Top of Form

MANU/DE/2024/2013IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHIRFA 622/2004Decided On:02.07.2013Appellants:Satpal YadavVs.Respondent:M/s. Cambata Aviation Pvt. Ltd.Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.Counsels:For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mr.Arun Bhardwaj, Adv.For Respondents/Defendant: Mr.Davinder Singh, Sr. Adv. and Mr.Saurabh Tiwari, AdvocateSubject:ServiceCatch WordsMentioned INActs/Rules/Orders:Constitution Of India - Article 12Disposition:Appeal dismissedJUDGMENTRajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.1. The appeal impugns the judgment dated 20th August, 2004 of the learned Additional District Judge dismissing the suit filed by the appellant, (i) for declaration that the letter dated 8th October, 1991 of the then respondent No. 2 Mr. K.K. Aggarwal, General Manager of the respondent No. 1 Company terminating the services of the appellant is illegal, mala fide, wrongful, arbitrary, unconstitutional, unreasonable, without authority and in violation of the terms ofemploymentand against the principles of natural justice and thus null and void; (ii) for recovery of Rs. 16 lakhs as damages forwrongfulterminationof services of the appellant; and, (iii) for interest. Notice of the appeal was issued and the Trial Court record requisitioned. The appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 6th July, 2006. Vide subsequent order dated 21st November, 2007, the name of the then respondent No. 2 Mr. K.K. Aggarwal was struck off from the array of parties. The counsels have been heard and the records perused.2. The appellant had filed the suit pleading that the respondent Company was engaged in the business ofGroundHandling Agent of airlines at the Airport; that the appellant was appointed in the respondent No. 1 Company as an Office Boy with effect from 1st October, 1973 initially on probation and his services were confirmed with effect from 30th November, 1973; that the appellant was promoted and given increments from time to time; that the appellant was promoted with effect from 28th May, 1974 as Office Clerk, with effect from 21st September, 1981 as Supervisor, with effect from 8th September, 1990 as Duty Officer and with effect from 30th November, 1990 as Assistant Airport Manager; that there is no age of superannuation in the respondent No. 1 Company andemployeeshave continued till the age of 70 years; that the respondent No. 1 Company vide letter dated 8th October, 1991, with reference to para 3 of the appointment letter dated 1st October, 1973 terminated the services of the appellant with immediate effect. It was the plea of the appellant that para 3 of the appointment letter under which his services had been terminated was not applicable to this kind of arbitrary, illegal, mala fide andwrongfulterminationthat the power thereunder could be used only in exceptional circumstances against misconduct. Alternatively, it was the plea of the appellant that the said paragraph was to be applicable only as long as the appellant was an Office Boy and after confirmation and promotion from the post of Office Boy to a higher post, the terms of the said appointment letter would not be applicable and the appellant would have to be governed by the general, reasonable and fair commonemploymentconditions which would include termination ofemploymentonly on goodgrounds, after due notice and charge sheet followed by enquiry. The appellant thus contended that the termination without charge sheet and enquiry was illegal. It was further the plea of the appellant that his appointment was by the Director, Delhi Operations of the respondent Company, the termination was affected by the then respondent No. 2 Mr. K.K. Aggarwal who was only a General Manager and not a Director and the termination was illegal for this reason also. The amount of Rs. 16 lakhs was claimed as damages on the basis of the amount which the appellant would have earned by serving in the respondent Company till December, 2015.3. The respondent and Mr. K.K. Aggarwal aforesaid contested the suit by filing a written statement pleading that the contract of the respondent Company with the appellant was a contract of personal service which was not specifically enforceable and qua which no declaration was maintainable; that there was information available with the respondent which implicated the appellant and owing whereto the respondent Company lost faith in the appellant; however, since imputing misconduct of the appellant would have affected the future prospects of the appellant, the respondent Company as per its policy resorted to discharge simpliciter of the services of the appellant; that the respondent Company is not required to justify its action of terminating the services of the appellant.4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the suit Court:i) Whether the termination of the services of the plaintiff is illegal and wrongful?ii) Whether the suit is not maintainable?iii) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled?5. The suit Court after recording of evidence held, (a) that the appointment letter dated 1st October, 1973 issued by the respondent Company to the appellant and proved as Ex. DW 1/3 empowered the respondent Company to terminate the services of the appellant at any time without assigning any reason and without giving any notice and merely by giving one month's salary in lieu of notice; (b) that in the termination letter dated 8th October, 1991 proved as Ex. CW/15, there was no whisper of any charge of misconduct or otherwise against the appellant and it was a case of termination simpliciter; (c) that there was thus no breach of the terms and conditions of appointment and the termination was valid. The plea of the appellant that the appointment after completion of probation and promotion was not governed by the appointment letter dated 1st October, 1973 was rejected and it was held that it was not necessary that after every promotion a fresh appointment letter has to be issued and that the terms of appointment would remain the same, even if theemployeeis promoted subsequently. It was yet further held that the respondent Company had given valid explanation for not terminating the services of the appellant on thegroundof misconduct. Accordingly, the termination of the services of the appellant was held to be legal and valid and in accordance with the service agreement Ex. DW 1/3. Qua Issue No. 2, the suit court held that the respondent Company is not a State and the relief of declaration cannot be granted against a company which is neither a Government, Government Company, Government Instrumentality, Statutory Corporation nor an authority within the meaning of Article12of the Constitution of India and that the status of the appellant was different from that ofemployeesworking with Government or Government Bodies within the meaning of Article12of the Constitution on India. It was yet further held that in the case of illegal termination of a contractual relationship of master and servant, since such a contract is not specifically enforceable, damages if any and not declaration is the remedy. Accordingly, the suit filed by the appellant was held to be not maintainable; axiomatically the suit was dismissed.6. The counsel for the appellant has drawn attention to some of the clauses of the appointment letter dated 1st October, 1973 Ex. DW 1/3 and the senior counsel for the respondent to others. The relevant clauses of the appointment letter are as under:You will be on probation for three months. On the completion of the same and if your service are found satisfactory, of which the Management will be the sole judge, you will be confirmed. Your services are liable to be terminated at any time, even before the expiry of the probationary period without assigning any reason, and without giving any notice.The Management may however, extend the period of probation for a further specified period and thereby offer further opportunity of satisfy the Management as to your usefulness to the Company. On confirmation, your services can be terminated on giving one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice and without assigning any reason.If any act of misconduct is alleged against you the management shall take such action against you as it might find necessary. The Management may in the case of serious misconducts hold an inquiry and even suspend you, pending inquiry. You shall not claim any payment for the suspension period.In case the Management finds that you are surplus to requirements, the Management shall terminate your service on payment to you of such compensation as provided under law. Management in that event shall not be obliged to follow the rule of Last come First go.In the event of your wishing to terminate your service with the Company, you shall given the Company at least 30 days notice in writing.It may be mentioned that though the paragraphs of the appointment letter are not numbered but the first of the clauses reproduced above is para 2 of the appointment letter and the second clause reproduced above is para 3 of the letter. It may further be mentioned that the impugned judgment has referred only to para 2 of the letter and has not made any reference to para 3 aforesaid, though the termination vide letter dated 8th October, 1991 Ex. CW/15 has been affected thereunder.7. The contention of the counsel for the appellant is that the services of the appellant could be terminated "at any time....without assigning any reason" under para No. 2 aforesaid (which as aforesaid is the only paragraph of the appointment letter referred to in the judgment) only during the period of probation and, after the completion of probation and especially after 18 years of service, the services of the appellant could be terminated only under the other two clauses aforesaid i.e. on thegroundof misconduct or on thegroundof the appellant being surplus to the requirement of the respondent Company. It is further contended that though the respondent Company in the termination letter did not assign any reason but subsequently in the written statement in the suit took the plea of having lost confidence in the appellant and which demonstrates that the termination of the appellant was for the reason of misconduct but the respondent Company neither served any charge-sheet nor held any enquiry nor gave an opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. It is thus contended that the judgment of the Trial Court is erroneous.8. Before noticing the argument of the respondent Company, it may be highlighted that the argument of the appellant before the Suit Court was to the contrary. There the contention of the appellant was that his services were no longer governed by the terms and conditions of the appointment letter dated 1st October, 1973 Ex. DW 1/3 but by "general, reasonable and fair commonemploymentconditions" as specifically recorded in the impugned judgment under Issue No. 1 in para 6. On enquiry the counsel for the appellant informs that it is not the plea of the appellant in the memorandum of appeal that the said argument of the counsel for the appellant has been wrongfully recorded. It has also been enquired from the counsel for the appellant whether the appellant has proved any "general, reasonable and fair commonemploymentconditions" of the respondent Company. The answer again is in the negative. What emerges therefore is that save for the appointment letter on the basis whereof the argument before this Court has been addressed, there are no other terms and conditions pleaded of theemploymentof the appellant with the respondent Company.9. The senior counsel for the respondent Company on the other hand has argued that the services of the appellant were terminated in 1991 and the suit was filed only in March, 1992; that the claim of Rs. 16 lakhs for emoluments to be earned upto December 2015 was in any case not maintainable; that the respondent Company terminated the services of the appellant in exercise of its contractual right to terminate the services without assigning any reason.10. The counsel for the appellant in rejoinder has raised the argument of the termination of services being by an officer junior in rank to the officer of the respondent Company, who had appointed the appellant.11. As far as the contention of the appellant of termination having been effected by an officer junior in rank to the officer appointing the appellant is concerned, on enquiry, it is stated that the Suit Court has not rendered any finding on the plea of the appellant. However, on further enquiry whether the appellant in the memorandum of appeal has pleaded that the saidgroundwas urged and not decided, the counsel for the appellant fairly states that no such pleading has been made. The senior counsel for the respondent Company has responded to the said contention by drawing attention to the resolution dated 7th March, 1990 of the Board of Directors of the respondent Company proved as DW 1/2 authorising the then respondent No. 2, General Manager to exercise the power of termination qua theemployees. In view of the same, no merit is found in the said contention.12. I am unable to accept the contention of the appellant, of para 2 supra of the appointment letter making the services of the appellant 'liable to termination at any time even before the expiry of probationary period, without assigning any reason and without giving any notice' being applicable only during the period of probation and not thereafter. Merely because the words "even before the expiry of probationary period" are used would not limit the right conferred by the respondent Company thereunder unto itself to terminate the services without assigning any reason and without giving any notice, to the period of probation.13. Be that as it may, the termination affected by the respondent Company was under para 3 as aforesaid and not under para 2 and which para 3 has escaped the attention of the Suit Court. Even if there were to be any ambiguity in para 2, the same is unequivocally removed in para 3 by observing that "on confirmation, your services can be terminated on giving one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice and without assigning any reason".14. Thus post probation, the services of the appellant were terminable under three clauses; firstly, by one month's notice or paying salary in lieu thereof and without assigning any reason; secondly, if misconduct was alleged against the appellant by holding enquiry; and, thirdly, if the services of the appellant were to become surplus to the requirements of the respondent Company, by payment of compensation. I have repeatedly enquired from the counsel for the appellant as to how such multifarious contractual rights of the respondent Company could be limited and as to how the respondent Company in spite thereof can be said to be entitled to only to terminate the services if the appellant was guilty of misconduct or if his services become surplus and which interpretation would have the effect of making para 3 of the appointment letter entitling the respondent Company to terminate the services with one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof without assigning any reason, redundant. The accepted rule of interpretation of deeds and documents is to first attempt to give a harmonious construction thereto and even if the same is not possible, the earlier clause prevails over the latter. Even if it were to be so, para 3 entitling the respondent Company to terminate the services without assigning any reason with one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof would prevail over the latter paragraph permitting termination on thegroundof misconduct or on thegroundof services of the appellant becoming surplus.15. Faced therewith, the counsel for the appellant has urged that the respondent Company in the written statement to the suit having averred the termination to be owing to misconduct, contractually was bound to hold an enquiry and having not done so, the termination is bad and stigmatic.16. I am unable to agree. The Supreme Court in Krishna Devaraya Education Trust Vs. L.A. BalakrishnaMANU/SC/0026/2001: AIR 2001 SC 625 and Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. Of Medical SciencesMANU/SC/0705/2001: AIR 2002 SC 23, though relating to cases of probation, has held that if the dispensation is simpliciter, merely because the employer, upon such dispensation being challenged before the Court, explains the reason for such dispensation, cannot turn the dispensation from being simpliciter to stigmatic for it to be held that dispensation without holding enquiry is bad. It was further held that in order to amount to a stigma, the termination order must be in a language which imputes something and allegations made against the terminatedemployeein the counter affidavit by way of defence to achallengeto termination made by the terminatedemployeedo not change the nature and character of the order of termination.17. In the present case, even in the written statement, the respondent has not elaborated or imputed any misconduct on the appellant and has merely pleaded that on the basis of the information received, it was not possible for the respondent No. 1 Company to continue to repose confidence in the appellant who was employed at a sensitive position at the Airport and since any punitive action against the appellant would have had adverse consequence for the appellant and may have affected his future prospects, the respondent Company as per its policy decided to exercise its right of simpliciter termination of the services. The said explanation has been given merely in defence to the plea taken by the appellant in the plaint of the termination being attributable to the change of hands in the management from Sindhis to Parsis and with motive and attempt to employ a Parsi in the place of the appellant.18. It is worth mentioning that in any case it is not the case of the appellant that the appellant suffered any adverse consequence owing to the said plea taken by the respondent Company in the written statement or that the respondent Company has in any manner published having lost confidence in the appellant. The termination, therefore, remains a simpliciter one.19. Before parting with this case, I may record that when during the course of hearing it was brought to the notice of the counsel for the appellant that there was no security of tenure in privateemployment(as observed by the Supreme Court in para 14 of Union Public Service Commission Vs. Girish Jayanti Lal VaghelaMANU/SC/8003/2006: (2006) 2 SCC 482) as that of the appellant with the respondent was and it was not the case of the appellant that the appellant was a workman, the counsel for the appellant had sought to urge that the promotion of the appellant from Office Boy to Assistant Manager was only nominal; however the counsel fairly admits that there is no foundation for such a case in the pleadings or in the evidence. Rather, the case built up by the appellant is to the contrary.20. I am therefore of the view that the termination of the services of the appellant was in accordance with the contract ofemploymentof the appellant with the respondent Company and thegroundsurged to impugn the saidemploymentare not available to the appellant. Once it is held that the termination is not illegal, the question of the appellant being entitled to any damages does not arise. There is no merit in the appeal; the same is dismissed; however in the facts and circumstances, with no order as to costs.Decree sheet be drawn up. Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

Go to top

Bottom of Form

MANU/DE/1446/2012Equivalent Citation:2012VIAD(Delhi)455, 190(2012)DLT185, 2012LLR608IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHIRFA No. 294/2004Decided On:20.03.2012Appellants:Ge Capital Transportation Financial ServicesLtd.Vs.Respondent:Shri Tarun BhargavaHon'ble Judges/Coram:Hon'ble Mr. JusticeValmiki J. MehtaCounsels:For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mr.Divjyot Singh, Advocate with Mr.Gurpreet Singh, AdvocateFor Respondents/Defendant: Mr.Arya Girdhari, AdvocateSubject:ContractCatch WordsMentioned INActs/Rules/Orders:Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 14(1),Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 41;Industrial Disputes Act, 1947;Contract Act, 1872 - Section 23,Contract Act, 1872 - Section 73;Constitution of India - Article 12;Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 96,Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 226Cases Referred:Sh. Satya Narain Garg through his legal heirs v. DCMLtd. & Ors.,MANU/DE/7110/2011: (187) 2012 DLT 25;S.S. Shetty v. Bharat NidhiLtd.,MANU/SC/0080/1957: AIR 1958 SC 12;Collier v. Sunday Referee Publishing Co.Ltd.,1940 4 ALL. E.R. 234;Tarlochan Singh Mokha v. M/s. Shriram Pistons & RingsLimited& Ors.,MANU/DE/0108/1998: 74 (1998) DLT 455;Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Etc v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr.,MANU/SC/0439/1986: AIR 1986 SC 1571;BinnyLtd. & Anr. v. V. Sadasivan & Ors.MANU/SC/0470/2005: (2005) 6 SCC 657;D.C.M.Limited& Anr. v. Mahabir Singh RanaMANU/DE/3348/2009;S.M. Murray v. M/s. Fenner IndiaLtd.MANU/DE/0205/1986: AIR 1986 Delhi 427Citing Reference:

Affirmed2

Discussed2

Distinguished1

Mentioned3

Disposition:Appeal allowedCase Note:Service - Maintainability - Compensation - Sections 14(1)(b) and (c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Trial Court decreedsuitof Respondent/Plaintiff/employeeagainst Appellant/Defendant/employer by which Appellant/defendant was directed to pay compensation amount of ` 10,87,294/- for unlawfulterminationof services and also held that there could be a specific performance of a contract for personal service - Hence, this Appeal - Whether,Suitfiled by Respondent/Plaintiff could be maintainable - Held, no evidence at all had been led by Respondent/Plaintiff as to steps taken by him to get alternativeemploymentwhen he was terminated at age of 34 years - Further as per admitted contractual terms contained in letter of appointment, services of Respondent/Plaintiff could be terminated by a one month's notice - However contract of personal service not being enforceable under Section 14(1)(b) of Act, 1963, contract being determinable in nature and hence could not be enforced as per Section 14(1)(c) of Act, 1963 or that injunction could not be granted to prevent breach of a contract which could not be specifically enforced, hencesuitwas clearly barred and not maintainable - Even presuming there was breach of contract, at best reasonabledamagescould be granted and once there was a clause forterminationof services by one month's notice, it could only be one month's notice which could be treated as reasonabledamagesinasmuch as parties understood period for obtaining of an alternativeemploymentas a one month's notice period - Thus impugned judgment granting one month's salary for each of balance years of 26 years i.e. salary for 26 months was clearly illegal and violative, thussuitwas also not maintainable in terms of Sections 14(1)(b) and (c) of Act, 1963 read with Section 41(e) thereof - Appeal allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

"Master who wrongfully dismisses his servant is bound to pay him suchdamagesas will compensate him for wrong that he has sustained."JUDGMENTValmiki J. Mehta, J.1. Thechallengeby means of this Regular First Appeal (RFA) filed under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is to the impugned judgment of the trial Court dated 31.1.2004 decreeing thesuitof the respondent/plaintiff/employeeagainst the appellant/defendant/ employer, and by which decree the appellant/defendant was directed to pay the compensation amount of`10,87,294/- for unlawfulterminationof services. The amount ofdamageswhich were calculated were one month's salary for each year of balance services till the date of retirement of the respondent/plaintiff, and which was found to be 26 years as the respondent/plaintiff was about 34 years of age when his services were terminated and the retirement age was 60 years. The facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff was appointed as Business Officer with M/s Shri Ram Fibres FinanceLtd. in the year 1990. After completion of probation, the services of respondent were confirmed on 15.1.1991. The services of the appellant were subsequently governed by the terms and conditions of the appointment letter dated 21.4.1998 issued by the subsequent employer i.e. M/s. GE Capital Transportation Financial ServicesLtd. The respondent/plaintiff claimed that he had to do some interior work in his flat and for which he had no other option but to take leave in November, 2001, and which leave was never refused. It was further pleaded in the plaint that on return from leave to the Ludhiana office on 21.1.2002, he was asked to join at Gurgaon and no work was assigned to him on his joining at Gurgaon. It was pleaded that he was paid salary for January and February, 2002 and his services were terminated by means of theterminationletter dated 28.2.2002. It was pleaded that theterminationletter was violative of principles of natural justice besides being illegal and an infringement of the terms of theemployment. The reliefs claimed in thesuitwere for declaration and injunction to seek continuation ofemploymentand for salary for the period for which it was not paid and to be continued up to the retirement age of 60 years.2. The appellant/defendant contested thesuitand pleaded that thesuitwas in fact barred under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It was pleaded that the services of the respondent/plaintiff were validly terminated. It was contended on behalf of the appellant/defendant that the services of the respondent/plaintiff had to be terminated as he was a delinquentemployeewho took leave on his own without any sanction.3. After completion of pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:-1. Whether thesuitin the present form is maintainable? OPP2. Whether theterminationof the services of the plaintiff by the defendant is illegal and void? OPP3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs prayed for? OPP4. Relief.4. With regard to issue No. 1 as to the maintainability of thesuit, the trial Court held thesuitto be maintainable. The trial Court has referred to various judgments of the Supreme Court to hold that there can be a specific performance of a contract for personal service.In my opinion, the trial court has clearly misdirected itself inasmuch as wherever parties are strictly governed by contractual rights and obligations i.e. theemploymentis purely a contractual one, i.e. not being under the Government or "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and also not of anemployeecovered under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the contractualemploymentcan always be terminated in terms of the contract. Also, even assuming theterminationis not as per the contract, at best the entitlement will be to claimdamageswhich naturally flow out of the breach i.e. of the illegalterminationof contract.5. The law in this regard is contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Shetty Vs. Bharat NidhiLtd.,MANU/SC/0080/1957: AIR 1958 SC 12. Para 12 of this judgment of the Supreme Court reads as under:-12. The position as it obtains in the ordinary law of master and servant is quite clear. The master who wrongfully dismisses his servant is bound to pay him suchdamagesas will compensate him for the wrong that he has sustained.They are to be assessed by reference to the amount earned in the service wrongfully terminated and the time likely to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable upon, e.g., a month's notice, thedamageswill ordinarily be a month's wages.......No compensation can be claimed in respect of the injury done to the servant's feelings by the circumstances of his dismissal, nor in respect of extra difficulty of finding work resulting from those circumstances. A servant who has been wrongfully dismissed must use diligence to seek anotheremployment, and the fact that he has been offered a suitable post may be taken into account in assessing thedamages.(Chitty on Contracts, 21st Edn., Vol (2), p. 559 para 1040).6. I have also had an occasion to consider this very aspect in the recent judgment in the case of Sh. Satya Narain Garg through his legal heirs Vs. DCMLtd. & Ors.,MANU/DE/7110/2011: (187) 2012 DLT 25. In this judgment of Sh. Satya Narain Garg (supra) I have referred to the recent judgment of Supreme Court in the case of BinnyLtd. & Anr. v. V. Sadasivan & Ors.MANU/SC/0470/2005: (2005) 6 SCC 657 in support of the proposition that public policy/administrative law principles do not apply toprivateemployment. Paras 7 to 10 of the judgment in the case of Sh. Satya Narain Garg are relevant and the same read as under:-7. Merely because two views are possible, this Court will not interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court, unless the conclusion is illegal or perverse or causes grave injustice. In case ofprivateemployment, the employers are fully justified in taking steps forterminationof services, if it finds that theemployeeis not upto the mark. Principles applicable in public law domain do not apply with respect toemployeesinprivateemployment.Employmentinprivatesector is governed by the terms and conditions ofemployment, and unless theterminationis shown to be violation of the terms and conditions ofemployment, it cannot be said that theterminationis illegal. In the present case, in my opinion, since there was no fixed period ofemploymentso far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, the deceased plaintiff could have been terminated from services even by a simplicitor notice, assuming even if the services of the deceased plaintiff were upto the mark. Further, even if there is illegalterminationof services, it is not possible to grantdamagesas claimed inasmuch as the principle of mitigation ofdamagessquarely applies. As per this principle of mitigation ofdamagesenshrined in Section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 even if anemployeeis illegally terminated from services, he cannot sit at home and he must take sufficient steps to procure alternativeemployment. The law in this regard is contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as S.S. Shetty v. Bharat NidhiLtd.,MANU/SC/0080/1957: AIR 1958 SC 12. Paras 12 and 13 of this judgment are relevant and the same read as under:12. The position as it obtains in the ordinary law of master and servant is quite clear. The master who wrongfully dismisses his servant is bound to pay him suchdamagesas will compensate him for the wrong that he has sustained.They are to be assessed by reference to the amount earned in the service wrongfully terminated and the time likely to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable upon, e.g., a month's notice, thedamageswill ordinarily be a month's wages... ... ... No compensation can be claimed in respect of the injury done to the servant's feelings by the circumstances of his dismissal, nor in respect of extra difficulty of finding work resulting from those circumstances. A servant who has been wrongfully dismissed must use diligence to seek anotheremployment, and the fact that he has been offered a suitable post may be taken into account in assessing thedamages.(Chitty on Contracts, 21st Edition, Vol (2), p. 559 para. 1040).13. If the contract ofemploymentis for a specific term, the servant would in that event be entitled todamagesthe amount of which would be measured prima facie and subject to the rule of mitigation in the salary of which the master had deprived him. (Vide Collier v. Sunday Referee Publishing Co.Ltd.,1940 4 ALL. E.R. 234at p.237 (A). The servant would then be entitled to the whole of the salary, benefits, etc., which he would have earned had he continued in the employ of the master for the full term of the contract, subject of course to mitigation ofdamagesby way of seeking alternativeemployment.7. A reference to the evidence led on behalf of the deceased plaintiff shows that the following is the only evidence which is led to show efforts made for alternativeemployment:I did not join any service afterterminationby defdt No. 1. I am not doing any job since 22.9.93 as I could not find any job despite my efforts.9. Surely, these types of self-serving averments cannot be held as discharge of onus of proof of mitigation ofdamages. The statement made by the deceased plaintiff is bereft of any details as to which companies or firms or persons he applied to, and on which dates, and for what position, and for what salary and also the details as to why he could not obtain the alternativeemployment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the deceased plaintiff, even assuming he was wrongly terminated from services, failed to prove that he had taken sufficient steps for mitigation ofdamages.10. One issue argued before this Court on 17.11.2011 was with regard to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Tarlochan Singh Mokha v. M/s. Shriram Pistons & RingsLimited& Ors.,MANU/DE/0108/1998: 74 (1998) DLT 455, wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has, relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Etc v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr,MANU/SC/0439/1986: AIR 1986 SC 1571, held that public policy principles contained and explained in the Brojo Nath Ganguly's case will also apply toprivateemployment. This judgment, however, in my opinion, no longer lays down the correct law inasmuch as the Supreme Court recently in the case of BinnyLtd. & Anr. v. V. Sadasivan & Ors.MANU/SC/0470/2005: (2005) 6 SCC 657 has held that public policy principles cannot apply toprivateemployment. Head note "E of the judgment succinctly brings out the ratio in this regard and the same reads as under:E. Constitution of India - Art. 226 - Maintainability - Generally - Relief, held, cannot be granted once writ petition is held to be not maintainablePublic-policy principles can be applied toemploymentin public sector undertakings in appropriate cases. But the same principles cannot be applied toprivatebodies. There are various labour laws which curtail the power of the employer from doing any anti-labour activity. Sufficient safeguards are made in the labour law enactments to protect the interests of theemployeesof theprivatesector. The service rules and regulations which are applicable to governmentemployeesoremployeesof public sector undertakings stand on a different footing and they cannot be tested on the same touchstone or enforced in the same manner. (Para 26)In the matter ofemploymentof workers byprivatebodies on the basis of contracts entered into between them, the courts have been reluctant to exercise the powers of judicial review and whenever the powers were exercised as againstprivateemployers, it was solely done based on the public law element involved therein.(Para 16)The decision of the employers in the preset cases to terminate the services of theiremployeescannot be said to have any element of public policy and the remedy available to the respondents is to seek redressal of their grievance in civil law or under the labour law enactments, especially in view of the disputed questions involved as regards the status ofemployeesand other matters. Their cases were purely governed by the contract ofemploymententered into between theemployeesand the employer. It is not appropriate to construe those contracts as being opposed to the principles of public policy and thus as void and illegal under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. (Para 31)7. In the present case, admittedly no evidence at all has been led by the respondent/plaintiff as to steps taken by him to get alternativeemploymentwhen he was terminated at the age of 34 years. Further, as per the admitted contractual terms contained in the letter of appointment dated 21.4.1998, Ex.P9, the services of the respondent/plaintiff could be terminated by a one month's notice. This para 7 of the letter dated 21.4.1998 reads as under:-7. One month's notice will be required in writing from either side in case of servicetermination. Payment of one month's salary will be required in lieu of notice. However, GE Capital TFS Reserves the right to terminate youremploymentongroundsof policy misconduct of unsatisfactory job performance.8. Whatever be the language of the prayer clauses of the plaint, and whatever be thegroundof cause of action pleaded, the sum and substance of the cause of action in the plaint is for re-employmentand continuation ofemploymentwith service benefits till the age of 60 years. In effect, therefore there is sought specific performance of the contractual services and which is impermissible in law. I may note that the contracts of personal service are only enforceable where the employer is a Government company or an arm of the State as per Article 12 of the Constitution of India. As per Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act,1963, a contract for personal service cannot be enforced.9. In fact, the subjectsuitwas also barred by Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides that the contract which is in its nature determinable, cannot be specifically enforced. I have referred to the fact that the contract was determinable by a one month's notice as per clause 7 of the terms and conditions of the letter dated 21.4.1998 and therefore the contract which was determinable by one month's notice cannot be specifically enforced. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly i.e. if there cannot be specific performance of the contract, there cannot be declaration and injunction to continue such a service contract. Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that injunction will not be granted to prevent breach of the contract, performance of which could not be specifically enforced.10. Therefore, looking at the matter from the point of view of the contract of personal service not being enforceable under Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the contract being determinable in nature and hence cannot be enforced as per Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or that injunction could not be granted to prevent breach of a contract which cannot be specifically enforced, thesuitwas clearly barred and not maintainable. The judgment of the trial Court does not refer to the binding provisions of Sections 14(1)(b), (c) and 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. To complete the discussion on this aspect, I would once again refer to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of BinnyLtd. (supra) and which specifically provides that inprivatecontracts i.e. in strict contractual matters, there does not arise the issue of applicability of Administrative Law principles.11. I have already stated above that even presuming there was breach of contract, at best reasonabledamagescan be granted and once there is a clause forterminationof services by one month's notice, it can only be one month's notice which can be treated as reasonabledamagesinasmuch as parties understood the period for obtaining of an alternativeemploymentas a one month's notice period-vide SS shetty's case (supra).12. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff places heavy reliance on two judgments of the two learned Single Judges of this Court. The first judgment is the judgment in the case of D.C.M.Limited& Anr. Vs. Mahabir Singh RanaMANU/DE/3348/2009and the second is S.M. Murray Vs. M/s. Fenner IndiaLtd.MANU/DE/0205/1986: AIR 1986 Delhi 427. It was argued on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff that since the retirement age is mentioned as 60 years in the letter dated 21.4.1998, it would mean that there is automatically a fixedemploymenttill 60 years.In my opinion, the arguments which have been urged on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff have no merits. The judgments which have been relied upon on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff also do not apply to the facts of the present case. So far as the judgment in the case of Mahabir Singh Rana (supra) is concerned, I may note that possibly the said judgment is a judgment where theemployeewas anemployeeunder the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Theemployeein the case of Mahabir Singh Rana (supra) was employed in the mill as a Weaving Apprentice and was working as an Assistant Weaving Master when his services were terminated. The judgment in the case of Mahabir Singh Rana (supra) also possibly cannot be said to lay down a good law inasmuch as the said judgment ignores the binding judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Shetty (supra) and which specifically provides that in case of illegalterminationof contractualemployment, there can only be granted reasonabledamagesi.e. salary for a few months till an alternativeemploymentis obtained and one month if the services are terminable by one month's notice. I have already noted that in the facts of the present case, the parties had agreed that one month's notice period was a sufficient notice period. So far as the judgment in the case of S.M. Murray (supra) is concerned the same does not apply to the facts of the present case and is distinguishable because in the said case the contract ofemploymentwas for a fixed period of five years and thesuitwhich was decreed in the said case was for the amount of salary and consequential benefits which were only for the balance period of five years and services for which period could not be performed because of earlier illegaltermination. This is made clear by a reading of para 28 of the said judgment and as per which the salary has been granted from the date ofwrongfulterminationof service agreement i.e. 21.4.1984 till it was to expire in its normal course i.e. 16.2.1986 i.e. the balance period of service of five years.13. In view of the above, the appeal has to succeed. The impugned judgment granting one month's salary for each of the balance years of 26 years i.e. the salary for 26 months is clearly illegal and violative of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Shetty (supra) and BinnyLtd. (supra). Thesuitwas also not maintainable in terms of Sections 14(1)(b) and (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Section 41(e) thereof.14. Appeal is therefore accepted. Impugned judgment and decree dated 31.1.2004 is set aside.Suitof the respondent/plaintiff will stand decreed only for one month's salary alongwith interest thereon @ 9% per annum simple till today. Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff agrees that one month's salary in the present case was`41,819/-, a figure which is given in para 35 of the impugned judgment. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be prepared. Trial Court record be sent back.15. Since the decretal amount of`10,87,294/- has been deposited in this Court, and which amount has been put in a fixed deposit, it is directed that the respondent/plaintiff be paid the amount due to him as per this judgment out of the amount deposited in this Court and the accrued interest thereon i.e. the amount of`41,819/- with interest @ 9% simple from 1.3.2002 till date. The balance amount thereafter remaining, be refunded back to the appellant. Registry shall issue the necessary cheques in favour of respective parties within a period of four weeks from today.

Manupatra Information SolutionsPvt.Ltd.

Go to top

MANU/DE/0386/2012IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHIRFA (OS) No. 3/1999Decided On:25.01.2012Appellants:Shriram Pistons & RingsLtd. & Anr.Vs.Respondent:Shri T.S. MokhaHon'ble Judges/Coram:Hon'ble Mr. JusticePradeep Nandrajogand Hon'ble Ms. JusticePratibha RaniCounsels:For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mr.T.K. Ganju, Sr. Advocate with Mr.Sayeed Aqib& Mr.Aditya Ganju, Advs.For Respondents/Defendant: Mr.Rajinder Dhawanwith Mr.D.D. Singhand Mr.B.S. Rana, Advs. with respondent in personSubject:ServiceCatch WordsMentioned INActs/Rules/Orders:Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Section 21;Companies Act, 1956 - Section 617;Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 - Section 2;Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 21;Contract Act - Section 23;Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 14;Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLimited(Service, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 - Rule 9(1);Constitution of India - Article 12,Constitution of India - Article 14,Constitution of India - Article 309,Constitution of India - Article 311Cases Referred:Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Tarun Kanti Sengupta & Anr.MANU/SC/0439/1986: AIR 1986 SC 1571;Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors.MANU/SC/0031/1991: AIR 1991 SC 101;Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corp. Vs. Chandra KiranMANU/SC/0499/1969: AIR 1970 SC 1244;Dr. S. Dutt Vs. University of DelhiMANU/SC/0131/1958: AIR 1958 SC 1050;S.R.Tewari Vs. District Board, AgraMANU/SC/0223/1963: AIR 1964 SC 1680;Smt.J.Tiwari Vs. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir & Ors.MANU/SC/0473/1979: AIR 1981 SC 122;Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors..Vs. Lakshmi NarainMANU/SC/0052/1979: AIR 1976 SC 888 : 1976 (2) SCC 58;S.S. Shetty Vs. Bharat NidhiLtd.MANU/SC/0080/1957: AIR 1958 SC 12;Dayanand Sarup Vs. Smt. Bimla Rani1981 LabIC 1009HC;IOCLtd. Vs. Amritsar Gas ServiceLtd.MANU/SC/0513/1991: 1991 (1) SCC 533;Sitaram Kanshi Ram Konda Vs. Pigment Cakes & Chemical Manufacturing Co.AIR 1980 SC 60;Indian Airlines Corporation Vs. Sukhdeo RaiMANU/SC/0668/1971: AIR 1971 SC 1828;S.M.Murray Vs. M/s. Fenner IndiaLtd.AIR 1986 Del 427;Central Inland Water TransportLtd& Anr. Vs. Brozo Nath Ganguli & Anr.MANU/SC/0439/1986: AIR 1986 SC 1571;Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors.MANU/SC/0031/1991: AIR 1991 SC 101;The Central Co-operative BankLtd. Kumbakonam Vs. M. Parthasarathi1988 1 law weekly 479;P.B.Ghayalod Vs. M/s Maruti UdyogLtd. & Ors.MANU/DE/0021/1992: AIR 1992 Delhi 145;Ajay Pasia v. Khalid Mujib SehravardiMANU/SC/0498/1980: (1981) I LLJ 103 SC;R. D. Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India :MANU/SC/0048/1979: (1979) II LLJ 217 SC;Ajay Hasai Vs. Khalid Mujib SchravardiMANU/SC/0498/1980: AIR 1981 SC 487;SBI vs. S.N.Goyal. RelevantMANU/SC/7605/2008: 2008 (8) SCC 92;Sirsi Municipality by its President, Sirsi Vs. Cecelia Kom Francis TellisMANU/SC/0066/1973: AIR 1973 SC 855;BinnyLtd. & Anr. Vs. V.Sadasivan & Ors.MANU/SC/0470/2005: AIR 2005 SC 3202;Vaish Degree College Shamli & Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors.MANU/SC/0052/1979: AIR 1976 SC 888Citing Reference:

Discussed15

Mentioned5

Disposition:Appeal allowedCase Note:ServiceTermination- Present Appeal filed against decree ofsuitfor declaration thatterminationwas illegal and fordamagesor reinstatement with full back wages Held, Single Judge had granted relief of declaration that clause 10 of agreement was void and consequently notice ofterminationalso fails relying on case law decided by Supreme Court in matter of Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd& Anr Vs Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr - Single Judge had preferred not to enter into discussion on issue about constitution of Appellant company and to consider that judgment of Supreme Court in above case could be made applicable to facts of present case where relationship was purely contractual Said above case was also discussed in detail in case ofprivateemploymentwhere specific performance of contract was sought to be enforced challenging clause 9 which was similar to clause 10 in present case - Law as enunciated by Apex court on issue requiring determination in this case, had not only been ignored but also misinterpreted and misapplied by Single Judge - Thus impugned judgment passed by Single Judge was liable to be set aside - Consequently Appeal allowedJUDGMENTPratibha Rani, J.1. The appellant-company M/s. Shriram Pistons & RingsLtd. impugned the judgment and decree dated 27th May, 1998, passed by the learned Single Judge, in asuitfiled by the respondent herein, (plaintiff in thesuit), who was their ex-employeein managerial capacity, seeking declaration that histerminationwas unconstitutional, illegal and mala fide and without authority. In addition, respondent also sought the relief ofdamagesfor`4 lacs and/or reinstatement with full back wages and benefit.2. The facts are not in dispute. Most of the documents produced during evidence by the parties are also not in dispute. So instead of mentioning the case of the respondent and the appellant separately, as averred in the plaint or defence taken in the written statement, succinctly stated the facts are that the appellant company employed the respondent as Administration Manager. He was issued an appointment letter dated 25th September, 1980 Exhibit P-1, containing the terms and conditions ofemployment, as per Clause 10 whereof, the respondent could serve the master servant relationship i.e. resign after giving three months" notice or the appellant could severe the master-servant relationship by terminating service of the respondent after giving three months" notice or salary in lieu thereof. The respondent continued to serve the appellant till his services were terminated videterminationorder Exhibit P-2 dated 21st March, 1985, invoking Clause 10 of the appointment letter, referred to above. It is not in dispute that respondent was paid the notice pay by his employer i.e., appellant company, as required under Clause 10 of the terms and conditions of the appointment, contained in Exhibit P-1. Subsequently other dues, after necessary adjustments, were also paid to the respondent.(N.B. in the appeal and at few other places a confusion has been created with reference to Ex.PW-1/1, which is an appointment letter dated 16th October 1979, appointing respondent as an "Officer" in J.Engineering WorksLtd., probably a sister concern of the appellant)3. After completing the pleadings, following issues were settled by learned Single Judge:(i) Whethersuitis not maintainable against Defendant No. 3" (ii) Whether Defendant No.2 is a separate legal entity and if not to what effect" (iii) Whether thesuitis bad for misjoinder of parties" (iv) Whether theterminationof respondent's services by Defendant No.1 was illegal and if so, to what effect" (v) Whether the plaintiff is stopped from challenging the validity ofterminationof his service' (vi) Whether the claim for declaration is barred under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act' (vii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled todamagesand if so, to what amount' (viii) Whether Defendants have paid`57,204.25 and other dues to the plaintiff' (ix) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled'4. The learned Single Judge, in view of discussion in para 36 and 37 of the impugned judgment, while declaring Clause 10 of the appointment letter andterminationto be void, in para 49 of the impugned judgment, granted the reliefs, which are extracted below :36. Whatsoever may be the contentions of the parties, the sole question for determination is "Whether the first defendant could invoke clause 10 and terminate the services of the plaintiff'' In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. AND Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Tarun Kanti Sengupta & Anr.MANU/SC/0439/1986: AIR 1986 SC 1571 which is followed by the Supreme Court 1991 in "Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors'.MANU/SC/0031/1991: AIR 1991 SC 101, the clause relied on by the defendants is void in law and consequently, the notice ofterminationfails to theground.37. The first defendant is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. The question whether the first defendant is a Government Company or not and whether the services of the plaintiff were terminated because he belongs to a particular community, would not at all be relevant and I do not deem it proper and necessary to decide those questions. When the notice ofterminationorder is void, the plaintiff would be entitled to the declaration and as a consequencedamages. I have no hesitation in granting a decree declaring that the notice ofterminationP-2 is void in law and is not enforceable at the instance of the defendants against the plaintiff.49. On issue No.7, I find that the plaintiff would be entitled to the sum of`5,82,785.75 :(i) declaring that the notice ofterminationdated the 21st of March, 1985 (Ex.P2) as null and void.(ii) declaring that the plaintiff is deemed to have been in service of the first defendant till he attained the age of superannuation on 31.01.1994.(iii) directing defendants 1 & 2 to pay the plaintiff the sum of`5,82,795.75.(iv) directing defendants 1 & 2 to pay the interest to the plaintiff @ 15% p.a. on the sum of`5,82,795.75 w.e.f. 1.2.1994 till the date of payment.(v) directing the defendants 1 & 2 to pay the plaintiff the costs of thesuit.(vi) directing the dismissal of thesuitagainst the third defendant without costs.5. As is to be noted from para 37 of the impugned decision, the learned Single Judge has held that it was irrelevant whether the appellant company was a government company and without deciding theprivatecharacter or otherwise of the appellant, has rendered a verdict against the appellant. The contentions of the appellant company in appeal, is that it is aprivatecompany and since the respondent was serving the company in managerial capacity, provisions of Industrial Dispute Act were not applicable to him and he was not covered under any of the exceptions recognized by law pertaining to service i.e. (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article311of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach of violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.6. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied uponMANU/SC/0499/1969: AIR 1970 SC 1244 titled as Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corp. Vs. Chandra Kiran;MANU/SC/0131/1958: AIR 1958 SC 1050 titled as Dr.S.Dutt Vs. University of Delhi;MANU/SC/0223/1963: AIR 1964 SC 1680 titled as S.R.Tewari Vs. District Board, Agra;MANU/SC/0473/1979: AIR 1981 SC 122 titled as Smt.J.Tiwari Vs. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir & Ors.;MANU/SC/0052/1979: 1976 (2) SCC 58 titled as Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli Vs. Lakshmi Narain;MANU/SC/0080/1957: AIR 1958 SC 12 titled as S.S. Shetty Vs. Bharat NidhiLtd.;1981 Lab IC 1009 HCtitled as Dayanand Sarup Vs. Smt. Bimla Rani;MANU/SC/0513/1991: 1991 (1) SCC 533 titled as IOCLtd. Vs. Amritsar Gas ServiceLtd. and;MANU/SC/7605/2008: 2008 (8) SCC 92 titled as SBI Vs. S.N. Goyal in support of his contentions.7. On behalf of respondent, in addition to oral submissions, written submissions alongwith citations have also been filed on 20.01.2012. In the written submissions, after mentioning the facts of the case, the following submissions have been made :(i) Performance appraisal Ex.D22 was made basis of theterminationwith nothing to suggest that it was a usual practice in case of all theemployees. The performance appraisal Ex.D22 is vague and lack in specific particulars. The signatures of Chairman have been forged on Ex.D21 (noting and directions of the Chairman).(ii) In asuitchallenging the validity and legality ofterminationof service, two aspects are involved i.e. (a) the justification and legality ofterminationof service; and (2) relief which is to be granted toemployeeconcerned. As far as aspect (a) is concerned, there is no bar on the jurisdiction of the Court. The nature ofemploymentviz. whether he was employed in a statutory corporation or he was a workman as defined in Section2 (s)of I.D. Act or he was inprivateemploymentis relevant. Such declaration have been granted by the Courts and in this connection, reliance have been placed onAIR 1980 SC 60titled as Sitaram Kanshi Ram Konda Vs. Pigment Cakes & Chemical Manufacturing Co.,MANU/SC/0668/1971: AIR 1971 SC 1828 titled as Indian Airlines Corporation Vs. Sukhdeo Rai, andAIR 1986 Del 427titled as S.M.Murray Vs. M/s. Fenner IndiaLtd.(iii) Placing reliance on judgment of Apex Court inMANU/SC/0052/1979: AIR 1976 SC 888 titled Vaish Degree College Shamli & Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors., this Court has jurisdiction to go into the validity of justification ofterminationof services of the respondent.(iv) The respondent being Sikh, victimized post 1984 riots.(v) In view of admission of the appellant that 54% of the shares are held by financial institutions, it has rightly been held to be a Government Company within the meaning of Section617of Companies Act and the relief of declaration anddamageshave rightly been granted to the respondent and he was also entitled to get the relief of reinstatement.(vi) Referring to Section21IPC clause 12, it has been submitted that theemployeesof Government company cannot be said to beemployeeof aprivateemployer even if such a Government Company may not be a State or other Government authority. Clause 10 of the appointment letter being punitive in nature would not be applicable in such a case which has also been declared void and not enforceable by learned Single Judge as the same is opposed to public policy and void as per Section23of the Contract Act.(vii) On the basis of judgment of Apex Court inMANU/SC/0439/1986: AIR 1986 SC 1571 titled Central Inland Water TransportLtd& Anr. Vs. Brozo Nath Ganguli & Anr. wherein the regulations similar to Clause 10 of the appointment letter of the respondent was held to be void being violative of Article14of the Constitution of India and Section23of the Contract Act, which is applicable to both Government as well asprivateconcerns, thesuithas been rightly decreed.8. We have carefully considered the contentions raised at the bar and also gone through the impugned judgment and the Trial Court Record.9. The questions of law which thus arise for consideration before us relate to the applicability of law declared in the decisions reported asMANU/SC/0439/1986: AIR 1986 SC 1571 Central Inland Water TransportLtd& Anr. Vs. Brozo Nath Ganguli & Anr. andMANU/SC/0031/1991: AIR 1991 SC 101 titled Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors., toprivatecompanies substantial shares whereof are held by financial institutions.10. In para 47 of the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge held the appellant company to be a corporate body and that principles laid down by Supreme Court in AIR 1976 SC 888 titled as Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. and1988 1 law weekly 479titled as The Central Co-operative BankLtd. Kumbakonam Vs. M. Parthasarathi of Madras High Court, would apply.11. There is clear enunciation of law by this Court on this aspect in the caseMANU/DE/0021/1992: AIR 1992 Delhi 145 titled P.B.Ghayalod Vs. M/s Maruti UdyogLtd. & Ors. (The date of decision is 11.09.1991). The instant case has been decided much thereafter on 27.05.1998. In the case P.B.Ghayalod Vs. M/s Maruti UdyogLtd. & Ors., (Supra), the question that arose for decision was whether respondent No.1 i.e. M/s Maruti UdyogLtd. is an "authority" under the control of Government of India and as such an "instrumentality" within the domain of Article12of the Constitution of India.12. In the above noted case, the case of the petitioner was that respondent No.1 was a Government Company as defined under the Companies Act and became a deemed public company. The joint venture agreement was signed with Suzuki Motor Company with equity participation in between Government of India and Suzuki Motor Company in the ratio of 60 : 40. The petitioner claimed that the respondent No.1 company is completely under the control of respondent No.2 under the Ministry of Industries and thus a "State" being an "authority" within the territory of India and under the control of the Government of India within the meaning of Article12of the Constitution of India.13. The petitioner P.B.Ghayalod was appointed as General Manager (Marketing & Sales) vide appointment letter dated 07.05.1985 which contained condition No.6 to the effect that his services would be terminated by a three months notice without assigning any reason. The services of the petitioner were terminated on 14.09.1990 in terms of Clause 6 of the appointment letter which was challenged on thegroundof being void, illegal and in contravention of provisions of Article14of the Constitution of India and opposed to public policy and also void under Sec.23of the Contract Act. While answering the question referred to above, in para 8 and 9 of the judgment, it was observed as under :8. The above question came up for decision before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a case entitled Ajay Pasia v. Khalid Mujib SehravardiMANU/SC/0498/1980: (1981) I LLJ 103 SC wherein their Lordships cited with approval the observations in their own earlier judgment reported in R. D. Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India :MANU/SC/0048/1979: (1979) II LLJ 217 SC. When does such a corporation become an instrumentality or agency of Government" Is the holding of the entire share capital of the Corporation by Government enough or is it necessary that in addition there should be a certain amount of direct control exercised by Government and, if so, what should be the nature of such control Should the functions which the corporation is charged to carry out possesses any particular characteristic or feature or is the nature of the functions immaterial Now, one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, as is quite often the case, a corporation established by Statute may have no shares or shareholders, in which case it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a Board of Directors appointed by Government though this consideration also may not be determinative, because even where the Directors are appointed by government, they may be completely free from governmental control in the discharge of their functions. What then are the tests to determine whether a corporation established by statute or incorporated under law is an instrumentality or agency of Government. It is not possible to formulate an inclusive or exhaustive test which would adequately answer this question. There is no cut and dried formula, which would provide the correct division of corporation into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of Government and those which are not.9. Their Lordships after considering the entire case law laid down the following principles in order to determine as to whether a particular corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government within the meaning of Article12of the Constitution of India in the above said case:MANU/SC/0498/1980: (1981) I LLJ 103 SC (supra).(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government;(2) Where financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet the almost entire expenditure of the corporation it would afford same indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character.(3) It may also be a relevant factor, whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected;(4) Existence of "deep and pervasive State control" may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality;(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government;(6) Specifically, if a department of a Government is transferred to a corporation it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.14. This Court held that M/s Maruti UdyogLtd. is not an instrumentality of State or an "authority" for purpose of Article12of the constitution. From the judgment referred to above, it is clear that mere share holding is not the determining criteria to hold any company to be a Government Company for purpose of Article12of the Constitution andterminationinvoking clause 6 of appointment letter was held to be valid.15. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the appellant company by no means satisfy the criteria laid down in para 9 of the judgment of P.B.Ghayalod Vs. M/s Maruti UdyogLtd. & Ors., (Supra), and cannot be termed as "instrumentality" of State or "authority" norterminationinvoking clause 10 of appointment letter could be declared void. Unlike the statutory corporation/bodies whose activities are strictly governed by various statutory enactments and rules and regulations framed thereunder, a company incorporated under the Companies Act is not a creation of Statute. Rather this is formed in accordance with the Statute i.e. Companies Act. Thus, such company cannot be treated as statutory body, none of the beneficiary oremployeeof such company enjoy the statutory status or protection of Article311of the Constitution. A company registered under the Companies Act and carrying on trading business is aprivateenterprise to make profit through its business activities. Respondent was appointed as Manager (Administration) and was in theprivateemployment. He was not enjoying any statutory status and not entitled to be proceeded against after setting up inquiry before invoking clause 10 of the terms and conditions of appointment letter Ex.P1.16. It needs to be highlighted that in Central Inland Water TransportLtd. case (supra) the Supreme Court did not hold that a Government company per se would be an instrumentality of the State and thus would be bound, in its actions, whether contractual or not, to act within the confines of Article14of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held that where a corporation, including a company, acquires the status of an "authority" within the meaning of Article12of the Constitution of India, only then the said company would be an instrumentality of the State and thus Article14of the Constitution of India would apply. The test on which it had to be determined: Whether the Government company was an instrumentality of the State were the well known principles culled out in the decision reported asMANU/SC/0498/1980: AIR 1981 SC 487 Ajay Hasai Vs. Khalid Mujib Schravardi.17. We find that case law Sitaram Kanshi Ram Konda Vs. Pigment Cakes & Chemical Manufacturing Co., (Supra) relied upon the respondent has no application to the facts of the present case for the reason that in a case pertaining to industrial dispute, asuitwas filed before the Civil Court in respect of certain unjustifiable and illegal actions on the part of employer which were in the nature of industrial dispute and apart from that, in the alternative, he also prayed for awarding compensation forwrongfuldismissal and the Apex Court held that to thislimitedextent, the matter could be examined by Civil Court. Here, in the given case, the appellant being appointed in managerial capacity, services being terminated as per contract, the jurisdiction of Civil Court to deal with the matter is not in question.18. Case law S.M.Murray Vs. M/s. Fenner IndiaLtd. (Supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent pertains to thesuitfordamagesand injunction against dispossession from the premises allotted to theemployeeduring the course ofemployment, thus, having no applicability to the facts of the present case.19. The applicability of other three judgments Indian Airlines Corporation Vs. Sukhdeo Rai (Supra); Central Inland Water TransportLtd& Anr. Vs. Brozo Nath Ganguli & Anr. (Supra), and Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli Vs. Lakshmi Narain (Supra) shall be considered hereinafter at the appropriate stage.20. Reliance on judgment Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Shamli & Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. (Supra), does not promote the case of the respondent. Rather in that case in para 18, it was held as under :18. On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and theemployee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognized exceptions - (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article311of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.21. This view of ours is further fortified by observation made by Justice Bhagwati (as his Lordship then was) in the concurring judgment in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli Vs. Lakshmi Narain (Supra) in para 31, which is extracted below :31. ...There are two distinct classes of cases which might arise when we are considering the relationship between employer andemployee. The relationship may be governed by contract or it may be governed by statute or statutory regulations. When it is governed by contract, the question arises whether the general principles of the law of contract are applicable to the contract ofemploymentor the law governing the contract ofemploymentis a separate and sui generis body of rules. The crucial question then is as to what is the effect of repudiation of the contract ofemploymentby the employer. If an employer repudiates the contract ofemploymentby dismissing hisemployee, can theemployeerefuse to accept the dismissal as terminating the contract and seek to treat the contract as still subsisting" The answer to this question given by general contract principles would seem to be that the repudiation is of no effect unless accepted, in other words, the contracting party faced with awrongfulrepudiation may opt to refuse to accept the repudiation and may hold the repudiation to a continuance of his contractual obligation. But does this rule apply towrongfulrepudiation of the contract ofemployment" The trend of the decisions seems to be that it does not. It seems to be generally recognized thatwrongfulrepudiation of the contract ofemploymentby the employer effectively terminates theemployment: theterminationbeingwrongfulentitles theemployeeto claimdamages, but theemployeecannot refuse to accept the repudiation and seek to treat the contract ofemploymentas continuing. What is the principle behind this departure from the general rule of law of contract' The reason seems to be that a contract ofemploymentis not ordinarily one which is specifically enforced. If it cannot be specifically enforced, it would be futile to contend that the unaccepted repudiation is of no effect and the contract continues to subsist between the parties. The law in such a case, therefore, adopts a more realistic posture and holds that the repudiation effectively terminates the contract and theemployeecan only claimdamagesforwrongfulbreach of the contract. Now a contract ofemploymentis not specifically enforced because ordinarily it is a contract of personal service and, as pointed out in the first illustration to clause (b) of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced. Of course this illustration has not been omitted in the new Specific Relief Act, 1963 and what would be the effect of such omission may be a point which may require consideration someday by this Court. But for the purpose of this case, I will proceed on the assumption that even under the new Act, the law is the same and it frowns on specific enforcement of a contract of personal service.22. The legal position in this regard was again cleared in the case,MANU/SC/7605/2008: 2008 (8) SCC 92 titled SBI vs. S.N.Goyal. Relevant para 17 of the judgment is extracted below :17. Where the relationship of master and servant is purely contractual, it is well settled that a contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable, having regard to the bar contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Even if theterminationof the contract ofemployment(by dismissal or otherwise) is found to be illegal or in breach, the remedy of theemployeeis only to seekdamagesand not specific performance. Courts will neither declare suchterminationto be a nullity nor declare that the contract ofemploymentsubsists nor grant the consequential relief of reinstatement. The three well recognized exceptions to this rule are:(i) where a civil servant is removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article311of the Constitution of India (or any law made under Article309);(ii) where a workman having the protection of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is wrongly terminated from service; and(iii) where anemployeeof a statutory body is terminated from service in breach or violation of any mandatory provision of a statute or statutory rules.There is thus a clear distinction between publicemploymentgoverned by statutory rules andprivateemploymentgoverned purely by contract. The test for deciding the nature of relief -damagesor reinstatement with consequential reliefs -is whether theemploymentis governed purely by contract or by a statute or statutory rules. Even where the employer is a statutory body, where the relationship is purely governed by contract with no element of statutory governance, the contract of personal service will not be specifically enforceable. Conversely, where the employer is a non-statutory body, but theemploymentis governed by a statute or statutory rules, a declaration that theterminationis null and void and that theemployeeshould be reinstated can be granted by courts.23. Here the case of the respondent was not covered under any of the exceptions referred to in the cases noted above. It is settled legal position that contract of personal services cannot be specifically enforced either by the Master or the Servant. The legal remedy in such relationship is only by way of claimingdamagesunless the case of suchemployeefalls under any of the exceptions referred to above. Whether in the relationship of Master and Servant, theterminationcan be declared as nullity, was answered by the Apex Court inMANU/SC/0066/1973: AIR 1973 SC 855 titled as Sirsi Municipality by its President, Sirsi Vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis. The relevant paras 15 to 18 are extracted below :15. The cases of dismissal of a servant fall under three broad heads. The first head relates to relationship of master and servant governed purely by contract ofemployment. Any breach of contract in such a case is enforced by asuitforwrongfuldismissal anddamages. Just as a contract ofemploymentis not capable of specific performance similarly breach of contract ofemploymentis not capable of founding a declaratory judgment of subsistence ofemployment. A declaration of unlawfulterminationand restoration to service in such a case of contract ofemploymentwould be indirectly an instance of specific performance of contract for personal services. Such a declaration is not permissible under the Law of Specific Relief Act.16. The second type of cases of master and servant arises under Industrial Law. Under that branch of law a servant who is wrongfully dismissed may be reinstated. This is a special provision under Industrial Law. This relief is a departure from the reliefs17. The third category of cases of master and servant arises in regard to the servant in theemploymentof the State or of other public or local authorities or bodies created under statute.18.Terminationor dismissal of what is described as a pure contract of master and servant is not declared to be a nullity howeverwrongfulor illegal it may be. The reason is that dismissal in breach of contract is remedied bydamages. In the case of servant of the State or of local authorities or statutory bodies, courts have declared in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statute. Apart from the intervention of statute there would not be a declaration of nullity in available under the Indian Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act which do not provide for reinstatement of a servant. the case ofterminationor dismissal of a servant of the State or of other local authorities or statutory bodies.24. Since the respondent was not a workman, the appellant company could in exercise of powers conferred by Clause 10 of the terms and conditions of appointment, have terminated the services of respondent by giving notice or paying in lieu of such notice.Terminationof service on the basis of adverse finding do carry a stigma, but in the instant case, the performance appraisals are internal process to assess the efficiency, utility and administrative as well managerial skill of theemployeeplaced at managerial level. Theterminationorder Ex.P2 did not contain any adverse finding. It was aterminationsimplicitor under clause 10 of terms and conditions of appointment of respondent.25. In case ofprivateemployee, a contract of personal services cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced. The Court would not be imposing anemployeeon the employer and enforce contract of personal services. An employer cannot be forced to take anemployeewhen there is complete loss of faith between the two or can be inferred from the averments made in this case. The claim ofdamagesi.e. salary, till respondent would have attained the age of superannuation by learned Single Judge is not sustainable in law. This is for the reason that if a contract expressly provides that it isterminationupon serving a particular period of notice e.g. three months notice, thedamageswill ordinarily be wages for that period. He cannot claim compensation in respect of the injuries to his feelings by suchterminationor the problems faced in finding another job.26. On the issue of award ofdamagestill the date of attaining superannuation, the respondent was anemployeeof aprivatecompany appointed in managerial capacity and their mutual rights and obligations were governed by the terms and conditions of the appointment letter Ex.P1. The case of the respondent was covered under the first category i.e. Master and Servant relationship, in the nature ofprivateemployment. Since under Clause 10 of Ex.P1 respondent's services could be terminated on three months? notice or pay in lieu thereof, all that he was entitled was notice pay and other legitimate dues.27. Learned Single Judge while declaring clause 10 of the appointment letter as void relying on pronouncements Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. (supra) and The Central Co-operative BankLtd. Kumbakonam Vs. M. Parthasarathi (supra), failed to appreciate that those reports applied to undertakings, corporations or Government bodies but notprivatecompanies. Clause 10 of appointment letter Ex.P1 permitted the appellant to terminate the services of the respondent by giving three months' notice or notice pay in lieu without assigning any reason. Thus,terminationsimplicitor is not violation of the terms and conditions of the appointment letter nor in violation of principle of natural justice.28. A feeble attempt has been made by the respondent to make it a case of victimization post 1984 riots. It is a matter of record and admission by respondent that so long as he remained in theemploymentor even thereafter in various communications, there was no mention of victimization on account of religion. It was for the first time made while serving legal notice. Learned Single Judge while dealing with this aspect, in para 37 of the judgment has considered it to be not relevant and did not deem it proper and necessary to decide this question. In order to deal with this contention, suffice it to refer that as per para 9 of the written statement, Manager (Administration) Head Office of the appellant Mr. I.J.S. Sethi himself is a Sikh and serving the appellant. The contention of appellant that he was appointed by the Chairman butterminationorder has been issued by the Manager or forgery of signature on Ex.P21 is without any substance in view of his own admission that his services have been terminated after the approval of the Chairman.29. The learned Single Judge had granted the relief of declaration that clause 10 of the agreement Ex.P1 is void and consequently notice ofterminationalso fails relying on the case law Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. AND Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Tarun Kanti Sengupta & Anr. and "Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors'.(Supra). (Para 36 of the impugned judgment). Learned Single Judge has preferred not to enter into discussion on the issue about the constitution of the Appellant company and to consider whether the judgment of Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. (Supra) and Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors.' (Supra), could be made applicable to the facts of this case where the relationship was purely contractual.30. To support our view that cases Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. (supra) and The Central Co-operative BankLtd. Kumbakonam Vs. M. Parthasarathi (supra) could not have been relied upon in case ofprivateemployer terminating the services of itsemployeeinvoking the terms of the contract, it would be advantageous to refer to the judgment of Apex Court inMANU/SC/0470/2005: AIR 2005 SC 3202 BinnyLtd. & Anr. Vs. V.Sadasivan & Ors. In BinnyLtd.'s case (Supra), theterminationwas challenged byemployeesand apart from other judgments, applicability of Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. (Supra) and Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors.' (Supra), was also discussed in detail in case ofprivateemploymentwhere specific performance of the contract was sought to be enforced challenging clause 9 which was similar to clause 10 in the present case. In para 25 to 28 and 31 of the judgment, the Apex Court has held as under :-25. Two other decisions relied upon by the appellant to argue that the writ petition was maintainable are the decisions reported inMANU/SC/0439/1986: (1986) II LLJ 171 SC Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr. (supra) and in Delhi Transport Corporation v. PTC Mazdoor Congress and Ors. The Central Inland case was extensively relied on. In this case, the appellant corporation was a Govt. company incorporated under the Companies Act and the majority of the shares were held by the Union of India and remaining shares were held by the State of West Bengal. Each of the respondents in the two appeals was in the service of the said company. A notice under Rule 9(1) was served on them and their services were terminated with immediate effect by paying three months pay. They filed writ petitions before the High Court and the Division Bench allowed the same. The appellant corporation filed an appeal before this Court. The main thrust of the argument of the respondents was that Rule 9(1) of Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLimited(Service, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 was void and illegal and violative of Article14of the Constitution and it was also void in view Section23of the Contract Act. This Court held that Rule 9(1) was violative of Article14as it was against the public policy as the employer had absolute power to terminate the service of anemployeegiving three months notice. This Court held that this was an absolute arbitrary power given to the corporation andterminationof the respondentemployeesby invoking Rule 9(1) was illegal.26. It is important to understand the real dicta laid down in the background of the facts involved therein. The appellant was a public sector undertaking and in that view of the matter it was held that the contract ofemploymentand the service rules which gave absolute and arbitrary power to terminate the service of theemployeeswere illegal. It may be also noticed that theterminationclause was referred to in the context of the contract read as a whole and no enquiry was contemplated under the rules even in the case of allegation of misconduct and it was held to be violative of the principles of natural justice. It was also held to be violative of Section23of the Contract Act as it was opposed to public policy to terminate the services of theemployeewithout conducting an enquiry even on thegroundof misconduct. The public policy principles can be applied to theemploymentin public sector undertaking in appropriate cases. But the same principles cannot be applied toprivatebodies. There are various labour laws which curtail the power of the employer from doing any anti-labor activity. Sufficient safeguards are made in the labour law enactments to protect the interests of theemployeesofprivatesector. The service rules and regulations which are applicable to govt.employeesoremployeesof public sector undertakings stand on a different footing and they cannot be tested on the same touchstone or enforced in the same manner. Therefore, the decision rendered by this Court in Central Inland case is of no assistance to the respondents in Civil Appeal No. 1976 of 1988 or to the appellants in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 6016 of 2002.27. In the second case also, namely, the Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress and Ors., the appellant was a public sector undertaking and the main controversy was about the term "other authorities" under Article12of the Constitution. Both in Central Inland and DTC cases, the decision of the public sector undertaking was underchallengeand the question raised was whether the principles of natural justice and fairness are to be applied. It was held that this Court has got jurisdiction to consider this question by invoking the principles of judicial review. But it would be noticed that in both the cases, it was a public sector undertaking coming within the purview of "other authorities" under Article12of the Constitution.28. In this context, it must be noted that the High Court purported to apply the ratio in the above two decisions on the assumption that allterminationsimplicitor clauses providing forterminationon giving notice will be per se invalid. But the High Court has not examined Clauses (8) & (9) of the Agreement between Management and the Staff of BinnyLimitedin their entirety. Clause (9) contemplates an inquiry in a case ofterminationfor misconduct. Thus there is a provision for natural justice in case ofterminationinvolving misconduct and stigma. In such a case, whether the ratio of the decisions in DTC and Central Inland cases would apply or not, was not examined by the High Court. This is an additional reason why the declaration by the High Court should not be allowed to stand.29. ...30. ...31. The decision of the employer in these two cases to terminate the services of theiremployeescannot be said to have any element of public policy. Their cases were purely governed by the contract ofemploymententered into between theemployeesand the employer. It is not appropriate to construe those contracts as opposed to the principles of public policy and thus void and illegal under Section23of the Contract Act. In contractual matters even in respect of public bodies, the principles of judicial review nave gotlimitedapplication.31. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex court in BinnyLtd. & Anr. Vs. V.Sadasivan & Ors. (Supra), no doubt is left regarding the applicability of Central Inland Water Transport CorporationLtd. & Anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. (Supra) and Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress & Ors.' (Supra), only on the undertakings, corporations and Government companies and not aprivatecompany.32. We are of the considered view that the law as enunciated by the Apex court and this Court on the issue requiring determination in this case, has not only been ignored but also misinterpreted and misapplied by learned Single Judge. Thus, the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.05.1998 passed by learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Manupatra Information SolutionsPvt.Ltd.

Go to top

MANU/DE/7110/2011Equivalent Citation:187(2012)DLT25, 187(2012)DLT25, 2012(127)DRJ216IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHIRFA No. 556/2002Decided On:05.12.2011Appellants:Shri Satya Narain Garg through his Legal HeirsVs.Respondent:DCMLtd. & OthersHon'ble Judges/Coram:Hon'ble MR. JusticeValmiki J. MehtaCounsels:For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mr.S.P. Mittalwith Mr.Nitin Nayyar, Advocates