zero-variable theories in the analysis of social phenomena

European Journal of Personality, Vol. 4, 37-55 (1990)

Zero-variable theories in the analysis of social phenomena

ROBERT A. WICKLUND University of Bielefeld, FRG

Abstract

Are the background and context of complex social behaviour neglected in theory- building? This sweeping question is handled here in a highly specific way. First, the character of the everyday ‘explainer’s’ theories is examined, and it is found that the explainer’s accounts of social behaviour can go in different directions. These directions, which are regarded here as opposite ends of a continuum, are: (1) the explainer takes into account the manifold personal and contextual factors that bear on psychological accompaniments of behaviour; (2) the person whose behaviour is to be explained is first categorized (e.g. ‘aggressive type’), whereby reference to the category then serves as the explanation. While an optimistic view of progress in psychological theorizing (cf. Lewin, 1931; Wegner and Vallacher, 1977) would lead one to think that the scientific psychologist would steer away f rom such simplified, ‘aggressive type’ explanations, a glance at widespread, current accounts of complex social behaviour reveals that these modes of explaining are indeed a dominant mode. The primary aspects of this paper are then devoted to several observations on this direction of theorizing, and it is proposed that such theorizing (a) reduces one’s theory to a list of behaviours; (b) results in no antecedent, psychological variables; (c) depends on a trivial, circular form of research for support; (d) develops in the direction of trying to claim all of the variation within the behaviour realm being studied; and (e) precludes theoretical integration, in that the criterion of success within such endeavours is the uniqueness of the theorist’s own classification system.

INTRODUCTION

Psychologists who characterize the theorizing or explaining of the common person are inclined to see qualitative differences between the explaining of the scientific psychologist and that of the layperson. Psychologists know that their own thinking is systematic and that they are attentive to the nuances of behaviour, to their subjects’ thinking and motivation, and to the subtleties of their respondents’ backgrounds. The

Mailing address: Robert A. Wicklund, Abteilung Psychologie, Universitat Bielefeld, Postfach 8640,4800 Bielefeld 1, FRG.

0890-2070/90/010037-19liO9.50 0 1990 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 3 June 1988 Accepted 2 December 1988

38 R. A. Wicklund

layperson as ‘explainer’ is regarded as a ‘less-than-ripe’ scientist. For instance, in the everyday analysis of motivation, the everyday explainer is said to use a ‘naive’ system-for example the naive analysis of action proposed by Heider (1958). And the everyday explainer’s usage of personality-trait language is referred to as ‘implicit’ (cf. Borkenau and Ostendorf, 1987; Rosenberg and Jones, 1972), implying that something is lacking, relative to the more scientific-psychological view of personality processes.

Wegner andVallacher (1977) have looked carefully at thisprofessional-vs.-layman distinction, suggesting that the everyday explainer tends to oversimplify the complex perspective of the respondent, relative to the scientific psychologist, who is more attuned to the shades of meaning within the background of the person being studied (Wegner and Vallacher, 1977, p. 67).

There may well be systematic differences between the ‘naive’ or ‘implicit’ psychologist and the professional, and as Wegner and Vallacher suggest, this difference could begin with the differential attention given to subtle factors in the respondent’s (target person’s) background. In turn, attention to subtle background factors would then lead the theorist to a more systematic conceptualization of pertinent psychological forces. Nonetheless, let us suppose, as a first premise, that psychology would not simply divide humanity into two parts, such that one part is capable of correct, sensitive-to-the-perspective-of-the-respondent thinking, whereas the other half of the world is doomed to incompetent scientific thinking. Rather, if the scientific community is indeed more sensitive to the multitude of processes taking place within the individual, and also more capable of describing these processes systematically, the roots of the difference would lie in specific training and research experience.

This means that certain research endeavours and theorizing will approximate Wegner and Vallacher’s (1977) ideal more than others. No matter whether due to training, experience, or even psychological factors, some investigators will be more inclined than others to reduce human functioning to a concrete level, equating fixed empirical categories of humans with psychological constructs, while other investigators would-in the language of Wegner and Vallacher-be more attuned to the remote and multiple causes.

These kinds of differences among theorists were the focal point of a treatise by Lewin (1931), who drew a distinction between Aristotelian and Galilean thinking in psychology (cf. Gollwitzer and Wicklund, 1987; Wicklund and Gollwitzer, 1987). For Lewin, the Galilean form of theorizing involved an acknowledgement of the individual as subject to multiple, simultaneous psychological forces, many of which would lie in the background of the respondent (cf. Wegner and Vallacher, 1977). The explanation of behaviour would then lie in the resolution of those forces. By Lewin’s analysis, the Aristotelian explanation took the form of first fitting the respondent to a fixed category on the basis of some overt, fixed quality (age, gender, race), and then using the person’s membership in that category as an account of the person’s behaviour.

An ideal psychology

Lewin (1931) was optimistic regarding the future of the discipline, which, as of about 1930, was in his words primitively Aristotelian in its mode of thinking. He found that the propensity to ascribe a firm, unchangeable essence or concrete quality to humans, and to explain behaviour in terms of that fixed essence, was about to be replaced by

Zero-variable theories 39 a systematic psychology that would attune itself to the multiplicity of forces acting on behaviour-no matter whether biological, physiological, motivational, or otherwise. A similar optimism can be seen in Wegner and Vallacher (1977), who explicate the differences between the ‘implicit’ explainer and the trained psychologist:

To begin with, clinical psychologists are more sensitive to the fact that ‘causes have causes’. Unlike the layman, the professional typically investigates causal chains-the sequence of causes leading up to the present-before forming a detailed impression of someone. Under certain circumstances, for example, both the layman and the psychologist might attribute a bad act to an internal quality of the actor. The psychologist would want to know why the actor has that particular quality-what forces in the actor’s past caused his present trait. . . . The layman, on the other hand, ends his causal analysis once a trait has been attributed to the actor.

(pp. 149-150)

While Wegner and Vallacher’s statement seems to ring true, it has yet to be demonstrated that psychologists, as opposed to non-psychologists, are more ad- vanced psychological thinkers in the sense of looking toward the causes behind the surface manifestation. In fact, it is quite easy to demonstrate that many laypeople are interested in looking toward the complex background (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernan- dez, Peterson and Reeder, 1986). Thus, it should not be simply the professional-vs.-layperson distinction that concerns us, but rather distinctions among professionals with respect to the kind of theorizing that is offered. Although Lewin (1931) and Wegner and Vallacher (1977) give us a sense of optimism regarding the depth of psychological constructs among professionals, recent explanations of complex social behaviour have taken a decided turn in the direction of what Wegner and Vallacher have labelled superficial, and towards what Lewin called Aristotelian thinking. The product of this current mode of explanation, to be explicated with three examples, will be called the zero-variable theory.

THE ZERO-VARIABLE THEORY

Theory = characterization of a person type

The starting point for many theories, models, or ‘accounts of behaviour’ is the specification of a given behavioural domain. Our interest here is in explanations that come to grips with complex social behaviours, and three contemporary, in part very well known, explanations have been selected. All three of them delve into certain facets of complex human behaviours, such as skilled influence of others, aggression, active vs. passive dealing with others, empathic reactions, consistency across different situations, instrumental use of others, and in general, a great host of the behaviours out of the repertoire of classic social psychology. Among this rich offer- ing of social behaviours the zero-variable theorist selects a particular set of behaviours, whereby a type of person is then characterized. The type is made up of the selected behavioural propensities, assumed to hang together; the type is likely to manifest those behaviours. The types are as follows for the three explanations that are the examples here:

40 R. A. Wicklund

A conceptualization of ‘argumentativeness’

Infante and Rancer (1982) begin their conceptualization with the following definition of the argumentative type of person:

Argumentativeness is conceptualized as a generally stable trait which predisposes the individual in communication situations to advocate positions on controversial issues and to attack verbally the positions which other people take on these issues. The individual perceives this activity as an exciting intellectual challenge, a competitive situation which entails defending a position and ‘winning points’. Feelings of excitement and anticipation precede an argument. Following an argument the individual feels invigorated, satisfied, and experiences a sense of accomplishment.

(P. 72)

A conceptualization of ‘androgyny ’

An interesting and singular aspect of the Bem (1974) androgyny concept is its status as a compromise between two behavioural directions: a feminine and a masculine direction. Masculine stands for ‘aggressive’, ‘dominant’, ‘independent’, while the feminine person is said to exhibit ‘empathy’, ‘fidelity’, and ‘warmth’. The characterization of the androgynous individual-aside from whether the person is actually male or female-is in terms of an exact compromise between the ‘m’ and ‘f‘ extremes. Androgynous means ‘not more masculine than feminine’ and ‘not more feminine than masculine’. In short, the behaviour catalogue that stands behind the characterization is a blend of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ behavioural dispositions. The androgynous person is both dominant and warm.

A conceptualization of ‘self-monitoring’

In Snyder’s (1974) introduction to the concept, the characterization of the ‘self- monitor’ reads as follows:

. . . concern for social appropriateness, sensitivity to the expression and self-presentation of others in social situations as cues to social appropriateness of self-expression, and use of these cues as guidelines for monitoring and managing self-presentation and expressive behavior. (P. 529)

Two prominent characteristics of the zero-variable theory

No matter whether argumentativeness, androgyny, or self-monitoring is considered, the person is regarded as an object, or essence, with a singular direction-an essence that carries out the behaviours included in the characterization. To cite Lewin (1931), whose description of Aristotelian thinking captures the qualities of the zero-variable theory,

. . . for Aristotle the class defined the essence or essential nature of the object and thus determined its behavior in both positive and negative respects. (P. 4)

The second characteristic of the zero-variable theory is its seeming absence of variables. Given that there is no regard for the origins, coming-and-going, or rise-and- fall of the condition of ‘argumentativeness’, ‘androgyny’, or ‘self-monitoring’, there

Zero-variable theories 41

is necessarily no need for psychological variables that would stipulate the extent of a person’s standing on those dimensions. The freezing of a person into a category, whereby the issue is handled in terms of ‘low’ and ‘high’ types, thus precludes all conceivable psychological variables.

The vectors which determine an object’s movements are completely determined by the object. That is, they do not depend upon the relation of the object to the environment, and they belong to that object once [and] for all, irrespective of its surroundings at any given time.

(Lewin, 1931, pp. 28-29)

Egocentrism as a by-product

In the course of drawing together a group of behavioural tendencies under the umbrella of one’s own concept (e.g. ‘argumentativeness’), alternative ways of con- struing or explaining those behavioural tendencies are necessarily excluded. The attaching of a new label to the particular grouping of behavioural tendencies apparently allows the theorist to draw the conclusion that the label in question has a unique claim to those tendencies. To be sure, the zero-variable endeavour is seldom, if ever, a context in which the theorist undertakes a comparison with alternative explanations. ‘Alternative explanations’, at least in the examples chosen here, is a foreign concept (cf. Cronbach and Meehl, 1955, p. 283).

Why is the consideration of alternative explanations found only among theoretical work that involves variables? If a theory has variables that systematically lead the way to the central psychological construct,’ the theorist or others would be more likely to notice overlap with other explanations. This is particularly true once the pertinent variables are operationalized. Thus, two researchers, beginning with different labels for a given psychological construct (i.e. condition of the organism-state or trait), would rather easily discover that they are using similar or identical empirical methods to produce or tap into their respective psychological constructs. If the behaviours that are predicted are also similar, they are then forced to acknowledge each other’s systems.

The reduction of the psychology of the respondent to a single scale

According to Sternberg (1985), a central difference between the implicit theory and the explicit theory is the fact that the explicit form is accompanied by certain empirical work. Presumably this must mean that the theory is an explicit theory once it is operationalized. The empirical accompaniment to the zero-variable theory is typically a scale, whereby the scale follows the rational method of scale construction (see Broughton, 1984) and consists of items that are directly implied by the construct (i.e. type characterization). When one examines the contents of the scales used to assess

:The psychological condition of the organism will be used here as a blanket term to cover what is meant by traits as well as states. Thus, the central construct to which the researcher refers-no matter whether achievement motivation, cognitive dissonance, or androgyny-will be treated under the rubric of a condition of the organism. This simplification is introduced here to avoid any disputes about distinctions between traits and states. A discussion of the distinction, and whether it is justified theoretically, is found in Allen and Potkay (1981) and in Chaplin, John and Goldberg (1988).

42 R. A. Wicklund

argumentativeness, androgyny, and self-monitoring, one sees an unmistakable content overlap with the respective type characterizations (see above). In the Infante and Rancer (1982) scale, for instance, one finds the items

‘I am energetic and enthusiastic when I argue.’ ‘I enjoy a good argument over a controversial issue.’ ‘I consider an argument an exciting intellectual challenge.’

The Androgyny scale (Bem, 1974) is composed of 20masculine items (e.g. aggressive, assertive, individualistic, masculine) and 20 feminine items (e.g. affectionate, feminine, gullible, sensitive to the needs of others). The androgynous person is defined as possessing about an equal extent of masculinity and femininity. Finally, the Self- Monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) is composed of such items as

‘When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behaviour of others for cues.’ ‘In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.’ ‘I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).’

Thus, each type characterization carries its unique scale, whereby the scale is an elaborated form of the type characterization. Both are lists of behavioural tendencies.

The theorist’s own scale comes to serve as the single admissible operationalization of the type characterization. With this insistence on the exclusive rights of the original scale, the three examples here and many others have represented an approach that Nicholls, Licht and Pearl (1982) refer to as ‘one-scale research’.

Is it true that the theorists regard their own measuring instruments as the only valid operationalizations of the concept? In one case, the theorist and co-workers-such as Snyder (1987), Gangestad and Snyder (1985), and Snyder and Gangestad (1986)- have rejected all suggestions from others in the direction of alternative scales or modifications of the original (cf. Briggs, Cheek and Buss, 1980; Cheek, 1982; Lennox and Wolfe, 1984; Nowack and Kammer, 1987).

A similar development is seen in the case of Bem’s concept of androgyny (1974, 1977), where 20 feminine and 20 masculine traits are the basic stuff of the androgyny questionnaire. Although numerous theoretical and methodological aspects of the questionnaire have been attacked (Locksley and Colten, 1979; Pedhazur and Teten- baum, 1979), the theorist has shown no movement toward improved or alternative operationalizations.

One sees no greater openness to alternative indices of argumentativeness. Infante and Rancer (1982), in their introduction of the scale, point to the definite discriminate validity of the scale and offer no suggestions as to possibilities for other techniques for tapping into argumentativeness.

In one sense, one can readily understand this jealous guarding of one’s own scale. The behaviours that are addressed by the theorist are not unique to that theorist’s thinking; they have already been examined by others. If the theorist has something new to offer, then it is the manner in which those behaviours are packaged, and the manner in which the behavioural tendencies are measured. In other words, the empirical reduction of the concept is a very dominant part of the theorizing. If it turns


out that one’s instrument is easily replaceable, a substantial portion of one’s theorizing is thereby shunted aside. One has no variables to fall back on.

The theorist ascribes an essence to the human

Present-day child psychology and affect psychology also exemplify clearly the Aristotelian habit of considering the abstractly defined classes as the essential nature of the particular object and hence as an explanation of its behavior. Whatever is common to children of a given age is set up as the fundamental character of that age. (Lewin, 1931, p. 15)

Thus, by Lewin’s objection, the system or method by which the organism is classified comes to define the crucial essence of that organism. Children are grouped together into age classifications, then the reactions common to those classes become the dependent variable side of the theory. The ‘independent’ variable, or the ‘explanation’, is of course the class or label of the category, itself

The fact that three-year-old children are quite often negative is considered evidence that negativism is inherent in the nature of three-year-olds, and the concept of a negativistic age or stage is then regarded as an explanation.

(Lewin, 1931, p. 15)

Lewin attacks such accounts as circular, and proposes that, in many branches of psychology, no better way of thinking or theorizing has been substituted.

The case is identical to the modern zero-variable theory. A classification system is the starting point: two (or more) classes are formed, then the behaviours said to occur frequently within each category become the essence of the theory. For instance, the characterization of the self-monitors’ behavioural tendencies becomes the stuff of the category; the opposite tendencies form the opposing category. Then based on a criterion-in this case, a self-monitoring scale-individuals are assigned one or the other essence by means of their answers.

The essence is forever

One of the accompaniments of the zero-variable explanation is the rigorous exami- nation of the classification system in terms of test-retest reliability. The ascribed essence would seemingly have no explanatory power if respondents were to change their standing from time to time, springing from one category to the next. In the case of Infante and Rancer (1982). we see that the same individuals were given the questionnaire twice, with 1 week separating the testings, and that the correlation between those two testings was approximately0.87 (the exact value depends on which subscale is looked at). Similarly, for the Bem scale the test-retest values were in the vicinity of 0.93 and for the Snyder scale they were 0.83.

Although the question is never posed to the zero-variable theorist, one would like to ask, ‘How far back into the individual’s history would such a test-retest procedure be reasonable?’ ‘Ten years, or back into infancy?’ Common sense would answer, ‘Ridiculous!-It takes time for such tendencies to mature.’ On the other hand, when we examine the theorists’ assumptions about the origins of their respective postulated essences, we are led to think that the essences were ‘always there’. For instance, in a

44 R. A . Wicklund

rich display of evidence for the ‘predictive potential of the Argumentativeness scale’, Infante and Rancer (1982) report that the more argumentative person has better grades in school, has an earlier birth order, and is more conservative. The essence of one’s argumentativeness appears to be set at a very early age.

In the case of Bem (1974,1977), there are no explicit hints, other than to biological sex differences, regarding the origin of the gender-orientation differences. Again, one is led to think that the essence possesses an infinite quality. In the case of self- monitoring, these surmisings about the longevity or permanence of the respective inclinations are finally cleared up: ‘Self-monitoringness’ is an inborn characteristic:

People appear to be born with a biological-genetic predisposition to be high or low in self-monitoring. Then, over an extended course of socializa- tion, small initial differences emerge in relatively restricted domains. They are then amplified and extended over time to eventually become the many and varied manifestations of self-monitoring . . . the social circumstances and life experiences that bring out the diverging self-monitoring orienta- tions may be ones toward which people gravitate precisely because of their self-monitoring predisposition. (Snyder, 1987, p. 153)

Differentiating the central categories from competing categories

The starting point of this procedure is one’s suspicion that alternative category systems (i.e. using different labels and different scales) might have applicability within the behavioural realm being studied. This starting point might be seen as a territorial struggle, whereby a vast array of social behaviours is initially regarded as subsumable under one’s conceptual label and corresponding scale. To the extent that a second person lays claim to some of the same territory, it then becomes necessary to carry out what has come to be known as a discriminant validity analysis.

Discriminant validity, as employed within the current zero-variable tradition, means that one’s own categorizing system (the scale) is compared with competing categorizing systems (usually scales) in the hope that no correlations will be found. To the extent that there are correlations, one’s own system then becomes threatened as the sole ‘interpretation’ of the territory in question.2

Argumentativeness

Discriminant validity in the context of Infante and Rancer (1982) refers to an absence of correlation between the scale and certain dispositions that ‘don’t belong’ to the type characterization. For instance, the correlation between one’s standing on the scale and ‘watching and rating TV programmes’ approximated zero. The correlations between scale standing and ‘participate in conversation’ were 0.15 and -0.22 (the argumentativeness scale has ‘avoidance’ and ‘approach’ aspects). In short, ‘argumentativeness’ is not the same as simply being open to passive communication (watching

2Although the classic work of Campbell and Fiske (1959) is often cited in connection with the performing of discriminant validity tests, it is also clear that the zero-variable theorist neglects a central point in the multitrait-multimethod suggestions of Campbell and Fiske. They advocated explicitly a ‘multiple operationalism’,in contrast to the ‘single operationalism now dominant in psychology’ (p. 101). and which also happens to dominate in zero-variable theorizing. In fact, they are so explicit on this point that one could hardly miss the message: ‘Any single operation, as representative of concepts, is equivocal’ (p. 101).


TV) or the propensity to engage in conversation. This is, thus, the general character of the way that discriminant analysis proceeds in this context. One sees the technique applied in somewhat more extensive form as we move on to androgyny and self- monitoring.

Androgyny

Among the scales regarded by Bem (1974) as competitive, whereby a discriminant analysis was called for, were two other pertinent scales. The correlation between the Bem Androgyny scale and the Guilford-Zimmerman Masculinity/Femininity scale was nil; the corresponding correlation between the BSRI and the comparable California Psychological Inventory scale was about 0.40; the correlation was slightly higher (0.50) for male subjects. What was the conclusion drawn from these analyses?

. . . the fact that none of the correlations is particularly high indicates that the BSRI is measuring an aspect of sex roles which is not directly tapped by either of these two scales. (Bem, 1974, p. 160)

But, contrary to this particular discriminant analysis, wouldn’t one want a very high relation between the BSRI and other measures of androgyny? Certainly yes, if one understands the main point of Campbell and Fiske (1959). This leads us once again to think that individuality of one’s own scale is a very central goal in development of the theory. Even when there is some psychological basis for thinking that another construct would correlate with the central construct being pursued, the theorist sees to it that no correlations exist on the empirical level.

Self -monitoring

Snyder (1974,1979,1987) reports that the Self-Monitoring scale (SM scale) correlates with y10 other scale-meaning that there is no other suitable existing operationalization of the SM ‘construct’. By ‘no other scale’, we are led to understand that the SM measure does not correlate with ‘need for approval’, ‘Machiavellianism’, ‘extraver- sion’, ‘locus of control’, ‘inner-directed vs. other-directed’, ‘field dependence’, ‘self- esteem’, ‘hypnotic susceptibility’, ‘neuroticism’, ‘trait anxiety’, ‘repression-sensitiza- tion’, ‘achievement anxiety’, ‘need for cognition’, ‘intelligence’, ‘academic achievement’, ‘religion’, ‘public self-consciousness’, ‘private self-consciousness’, ‘social anxiety’, ‘clinical scales of the MMPI’, ‘socio-economic status’, ‘birth order’, ‘gender’ (Snyder, 1979,1987). One can, of course, debate about whether the ‘non-correlations’ on which Snyder bases his conclusions are in fact so inconsequential (cf. Briggs and Cheek, 1988; Cheek, 1982; Nowack and Kammer, 1987).3 That issue notwithstanding, the important question here is: What is the sense of this discriminant validity procedure for the theorist? Snyder’s (1979) position is clear:

Might not such an individual be identified equally well by existing measures of related psychological constructs? (P. 92)

Obviously the answer is supposed to be ‘no’ (Snyder, 1974,1979,1987). It is important for the theorist that no other scale identifies (= classifies) people in the same manner ’Cheek (1982) reported a correlation of 0.45 between the Self-Monitoring scale and the Public Self- Consciousness scale.

46 R.A. Wicklund

as one’s own. Were this the case, the theorist would then have to allow that a competing scale, associated with a competing construct (= label), encroaches success- fully on the ‘theoretical’ territory. Thus, a tentative conclusion, at this point, is that the purpose of such discriminant-validity exercises is that of ensuring the exclusive claim of one’s scale to a given behavioural domain.

The exclusiveness of one’s own scale as a social comparison issue

To the degree that an individual lays claim to being highly competent within a given performance domain, there will be a tendency to dissociate oneself from others who are competent in that same domain (Tesser, 1980,1986). Translating this proposition slightly, we arrive at the following: To the extent that a theorist defines a given field of behaviour by means of his or her own personal label, there should be a corresponding dissociating of oneself from others to the extent that they are highly competent (= prominent) in that area of study.

The discriminant analysis as employed here appears to be a response of dissociation; the theorist is out to show that there is no overlap between one’s own creation and the measure of a competitor. If this derivation from Tesser’s theory holds, the dissociation efforts (discriminant analyses) should be seen primarily with respect to prominent other scales. ‘Intelligence’ is a concept with high prominence, as are ‘androgyny’ and ‘neuroticism’. However, the deciding starting point for these discriminant analyses is not the psychological similarity of the two concepts in question (i.e. one’s own and the competitor), nor a consideration of variables basic to each of the constructs. Rather, the zero-variable discriminant analysis begins with a single- minded orientation toward the prominence of measures that might eventually figure into the analysis, hence intelligence, need for cognition, MMPI scales, and so forth.

A good illustration is the discriminant analysis work done with the ‘publiclprivate self-consciousness’ scales (Buss, 1980; Carver and Scheier, 1981, 1985; Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss, 1975). While the authors report numerous seemingly inconsequential correlations between their own scale and those of highly-cited competitors, they neglect to look at a scale that was published somewhat earlier-that of Paivio, Baldwin and Berger (1961)-which also carried the name ‘self-consciousness’. Clearly, the scale was not totally unknown, i.e. it was cited (see Buss, 1980, p. 182), but nonetheless, one might surmise that its lack of prominence kept it out of the discriminant analyses. There is a remarkable similarity between the seven items of the ‘public self-consciousness’ scale and the six items of the older Paivio etal. (1961) scale. Characteristic of the older scale were ‘I am bashful with most strangers’, ‘I often wonder what others think of me’, ‘I often worry about what people think of me’, ‘Other people can hurt my feelings easily’. The newer scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) contains, for example, ‘I’m concerned about the way I present myself‘, ‘I’m self- conscious about the way I look’, ‘I’m concerned about what other people think of me’, ‘I’m usually aware of my appearance’. Might a discriminant analysis with that old scale have been wise? It could eventually happen that one’s own concept would be swallowed up by quite unknown, foreign concepts.

The problem with the zero-variable theory lies in its formulation: the would-be psychological condition is nothing more than a label that refers to a group of behaviour tendencies. As such, it is meaningless to speak of ‘different ways of tapping into the label’ or ‘divergent methods of operationalizing the label’. There is nothing


in the way of a psychological condition (see footnote 1) to be operationalized, since the psychological condition (construct) is equivalent to a label, and the label is equivalent to the behaviour list that it heads. If someone else is known for identifying those tendencies just as well, the singularity of one’s contribution thereby vanishes.

A misconstrued ‘construct validity’ replaces hypothesis testing

How are we to understand construct validity? One starting point is the classical statement of Cronbach and Meehl(1955), who referred to the search for converging evidence for a psychological construct, whereby the construct is not reducible to a single set of operations. For instance, they take the case of a certain test, which is said to measure anxiety proneness. Beyond the test scores themselves, one would look at raters’ judgements of respondents’ tenseness, physiological indicators of anxiety proneness, and a high correlation between the scale and a known anxiety scale.

Campbell and Fiske (1959) continue the reasoning: ‘Validity is represented in the agreement between two attempts to measure the same trait through maximally different methods’ (p. 83). Just as Cronbach and Meehl, they note that, ‘any single operation, as representative of concepts, is equivocal’ (p. 101). When one has a psychological construct, the potential operational approaches to that construct are fairly unlimited. In this context, one could point to the grander conceptualizations of personality (Cattell, 1950; Eysenck, 1967) as being open, i.e. as involving psychological constructs; the psychological condition of the human is not reduced to a single list of behaviours. Furthermore, the causes underlying classes of traits are an integral part of the thinking of Cattell and Eysenck, whereby constitutional factors as well as the environment are brought into the picture.

Campbell and Fiske (1959) and also Meehl(l978) are, however, pessimistic about psychology’s readiness to implement constructs. Rather, single operationalism (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) is said to be dominant in psychology. Somewhat more recently, Meehl(l978) has noted that the use of open concepts, i.e. concepts whose possible operational definitions are dependent on the investigator’s reading of the construct, is regarded as a kind of ‘methodological sin’.

To be sure, the zero-variable mode of analysing complex human behaviour allows no room for open constructs, and is a rather staunch continuation of single operationalism. At least this point is reflected in the manner in which our three theories implement (misuse) the notion of construct validity. The purpose of the next set of three illustrations is, then, two-fold: (1) The examples show how the concept ‘construct validation’ is bent, in that

construct validations are limited to one’s own scale and to the behavioural instances mentioned in the scale.

(2) The examples will also show that a hypothesis, in the sense of a hypothesized statement about the inter-workings of psychological variables, is impossible within the zero-variable context. Flatly stated, one cannot have a hypothesis if there are no variables.

Argumentativeness

Acquaintances of the high-argumentative respondent rate that person as tending to argue. It can also be shown that the ‘highs’ are more likely to find participation in a debate to be attractive. If we look back at the Argumentativeness scale, we see that

48 R. A. Wicklund

these kinds of effects are already explicit in the scale. Thus, the course of development of a zero-variable theory is (1) to characterize a type of person in terms of a list of behavioural tendencies, (2) to compose a scale that lists these behavioural tendencies in detail, and (3) to do ‘construct validity’ studies to demonstrate that those tendencies are, in fact, to be expected of the respondents who have been classified into the two types. This three-fold system is spelled out in Table 1.

Table 1. Theory construction and research according to the zero-variable approach

FIRST STEP

(= Theory) A list of behavioural tendencies, X , Y , and Z , as components of the type characterization

SECOND STEP Build the list of behavioural tendencies ( X , Y, and Z ) into a scale, and elaborate on X , Y , and 2. The scale and the characterization carry the same name

THIRD STEP The observation of the elaborated list of X , Y , and Z on the behavioural level. This step constitutes ‘construct validation’ andlor ‘hypothesis testing’

Androgyny

The triad-type characterization, scale, and behavioural level-is very similar within the Bem framework. A comment by Nicholls et al. (1982) is informative in this context:

Consider, for example, the relations of masculinity and feminity scales with overt social behaviour. Bem (1977) has shown that persons identified by her scales as masculine are less likely to conform to social pressure of false norms. This evidence was presented as showing that ‘masculine . . . subjects were significantly more independent than feminine subjects.’

(Bem, 1977, p. 201)

However, given the content of Bem’s masculinity scales (e.g. ‘independent, willing to take a stand, strong personality, assertive, dominant, individualistic, forceful, self-reliant, defends own beliefs’), this result can be interpreted parsimoniously as indicating that self-report of independent, self-assertive tendencies predicts independent, self-assertive behavior.

(Nicholls et al., 1982, pp. 574-575)

One can extend the observation of Nicholls et al. to the case of the androgyny type characterization, the Androgyny scale, and the behaviours that are said to reflect androgyny. The characterization consists of a masculine/feminine compromise, and the resulting behaviours that are ‘predicted’ are also seen as reflecting both masculine and feminine components. This consistency within the three stages of the theory (characterization, scale, behaviour) then qualifies as construct validity.

Self-monitoring

What are the construct validities within the realm of self-monitoring?


(1) High self-monitors are described by peers in a manner that matches the SM characterization. This means, in other words, that the self-monitor is viewed as a person who behaves appropriately (among other behaviours).

(2) Good actors have high SM scale values. (3) High self-monitors are particularly adept at simulating emotions. (4) High self-monitors are able to, and/or willing to, deceive others. ( 5 ) High self-monitors are not faithful to their acquaintances.

Short conclusion

The commentary of Nicholls et al. (1982) and Lewin’s (1931) charge of circularity apply universally to the zero-variable theory, and necessarily so. The reason is that the starting point of the theory, thus the ‘background’ or ‘psychological condition’ of the individual, is construed so as to make it identical to the behaviours that are ultimately measured in the ‘construct validity’ research. If the theories were constructed otherwise, such that the starting point were a psychological construct, one could then talk about a meaningful hypothesis. That is, a statement about the relation between a psychological condition and some subsequent behaviour is a psychological statement and is open to question until tested. Such a relation is theoretical, i.e. hypotheti- cal, and is not true by definition. One is brought to understand what Lewin (1931) intended with his remark that the Aristotelian mode of thought within psychology ‘. . . is founded on a very meager confidence in the lawfulness of psychological events’

An interesting sidelight to the kind of research just reported is the manner in which the undertaking is characterized by the investigator. The term ‘theory’ is seldom used, and the term ‘explanation’ is equally rare (with some exceptions-see Snyder and DeBono, 1985). Thus, one conceivable interpretation of these kinds of research activities is that the investigator is simply introducing a new scale, which is eventually to be of use within existing theoretical frameworks, or in theories that are yet to be explicated. However, the nature of the procedures summarized thus far, particularly in the discriminant validity and construct validity analyses, belies such modest aspi- rations: each theorist concentrates on forging the uniqueness of the scale relative to competitors, and on the predictive relevance of the scale to complex social behaviours. The character of these undertakings, coupled with the absence of any reference to alternative accounts of the behaviours in question, points toward the conclusion that each theorist is indeed trying to account for a large realm of behaviour. Whether this ‘accounting for’ is labelled ‘theory’, ‘attempts to explain’, or otherwise is of secondary importance.

(P. 19).

A statistical interaction does not produce a construct

Occasionally researchers have implemented the category systems (zero-variable theories) discussed here in combination with dimensions of other kinds, showing how two dimensions interact with one another. One is often inclined to regard effects involving interactions as evidence that a psychological process, controlled by psychological variables, is under study. Thus, the question is: Does a statistical interaction involving scales such as androgyny or self-monitoring bring evidence to bear on androgyny or self-monitoring as a psychological construct? First of all, let us look at some examples.

50 R. A. Wicklund

Many of the studies with interactions or interaction-like patterns involve gender as a second variable. For example, in work by Heilbrun (1981), subjects were classified according to the Bem (1974) inventory and also according to gender. Then a measure of personal defensiveness was taken. The results showed a strong interaction pattern: androgynous males (relative to non-androgynous males) showed a very low level of defensiveness, while the opposite pattern prevailed among androgynous women (relative to non-androgynous women).

Can one say that the results were derived from the androgyny ‘construct’? In accounting for this interaction pattern, Heilbrun refers to the social pressures (‘cultural sanctions’) brought to bear on androgynous women and men. However, the androgyny notion per se has no such social or cultural background variables. Strictly speaking, within the context of Bem’s (1974) statement, the results can only be interpreted as showing that the scale, in this case, works differently for men than for women.

Interaction-like patterns are also shown in research by Bem, Martyna and Watson (1976), where the relation between androgyny, femininity, masculinity, and nur- turant behaviour was studied. The data patterns for men were considerably more consistent than those for women, but in this case no explanation for the sex difference is offered. If an account were to be proposed, it would have to be drawn fromvariables outside the ‘construct’ (as in Heilbrun’s cultural sanctions account). Otherwise, all one can say is that the Bem scale tended to predict better for men than for women.

A further example is found in Anderson and Thacker (1985). Using assessment centre ratings as a dependent variable, the authors found that high self-monitors received high ratings, i.e. they left a more favourable impression. This much is congruent with existing self-monitoring ‘construct validity’ findings (cf. Snyder, 1987). However, the Anderson and Thacker (1985) finding was qualified by a sex difference: the relation between self-monitoring scores and assessment centre ratings was found only among women.

The explanation? Just as with Heilbrun (1981), external factors relating to social pressures were brought to bear on the problem: ‘Close attention to situational cues (role prescriptions) and accurate impression management . . . should be especially crucial, for example, for women moving into upper-level management.. .’ (Anderson and Thacker, 1985, p. 348). While the account is not spelled out fully, the idea is that it was generally more important for women to create and maintain a positive public image. Such variables as socially-determined importance are, however, in no way an integral part of the self-monitoring ‘construct’.

Another illustration using the Bem (1974) scale comes from DeGregorio and Carver (1980). It was assumed that respondents who are ‘low masculine’ as well as ‘A- Types’ (Glass, 1977; Jenkins, Rosenman and Zyzanski, 1974) would evidence more self-rated social anxiety. The reasoning was simply that Type A tendencies conflict with the tendencies that qualify as ‘low masculine’. Indeed, the results confirmed this reasoning, but only among the female subjects. As with Anderson and Thacker (1985) and Heilbrun (1981), the authors draw on a social-pressures explanation, referring to societal forces exerted on women.

This handful of illustrations makes an important point: interactions involving a zero-variable theory are not explainable within the language of the theory-by definition. A theory without variables has no equipment for handling effects that are mediated by other tendencies residing in the person (e.g. Type A tendencies; DeGre-


gorio and Carver, 1980) or by tendencies stemming from social pressures or expecta- tions (Anderson and Thacker, 1985; Heilbrun, 1981). The production of interaction- like effects does not magically create a theoretical construct out of a zero-variable theory. The theoretical work must first be done, and the relations among the theoretical variables spelled out, quite independently of the existence of interactions with other chronic tendencies, gender, or situational configuration^.^

THE IMPLICIT PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE ZERO-VARIABLE THEORIST A CONCLUSION

Wegner and Vallacher (1977) viewed the naive or implicit psychologist as prone to settle on the superficial, whereas the professional, .trained psychologist was given credit for looking behind the surface, for the real causes. Such differences between laypeople and trained psychologists might well exist. However, the present look at a sample of psychologists’ zero-variable endeavours draws the superiority of the scientific psychologist’s theory into question. The layperson is certainly, under certain conditions, a step ahead of the psychological zero-variable account of social behaviour (see Funder, 1980; Wicklund and Braun, 1987). Why is it, then, that different segments of scientific explanation of social behaviour go in such different directions? While an analysis of the theory-building behaviour of scientists goes well beyond the scope of this paper, and certainly lacks an empirical basis, it will nonetheless be instructive to look at two alternative approaches to theorizing about an area. By comparing these two approaches, we may at least be guided toward a hint as to how the scientist comes to settle on a zero-variable formulation.

The background of a theory with variables If we look at the development of the theoretical ideas surrounding the achievement motive (Atkinson, 1957; Atkinson and Feather, 1966; McClelland, 1961; McClelland, Clark, Roby and Atkinson, 1949), we see a concentrated effort on the part of researchers to take up direct contact with respondents. For instance, the earliest empirical work in this school involved the experimental activation of the achievement motive (McClelland etal., 1949), whereby both the independent variable and dependent variable sides of the research entailed the researchers’ becoming highly familiar with subjects and their context. All of this work, which entailed multiple operationalizations of the achievement motive, and which looked at competing motives (i.e. failure anxiety), was conducted in paradigms that necessitated a good deal of attention to the background and situation of the person (see Atkinson and Feather, 1966; McClelland, 1961). The alternative? The concept ‘achievement motive’ could just as well have been studied as follows: ‘One can produce statistical interactions with the androgyny or self-monitoring dimension in a much simpler manner. The investigator creates a situation (A) that is especially appropriate for the tendencies of the person who scores high on the scale, and another situation (B) that is especially appropriate for the person who scores low on the scale. Then each category of person (i.e. both the ‘high’ and the ‘low’) is confronted with each type of setting. It should then come as no surprise that the ‘highs’ react more strongly to Setting A than to B, and that the ‘lows’ show the opposite pattern, resulting in a statistical interaction. Such a paradigm is found in Snyder and DeBono (1985). Again, there is no psychological variable or construct involved. The situational variable is nothing more than the generation of a setting that corresponds to the high- or low-scorers’ behavioural tendencies.

52 R. A. Wicklund

The b’ackground of a zero-variable theory

The focus here would have been on a single questionnaire (not on multiple operationalizations of a construct), and then locating respondents to fill out the questionnaire. In order to show the construct validity of the system, the investigator would find out whether subjects behave in line with the behavioural descriptions that constitute the questionnaire. The latter often involves nothing more than self-reported behaviours or reports from the subject’s acquaintances. Such a methodology allows the researcher to remain at a distance from the respondent. With the full reliance on such methods, the subject’s actual background, other pertinent motives, and context remain largely unknown to the researcher. Especially critical is that the researcher is not involved directly in altering that context for the purpose of examining variables. All of this can only distance the researcher from the perspective of the respondent. To cite Funder (1980), Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Maracek (1973), and Wicklund and Braun (1987)-the explainer who is unfamiliar with the person and with the person’s performance context is more inclined to fit that person into the fixed categories that are defined by observable, unchanging person attributes.

One can speculate about the basis of the growing popularity of this latter form of researching and training, but quite aside from how one explains these two research directions (Aristotelian vs. Galilean, in Lewin’s language), it is increasingly clear that the field of complex social behaviour will continue to be divided up by an accelerating use of the zero-variable account of social behaviours. Such zero-variable theories have become popular and will continue to be pushed, on the grounds that they ‘explain variance’. The disturbing side of this development is the egocentrism that is associated with each psychologist claiming some of the territory for his or her own list of behavioural tendencies; we must reckon with the possibility that psychologists and their theorizing already resemble the picture of the young playing partners described by Piaget (1966), working together in the same sand box, together in a geographical sense, but not acknowledging what the other is doing.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A debt of gratitude is expressed to Peter M. Gollwitzer, whose collaboration on an earlier critique of Aristotelian theorizing provided the impetus for the present paper. The author would also like to thank Michael Koller and Rainer Riemann for their comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

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RESUME

Le background et le contexte du comportement social complexe est-il neglige au cours de la thiorisation? Cette question lourde de consequences est traitee ici d’une manikre trbs specifique. La nature des theories explicatives, comme celles utilisees par les profanes dam la vie courante, est tout d’abord examinee. I1 a CtC trouvC que les explications de I’apparition d’un certain comportement social peuvent aller dans differentes directions. Ces directions qui sont


considCrees ici comme les extrCmitCs opposCes d’un continuum sont: (a) Le commentateur tient cornpte des rnultiplesfacteurscontextuels et personnelsaccornpagnant, au senspsycholo- gique, le comportement. (b) La personne dont le comporternent doit &tre expliquC est premierernent catCgorisCe (par exernple ‘type agressif‘), le renvoi a la categorie servant par la suite d’explication. Tandis que la vision optirniste du progres de la theorisation (cf. Lewin, 1931; Wegner et Vallacher, 1977) arnenerait a penser que le psychologue scientifique devrait se tenir eloigne de telles explications fort sirnplifikes (par exernple en termes de ‘type agressif‘), un regard jete sur les explications actuellernent courantes et repandues du comportement social complexe nous apprend que ce mode d’explication est en realit6 le mode dominant. Cet article porte principalement sur un certain nornbre d’observations (illustrations) divergentes de cette forrne de theorisation. I1 y est Ctabli qu’un tel mode de theorisation (a) reduit la theorie a une liste de comporternents, (b) n’aboutit pas a des variables psychologiques antkcedentes, (c) repose sur une forrne circulaire, triviale de recherche de support, (d) se dkveloppe dans le sens de tentatives pour exiger route variations 2 I’intCrieur d’un certain dornaine de cornporternent, et (e) exclut toute integration theorique du fait que le critkre de succes d’une telle entreprise repose sur le caractkre unique du systkme de classification propre au theoricien.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Wird bei der Theorienentwicklung der Hintergrund und der Kontext komplexen sozialen Verhaltens vernachlassigt? Diese ubergreifende Frage wird hier aus einern spezifischen Blickwinkel behandelt: Einleitend wird auf das Wesen von ‘Alltagserklarungen’ eingegangen, wobei festgestellt wird, daR die alltagliche Erklarung von Verhalten in zwei alternative Richtungen laufen kann: ( I ) die Erklarung berucksichtigt die mannigfaltigen personen- und kontextbezogenen Faktoren, die Verhalten begleiten; (2) die Erklarung beginnt rnit der Kategorisierung der Person (z. B. ‘sie sei ein aggressiver Typ’). Die Mitgliedschaft der Person in der Kategorie gilt dann als (Verhaltens-) Erklarung. FuRend auf den Beitragen von Lewin (1931) und Wegner und Vallacher (1977) wurde man erwarten, dal3 der wissenschaftlich arbeitende Psychologe eher eine Erklarungder kornplexeren Art anbietet. Dieser Optirnisrnus ist aber nicht gerechtfertigt: ein Blick auf aktuelle, verbreitete Ansatze uber komplexes, soziales Verhalten deutet auf eine Verbreitung der vereinfachten Erklarungsart (‘aggressiver Typ’) hin. Dieses Papier befaRt sich mit dem vereinfachten Erklarungstyp. Dazu werden folgende Thesen erarbeitet: (a) Solche Erklarungen ersetzen Theorien durchVerhaltenslisten; (b) Sie schlieaen psychologische Variablen aus; (c) Sie bringen eine triviale, zirkulare Forschungsweise mit sich; (d) Sie beanspruchen, sich auf die gesarnte Verhaltensvariation innerhalb des erforschten Verhaltensbereiches zu beziehen; (e) Sie behindern das Erreichen von theoretischer Integration, weil fur solche theoretischen Bemuhungen als zentrales Er- folgskriterium des jeweiligen Forschers die Originalitat des eigenen Klassifikationssysterns im Mittelpunkt steht.

zero-variable theories in the analysis of social phenomena

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