of theCommission, shall represent it in its capacityas an organ of the United Nations.


The Secretary-General shall act in thatcapacity in all meetings of the Commissionfor Conventional Armaments. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in hisplace at meetings of the Commission.


staff required by the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments. This staff shall formpart of the Secretariat.


sentatives on the Commission for Conven-tional Armaments notice of meetings of theCommission and of its committees and sub-committees.


for the preparation of documents requiredby the Commission for Conventional Arma-ments and shall, except in urgent circum-stances, distribute them at least forty-eighthours in advance of the meeting at whichthey are to be considered.

Rule 20The Secretary-General or his Deputy acting

on his behalf may make either oral or writtenstatements to the Commission for Conven-tional Armaments concerning any questionunder consideration by it.

CHAPTER VI: Conduct of BusinessRule 21

The Chairman shall call upon representa-tives in the order in which they signify theirdesire to speak.

Rule 22The Commission for Conventional Arma-

ments may appoint such committees or sub-committees as it deems necessary and refer


to them any question falling within theframework of the terms of reference of theCommission for study and report.

Committees and sub-committees may beauthorized to sit when the Commission forConventional Armaments is not in session.


the Chairman shall immediately state hisruling. If it is challenged, the Chairman shallsubmit his ruling to the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments for immediate decisionand it shall stand unless over-ruled.


stantive motions shall as a rule be placedbefore the representatives in writing.



Parts of a motion or of a draft resolutionshall be voted on separately at the requestof any representative, unless the originalmover objects.


draft resolution proposed by a representativeof a State Member on the Commission forConventional Armaments to be seconded bythe representative of another State Memberbefore being put to a vote.

Rule 27If two or more amendments to a motion or

draft resolution are proposed, the Chairmanshall rule on the order in which they are tobe voted upon. As a rule, the Commission forConventional Armaments shall first vote onthe amendment furthest removed in substancefrom the original proposal and then on theamendment next furthest removed until allamendments have been put to the vote butwhen an amendment adds to or deletes fromthe text of a motion or draft resolution, thatamendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 28Any Member of the United Nations which

is not a Member of the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments or any State not aMember of the United Nations may be in-vited, as the result of a decision of the Com-mission for Conventional Armaments, toparticipate, without vote, in the discussion ofany question brought before the Commissionfor Conventional Armaments when the Com-mission considers that the interests of thatState are specially affected. The Commissionfor Conventional Armaments may also inviterepresentatives of other States for informa-tion purposes.

The representative of a State not a Memberof the Commission for Conventional Arma-ments may participate in the meetings of the

Commission as soon as his credentials havebeen approved by the Commission.

Rule 29Any State invited in accordance with the

preceding Rule to participate in the discus-sions of the Commission for ConventionalArmaments may submit proposals and draftresolutions. These proposals and draft reso-lutions may be put to a vote only at therequest of a representative of a State Memberon the Commission.


ments may invite members of the Secretariator other persons, whom it considers competentfor the purpose, to supply it with informationor to give other assistance in examiningmatters within its competence.

CHAPTER VII: Quorum and VotingRule 31

Each Member of the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments shall have one vote.

Rule 32At any meeting, a majority of the Members

of the Commission shall constitute a quorum.Rule S3

All decisions of the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments shall be made by amajority of the Members of the Commission.

CHAPTER VIII : LanguagesRule 34

Chinese, English, French, Russian andSpanish shall be the official languages of theCommission for Conventional Armaments, andEnglish and French the working languages.





Rule 37Any representative may make a speech in

a language other than the official languages.In this case he shall himself provide forinterpretation into one of the workinglanguages. Interpretation into the other work-ing language by an interpreter of the Secre-tariat may be based on the interpretationgiven in the first working language.

Rule 38Verbatim records of meetings of the Com-

mission for Conventional Armaments shallbe drawn up in the working languages. At therequest of any representative, a verbatimrecord of any speech made in an officiallanguage other than the working languageshall be drawn up in the original language.


Rule 39All decisions and other important docu-

ments shall forthwith be made available inthe official languages. Upon the request of anyrepresentative, any other document shall bemade available in any or all of the officiallanguages.

Rule 40Documents of the Commission for Con-

ventional Armaments shall, if the Commissionso decides, be published in any language otherthan the official languages.

CHAPTER IX : Publicity of Meetings—RecordsRule 41

Unless it decides otherwise, the Commissionfor Conventional Armaments shall meet inpublic.


verbatim record of each meeting of the Com-mission for Conventional Armaments shallbe made available in the working languagesto the representatives on the Commission andto the representatives of any other Stateswhich have participated in the meeting notlater than 10 a.m. of the first working dayfollowing the meeting. The verbatim recordof any speech made in any other of theofficial languages, which is drawn up inaccordance with the provisions of Rule 38shall be made available in the same mannerto any of the above mentioned representativesat his request.

The Commission for Conventional Arma-ments shall determine the extent of circula-tion of the records of its private meetings.


have participated in the meeting shall, withintwo working days after the time indicatedin Rule 42, inform the Secretary-General ofany corrections they wish to have made in theverbatim record.


ments may decide that for a private meetingthe record shall be made in a single copy alone.This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the Stateswhich have participated in the meeting shall,within a period of ten days, inform the Secre-tary-General of any corrections they wish tohave made in this record.


be considered approved unless the Chairmanis of the opinion that they are sufficientlyimportant to be submitted to the representa-tives on the Commission for ConventionalArmaments. In the latter case, the representa-tives on the Commission shall submit within

two working days any comments they maywish to make. In the absence of objectionsin this period of time, the record shall becorrected as requested.

Rule 46The verbatim record referred to in Rule 42,

or the record referred to in Rule 44, in whichno corrections have been requested in theperiod of time required respectively by Rule43 and Rule 44 or which has been correctedin accordance with the provision of Rule 45,shall be considered as approved. It shall besigned by the Chairman and shall become theofficial record of the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments.

Rule 47The official record of public meetings of

the Commission for Conventional Armaments,as well as the documents annexed thereto,shall be published in the official languages assoon as possible.

Rule 48At the close of each private meeting, the

Commission for Conventional Armamentsshall issue a communique through the Sec-retary-General.


United Nations which have taken part in aprivate meeting shall at all times have theright to consult the record of that meetingin the offices of the Secretary-General. TheCommission for Conventional Armaments mayat any time grant access to this record toauthorized representatives of other Membersof the United Nations.

Rule 50The Secretary-General shall, at suitable

intervals but at least once each year, submitto the Commission for Conventional Arma-ments a list of the records and documentswhich up to that time have been consideredconfidential. The Commission shall decidewhich of these shall be made available toother Members of the United Nations, whichshall be made public, and which shall continueto remain confidential.

ANNEXPROVISIONAL PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITHCOMMUNICATIONS FROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODIES1. A list of all communications from private

individuals and non-governmental bodies re-lating to the Commission for ConventionalArmaments shall be circulated to all repre-sentatives on the Commission.

2. A copy of any communication on the listshall be given by the Secretariat to any rep-resentative on the Commission for Conven-tional Armaments at his request.