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Would autocracies promote autocracyA political economy perspectiveon regime-type export in regionalneighbourhoodsJulia Bader a Joumlrn Graumlvingholt a amp Antje Kaumlstner aa German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut fuumlrEntwicklungspolitik (DIE) Bonn GermanyPublished online 24 Mar 2010

To cite this article Julia Bader Joumlrn Graumlvingholt amp Antje Kaumlstner (2010) Would autocraciespromote autocracy A political economy perspective on regime-type export in regionalneighbourhoods Contemporary Politics 161 81-100 DOI 10108013569771003593904

To link to this article httpdxdoiorg10108013569771003593904

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

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Would autocracies promote autocracy A political economy perspective onregime-type export in regional neighbourhoods

Julia Bader Jorn Gravingholt and Antje Kastner

German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) Bonn Germany

Non-democratic regional powers are increasingly blamed for authoritarian backlashes informerly democratising countries or for the persistence of entrenched autocratic regimes intheir neighbourhood Yet there is a striking scarcity of theoretical deliberations as to whypowerful autocracies should prefer autocratic neighbours over democratic ones Employinga rational-choice model that links foreign policy behaviour to the logic of domesticpolitics this article develops a theoretical argument why and under which circumstancesautocratic regional powers should be expected to attempt to impact upon governancestructures in their regional environment Combining a political economy perspective withfindings from transition literature the authors conclude that all else equal autocraticregional powers have strong incentives to favour similar political systems in nearby statesbut that this interest must be weighted against an overarching interest in political stabilityThe article discusses these theoretical findings against the backdrop of country cases in theregional environments of Russia and China

Keywords autocracy promotion China Russia political economy foreign policy

Introduction

Why would an autocratic power prefer to see autocratic rule in a foreign country too Or

would it

Some commentators have recently suggested that a clear causal link exists between the rise

of authoritarian powers such as China and Russia and another trend according to which on a

global scale democracy is no longer progressing as it was in the 1990s but is rather on the

retreat (Puddington 2007 Diamond 2008 Kagan 2008) It has even been argued that the true

challenge for liberal democracy might still lie ahead if Russia and China were to consolidate

their political and economic power as the first authoritarian and capitalist major powers to

emerge since the Second World War in which case they would represent attractive models

for other states to follow (Gat 2007)

But would that make sense for the autocratic power itself Is a spread of autocracy really in

the interest of an autocratic power The answer is less obvious than it may appear at first glance

In the case of China for example it has been argued that lsquo[its] foreign policy is more mercantilist

then pro-authoritarianrsquo (Carothers 2009) China has much to gain from reliable economic ties

with both neighbouring countries and resource exporters worldwide ndash but why should autocratic

ISSN 1356-9775 printISSN 1469-3631 online

2010 Taylor amp Francis

DOI 10108013569771003593904

httpwwwinformaworldcom

Julia Bader is a Research Fellow at the German Development InstituteDeutsches Institut fur Entwick-lungspolitik (DIE) in Bonn and a PhD candidate at the University of Heidelberg Germany Her researchfocuses on Chinarsquos foreign policy and democratisation in Asia Email juliabaderdie-gdideJorn Gravingholt is a Senior Research Fellow at the DIE He has published on political transformation inRussia and Central Asia development and conflict and democracy promotionAntje Kastner is an Associated Researcher at the DIE and a PhD candidate at the Berlin Graduate Schoolfor Transnational Studies Her thesis analyses Russiarsquos influence on the political systems of the formerSoviet republics

Contemporary Politics

Vol 16 No 1 March 2010 81ndash100

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rule such as in Myanmar and North Korea be an asset in that regard For Russia too the

case can be made that having such unpredictable regimes as Belarus under Lukashenka or

Turkmenistan under Niyazov in the neighbourhood should not be viewed as an immediate

benefit Moreover and from a more general point of view the fact that democracies are

known to prefer democracies around does not automatically make for a logical opposite argu-

ment about autocracies

On the other hand it is difficult to find evidence of autocracies attempting to strengthen the

evolution of democracy in another country If not exactly promoting autocracy China seems to

be doing little to end the largely defunct autocratic regimes in Myanmar and North Korea Like-

wise Russia under an increasingly authoritarian Putin presidency was highly critical of alleg-

edly foreign-sponsored lsquocolour revolutionsrsquo in Georgia Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2003

and 2005 that appeared to be manifestations of popular uprising against authoritarian rulers

This article aims to establish from a theoretical point of view whether there are good reasons

to assume that the recent lsquodemocratic rollbackrsquo (Diamond 2008) is at least partly due to the rise of

authoritarian powers ndash such as Russia and China For the sake of simplicity we restrict our model

to an autocratic powerrsquos immediate regional environment assuming that the logic at work when a

government tries to affect another countryrsquos system of governance should be most pronounced in

neighbourly relations In doing so we also contribute to the emerging literature on new regional

powers gaining weight in international affairs as a consequence of their regional importance as in

the debate on BRICs (Brazil Russia India China) or lsquoBRICSAMrsquo (the former plus South Africa

ASEAN states and Mexico) (see eg Goldman Sachs 2001 Cooper et al 2006)

Our approach is rooted in a political economy framework Based on the works of Wintrobe

(1990 1998) Olson (1965 1993 2000) and others major progress has been made in recent years

in explaining the contrasting features of democracy and autocracy with the help of such

frameworks (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003 Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) We build on

this literature in trying to establish whether or not an autocratic power should be expected to

prefer and possibly promote autocracy in other countries This approach is new in that delib-

erations on foreign policy considerations of autocratic vs democratic leaders have so far

mainly concentrated on issues of war (see eg Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003 pp 243ndash248)

and trade (Frieden and Lake 2000 Milner and Kubota 2005) while preferences for regime

types have not yet been a matter of much debate

We will show that it is indeed reasonable to attribute the lsquodemocratic rollbackrsquo at least in part

to the interest of authoritarian regional powers but that the logical relationship is more complex

than to allow for a strong unidirectional influence in each and every case In particular we argue

that more than by an interest in regime convergence authoritarian and democratic powers alike

tend to be driven by an overarching preference for lsquostabilityrsquo in foreign relations Conversely

lsquochangersquo will be prized higher in such cases where instability is rife anyway and hence oppor-

tunity costs for lsquocreative engagementrsquo are comparatively low

The argument will be presented in three parts First the problem of autocracy promotion by

authoritarian regional powers is placed in the larger context of three strands of literature one on

the logic of democracy promotion a second on (the limits of) democratisation and a third on

global power shifts and the emergence of new regional powers in particular of authoritarian

China and Russia Second we develop a static model showing that regional powers ndash autocratic

and democratic alike ndash can indeed be assumed to have a preference for systems convergence

leaving autocratic powers with a preference for autocratic rather than democratic neighbours

Third taking a dynamic view we show that this general preference does not automatically

translate into lsquotransformativersquo foreign policy initiatives but that regional powers only foster

regime change under conditions of domestic instability in the satellite country Our model

will be illustrated with examples of Chinese and Russian foreign policy We summarise our

82 Julia Bader et al

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findings in the conclusion and offer ideas for further investigation into the mechanisms at play

when authoritarian powers promote autocracy and into their prospects of success

Democracy promotion stagnant democratisation and the rise of regional powers

A first strand of scholarship with direct bearing on the question discussed in this article is

obviously the vast literature on democracy promotion Major studies in this area have concen-

trated on the effects of democracy promotion and on the instruments employed by democratic

nations vis-a-vis other countries in order to achieve such effects (Carothers 1999 Burnell

2000 Finkel et al 2007) Much has also been written about why democracies should help

other countries to become democratic although most accounts are more prescriptive than expla-

natory in a strict sense First of all there is the moral argument that democratic governments tend

to respect human rights better and provide for more participation and more equitable develop-

ment than non-democracies and that democracy should therefore be promoted in the interest

of men and women in other countries too Beyond altruism students of the lsquodemocratic

peacersquo theory argue that it is in the interest of every democratic country to have as many democ-

racies around as possible since the likelihood of war being waged between democratic states has

in the past declined to almost zero (Doyle 1995 Levy and Razin 2007) Pointing to the likely

costliness of inter-democracy war for both populations and leaders Bueno de Mesquita et al

(2003) have provided one possible explanation for this phenomenon

That the logic of the democratic peace may hold the power to translate itself into political

choices seems also to be confirmed by studies on lsquodemocratic diffusionrsquo Analyses of the geo-

graphic diffusion of democratic rule have shown that countries tend to adapt their regimes to

match the average degree of democracy found among their contiguous neighbours (Brinks

and Coppedge 2006 Gleditsch and Ward 2006) Yet while this nexus has been extensively

studied in relation to the spread of democracy (Starr 1991 Kopstein and Reilly 2000 Levitsky

and Way 2005 Goodliffe and Hawkins 2007) the impact of the recent comeback of authoritar-

ian regional powers on their regional environment has found less attention In fact if it had been

only the logic of the democratic peace we should have witnessed a continued rise of democratic

rule among the nations of the world until today ndash which is not exactly what can be observed

Rather there is evidence that the wave of democratisation which flooded the world in the

1990s has in recent years trickled away World-wide indexes of governance and freedom

noted a global decline in levels of democracy which lsquowas most pronounced in South Asia

but also reached significant levels in the former Soviet Union the Middle East North Africa

and sub-Saharan Africarsquo (Puddington 2008 however on trends see Merkelrsquos 2010)

This is where a second strand of scholarship comes in ndash the study of failed democratisa-

tions The democratisation euphoria in the immediate post-Cold War era of the early 1990s

was soon followed by the sobering realisation that transition from autocracy to democracy

was not the only game played in countries that underwent fundamental changes after the end

of communism The answer to the lsquoend of historyrsquo (Fukuyama 1992) was the lsquoend of the

transition paradigmrsquo (Carothers 2002) The debates centred first on democracies lsquowith adjec-

tivesrsquo (delegative defective illiberal etc) then moved on to lsquohybrid regimesrsquo and in several

cases settled on lsquosemi-authoritarianismrsquo (OrsquoDonnell 1996 Zakaria 1997 Diamond 2002

Ottaway 2003 Merkel 2004) Most studies focused on the question of why democratisation

failed ndash thus still assuming that transition to democracy should have been the normal course

of events whereas cases of authoritarian backlash were to be explained as the irregular excep-

tions to the rule One conclusion drawn by many observers of failed and successful political

transitions was the realisation that domestic factors usually have a much stronger impact on

the outcome of transition processes than external ones (Schmitter 1996 Whitehead 1996

Contemporary Politics 83

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Yilmaz 2002) There is no agreement however on the conditions which account for stronger

external impact

Turning to domestic factors students of political regimes have increasingly paid attention to

the mechanisms at work in authoritarian contexts thereby putting an end to a long period of

neglect of the study of authoritarian regimes1 Political economy frameworks partly using con-

cepts of (neo-)patrimonialism have been employed to explain the resilience of autocratic rule

implicitly also contributing to a better understanding of why transitory regimes that seem to have

opened up for democratisation may fall back into authoritarian equilibria (Bueno de Mesquita

et al 2003 Erdmann and Engel 2007 Schlumberger 2008)

What has not yet been the subject of extensive research however is the role played by

outside powers in helping to bring about or stabilise non-democratic rule Some observers

though have begun to associate the finding of stagnant democratisation with the phenomenon

of newly emerging non-democratic powers within a changing world order and most prominently

of China and Russia (Kagan 2008 Puddington 2008) This links the issue of regime transform-

ation with a third body of scholarship the increasing literature on global power shifts and the

emergence of new powerful actors not all of which are democratic by any meaningful standard

as major players on the international scene

Two types of mechanisms can be distinguished to possibly be at play the power of example

and the power of influence In terms of example it has been argued that due to the highly suc-

cessful economic performance of authoritarian states such as Singapore or China authoritarian

governance has gained more and more attractiveness especially among smaller low-income

countries At the same time partly driven by the economic ascent of regional powers

(Goldman Sachs 2001) like Brazil South Africa Indonesia China or Russia the international

order has seen major shifts in the distribution of power Dubbed lsquoAsian Driversrsquo China and

India in particular have been said to exercise increasing influence on the developing world

(Kaplinsky and Messner 2008) but many have argued that Russia is also on its way to regain

some of the influence lost with the demise of the Soviet Union (MacFarlane 2006 Giessmann

2008) Thus the perception of a new seemingly promising authoritarian model of development

has been accompanied by a global power shift leaving more leverage for emerging powers to act

ndash in particular within their regional settings

Comparing regions

Given this global development authoritarian governments have increased their attractiveness as

a role model and their power to impact on other countries The empirical question at stake is

whether authoritarian regional powersrsquo growing leeway to actively shape their surroundings

can help explain the recent trend in receding democratisation From a theoretical point of

view the puzzle is whether and why authoritarian regional powers should have a preference

for a specific regime type in their regional neighbourhood

Realist and neorealist schools in international relations have traditionally argued that on the

international arena all states share the same interest ndash ie increasing their relative power vis-a-

vis other states ndash and therefore behave alike in the face of the same external challenges ndash irre-

spective of their domestic regime type2 Consequently according to this line of thinking there

would be no reason to assume that an autocratic regional power should prefer different regimes

in its neighbourhood than would a democratic power In fact if a difference in regime type does

not translate into different foreign policies neither power should have any preference for any

regime type at all

The (neo)realist contention of indifference with regard to regime type (and domestic politics

in general) has been criticised from many directions yet arguably most forcefully with reference

84 Julia Bader et al

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to the empirical phenomenon that established democracies do not go to war with each other

while all other pairs of regimes do3 Scholars such as Levy (1988) have made a strong case

for considering domestic political factors when explaining the causes of war Since then

rational-choice-based explanations of domestic politics have been widely used to account for

foreign policy decisions mainly again with respect to the origins of wars (see eg Bueno de

Mesquita and Siverson 1995 Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001)

In line with this latter strand of scholarship we start from the assumption that foreign policy

preferences are strongly influenced by domestic politics As a consequence of this assumption

we argue that governments are not indifferent with respect to the political regime type of other

states but do develop a preference towards systems convergence in particular in their regional

environment In doing so in a first step we take a closer look at the domestic mechanisms deter-

mining state behaviour to build our argumentation of foreign policy preference on the analysis of

domestic incentive systems thereby taking on a rational-choice perspective Contrasting the

authoritarian logic of foreign policy-making against the democratic one in a second step we

find plausible theoretical reasons why governments domestically profit from similar systems

in their regional environment and we therefore assume that they prefer system convergence in

their neighbourhood

Based on the concept of homo-economicus the micro-foundation for our theoretical frame-

work rests upon the assumption that actors be they individuals or groups are seeking to maxi-

mise their utility Governments are such rational actors and their overriding interest is to

preserve their claim to power In the words of Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003 p 8) lsquoevery

political leader faces the challenge of how to hold onto his or her jobrsquo

We also agree with Bueno de Mesquita et al in that the political leaderrsquos desire to survive

motivates his or her selection of policies and political institutions not only in the domestic realm

but likewise extends to the definition and pursuit of foreign policy objectives lsquo[A]ll actions

taken by political leaders are intended by them to be compatible with their desire to retain

powerrsquo (ibid p 9)

We thus combine liberal foreign policy analysis with a rational-choice micro-foundation to

form a foreign policy framework in which foreign policy choices are the effective outcome of a

governmentrsquos interest in domestic political survival In order to achieve this objective govern-

ments are in the first place dependent on the support of crucial societal groups which are most

likely to take the form of collective political economic or bureaucratic actors In the following

these groups will be referred to as the governmentrsquos coalition (Olson 1965 Bueno de Mesquita

2002) These societal subsets of the population in turn have their own rational agenda

Subsequently it is argued that politics can be understood as exchange between the govern-

ment and the coalition in which policies are traded for political support On the one hand gov-

ernments are interested in securing the coalitionrsquos loyalty to sustain their leadership They do so

by formulating policies which favour certain societal groups Examples in domestic politics for

serving such a vested interest range from preferential tax policies or industrial regulations for

specific industries to the exclusive provision of or access to luxury consumer goods to individ-

uals Societal actors on the other hand have an interest in gaining certain privileges to

strengthen their own position so that they in turn favour regime continuity expressed through

support for the government

But is this bargain between government and coalition the same in democratic and autocratic

regimes A growing number of scholars have argued that governmental interests and policies

vary due to structural differences between both regime types (Olson 1993 Lake and Baum

2001 Bueno de Mesquita 2002 Faust 2007) These differences relate to the way in which a

government comes to and stays in power While democratic leaders must be confirmed by

popular elections autocratic governments come to and stay in power through a consensus

Contemporary Politics 85

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among smaller subsets of the population In consequence democratic governments have to

involve at least a majority of the electorate in exchange for political support while autocratic

leaders focus on paying off small interest groups Mancur Olson put the structural differences

in a nutshell by drawing the distinction between an lsquoencompassingrsquo coalition which prevails

in democratic states and a lsquodistributionalrsquo coalition found in autocratic states (Olson 1982)

Whereas the first is larger in size it is for the same reason confronted with a collective

action problem as it has difficulties in organising and articulating a common interest In contrast

distributional coalitions unite a smaller number of individuals and face less obstacles to find

common ground

The systematic variation in coalition size arising from structurally different incentive

systems in democracies and autocracies leads to different governmental policy patterns Demo-

cratically elected governments are neither confronted with a concise unanimous interest nor

practically capable of reimbursing every coalition member Thus they try to consolidate their

leadership in the most efficient way by satisfying the emerging societal consensus through the

provision of public goods such as security social welfare or education In contrast to democra-

cies the smaller coalition of autocratic governments implies that the governmentrsquos distribution

of goods is more exclusively targeted towards the coalition members With decreasing size of the

coalition the pressure to use resources efficiently is shrinking It is more feasible to pay off

coalition members with targeted privileging policies and less necessary to be efficient in provid-

ing public goods

This is not to say that democratic governments will never try to consolidate their power by

the means of providing private goods and privileging policies However for reasons of account-

ability which provides considerable incentives to use resources in an efficient way in relative

terms democratic governments will rely more strongly on the provision of public goods In con-

sequence it is difficult to extract resources from democracies Similarly autocratic leaders most

often cannot completely refuse to provide public goods However facing less pressure from the

population to respond to public demands which opens up a bigger discretionary leeway for dis-

tribution relatively speaking they rely more strongly on the distribution of private goods In

contrast to democracies autocratic regimes are due to their independence from electoral out-

comes less committed to redistributing their gains After having paid off societal interest

groups and provided rudimentary public goods autocratic governments are still in a position

to accumulate resources While this surplus often serves the government to enrich itself the

fact that public control is less pronounced also offers incentives for other states to exploit

autocratic regimes

In our argument these structural differences between democratic and autocratic govern-

ments and their distributional consequences are of utmost importance not only for the domestic

but also for the foreign policy context Transferring these differences between autocracies and

democracies to the logic of foreign policy-making we find plausible theoretical reasons why

governments benefit domestically from similar systems in their neighbourhood and this is

why we predict that they prefer system convergence in their region A governmentrsquos gain in

another countryrsquos regime type is largely influenced by its domestic needs While democratic

governments due to the large size of their coalition are relatively more interested in the

provision of public goods ndash be they obtained at the domestic or international level ndash autocratic

governments tend to put a relatively stronger focus on the provision of private goods ndash be they

obtained at home or abroad ndash to pay off small societal groups At the same time the regime type

of a smaller neighbouring country ndash which for reasons of simplicity we refer to as lsquosatellitersquo ndash

has certain implications with regard to the regional powerrsquos interest in impacting on the form of

political order in neighbouring countries In brief while gains from a democratic neighbourhood

tend to take the form of transboundary public goods those from autocratic satellites result from

86 Julia Bader et al

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their proneness to external exploitation In the following we will elaborate on these arguments in

more depth

A preference for system convergence

Generally speaking one could assume that interaction between two or more counterparts is

easier if all participants follow the same or similar incentive systems simply because expec-

tations on the outcome might be similar and anticipation of the otherrsquos action might be easier

and probably also more precise Accordingly one would generally expect that governments

would prefer their governmental counterparts in other countries to rest on similar regime

types and to follow similar incentive structures

More specifically the reasons for the mutual benefit of dyadic democracy and autocracy

relations rooted in similar domestic incentive systems follow two different logics According

to the first logic democratic governments as they need to prioritise the provision of public

goods over that of private ones are likely to opt for foreign policy choices which help to

improve their policy performance Accordingly they are interested in two things First in

maximising the domestic provision of nationally or internationally produced public goods

and second in minimising transboundary public bads On the one hand democratic leaders

are expected to gain electoral support when they are able to provide public goods However

the interest in providing the population with public goods does not stop at the national territor-

ial borders but it is easy to identify its international dimension whenever goods are concerned

that might be affected by the performance of neighbouring countries such as peace free trade

or a clean environment Being transnational public goods this presumes that both states

involved genuinely contribute to its creation The structural divide between democracies and

autocracies postulates that democracies engage relatively more in the provision of such

goods Further research has shown that cooperation among democracies with the aim to

establish such common goods is higher than with or among other forms of government

(Milner and Kubota 2005) On the other hand democratic leaders face serious difficulties

when confronted with negative externalities like uncontrolled migration flows cross-border

environmental pollution the spread of pandemics or transnational organised crime These

negative spill-overs are more likely to be caused by non-democratic neighbouring states

because these are to a lesser degree accountable to their own populations and thus face

less pressure to deliver public goods In consequence democracies have strong incentives to

favour democracies as well as strong disincentives to like autocracies in their geographic vicin-

ity As the governmentrsquos performance is evaluated in regular intervals and elections decide

upon its political survival it is highly likely that a democratic government would strongly

prefer to have other democracies around The sole presence of another democratic government

inclined to provide good governance and public goods would create synergies useful to deliver

a positive performance In an increasingly globalised world this reasoning is theoretically not

restricted to a limited geographic setting but as positive externalities can be assumed to have a

higher pay off in the geographic vicinity the logic described should be even stronger in a

regional context

According to the second logic the government of a regional autocratic power faced with a

strong need to distribute private goods is likely to use its external relations as one way to secure

the resources necessary in order to strengthen its domestic position On the part of the satellite

countries in turn lacking accountability to their populations does not only cause autocratic

regimes to use much of their domestic resources to satisfy privileges From a regional

powerrsquos point of view lacking accountability in addition eases exploitation from outside

Such exploitation can for example take the form of long-term mining concessions in exchange

Contemporary Politics 87

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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2013

rule such as in Myanmar and North Korea be an asset in that regard For Russia too the

case can be made that having such unpredictable regimes as Belarus under Lukashenka or

Turkmenistan under Niyazov in the neighbourhood should not be viewed as an immediate

benefit Moreover and from a more general point of view the fact that democracies are

known to prefer democracies around does not automatically make for a logical opposite argu-

ment about autocracies

On the other hand it is difficult to find evidence of autocracies attempting to strengthen the

evolution of democracy in another country If not exactly promoting autocracy China seems to

be doing little to end the largely defunct autocratic regimes in Myanmar and North Korea Like-

wise Russia under an increasingly authoritarian Putin presidency was highly critical of alleg-

edly foreign-sponsored lsquocolour revolutionsrsquo in Georgia Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2003

and 2005 that appeared to be manifestations of popular uprising against authoritarian rulers

This article aims to establish from a theoretical point of view whether there are good reasons

to assume that the recent lsquodemocratic rollbackrsquo (Diamond 2008) is at least partly due to the rise of

authoritarian powers ndash such as Russia and China For the sake of simplicity we restrict our model

to an autocratic powerrsquos immediate regional environment assuming that the logic at work when a

government tries to affect another countryrsquos system of governance should be most pronounced in

neighbourly relations In doing so we also contribute to the emerging literature on new regional

powers gaining weight in international affairs as a consequence of their regional importance as in

the debate on BRICs (Brazil Russia India China) or lsquoBRICSAMrsquo (the former plus South Africa

ASEAN states and Mexico) (see eg Goldman Sachs 2001 Cooper et al 2006)

Our approach is rooted in a political economy framework Based on the works of Wintrobe

(1990 1998) Olson (1965 1993 2000) and others major progress has been made in recent years

in explaining the contrasting features of democracy and autocracy with the help of such

frameworks (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003 Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) We build on

this literature in trying to establish whether or not an autocratic power should be expected to

prefer and possibly promote autocracy in other countries This approach is new in that delib-

erations on foreign policy considerations of autocratic vs democratic leaders have so far

mainly concentrated on issues of war (see eg Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003 pp 243ndash248)

and trade (Frieden and Lake 2000 Milner and Kubota 2005) while preferences for regime

types have not yet been a matter of much debate

We will show that it is indeed reasonable to attribute the lsquodemocratic rollbackrsquo at least in part

to the interest of authoritarian regional powers but that the logical relationship is more complex

than to allow for a strong unidirectional influence in each and every case In particular we argue

that more than by an interest in regime convergence authoritarian and democratic powers alike

tend to be driven by an overarching preference for lsquostabilityrsquo in foreign relations Conversely

lsquochangersquo will be prized higher in such cases where instability is rife anyway and hence oppor-

tunity costs for lsquocreative engagementrsquo are comparatively low

The argument will be presented in three parts First the problem of autocracy promotion by

authoritarian regional powers is placed in the larger context of three strands of literature one on

the logic of democracy promotion a second on (the limits of) democratisation and a third on

global power shifts and the emergence of new regional powers in particular of authoritarian

China and Russia Second we develop a static model showing that regional powers ndash autocratic

and democratic alike ndash can indeed be assumed to have a preference for systems convergence

leaving autocratic powers with a preference for autocratic rather than democratic neighbours

Third taking a dynamic view we show that this general preference does not automatically

translate into lsquotransformativersquo foreign policy initiatives but that regional powers only foster

regime change under conditions of domestic instability in the satellite country Our model

will be illustrated with examples of Chinese and Russian foreign policy We summarise our

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findings in the conclusion and offer ideas for further investigation into the mechanisms at play

when authoritarian powers promote autocracy and into their prospects of success

Democracy promotion stagnant democratisation and the rise of regional powers

A first strand of scholarship with direct bearing on the question discussed in this article is

obviously the vast literature on democracy promotion Major studies in this area have concen-

trated on the effects of democracy promotion and on the instruments employed by democratic

nations vis-a-vis other countries in order to achieve such effects (Carothers 1999 Burnell

2000 Finkel et al 2007) Much has also been written about why democracies should help

other countries to become democratic although most accounts are more prescriptive than expla-

natory in a strict sense First of all there is the moral argument that democratic governments tend

to respect human rights better and provide for more participation and more equitable develop-

ment than non-democracies and that democracy should therefore be promoted in the interest

of men and women in other countries too Beyond altruism students of the lsquodemocratic

peacersquo theory argue that it is in the interest of every democratic country to have as many democ-

racies around as possible since the likelihood of war being waged between democratic states has

in the past declined to almost zero (Doyle 1995 Levy and Razin 2007) Pointing to the likely

costliness of inter-democracy war for both populations and leaders Bueno de Mesquita et al

(2003) have provided one possible explanation for this phenomenon

That the logic of the democratic peace may hold the power to translate itself into political

choices seems also to be confirmed by studies on lsquodemocratic diffusionrsquo Analyses of the geo-

graphic diffusion of democratic rule have shown that countries tend to adapt their regimes to

match the average degree of democracy found among their contiguous neighbours (Brinks

and Coppedge 2006 Gleditsch and Ward 2006) Yet while this nexus has been extensively

studied in relation to the spread of democracy (Starr 1991 Kopstein and Reilly 2000 Levitsky

and Way 2005 Goodliffe and Hawkins 2007) the impact of the recent comeback of authoritar-

ian regional powers on their regional environment has found less attention In fact if it had been

only the logic of the democratic peace we should have witnessed a continued rise of democratic

rule among the nations of the world until today ndash which is not exactly what can be observed

Rather there is evidence that the wave of democratisation which flooded the world in the

1990s has in recent years trickled away World-wide indexes of governance and freedom

noted a global decline in levels of democracy which lsquowas most pronounced in South Asia

but also reached significant levels in the former Soviet Union the Middle East North Africa

and sub-Saharan Africarsquo (Puddington 2008 however on trends see Merkelrsquos 2010)

This is where a second strand of scholarship comes in ndash the study of failed democratisa-

tions The democratisation euphoria in the immediate post-Cold War era of the early 1990s

was soon followed by the sobering realisation that transition from autocracy to democracy

was not the only game played in countries that underwent fundamental changes after the end

of communism The answer to the lsquoend of historyrsquo (Fukuyama 1992) was the lsquoend of the

transition paradigmrsquo (Carothers 2002) The debates centred first on democracies lsquowith adjec-

tivesrsquo (delegative defective illiberal etc) then moved on to lsquohybrid regimesrsquo and in several

cases settled on lsquosemi-authoritarianismrsquo (OrsquoDonnell 1996 Zakaria 1997 Diamond 2002

Ottaway 2003 Merkel 2004) Most studies focused on the question of why democratisation

failed ndash thus still assuming that transition to democracy should have been the normal course

of events whereas cases of authoritarian backlash were to be explained as the irregular excep-

tions to the rule One conclusion drawn by many observers of failed and successful political

transitions was the realisation that domestic factors usually have a much stronger impact on

the outcome of transition processes than external ones (Schmitter 1996 Whitehead 1996

Contemporary Politics 83

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Yilmaz 2002) There is no agreement however on the conditions which account for stronger

external impact

Turning to domestic factors students of political regimes have increasingly paid attention to

the mechanisms at work in authoritarian contexts thereby putting an end to a long period of

neglect of the study of authoritarian regimes1 Political economy frameworks partly using con-

cepts of (neo-)patrimonialism have been employed to explain the resilience of autocratic rule

implicitly also contributing to a better understanding of why transitory regimes that seem to have

opened up for democratisation may fall back into authoritarian equilibria (Bueno de Mesquita

et al 2003 Erdmann and Engel 2007 Schlumberger 2008)

What has not yet been the subject of extensive research however is the role played by

outside powers in helping to bring about or stabilise non-democratic rule Some observers

though have begun to associate the finding of stagnant democratisation with the phenomenon

of newly emerging non-democratic powers within a changing world order and most prominently

of China and Russia (Kagan 2008 Puddington 2008) This links the issue of regime transform-

ation with a third body of scholarship the increasing literature on global power shifts and the

emergence of new powerful actors not all of which are democratic by any meaningful standard

as major players on the international scene

Two types of mechanisms can be distinguished to possibly be at play the power of example

and the power of influence In terms of example it has been argued that due to the highly suc-

cessful economic performance of authoritarian states such as Singapore or China authoritarian

governance has gained more and more attractiveness especially among smaller low-income

countries At the same time partly driven by the economic ascent of regional powers

(Goldman Sachs 2001) like Brazil South Africa Indonesia China or Russia the international

order has seen major shifts in the distribution of power Dubbed lsquoAsian Driversrsquo China and

India in particular have been said to exercise increasing influence on the developing world

(Kaplinsky and Messner 2008) but many have argued that Russia is also on its way to regain

some of the influence lost with the demise of the Soviet Union (MacFarlane 2006 Giessmann

2008) Thus the perception of a new seemingly promising authoritarian model of development

has been accompanied by a global power shift leaving more leverage for emerging powers to act

ndash in particular within their regional settings

Comparing regions

Given this global development authoritarian governments have increased their attractiveness as

a role model and their power to impact on other countries The empirical question at stake is

whether authoritarian regional powersrsquo growing leeway to actively shape their surroundings

can help explain the recent trend in receding democratisation From a theoretical point of

view the puzzle is whether and why authoritarian regional powers should have a preference

for a specific regime type in their regional neighbourhood

Realist and neorealist schools in international relations have traditionally argued that on the

international arena all states share the same interest ndash ie increasing their relative power vis-a-

vis other states ndash and therefore behave alike in the face of the same external challenges ndash irre-

spective of their domestic regime type2 Consequently according to this line of thinking there

would be no reason to assume that an autocratic regional power should prefer different regimes

in its neighbourhood than would a democratic power In fact if a difference in regime type does

not translate into different foreign policies neither power should have any preference for any

regime type at all

The (neo)realist contention of indifference with regard to regime type (and domestic politics

in general) has been criticised from many directions yet arguably most forcefully with reference

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to the empirical phenomenon that established democracies do not go to war with each other

while all other pairs of regimes do3 Scholars such as Levy (1988) have made a strong case

for considering domestic political factors when explaining the causes of war Since then

rational-choice-based explanations of domestic politics have been widely used to account for

foreign policy decisions mainly again with respect to the origins of wars (see eg Bueno de

Mesquita and Siverson 1995 Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001)

In line with this latter strand of scholarship we start from the assumption that foreign policy

preferences are strongly influenced by domestic politics As a consequence of this assumption

we argue that governments are not indifferent with respect to the political regime type of other

states but do develop a preference towards systems convergence in particular in their regional

environment In doing so in a first step we take a closer look at the domestic mechanisms deter-

mining state behaviour to build our argumentation of foreign policy preference on the analysis of

domestic incentive systems thereby taking on a rational-choice perspective Contrasting the

authoritarian logic of foreign policy-making against the democratic one in a second step we

find plausible theoretical reasons why governments domestically profit from similar systems

in their regional environment and we therefore assume that they prefer system convergence in

their neighbourhood

Based on the concept of homo-economicus the micro-foundation for our theoretical frame-

work rests upon the assumption that actors be they individuals or groups are seeking to maxi-

mise their utility Governments are such rational actors and their overriding interest is to

preserve their claim to power In the words of Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003 p 8) lsquoevery

political leader faces the challenge of how to hold onto his or her jobrsquo

We also agree with Bueno de Mesquita et al in that the political leaderrsquos desire to survive

motivates his or her selection of policies and political institutions not only in the domestic realm

but likewise extends to the definition and pursuit of foreign policy objectives lsquo[A]ll actions

taken by political leaders are intended by them to be compatible with their desire to retain

powerrsquo (ibid p 9)

We thus combine liberal foreign policy analysis with a rational-choice micro-foundation to

form a foreign policy framework in which foreign policy choices are the effective outcome of a

governmentrsquos interest in domestic political survival In order to achieve this objective govern-

ments are in the first place dependent on the support of crucial societal groups which are most

likely to take the form of collective political economic or bureaucratic actors In the following

these groups will be referred to as the governmentrsquos coalition (Olson 1965 Bueno de Mesquita

2002) These societal subsets of the population in turn have their own rational agenda

Subsequently it is argued that politics can be understood as exchange between the govern-

ment and the coalition in which policies are traded for political support On the one hand gov-

ernments are interested in securing the coalitionrsquos loyalty to sustain their leadership They do so

by formulating policies which favour certain societal groups Examples in domestic politics for

serving such a vested interest range from preferential tax policies or industrial regulations for

specific industries to the exclusive provision of or access to luxury consumer goods to individ-

uals Societal actors on the other hand have an interest in gaining certain privileges to

strengthen their own position so that they in turn favour regime continuity expressed through

support for the government

But is this bargain between government and coalition the same in democratic and autocratic

regimes A growing number of scholars have argued that governmental interests and policies

vary due to structural differences between both regime types (Olson 1993 Lake and Baum

2001 Bueno de Mesquita 2002 Faust 2007) These differences relate to the way in which a

government comes to and stays in power While democratic leaders must be confirmed by

popular elections autocratic governments come to and stay in power through a consensus

Contemporary Politics 85

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among smaller subsets of the population In consequence democratic governments have to

involve at least a majority of the electorate in exchange for political support while autocratic

leaders focus on paying off small interest groups Mancur Olson put the structural differences

in a nutshell by drawing the distinction between an lsquoencompassingrsquo coalition which prevails

in democratic states and a lsquodistributionalrsquo coalition found in autocratic states (Olson 1982)

Whereas the first is larger in size it is for the same reason confronted with a collective

action problem as it has difficulties in organising and articulating a common interest In contrast

distributional coalitions unite a smaller number of individuals and face less obstacles to find

common ground

The systematic variation in coalition size arising from structurally different incentive

systems in democracies and autocracies leads to different governmental policy patterns Demo-

cratically elected governments are neither confronted with a concise unanimous interest nor

practically capable of reimbursing every coalition member Thus they try to consolidate their

leadership in the most efficient way by satisfying the emerging societal consensus through the

provision of public goods such as security social welfare or education In contrast to democra-

cies the smaller coalition of autocratic governments implies that the governmentrsquos distribution

of goods is more exclusively targeted towards the coalition members With decreasing size of the

coalition the pressure to use resources efficiently is shrinking It is more feasible to pay off

coalition members with targeted privileging policies and less necessary to be efficient in provid-

ing public goods

This is not to say that democratic governments will never try to consolidate their power by

the means of providing private goods and privileging policies However for reasons of account-

ability which provides considerable incentives to use resources in an efficient way in relative

terms democratic governments will rely more strongly on the provision of public goods In con-

sequence it is difficult to extract resources from democracies Similarly autocratic leaders most

often cannot completely refuse to provide public goods However facing less pressure from the

population to respond to public demands which opens up a bigger discretionary leeway for dis-

tribution relatively speaking they rely more strongly on the distribution of private goods In

contrast to democracies autocratic regimes are due to their independence from electoral out-

comes less committed to redistributing their gains After having paid off societal interest

groups and provided rudimentary public goods autocratic governments are still in a position

to accumulate resources While this surplus often serves the government to enrich itself the

fact that public control is less pronounced also offers incentives for other states to exploit

autocratic regimes

In our argument these structural differences between democratic and autocratic govern-

ments and their distributional consequences are of utmost importance not only for the domestic

but also for the foreign policy context Transferring these differences between autocracies and

democracies to the logic of foreign policy-making we find plausible theoretical reasons why

governments benefit domestically from similar systems in their neighbourhood and this is

why we predict that they prefer system convergence in their region A governmentrsquos gain in

another countryrsquos regime type is largely influenced by its domestic needs While democratic

governments due to the large size of their coalition are relatively more interested in the

provision of public goods ndash be they obtained at the domestic or international level ndash autocratic

governments tend to put a relatively stronger focus on the provision of private goods ndash be they

obtained at home or abroad ndash to pay off small societal groups At the same time the regime type

of a smaller neighbouring country ndash which for reasons of simplicity we refer to as lsquosatellitersquo ndash

has certain implications with regard to the regional powerrsquos interest in impacting on the form of

political order in neighbouring countries In brief while gains from a democratic neighbourhood

tend to take the form of transboundary public goods those from autocratic satellites result from

86 Julia Bader et al

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their proneness to external exploitation In the following we will elaborate on these arguments in

more depth

A preference for system convergence

Generally speaking one could assume that interaction between two or more counterparts is

easier if all participants follow the same or similar incentive systems simply because expec-

tations on the outcome might be similar and anticipation of the otherrsquos action might be easier

and probably also more precise Accordingly one would generally expect that governments

would prefer their governmental counterparts in other countries to rest on similar regime

types and to follow similar incentive structures

More specifically the reasons for the mutual benefit of dyadic democracy and autocracy

relations rooted in similar domestic incentive systems follow two different logics According

to the first logic democratic governments as they need to prioritise the provision of public

goods over that of private ones are likely to opt for foreign policy choices which help to

improve their policy performance Accordingly they are interested in two things First in

maximising the domestic provision of nationally or internationally produced public goods

and second in minimising transboundary public bads On the one hand democratic leaders

are expected to gain electoral support when they are able to provide public goods However

the interest in providing the population with public goods does not stop at the national territor-

ial borders but it is easy to identify its international dimension whenever goods are concerned

that might be affected by the performance of neighbouring countries such as peace free trade

or a clean environment Being transnational public goods this presumes that both states

involved genuinely contribute to its creation The structural divide between democracies and

autocracies postulates that democracies engage relatively more in the provision of such

goods Further research has shown that cooperation among democracies with the aim to

establish such common goods is higher than with or among other forms of government

(Milner and Kubota 2005) On the other hand democratic leaders face serious difficulties

when confronted with negative externalities like uncontrolled migration flows cross-border

environmental pollution the spread of pandemics or transnational organised crime These

negative spill-overs are more likely to be caused by non-democratic neighbouring states

because these are to a lesser degree accountable to their own populations and thus face

less pressure to deliver public goods In consequence democracies have strong incentives to

favour democracies as well as strong disincentives to like autocracies in their geographic vicin-

ity As the governmentrsquos performance is evaluated in regular intervals and elections decide

upon its political survival it is highly likely that a democratic government would strongly

prefer to have other democracies around The sole presence of another democratic government

inclined to provide good governance and public goods would create synergies useful to deliver

a positive performance In an increasingly globalised world this reasoning is theoretically not

restricted to a limited geographic setting but as positive externalities can be assumed to have a

higher pay off in the geographic vicinity the logic described should be even stronger in a

regional context

According to the second logic the government of a regional autocratic power faced with a

strong need to distribute private goods is likely to use its external relations as one way to secure

the resources necessary in order to strengthen its domestic position On the part of the satellite

countries in turn lacking accountability to their populations does not only cause autocratic

regimes to use much of their domestic resources to satisfy privileges From a regional

powerrsquos point of view lacking accountability in addition eases exploitation from outside

Such exploitation can for example take the form of long-term mining concessions in exchange

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

Contemporary Politics 89

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

90 Julia Bader et al

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

92 Julia Bader et al

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

Contemporary Politics 95

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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findings in the conclusion and offer ideas for further investigation into the mechanisms at play

when authoritarian powers promote autocracy and into their prospects of success

Democracy promotion stagnant democratisation and the rise of regional powers

A first strand of scholarship with direct bearing on the question discussed in this article is

obviously the vast literature on democracy promotion Major studies in this area have concen-

trated on the effects of democracy promotion and on the instruments employed by democratic

nations vis-a-vis other countries in order to achieve such effects (Carothers 1999 Burnell

2000 Finkel et al 2007) Much has also been written about why democracies should help

other countries to become democratic although most accounts are more prescriptive than expla-

natory in a strict sense First of all there is the moral argument that democratic governments tend

to respect human rights better and provide for more participation and more equitable develop-

ment than non-democracies and that democracy should therefore be promoted in the interest

of men and women in other countries too Beyond altruism students of the lsquodemocratic

peacersquo theory argue that it is in the interest of every democratic country to have as many democ-

racies around as possible since the likelihood of war being waged between democratic states has

in the past declined to almost zero (Doyle 1995 Levy and Razin 2007) Pointing to the likely

costliness of inter-democracy war for both populations and leaders Bueno de Mesquita et al

(2003) have provided one possible explanation for this phenomenon

That the logic of the democratic peace may hold the power to translate itself into political

choices seems also to be confirmed by studies on lsquodemocratic diffusionrsquo Analyses of the geo-

graphic diffusion of democratic rule have shown that countries tend to adapt their regimes to

match the average degree of democracy found among their contiguous neighbours (Brinks

and Coppedge 2006 Gleditsch and Ward 2006) Yet while this nexus has been extensively

studied in relation to the spread of democracy (Starr 1991 Kopstein and Reilly 2000 Levitsky

and Way 2005 Goodliffe and Hawkins 2007) the impact of the recent comeback of authoritar-

ian regional powers on their regional environment has found less attention In fact if it had been

only the logic of the democratic peace we should have witnessed a continued rise of democratic

rule among the nations of the world until today ndash which is not exactly what can be observed

Rather there is evidence that the wave of democratisation which flooded the world in the

1990s has in recent years trickled away World-wide indexes of governance and freedom

noted a global decline in levels of democracy which lsquowas most pronounced in South Asia

but also reached significant levels in the former Soviet Union the Middle East North Africa

and sub-Saharan Africarsquo (Puddington 2008 however on trends see Merkelrsquos 2010)

This is where a second strand of scholarship comes in ndash the study of failed democratisa-

tions The democratisation euphoria in the immediate post-Cold War era of the early 1990s

was soon followed by the sobering realisation that transition from autocracy to democracy

was not the only game played in countries that underwent fundamental changes after the end

of communism The answer to the lsquoend of historyrsquo (Fukuyama 1992) was the lsquoend of the

transition paradigmrsquo (Carothers 2002) The debates centred first on democracies lsquowith adjec-

tivesrsquo (delegative defective illiberal etc) then moved on to lsquohybrid regimesrsquo and in several

cases settled on lsquosemi-authoritarianismrsquo (OrsquoDonnell 1996 Zakaria 1997 Diamond 2002

Ottaway 2003 Merkel 2004) Most studies focused on the question of why democratisation

failed ndash thus still assuming that transition to democracy should have been the normal course

of events whereas cases of authoritarian backlash were to be explained as the irregular excep-

tions to the rule One conclusion drawn by many observers of failed and successful political

transitions was the realisation that domestic factors usually have a much stronger impact on

the outcome of transition processes than external ones (Schmitter 1996 Whitehead 1996

Contemporary Politics 83

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Yilmaz 2002) There is no agreement however on the conditions which account for stronger

external impact

Turning to domestic factors students of political regimes have increasingly paid attention to

the mechanisms at work in authoritarian contexts thereby putting an end to a long period of

neglect of the study of authoritarian regimes1 Political economy frameworks partly using con-

cepts of (neo-)patrimonialism have been employed to explain the resilience of autocratic rule

implicitly also contributing to a better understanding of why transitory regimes that seem to have

opened up for democratisation may fall back into authoritarian equilibria (Bueno de Mesquita

et al 2003 Erdmann and Engel 2007 Schlumberger 2008)

What has not yet been the subject of extensive research however is the role played by

outside powers in helping to bring about or stabilise non-democratic rule Some observers

though have begun to associate the finding of stagnant democratisation with the phenomenon

of newly emerging non-democratic powers within a changing world order and most prominently

of China and Russia (Kagan 2008 Puddington 2008) This links the issue of regime transform-

ation with a third body of scholarship the increasing literature on global power shifts and the

emergence of new powerful actors not all of which are democratic by any meaningful standard

as major players on the international scene

Two types of mechanisms can be distinguished to possibly be at play the power of example

and the power of influence In terms of example it has been argued that due to the highly suc-

cessful economic performance of authoritarian states such as Singapore or China authoritarian

governance has gained more and more attractiveness especially among smaller low-income

countries At the same time partly driven by the economic ascent of regional powers

(Goldman Sachs 2001) like Brazil South Africa Indonesia China or Russia the international

order has seen major shifts in the distribution of power Dubbed lsquoAsian Driversrsquo China and

India in particular have been said to exercise increasing influence on the developing world

(Kaplinsky and Messner 2008) but many have argued that Russia is also on its way to regain

some of the influence lost with the demise of the Soviet Union (MacFarlane 2006 Giessmann

2008) Thus the perception of a new seemingly promising authoritarian model of development

has been accompanied by a global power shift leaving more leverage for emerging powers to act

ndash in particular within their regional settings

Comparing regions

Given this global development authoritarian governments have increased their attractiveness as

a role model and their power to impact on other countries The empirical question at stake is

whether authoritarian regional powersrsquo growing leeway to actively shape their surroundings

can help explain the recent trend in receding democratisation From a theoretical point of

view the puzzle is whether and why authoritarian regional powers should have a preference

for a specific regime type in their regional neighbourhood

Realist and neorealist schools in international relations have traditionally argued that on the

international arena all states share the same interest ndash ie increasing their relative power vis-a-

vis other states ndash and therefore behave alike in the face of the same external challenges ndash irre-

spective of their domestic regime type2 Consequently according to this line of thinking there

would be no reason to assume that an autocratic regional power should prefer different regimes

in its neighbourhood than would a democratic power In fact if a difference in regime type does

not translate into different foreign policies neither power should have any preference for any

regime type at all

The (neo)realist contention of indifference with regard to regime type (and domestic politics

in general) has been criticised from many directions yet arguably most forcefully with reference

84 Julia Bader et al

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to the empirical phenomenon that established democracies do not go to war with each other

while all other pairs of regimes do3 Scholars such as Levy (1988) have made a strong case

for considering domestic political factors when explaining the causes of war Since then

rational-choice-based explanations of domestic politics have been widely used to account for

foreign policy decisions mainly again with respect to the origins of wars (see eg Bueno de

Mesquita and Siverson 1995 Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001)

In line with this latter strand of scholarship we start from the assumption that foreign policy

preferences are strongly influenced by domestic politics As a consequence of this assumption

we argue that governments are not indifferent with respect to the political regime type of other

states but do develop a preference towards systems convergence in particular in their regional

environment In doing so in a first step we take a closer look at the domestic mechanisms deter-

mining state behaviour to build our argumentation of foreign policy preference on the analysis of

domestic incentive systems thereby taking on a rational-choice perspective Contrasting the

authoritarian logic of foreign policy-making against the democratic one in a second step we

find plausible theoretical reasons why governments domestically profit from similar systems

in their regional environment and we therefore assume that they prefer system convergence in

their neighbourhood

Based on the concept of homo-economicus the micro-foundation for our theoretical frame-

work rests upon the assumption that actors be they individuals or groups are seeking to maxi-

mise their utility Governments are such rational actors and their overriding interest is to

preserve their claim to power In the words of Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003 p 8) lsquoevery

political leader faces the challenge of how to hold onto his or her jobrsquo

We also agree with Bueno de Mesquita et al in that the political leaderrsquos desire to survive

motivates his or her selection of policies and political institutions not only in the domestic realm

but likewise extends to the definition and pursuit of foreign policy objectives lsquo[A]ll actions

taken by political leaders are intended by them to be compatible with their desire to retain

powerrsquo (ibid p 9)

We thus combine liberal foreign policy analysis with a rational-choice micro-foundation to

form a foreign policy framework in which foreign policy choices are the effective outcome of a

governmentrsquos interest in domestic political survival In order to achieve this objective govern-

ments are in the first place dependent on the support of crucial societal groups which are most

likely to take the form of collective political economic or bureaucratic actors In the following

these groups will be referred to as the governmentrsquos coalition (Olson 1965 Bueno de Mesquita

2002) These societal subsets of the population in turn have their own rational agenda

Subsequently it is argued that politics can be understood as exchange between the govern-

ment and the coalition in which policies are traded for political support On the one hand gov-

ernments are interested in securing the coalitionrsquos loyalty to sustain their leadership They do so

by formulating policies which favour certain societal groups Examples in domestic politics for

serving such a vested interest range from preferential tax policies or industrial regulations for

specific industries to the exclusive provision of or access to luxury consumer goods to individ-

uals Societal actors on the other hand have an interest in gaining certain privileges to

strengthen their own position so that they in turn favour regime continuity expressed through

support for the government

But is this bargain between government and coalition the same in democratic and autocratic

regimes A growing number of scholars have argued that governmental interests and policies

vary due to structural differences between both regime types (Olson 1993 Lake and Baum

2001 Bueno de Mesquita 2002 Faust 2007) These differences relate to the way in which a

government comes to and stays in power While democratic leaders must be confirmed by

popular elections autocratic governments come to and stay in power through a consensus

Contemporary Politics 85

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among smaller subsets of the population In consequence democratic governments have to

involve at least a majority of the electorate in exchange for political support while autocratic

leaders focus on paying off small interest groups Mancur Olson put the structural differences

in a nutshell by drawing the distinction between an lsquoencompassingrsquo coalition which prevails

in democratic states and a lsquodistributionalrsquo coalition found in autocratic states (Olson 1982)

Whereas the first is larger in size it is for the same reason confronted with a collective

action problem as it has difficulties in organising and articulating a common interest In contrast

distributional coalitions unite a smaller number of individuals and face less obstacles to find

common ground

The systematic variation in coalition size arising from structurally different incentive

systems in democracies and autocracies leads to different governmental policy patterns Demo-

cratically elected governments are neither confronted with a concise unanimous interest nor

practically capable of reimbursing every coalition member Thus they try to consolidate their

leadership in the most efficient way by satisfying the emerging societal consensus through the

provision of public goods such as security social welfare or education In contrast to democra-

cies the smaller coalition of autocratic governments implies that the governmentrsquos distribution

of goods is more exclusively targeted towards the coalition members With decreasing size of the

coalition the pressure to use resources efficiently is shrinking It is more feasible to pay off

coalition members with targeted privileging policies and less necessary to be efficient in provid-

ing public goods

This is not to say that democratic governments will never try to consolidate their power by

the means of providing private goods and privileging policies However for reasons of account-

ability which provides considerable incentives to use resources in an efficient way in relative

terms democratic governments will rely more strongly on the provision of public goods In con-

sequence it is difficult to extract resources from democracies Similarly autocratic leaders most

often cannot completely refuse to provide public goods However facing less pressure from the

population to respond to public demands which opens up a bigger discretionary leeway for dis-

tribution relatively speaking they rely more strongly on the distribution of private goods In

contrast to democracies autocratic regimes are due to their independence from electoral out-

comes less committed to redistributing their gains After having paid off societal interest

groups and provided rudimentary public goods autocratic governments are still in a position

to accumulate resources While this surplus often serves the government to enrich itself the

fact that public control is less pronounced also offers incentives for other states to exploit

autocratic regimes

In our argument these structural differences between democratic and autocratic govern-

ments and their distributional consequences are of utmost importance not only for the domestic

but also for the foreign policy context Transferring these differences between autocracies and

democracies to the logic of foreign policy-making we find plausible theoretical reasons why

governments benefit domestically from similar systems in their neighbourhood and this is

why we predict that they prefer system convergence in their region A governmentrsquos gain in

another countryrsquos regime type is largely influenced by its domestic needs While democratic

governments due to the large size of their coalition are relatively more interested in the

provision of public goods ndash be they obtained at the domestic or international level ndash autocratic

governments tend to put a relatively stronger focus on the provision of private goods ndash be they

obtained at home or abroad ndash to pay off small societal groups At the same time the regime type

of a smaller neighbouring country ndash which for reasons of simplicity we refer to as lsquosatellitersquo ndash

has certain implications with regard to the regional powerrsquos interest in impacting on the form of

political order in neighbouring countries In brief while gains from a democratic neighbourhood

tend to take the form of transboundary public goods those from autocratic satellites result from

86 Julia Bader et al

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their proneness to external exploitation In the following we will elaborate on these arguments in

more depth

A preference for system convergence

Generally speaking one could assume that interaction between two or more counterparts is

easier if all participants follow the same or similar incentive systems simply because expec-

tations on the outcome might be similar and anticipation of the otherrsquos action might be easier

and probably also more precise Accordingly one would generally expect that governments

would prefer their governmental counterparts in other countries to rest on similar regime

types and to follow similar incentive structures

More specifically the reasons for the mutual benefit of dyadic democracy and autocracy

relations rooted in similar domestic incentive systems follow two different logics According

to the first logic democratic governments as they need to prioritise the provision of public

goods over that of private ones are likely to opt for foreign policy choices which help to

improve their policy performance Accordingly they are interested in two things First in

maximising the domestic provision of nationally or internationally produced public goods

and second in minimising transboundary public bads On the one hand democratic leaders

are expected to gain electoral support when they are able to provide public goods However

the interest in providing the population with public goods does not stop at the national territor-

ial borders but it is easy to identify its international dimension whenever goods are concerned

that might be affected by the performance of neighbouring countries such as peace free trade

or a clean environment Being transnational public goods this presumes that both states

involved genuinely contribute to its creation The structural divide between democracies and

autocracies postulates that democracies engage relatively more in the provision of such

goods Further research has shown that cooperation among democracies with the aim to

establish such common goods is higher than with or among other forms of government

(Milner and Kubota 2005) On the other hand democratic leaders face serious difficulties

when confronted with negative externalities like uncontrolled migration flows cross-border

environmental pollution the spread of pandemics or transnational organised crime These

negative spill-overs are more likely to be caused by non-democratic neighbouring states

because these are to a lesser degree accountable to their own populations and thus face

less pressure to deliver public goods In consequence democracies have strong incentives to

favour democracies as well as strong disincentives to like autocracies in their geographic vicin-

ity As the governmentrsquos performance is evaluated in regular intervals and elections decide

upon its political survival it is highly likely that a democratic government would strongly

prefer to have other democracies around The sole presence of another democratic government

inclined to provide good governance and public goods would create synergies useful to deliver

a positive performance In an increasingly globalised world this reasoning is theoretically not

restricted to a limited geographic setting but as positive externalities can be assumed to have a

higher pay off in the geographic vicinity the logic described should be even stronger in a

regional context

According to the second logic the government of a regional autocratic power faced with a

strong need to distribute private goods is likely to use its external relations as one way to secure

the resources necessary in order to strengthen its domestic position On the part of the satellite

countries in turn lacking accountability to their populations does not only cause autocratic

regimes to use much of their domestic resources to satisfy privileges From a regional

powerrsquos point of view lacking accountability in addition eases exploitation from outside

Such exploitation can for example take the form of long-term mining concessions in exchange

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

Contemporary Politics 91

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

92 Julia Bader et al

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

Contemporary Politics 93

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

Contemporary Politics 95

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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Yilmaz 2002) There is no agreement however on the conditions which account for stronger

external impact

Turning to domestic factors students of political regimes have increasingly paid attention to

the mechanisms at work in authoritarian contexts thereby putting an end to a long period of

neglect of the study of authoritarian regimes1 Political economy frameworks partly using con-

cepts of (neo-)patrimonialism have been employed to explain the resilience of autocratic rule

implicitly also contributing to a better understanding of why transitory regimes that seem to have

opened up for democratisation may fall back into authoritarian equilibria (Bueno de Mesquita

et al 2003 Erdmann and Engel 2007 Schlumberger 2008)

What has not yet been the subject of extensive research however is the role played by

outside powers in helping to bring about or stabilise non-democratic rule Some observers

though have begun to associate the finding of stagnant democratisation with the phenomenon

of newly emerging non-democratic powers within a changing world order and most prominently

of China and Russia (Kagan 2008 Puddington 2008) This links the issue of regime transform-

ation with a third body of scholarship the increasing literature on global power shifts and the

emergence of new powerful actors not all of which are democratic by any meaningful standard

as major players on the international scene

Two types of mechanisms can be distinguished to possibly be at play the power of example

and the power of influence In terms of example it has been argued that due to the highly suc-

cessful economic performance of authoritarian states such as Singapore or China authoritarian

governance has gained more and more attractiveness especially among smaller low-income

countries At the same time partly driven by the economic ascent of regional powers

(Goldman Sachs 2001) like Brazil South Africa Indonesia China or Russia the international

order has seen major shifts in the distribution of power Dubbed lsquoAsian Driversrsquo China and

India in particular have been said to exercise increasing influence on the developing world

(Kaplinsky and Messner 2008) but many have argued that Russia is also on its way to regain

some of the influence lost with the demise of the Soviet Union (MacFarlane 2006 Giessmann

2008) Thus the perception of a new seemingly promising authoritarian model of development

has been accompanied by a global power shift leaving more leverage for emerging powers to act

ndash in particular within their regional settings

Comparing regions

Given this global development authoritarian governments have increased their attractiveness as

a role model and their power to impact on other countries The empirical question at stake is

whether authoritarian regional powersrsquo growing leeway to actively shape their surroundings

can help explain the recent trend in receding democratisation From a theoretical point of

view the puzzle is whether and why authoritarian regional powers should have a preference

for a specific regime type in their regional neighbourhood

Realist and neorealist schools in international relations have traditionally argued that on the

international arena all states share the same interest ndash ie increasing their relative power vis-a-

vis other states ndash and therefore behave alike in the face of the same external challenges ndash irre-

spective of their domestic regime type2 Consequently according to this line of thinking there

would be no reason to assume that an autocratic regional power should prefer different regimes

in its neighbourhood than would a democratic power In fact if a difference in regime type does

not translate into different foreign policies neither power should have any preference for any

regime type at all

The (neo)realist contention of indifference with regard to regime type (and domestic politics

in general) has been criticised from many directions yet arguably most forcefully with reference

84 Julia Bader et al

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to the empirical phenomenon that established democracies do not go to war with each other

while all other pairs of regimes do3 Scholars such as Levy (1988) have made a strong case

for considering domestic political factors when explaining the causes of war Since then

rational-choice-based explanations of domestic politics have been widely used to account for

foreign policy decisions mainly again with respect to the origins of wars (see eg Bueno de

Mesquita and Siverson 1995 Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001)

In line with this latter strand of scholarship we start from the assumption that foreign policy

preferences are strongly influenced by domestic politics As a consequence of this assumption

we argue that governments are not indifferent with respect to the political regime type of other

states but do develop a preference towards systems convergence in particular in their regional

environment In doing so in a first step we take a closer look at the domestic mechanisms deter-

mining state behaviour to build our argumentation of foreign policy preference on the analysis of

domestic incentive systems thereby taking on a rational-choice perspective Contrasting the

authoritarian logic of foreign policy-making against the democratic one in a second step we

find plausible theoretical reasons why governments domestically profit from similar systems

in their regional environment and we therefore assume that they prefer system convergence in

their neighbourhood

Based on the concept of homo-economicus the micro-foundation for our theoretical frame-

work rests upon the assumption that actors be they individuals or groups are seeking to maxi-

mise their utility Governments are such rational actors and their overriding interest is to

preserve their claim to power In the words of Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003 p 8) lsquoevery

political leader faces the challenge of how to hold onto his or her jobrsquo

We also agree with Bueno de Mesquita et al in that the political leaderrsquos desire to survive

motivates his or her selection of policies and political institutions not only in the domestic realm

but likewise extends to the definition and pursuit of foreign policy objectives lsquo[A]ll actions

taken by political leaders are intended by them to be compatible with their desire to retain

powerrsquo (ibid p 9)

We thus combine liberal foreign policy analysis with a rational-choice micro-foundation to

form a foreign policy framework in which foreign policy choices are the effective outcome of a

governmentrsquos interest in domestic political survival In order to achieve this objective govern-

ments are in the first place dependent on the support of crucial societal groups which are most

likely to take the form of collective political economic or bureaucratic actors In the following

these groups will be referred to as the governmentrsquos coalition (Olson 1965 Bueno de Mesquita

2002) These societal subsets of the population in turn have their own rational agenda

Subsequently it is argued that politics can be understood as exchange between the govern-

ment and the coalition in which policies are traded for political support On the one hand gov-

ernments are interested in securing the coalitionrsquos loyalty to sustain their leadership They do so

by formulating policies which favour certain societal groups Examples in domestic politics for

serving such a vested interest range from preferential tax policies or industrial regulations for

specific industries to the exclusive provision of or access to luxury consumer goods to individ-

uals Societal actors on the other hand have an interest in gaining certain privileges to

strengthen their own position so that they in turn favour regime continuity expressed through

support for the government

But is this bargain between government and coalition the same in democratic and autocratic

regimes A growing number of scholars have argued that governmental interests and policies

vary due to structural differences between both regime types (Olson 1993 Lake and Baum

2001 Bueno de Mesquita 2002 Faust 2007) These differences relate to the way in which a

government comes to and stays in power While democratic leaders must be confirmed by

popular elections autocratic governments come to and stay in power through a consensus

Contemporary Politics 85

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among smaller subsets of the population In consequence democratic governments have to

involve at least a majority of the electorate in exchange for political support while autocratic

leaders focus on paying off small interest groups Mancur Olson put the structural differences

in a nutshell by drawing the distinction between an lsquoencompassingrsquo coalition which prevails

in democratic states and a lsquodistributionalrsquo coalition found in autocratic states (Olson 1982)

Whereas the first is larger in size it is for the same reason confronted with a collective

action problem as it has difficulties in organising and articulating a common interest In contrast

distributional coalitions unite a smaller number of individuals and face less obstacles to find

common ground

The systematic variation in coalition size arising from structurally different incentive

systems in democracies and autocracies leads to different governmental policy patterns Demo-

cratically elected governments are neither confronted with a concise unanimous interest nor

practically capable of reimbursing every coalition member Thus they try to consolidate their

leadership in the most efficient way by satisfying the emerging societal consensus through the

provision of public goods such as security social welfare or education In contrast to democra-

cies the smaller coalition of autocratic governments implies that the governmentrsquos distribution

of goods is more exclusively targeted towards the coalition members With decreasing size of the

coalition the pressure to use resources efficiently is shrinking It is more feasible to pay off

coalition members with targeted privileging policies and less necessary to be efficient in provid-

ing public goods

This is not to say that democratic governments will never try to consolidate their power by

the means of providing private goods and privileging policies However for reasons of account-

ability which provides considerable incentives to use resources in an efficient way in relative

terms democratic governments will rely more strongly on the provision of public goods In con-

sequence it is difficult to extract resources from democracies Similarly autocratic leaders most

often cannot completely refuse to provide public goods However facing less pressure from the

population to respond to public demands which opens up a bigger discretionary leeway for dis-

tribution relatively speaking they rely more strongly on the distribution of private goods In

contrast to democracies autocratic regimes are due to their independence from electoral out-

comes less committed to redistributing their gains After having paid off societal interest

groups and provided rudimentary public goods autocratic governments are still in a position

to accumulate resources While this surplus often serves the government to enrich itself the

fact that public control is less pronounced also offers incentives for other states to exploit

autocratic regimes

In our argument these structural differences between democratic and autocratic govern-

ments and their distributional consequences are of utmost importance not only for the domestic

but also for the foreign policy context Transferring these differences between autocracies and

democracies to the logic of foreign policy-making we find plausible theoretical reasons why

governments benefit domestically from similar systems in their neighbourhood and this is

why we predict that they prefer system convergence in their region A governmentrsquos gain in

another countryrsquos regime type is largely influenced by its domestic needs While democratic

governments due to the large size of their coalition are relatively more interested in the

provision of public goods ndash be they obtained at the domestic or international level ndash autocratic

governments tend to put a relatively stronger focus on the provision of private goods ndash be they

obtained at home or abroad ndash to pay off small societal groups At the same time the regime type

of a smaller neighbouring country ndash which for reasons of simplicity we refer to as lsquosatellitersquo ndash

has certain implications with regard to the regional powerrsquos interest in impacting on the form of

political order in neighbouring countries In brief while gains from a democratic neighbourhood

tend to take the form of transboundary public goods those from autocratic satellites result from

86 Julia Bader et al

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their proneness to external exploitation In the following we will elaborate on these arguments in

more depth

A preference for system convergence

Generally speaking one could assume that interaction between two or more counterparts is

easier if all participants follow the same or similar incentive systems simply because expec-

tations on the outcome might be similar and anticipation of the otherrsquos action might be easier

and probably also more precise Accordingly one would generally expect that governments

would prefer their governmental counterparts in other countries to rest on similar regime

types and to follow similar incentive structures

More specifically the reasons for the mutual benefit of dyadic democracy and autocracy

relations rooted in similar domestic incentive systems follow two different logics According

to the first logic democratic governments as they need to prioritise the provision of public

goods over that of private ones are likely to opt for foreign policy choices which help to

improve their policy performance Accordingly they are interested in two things First in

maximising the domestic provision of nationally or internationally produced public goods

and second in minimising transboundary public bads On the one hand democratic leaders

are expected to gain electoral support when they are able to provide public goods However

the interest in providing the population with public goods does not stop at the national territor-

ial borders but it is easy to identify its international dimension whenever goods are concerned

that might be affected by the performance of neighbouring countries such as peace free trade

or a clean environment Being transnational public goods this presumes that both states

involved genuinely contribute to its creation The structural divide between democracies and

autocracies postulates that democracies engage relatively more in the provision of such

goods Further research has shown that cooperation among democracies with the aim to

establish such common goods is higher than with or among other forms of government

(Milner and Kubota 2005) On the other hand democratic leaders face serious difficulties

when confronted with negative externalities like uncontrolled migration flows cross-border

environmental pollution the spread of pandemics or transnational organised crime These

negative spill-overs are more likely to be caused by non-democratic neighbouring states

because these are to a lesser degree accountable to their own populations and thus face

less pressure to deliver public goods In consequence democracies have strong incentives to

favour democracies as well as strong disincentives to like autocracies in their geographic vicin-

ity As the governmentrsquos performance is evaluated in regular intervals and elections decide

upon its political survival it is highly likely that a democratic government would strongly

prefer to have other democracies around The sole presence of another democratic government

inclined to provide good governance and public goods would create synergies useful to deliver

a positive performance In an increasingly globalised world this reasoning is theoretically not

restricted to a limited geographic setting but as positive externalities can be assumed to have a

higher pay off in the geographic vicinity the logic described should be even stronger in a

regional context

According to the second logic the government of a regional autocratic power faced with a

strong need to distribute private goods is likely to use its external relations as one way to secure

the resources necessary in order to strengthen its domestic position On the part of the satellite

countries in turn lacking accountability to their populations does not only cause autocratic

regimes to use much of their domestic resources to satisfy privileges From a regional

powerrsquos point of view lacking accountability in addition eases exploitation from outside

Such exploitation can for example take the form of long-term mining concessions in exchange

Contemporary Politics 87

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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2013

to the empirical phenomenon that established democracies do not go to war with each other

while all other pairs of regimes do3 Scholars such as Levy (1988) have made a strong case

for considering domestic political factors when explaining the causes of war Since then

rational-choice-based explanations of domestic politics have been widely used to account for

foreign policy decisions mainly again with respect to the origins of wars (see eg Bueno de

Mesquita and Siverson 1995 Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001)

In line with this latter strand of scholarship we start from the assumption that foreign policy

preferences are strongly influenced by domestic politics As a consequence of this assumption

we argue that governments are not indifferent with respect to the political regime type of other

states but do develop a preference towards systems convergence in particular in their regional

environment In doing so in a first step we take a closer look at the domestic mechanisms deter-

mining state behaviour to build our argumentation of foreign policy preference on the analysis of

domestic incentive systems thereby taking on a rational-choice perspective Contrasting the

authoritarian logic of foreign policy-making against the democratic one in a second step we

find plausible theoretical reasons why governments domestically profit from similar systems

in their regional environment and we therefore assume that they prefer system convergence in

their neighbourhood

Based on the concept of homo-economicus the micro-foundation for our theoretical frame-

work rests upon the assumption that actors be they individuals or groups are seeking to maxi-

mise their utility Governments are such rational actors and their overriding interest is to

preserve their claim to power In the words of Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003 p 8) lsquoevery

political leader faces the challenge of how to hold onto his or her jobrsquo

We also agree with Bueno de Mesquita et al in that the political leaderrsquos desire to survive

motivates his or her selection of policies and political institutions not only in the domestic realm

but likewise extends to the definition and pursuit of foreign policy objectives lsquo[A]ll actions

taken by political leaders are intended by them to be compatible with their desire to retain

powerrsquo (ibid p 9)

We thus combine liberal foreign policy analysis with a rational-choice micro-foundation to

form a foreign policy framework in which foreign policy choices are the effective outcome of a

governmentrsquos interest in domestic political survival In order to achieve this objective govern-

ments are in the first place dependent on the support of crucial societal groups which are most

likely to take the form of collective political economic or bureaucratic actors In the following

these groups will be referred to as the governmentrsquos coalition (Olson 1965 Bueno de Mesquita

2002) These societal subsets of the population in turn have their own rational agenda

Subsequently it is argued that politics can be understood as exchange between the govern-

ment and the coalition in which policies are traded for political support On the one hand gov-

ernments are interested in securing the coalitionrsquos loyalty to sustain their leadership They do so

by formulating policies which favour certain societal groups Examples in domestic politics for

serving such a vested interest range from preferential tax policies or industrial regulations for

specific industries to the exclusive provision of or access to luxury consumer goods to individ-

uals Societal actors on the other hand have an interest in gaining certain privileges to

strengthen their own position so that they in turn favour regime continuity expressed through

support for the government

But is this bargain between government and coalition the same in democratic and autocratic

regimes A growing number of scholars have argued that governmental interests and policies

vary due to structural differences between both regime types (Olson 1993 Lake and Baum

2001 Bueno de Mesquita 2002 Faust 2007) These differences relate to the way in which a

government comes to and stays in power While democratic leaders must be confirmed by

popular elections autocratic governments come to and stay in power through a consensus

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among smaller subsets of the population In consequence democratic governments have to

involve at least a majority of the electorate in exchange for political support while autocratic

leaders focus on paying off small interest groups Mancur Olson put the structural differences

in a nutshell by drawing the distinction between an lsquoencompassingrsquo coalition which prevails

in democratic states and a lsquodistributionalrsquo coalition found in autocratic states (Olson 1982)

Whereas the first is larger in size it is for the same reason confronted with a collective

action problem as it has difficulties in organising and articulating a common interest In contrast

distributional coalitions unite a smaller number of individuals and face less obstacles to find

common ground

The systematic variation in coalition size arising from structurally different incentive

systems in democracies and autocracies leads to different governmental policy patterns Demo-

cratically elected governments are neither confronted with a concise unanimous interest nor

practically capable of reimbursing every coalition member Thus they try to consolidate their

leadership in the most efficient way by satisfying the emerging societal consensus through the

provision of public goods such as security social welfare or education In contrast to democra-

cies the smaller coalition of autocratic governments implies that the governmentrsquos distribution

of goods is more exclusively targeted towards the coalition members With decreasing size of the

coalition the pressure to use resources efficiently is shrinking It is more feasible to pay off

coalition members with targeted privileging policies and less necessary to be efficient in provid-

ing public goods

This is not to say that democratic governments will never try to consolidate their power by

the means of providing private goods and privileging policies However for reasons of account-

ability which provides considerable incentives to use resources in an efficient way in relative

terms democratic governments will rely more strongly on the provision of public goods In con-

sequence it is difficult to extract resources from democracies Similarly autocratic leaders most

often cannot completely refuse to provide public goods However facing less pressure from the

population to respond to public demands which opens up a bigger discretionary leeway for dis-

tribution relatively speaking they rely more strongly on the distribution of private goods In

contrast to democracies autocratic regimes are due to their independence from electoral out-

comes less committed to redistributing their gains After having paid off societal interest

groups and provided rudimentary public goods autocratic governments are still in a position

to accumulate resources While this surplus often serves the government to enrich itself the

fact that public control is less pronounced also offers incentives for other states to exploit

autocratic regimes

In our argument these structural differences between democratic and autocratic govern-

ments and their distributional consequences are of utmost importance not only for the domestic

but also for the foreign policy context Transferring these differences between autocracies and

democracies to the logic of foreign policy-making we find plausible theoretical reasons why

governments benefit domestically from similar systems in their neighbourhood and this is

why we predict that they prefer system convergence in their region A governmentrsquos gain in

another countryrsquos regime type is largely influenced by its domestic needs While democratic

governments due to the large size of their coalition are relatively more interested in the

provision of public goods ndash be they obtained at the domestic or international level ndash autocratic

governments tend to put a relatively stronger focus on the provision of private goods ndash be they

obtained at home or abroad ndash to pay off small societal groups At the same time the regime type

of a smaller neighbouring country ndash which for reasons of simplicity we refer to as lsquosatellitersquo ndash

has certain implications with regard to the regional powerrsquos interest in impacting on the form of

political order in neighbouring countries In brief while gains from a democratic neighbourhood

tend to take the form of transboundary public goods those from autocratic satellites result from

86 Julia Bader et al

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their proneness to external exploitation In the following we will elaborate on these arguments in

more depth

A preference for system convergence

Generally speaking one could assume that interaction between two or more counterparts is

easier if all participants follow the same or similar incentive systems simply because expec-

tations on the outcome might be similar and anticipation of the otherrsquos action might be easier

and probably also more precise Accordingly one would generally expect that governments

would prefer their governmental counterparts in other countries to rest on similar regime

types and to follow similar incentive structures

More specifically the reasons for the mutual benefit of dyadic democracy and autocracy

relations rooted in similar domestic incentive systems follow two different logics According

to the first logic democratic governments as they need to prioritise the provision of public

goods over that of private ones are likely to opt for foreign policy choices which help to

improve their policy performance Accordingly they are interested in two things First in

maximising the domestic provision of nationally or internationally produced public goods

and second in minimising transboundary public bads On the one hand democratic leaders

are expected to gain electoral support when they are able to provide public goods However

the interest in providing the population with public goods does not stop at the national territor-

ial borders but it is easy to identify its international dimension whenever goods are concerned

that might be affected by the performance of neighbouring countries such as peace free trade

or a clean environment Being transnational public goods this presumes that both states

involved genuinely contribute to its creation The structural divide between democracies and

autocracies postulates that democracies engage relatively more in the provision of such

goods Further research has shown that cooperation among democracies with the aim to

establish such common goods is higher than with or among other forms of government

(Milner and Kubota 2005) On the other hand democratic leaders face serious difficulties

when confronted with negative externalities like uncontrolled migration flows cross-border

environmental pollution the spread of pandemics or transnational organised crime These

negative spill-overs are more likely to be caused by non-democratic neighbouring states

because these are to a lesser degree accountable to their own populations and thus face

less pressure to deliver public goods In consequence democracies have strong incentives to

favour democracies as well as strong disincentives to like autocracies in their geographic vicin-

ity As the governmentrsquos performance is evaluated in regular intervals and elections decide

upon its political survival it is highly likely that a democratic government would strongly

prefer to have other democracies around The sole presence of another democratic government

inclined to provide good governance and public goods would create synergies useful to deliver

a positive performance In an increasingly globalised world this reasoning is theoretically not

restricted to a limited geographic setting but as positive externalities can be assumed to have a

higher pay off in the geographic vicinity the logic described should be even stronger in a

regional context

According to the second logic the government of a regional autocratic power faced with a

strong need to distribute private goods is likely to use its external relations as one way to secure

the resources necessary in order to strengthen its domestic position On the part of the satellite

countries in turn lacking accountability to their populations does not only cause autocratic

regimes to use much of their domestic resources to satisfy privileges From a regional

powerrsquos point of view lacking accountability in addition eases exploitation from outside

Such exploitation can for example take the form of long-term mining concessions in exchange

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

92 Julia Bader et al

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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among smaller subsets of the population In consequence democratic governments have to

involve at least a majority of the electorate in exchange for political support while autocratic

leaders focus on paying off small interest groups Mancur Olson put the structural differences

in a nutshell by drawing the distinction between an lsquoencompassingrsquo coalition which prevails

in democratic states and a lsquodistributionalrsquo coalition found in autocratic states (Olson 1982)

Whereas the first is larger in size it is for the same reason confronted with a collective

action problem as it has difficulties in organising and articulating a common interest In contrast

distributional coalitions unite a smaller number of individuals and face less obstacles to find

common ground

The systematic variation in coalition size arising from structurally different incentive

systems in democracies and autocracies leads to different governmental policy patterns Demo-

cratically elected governments are neither confronted with a concise unanimous interest nor

practically capable of reimbursing every coalition member Thus they try to consolidate their

leadership in the most efficient way by satisfying the emerging societal consensus through the

provision of public goods such as security social welfare or education In contrast to democra-

cies the smaller coalition of autocratic governments implies that the governmentrsquos distribution

of goods is more exclusively targeted towards the coalition members With decreasing size of the

coalition the pressure to use resources efficiently is shrinking It is more feasible to pay off

coalition members with targeted privileging policies and less necessary to be efficient in provid-

ing public goods

This is not to say that democratic governments will never try to consolidate their power by

the means of providing private goods and privileging policies However for reasons of account-

ability which provides considerable incentives to use resources in an efficient way in relative

terms democratic governments will rely more strongly on the provision of public goods In con-

sequence it is difficult to extract resources from democracies Similarly autocratic leaders most

often cannot completely refuse to provide public goods However facing less pressure from the

population to respond to public demands which opens up a bigger discretionary leeway for dis-

tribution relatively speaking they rely more strongly on the distribution of private goods In

contrast to democracies autocratic regimes are due to their independence from electoral out-

comes less committed to redistributing their gains After having paid off societal interest

groups and provided rudimentary public goods autocratic governments are still in a position

to accumulate resources While this surplus often serves the government to enrich itself the

fact that public control is less pronounced also offers incentives for other states to exploit

autocratic regimes

In our argument these structural differences between democratic and autocratic govern-

ments and their distributional consequences are of utmost importance not only for the domestic

but also for the foreign policy context Transferring these differences between autocracies and

democracies to the logic of foreign policy-making we find plausible theoretical reasons why

governments benefit domestically from similar systems in their neighbourhood and this is

why we predict that they prefer system convergence in their region A governmentrsquos gain in

another countryrsquos regime type is largely influenced by its domestic needs While democratic

governments due to the large size of their coalition are relatively more interested in the

provision of public goods ndash be they obtained at the domestic or international level ndash autocratic

governments tend to put a relatively stronger focus on the provision of private goods ndash be they

obtained at home or abroad ndash to pay off small societal groups At the same time the regime type

of a smaller neighbouring country ndash which for reasons of simplicity we refer to as lsquosatellitersquo ndash

has certain implications with regard to the regional powerrsquos interest in impacting on the form of

political order in neighbouring countries In brief while gains from a democratic neighbourhood

tend to take the form of transboundary public goods those from autocratic satellites result from

86 Julia Bader et al

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their proneness to external exploitation In the following we will elaborate on these arguments in

more depth

A preference for system convergence

Generally speaking one could assume that interaction between two or more counterparts is

easier if all participants follow the same or similar incentive systems simply because expec-

tations on the outcome might be similar and anticipation of the otherrsquos action might be easier

and probably also more precise Accordingly one would generally expect that governments

would prefer their governmental counterparts in other countries to rest on similar regime

types and to follow similar incentive structures

More specifically the reasons for the mutual benefit of dyadic democracy and autocracy

relations rooted in similar domestic incentive systems follow two different logics According

to the first logic democratic governments as they need to prioritise the provision of public

goods over that of private ones are likely to opt for foreign policy choices which help to

improve their policy performance Accordingly they are interested in two things First in

maximising the domestic provision of nationally or internationally produced public goods

and second in minimising transboundary public bads On the one hand democratic leaders

are expected to gain electoral support when they are able to provide public goods However

the interest in providing the population with public goods does not stop at the national territor-

ial borders but it is easy to identify its international dimension whenever goods are concerned

that might be affected by the performance of neighbouring countries such as peace free trade

or a clean environment Being transnational public goods this presumes that both states

involved genuinely contribute to its creation The structural divide between democracies and

autocracies postulates that democracies engage relatively more in the provision of such

goods Further research has shown that cooperation among democracies with the aim to

establish such common goods is higher than with or among other forms of government

(Milner and Kubota 2005) On the other hand democratic leaders face serious difficulties

when confronted with negative externalities like uncontrolled migration flows cross-border

environmental pollution the spread of pandemics or transnational organised crime These

negative spill-overs are more likely to be caused by non-democratic neighbouring states

because these are to a lesser degree accountable to their own populations and thus face

less pressure to deliver public goods In consequence democracies have strong incentives to

favour democracies as well as strong disincentives to like autocracies in their geographic vicin-

ity As the governmentrsquos performance is evaluated in regular intervals and elections decide

upon its political survival it is highly likely that a democratic government would strongly

prefer to have other democracies around The sole presence of another democratic government

inclined to provide good governance and public goods would create synergies useful to deliver

a positive performance In an increasingly globalised world this reasoning is theoretically not

restricted to a limited geographic setting but as positive externalities can be assumed to have a

higher pay off in the geographic vicinity the logic described should be even stronger in a

regional context

According to the second logic the government of a regional autocratic power faced with a

strong need to distribute private goods is likely to use its external relations as one way to secure

the resources necessary in order to strengthen its domestic position On the part of the satellite

countries in turn lacking accountability to their populations does not only cause autocratic

regimes to use much of their domestic resources to satisfy privileges From a regional

powerrsquos point of view lacking accountability in addition eases exploitation from outside

Such exploitation can for example take the form of long-term mining concessions in exchange

Contemporary Politics 87

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

Contemporary Politics 89

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

90 Julia Bader et al

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

Contemporary Politics 91

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

92 Julia Bader et al

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

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their proneness to external exploitation In the following we will elaborate on these arguments in

more depth

A preference for system convergence

Generally speaking one could assume that interaction between two or more counterparts is

easier if all participants follow the same or similar incentive systems simply because expec-

tations on the outcome might be similar and anticipation of the otherrsquos action might be easier

and probably also more precise Accordingly one would generally expect that governments

would prefer their governmental counterparts in other countries to rest on similar regime

types and to follow similar incentive structures

More specifically the reasons for the mutual benefit of dyadic democracy and autocracy

relations rooted in similar domestic incentive systems follow two different logics According

to the first logic democratic governments as they need to prioritise the provision of public

goods over that of private ones are likely to opt for foreign policy choices which help to

improve their policy performance Accordingly they are interested in two things First in

maximising the domestic provision of nationally or internationally produced public goods

and second in minimising transboundary public bads On the one hand democratic leaders

are expected to gain electoral support when they are able to provide public goods However

the interest in providing the population with public goods does not stop at the national territor-

ial borders but it is easy to identify its international dimension whenever goods are concerned

that might be affected by the performance of neighbouring countries such as peace free trade

or a clean environment Being transnational public goods this presumes that both states

involved genuinely contribute to its creation The structural divide between democracies and

autocracies postulates that democracies engage relatively more in the provision of such

goods Further research has shown that cooperation among democracies with the aim to

establish such common goods is higher than with or among other forms of government

(Milner and Kubota 2005) On the other hand democratic leaders face serious difficulties

when confronted with negative externalities like uncontrolled migration flows cross-border

environmental pollution the spread of pandemics or transnational organised crime These

negative spill-overs are more likely to be caused by non-democratic neighbouring states

because these are to a lesser degree accountable to their own populations and thus face

less pressure to deliver public goods In consequence democracies have strong incentives to

favour democracies as well as strong disincentives to like autocracies in their geographic vicin-

ity As the governmentrsquos performance is evaluated in regular intervals and elections decide

upon its political survival it is highly likely that a democratic government would strongly

prefer to have other democracies around The sole presence of another democratic government

inclined to provide good governance and public goods would create synergies useful to deliver

a positive performance In an increasingly globalised world this reasoning is theoretically not

restricted to a limited geographic setting but as positive externalities can be assumed to have a

higher pay off in the geographic vicinity the logic described should be even stronger in a

regional context

According to the second logic the government of a regional autocratic power faced with a

strong need to distribute private goods is likely to use its external relations as one way to secure

the resources necessary in order to strengthen its domestic position On the part of the satellite

countries in turn lacking accountability to their populations does not only cause autocratic

regimes to use much of their domestic resources to satisfy privileges From a regional

powerrsquos point of view lacking accountability in addition eases exploitation from outside

Such exploitation can for example take the form of long-term mining concessions in exchange

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

Contemporary Politics 89

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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for short-term cash transfers or any other rights to exploit collective non-cash assets in exchange

for immediate material benefits that can be used by an autocratic leadership to buy its limited

winning coalitionrsquos loyalty

In consequence it is simpler to manipulate an autocratic governmentrsquos spending decision its

tax policies or any other decision that directly or indirectly affects redistribution such as land

concessions or transit rights than it would be with a democratic government which would

face a plurality in a large winning coalition This fact creates incentives for any more powerful

government to profit from an autocracyrsquos existence in order to pursue its own policy goals

whether it is the extraction of natural resources or the achievement of policy concessions

While the temptation to exploit exists for both democratic and autocratic regional powers

alike one should expect that the attractiveness of exploitation varies for autocratic and demo-

cratic regional powers with growing proximity of the autocratic satellite Considering aspects

such as transportation costs communication density or cultural barriers regional proximity

should clearly strengthen the preference for autocracy in autocratic regional powers In contrast

from the viewpoint of a democratic regional power the desirability of exploiting autocracies

should diminish with regional proximity just as the risks of negative externalities increase

Accordingly autocracies have a strong incentive to prefer other autocracies in their regional

environment As an autocratic government is only accountable to a relatively small subset of

the population whose support it has to secure in order to stay in power it is highly likely that

it would prefer to be surrounded by other autocracies For an autocratic regional power the exist-

ence of smaller autocracies with additional allocation leeway such as natural resources or

certain geo-strategic assets would contribute to the governmentrsquos commitment to pay off its

coalition

Seemingly contradicting this theoretical argument empirical evidence shows that some

autocratic leaders too have an interest in public goods while democracies have also been

seen to support authoritarian regimes Autocratic governments may profit from the positive

externalities provided by a democracy through free riding or even provide public goods

themselves especially in the field of security However these seeming inconsistencies do

not necessarily contradict our argumentation Again we are not arguing in absolute but in

relative terms The importance of privileging policies to bind the coalition to an autocratic

government does not imply that the government is not interested at all in the provision of

public goods On the contrary it can additionally legitimise its hold on power through provid-

ing public goods but it is relatively more reliant on side-payments to targeted constituencies

to remain in power

Against the background of different incentive systems and policy outcomes that result from

the structural differences between democratic and autocratic regimes we have deduced a general

preference for systems convergence This leads us to believe that autocratic regional powers

favour autocracy in their regional environment while democratic regional powers prefer the

prevalence of democratic satellites Having addressed the question whether and why autocratic

states support autocracy in satellite countries we will now look into whether the established

preference for systems convergence is confronted by other considerations and under what

conditions it is translated into policy-making

A preference for stability

Does a preference for convergence mean that regional autocrats will do everything in their power

to change regimes that are not to their liking Obviously not Every rational actor will weigh the

possible gains from a desired end state against the costs incurred by the necessary changes them-

selves In many normal life situations long-term gains will outweigh short-term costs of change

88 Julia Bader et al

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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so that a clearly profitable equilibrium is often so strongly preferred over a less profitable status

quo that change will be sought For the complicated matter of political regime change however

our expectation should be different Two main factors are important here

First the costs of change itself are hard to predict Countries in transition are prone to all

kinds of systemic failures with potential fallout far beyond their national borders As Mansfield

and Snyder (1995) and others have shown democratising (as opposed to democratic) countries

have historically been the most likely candidates to go to war with their neighbours The under-

lying logic is that governments of countries in transition have yet to consolidate their power and

position and that in the absence of a stable political environment promising material or ideo-

logical gains from war to their selectorate may appear as the only option available to make

up for lacking the capacity of distributing significant benefits right away ndash as those have yet

to materialise in the future In addition leaders can use the perception of external threats as a

powerful motivator to reduce the domestic struggle so typical of transition periods to a

minimum ndash and manipulate public opinion accordingly But even without war transition gov-

ernments are difficult candidates with whom to have international relations As their domestic

basis is often still shaky and the settlement among competing elites is usually not consolidated

agreements with them may prove to be far less reliable than with stable authoritarian or

democratic regimes alike

Thus the first problem a powerful neighbour with a theoretical interest in regime change

faces with regard to a less powerful satellite is the consequences of instability Bearing our

micro-foundation in mind we define stability as a governmentrsquos capacity to incur credible

long-term commitments ndash both inside and outside its state borders This means that stability

domestically implicates well established reliable and accepted rules as well as a statersquos capacity

to implement and defend those Stable states are able to comply with commitments even in the

event of a regular government turnover Unstable states by contrast are not credible partners

and a neighbouring regional power may well confront serious difficulties to derive benefits

from agreements with such a government

A second important aspect to take into account when regime change might seem attractive if

only judged by its outcome is the unpredictability of this very outcome Not only democratisa-

tion as discussed in section one has proved to be a process with uncertain outcomes lsquo(Re-)auto-

cratisationrsquo too cannot be assumed to be an easy win for those who bet on its success

Competing elites that have not been included in the autocratic leaderrsquos winning coalition may

challenge the leaderrsquos power postponing the prospect of a stable autocratic regime to an uncer-

tain future Or powerful democracies may begin to exert pressure on regimes that threaten to

slide back to autocracy They may even find allies within that country who use the opportunity

to discredit the ruling elites and their autocratic regime preference in the eyes of the larger elec-

torate Again an autocratic regional power might shy away from the temptation of outright auto-

cracy promotion as not only may the costs of the lsquoprocessrsquo turn out to be prohibitively high but

also the outcome of the attempt at lsquoregime engineeringrsquo is uncertain

Uncertainty itself however is not necessarily a convincing argument for a regional power to

refrain from pursuing change Much of course depends on the utility the regional power has in

the status quo ante In some cases the utility in relations with a satellite country may be very low

or even clearly negative ie characterised by an excess of negative externalities emanating from

that country In such cases which will typically be associated with an unstable political regime

in the first place and in particular if attempts at influencing policies have been unsuccessful

working for regime convergence may appear attractive to an autocratic regional power

Not every unstable polity is necessarily on the brink of regime change as instability may also

lead to a mere change in power (ie a new leadership) within the existing regime-type par-

ameters or to no change at all Yet once instability exists ie when a leadership is no longer

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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able to incur sufficient credible commitments the chances of regime change are obviously far

higher than under a stable scenario4 Thus while stability in a nearby country can be considered

a lsquodefaultrsquo foreign policy priority meaning that governments prefer to be surrounded by stable

regimes a governmentrsquos preference for stability is eroding during periods of instability in

satellite countries The fact that a government there can no longer enter into credible long-

term commitments with other states is not only considerably reducing its bargaining position

vis-a-vis other governments but also lowering other governmentsrsquo expected gains in this state

For regional powers who reside over comparatively ample economic and administrative

resources this moment of domestic instability in another country not only causes potential

losses but for at least three reasons also creates an incentive to promote regime change First

the fluidity of the political system in periods of instability makes a successful intervention from

without in favour of a particular political actor and with a particular political regime preference

more likely Second once a transition has been kicked off and instability set in the transition

path from a diverging system towards the preferred regime type is shorter That is the probability

to successfully promote regime change is increasing And third the opportunity costs of regime

change in a moment of instability are considerably lower than in the situation of stability as in

most situations gains from instability cannot be considered secure to persist in the future

To sum up from the point of view of an autocratic regional power stability in a contiguous

state is usually preferable as it reinforces the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in bilateral

and regional relations as well as domestically The regional powerrsquos government has an interest

in the continuation of the interrelational status quo as long as from the regional powerrsquos perspec-

tive bilateral relations are not so extremely bad that the potential gains of a lsquobetter dealrsquo clearly

outweigh the likely costs of regime change and ensuing uncertainty As long as a stable domestic

environment prevails in the satellite high incentives exist for the regional power to favour the

continuation of the status quo regardless of the form of government existing in the other state

As long as the government of a nearby satellite is capable of maintaining its position and offering

a minimum of benefits to its larger neighbour the regional powerrsquos government is unlikely to

make attempts to promote regime change As soon as instability comes in however the calcu-

lation becomes different Change may become an attractive strategy because it may appear to be

either feasible or relatively not too costly or both

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of different initial conditions in a satellite country

along the dimensions of stability (vertical axis) and regime type (horizontal axis) The

additional category of lsquotransitrsquo along the regime-type axis helps illustrate the argument that

under stable conditions a transition from democracy to autocracy (or vice versa) is highly

unlikely Hence the autocratic powers face very low incentives to work towards a change

of the status quo In an unstable scenario by contrast regimes rest on shakier foundations

Table 1 Regime-type interest of an autocratic power depending on different satellite country scenarios

Neighbouringpolitical regime Autocratic Transit Democratic

Stable Interest in maintainingexisting regime

Accept existing regime

Unstable Interest in autocraticconsolidation

Interest in change of politicalorder (autocratisation)

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

Contemporary Politics 91

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

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infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

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investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

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Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

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the line between the two types gets blurred and regime change is well possible or in the eyes of

the autocratic external power appears at least theoretically lsquoachievablersquo Hence we can

assume that its interest in its neighbour being autocratic too begins to prevail Depending

on the current regime type the autocratic power favours autocratisation (meaning regime

change) or autocratic consolidation

The next section will use examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia to illus-

trate the logic proposed here thereby concentrating on the unstable scenarios

Illustrating the model examples from the neighbourhoods of China and Russia

So far we have presented a theoretical argument why non-democratic regional powers have a

preference for system convergence in another country if this country is not politically stable

We will now illustrate this argument with examples discussing the interests of China and

Russia in contiguous states with unstable political regimes For each regional power we will

examine a state which was at a certain point in time more democratic (Cambodia for China

Georgia for Russia) and one the political system of which was rather tipped towards authoritar-

ian rule (Myanmar for China Kyrgyzstan for Russia) The discussion of cases begins with a brief

introduction into the coalitional politics within each of the two regional powers that drive their

respective foreign policy priorities

Chinarsquos regional foreign policy interest

Chinarsquos political system remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and so is its dis-

tribution coalition Just as the economic reforms have changed society the regimersquos distribution

coalition has adapted Threatened by their potential to challenge the political order the party lea-

dership has successfully integrated newly emerging social groups into its ranks Since the 1980s

party members are recruited by the criteria of educational attainment rather than by ideology and

after its opening up to business in 2001 the party also strategically targeted private entrepreneurs

in its recruitment strategy (Li and Waldner 2001 Wu 2003)

Yet while necessary party membership is not a sufficient condition to participate in the

regimersquos coalition Therefore shifts in recruitment patterns reflect the changing importance of

different societal subgroups in the Chinese leadershiprsquos winning coalition This coalition com-

prises the military the bureaucracy different party suborganisations such as the Communist

Youth League and powerful business actors from both the state and private sectors It is

these groups that offer a power base for individuals in the internal struggle for power at the

highest leadership level (Dickson 2003 Kim 2003 Wu 2003 Shirk 2007)

Analysing the Chinese distribution coalition it is striking however that the leadership

increasingly responds to the masses Since Tiananmen which had revealed the regimersquos fragi-

lity the political leadership tried to stabilise its power in a twofold manner While on the one

hand strengthening the internal security apparatus in order to prevent organised mass opposition

the regime tried on the other to increase its legitimacy in the population by redistributing wealth

more equally implying sustained high economic growth rates

Chinarsquos foreign policy is often discussed with regard to geo-strategic considerations and

growing energy needs in the context of maintaining economic growth Yet while both motiv-

ations are persistent in Chinarsquos foreign policy goals the interests of domestic coalition

members are also an important factor determining foreign policy Some of the members in

the Chinese winning coalition clearly have strong external interests For example the

Peoplersquos Liberation Army has strong incentives to maintain an external threat scenario in

order to increase its budget Taiwan has successfully been used to this end (Shirk 2007)

Contemporary Politics 91

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

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] at

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2013

Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

92 Julia Bader et al

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2013

infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

Contemporary Politics 93

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2013

investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

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2013

Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

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2013

The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

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in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

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Also the lsquogoing outrsquo policy of the Chinese government is designed to promote specific state-

owned enterprises with respect to their competitiveness on the world market In addition in

the context of an only partially liberalised economy access to natural resources abroad not

only ensures national energy supply but also yields high profits on the domestic market

Against this background we now turn to Chinarsquos bilateral relations with two countries in the

region that both experienced considerable instability Cambodiarsquos leadership has successfully

stabilised the political system by undermining the international efforts to democratise the

country and by establishing a de facto one-party rule Myanmarrsquos military central government

could strengthen its hold on power although the remaining potential for instability is unclear

in Cambodia building on autocratic structures

Coming from civil war Cambodiarsquos domestic political situation in the 1990s was dominated by

uncertainty Even though a new democratic constitution was introduced and elections were held

during the UN peace-keeping mission (1992ndash1993) the democratic base of the political system

remained fragile Chinarsquos relation to Cambodia has been characterised by a striking shift in its

support for competing Cambodian elites After heavy support for the royal family and the Khmer

Rouge both during their reign and in the following period of resistance against the Vietnamese

the Chinese government refocused its support to the party of Prime Minister Hun Sen which has

its roots in the Vietnamese occupation

Chinarsquos interest in Cambodia broadened after the end of civil war from the mere geo-politi-

cal goal of containing Vietnam From a strategic perspective the Chinese government seeks to

secure access to the Gulf of Thailand Cambodia also forms a base for Chinese interests in the

ASEAN regional community But the strategy of investing in Cambodiarsquos infrastructure by

building badly needed roads or improving electricity supply also converges with commercial

interests of Chinese construction companies who are eager to acquire contracts for ndash sometimes

highly controversial ndash investment projects For example Chinese state-owned companies are

involved in a number of hydropower projects in Cambodia that previously have been rejected

by international donors but are considered prestige projects by the authoritarian Cambodian

government (Middleton 2008) In ChinesendashCambodian joint ventures Chinese investors have

acquired large land concessions for agro-business notably logging and rubber production

(Global Witness 2007)

With respect to the political developments in Cambodia the royalist winners of the UN-run

1993 elections were forced into a coalition with the incumbent government under Hun Sen In

1997 conflicts over power between both parties culminated in an armed conflict Driving some

royalists into exile and others into collaboration with the victorious party this conflict turned

into a key event for Cambodiarsquos politics and considerably strengthened Hun Senrsquos hold on

power It also marked a turning point in Chinarsquos relations with Hun Sen

Against the background of Hun Senrsquos strict anti-Taiwan policy and the co-optation of some

Khmer Rouge and royalists who had cultivated close ties to China during the anti-Vietnamese

resistance the Chinese government managed to transform enmity to friendship with Hun Sen

While some Western donors withheld development assistance to Cambodia because of human

rights concerns in the aftermath of political violence the Chinese government turned a blind

eye to the legitimacy question and was the first external actor to accept the new Cambodian gov-

ernment It furthermore shifted its military support to the powerful Hun Sen government grant-

ing it military supply at lsquofriendship pricesrsquo Since then under de facto one-party rule political

stability in Cambodia has significantly increased (Storey 2006)

Hun Sen is nowadays considered to be one of Chinarsquos closest allies in Southeast Asia Since

2004 China has become active as a donor in Cambodia Heavy investments in Cambodiarsquos

92 Julia Bader et al

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2013

infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

Contemporary Politics 93

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03

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2013

investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

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] at

03

38 2

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2013

Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

Contemporary Politics 95

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

infrastructure by Chinese companies have improved transportation for the Cambodian popu-

lation This directly strengthened the legitimacy of the Hun Sen government Subsidised by

Chinese state money Chinarsquos large-scale infrastructure projects and its military assistance

feed the Cambodian political economy and enrich small elite circles in both Cambodia and

China

in Myanmar stabilise the central government

Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar tightened after both regimes faced international

isolation in the aftermath of violent oppression of protests against their respective political lea-

derships in 1988 and 1989 Since then the Chinese government has actively supported the junta

by delivering weapons and by diplomatically protecting the leadership at the international level

against interference for humanitarian and human rights reasons

China has both geo-strategic and economic interests in Myanmar On the one hand the

Chinese government perceives access to the Indian Ocean as being of geo-strategic importance

On the other with investments of US$856 million primarily in manufacturing mining infra-

structure and the energy sector China has emerged as the number one investor in Myanmar

(Storey 2009) All three major state-owned energy corporations are operating in Myanmar

and there are more than sixty 60 hydropower projects with Chinese engagement primarily

designed to export power to Thailand (Earthrights International 2008) In another energy-

related project the Chinese government invests US$25 billion in a strategic pipeline running

from Myanmarrsquos offshore oil and gas fields to the Chinese city of Kunming which will allow

circumventing the Strait of Malacca for energy shipping from the Middle East (Storey 2007)

However Myanmar also plays an important role in Chinarsquos domestic development strategy

which has in recent years focused on promoting economically backward inland provinces For

them resource-rich Myanmar offers business opportunities especially for locals from the south-

west Chinese province of Yunnan Many projects in the construction sector are carried out by the

province government of Yunnan which subcontracts the projects to enterprises linked to the

government (Guo 2007)

Furthermore a notable wood-processing industry has developed in Chinese towns along the

Burmese border China has evolved as a major exporter of timber products in a time of a nation-

wide logging ban Low prices for imported wood are credited to the fact that 98 of Chinarsquos

imported timber from Myanmar is estimated to be illegally logged woods involving the

cooperation of both the central government and local militias in Myanmar (Global Witness

2005 Myoe 2007)

The cease-fire agreements between the central government and several ethnic resistance

groups allow the local militias to maintain their control over territories and lucrative businesses

such as exploitation of natural resources and drug production In the past China has supported

both the central government and oppositional local warlords Given its strong strategic and

business interests with heavy investments the Chinese government repeatedly called on Myan-

marrsquos military junta to reconcile with oppositional forces in order to establish a strong central

government But the regime has not responded much to these pleas To the contrary in

August 2009 Myanmarrsquos central government in an attempt to bring contested territories

under its control launched an attack against rebel groups along the Thai and Chinese borders

This has caused concern with Chinese officials not only because of the subsequent flood of refu-

gees into China but also because it was seen as a warning towards the strongest of the opposi-

tional forces with which the Chinese government also has close ties A serious confrontation

between the central government and this group would probably lead to a lengthy guerrilla

war This would not only slow down Yunnanrsquos economic development and threaten Chinarsquos

Contemporary Politics 93

Dow

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ded

by [

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kow

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] at

03

38 2

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ber

2013

investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

Contemporary Politics 95

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

investment projects in Myanmar but most likely also spur narcotics production in Myanmar

Given the undesirability of this scenario observers believe that the Chinese government will

activate its behind-the-scene diplomacy to broker a political compromise maybe even offering

financial incentives to both sides (Storey 2009)

Russiarsquos regional foreign policy interests

With the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 Russia has been able to

overcome the instability of the previous decade but has also returned to a more authoritarian

model of governance (see the article by Gerrits 2010) The windfall profits from the export of

Russian oil and gas served the government to change existing redistribution patterns so as to

rebuild its domestic coalition During Putinrsquos first term as president huge amounts were invested

in the rebuilding of the security services which eventually restored government control over

horizontal and vertical policy processes subordinating both other ministries and the heads of

the Russian regions under the presidentrsquos rule (White and Khryshtanovskaya 2003) In Putinrsquos

second term the bureaucratic-economic alliance deepened with the de facto re-nationalisation

of important companies (Gaddy 2007)

The Russian leadership ensured the loyalty of both the elite and the population not only by

domestic but also by foreign policy measures The bureaucratic-economic alliance was co-opted

through a rise in wages improved working conditions and access to economic resources The

maintenance of such co-optation strategies however was dependent on a foreign policy

aimed at ensuring the continuous resource flow from Central Asia (Kastner 2008)

Vis-a-vis the population the Russian government defended its claim to legitimacy through a

mix of improved performance and Russian nationalism On the performance side a number of

regional centres developed economic prosperity progress was made in strengthening the rule of

law and some improvements materialised in the public health and education sectors in the

context of the presidentrsquos national priority projects This was accompanied by a rise in govern-

ment-sponsored ethnically Russian nationalism Both legitimisation strategies are mirrored in a

foreign policy aiming to restore Russian hegemony in the former USSR5

The cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan illustrate how Russiarsquos drift towards authoritarianism

has shaped its preference for similar forms of government in the former USSR Both Georgia and

Kyrgyzstan were relatively weak states so that the costs to apply pressure for system conver-

gence were relatively low In Georgia Russian policy-makers obstructed the conditions for a

further democratisation whereas in Kyrgyzstan they supported the emergence of a more

stable form of authoritarian rule

in Georgia pressuring for autocratisation

Georgia has since the fall of communism been relatively unstable due to pending secessionist

conflicts poor economic performance and high levels of corruption From the late 1990s the

Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze entered a legitimacy crisis which culmi-

nated in the 2003 Rose Revolution The newly elected president Mikheil Saakashvili initially

made attempts to streamline the conditions for a subsequent democratisation The conduct of

free and fair elections and the governmentrsquos aspirations towards NATO and EU membership

underlined this trend Nevertheless state building measures moved into the foreground

much of the state bureaucracy was replaced military spending was increased presidentialism

was strengthened and government control over the breakaway region Adjaria was re-established

(Mitchell 2009)

94 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

Contemporary Politics 95

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

Russian interest in Georgia has been persistent although Georgia lacking major oil or gas

deposits is arguably not as high on the agenda as the resource-rich countries of Central Asia

Georgia is first of all of strategic importance to the Russian government as it borders to

Russian secessionist provinces in the North Caucasus (Baev 2003) RussianndashGeorgian relations

had cooled off since the late 1990s when the Shevardnadze-government demanded the withdra-

wal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory In reaction Russian authorities

introduced from 2001 a visa regime for Georgia while they exempt the secessionist regions

from this system revived the Soviet-time military basis in Abkhazia and started to issue

Russian passports to the local population (Popescu 2006 Jackson 2008) Further Georgia is

economically important to parts of the Russian business elite as it serves as transit corridor

linking Russia to the Middle East and to the European market and offers opportunities for

asset stripping most notably in the electricity and metallurgy sectors (Papava 2006)

After the new Georgian leadership started to contradict Russian interests by re-annexing the

breakaway region of Adjaria in May 2004 and with the imprisonment of four allegedly Russian

spies in 2006 Russian policy-makers more systematically undermined the capacity of the

Georgian government to maintain domestic support thus hampering the chances for the

countryrsquos democratic development Not only did they impose an import ban on certain

Georgian export products most notably wine and mineral water but also subverted the Georgian

leadershiprsquos performance by suspending air rail road and sea travel as well as postal links

between the two countries by disproportionately raising the import price of gas (Kramer

2006) by raiding Georgian businesses in Moscow and departing Georgians on charge of

criminal offences (BBC 2006) Finally Russian security forces further contributed to a

destabilisation of the country by undercutting the Georgian executiversquos monopoly of violence

when stepping up their support for secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and North Ossetia thus

intentionally contributing to the escalation of conflict in August 2008 All this subverted the

Georgian leadershiprsquos effort to move towards democracy as it reinforced instability and

intransparent practices

in Kyrgyzstan supporting authoritarian consolidation

Kyrgyzstan like Georgia is neither rich in natural resources nor does it enjoy a high level of

development Nevertheless during the 1990s the country enjoyed relative stability under the

leadership of President Askar Akayev Ethnic fragmentation and the rise of Islamic fundament-

alism however represented sources of instability (Sukhov 2006) Although Akayevrsquos govern-

ment was the most liberal in Central Asia the early 2000s saw a rise in government

corruption and repression undermining Akayevrsquos popularity with the public and leading to

his resignation during the 2005 Tulip Revolution

Bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia were friendly throughout the 1990s But

Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan as a political and strategic partner in the region was reinforced

with the rise in the oil price and the spread of Islamic extremism Furthermore Russian business

elites profit from the willingness of the incumbent leadership to trade stakes in profitable

Kyrgyz enterprises for political support Following the Tulip Revolution Kurmanbek Bakiev

was victorious in the freest and fairest presidential elections Central Asia had ever seen But

initial hopes for a more democratic political course made way for more autocratic practices

(Radnitz 2006) Bakiev rebuilt his coalition by redistributing power from the governors of the

Kyrgyz regions to economic elites from the South of the country and interior forces around

his prime minister In the light of strong public protests Bakiev failed to consolidate his

power and took on a stronger pro-Russian stance as a source for legitimacy and stability

(Marat 2009)

Contemporary Politics 95

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

The subsequent rise in Russian engagement in the countryrsquos domestic affairs enabled the

government to consolidate its power and to strengthen authoritarian institutions Direct

Russian support for Bakievrsquos government materialised in a $150 million transfer prior to the

2009 presidential elections which has been used by the president to boost his re-election

chances by stimulating economic activity in the country (Eurasianetorg 2008) Further

Bakievrsquos claim to power is supported domestically and internationally by Russian assistance

to Kyrgyz security elites A prominent role is played by the base of the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation and by cooperation in border protection and the fight against drug traffick-

ing and terrorism between Russian and Kyrgyz agencies (Marat 2009)

In the economic realm Russian state-enterprises invest in Kyrgyzstanrsquos ailing economic

infrastructure which profits both workers and the economic elite and is therefore generally

seen as positive even if debt-for-equity deals are involved and if their effect is limited The

biggest Russian investment into the Kyrgyz economy a $117 billion deal over co-ownership

and investment in the Kambarata hydropower plant profits economic and strategic interests

on both sides The project is not only expected to provide economic gains to the two state-

owned stakeholders involved but also Kyrgyzstanrsquos upstream position could also become a

strategic lever against non-cooperative Central Asian downstream countries and thus a

means to extract concessionary resource prices from the Uzbek government (Karimova and

Erimova 2009)

Finally Russian policy-makers also sustain the relationship between the Kyrgyz government

and the countryrsquos population Considering the poor socioeconomic conditions in most of

Kyrgyzstan Bakievrsquos government owes the absence of large-scale social unrest largely to the

Russian governmentrsquos policies on migrant workers which enable large sections of the

Kyrgyz population to subsist on remittances from relatives working in Russia (Eurasianetorg

2006) Accordingly Russia considerably contributes to the stabilisation of Kyyrgyzstanrsquos

domestic scene and thus extends the longevity of Bakievrsquos authoritarian rule

The above cases illustrate why and how both China and Russia have undertaken active

foreign policy measures to directly or indirectly promote authoritarian tendencies in their

regions In the more democratic scenarios of Cambodia and Georgia the regional powersrsquo auth-

orities either supported non-democratic forces or actively tried to undermine the incumbent

proto-democratic governments In contrast in the more authoritarian cases of Myanmar and

Kyrgyzstan Chinese and Russian policy-makers supported incumbent leaders in their attempt

to stabilise the country thus contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian rule

Conclusion

In this article we developed a theoretical argumentation on external autocracy promotion by

regionally dominant authoritarian powers Based on lsquothe logic of political survivalrsquo our argu-

ment is that authoritarian regional powers have an interest in being surrounded by other auto-

cratic regimes because they gain from similar incentive systems in their regional proximity

Yet as transition processes tend to involve instability and uncertainty about future gains we

predict the foreign policy options of regional powers to be biased in favour of the status quo

as long as it is supported by stability Complementary to this prediction we identified and

illustrated scenarios of instability in which a regional autocratic power develops a preference

for system convergence that as our illustrations show can translate into strategies to actively

achieve this objective

This contribution attempts to fill the research gap on authoritarian external behaviour Our

theoretical considerations on the prevalence and causes of autocratic system preference can

offer a partial answer to the puzzle of explaining the current trend of receding democratisation

96 Julia Bader et al

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

in the world Just as democracies favour similar systems in their neighbourhood we can

plausibly assume autocracies doing so too

However identifying an interest is not the same as predicting a certain behaviour Whether

or not autocrats have actively exploited the current global trends that some analysts characterise

as democratic regression in order to promote autocracy is an empirical question the answer to

which will require more systematic explorative research While it should not be surprising if this

was indeed the case our model has not included any considerations about a satellite countryrsquos

receptivity for a regional powerrsquos political interventions Nor have we factored in further

considerations on the part of the regional power as it will devise its actual political strategies

not only based on its interests but also on its perceived chances of success Here more theoretical

modelling will be required Finally our illustrative case studies may have hinted at some

potential ways of how to externally promote autocracy (elaborated by Jackson 2010) without

however being comprehensive In contrast to the extensive literature on democracy promotion

the tools and mechanisms of autocracy promotion remain opaque This topic too awaits further

elaboration

Acknowledgment

Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project lsquoThe Impact of Russia India and

China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)rsquo enabled by funding

from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The paper has benefited

from comments by Jorg Faust Oliver Schlumberger Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and two

anonymous referees Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in

Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London All responsibility of

course remains solely with the authors

Notes

1 It is symptomatic that Linzrsquos (1975 reissued as Linz 2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarianregimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only anew introduction) in 2000

2 As Ray (2003 p 229) notes some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account3 Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional

historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period ndash driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics ndash by controlling for common interests See Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

4 In fact it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities exceptfor truly extraordinary circumstances Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a lsquobenevolentautocratrsquo relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediatepressure having been put on him Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario

5 See also Nicole Jackson (2010)

References

Acemoglu D and Robinson J 2006 Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy CambridgeCambridge University Press

Baev PK 2003 Russiarsquos policies in the north and south Caucasus In D Lynch ed The south Caucasusa challenge for the EU Paris Institute for Security Studies 41ndash52

BBC 2006 Georgians deported as row deepens Available from httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope5412672stm [accessed 17 November 2009]

Brinks D and Coppedge M 2006 Diffusion is no illusion Comparative Political Studies 39 (4)463ndash489

Bueno de Mesquita B 2002 Political institutions policy choice and the survival of leaders BritishJournal of Political Sciences 32 (4) 559ndash590

Contemporary Politics 97

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

Bueno de Mesquita B and Siverson RM 1995 War and the survival of political leaders a comparativestudy of regime types and political accountability The American Political Science Review 89 (4)841ndash855

Bueno de Mesquita B Smith A Siverson RM and Morrow JD 2003 The logic of political survivalCambridge MA MIT Press

Burnell P ed 2000 Democracy assistance international co-operation for democratization LondonFrank Cass

Carothers T 1999 Aiding democracy abroad the learning curve Washington DC Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace

Carothers T 2002 The end of the transition paradigm Journal of Democracy 13 (1) 5ndash21Carothers T 2009 Democracy assistance without a planlong version Development and Transition 12Cooper A Antkiewicz A and Shaw T 2006 Economic size trumps all else Lessons from BRICSAM

CIGI Working Paper No 3 Waterloo ON Centre for International Governance InnovationDiamond L 2002 Thinking about hybrid regimes Journal of Democracy 13 (2) 21ndash36Diamond LJ 2008 The democratic rollback the resurgence of the predatory state Foreign Affairs 87

(2) 36ndash48Dickson BJ 2003 Economics as the central task do entrepreneurs matter In DM Finkelstein and M

Kivlehan eds Chinarsquos leadership in the 21st century the rise of the fourth generation Armonk NYME Sharpe 186ndash203

Doyle M 1995 On the democratic peace International Security 19 (1) 180ndash184Earthrights International 2008 China in Burma the increasing investment of Chinese multinational

corporations in Burmarsquos hydropower oil and natural gas and mining sectors Availablefrom httpwwwearthrightsorgsitesdefaultfilespublicationsChina-in-Burma-update-2008-Englishpdf [accessed 20 November 2009]

Erdmann G and Engel U 2007 Neopatrimonialism reconsidered Commonwealth amp ComparativePolitics 45 (1) 95ndash119

Eurasianetorg 2006 Emigration from Kyrgyzstan is surging Available from httpwwweurasianetorgdepartmentscivilsocietyarticleseav032106_prshtml [accessed 17 November 2009]

Eurasianetorg 2008 Kyrgyzstan Russian economic assistance gives Bishkek a lift Available from httpwwweurasianetorgdepartmentsinsightbarticleseav040909b20shtml [accessed 17 November2009]

Faust J 2007 Democracyrsquos dividend political order and economic productivity World Political ScienceReview 3 (2) 1ndash29

Finkel SE Perez-Linan A and Seligson MA 2007 The effects of US foreign assistance on democracybuilding 1990ndash2003 World Politics 59 404ndash439

Frieden JA and Lake DA 2000 International political economy London RoutledgeFukuyama F 1992 The end of history and the last man New York Free PressGaddy CG 2007 The Russian economy in the year 2006 Post-Soviet Affairs 23 (1) 38ndash49Gat A 2007 The return of authoritarian great powers Foreign Affairs 86 (4) 59ndash70Gelpi CF and Griesdorf M 2001 Winners or losers Democracies in international crisis 1918ndash94

American Political Science Review 95 (3) 633ndash647Gerrits AWM 2010 Exploring democracy in the Russian Federation political regime public opinion

and international assistance Contemporary Politics 16 (1) 33ndash49Giessmann HJ ed 2008 Security handbook 2008 emerging powers in East Asia China Russia and

India Baden-Baden Nomos VerlagsgesellschaftGleditsch KS and Ward MD 2006 Diffusion and the international context of democratization

International Organisation 60 (4) 911ndash933Global Witness 2005 A choice for China ending the destruction of Burmarsquos northern frontier forests

Washington DC Goldman WitnessGlobal Witness 2007 Cambodiarsquos family tree illegal logging and the stripping of public assets by

Cambodiarsquos elite Washington DC Goldman WitnessGoldman Sachs 2001 BRICs and beyond London Goldman SachsGoodliffe J and Hawkins D 2007 Dependence networks and the diffusion of democracy Annual

meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Palmer House Hotel Chicago 12ndash15April 2007 Available from httpwwwallacademiccommetap199294_indexhtml [accessed12 April 2007]

Guo X 2007 Towards resolution China in the Myanmar issue Silk Road Paper Washington DC JohnsHopkins UniversityndashSAIS

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nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03

38 2

8 D

ecem

ber

2013

Jackson A 2008 Soft annexion of Abkhazia is the greatest legacy of Putin to his successors CaucasianReview of International Affairs 2 (3) 1ndash5

Jackson NJ 2010 The role of external factors in advancing non-liberal democratic forms of political rulea case study of Russiarsquos influence on Central Asian regimes Contemporary Politics 16 (1)101ndash118

Kagan R 2008 The return of history and the end of dreams New York Alfred A KnopfKaplinsky R and Messner D 2008 Introduction the impact of Asian drivers on the developing world

World Development 36 (2) 197ndash209Karimova C and Erimova E 2009 Muddied look to Kyrgyz power deal Available from httpwww

atimescomatimesCentral_AsiaKC11Ag01html [accessed 1 February 2010]Kastner A 2008 From chaos to pragmatism the domestic sources of Russian foreign policy 1991ndash2008

DIE Discussion Paper 19 BonnKim T 2003 Leading small groups managing all under heaven In DM Finkelstein and M Kivlehan

eds Chinarsquos leadership in the 21st century the rise of the fourth generation Armonk ME Sharpe121ndash139

Kopstein J and Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the postcommunist worldWorld Politics 53 (1) 1ndash37

Kramer AE 2006 Gazprom of Russia to double natural gas prices for Georgia InternationalHerald Tribune Available from httpwwwnytimescom20061222businessworldbusiness22iht-gazprom3992669html [accessed 22 December 2006]

Lake DA and Baum MA 2001 The invisible hand of democracy political control and the provision ofpublic services Comparative Political Studies 34 (6) 587ndash621

Levitsky S and Way L 2005 International linkage and democratization Journal of Democracy 16 (3)20ndash34

Levy G and Razin R 2007 It takes two an explanation of democratic peace Journal of EuropeanEconomic Association 2 (1) 1ndash29

Levy JS 1988 Domestic politics and war Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (4) 653ndash673Li B and Waldner A 2001 Career advancement as party patronage sponsored mobility into the Chinese

administrative elite 1949ndash1996 American Journal of Sociology 106 (5) 1371ndash1408Linz JJ 1975 Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes In FI Greenstein and NW Polsby eds Handbook

of political science Vol 3 macropolitical theory Reading MA Addison Wesley 175ndash411Linz JJ 2000 Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes Boulder CO Lynne RiennerMacFarlane N 2006 The lsquoRrsquo in BRICs is Russia an emerging power International Affairs 82 (1)

41ndash57Mansfield E and Snyder J 1995 Democratization and the danger of war International Security 20 (1)

5ndash38Marat E 2009 Bakiyev relies on Russia in domestic affairs Eurasia Daily Monitor 3 (128)Merkel W 2004 Embedded and defective democracies Democratization 11 (5) 33ndash58Merkel W 2010 Are dictatorships returning Revisiting the lsquodemocratic rollbackrsquo hypothesis

Contemporary Politics 16 (1) 17ndash31Middleton C 2008 Cambodiarsquos hydropower development and Chinarsquos involvement Berkeley CA

International Rivers and the Rivers Coalition of CambodiaMilner HV and Kubota K 2005 Why the move to free trade Democracy and trade policy in the

developing countries International Organization 59 (1) 107ndash143Mitchell LA 2009 Uncertain democracy US foreign policy and Georgiarsquos Rose Revolution

Philadelphia PA University of Pennsylvania PressMyoe MA 2007 Sino-Myanmar economic relations since 1988 Working Paper Series Singapore

National University of Singapore Asia Research InstituteOrsquoDonnell G 1996 Illusions about consolidation Journal of Democracy 7 (2) 34ndash51Olson M 1965 The logic of collective action public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge Harvard

University PressOlson M 1982 The rise and decline of nations economic growth stagflation and social rigidities

New Haven CT Yale University PressOlson M 1993 Dictatorship democracy and development American Political Science Review 87 (3)

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Basic Books

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Ottaway M 2003 Democracy challenged the rise of semi-authoritarianism Washington DC CarnegieEndowment for International Peace

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Schlumberger O 2008 Structural reform economic order and development patrimonial capitalismReview of International Political Economy 15 (4) 622ndash649

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ecem

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2013