THE WORLD BANK URR7306DEVELOPMENT ECONOllICS DEPARTMENT VOL. 4

URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS DIVISION

URBAN AND REGIONAL REPORT No. 73-6

REPORT ON BOMBAY

ANNEX III:

TRANSrORTATION

B. B. KING and Others

l!arch 31, 1971

These materials are for internal use onlyand are circulated to stimulate discussionand critical comment. Views are those ofthe author and should not be interpretedas reflecting the views of the World Bank.References in publications to Reportsshould be cleared with the author toprotect the tentative character of thesepapers.

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REPORT ON BOiDBAY

ANN_EX III - TRANSPORTATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

I. COMNNUTER PASSErNCER RAIL SERVICS ............ 1

Introluction ......... 1Existing Facilities, Services and Traffic ... 1Fares. Earnings and Costs ..... .............. 5Studies of Future Requirements .... .......... 7Current Improvement Programs and Proposals 10Observations on Mass Transit Studies aad

Proposals ....... .......................... 14Alternatives to Consider ..... ............... 16Iprovements of Existing Services .... ....... 18

II. RAIL GOODS TRAFFIC ..... ..................... 21

III. BUS TRANSPORTATION IN BOMBAY .... ............ 24

The Operating Company ..... .................. 24Route Structure and Schedules .... ........... 24The Fleet ....... ............................ 25Road Traffic ....... ......................... 26Capacity and Growth ..... .................... 27Fare Structure ...... ........................ 27Traffic and RevenIuCs ..... ................... 29Capital Requirer!ents and Financing .......... 29B;onus Incentives ...... ...................... 30Types of Buses ...... ........................ 31BES&T and the Governmenlt ..... ............... 32Demand or Supply? ...... ..................... 33Cross Subsidies and Misallocations .......... 33Mtanagement ....... ........................... 34Prospects for the Future ..... ............... 35

IV. BOWBAY ROAD DEVELOPMENT PLAN .... ............ 39

Work in Progress ...... ...................... 40Road Program Issues ..... .................... 40

V. AIR lRANSPORI'Al'ION ...... .................... 45

Introduction andl Background .... ............. 45Domestic Passenger Travel ................... 45International Passcnger Traffic ... ......... 45International Freight and Mail 'l'raffic ...... 46

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont 'd) Page No.

Domestic Freight and Mail Traffic .... ....... 46Aircraft Movements ........................ 46Airport Current Finances .................... 47Bombay Airport Modernization .......... I ..... 48

VI. PORT OF BOMUAY .............................. 52

Introduction ... ....... .......... 52

Administratlon ........ ...................... 52Finance ....................-. 52Port Facilities ........ ..................... 52Port Traffic ......... ....................... 55Port Trust Railway .................. , 56Current Developments ...... .................. 56Port Haster Plan Study ...... ................ 57New Port Development .......... , ........... 57

Transport Modifications at Existing Docks .. , 59

LIST OF TABLES

1. Growth of Suburban Passenger Traffic2. Transit P4ssenger Trips Crossing Screenlines (Bus and Rail)3. D4ily Transit Passenger Assignments (1981)4. Daily Average Passengers Carried by BES&T, 1966/67 to 1969/705. Construction Recommended by Bombay Traffic and Transportation

Study6. Bombay Road Program7. Bombay Road Works in Progress8. Bombay Road Program - Recommended Stage Development

REPORT ON BOMBAY

ANNFX III - TRANSPORT'ATIoN

I. CODIUTER PASSENGER RAIL SERVICES

Incroduction

1. Bombay's commuter railroads are simultaneously benefactors, vic-tims, and villains. The city cannot function today without them; there isno other way to carry the daily surges of workers from home to office andfactory and back again. For their efforts to carry these ever-increasingmasses, the railroads draw more criticism than praise: complaints about

overcrowding In the trains, deteriorating quality and reliability of serv-ices, shocking accident records, and the like. Their patrons, on severaloccasions, have expressed their dissatisfaction by burning the trains. Whilesome of the complaints may be unjust and the ways of voicing them extreme,there are certainly symptoms of malaise in the railroads. unfortunately,the railroads, through their service and pricing policies - with a helpinghand from regional geography and a distorted urban land market - have helpedto foster the pattern of urban development which is one of the sources oftheir troubles. Unrealistically low rail fares and the availability of rela-tively cheap and uncontrolled suburban land have encouraged the location ofresidences farther and farther from places of work, thereby producing ever-longer work trips and ever-greater demands on the rail system. In additionto creating many of the problems which now beset the railroads, this suburbangrowth has allowed decision makers to postpone a confrontation with the re-development needs and opportunities within the city. Particularly now thatproposals are being put fo:r for major new rail transit facilities, it isimportant that they be viewed in the context of overall urban developmentneeds, plans, and resources.

Existing Facilities, Services and Traffic

2. There is no single and separate entity responsible for providingrail commuter services in lombay. Both the Western Railway and the CentralRailway, which have their headquarters In Bomhay, have developed commuterservices as an adjunct to their main line passenger andl freight services.rhe Western Railway main line comes from Ahmadabad ar.d enters the GreaterBombay area at the north, crosses Bassein Creek, runs the full length ofthe island near its western edge, and terminates at Churchgate Station inthe Fort Area. The suburban tracks of lWestern Railway parallel the mainline and extend 34 km from Ghurchgate Station to Borivli; from there, com-muter trains use the main line tracks to Virar, another 26 km to the north.The Central lRailway, coming from the two crossings of the Ghats near Nasikand Poona, approaches Bombay from the northeast through Kalyan and rhana.Separate commuter tracks start at Kalyan and parallel the main line tracksto Kurla where the commutcr lines split into two branches which both event-ually end at Victoria Terminus. The main line and one commuter branch gener-ally follow the main axis of the island, and the 15 km llarbour Line branchskirts the eastern shoreline before reaching Victoria Terminus. There is

an additional 6 km feeder line from the Trombay area to Kurla, and another2 km connection from Raoll Junction, on the Harbour Line, to Mahim Stationon the Western Railway line. This is the only track link between the Westernand Central Railways, although passengers may cr-nect from one railway to theother through a common station at Dadar. Kalyan to Victoria Terminus is 54km; beyond Kalyan, the Central 'Railway operates commuter trains on the twomain line tracks to Kasara (67 km further) and KarJat (46 km further). Intotal, the "commuter-shed" for Bombay extends 60 km to the north, 121 km tothe northeast, and 100 km to the east and southeast. All the suburban com-muter operations for both the Central and Western railways are on electrifiedbroad-gauge track. Both railways, however, operate meter-gauge and narrow-gauge in their nonsuburban systems.

3. The distinction between main lines and commuter lines is more amatter of nomenclature than practice. From Borivli to Virar on the l1esternRailway and beyond Kalyan on the Central Railway, all trains run on the samelines. Between Borivli and Churchgate Station or Kalyan and Victoria Term-inus, inter-regional trains do use only the main lines but commuter trainsrun on both the main line and commuter tracks in order to provide greaterservice capacity. An average of about 15 long distance main line trainsoperate each direction daily at Bombay Central, the main line terminal forWestern Railways, and 21 at Victoria Terminus. The present procedure isto permit "fast" commuter trains - i.e., those which do not stop at allsuburban stations - to use main line tracks jointly with scheduled main linetrains during peak traffic periods. The Western Railway run!: approximately469 commuter trains per average weekday. l/ This is a fairly high frequency,considering that the Churchgate tu Grant Road section is only double trackedand a turn-around is required at Churchgate. The Central Railroad operates352 trains on the major line and 238 on the Harbour Branch, plus 100 trains inthe Kurla and Kalyan areas. 1/ The high frequency of suburban commuter ser-vice on both railroads makes it difficult to operate main line freight andpassenger services in Bombay on tracks which are used in common. The rail-roads would like to segregate t.e quadruple track, using a double track forsuburban service and the other double track for mainline services. In viewof the substantial congestion on the railroads at the present time, andprobably the achievement of capacity in terms of headways -- at least at thepeak hours, it does not seem appropriate to segregate the tracks in thismanner. The effect that the present mixed use of tracks has on passengercapacity has not been precisely determined but the presence of main linetrains (and the priority which they apparently have) is certain to reducethe capability for carrying comiuters below the potential capacity of apurely commuter service - a point which is discussed further in relation topossibilities for future improvements. (para. 43.)

4. Table 1 shows the growth in daily commuter passenger traffic onthe Western and Central Railways from 1950 to 1967, and the correspondingchanges in numbers of trains run. The total daily traffic now exceeds 2.2

1/ 1967 data.

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million passengers and is rearly equally divided between the two railways.An even more impressive figure is that, of the 2.2 billion total passengerscarried by all Indian Railways in 1967 (the (late of the Bombay Traffic Cellstudies), 35% were Bombay commuter service passengers. The growth of traf-fic for the 1Western lRailway, for which data were provided back to 1965-66,suggests atn annual growth rate for the period 1965-66 to 1969-70 of about 4percent per year. While this is not very rapid growth, it should be notedthat the growth in the period 1965-66 to 1966-67 was about 12 percent, andthe next three years' growth in total is only about 5 percent. Similar pat-terns are seen to exist when individual, first-class, and third-class serv-ices are considered. While first-class services on the Western and CentralRailroads runs about 10 percent of the total traffic, the growth rate of first-class service on the Western Railroad for the period 1965-1966 to 1969-70 hasbeen 9 percent per year. In the first year of that period, it exceeds 20 per-cent. A similar pattern of growth appears on the Central Railroad. llowever,both roads appear to have declining traffic in 1968-69. The figures stronglysuggest that the shortage of capacity is imposing a substantial constraint ontraffic growth.

5. lTe railways have about reached the limit in numbers of trains theycan operate during a peak hour, given their present facilities, equipment,and operating procedures. The growth is now being absorbed by increases inthe average number of p.-zqengers per train and by spreading traffic overlonger morning and evening peak periods. These periods now extend fromabout 8:30 to 11:00 a.n. and 4:30 and 7:30 p.m. Loads reach their absolutepeaks at terminals in the Fort Area between 9 - 10 a.m. and 5 - 6 p.m., whensome 90,000 passengers enter (a.m.) and leave (p.m.) the Fort Area each hourthrough four downtown terminals (Churchgate, MSarine Lines, Victoria Terminus,Masjid).

6. Peak period operations, as in all urban transportation systems, arethe crucial considerations: they are the basis for establishing schedulesand equipment requirements, they strain the capacity of lines and stations,and they largely determine the financial situation for ,he operators. Pre-sently the Western Railway runs 18 trains and the Central Railwav runs 26trains durtng the peak hour. (The Central Railway figure includes both theCeniter Island and llarbour Line branches.) Trains normally cons!st of 9 carrakes, although some old 7 and 8 car rakes are -'il! being used until theycan be replaced by new stock.

7. The "Marked Carrying Capacity" of these trains depends on the num-ber of Class I and III l/ cars which are included and the particular stockbeing used; it usually ranges between 1674 and 1778 passengers per 9-carrake. Tlhis "capacity" is described as that which enables passengers to ridein tolerable standing comfort (plus, of course, the seated passengers). For

1/ The Central 11ailroad uses Class III and composite Class I-III coaches,the latter heing divided roughly two-thirds for Class I and one-thirdfor Class III and having slightly lower capacity.

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the newest rakes, this marked capacity is 867 seated and 867 stariing pas-sengers, or 1,734 in all. Actual peak period loading practice bears littleresemblance to this "marked capacity," however. The railways estimate thatpeak periocl trains carry 70% overloads, or about 3,000 passengers instead of1,700. The 3,000 passenger figure would be more in line with peak periodspace utilization elsewhere; i.e., it is equivalent to full seat occupancyplus 1.3 sq. ft. per standing passenger.

8. Scarcely any information is available regarding the actual numbersof riders on peak period trains, aside from the estimated hourly arrivals ofpassengers and the known nunbers of trains at terminals in the Fort Area.For the W4estern Railways, the highest number of arrivals in tie Fort Area(at Marine Line Station) in a single hour of an average weekday is 45,000,or about 2,500 passengers per train. Of these, about 2,000 pas3engers pertrain debark at Churchgate Station. The numbers for the Central Railwaysare not strictly comparable since some rakes on the Harbour Line have 8 in-stead of 9 cars. However, 47,700 total passengers arrive at Masjid andVictoria Terminus during a single hour, about the same as on the WesternRailway, and this load is spread over 26 rather than 18 trains. Assumingthe same loading per car on both Central Railway Lines (which may not be thecase), the average train load for an 8-car rake is about 1,700 and for a9-car rake, about 1,900 passengers. These figures suggest that, althoughthe marked caprrity is regularly exceeded, comparatively few trains on eitherrailway arrive in the Fort Area with 3,000-passenger loads even during thehighest traffic hour.

9. This is not to say that the railways are not having capacity prob-lems, but rather that all the problems are not clearly identifiable fromexisting information about passenger movements. Part of the difficultystems from the fact that traffic studies have been largely concerned withthe "Fort Area problem" and have tended to ignore conditions and travel pat-terns at other locations. There is evidence from the studies that, at leaston a daily basli, the maximum rail-passenger traffic (peak load point) oc-curs not at the Fort Area but considerably further north on the Island, nearDadar. It is a reasonable expectation that traffic would start diminishingbefore reaching the last stations of a dead-end line. It seems particularlylikely to be the case in the specific situation of Bombay where textile millsand other large industrial employers, commercial sub-centers and other in-tensive activities are located between the Fort Area and the major residen-tial areas in the northern suburbs. Virtually no data are available, how-ever, to describe passenger movements into, out of, and through these inter-vening areas during peak periods.

10. What is not clear from discussions of corridor capacities and trainloading characteristics is that there are also problems related to passengercollectinn and dispersion at some stations in the Fort Area. Although Church-gate and Victoria Terminus are packed with people during the rush hours, pas-sengers are able to move quite rapidly through the stations themselves. Themain problems, at the moment, are outside. People spill out of the stationsand block the sidewalk with queues waiting for buses and taxis and disruptmovements of traffic on the abutting main streets.

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11. Safety is another serious problem for the railroads. In the pastyear, more than 600 fatal railway accidents were re9orted in the Bombay area,mostly .ivolving either passengers falling from moving trains or pedestrianswho were struck while walking on the traclks. Passenger accidents are larvelyattributable to crowdeci cond(itionis on trains, the absence of doors on theccaches, and the common practice of riding outsi4e the coaches on Lhe foot-boards (or even on top of coaches), frequently when the train is not evenfilled. The pedestrian accidents continue to occur despite the railways'efforts to keep persons off the tracks by building walls and fences at therinht-of-way limits. If, in addition to the fences, pedestrian bridges wereprovided at more frequent intervals in denselydeveloped areas, this trespass-ing problem might be alleviated. However, many accidents occur at stationswhen passengers alight from trains (often still moving) and short-cut acrossadjacent tracks to board another train or to beat the crowd to the exits.Some reduction in these accidents might be achieved by barriers between lines,but a solution to the problem is probably more a matter of training and dis-cipline than physical controls.

12. Although not identified by the railroads in terms of being a prob-lem, certainly one of the important needs whlich should be considered is thereplacement and modernization of rolling equipment. ?uch of the equipmentused is very old. Of 383 electric multiple units, 116 are considered by therailroad to be over age (over 40 years old). The Central Railroad does notgive specific ages for their equipment but 232 of their 448 units are clas-sifie(d as "new." The remainder are apparently quite old. The annual reportsrefer frequently to the maintenance difficulties with t'e 1928 stock and thedifficulties of getting replacement parts because of foreign exchange limita-tions.

Fares, Earnings and Costs

13. Six basic types of tickets are sold to commuters on the Bombaysuburban railway services. The principal classifications are first classand third class. Within each of these classes, one can buy a single-journeyticket, a monthly season ticket, or a quarterly season ticket. For purposesof calculating passengers, Llte railroads assume that a monthly season ticketis equivalent to 50 Dassengers and a quarterly season ticket to 150 passengers.In terms of price, however, very substantial discounts are available for sea-son ticket holders. Monthly ticket holders may pay as much as 13 times theprice of a sin,;le-journey ticket but probably use the ticket about 50 times.For very lobug trips, the monthly ticket price is only about 6 times thesingle-Journey fare. Additional liscounts occur when quarterly tickets arepurchased1. The quarterly ticket is approximately 2-1/2 times the price ofa monthly season ticket. For third-class tickets, the multiples are alsofairly low, with monthly season tickets ranging from about 20 to about 8times the price of a slngle journey. Again the quarterly season ticket Isonly 2-1/2 times the price of the monthly season ticket. Not surprisingly,as a result of this type of fare structuire, about 2-1/2 times as many seasontickets are sold as sin!le-Journey t!ckets for third class and about 20 timesas many first-class season tickets are sold as first class single-journeytickets on the Central Railroad.

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14. Several recent fare changes have taken place, but they were gener-ally o)f a minior nature. In 1968, third class monthly season tickets were in-creased in price by 25 palse, and first class tickets by Rs. 1. On the firstof October 1969, quarterly season tickets were increased in price by 75 paisefor third class tick!ts and Rs. 3 for first class tickets. The management ofthe two railroads indicate that fare increases are politically very difficultin Bombay and that it would be difficult to raise the fares sufficiently tooffset the present estimated deficit from suburban services. The presentfare structure has a very substantial taper. For monthly third class seasontickets, the rate per kilometer tapers from Rs. 1.23 down to 20 paise perkilometer. For trips from the ;ost northern point in Bombay City served bythe Central Railroad (Sion) to Victoria Terminus, the monthly season ticketis Rs. 6.05 and the price per kilometer is about 45 paise. For the trip fromKalyan Junction to Victoria Terminal, the third class monthly season ticketis Rs. 13.60 for a 54-kilometer trip, or about 25 paise per kilometer. Inaddition to the substantial fare taper and very pronounced discounts forseason tickets, the railroad also provides student fares. First class,student season tickets are sold at half the monthly adult price. One mightspeculate as to why students should be permitted half fare for first classservice, when they can travel third class at less than even half the firstclass fare. If the first class service is indeed a luxury, preferred typeof service, there appears to be little reason to provide students with halffare for that quality.

15. The earnings from suburban rail service have grown somewhat fasterthan the number of passengers principa1 ly as a result of the fare increasesthat have taken place in the last iew years. First class earnings on theWestern Railroad, for example, have grown 14 percent annually from 1965-66to 1969-70. Third class earnings during thle sae period have grown 12 per-cent annually, with total revenues in lakhs going from 554 in 1965-66 to 876in 1969-70. Total re.-enues for the Central Railroad in 1968-69 from suburoanservices were Rs. 772 lakhs, with about 1/8 of the revenue coming from firstclass passengers.

16. Prior to 1966-67, the railroads reported estimated allocations ofcost and earnings from electric, multiple unit suburban *;ains. In 1966-67,the requirement to report such data was elirminated. Using 1965-66 as a guide,they earned 1.15 paise per passenger kilometer at a cost per passenger kilo-meter of 1.02 paise, while 10.6 rupees were earned per train kilometer andthe cost per train kilometer was 9.51 rupees. Thus, in 19)65-66, accordingto the railroad allocations, the suburban train s2rvice generated a profit.No notes are available, however, in the reports, telling V3w these alloca-tions were made or what are Included in the numbers. In particular, itshould be recognized that the railroad fac.lities and operations of the sub-urban services are common with those for the non-suburban services, includingfreight services. 'Thus the allocations may tend to be arbitrary and havelittle basis in fact. The report for the Central Railroad for 1966-67 wasnot supplied, so comparable figures are not available. Nevertheless, thefollowing estimate was given for the loss on electric, multiple-unit ser-vices of the Central Railroad of Bombay in 1968-69.

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Rs. Crores

1. Total Working Expenses 7.606

2. Depreciation Charges on Rolling Stockat Current Prices and Depreciationas Booked in respect of Other Assets 1.291

3. Interest on Dividend Charges as Booked 1.311

4. Fully DiL:tributed Costs (1+2+3) 10.208

5. Gross Earnings 7.720

6. Loss 2.488

17. It is clear from these figures that gross earnings exceed whatthe Central Railroad calls "Total Working Expenses" which, in turn, excludedepreciation and interest charges. It would appear that total working ex-penses are greater than out-of-pocket costs andl probably are greater thanma- ginal costs. I,, any event, the figures suggest moderately sizeable losses!. the year 1968-69.

18. It appears that both the Western and Central Railroads are moder-ately profitable, although, in evaluating railroads' capital stock, it isoften difficult to place appropriate values on their assets. For the yearending 'March 31, 1969, the Central Railroad reported a profit after all ex-penses of Rs. 26.2 crores. In the previous year, a profit of Rs. 39.3 croreswas reported. The Western Railroad was formed in 1951 and has had a returnon capital -- as they measure it -- in excess of 9 nercent in every yearsince its formation. In 1969-70, the Western Railroad reported a profit ofRs. 33.2 crores. If, in fact, the suburban services are operated at a loss,there are sufficient revenues in both railroads to subsidize the suburbanoperations as the accounting is presently reported. Hlowever, the cross-subsidies implied are terribly complex, with freight and mainline passengerservice sub -dizing low-priced rail commuter service. This may have theeffect of disiorting the allocation of fr-ight between rail and truck inaddition to (istorting the land use allocation decisions within the Bombaymetropolitan area.

Studies of Future Requirements

19. Studies by the Traffic Cell have estimated the daily volumes oftransit passenger trips crossing screenlines 1/ in 1968 and 1981 as shownin Table 2. These are derived from estimates of the present and futuredistributions of population, land uses and economic activities by using

1/ Arbitrary lines (shown on Map No. 2) running generally east-west acrossBombay, dividing it into a series of strip zones.

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multiple regression analyses techiques. The estimates are for hotil rail-passenger and bus-passenger trips. Besides the usuql caveats about theaccuracy of forecasts based on other forecasts whicih thenselves are of doubt-ful validity, these estimates of future transit passenger trips have somebuilt-in procedural weaknesses. 1/ .1owever, they are the best estimatesavailable and serve to illustrate orders-of-magnitude of expected increasesin transit passenger trips.

20. The Traffic Coll studies preceded the preparation of the Metropoli-rnn Regional Plan; consequentlv, these estimates do not reflect tile popula-tion and activ1ty patterns proposed by that plan. Tlhe encire Twin-City con-cept, withl its resualtant impacts on the snnpe of regional developmcnit andtravel patterns, has been excluded from consideration. Tlic esti-nate; doincltide an assumption that the Backhay Reclamation Sclhemec will be varriedout and will resuitt In thle employmnellt of 150,00( additional persons In thatarea (whlich exp ;:.ns the unusually large jump in trips acioss ScreenlineNo. 1).

21. Two features stand ou: in Table 2: the volumes crossing Screen-lines 3 - 6 (roughly the Bombay Central-Dadar vicinity) are substantiallyhigher than in other areas, and traffic growth is highest in the northernsuburbs (crossing Screenlines 7 and 8).

22. Using these estimates of total transit passenger trips, the Traf-fic Cell made a further subdivision into estimates of rail passengers an'j buspassengers. The split of transit passengers between these modes was based ona "minimum tice path" traffic assignment technique. Travel times between allzones were compar'!d vla the shortest (time) rail routes and bus routes, andan "all-or-nothing" assignment was made; i.e., if the travel time was shorterby rail than by bus, all trips -ere assigned to the rail system. This tech-nique has serious shortcomings. If the estimated travel time between twozones is 40 minuces by bus and 39 minutes by rail, for example, all trips areassigned to the rail _ystem and none to the bus system. 2/ The techniquc alsoignores any diVference in travel costs between the two modes. The modal splitis obviously hi hly sensitive to assumptions about locations of facilitiesand their operating speeds. Present (1968) travel times, as observed byactual measurements, were used for the road system while new rail transitfacilities were assumed to have 60 kph operating speeds.

I/ The estimates are for transit trips only; no comparison has been madewith separate estimates of automobilp passenger trips (by Wilbur Smith)or with independent estimates of tctal trips which would be generated.The equations for estimating transit are based solely on pregentlyobserved behavior without regard to possible variations in trip pricing,automobile ownership, or other factors.

2/ See paras. 26-27 for further discussion of this point.

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23. Traffic assignments were made for two alter.-ative rail transitplans; the bus routes (road plan) remained the same for both. 1/ Plan A in-cluded a new rail transit corridor between the Central Railwa-. ard P.D. HelloRoad, crossing the Parbour branch at Raoli Juniction, extending a].cng the SewriExpressway at Wadala, and terminating at Ghatkopar near the Eastern ExpressHiighway. Another new corridor generally follows along the west side of theWestern Railway to Bandra and Santacruz Airport. These corridors would belinked between Santacruz and Ghatkopar, and between Churchgate and Victo,'d,Terminus. Several other intermediate cross connections were proposed butafter preliminary testing it was decided that bus connections would be moresuitable than rail. Plan B included all of the features of Plan A plus arail corrido; frum Kurla, running throughl the center of the island and meet-ing the western corridor near Marine Lines Station. The central-island cor-ridor was added after traffic assignments on the two-corridor system of PlanA indicated overloading of the western corridor.

24. Table No. 3 shows the daily transit passenger trip assignments tothe two rail transit plans, based on the Traffic Cell's estimates of trip-making patterns for 1981. Only trips which were assigned either to the ex-isting rail lines or to the proposed rail transit lines are shown in thistable; bus passenger trips are not included.

25. Recalling the sequence of the Traffic Cell's studies, Plan A wasthe first proposal which was tested. When the traffic assignments indicatedthe Eastern and Western Transit Corridors would be "tremendously overloaded," 2/a new plan was tested which included a central corridor. Several observa-tions should be made. First, the traffic assignments are based on estimatesof total daily rail passenger movements in both directions. In order to drawany conclusion about overloading, it is naecessary to convert these daily fig-ures into directional movements during peak hours, recognizing that the per-centage of total travel occurring in the peak hour a -. the directional splitof that traffic will vary for each section of line.

26. A .econd, and seemingly more important criticism of these assign-ments, may b seen by comparing the daily volumes assigned to the WeFternTransit Corridor and to the Western Railway. As was previously poir ted out,the assignm-_.s were ;ade on an "all or nothing" basis and, moreover, theywere made without regard to the available capacity of each facility. Theresult was that Plan A, for example, had 1,552,940 daily trips assigned tothe new Westera Transit Corrl.Ior where it crosses Screenline No. 5. whilethe existing Western Railroad was assigned only ,,9300 daily trips, or about4 trainloads for both directions of travel. These heavy assignments of traf-fic on the proposed new transit line are principally the result of assumed

1/ Interestingly, newtther assignment plan assumed that the freeways pro-posed by the Wilbur Smitlh Study would be built or available for transituse

2/ Traffic Cell Report, p. vi-32.

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higher operating speeds (and therefore reduced travel times) than on theexisting lines. The assigned volumes, in tuni, were interpreted as the jus-tification for an additional Central Transit Corridor which was tested inPlan B. The central Transit Corridor does divert 344,000 trips from theWestern Transit Corridor at Screenline No. 5, but still leaves the WesternRailway with only 7,900 daily trips. 1/

27. Although the reports do not expUicitly state it in this way, theimplication in finding that heavy 1981 traffic volumes "justify" the con-struction of new Western, Central, and Eastern Transit corridors is thatcommuter passenger traffic on thf Westerr. Railway will virtually cease andon the Central Railway lines will be cut to a fraction of the present levels.Obviously this would be inconsistent with the need to make maximum use ofavailabie resources and facilities before embarking on costly new investmentprograms for new facilities. Furthermore, it is contrary to the railroad'spresent studies and construction programs which are aimed at expanding thecapabilities of their existing systeni.

Cuirent Improvement Programs and Pt.oposals

28. The Western Railway is quadrupling its tracks in the section be-tween Churchgate and Grants Road Stations. This work, estimated to costRs. 4.15 crores, has been ui:Oervay since 1966 and is intended to provideadditional capacity and operating flexibility in the southern portion ofthe island. 2/ When. completed at the end of 1972, the Western Railway willhave four suburban lines extending the full distance from Churchgate toBorivli, (A later stage would extead the quadruple lines from Borivli toVirar.) The most difficult problems encountered io carrying out this workha-e been those related to right-of-way acquisition, despite a fairly com-plete kit of administrative and legislative tools for accomplishing this.One of the knottiest problems is still un;eeolved: the detailed method forbringing .he new lines into Churchgate Station. The railroad proposes towiden the station to the east and build new platfortrs in the space now takenbv Maharishi Karve Road. This, in turn, requires that the road be shiftedabout half the roadway width eastward along several bleck lengths, takingnearly all of the property between the present edge of street and the build-ing line. Juidging from previoua difficulties in acquiring land under muchless comnplicated circumstar'es, it would not be surprising if the trackwidening were completed for the remai%der of the project before the right-of-way problems are settled in this last and most crucial secticn.

1/ There are other peculia, lies in the Plan B rssignment. For example,although the Central Tre it Corridor is very near the Central Railwayline, no traffic Is diverLed from the railway but r-affic is divertedfrom the more distant Eastern TrAnsit Corridor.

2/ There may, in fact, be =cre capacity in this section ic relation totraffic demands than on sections further north, where passerger loadsare apparently much higher.

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29. The Central Railway has made a preliminary study of the costs ofmodifying its lines and stations to permit the use of 12 car rakes insteadof the present 8 or 9 car rakes. This study estimates that it would costabout Rs 40 crores to make this change, including the revisions in stations,tracks, and train control systems and the purchase of additional rollingstock. 1/ This investment would increase peak period' capacity on the CentralRailway by about 50% over present limits. No decision to proceed with th'swork has yet been made. rhe Western Railway does not consider that it isfeasible to expand its rakes from 9 to 12 cars, as proposed for the Ce.tralRailway, although a detailed study apparently has not been made to de-erminewhat the costs and benefits would be for a similar modification of the WesternRailway lines.

30. With respect to longer range rail-transit services, there is aprofusion of differing proposals.

31. At the conclusion of its lengthy analyses of travel patterns inthe Bombay Metropolitan Area, the Traffic Cell report makes the followingrathier cautious recommendation:

"In the conte::L of the continued development in the BackbayReclamation area on the southern tip of Bombay and expansion ofsuburban areas, it will be necessary to have a loop consistingof three corridors joining Santacruz, Kurla, Chembur areas tosouth of Bombay. It is, however, recommended for the present,to implement only one of the corridors in addition to the thirdterminal at Ballard Estate to relieve the existing overcrowdingand for catering to the increased traffic to some extent." 2/

The "third terminal at Ballard Estate" is a reference to an earlier recom-mendation (1968) by the Metropolitan Transport Team of the Planning Commis-sion. That team concluded that the commuter problems in the Fort Area couldbe substantially relieved by using the lines of the Bombay Port Trust Rail-road (generally following along the east side of P.D; Mello Road) for com-muter traffic and building a new passenger terminal at Ballard Pier. Thisproposal was intended to add line capacity and to relieve thie passenger dis-persal problem in the Fort Area by providing the new station in an area ofheavy concentration of trips. 3/ The same Metropolitan Transport Team, afterreviewing t'e traffic and transportation problems of Bombay, recommended amass rapil transit system should be provided in a north-south direction in

1/ The study itself was not available to the mission so it is not c!earwhether the RB. 40 crores include the elimination of grade level cros-sings on these lines.

2/ P. 16, Summary, Traffic Cell Report.

3/ See p2ras. 174-175 for further discussion of this proposal.

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corridors to be identified by further studies. These were the studies whichsubsequently were conducted by tthe Traffic Cell.

32. Map No. 2 shows the Plan b rail transit system proposed by thie1'raffic Cell. Its main features are thle three north-south corridors, a loopconnecting Churchgate and Victoria Terminuis, and a northern loop betweenGhatkopar and Santacruz. In presenting this proposal, the Traffic Cell sug-gested that engineering feasibility studies of all thrce corridors should beundertaken but that only one of the corridors (unidenitified) be implemented,in eddition to the Hallard Estate Terminal, until major decisionis are reachiIabout further flackhay Reclamation. Bai'dra-Kurla dc.elopment, anti the T'1iinCity. l/

33. The Hetropolitan Tranisport Team of the Planninig Commiss 'on accuptedthe findings of the Traffic Cell studies concerning the genierai locations ofthe three north-south corridors, but proposed actual rail transit alignrmentswhich were significantly different. The Port Trust Railroad, converted topassenger commuter service, was proposed for the Eastern Transit Corridor inlieu of the Traffic Cell's alignment further to the west. The Central Cor-ridor proposal was nearly the same as suggested by the Traffic Cell exceptthat it would terminate at Matunga, just west of Raoli Junction, rather thanextending across Mahim Creek to Kurla. Also, at the southern end, it wouldloop around the Oval Maida:t, staying to the east of Churchgate Station ratherthan joining the Weszern Transit Corridor near Marine Lines. The WesternTransit Corridor wou.ld be shortened considerably, veering south-eastward ata point near Lower Parel Srttion and joining the Central Corridor about op-posite Bombay Central. A separate loop was then proposed to start at CharniRoad and follow the Backbay shoreline to the southern end of the reclamationarea before looping back to Victoria Terminus. No traffic assignments weremade for this proposed system, although the results could be expected todiffer appreciably from Plan B.

34. As a result of the Metropolitan Transport Team's recommendationsthat further studies should be conducted, the Bombay Metropolitan TransportProject (Railways) was established in 1969 and given the responsibility to:

(i) assess commuter - fic demands at present and for thenext 10/15/20/25 years,

(ii) study methods for optimizing commuter transport capabilitieson ex,sting rail lines;

(iii) make preliminary engineering feasibility studies for theBallard Estate Terminal and connecting lines from Wadala;

l/ Traffih Cell Report, pp. vii - 23. Although this report recommends con-struction of the Ballard Estate Terminal, the traffic assignment studiesdid not include the Port Trust Railroad line, which would serve thisterminal, in their transit system so no estimate was made oi passengertraffic which would use this line and station.

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(iv) study passeng . dispersal problems in the Fort Area; and

(v) make teclhno-economic feasibility studies for a Mass RapidTransit System. 1/

35. After reviewing the previous studies and making some rough c.alcula-tions of traffic demands and rail line capacities, the Metropolitan TcansportProject (Railways) proposed that the following additional rail lines shouldbe studied:

(i) pair of lines, Malad-Bombay Central,

(ii) pair of lines, Thana-Kurla,

(iii) Jogeshwari - Churchgate corridor,

(iv) Chatkopar - Victoria Terminus corridor,

(v) Kurla-Bandra,

(vi) northern connector between (lii) and (iv),

(vii) Churchgate - Victoria Terminus locp via Backbay,

(viii) Churchgate - Victoria Terminus loop via Museum andSachivalaya.

These studies would be in addition to the Ballard Estate Terminal Study (re-portedly already underway) and the studies for optimization of existing raillines.

36. These proposals are confined to the Greater Bom'.ay area and do notconsider what additional and complementary facilities are needed in the re-mainder of the metropolitan area. The proposals would add about 110 km ofnew rail lines to the 90 km now existing in Greater Bombay. Of these 110 km,abont 62 km are proposed to be underground and 48 km on the surface. TheMetropolitan Transport Project assumed surface lines would cost Rs. 1 croreper km and underground lines would cost Rs. 6 crores per km, resulting in anestimated cost of Rs. 48 crores for surface lines and Rs. 372 crores forunderground lines. The combined total of Rs. 420 crores does not appear toinclude the costs of additional stationis, land acquisition, or the rollingstock and other accessory equipment required to operate on these lines.

37. To complete thc picture of current proposals for rail transit im-provements, the Metropolitan Regional Planning Board has also made transitrecommendations in its report "Strategy for Bombay Metropolitan Region." 2/This report makes the following statements alout mass transit:

1/ Railway Board Lcttp- dated Jinuary 11, 1969.

2/ Published January 27, 1970.

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"(ii) Mass Tranisit. The following railway progranmmes foraugmentation of commuter travel facilLties within the metro-politan area will have to be Included In thie Regional Dev.lop-ment Plan.

(a) Quadruplication of Railway tracks between Churchgate-Grant Road and Borivli-Virar sections of thie Western Railwayand the sections beyond Kalyan on the Central Railway isimmediately reqluired. Of these, work on Churchgate-GrantRoad section is already on hand.

(b) Introductioni of twelve coachi tra1iis on the Central

RaJlway and related improvemeuiits.

(c) Near;ures for improving frequency of trains byimprovements in signallinig systems, yard-remodelling, etc.

(d'! The developmenit of one additional traffic corridorfor mass transportation and provision of a third terminal in

Ballard Estate.

(e) Shifting of the mainline terminus to be betweenDadar and Parel is possible.

(f) Feasibility studies for the underground railway.

(g) Augmentation of bus fleet by adding large capacitybuses.

(h) Increased 'ins depot and workshop facilities.

"Otlher Urban Areas: Organization of Mass Transit ser-

vices and City bus services in existing cities would be amatter of details. Adequate provision for mass transportationservices will also certainly be needed in the two major town-

ships fiz., Trans-Thana and Metro Centre. The goods linesproposed/existing in these areas will have to be in course oftime upgraded to passenger-cum-goods lines and additional lines

and stations will also be necessary."

Observations on Mass Transit Studies and Proposals

38. The mission had neither the time nor the necessary information tomake an exhaustive examination of the various proposals which have been put

forth for rail mass transit nprovements. However, there is sufficient basis

for making the following general observations which may suggest possibled!rections for further studies.

(i) To state a point which is se obvious that it hardly aeedsEtating, the groups which have studied Bombay's mass transit problems have

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widely differing viewpoints about what should be done to improve the presentsituation and to accommodate the expected future travel den,ands. I/

(ii) None of the proposals (except for modification of the CentralRailway to hancile 12-car rakes) are yet supported by studies which would givea valid prelirninary indication of their capital and operating costs, theirecosv,mic and other benefits, or their physical and financial feasibility.Altsough same useful background studies have been carried out, none of thesestu.dies havs dealt specifically with the proposals which are being presented.Even the Traffic Cell's rather laborate traffic assignment studies testedsystems which differ substantially from those which are now proposed. (Thetesting procedures, as pointed out in para. 19, had inherent weaknesses wh4cnseverely limited their usefulness even for the systems which were tested.)

(iii) .'ll of the proposals involve high financial costs and musttherefore be considered in the context of total resource availability andother competing demands. The initial :ost of the Metropolitan TransportProject proposals (roughly estimated at Rs 420 crores), for example, wouldimpose a severe burden on the total resources of the metropolitan region,regardless of the "need" that might be demonstrated for these investments.

(iv) Studies which have been conducted to date do not refLect cur-rent proposals for the future development of the Bombay Metropolitan Region,as described by the draft plan and report of the Metropolitan Regional PlanningBoard. Conversely, the Metropolitan Regional Plan has not been examined inthe light of its implications for future transport requirements. As a result,the mass transit proposals have not been integrated, eatier in area of cover-age or substance, with the proposals for metropolitan regional development.There is at least a reasonable possibility that the two sets of proposals maybe working at cross-purposes.

39. The Metropolitan Transport Project (Rallwa-s) has clearly indicatedits recognition that additional studies are needed to provide an adequatebasis for decisions about future mass transit projects. It has recommendeda specific list of studies 2/ which it considers should be carried out andhas suggested that all of these should be undertaken simulta:neously. Thestudies are identified by location only; the precise scope and nature ofthe proposed studies are not described.

40. ihe notion of simultaneous studies should be carried one step fur-ther. What Is needed is a coordinated study program which begins with theconsideration of the entire t:ansport system, including both highways and

1/ It might also be pointed out that there has been a secies of earlierstudies, not mentioned here, whichi have made recommendations differingfrom all of the present proposals and from each other. They are allso out of date that they have not been included in this discussion.

2/ See para. 35.

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mass transit facilities, an( the plans for regional development. After ex-amining various system a.ternatives witlhin this physical, social and econon,icplanning framework (observing reasonable order-of-magnitude constraints oninvestment3), the details and timinig of the comnno.ent projects can thien bedetermined. Assurance that the be;t investment decisions are being riade,given the present and forecast future circumstanlces and the constraints onresources, can only be gained by Looking first at the system and thien atthe projects. The reverse procedure, starting witlh detailed examinatiolns ofprojects, does noc yield the same results.

41. When one considers thte size and complexity of transport analyses,as well as the importance of updatinig decisions to reflect changing condi-tions, it becomes apparent thac a continuinig plannin$ program is re(lUirLd,not simply an ad hoc study. Moreover, the transit planning activirv slhouldbe carried on by, or at least have substantial participation of, tLle agencyor agencies which ultimately have the responsibility for building and operat-ing the system. At least during the early stages and for highly specializedtasks throughout the plcnning program, consultants' services will undoubtedlybe required; however, a concerted effort should be made to develop ir-housestaff capabilities for the major portion of the planning activity.

Alternatives so Consider

42. Wthen identifying alternative courses of action to consider, it isimportant to know the desired objectives and, equally important, to eliminateany artificial constraints which might cause worthwhile possibilities to beoverlooked. This is parEicularly true in the case of decisions for urbantransport investments, wbere the goal is not simply to move more people. Tthebest urban transport "solution" may be one in which new investments in trans-port services are a relatively minor part. For example, the mass transitprojects which have been proposed for Bombay are aimed at improving thequality of present services (by reducing crowded conditions, improving re-liability and punctuality, etc.) and at providing for anticipated futuregrowth. The present proposals would try to accomplish this by providingadditional rail lines, more trains, bigger stations, etc. at considerablecapital and operating cost. A non-transit solution to the same problemwhich might be equally effective and less costly would include the reloca-tion of job sites from the r!':.c Area to the northern suburbs in order to re-duce the number of persons entering the Fort Area, to shorten the trip forpersons now living in the suburbs, and to permit commuters from the Fort Areato use vacant space on existing outbound trains. (Some of the railroad's own90,000 employees might be a good starting point for this kind of movementl)This approach has the advantage of easing the problem on three fronts--re-ducing overa.l travol, reducing passenger dispersion difficulties in theFort neea, and making more efficient use of present facilities--while pro-viding additional capacity is certain to worsen the passenger dispersalsituation and the unbalanced directional movement.

43. Another alternative which appears to merit serioue study would beto move all main-line passenger services from Victoria Terminus and Church-gate to a new terminal, possibly in the Bandra-Kurla or Mahim-Sion vicinity.

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A new rail passenger terminal in either area could be part of a completetransportation complex, with connectiag services to suburban commuter lines,metropolitan buses, taxis, airport shuttles, etc. A transportation terminalof this type would also be a focal point for stimulating other commercial andoffice development. The main advantages from a transportation viewpointwould be to free the existing riglhts-of-way and stations in the island fo-exclusive use by metropolitan conmuter trains during peak traffic periods. 1/This would permit track layouts to be modified for more efficient operationsand would permit complete flexibility of track scheduling. 2/ The currentproposals by the Metropolitan Transport Project are based on assumptionsthat no commuter trains will be permitted to use main-line tracks by 1981.This assumption should be carefully reexamined in terms of the trade-offswhich are involved, considering that daily passengers on the main line trainsnumber in the thousands while the daily commuter passengers already exceed2 million. There is no evidence to indicate that the main-line passengerswould be inconvenienced by moving to a new metropolitan area terminal, giventhe present patterns of development in Bombay and the wide range of connect-ing services which could be provided at a new l1cation further north.

44. A new metropolitan transportation center could also provide betterinterconnection between both the main-line and the commuter passenger ser-vices of the Central and the Western Railways. This capability for inter-changing between lines will become increasingly important as new growth ex-tends further to the north and eastward across Thana Creek. Some capabilityexists for inter-line transfers at Dadar and Mahira-Raoli Junction but thetransfer arrangements are inconvenient and probably inadequate to cope wit:growing demands. In any event, the full capability for suburban-mainline-interline passenger exchange does not now exist.

45. One feature that has been included in several of the mass transitproposals is the construction of a connecting rail loop between Churchgateand Victoria Terminus. Among the possible advantages of this loop would be:

(i) the dispersion of some passengers who now use Churchgateand Vistoria Terminus to one or two new stations nearertheir places of work; and,

1/ Freight traffic also uses these lines but could be moved duriag offpeak hours. Tnere also appear to be opportunities for longer rangemodifications in freight handling facilities and operations which wouldalter the track-use requirements in Bombay. (See para. 178.)

2/ In planning and carrying out all track improvements, including thosenow underway, possibilities for future changes in opcrations shouldbe kept in mind. There .may be opportunilties for Improved operationswhlich could be preserved or enhanced at relatively nominial costs atthc time of construction but which would be muclh more cobtly to pro-vide by revistons at a later date.

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(ii) the elimination of dead-end train turnaroundIs at bothstations, thereby pernmitting closcr headways and im-proved operations.

For the full realization of either of these benefits, the loop would have tobe an extension of the incoming tracks at bothi stations. This would be verycostly, regardless of how it might be accomplished. Existing buildings andcross-streets would make it difficulL, if not completely impractical, to con-strtict the loop at grour,d level to meet existing tracks. If the loop wereconstructe(d underground, the present tracks should also go underground be-fore reachinlg both stations (a costly solution, but one that could have someattracrt'e features). A separate underground line would require passengertransfers at Churclhgate and Victoria Terminus and would not permit thestraiglht-through train operations. Detailed studies would be required tocompare the potential benefits and costs of the loop. The number of pas-sengers who would use this loop is quite small in comparison to the rider-ship on existing sections of either railway (and also hiighly dependent onwhether the Backbay Reclamation continues or not). Provision of a loop be-tween the Central and the Western lines would certainly make it essentialto reconsider the entire question of separate or unified passenger trans-portation operations in the metropolitan area.

Improvements of Existing Services

46. Regardless of whatever shortcomings they now have, it is clear thatthe present railroads must continue to bear the main burden of commute. traf-fic in Bombay for some time to come. If it were possible to decide immediate.-'y that a new and separate rail transit system should be built (and ;here isnot yet an adequate basis for making that decision), seven to ten years caneasily el.pse before such a system would be in operation. Further studiesare needed of system configuration, preliminary and detailed engineering de-signs must be prepared, financial plans and schedules must be worked out,rights-of-way acquired, etc. before actuzl construction could begin. Inshort, if the mass transit passenger traffi.. which has been forecast for 1981actually develops, the probability is high ftat these passengers will beriding on existing rail and bus systems.

47. There are at least two clear conclusions to draw from this. First,the continuing program of metropolitan area transport and planning studieswhich is required to guide investment decisions should be initiated aj soonas possible. Second, the highest priority siiould be given to the studies andresulting investments which will permit better utilization of the existingrail systems. In fact, only after the optimum capabiliti2s of the existingsystem have been identified will it be possible to assess the need for build-ing new systems.

48. The "optimization" studies shouli consider all possibilities forimproving present services. Some of the more obvious ways include the fol-lewing:

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(i) Equipment modernization. The 1928 rakes still being usedby the Western Railway carried 20% fewer passengers thanth- 1964 rakes 1/ and even the 1952 rakes carry 140 fewerpassengers than the 1964 rakes. Replacement of old carswould increase train capacities and also improve trainoperations, besides reducing maintenance and repairs.Serious consideration should be given to modifying carinteriors, possibly removing space-wasting bulkheads andrevising the seating arrangements. By removing some ofthe seats, at least in trains operating on shorter runs,capacity could be increased substantially.

(ii) Longer trains. The preliminary findings of the CentralRailway regarding the use of 12-car rakes slhould be exam-ined in more detail and similar studies should be mad- forthe Western Railway. Even changing to 10-car rakes wouldincrease the capacity of each train by 11%. Before makinga definite decision to change to 12 car rakes, otlher pos-sibilities should be examined to determine which is the nosteconomic size, in terms of costs and benefits.

(iii) Level-grade crossing elimination. Train delays would bereduced and safety and punctuality 'mproved if separatedcrossings were provided at major roads and if more effectivecrossing protection were provided at minor streets. Roadtraffic would also benefit from the uninterrupted flow atseparated crossings.

(iv) "Bottleneck" elimination. Sharp curves and other tracklayout features restrict operating speeds on some sectionsand add to the turnaround time at stations. Even if thecorrection of these conditions requires additional rightof way, tl.e benefits may still justify this.

(v) Operational Revisions. Train scheduling and operatingprocedures should be examined to assure that the mostappropriate and efficient techniques ore being used, in-cluJing shuttling, station-skippinp, express trains, anddifferent allocations of tracks fpr commuter and mainlineoperations.

49. The foregoing suggestions all relate to possibilitieb for improvingline capacity. Most of the measures wlich might ibiprove the collection anddispersion of passengers in the vicinity of Churchgate and Victoria Terminusare not the railroad's responsibilities and require actions by other agencies.Some of the possibilities that are worth investigating Include:

1/ Base(d on Traffic Cell's calculations of seated capacity plus standingcapacity, all;.wing 1.3 sq. ft. per standing passenger.

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(i) Bus service improvements. Frequent shuttle buses, operat-ling from off-street loading zones near the railroad stationsdirectly to a few key locations in the Fort Area and Colabawhich are beyond a convenient walking distance, could easecongestion around the stations and provide a very usefulservice.

(ii) Intersecti)n traffic control improvements. Modern trafficcontrol :quipment and improved intersection designs, coupledwith better regulatic' of pedestrians, at nalr, strec: Inter-sections near the stationis would permit faster and safer move-ments of vehicles and pedestrians.

(iii) Separated pedestrian crossings. There may be justifica'onfor conLtructing separated pedestrian crossings, leadingdirectly from the stations and passing either over o; underthe adjacent streets, in order to remove the pedestrian-vehicle interference completely when both flows are veryhigh.

50. It should be emphasized that these suggestions for better utiliza-tion of existing facilities, for the most part, are neither new nor startling.Similar suggestions have been made by t.he Metropolitan Regional PlanningBoard, the Metropolitan Transport Team and the Traffic Cell, and others. Forexample, engineers who studied the operations of the Western Railway for theJuhu Chamber of Commerce concluded that tbe speed and frequency of suburbancommuter services could be improved significantly, simply by revising sched-uling and operating procedures fcr existing equipment and facilities. Gener-ally, however, these suggestions havz not been followed by the necessary de-tailed studies which would ana4yze their feasibility in terms of costs andbenefits and would provide a basis for decisions and improvement programs.

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II. RAIL GOODS TRAFFIC

51. The total broad ga;ige rail car interchanges between the Westernand Central railways are very substantial. The Central Railway in the fis-cal year 1968/69 received 1,732 wagons per day from the Western Railway, in-zluding 1,031 loaded and 701 empty. The average daily dispatches from theCentre' Railway to the Westein Railway amounted to approximately the samenumber of cars, 1,750 of which 1,365 were loaded and 385 were empty. Al-though the n.zbers seem extremely large, there is fair agreement betweenthe Central Railway report and the Western Railway report for the year1968/69. Of this very large number of interchanges between the two princi-pal railroads serving Bombay, app;oximately 400 are made in the metropoli-tan area of Bombay, at Dadar Junction and at the Bombay Port Trust at Wadala.

52. In 1969/70, 196 cars were dispatched f'r.' Dadar Junction including179 loaded and 17 empty, and 242 were dispatched from the Wadala Terminal,157 loaded and 85 empty. In the same year, the average daily receipts were220 cars (208 loaded and 12 empty) at Dadar Junction and 240 cars per day(168 loaded and 72 empty) at Wadala. This interchange at each of the sta-tions Dadar and Wadala amounts to approximately the equivalent of 4 trainsat each station in each direction for the Western Railroad. In 1969/70 theWestern Railroad handled 959 million wagon-kilometers and 16,193,000 goodstrain-kilometers or a weighted average of about 59 wagont-kilometers pertrain-kilomeZer, suggesting a train length of slightly under 60 wagons inthe broad gauge operation of the Western Railway.

53. Although this interchange does not represent a very large propor-tion of the total interchanges made by either the Central Railway or theWestern Railway, the volume of interchange taking place in the already verycongested railway operations in the Bombay metropolitan area may make for anintolerable situation. The railroads have suggested, and indeed plan toconstruct, a new link in the northern, less dense part of the metropolitanarea to avoid congestion in Bombay City. As of the 1969/70 reports of thetwo railroads, however, the project has not yet been surveyed and no costestimate is given.

54. In addition to the congestion within the Bombay metropolitan area,a major problem for the railroads is the inadequate track capacity throughthe Chats. There a-e presently two Ghat lines that are utilized to nearlyfull capacity. The capacity limitat,on is principally the result of opera-ting procedures which require large separations between trains to preventaccidents that may be caused by runaway trains. There are proposals foradding a third Chat line, but no detailed proposal or justification of theproject has been developed. It would appear that since such a large portionof the movement of freight over the Ghats is petroleum and petroleum pro-ducts, it wo,.d be worthwhwle to consider as an alternative the constructionOr a pipeline rather than a third Ghat line. In 1968/69, the Central Rail-way originated 716,000 tona of mineral oils, nearly all of which was bulk.In the same year, thiey terminated 928,000 tons, again principally all bulk.

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All of this traffic--except for a *ery irsignificanP. amount--MDovod on thebroad gauge sections of the Central Railroad, bhLt no information is avail-able on the amount moving over the Chats.

55. Before expending large amounts of money on tihe develo) -

new Chat liite, it would be appropriate to consider a large number u. :-heralternatives, including the provision of devices to stop runaway trains inthe event of brake failure such as in-track braking and the provision ofextra motive power so that longer trains may be moved over the Chats.

56. The probltnm of the Ghat line may Indirectly affect the BomL-'yarea, since it eliminates some of tlie flexibility in scheduling that cttuldassist in relieving tne main lines In the metropolitan area during tl;e p.akhours of commuter traffic. Also, because of scl:eduling, the storage oftrains and freight is longer than might be necess v if the capacit, prohle:tdid not exist. The extent of these problems is no. entirely clear; h0wever,it would seem desirable to remove any unnecessary freight problems from ctlealready overburdened rail syste.w in Bombay.

57. In-addition to the storage and yard facilities located in BombayCity, the two railroads have exLt.nsive workshops in the City. These areprincipally at Parel. The Central Railway workshops at Parel perform allof: the work required on the Central Railway locomotives, both broad gaugeand narrow gauge. Carriage and wagon work is done elsewhere. The CentralRailway also performs some special repairs at their Parel workshop for theWestern Railway. The Western Railway has extensive workshops for carriagerenaitfsat Parel. Parel is the only broad gauge carriage workshop of theWestern Railway. Thus the possibilities of moving these activiPies out ofBombay City appear remote in the short run. The difficulties of moving theextensive facilities neededl to repair locomotives and carr:ages would prob-ably preclude any immediate change.

58. The third Bombay railway, that of the Bombay Port Trust, has scmeentirely different problems that are related to serving ships at dockside.Rail- cars frequently are not available when they arc needed for unloadingships-,. and material beir.g brought in to be loaded onto the ships must beb!ought to the port earlier to assure its availability when the ship arrives.Compounding the congestion at the port is the presence of rail cars blockingthe access to the ships. The port consultants have suggested that the rail-way be abandoned and a road be provided to replace it (see para. 174). ifthe movements of cargo fron the port and to the port originate and terminateoutside the Bombay metropolitan area, the use of truck transnortation ratherthan ra1W directly from the ships does not seem entirely satisfactory.Long-distance hauls would require a truck movement from the docks to anintermediate warehouse or .ransfer point where goods i,uld be transferredto a railroad car and then moved by rail to the destination area. Suchdouble handling Is very expensive. It would seem that a major attempt a_coordinating the rail operations so that the demands of ship loading ar.unloading could be met would be most appropriate. In this way doublehandling of import and export merchandise would not be required.

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59. Part of the problem of sort movement results from difficulties iu.clearing Customs, both inbound and outbound. It would seem that effectivecoordination between the Customs operations and the transportation opera-Ltons of the port would provide greatly improved transportation and handlingof freight through the Bombay port. It might also relieve some of the prob-lems presently creating a demand for the new port at Nhava Sheva. To theezn.t that loading and rnloading operatious at the port would be expeditedso that ships could be urned around more quickly, so:ne of the need for thenew port might be alle,iated.

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III. BUS TRANSPORTATION IN BOMBAY

The Operating Company

60. All internal bus transportation in Greater Bombay is provided bythe Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking of the Municipal Corpo-raEi'n of Greater Bombay (BES&T), except for some verY limited privatelyoperated bus services to a few factories and other special places. OutsideGreater Bombay, bus services are provided by the Maharashtra State RoadTransport Corporation (a nationalized corporation), which also providesintercity service and ser;ice between Greater Bombay and other areas. Thus,although Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation operates in Bombay, itdoes not carry any internal local traffic. 1/

Route Structure and Schedules

61. Th- BES&T operates slightly less than 120 bus routes consisting ofapproximately 1,360 kil.tnmeters. This sytom is divided into 10 depot areasfor which traffic and roiute information _.re reported. The route structureprovides very extensive coverage of both _he city and the suburban areas ofBombay that are w-ithin the Bombay municipal limits.

62. Although buses operate on the comparatively few existing east-westroads, the bulk of the routes In the suburban area tend to -in north andsouth as do the railroads. Indeed, many of tha bus routes ari nearly paral-lel to the rail commu~ter system. Such greater and more ubiquitous coverageis available in the city, although there is somep fairly extensive parallel-ing of railroad operations. One would expect the bus system to provide ex-tepsive feeder st-vice to the baaically north-south oriented rai! commuterservice. While this is probably the case, the route system does not havegreat focus on the railroad station pattern, although all stat'-ns Ereserved by the bus system. There does appear to be a closer relationshipbetnwen reiilroad stations and bus cperations in the suburban area than inthe city.

63. If the buses serv3 as important feeders and diatributors of railpassenigers, it is surprist'ag that very few bus routes orig'oate at the railstation, particularly Churchgate and Victoria Terminus. !.arge numbers ofpassengers embarking and disembarking from buses at these princlpal terminalscreate long delays to scheuules, and buses cannot generally be availrble toaccumulate passengers as they l1ave the terminal. Since buses generally waitat their point of origin, a logical place to wait and provide a service whiledoing so is at the main ra&'raad stations.

1/ The geographic area served by the ele tric supply operatio;n of theBES&T is confined to the city of Bo3)a;y, which may cause cross subsidiesto arise between transportatiorn and electric supply operations. Crosssubsidation within the bus transport system is discussed below.

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64. The BES6T provides excellent route maps of its system with de-tailed routing described. Separate maps and descriptions are provided forcity and suburban services. In addition, the BES&T makes a complete faretable available which gives for each route the time of the first bus, thelast bus, and the headways in addition to the fares between any points alongthe route. According to those tables, the shortest headways are 4 minutesand there are very few that are longer than 8 minutes. Thus, it would appearthat present schedules do not reach saturation on individual rou.tes. It isdifficult to say, hovever, whether individual stations or stops servinglarge numbers of routes are oversaturated owing to the confluence of a largenumber of longer headways. While congestion at station!. can be alleviatedsomewhat through the scattering of bus stops, such an answer is not entirelysatisfactory because it would inconvenience passengers requiring a transfer.

T'he Fleet

65. The transport operations of the BES&T are provided tlrougi. conven-tional and trolley buses. l/ The' bus fleet totaled 1,291 at thi.' end of August1970, divided into 714 single-deck and 577 double-deck buses. Of the latter,50 were articulated trailer double-deck buses. The fleet composition is evenmore variable. There are buses of at least three manufacturers; there are 8cifferent model single-deck buses in the fleet and a total of 29 differenttypes when seating configuration is considered. A large number of seating/model combinations appear in the fleet unly two or three times. There are 26se.ting/nodel combinations which appear in the fleet five or fewer times!This abundance of model types and seating configurations probably results insome uneconomic maintenance and operating practices; it suggests the need forlarger inventories of spare parts and a larger number of maintenance prac-tices and rules to handle the large variety of buses in the f'.eet. It isdifficult, however, sz know exactly what the cost of such hih' variety mightbe or to recommend a procedure to correct it without an infu: of subst:an-tial new capital thiat could quickly make the fleet mcre uniform. If equip-menr Is added and replaced gradually, thiere are bound to be changes in modelsand manufacturers, but the abundance in Bombay is far greater than one mightreasonably expect.

66. Most of t:ie single-deck buses have total seating and standing ca-pacities of 50 passengers. The bulk of tlhcse have approximately 40 seatsand roum for approximately 10 standees. Of the single-deck buses, however,18 have 45 or 46 seats and room for approximately 35 standees. The rangeof capacity for thie double-deck buses is approximately 80 to 90. Thle articu-lated trailer buses have a capacity of approximately 100, almost entirelyseated. The remainder of the double-deck buses also have mo3t of their ca-pacity In seats, with more, but still relatively few standees -- approxi.tLely

1/ T'rolley buscs are relatively in3ig1nificant In the total transport opera-tion. In the 1969/70 fiscal year. tlherc were on ly 12 trolley busesoperated by the BES&T, and the averagc number of such buses in servicewas ll.

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11 or 12. The capacities of the sin,;le-deck buwses withi large nunribcrs ofstandees are nearly equivalent to t1le smaller double-dvck buses butL haveapproximately 20 percenL less capacity than the articulated trailers. (fcourse these "standce" buses do not provi(de equivalent service in turins ofseating.

67. Detailed data was not provided on the age distilbutioil of thefleet. The outward appearance of the fleet is thiat of very old equipment.This may be somewhat deceiving, towever, because double-deck buses May te:ndto look ancient even if they are currently produced. Furthermore, It ap-peared that maintenance efforts are directed more toward the mechanicalrunning of the buses thani to their phiysicai appearance. Thc buses appearto be somewhat banged up, and body repair work Is poor. lhis may be a re-~'lection of the BES&T's priority o0. the contitued operatlon of Ltle bus ov_r* s outward appearance. Certainly the BESET's fleet utilization of .ti.tjO percent must be regarded as quite good when the problems of sparc part:.are considered. The utilization figure mLy be somewhat distorted as theeffective fleet excludes buses undergoing major overhaul. According to thlestatistics, however, never more thatn 3 percent of the fleet is being over-hauled at one time.

Road Traffic

68. Any public transport system utilizing public roads must operate inan environment with many other vehicles. In Bombay, the problem is compound-ed very substantially by the presence on the roads of many pedestri_ns, hand-carts, oxcarts, horsecarts, stray oxen, and other vehicles, principaily taxisand trucks. Insufficient atten.ion has been paid in Bombay to adequate traf-fic control and vehicular discipline on the roadway. Very few traffic lightsexist, and in many places roundabouts or traffic circles are used in placeof appropriate signalization. While at the present time traffic is not assevere as it is in many other c'ties, the poor utilization of roadway capac-ity does result in substantial congestion and dangerous practices. Pedes-trians utilize the streets as sidewalks, cross the roadway apparently atwhim, with the result that traffic is considerably slowed down. This, ofcourse, has substantial repercussions on bus operating performance andeconomics. If the buses could travel at higher speeds, they could be uti-lized nore effectively and produce higher revenues per day.

69. A program of strict enforcement, keeping pedestrians on the side-walk and permitting crossing only at specified intersections unde. appro-priately signaled conditions, may produce a significant improvemert in road-way operations in Bombay. Such enforcement, however, would be an enormoustask. In particular, the sidewalks are presently occupied by vendors andsidewalk residents who restrict the flow of pedestrian traffic. These"zero" rent activities on the sidewalk provide a high penalty for transpor-tation on the roadway.

70. The presence of other non-motor vehiculdr traffic, such as animal-drawn carts, handcarts, and stray animals, appears to be a serious problemin only a few areas of Bombay. Nevertheless, they have a substantial impact

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on traffic flow whien and where they occur. Before embarking on a substan-tial construction program for new roads, more consideration should be givento improving the traffic flow on existing roads and streets. Througlh con-trolling traffic, substantial itncreases in road capacity may be achievableat far lower expense than building new facilities. Furthermore, the addeddiscipline required and produced would increase safety and make *ravel morecomfortable. Buses and taxis, wh,ich have to stop suddenly to avoid hittingpedestrians or animals, cannot oroduce a comfortable ride. Furthermore,sudden weaving and turning to a%oid such obstacles also diminishes qualityof service. At some time in the future, it will be necessary to improvetraffic conditions in Bombay; it would seem that the sooner this is done,the better. Such improvements may have far-reaching effects on the accuracyand operating efficicncy of thc present BESET bus system.

Capacity and Growth

71. Data are not given in the BES&T's repor.s for capacity utilization.Figures are given for passengers carried and effective kilometers but are notbroken down as to bus type, nor are comparisons made between passe :ger kilo-meters and available seat kilometers. Such statistics would be very usefulin evaluating the performance of the system with respect to passenger ser-vice. Furthermore, it may suggest differences between bus types that arenot apparent from physical measurements. The absence of detailed load factorinformation makes it difficult to determine whether there are constraints onsupply which are restricting the growth in passenger transportation. In thesimplest case, of course, if all buses were filled all of the time and therewas no increase in either the number of buses or the seats per bus, onecould not expect any growth in traffic. On the other hand, if traffic grewwhile capacity was well in excess of traffic at all times of day, one couldargue that such growth is due to increasing demand.

72. Because of the way passenger information is obtained, it is diffi-cult to obtain the true number of passengers using the system. This is un-fortunate as such statistics could be very valuable in planning and managingthe system. The principal reason for losing that information is that BES&T'sdata comes from single ticket srles, whiich do not always represent singletrips. For example, some very long trips require two or more tickets. Whilethere probably are not very many such trips on the bus system, there aresome and they may be relatively important. In addition. data are not pre-sented for those passengers traveling free, such as policemen.

Fare Structure

73. A zone system of fares is used by the BlS&T. The minimum chargefor adults is 10 paise and tickets go up to 50 palise. For adult fares ex-ceeding 50 paise, a 45 paise ticket and an additional ticket are sold, makingthe total the amount of the fare. Children travel at half fare with a min-lmum of 5 paise. As a result of the method of charging fares in excess of50 paise, ticket saic dAta for 5 paise tickets represent exclusively chil-dren's tickets in excess of 5 paise and tickets to make up fares in excess of45 paise appear as lower price tickets, and it is impossible to distinguishbetween them.

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74. The fare structure has a fairly sharp taper for both ordinaryservices and limited and express services. For ordinary services, the taperruns from 5 paise/kilometer for 2-kilometer trips to 2.12 paise/kilometerfor 26-kilometer trips. On limited and express services, the taper runsfrom 7.5 paise/kilometer fLr 2-kilometer trips down to 2.5 paise/kilometerfor 26-kilomeLer trips.

75. The orcinary fare structure was cha.aged in 1966. For ordinaryservices, 5 paise were added to each previous fare, and an additional cate-gory of 10 paise for a 2-kilometer trip was introduced. For the limited audexpress services, the basic structure itself was changed, with a slharplyincreased taper. There has been essentially no change in the money faresince 1966 except for the introduction of a 35-paise fare on December 1,1968, for limited and express service. To the extent that there has beenany change in service quality, however, an implicit fare change may indeedhave taken place. Such would be the case, for example, if headways haveincreased or if capacity were shifted from seated to standing or if fewerbuses were operated. In money terms, however, it is interesting that busfares substantially exceed third-class seasonal railroad fares. For example,a 26-kilometer bus trip would cost 65 paise for a limited and express ser-vice bus, while a third-class monthly ticket for a 27-kilometer railroadtrip would cost Rs. 4.25, an amount that would be paid for 14 bus trips or7 roundtrips. For most passengers making work trips, a monthly seasonticket would probably provide for approximately 25 round trips.

76. It is not clear whether cost differences explain all of the pricedifferences. It is difficult to determine this because for both the rail-roads and the bus system some common costs exist between the local cormutingoperation and other activities of the organization providing the service.For the railroads, in addition to the commuter service, there is mainlinepassenger service and freight services. Much equipment and investment and,particularly, many personnel are commonly used between the commuting opera-tions and these other railroad services. A similar situation exists in theBES&T between the electric power services and the bus services. The problemis probably not sc severe in the latter case because the services are rela-tively distinct in the equipment and personnel used to provide them. Never-theless, data are not sufficiently detailed to indicate the true financialpicture. It is, of course, highly likely that bus transportation is moreexpensive per seat mile than rail. It is just as clear, however, that thereis probably a deficit in both op'eratior. given the existing fare structures.Facusing on bus finances for the moment according to the BES&T financialaccounting, during the year 1969/70, the deficit from bus operations -- evenif the total of general administration allocated and the depreciation chargeswere subject to question and 'eli-minated from the calculations -- would stillbe present. 1/ Such is not the case, h6ivever, with respect to the trolley bus

1/ It is impossible to evaluatee the reciation figures as presented with-out a great deal more detail r^ga ..tg tthe assets being depreciated.For economic analysis purpo¾eE, ' production ccsts may be more appro-priate and these may bear little relation to depreciated values. Never-theless, it is clear .tiat some depreciation and some allocation of ad-ministrative expenses must be charged.

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operations where elimination of depreciation and the administrative allocationwould result in a slight surplus, but these expenses are trivial compared tobua operations.

Traffic and Revenues

77. Traffic on the BES.T for the 1967/68 through 1969/70 fiscal yearsis given in Table 4. Th#2 figures are not entirely accurate, however, sincethey represent the total number of passenger tickets sold plus the numberof reserve and school bus 5jssengers. Because of the niultiple ticket issuancefor tickets over 50 paise, some doublecounting occurs. Unfortunately, be-cause estimates of passengers carried are based on ticket sales, when thefare increase took place in 1966, introducing more fares in excess of 50paise, it is likely that some additional tickets were sold offsetting thedecline in traffic that might be expected to accompany the fare increase.l'he metlhod of reporting the data does not permit such a specific assessmentof the effect of the fare increase. Perhaps more detailed information isavailable at the BES&T, but it was not in the reports supplied.

78. If the data provided can be used as approximaticns for actual pas-sengers carried, the rate of growth in traffic from 1967/68 to 1969/70 isabout 10 percent -er year. The 1966/67 figures are obviously confounded withthe fare charnge that took place during that year, and it would thus be in-appropriate to use that year in estimating the growthi rate. In the BES&T'sestimates of capital requirements for the next five years, a traffic growthrate of 2.5 percent per year is projected. In their calculations, the BES&Tsays that the rate of growth during the last five years was 2.7 percent.If that is the case, the recent annual growth of about 10 percent since thefare change is most interesting. To some extent it might be due to a re-covery from the loss that accompanied the fare increase or it may be due toincreases in load factors that accompanied the incer ive pay practices thatwere introduced. I/

Canptal_R.quirements and Financing

79. On the basis of assumed growthi rates of 2.5 percent and 5 percentper year, the BES&T has calculated the annual increase in buses thlat will berequired. Under the assumption of 2.5 percent growth, 30 buses will have tobe added annually to meet the traffic growtht alone. Under the assumption of5 percent growth, 60 buses *will have to be added annually. Under eitherassumption, 90 buses will be required for replacement eachi year. These fig-ures probably assume -- although it is not clear in the report -- that double-deck buses will be provided with a capacity of about 90 passengers. As in-dicated earlier, the use of single-deck buses with more passengers standing(total capacity seated and standing nearly equal to that of the double-dackbus) may result in a substantial reductioni in the capital requirements to

1/ These bonuses are paid to drivers, conductors, and supervisors whentheir buses produce revenue over a certain level.

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provide for the growth in traffic. The capital requirements estimated bythe hFS&T amount to Ks. 1,986 lakhs over the next five years, 1969/70 to1973/74. (Thls capital requirement for transport operations alone will alsorequire Rs. 34 lakhs of toreign exchange.) During the last five years lessthan one-tlhird c7 this amount was invested in transport operations of theBES&T. Only abouc Rs. 600 lakhs were expended in the period 1964/65 to1968/69. The bulk of tthe annual capital requirements results from replace-ment demand rather t' n from the provision of capacity to meet the expantledlgrowth In traffic under the assumptions given. If bus traffic were to growas it lhas over the last tlhree years? substantially more capacity would haveto be added if tile system werc to accommodate it.

80. Financing for the estimated capital re41::irement will have to beprovided from rources othec thsan internally generated funds. lhe transportoperation revenues from the period 1966/67 to 1969/70 increased from Rs.1,034 lakhis to Rs. 1,408 lakhs, or about 11 percent per year. At the sametime, expenditures on the bus operations increased from Rs. 1,160 lakhs toRs. 1,664 lakhs, or 13 percent per year. In each year, the bus operation,according to tiese figures, resulted i- a deficit. Estimates for thie year1970/71 indicate a slight decrease in expenditures, but nevertheless a sub-stantial deficit of Rs. 221 lakhs. While prospects are not so grim for theundertaking as a whole, since in three of the four years 1966/67 through,1969/70 the undertaking had a surplus, the deficit in 1969/70 was, however,sufficient to offset the surpluses from the previous two fiscal years. (Asurplus of Rs. 11 lakhs is projected for 1970/71.) Witlhout some major in-fusion of capital, it will be impossible for the BES&T to add the number ofbuses it estimates will be required to accommodate the growth in traffic.The total depreciationi taken by the bES&T in 1969/70 vas Rs. 107 lakhs forbuses and trolley buses.

81. The BES&T indicates that if fares were raised to the levil permit-ted by the state government, additional revenue of Rs. 160 lakhs p r yearwould be raised. It is not clear how this estimate has been derive.!, par-ticularly with respect to the effect of a fare increase on ridership. Never-theless, Rs. 160 lakhs per year is far from sufficient to meet the capitalrequirements estimated.

Bonus Incentives

82. Apparently union rules require that the BES&T provide one con-ductor per deck on its buses. There was a problem getting the conductorsand drivers to fill tthe buses prior to the irtroduction of an incentive sys-tem where bonuses are given to conductors on the basis of their cc.1.le..tions.'Ihis encourages some overloading. The conduccor is given targets of Rs.1,'0C per month for city operations and Rs. 2,000 per month for suburbanoperations. The conductor receives a bonus of 3 percent of the excess reve-nue collected over these targets. If the conductor is absent three days orif lie Is penalized for a disciplinary action, he loses his eligibility fora bonus that month. The results of these incentLives have been increased loads

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nn the buses and much improved attendance for drivers and conductors. During

196)9/70, Rs. 17 lakhs were paid to conductors, drivers, and traffic super-

visory staff as an incentive bonus.

83. Unfortunately detailed attendance figures for conductors and drivers-;e not given in the administrative reports. There is some discussion of the

effect of the incentive plans on "Traffic Leave Reserves." It is not clearhobw these reserves are calculated, but the reports suggest that substantialsavings have been achieved through the ir.troduction of the incentive bonus

and other productivity programs. According to the 1968/69 administrativereport, thie reduction in this account amounted to Rs. 13 lakhs yearly. Theincentive pay to conductors, drivers, and supervisory staff that year was Rs.

,5 iak,s Unless revenues increased very substantially through the program,the payoff has not been spectacular. Traffic did, however, increase rathersubstantially in the 1968 to 1970 period.

Type~s v, *uses

84. The BES&T made a comparative study of the economics of three dif-ferent bus types: an indigenous double-deck bus, an articulated double-

deck bus, and a Leyland Comet single-deck bus. A summary was made availableto the mission. The study results show that any of the three types of bus

will result in an operating loss. According tc the assumptions made, the

loss per seat (an appropriate measure for this purpose) is least for thearticulated double-deck bus and is greatest for the single-deck bus. How-

ever, it is not clear why, for example, a 12-year service life was assumedfor the double-deck bus, an 8-year service life for the articulated double-deck bus, and only a 6-year service life for the single-deck bus. Further-more, tlhe quality of capacity was neither held constant nor stated in a

favorable way for all bus types. The capacity stated for the double-deckbus was 92 (about the size of a large number of double deck buses presentlyin the fleet), for the articulated double-deck 100, and for the single-deckonly 50. Using the BES&T assumptions, except for tie capacity of the single-deck bus, suggests that a break-even capacity for single-deck buses would beapproximately 70 passengers. Since there are already single-deck buses in

the BES&T fleet with statecl capacities of 80 passengers, the study may notbe entirely indicative of thie economic performance of thiese bus types for thebES&T.

85. Aside from the capacity assumptions made, if a longer service life

for the single-deck buses is assumed, the c=onomic comparisons may changesignificantly. Not included in such compari.ons, of course, are the demandeffects of having lower capacity vehicles p oviding transportation service.

A distinct advantage of lower capacity vehicles, up to a point of saturation,

is a reduction in headways and the ability to provide service to a largernumber of specific orJgin-destination pairs. Such improved service has, in

general, been found to stimulate demanid for such transportation.

86. In addition to thie relatively straightforward economic analysisthat one can perforn on paper to compare single-deck witlh double-deck buses,

it would appear that transit operations in most piare.i in the world have

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found sufficient disadvantages for double-deck buses so that such buses arebecoming relatively unlcormnonI. A few obvious disadvantages are:

The :. essity for passengers to climb stairs oni a movinig

vehicle leads to possible accidents amid injuries anidslows the boardinig and exiL processes.

Any sway produced througlh turning or weaving, motionts orroad unevenncss is magnified on the upper level leadilzgto a relatively uncomfortable ride (aithoioglh the viewmay be superior).

In uany cases, there are rrquir ments to lave three employeesper bus, i.e., conductors on each level as well as adriver.

The fact that few double-deck buses are being made today makesobtaining of spare parts somewlhat more difficult thanwith a conventional single-deck bus, leading to a poorerflcet utilization thazi mnight be necessary.

87. For the BES&T operationi. the spare parts problems may be parcicu-larly acute as many parts must be imported from England, which creates adrain on &'carce foreign exchange. For that matter, many of tihe bus modelsbeing operated in Blombay are no longer in production.

BES&T and the Government

88. The BES&T is required by state law to pay a passenger tax, whf.-hhas amounted to approximately Rs. 60 lakhs annually since September 196o.The BESET committee has met with the state government several times toplead for an exemption from the passenger tax in view of BES&T's unsatis-factory financial circumstances. The committee requested that the govern-ment should make capital contributions to the undertaking as it has noequity resources for capital expenditures. The pleas of the committee wererejected on time grounds that a tax was imposed by the legislature and itwould not be possible for the government to exempt the BES&T. Apparentlythe legislation provides for different rates of tax being fixed for j.ffer-ent areas and the BES&T committee requested that the government reduce thetax to 1 percent, as had been done by other state governments in the case ofmunicipal transport services. Clearly the abolition of the tax could beused to increase the BESET's revenues from transport cerations.

69. In 1968/69, the BES&T had also approached the government for anincrease in annual payment for facilities granted to police personnel whoare aiiowed to travel free on buses. On the basis of the data collected, theundertaking had asked for increase in the payment to Rs. 20 'akhs as againstRs. 1.5 lakhs now paid by the government. The government offered only Rs. 6lakhs. The annual report for 1969/70 does not discuss the amount for re-imbursement for free travel.

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Demand or Supply?

9(m. Capacity figures are not available in sufficient detail to deter-mibe whether the bus system is capacity constrained during the peak hoursand hence whether traffic is determined more by supply or demand. It isimpossible, therefore, to know whether additional capital equipirent wouldstimulate traffic. While the reports do not provide much infocnjtion onthis subject, casual observation in Bombay during the peak hours suggeststhat capacity is inad quate during the peak hours and long queues result.If the incentive pay plan for conductors and drivers has resulted in "over-loading" as suggested by the BES&T personuel, load factors achieved may beat their maximum and additional traffic may not be absorbed. If it is truethat capacity is fully utilized, se might expect that there is substantiallatent demand that is presently being unsatisfied owing to the rationingof service. Certainly the long queues observed tend to conrfirm such ahypothesis.

91. Normally where there is excess demand we assume that prices (fares)could be increased to bring demand in line with available supply. Apparent-ly, this is nearly impossible to accomplish politically in Bombay with theresult that instead of a monetary fare increase, an implicit fare increasethrough reduced service quality occurs. Certainly long queues and slowrides in crowded buses must be regarded as a form of price increase. Evenif capacity is severely constraining demand during th.. peak hours, it isnot necessarily true that offpeak traffic may not continue to grow. Thefigu. ; reported on income per bus kilometer suggest _hat some substantialgrowth must be taking place somewhere in the system. During the 1965/66to 1969/70 period, income per bus kilometer increased from Rs. 1.2 to Rs.1.59. The fare increase took place in 1966/67 when the income per buskilometer increased about 11 percent and has increased very slightly in thefollowing year, and in 1968/69 and 1969/70 increased very substanti"lly.The declines are undoubtedly due to the fare increase while the increasesare undoubtedly due to the incentive pay plans for conductors and drivers.

Cross Subsidies and Misallocations

92. At the present time, according to the BLS&T financial statistics,tthe electric supply operations produce a surplus which provides the sourceof finiancing to subsidize the transportation operation. It is quite clearthat present fares are not adequate for meeting the cost. This could bedue to all fares being too low or could be due to a structural defect inthe sharp fare taper that was observed. Without detailed accounting infor-mation and operating statistics, it is difficult to know whether it is tihefare structure or its level that is more seriously out of line. The re-sult, nevertheless, is the same, a subsidy from electricity users to busriders.

93. It is not simple to evaluate the effect of the cross subsidy fromelectrlcity users to commuters. The electricity users of the BES&T are 1fithe city and are generally the higher income residents and industries, whilefor the most part, commuters have lower incomes; from the point of view of

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income distributioni, therefore, there is some basis for it. Moreov.r, thcfact that fares are nonremunerativv suggests that miore resources are devotedto transportation under the existinc: systz-; thiain if they were rem'illerative.People tend to live farther from tiheir place of work (or shops and othernon-work destinations) than they would if they liad to pay more for theirtransportation. If tthey had to pay miore, t!bey would probably try to livecloser to their places of work, whiere, however, land nd housing aire nmoreexpensive; i.ideed, if fares were to Increase, the valut of thiis lani( woulliincrease as well, compounding tl.. e-fect. Withi low-cost tranFportation,city employers are able to attract employees from greater distances whopay less for their housing and transportationl thani tht-y shiotild and LilIS LlItemployer may find that lhe can pay a lower wage than would otherwise be re-quired. To the extent that low-cost labor is a benefit to the city employerand the latter is also a large consumer of electric Dower, it is nor .-ntire-ly clear that the cross subsidy is a poor one.

94. On the other hand, the pricing system does not properly allocatethe transportation resources. Employees are noL giveni the choice of spend-ing more money on transportation or on housing. Given the choice, an em-ployee might choose higher priced but closer housing as opposed to lowercost housing coupled with higr:-cobt transportation. Such a choice is notopen to hirm under the r:2seut cost subsidy situation. Thus whether or notthe cost subsidy is equ'table in ternis of the income redistribution effectdoes not address the whole question. The fact is thiat a misallocationtakes piace if the decisionmaker is not confronted with an appropriatechoice.

95. The reduced fare for cihildren is presently taken out of th:. UESLTbudget, thus penalizing the bus operation for a basic welfare function thatit provides. Children travel at hialf fare on .he BES&T system, but theycontribute to :osts and capacity utilization just as adults do. While achild will take up slightly less space, the functions of driver and con-ductor of stopping the vehicle, allowing a clhild to board, selling a ticket,and disembarking a child are all functions requiring the same effort for achild as for an adult. The operating ?erformance of the bus system shouldnot be penalized for this activity, since it is not a transportation func-tion but is rathier a question of broad, public policy. W4hile this form ofredistribution may be entirely appropriate, it is best that it be madeexplicit. Without clearer data regarding child riders on the BES&T, ex-plicit consideration cannot be giver; to the cost of providing reduced farerides for children.

Management

96. The BESET has been very cognizant of modern management methods ir,operating the Bombay bus service. For example, they have attempted to usemodern computer techniques to schedule buses and crews as well as to analyzethe bus route structure for possible improvements to provide better serviccto the Bombay population. While sonic of these efforts dlo not appear to betotally successful, the BES&T must be commiended for making a serious effort.

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In addition to their attempting such improvements in operations, recent in-troduction of incentive schemes for conductors. drivers, and traffic super-visory staffs appear to have improved the operating results of the systemby Increas'ng load factors on the buses, and obtaining generally greaterproductivity from revenue producing equipment. Beside incentives for thetransportation personnel, an experimental program to provide incentives toengineering staff has been in effect. If thir. is successful, improvedequipment utilization and lower maintenance c.sts may result. in studyinpits route structure, the BES6T has conducted extensive origin and destina-tion surveys of its passengers to determinp where passengers are actuallygoing. Whil- *'.es_ srudies have many limitations, niost transit compinieshave not made suchi efforts at all.

97. The 1969/70 administration report of thc BESLT describes a rela-tively minor problem that may have some management and engineering implica-tions:

"The 50 new Leyland Titan (beaver) double-deck buses havebeen fitted witlh ac alterniators and with transistorizedregulato,s for charginig of batteries. The alternatorsare preferable to the ilternate dc generators and theformer can charge the batteries at low en;ine speeds whichare mostly obtainable in city service. This results inthe batteries having hardly to be removed from the busesfor charging purposes."

It would seem that recently purchased buses s:iould be equipped with acalternators initially rathler than require a modification socn after beingput in operatinn. Similarly, all of the 50 semi-articulated double-decktrailer buses had to be fitted with transistorized inverters and fluorescenttubes for iliumination because of the low capacity of the dc generatorsfitted on the tractors of these buses. It is not c.ear why the generatorswere not replaced with alternators on these buses. The administration re-port states that the capital costs of thc inverters and the fluorescentLubes are considerably more tihan for standard fittings witli 12/24 volt lampbulbs. Individually thiese decisions are not crucial, hut they raise inter-esting questions about whether suchi problenis arise from engineering errors.from lack of attention to details of specifications, from arbitrary restric-tions on procurement practices, or other reasons.

PrOSP!lcts for the Future

Minibuses

98. During discussions :.,ch the BES&T staff, we asked whetlher theylhnd considered a small minibus to provide service in the fcrt area. Sucha bus would essentiatlly compete withl a taxicab and could perhaps chargepremium bus fares. Furtlhermore, because the bus would be very small, theparticular route served could be determined at the time the passenger loadwns establislhed ratlher thinou a fixed route system. Tn effect, the systemwould be a jitney service providing higlh quality, iairly fast service for

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some of the people employed in or traveling to the fort area. In particti-lar, stch services coulci bc provided from the terminal of thle Westernt aadCentral Railways, making a logical improvement in service.

99. It turned out that a scliecne had been sutgested for operating aminibus service, but with some different characteristics. It was to bea fixed-route, flac-fare service operating over 11 separate routes, all ofabout 4 - 5.5 kilometers tound trip. The proposal suggests a flat fare ofabout 30 paise and estimates t'ae cost of operating tthe vehlcle at about Rs.3.5 per roundtrlp. It was planned that the vehicle would be a Temipo Sta-tion-wagon costing about Rs. 30,001) each. The attempt to serve the middle-class, slhort-distanice travelers using tile minih'us was rejected and nothinlgfurther has been donie about the proposal.

iUO. It would seem that since better service is provided by stuchi mini-buses, particularly in the higlhly congested fort area, a hig.her f.are ota]udbe charged than the 30 paise proposed. Indeed, some trade-off mtust cxistbetween high quality service and the price. charned'. If fewer passC1nge.7swere allowed in the vehicle, i.e., a smaller vehicle were to be used, amore personallzed service could be achieved to compete very directly witthtaxicab service. The ninimum fare for a taxicab ls bO paise; If the minibustrip is long enough -- even on a flat-fare basis -- pas-.engers may well bewilling to pay approximately chat fare.

Com.-uterized Routes

101. The BES&T engaged a consulting firm to create a new roLce planusing a computer. The data used to develop the route plan were obtained bya survey of bus passengers. The problem with such a survey, of course, isthat it includes only those people who are preserntly riding the buses andignores the fact that service Improvements or service deterioration maychange the composition of riders. This is particularly true as the pro-posed new routes -:uld not serve people the same way as the old routes. Insome cases passen-ers would be s -rved better, in others worse. A.' attemptwas made in the survey to det-rnm.ne demands by specific times of d.ky. Suchdata, while very desirable, may not be obtainable by interviewing p.2oplewaiting fo,r buses. They may prefer to go at other times of day but findthat travel at those hours takes mucih longer because of conge-tion or re-quires more waiting in a queue. The basic p-inciple for defining routes,called "demand efficiency factor", is the ratio of total demand served bythe route to the roundtrip time. This is a fairly simple definition thatmay not correlate well with passenger desires for service. One eyamplethat comes out of the routing is the very substantial increase in t..e numberof trarnsfers recuired. According to the report, the present system ofroutes requires approxiLtately 6.5 percent of all passengers to change buses,all the rest being provided with direct bus connection. The new systemwould require an additional 11.5 percent of all passengers to cnange busesin the course of their journeys. Thue, 18 percent of all passengers wouldhave to make transfers under the new system. While this might be a veryefficienl way to operate the bus system, probably the most burdensome as-pect of bus travel to the passenger is the need to transfer. Increasing

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the need for transfers by a factor of two does not make w,ch sense in cermsof improving service. On the other hand, auch an increase is an impli-i-fare increase and, since operating costs go down with the more effectiverouting, it might he a desirable way to improve the operating performanceof the bus system. Further reductions in service would result irom theelimination of all limited stop services, putting the buses instead onregular services and providing that all passengers change at Mahim and Sicnstations. No island buses would run beyond these stations and no suburbanbus to the island. The rationale for such a svstem is not clear. In vis-ualizing how such a solution could occur, the most plausible hypothesis isthat the entire bus network did not fit into the computer so was divid,-dinto the city and suburban areas and routes were found separately. Thenthe routes were linked by having passengers transfer.

102. Proper route scheduling recuires detailed information not only ontravel time, but it should also include consid2-ation of revenue and serviceeffects for passengers. The consultant report indicates that five miruteswere added as a discomfort factor for pass2ngers required to change onceand fifteen minutes for passengers required co change twice. According tothe report, the maximum number of passengers waiting in queues at any onetime would be reduced 60 percent using the new route system. Furthermore,the queues would be cleared sooner, both in the morning and afternoon peaks.It is not ent_relv clear how all these calculations were made, but if sub-stantially reduced operating costs could be achieved and better utilizationof buses accomplished through the use of the system, even tbough servicequality would deteriorate somewhat f.J- some passengers, it may be a worth-while approach.

103. As a large number of the proposed routes are different from exist-ing ones, the report suggests that the whole scheme would have to be putthrough on a single day. It seems that some attempt should be made priorintroducing this scieme overall to test it on a few routes. The selectedroutes would have to be somewhat regional in nature to give the effect ofthe change without confounding it with the old bus system.

Maintenance Workshop

104. The BES&T reports indicate that there is a substantial need foradditional maintenance capacity. There is presently a central workshop atDadar which handles major repairs, including overhauling er.,-ines, chassis,etc., and various engineering jobs for the other departments of the under-taking. All day-ro-Lay maintenance of buses and other minor repairs aredone at the depr.:s. of which there are presently 10, two of which have beenadded within the last :wo or three years, Matal and Deonar. The Marol depotis located norch of Santa Cruz airport, while Deonar depot is locEted atTrombay along the Sion-Trombay road. The central workshop was originallyadjacent to a workshop for trams. The workshop was designed for a fleetof 500 vehicles, and the BES&T feels that the workshop should be capableof handling 2,000 vehicles.

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105. A new west wing has been proposed for the present workshop. Tihisnew wing would contain a complete cent.alized store tar the BES&T bus sys-tem. The new structure would be a multi-storied, expensive, and modernbus maintenance facility. Facilities proposed include: a reclamationlplant for lubricat_;ig oils, a tire reprir shop witlh provision for expansionto include tire retreading in the future. The estimated cost of Lhe buil-ing Is about Rs. 140 lakha. rhe cost of desired machinery and equipment isestimated to oe Rs. 46 lakhs, which includes 34 lakhs of imported equipment.

106. It: is not clear why the projosal for the new central workshopsincludes an oil reclamation plart. The 1968/69 administration report ofthe BY:S&T notes that a reclamation pl.nt was constructed in t'ie bus work-shop.9 and *as successfully commissioned. A,cording to that report, thecost of reclaimed oil is approximately 45 paise per liter as against rhecost cf Rs. !.80 of new oil. The estimatr-d savinj-s given in their reportis about Rs. 60,000 - 70,U00.

Rolling Stock

107. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. (TELCO0 has madeproposals to the BES&T for high-capacity single-deck buses that would pro-vide capacity for 43 seated and 40 standing passengers. The seating ca-pacity of such buses would be equal to or greater thian that of most ofthe single-deck buses bi-ing operated today in Bombay. The total capacity,with otandees, nearly matches that of the maJority of double-deck busespresently ia the fleet. While the details of this proposal have not beenpicjidrd to the Mlssion, it would appear that such a proposal would bewel; wirth careful scrutiny. The buses would tse parts and equipment incommon iith many of the trucks Tata produces in India, thus providing alarge market far spare parts and skilled mechanics that could lead to muchbetter fleet utilization in the bus operation.

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IV. BOMBAY ROAD DEVELOPMEiiT PLAN

108. The responsibility for planning and building the rmajor road systemirt Bombay is shared by tile Government of India, the Stace of hPllaraslitra,anu che Bombay Municipal Corporation. Recognizing the growing problems ofroad transportation, these thrce go.-ernmental levels jointly sponsored aBombay Traffic and Transportatioa c udy in 1962 which w.s conlucred by theconsulting firm of Wilbur Smith r.rd Associat s. The objective was to rccom-mend ways for improving the efficiency of traffic operations on existingstreets and to provide a plan for new ro.d construction.

109. The traffic study was patterned after tlhe studies being carried onfCo U.S. cities at that time. Origin-destination surveys were conducted toestablish existing travel patterns, anu growth trends for population, ve-lhlcle ownersltip, and land usc plans were used as a basis for forecasting1981 travel patterns. The emphasis was almost entirely on automobile andtruck traffic. although refei -re was made to the need for othler studiesof mass transit services. Tht a! report for this study was presentedin December 1963 and contai;.ed recommendations for building a system offreeways, expre-sswiys, 1/ and major str -ets. The recommended network wouldencircle the IslanJ witlF freeways (the West Island and East Island Freeways,and the Mzhim and- Cross Island Connectors), and would bisect the Islandlongitudinally with a Central Island Expressway. The report pointed out thatwi.h the proposed system, all )ortions of thie Island would be within onemile of a freeway or expressw&v. The plan also called for upgrading por-tions of tl,e Eastern and Western Express Iiighways in the subutos to freewaystandmrds, the construction of the Sewri Expressway leading to the ThanaCreek Bridge and construction of a Tardeo Expressway link between the WestŽsland Freeway and the Central Island Expressway (see Map 2). In all, 28miles of freeway, 14 miles of expressway. and 75 miles of lajor route im-provements were proposed, at a 1963-estimated cost of Rs. 96 crores. TheWest and East Island Freeways account for Rs. .57 crores of this total. Asummary of the proposed works is shown in Table 5.

110. The Government of Mahprashtra appointed a Steering Committee toexamine these proposals, to consider their priorities, and to recommend aplhased program for development. This Committee's report 2/ proposed a Rs.27 crores first-phase program (Table 6), of ihich Rs. 18 crores was to bespent in the Fourth Five-Year Plan and the remaining Rs. 9 crores would

1/ Both freeways and expressways ;ce high standard higlways on which vehi-cular access is provided at only a relatively few points; the main dif-ference is that expressways have some surface level intersections withother ronds, while the freeways have all grade-separated interchanges.

2/ IncerporaLed in "Traffic and Transportation Problems lr. MetropolitanCities - Interim Report," by Metropolitan Transport Team of PlanningCommission, May 1967.

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carry over to the Fifthi Five-Year Plan. The detailed program which subse-quently was submitted to the Goverument called for expenditures of Rs. 12.3crores during the Fourth Five-Year Plan, with the remainder of the Rs. 27crores scheduled for the next Plan period (Table 6).

Work in Progress

l1l. l'hc Maharashtra State Roads Department reports that progress onthese rcadworks is as shown in Table 7. Surveys are still underway forthe East and West Island Freeways. Construction efforts have been con-centrated on the sea walls and land reclamation work for the West IslandFreeway and the three northern suburban link roads (Item 3, Table 6). Al-though the Thana Creek Bridge is expected to be completed in late 1971, onlyland acquisition and the constriction of a test embankment have started onthe Chembur - Mankhurd approach road on the west side, .nd the east sideconnection is still under construction so it would appear that adequateaccess to the bridge will not be provided for several years. Alternativedesign-s for the East Island Freeway are still being reviewed by thie Govern-ment and by a local ad IIoc committee in an attempt to resoive questionsabout its deLailed location and access provisions. On the Bandra - DharaviLirk Road, the bridige across Mahim Creek is nearing completion but problemshave been en'-ountered in land acquisition and squatter resettlement at thesouthrern approach to the bridge. Until the southern approach road is com-plete(: this buldge will sit idle. In brief, the only usabl2 additions tothe lbombay major road network in the near future will probably be the linkroads in the northiern suburbs.

Road Prorram Issues

112. Thrce basic questions should be considered with respect to thepresent ancl proposed program of roadworks:

(i) Is the propose(d freeway-expressway-major road systempart of the most appropriate transport investmient pro-gram for Bor.bay?

(il) Are tne project priorities valid?

(iII) What hns been the progress in project implementation?

113. In reality. the first and most fundamettal question should bestated in two parts: was this road program part of the best trar.srort in-vestmenit program when it was proposed in 1963, and, tn view of developmentsduring t'ie past eight years, is it now the best program?

114. Some insight on thiese issues can be gained by recalling the back-ground for the prograni proposals. The study which produced tihese proposalswas a road traffic studly. It considered only ways to improve motor vehiclemovcmenits itn Greater Bombay; it did not examine the total transport situa-tion tin Greater Bombay or the metropolitan area. Mass transit requirementsand opportunities for improvements on existing systems were not considered

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in any detail despite the facts tclat car trips accounted for only 1.4%, andtrain and bus trips r..ade up about 90% of all passenger trips in Bombay,and that only 1 of every 80 persons on the Islancl owned an automobile. I/The studv did not impose any limits on the availability of resources, eitlherwithin the transport sector or in other sectors of urban development. Thestudy did exam_ne the relative merits of several different road system pro-posals. However, it assumed as a starting point that the West Island Free-way and Malabar Hill Tunnel would be built; no system was investigatedwhich did not include these facilities. Inasmuch as there were no metro-politan regional development plans when the study was nmade, there was nopossibility to study thie road program in the context of propoals for TwinCity developmneit or other elements which are now under consideration.

115. Thie consultants' study recommendations di6 include a specific timeframework far carrying out the road improvement program, as s!!own in Table8. The proposed First Stage of the program, from 1963 through 1966, wasmainly directed at widening existing streets, improving intersections andtraffic regulations, and acquiring rigihts-of-way for new construction thatwas to be carried out in later phases. The Second Stage called for con-struction of the three main freeways on the Island plus the arterial con-nection to the Thana Creek ana several other smaller projects, all to becompleted by 1971. The Third and Fourth Stages were to consist mainly ofthe completion of the freeways in the area of Mahim Creek and constructionof the Sewri Expressway and connecting links between the freeways and ex-pressways, in the 197" :981 period.

116. Actual progress in the implementation of these recommendations hasbeen quite a different story. Details of improvements made on existingstreets were not furnished to the mission, but visual inspection indicatesthat comparatively few were carried out. It is certain that the new con-struction works proposed fcr the 1967-71 period have not kept pace witlhthe program. Of the major projects whicih were recofmended to be completedby 1971, the We. t Island Freeway is the only one on whiich any constructionhas started, and this work has so far beLn confined to seawall construction,an overpass, and land reclamation. Design studies are still in progress onthe freeway alignment and for the talabar Hlill Tunnels, 2/ which must be

1/ There were onlv 42,000 passenger cars owned in the Bombay Study Area in1962. and 34,000 on thle Island. The forecast was that 149,000 cars wouldbe owned in the Study Area by 1981 and 81,000 on1 the Island. There was1 car for every 104 persons In the Study Area and 1 per 82 persons onthe Island in 1962: these ratios were forecast to be 1:54 and 1:40,respectively, in 1981. (Source: Table 18, Bombay Traffic and Tranis-portation Study Report; W. Smith and Associates; 1963.)

2/ A nunmber of serious problems must still be solved, ranging fron, pro-cedures for tunnel construction to questions of how traffic will operateif the West Island Freeway is constructed with six lanes and the tunnelshave only two lanes each direction, as apparently is now proposed. Asyet, there has been no budget allocation for construction of the tun-nels.

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completeLl before the West Island Freeway can serve as it was intended.Land acquisition has not vet started for the E2st Island Freeway, pendlingresolution of location and design questions. Construction of the CenterIsland Expressway is even further in the future as design surveys have notyet started.

117. There have been valid and possibly unavoidable reasons for notmeeting the recommended schedule. Foremost has been the lack of funds,but there have been problens of organization and staffing, right-of-wayacquisition, etc. Regardless of the contributing factors, only a smallfraction of thic proposed works has been carried out, or even appears pos-sible to be completed by the 1981 target date.

118. Returning then to the original question, thie roach system proposalsfor Bombay were not supported by convincing evidence that they were the"best" in terms of overall urban transport and development needs at thetime they were presente(d in 1963. Developuments during the interveningyears, including the proposal of substantially different concepts for fu-ture urban y.rowth, make it highly questionable whether the originally pro-posed road system is now a valid basis for a transport investment program.The Bombay Metropolitan Regional Planning Board apparently recognized thiswhen it commented on the road development program:

"This programme has been suggested after taking intoconsideration the needs of the car traffic by 1981 onthe basis of the then trends of development and theproposals of the Development Plan of Bombay. It isproposed that a reassessment of the programme suggestedby Wilbur Smith and Associates be made." 1/

119. However, some recommendations made by the consultants are evenmore appropriate now than in 1963; namely, those relating to the need forimprovedl traffic regulations and controls. Particularly given the diffi-culty in obtaining sufficient funds to finance large new road constructionprojects, more attention should be given to measures which would permitmore efficient use of existing streets. It is unfortunate that the toppriority assigned to Ehese measures by the consultants was not adopted.If the Rs. 12 crores which were allocated mainly to construction of theEast and West Island Freeways and the northern link roads had been used in-stead for improvements on existing streets and intersections, substantialbenefits would have been realized already from the improved traffic flows.As it is now, it will be at least five more years before the West IslandFreeway could be opened to traffic; the East Island Freeway will be evenlater, and the link roads will have no effect on traffic on the Island.Unless a concerted effort to improve existing streets is made in the mean-time. traffic conditions throughout the Island will continue to deteriorate.

1/ Page 27, Section 4.4.3(i); "Strategy for Bombay Metropolitan Region --A Stummary of Volumes I and II of the Report of the Draft Regional Plan1970-1991; by the Metropolitan Regional Planning Board, January 1970.

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120. All of the road project prioricies should be reappraised in viewof the present situation. The relatively muclh greater importance o' publictransportation for moving people in thc Bombay metropolitan area is begin-ning to be more fully appreciated. CompareC to possible niss transit im-provements, thc justification for costly freeways (which, as now beingplanned, are not even intenided to carry corvnuter buses and which '.ould

uainly benefit the small percentage of car owtners) is vcry doubtful. Ihereare also the new proposals for metropolitan developmetlL, including tile TwinCity, to be considered. The transport investments which will be requiredto make the Twin City a viable development have not yet been determined.A delicate balance must be sought to assure that this area is sufficientl'accessible to Bombay to make it an attractive growth center and, at thesame time, not to make it so accessible that it simply becomes another'bedroom" community for commuters. In this respect, proposals for addli-tional road bridges between the Twin City and thie Island seem unwarrantedor at least vastly premature.

121. After a new look at total transport requirements in the Bombaymetropolitan area and at the financial and other capabilities for makingtransport improvements, there is a strong possibility that major revisionsto current project proposals would be suggested. The schedule for construc-tion of the freeways and expressways on the Island has already changeddrastically from that proposed by the consultants; it might even be thatthese projects should be deferred indefinitely.

122. This rather discouraging assessment of road planning and develop-ment in Bombay deserves a closing comment about factors which have contrib-uted to the present situation. It would be a gross oversimplification toascribe the blame to inadequate performance by the road traffic consul-tants. The faults of the 1963 traffic study lie not so much in how it wasconducted as in what it was required to do. I/ The root of the problem canbe traced back to studly instructions, or "terms of reference," which weretoo narrowly and inadequately defined and which did not focus on the rightissues. This is not to say that a study leading to recommendations forroad improvements should not have been undertaken. The subject was. andstill is, wortlh careful investigation. It must be studied, however, with-in the context of the resources available for implementation, the overallrequirerents and objectives for urban development, and the full range ofalternative ways for accomplishing these objectives. Operating, withoutthese guidelines, the 1963 traffic study recommended a near Rs. 10) croresroad program. This was so far out of scale with then existing or foresee-able roaC investment capabtlities that it was unavoidable thiat only thesmallest and easiest pieces could be implemented. The remainder has neces-sarily slipped furtlher and further behind the recommendedl sclhe(lule. There

1/ Traffic study technliques have Improved considerably since 1963 so thlesame procedures probably would not be used if thie study were undertakennow, but this cannot be used as a criticism of the method used in 1963.

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is one brighter aspect: program slippage, in this case, is not such aserious complaint. rne delays in starting large new road works on theIsland may, unintentionally, have made it possible to find a more suitablesolution.

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V. AIR TRANSPORTATION

Introduction and Background

123. In a country as vast as India witlh large distances between keyurban centers, air transportation takes on even greater than ordinary sig-nificance in internal com-unicatien. Although there is an extensive net-work of railroads and highways linking tihe country, distances are suffi-ciently great that trav2l times via surface modes arc often prohiibitive inthis era. While this may be less true in India than in chc highIly developedindustrial nations, it is nevertlheless important.

124. Airports in India are operated by the Central Government. Forpurposes of administering aviation facilities, India is divided into fourregions, (Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta and Madras) each headed by a RegionalController of Aerodromes. The controller's responsibilities range fromthe operation of airports and communication facilities to examination andlicensing of pilots. The Bombay region has 19 airports in total with SantaCruz, Bombay's international airport, by far the largest. In addition toSanta Cruz, a small general aviatior. airport, Juhu, is in the metropolitanarea. Juhu principally serves for training and agricultural activities(crop spraying).

Domestic Pass en.er Travel

125. In 1968 1,749,394 passengers were carried on domestic scheduledservices for all of India. 1/ About twenty percent embarked at Bombay air-port. 2/ The average annual growth in scheduled domestic passenger trafficfrom Bombay Airport has been 12.7 percent from 1960 through 1968, and 14.5percent through 1969. This compares with 12 percent for passengers carried1960-1968 in worldwide scheduled services of ICAO carriers. 3/

International Passenger Traffic

126. In 1969 207.000 passengers on scheduled international services em-barked at Bombay airport. Recent growth hias not been as substantial forinternational as for domestic passenger travel, but it has been by no meansinsignificant; 1969 traffic is 40 percent greater than that of 1967. Of thefot;r international airports in India, Bombay is by far thc most important interms of passenger traffic, with 70 percent more embarkations than itsclosest rival, Delhi.

I/ l3nslc Statistics of Air Transport in Indla,_1968, Air TransportDirectorate, Civil Aviation Department, New Delhi, p. 13.

2/ Supplemental Information supplied by the Senior Aerodromes Office atBombav Airport. Mr. R.D. Prodham, Annex C.

3/ Basic Statistics, p. 124.

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International Frei gt and Mail T'raffic

127. International cargo on-loaded and off-loaded at Bombay shows growtlevery y,ear except on-loadings in 1966 and off-loadings in 1967, although thepattern of growth is somewhat erratic. Average annual grawtht 1960-1969 foron-load1e(d cargo was 13.4 percent. Except for 1956, bombay appears to be anet air cargo international exporter in terms of weight. If tile observedgrowth rates persist this phenomenon will continue and grow in importance.tievertheless, international cargo movement through Bombay airport is verysmall (5,868,800 Kgs on-loaded and 3,739,000 Kgs off-loaded in 1969).

128. The growth in international mail handled at Bombay has also beenerratic witlh declines both in 1963 and in 1966, thie latter being very sub-stantial. Except for the period 1963-1965, international mail off-loadedexceeded that on-loaded at Bombay. Again, the total volume of freight madeup by mail is relatively small; 918,300 Kgs on-loaded and 1,028,000 '-gsoff-loaded.

Domestic Freigrht and Mail Traffic

129. Domestic cargo operations have been extremely erratic; peak on-loaded cargo from Bombay occurred In 1961 (4,897,492 Kgs.), an increaseover thie previous year of 115 percent. Also, in 1961 off-loaded domesticcargo fell 55 percent from tthe previous year. both on-loaded and off-loaded cargo volumes increase and decrease through thle 1960-1969 period,neither moving together nor reaching peaks or troughs together. It doesappear, however, that with respect to domestic cargo movements in the1960-1969 period, again Bombay is a net exporter in weight terns. Thiswas true in every year of the period except 1960. Domestic cargo activityin 1969 was substantially less than international (3,687,300 Kgs on-loadedand 1,910,200 Kgs off-loaded).

130. Domestic mail movements by air are nearly as erratic as domesticcargo. In most years of the 1960-69 period, more mail was on-loaded atIBombay than off-loaded. Unlike international mail whiichi is substantiallysmaller in volume than international cargo, domestic mail volumies are aboutthe same magnitude as domestic cargo.

Aircraft Movements

131. The number of aircrafL movements and the size of aircraft usin,.thie facility are important factors for planniing airport facilities for alr-craft, e.g., runways, taxiways, aprons, communicntioii and nav'.gation facili-ties. I;ecause' of increasinr aircraft size and perhaps because of generallyIncreasing load factors (rntio of occupied to available seats), virf.raftmovemer,ts have not grown at nearly the rate of passenger traffic. In theperio(d 1960) to 1968, thte latest year for wlhichi data were provided, annualgrowth In aircraft movements (departures and landings) was about 6.5 per-cent. Thlere were less than 30,000 aircraft movements in 1968 -- less than85 movemen1ts per day o01 tbe average. To place this number in perspective,under poor weather conditions witlh aircraft operating under instrument

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flight rules (IFR), properly equipped airports handle about 40 aircraftmovements per hour. .c:a0Per conclitions at Bombay are generally above suchminimum. I/ Present levels of aircraft movemernt at Santa Cruz do not poseserious congestion problems. Withi further increase in tilo size of aircraftoperated by the world's airlines and the expected increase in size of air-craft in the fleet of India's domestic air carrier, Indian Airlines, throughfleet modernization, one can expect the growth in aircraft movements tocontinue at rates similar to those experienced recently even with fairlysubstantial increases in passenger traffic.

132. Domestic load factors on Indian Airlines (the ratio of occupiedseat kilometers to available seat kilometers) have been unusually high,70.4 percent in 1968. For Bombay area operations, the load factor was 74.9percent. The world average in 1967 was 59 percent. Generally, at loadfactors this large, service quality becomes poor and inany reservation re-quests must be refused. On the other hand, such high load factors can bevery profitable. Load factors may be reduced by increasing the average sizeof aircraft or the number of flights. If the load factors were reduced bylncreasing the number of flights, aircraft movements would increase. Assum-ing that flights into and out of Bombay Airport have the same load factor asthe Bombay region, a reduction in load factor to 60% would require a 25% in-crease in aircraft movements, otlher factors remaining the same. Even thislarge an increase would not seriously affect the level of aircraft movementsat Bombay Airport. In fact, if a reduction in load factor were tc beachieved, at least some of the reduction would likely come from increasedaircraft size.

133. Another important aspect of aviation activity is the distributionof flights throughout the day. Domestic flights generallv take place be-tween the hours of 6:30 a.m. and midnight, while most of the internationalflights are between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. This is due toworld travel and time patterns rather than considerations for travel to India.Approximately two-thirds of the aircraft movements are domestic and one-third international. This unusual pattern of operation makes for betterutilization of airport cap.city througlhout the dav thian at most locations.

Airport Current Flnanc's

134. Detailed revenue data were not provided., but conversationis suggestthat the bulk of alrport revenues are derived from lan(ling fees, whichl areestablished by law. Th,e table in para. 134 summarizes the sclhedule of land-ing fees. Although a fee schedule ior aircraft storage is also provided inthe law, few airlines use public storage facilities aidtl this is not an impor-tant source of reventec. TIle airlines have their own lhangar space whiichi theyrent for about Rs 10.5 per square yard per year for various lease terms.

li The numL_ s were not provided.

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135. In addition to the clharges for lanldinig and storing aircraft, thereis all international passenger tax of Rs 15.00 per departinig passenger. Atpresent, there Is no airport tax on domestic passengers. but suchi a tax isreportedly undler consideration.

Scledule of Landing Fees Applied at Indian Airports

_ Landi__Fees _

Aircraft Cross Weipht International Domestic

less than 10,000 Kgs. Rs 4. 00 r OOKs. Es 2.50 per 1,000 K*:s

over 10,000 Kgs but Rs 40.00 plus Rs 8.00 Rs 95.0J plus F-s;.less than 20.000 Kgs per 1,000 Kgs in excess 5.00 per 1,000 Kgs

of 10,000 Kgs. in excess of 10,000

over 20,000 Kgs. Rs k29,00 plus Rs 16.00 Rs. 75.00 plus Rsper 1,000 Kgs. in excess iO per 1,000 Kgs inof 20,000 Kgs. excess of 20,000 Kr-s.

Total reported revenue for Bombay Airport in 1968-69 was Rs. 13,817,422 andtotal reported expenses were Rs. 12,626,779, leaving a net rLvenue of Rs.1,190,643. Net revenue in the previous fiscal year was Rs. 1,834,042.

Bombay AirDort Modernization

136. A phased plan for improving Bombay Airport was prepared in 1968 bythe Committee on International Airports as part of a program for improvingthe four major international airports in India. The three-phase plan pro-vides for runway, taxiway, and apron additions and extensions and for im-proved terminal facilities. The airport has three runways:

Main Runway 09/27 11,000 feet

Second Runway 14/32 8,200 feet

Third Runway 05/23 5,870 feet

The main runwav is presently being widened to 200 feet and strengthened tonot less thani LCN 100 value. This work Is well along and Is expected to becompleted by Marchi 1971 in anticipation of 747 operations which are expectedto begin in May. The second runway is being extended to 9,000 feet. Thethird runway is "operationally not required" and may be merged witlh thetaxiway system.

137. Taxiways parallel to the main runway on the north are also expectedto be completed by March 1971. This improvement will permit aircraft to leavethe active runway quicker, clearing it for other landing or departing air-craft. With the low traffic levels at the airport and the positive -..rcraftcontrol through the tower, such expedition of ground traffic may not be of

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prime importance. liowever, some imprcvement may be appropriate to accotrno-date the much larger 747 aircraft. Other runway improvements parallel tothe second runwav are contemplated for later phases. These should certainlybe investigated carefull- in the light of current and forecast traffic levelsat the time ef decision. The tlhree intersecting runways can be useful sup-plements to the taxiway system. In the event that additional parallel taxi-way construction is deferred, it mav be desirable to provide large turn-around and holding areas for aircraft at the ends of the runway to permitincreased activity without seriously increasing delays due to the inabilityto clear aircraft from the active runway.

138. The apron is being extended at the present terminal building. Theextersion will provide additional capacity to accommodate the 747 and someincreas"d traffic levels. In addition, it will permit greater maneuveringroom for aircraft in parkinpz and passing.

139. Also in the third-phase plan is the construction of a new apron andextended taxiways north of the main runway at a location designated to be aproposed new international terminal complex. It is not clear why these apronsshould be constructed in advance of a decision to construc; the terminal com-plex, or whether a decision has been made to fund this additional development.Before construction can take place at thic location, the plan indicates thatsome additional land will aced to be acquired.

140. The present terminal building is being expanded now by extending ontwo sides and adding a large canopy the length of the building. The presentterminal building 's used by both domestic and international passengers andthus, in addition to ground passenger handling facilities, includes spacefor customs andl immigration activities. The division of domestic and intcr-national traffic between daytime and nighttime hours smooths the activitylevels, permitting better utilization of terminal capacity thtan can normallybe accomplished.

141. The master plan proposes a large international terminal complex "toinclude all terminal facilities and services neede.. in a modern and expandingairport." The plan would utilize approximately 450 acres most of which isalready owned by the government. While there are reasons to segregate in-terr.ational passengers because of the special needs for immigration control,customs, health, etc., the present natural separation of domestic and inter-national activities by hour of the day would suggest a morc flexibile designof the present terminal facility to accommodate the traffic rather than havea domestic terminal unused at night and an international terminal unuseddurinin Lte day. For example, flexibile partitions might be used to convertsome areas to meet the special requirements for international passengers.It may also be necessary to have additional space, but fLrthier extensions ofthe existing building with modified use of interior spaces may be muclh moreeconomic in the short run while traffic develops. Large capital investmentsmay thus be deferred several years.

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-.2. The master plan also recommenus the acquisition by the govern-entof additional land to be used for further airport expansion. This landacquisition is on the north and east of the present airport. It is recoin-mended that land bc acquired (123.26 acres) at the cast end of the mainf run-way so that it could be lengthened by 2,000 feet. Further, the plan r'caom-mends that rhe Kurla hiLls, sitting off the eastern end of the main runway,be cut lower to provide at least 10,500 feet of usable runway for landingwith dispJaced threshold. The hills prevent a normal clescent to the end ofthe runway. The present dlisplaced landing threshiold provides only 9,08(0feet on the main runway. It was reported that an accident dicd occur onl thesehills sone years ago. It may be pos'ible to reduce this hazard by installinpciectronic or optical devices such as .-.. rkers and lights on the hills. visualapproach siope indicators, anid appropriately designed and placed electronicand optical instrument landing ecuipment, such . high intensity lights.(Some cf this mav already be installed.)

i43. If the main runway is extended as reconmnended, a section of theAndheri-turia road would be relocated. No indication is given of the presentuse tf the property to be acquired. The plan also proposes the acquisitioncf 67.36 acres to permit the development of Lhe second runway. Altogetherche plan calls for tile auuiSition of 459 acres.

144. The estimated total cost for all phases of thie airport improvementplan is Rs 27.48 crores, with the bulk of thc funds, Rs 16.10 crores, devotedto Phase 1. Even if air traffic were to gro' very substantially, it appearsthat thie start of some of thc planned construction could be deferred forseveral years. Nelther tihe growth in passenger traffic nor the growth inaircraft movements over the last ten years suggest that -xtraordinary growthwill take place. Indeed, the small old equipment used to provide m>any don''c-tic services is likely to be replaced with newer and larger equipment, per-mitting improved service in the short run throughi reduced load factors andincreased speeds. (The :lcreasee speeds and newer equipment may induceadditionial travel as well.)

145. Beyond improvingp and increasing the capacity of the p-esent airport,there are no plans for a new airport by the airport authorities. lHowever,they are presently surveying a site at the northern end of Salsette Island,since a present planning contemplates saturation of Bombay Airport in 1990.Tlhis dloes not seem unreasonable, although nminy chianges .an take p:'ace in suchi.. long time period. Thc site being surveyed would become a secondl major air-psrt. They are seeking an area where there Is adequate room for .. rallelmair. runways (6,000 foot spacing). Studies to date linve only bee. concernedwith physical and potential operatioual characteristics of the s te: no comi-sideration has yet been given to suctI questions as accessibility, groundtravel times and costs, or relationsh'.p to proposed strategies for metro-politan area development.

146. The airport autihorities have not explored sites 'or airports inthe Twin City area and speak ontly of providing feeder service. The presentlocation of Santa Cruz airport may be closer, in terms of travel time-. to theproposed 'Ate of the Twin City than to the Fort area when the bridge acrossthe Thana Creek and its access roads a-, ompleted.

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147. Ground access to the airport is quite good -via the Bombay-Alma.dahadRoad (Western Expressway) and the Bombay-Agra Road (Eastern Express ..y).The airport is also accessible by train on the Western Railrcad. From theFort area to the airport is arnroximately Rs 13.50 via taxi. Because of thelocation, general improvements and expansion of cur-muter rail and highwayservices will also contribute to improvement of the airport grcund access.

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VI. POhfT OF BOMBAY I/

Introdluction

148. Bombay's claim to be the neemier port of India is based on thefacts that it is t'e leading oil port witt. over 'UZ of the traffic, theleading general cargo port with about 387.' rhe traffic, the leadlag portfor overseas passenger traffic and the riain base for the Indien Navy. TheBombay Port bore the brunt of the heavy foodgrains Ilnports of the last de-c.Ide, lhandling as muich as 35% cf the `uports in the peak period. The Portof Bombay is situa.ed al.iost midway -ong tre west coast of India and isgifttec with a natursl deep water ha'-.,r of 70 so. miles protected by themair,land of Konkan at its east and tne Island of Bombay on its west. Thedeep waters in the llarbor provide secure and ample shelter for slhipping.

Administratioii

149. The Pirt of Bombay is administered by a statutory, autonomous cor-poration know.n as the Bombay Port Trust, which was set up ir. 1873 by theGovernmert and comprises the Chairmtan appo!nted by the Government of Indiaand a Board of 24 Trustees presided over by the Chairman. Ten Trustees arenominated by the Government and the remainder are the elected representa-tives of various shipping and comme-cial interests connected wiLh the Port.The day-to-day administratiox* of the Port Trust is carried on under thesupervision and control of the Chairman, assisted by the Genc-ral Manager.

IS0. The revenue of the Port increased from .s. 5.50 crores in 1947-48to Rs. 23.18 crores in 1969-70. The expenditure has iocreasezi irom Rs. 4.36crores in 1947-48 to Rs. 21.49 crores in 1969-70. At the end of the finan-:ial year 1969-70, the Port had Rs. 53.79 crores in its Capital Reserves andRs. 28.28 cro'es in its Reserve Funds, apart from provision for depreciationon capital assets.

151. The P,rt accounts nave been streamlined by adoptin& managementaccounting procedures. The rate structure i8 also being rationalized on thebasis of the costs and values of services and what the traffic can bear.

Port Facilties

152. The Port has extensive wet and dry dock acconnodation to meet nor-mal needs of ships using thie Port. There are three enclosed wet docks hav-ing b total water area of 114.4 acres andl quuyage of nearly 28,331 feet.The leadli-g particulars of the wet docks are given below:

1/ Thie background informaticn in paras. 148-166 is mostly f; ,m a recentbr(cha.re prepared by the Bombay Port Trust, titled "Port of Bombay -thc Gateway :o India."

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Widlth Working Witer No. of Berthsof Depth Area of Inside Along

Wct Docks Entrance Main- Dock Wet Harbour Totaltnined i sins Basin Walls

Ft. Ft -r!res

Prince's Dock(1880) 66 21 30 1( - 10

Victoria Dock(1,888) 80 23 25 13 - 13

Alexandra Dock(1914) 110O 30 59.4 21 6 27

153. The Hughes Dry Dock pumps have recently been elecLrified and arenow being used also for impounding water to an extra height of 4 ft. so thatthe depth of water at all oerths in3ide the Alexandra Dock including thefour new berths has been inc:-.ased from 32 ft. to 36 ft.

154. The Prince's and Victoria Docks are tidal docks. Alexandra Dockhas an entrance lock 750 ft. long and 100 f-. wide through which vessels canenter or leave the docks at any state of the tide. There are points forsupply of fresh water to shipping at all berths. Oil bundering facilitiesexist at most berths. In addition, there are two dry docks - Merewether inth Prince's Dock and Huehes in the Alexandra Dock.

155. The transit sheds and warehouses Rt the Port aggregated 308,000sq. metres in floor area, but a large part of this was completely destroyedin the explosions and fire on 14th April 1944. Temporary structures werebuil. in place of those damaged and a program was instituted to reconstructthe temDorary sheds on a permanent basis. The reconstruction program cover-ed 13 sheds, of which 11 have now been completed. The new sheds have beendesigned with a steel frame and walls of precast concrete blocks. Tnh col-umn spacing has been kept wide enough to allow the use of mobile cranes,fork-lifts, and other cargo handling equipment. They have electric hoistsand steel chutes for handling cargo between the ground floor and the firstfloor.

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156. Storage accommodation at present is distriDLted as follows:

Transit Sheds WarehousesArea Served No. (Floor area) No. (Floor area)

Prince's Dock 6 78,921 sq. m. 3 5,200 sq. m.

Victoria Dock 7 44,621 sq. m. - -

Alexandra Dock 19 1,49,444 sq. m. 5 58,145 sq. m.

Wadi Bunder Wardhouses - 8,189 sq. m.

Frere Easin Sheds - 11,814 sq. m.

Open Berths: - rThe deep water open berths outside the Docks are:

Depth MaintaineJ Depth be:owBerth (below datum of Mean High Length of

soundings) Water Spring QuayageTides

Ballard Pier 30'0" 44'6" 800'0"

Pir Pau 29'0' 43'6" 570'0"

Marine OilTerminal,ButcherIsland 36'0" 50'6" 3 berths each for

650 ft. long tankers

157. Till 1954, dangerous petroleum inported in Bombay was handled atthe Pir Pau oil berth. Non-dangerous petroleum was handled at AlexandraDock harbour wall berths. With the installation of two oil refineries inBombay, these facilities became inadequate and a new Harine Oil Terminalequipped with modern facilities wes conastructed within the Bombay Hsrbour.The terminal has three berchs, tuo cf which are capable of accommodatingtankers up to 53,000 dwt. while the chird can accomnodate tankers of 3b,000dwt. The terminal is connected tc the refineries at Bombay by underwaterpipelines.

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158. Besides the wet docks, there are along the harbour front a numberof bunders and open wharves and basins where the traffic carried by sailingvessels is handled. These bunders are equipped with cranes and other facil-ities for loading, unloading and storing cargo, and have an aggregate quay-age of 41,000 ft.

159. There are various depots, such as Grain Depot, Cotton Depot, Man-ganese Ore Depot, etc. which provide for storage of grain, cotton bales, andother commodities as well as open storage of ores, coal, timber and otlherbuiliing materials, which are in the process of despatch either within Bom-bay and its suburbs or to the hinterland of the Port. Pre-shipment storagefacilities have been afforded to export cargo, e.g. oilcakes, sugar, ironand steel and recently tea. 1/

Port Traffic

160. There has been an appreciable increase in Bombay's seaborne tradein the last 25 years, in both volume and value. In 1938-39, the cargo hand-led at the Port amounted to about 5.2 million tons, made up of 3.3 milliontons of imports and 1.9 million tons of exports. In 1966-67, the trafficrose to the peak level of 18.2 million tons with 13.2 million tons of importsand 5 million tons of exports. In 1969-70, the total traffic handled at thePort was about 15.03 million tons comprising 11.43 million tons of imports(with reduced imports of foodgrains) and 3.60 million tons of exports.There is also a noticeable change in the composition of the trade and thePort now handles a much larger variety of cargo than in the past. In termsof volume, the Bombay Port handles about 26 percent of the total traffic ofthe major ports.

161. There has also been an increase in the number of ships using thePort and the trend is towards the use of larger vessels carrying larger ton-nage for individual ports.

Year Ships entered Net regd. Total deadtonnage of weight tonnageships handled

1950-51 2,946 7,120,751 6,997,000

1959-60 3,051 10,474,361 13,357,000

1968-69 2,505 10,266,060 15,035,000

1/ A point that is not apparent from this description of port facilitiesis that the Bombay Port Trust has extensive land holdings in Bombaywhich are not used for port-related activities.

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162. Bomibay is served by a number of shlpping lines, whose ships plyregularly between Bombay and Africa, the Middle East, Europe and America,Ceylon, Burma, Malaysia, Australia and Japan. In addition, there are nu-merous steamer services which operate along the coast of India. The over-seas passenger traffic is handled largely at Ballard Pier.

Port Truist Railway

163. The Port of bombay owns and operates its own railway, which isconiected to the broad-gauge main lines of Central and Western Railways atits Interchange Railway Yard at Wadala. The railway runs for about 11 kilo-mecres of straight route between Ballard Pier and Wadala and has an extensivenetwork of track of about 215 kilometres. It serves the Docks as well asthe Installations and factories in the Port Estate. It has its own 'leet ofabout 20 Diesel and 23 Steam Locomotives, Railway Cranes and Wagon W±ighi-bridge of 100 tons capacity. The Railway itself handles over 4 million tonsof traffic annually. This figure represents about 60% of the total rail-borne goods traffic of Bombay City. Less than one-fourth of this Port TrustRailway traffic is into or out of the docks. 1/ The remainder apparently isbetween factories, depots and mainline tracks.

Current Developments

164. Two major development schemes - the Dock Expansion Scheme andBallard Pier Extension - were embarked upon in 1965 and the entire projectis scheduled to be completed in 1971-72. The schemes provide for the fol-lowing additional facilities:

(i) 4 deep water berths in the Alexandra Dock basin and 3 mediumtype deep water berths along the harbour vall with an annualcargo handling capacity of 1.5 to 2 million tons.

(ii, An additonal berth at Ballard Pier for passenger vessels, wherecargo can also be worked when necessary.

(Wi') 31,000 sq. metres of reclaimed area.

(iv) 16,072 sq. metres of covered storage space in five transit shedsbe provided, if necessary.

(v) Two repair berths for coastal vessels.

165. The four new berths in the Alexandra Dock basin were commissionedon 23rd August 1969, and the three new berths at the Harbour Wall a littlelater. The new Ferry Wharf was commissioned on August 15th, 1969.

166. The total c;,st of these schemes will be about Rs. 22 crores witha foreign exchange co"nponent of nearly RB. 4 crores.

l/ Page 253; Master Plan Report for Bombay Port; by Bertlin and Partners;1970.

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Port Master Plan Stu

167. The Port Trustees appointed consulting engineers, Bertlin andPartners (Indlia), to carry out a comprehensive port study and prepare aMaster Plan for future development. The consultants were instructed:

"To prepare a Master Plan for the Port of Bombay taking intoconsideration the interest of all the users of the port andharbour and the probable development of the port trafficduring r.he next 50 years." 1/

The consultants were also instructed to make the engineering, economic andtraffic investigations which were needed for the preparation of this plan.The study was started on April 1964. A draft final report was submitted in1968 and discussed throughout 1969. The final four-volume report was pro-duced in 1970 (the first volume alone is more than 500 pages), dealing withnearly every imaginable port-related topic. The sheer size of this reportmakes it impossible, wlthin the present paper, to attempt a comprehensivesummary or evaluation of its findings. Two aspects of its recommendations,however, are particularly relevant to other main topics of this paper and sodeserve some consideration. They are the proposals for developing a newport on the east shore of Bombay Harbour, on the mainland, and proposalsfor modifications in ground transport facilities which serve the presentport.

New Port Development

168. The Consultants concluded that the Dock Expansion Scheme (para.163) could only temporarily relieve congestion in the docks; by improvingoperating procedures, the forecast traffic can be handled until about 1978.They recommended:

"Immediate nction should be taken to provide permanent specializeddeep water bulk handling berths for the major bulk trades at asite removed from the existing docks so that these facilities arecommissioned by 1978. Otherwit3.e by about 1976, the docks willagain be working to capacity and beyond that date traffic wouldhave to be diverted to less suitable ports. The existing dockswould thereafter be able to handle the growth in general cargotraffic through the port provided that most of the bulk cargo isdiverted to new specialized facilities." 2/

169. After comparing a dozen alternative sites, the consultants rec-omend that r,ew port facilities should be located across the harbour on themainland at Nhava Theva (Map No. 1). Among the favorable features of this

1/ Master Plan Study, Terms of Reference.

2/ P. 72, Vol. I, Bombay Port Maste. Plin Report.

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sice are its natural deepwater, extensive land area available, depth ofrock below the surface (which facilitates dredging), and proximity to main-land iail connections. The recommendation was for construction of an en-closed dock with lock entrances and a depth suitable for 80,000 DWT ladenbulk carriers and 100,000 DWT unladen vessels. The development would be instages. Stage I would comprise five bulk handlino berths, one containcrberth, a dry dock for 100,000 DWT vessels and a repair quay. Mecianizedteiiinals for bulk cargo and container handling and road and rail loading/unloading facilities would be provlided on reclaimed land. Stage II, provid-ing additiornal berths and services, Is forecast to be required to be completedabout 1900. Capital costs (19b7 prices) of the main civil engineering andancillary works for Stage I are estimated at Rs. 35.29 crores, includingRs. 9.69 crores foreign exchange. The dry bulk cargo and container termi-nals would cost an additional Rs. 15.65 crores. 1/ In addition to the NhavaSheva works, the consultants recommended the provision of a new crude oilberth on Butcher Island. The total costs of all these works and associatedreclamation, dredging, etc. were estimated at Ks. 85 crores (1967 prices).

170. The need for the Nhava Sheva development was predicated on fore-casts of dry bulk commodities traffic for 1975 (manganese ore, fertilizersand fertilizer raw materials, food grains, oilcake and sug.r, cement/clinkerand salt). Three years have elapsed since these forecasts were made, andtraffic has not grown as exvected during that time. The consultants havetherefore investigated a variety of growth assumptions, ranging from no in-crease in traffic above 1965 levels to the full forecast growth. With zerogrowthi, they found that only the improvements to the existing docks wouldbe needed. For all other assumptions, they found the new port deveThpmentwould provide an attractive to excellent rate of return. They found, forexample, that a 12% rate of return (discounted cash flow) would result ifthe forecast 1975 traffic is not attained until 1988. Considering the longconstruction period involved and the probable traffic generating effect ofproviding these facilities, they strongly recommend construction of theNhava Sheva port development as rapidly as possible. They add that the open-ing up of the east side of the harbour presents a unique opportunity for de-veloping a new industrial and residential area. 2/

1/1. The consultants present quite a plausible argument in favor ofthe new port development, especially as it is strengthened by their consid-eration of a range of traffic forecast assumptions. One issue that is notdiscussed and which might have a significant effect on the findings iswhuther, from tihe viewpoint of national interesLs, it would be desirable toencourage craffic to shift to other underutilized ports before expandingl.m'av port. Quite uriderstandably, this was not a subject of much interest

a study commissioned by the Bombay Port Trust but it warrants some con-sideration. The consultants' analyses of different traffic growth assump-iouns suggest that even if substantial shifts to other ports did occur, the

1_ Pp. 205-206, Vol. I, Master Plan Report.

P. iii-v, Vol. I, Master Plan Report.

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Nhava Sheva development would still be economically sound. However, theshift of traffic could be an important factor in determining the optimumtiming for the development which, in turn, is closely related to the timinpand viability of the Twin City development proposals.

172. Backers of the Twin City development liave cited the proprsel con-struction of thie new port at Nhava Sheva as one of the key elements; whiichwill make the Twirn City a success. The argument hias some merit. lort ac-tivities andl relate(d industries which might locate there could provide partof the much-needed employment base for the TDwin City. The rate and extentto whiclh this employment materializes, conversely, will depend on the timingand size of thte port development. The closest possible collaboration betweenthe Port Trust ancd the Twin City developers (CIDCO) is needed to assure thatthese developments arc consistent in thcir phasing and substance. There al-ready seems to be a possible conflict, at least in concept, between planningfor the port and for the city. The port is being planned to handle dry bulkcargoes. The materials handlIng process will be highly meccianized, and thebasic industries which the port might attract will be capital-intensive bulkprocessing industries. The city, on the other hand, is being talked of as asecond governiment and comnercial center for hleadquarters offices, banking,etc. The two activities are not particularly conpattble or mutually rein-forcing.

Transport Modifications at Existing Docks

173. The consultants found that in the vicinity of the present docks,the land transport links are already severely strained and the future poses

some serious problems;" l/ the most critical period being from now until theNhava-Sheva dock is coTmmissioned. 2/ The problehis which are then describedlcome under sevcral headings: mounting financial losses of the Port Railway;trutck and rail traffic interference withliin the dock area; and congestion onexternal roads and at the gates to the dock area.

i74. Nlearly all t,-uck traffic into atid out of the dock area uses P.D'Mc1lo Road (see Map No. 2), the major arterial street which runs thelength of the port properties. The Port Trust Railroad runs parallel tothis road, between it and the docks, antd the Western and Central Railways'Goods Depots are on thc opposite side of .he road. Truck traffic generallyenters and leaves the dock arca tarough one of eight gates situated alongP. D'Mello Road andl, at five of these gates, must cross the Port Trust Rail-way at grade level. The heaviest traffic is concentrated in the CarnacBunder area and tuses the Gamadia Road level crossing. A study made in 1961by the Port found that thils crossing was closed 70-80 times daily becatiseof rail movements, stopping all truck traffic each time and causing seriouscongestion and delays. Traffic to the docks at this crossing is forecast

1/ P. 251, Vo;. I. Port Master Plar. Report.

2/ op. cit.. p. 260.

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to Increase 140_ by 1975, as compared to 1966. 1/ Considering thle generalincrease in traffic whlich is expected by then oln P. D'Mello Road, the con-sultants thought it dlesirable to find an alternative access route for docktraffic.

175. The consultants have proposed an unusuial solution. They recom-mend tiie removal of three of t.e Port Trust Railway's tracks between Sewriand the docks and the corstruction of a two-lane road adjacent to the tworernaining tracks. 2/ This road would link teic docks directly to the depotarea at Sewri so that trucks wo-ild not have to use P. D'Mello Rcad or crossthe tracks (except some infrc9 uently used sidinps). If the relative impor-tance of rail traffic at dockside continues to decline, as the consultantsbelieve it will, thlis would be the first step toward the eventual completeelimination of dock railways. (This may be a self-fulfilling prediction:if most of the railroad tracks are removed, it seens very likely that railtraffic will decline.)

176. Without a more detailed review of the situation, any comment onthe suitability of this proposal can only reflect one's personal judgement.It would seem thiat the complete elimination of all direct rail links todockside is a decision which should be approached very cautiously. If, asthe consultants indicate, 3/ there are many more tracks than are now neededfor the traffic carried, the convctsion of part of the space they occupyto road use zmay be a worthwhile project. However, it would rule out thepossible use of these trac:ks for suburban commuter services to a BallardEstate Terminal, as has been proposed by the Metropolitan Transport Teart. 4/Tnt consultants' comment on this:

"The suggestion that suburban passenger traffic should be routedto Ballard Pier cannot be taken seriously. To do so it wouldhave to pass throug7h Alexandra Dock whichi is not a practicalproposition." 5/

177. Another proposed transport project, the East Island Freeway, isalso affected by the reco=3ended port Link R-ad. The consultants say:

If (the East Istand Freeway) is constructed it will not alter therecommendation at:d proposals already ouClined...Over a considerablelength of thie Link Road tihe two are irn the same linie. South of theVictoria Overbridge the Freeway is elevated. Northi of this bridgeit las beet shown in the Wilbur Smithi Report as running at g;round

1/. 2/ p. 267, Vol. 1, Port Master Plan Report.

i/ I. 267, Vol. I. Port Master P!an Report.

.;/ See para. 31.

/ 1'. 267, Vol. I, Port Master Plan Report.

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level. This is not acceptable as it would foul the main Port TrustRailway lines between Wadala and the docks, or the northern sectionof the Link Ioad if these railway lines are removed. It is there-fore rccommended that the Freeway should contintuc as an elevatuedroadi as far north as Sewri...Apart from the interchange at Sewri itis recormiiended that there should be no direct connection between thedocks on the Link Road and East Island Freeway. This will serve tokeep the docks traffic clear of tthe town traffic." 1/

178. Regardless of thc decision about building the Link Poad. it wouldseem appropriate that serious consideration be given to improving the traf-fir control on D'Mello Road to avoid at least some of the congestion. Inparticular, thie use of modern traffic signals might help to assist trucksmaking t;xrning miovements into both the port and the rail yards. In additionto signalizing D'Mello Road, certain other kinds of traffic might be im-proved, particularly, the hlandcarts. Much movement along the road takesplace using handcarts. Clearly the handcart is a muclh slower-moving vehicletthan the truck and occupies considerable roadway space. The provision ofsignals would help thle handcart operators to cross the road and, perhaps. byusing sidewalks or additional roadway capacity of limited strength theycoul(I reduce thie congestion along D'Mello Road considerably.

179. These solutions, however, are not the only possible ones. In theintermediate and longer term, the movement of the facilities creating theproblems might be considered as appropriate. In particular, there is aquestion whether the railrcad yards need be located across from the port,particularly so far down the island. The port presently has facilities fur-thier north and much space is-available that could ultimately be usea for ad-ditional yard and storage facilities for the railroads. If the port rai'-road were well coordinated with the Central and Western Railroads at somenorthern point, the flow of goods throughl Bombay might be substantially ex-pedited.

180. With regard to both the Ballard Estate passenger service proposaland the East Island Freeway, the port consultants have taken positions whichthcy consider to be in the best interests of the port. Whetlher these rec-ommendations are also in the best interests of Bombay is another question,and one for which there is not yet a factual basis for answering. For de-spite the long and intensive efforts whiich the consultants have made on thisstuily, their considerations and conclusions are circumscribed by terms ofreference whichi were too narowly defined to permit a full urban developmentperspective.

181, For much the same reason other consultants come to the conclusionthat thle solution to tile congestion of D'Mello Road was a new eastern ex-pressway, in neither case was it possible to get proper attention to tilealternative solutions of reducing the congestion on D'Mello Road by going

1/ P. 273, Vol. I, Port Master Plan Report.

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direcUly to the .ource of that congestion, sucih as moving the railway storage facilities aad yards and Improving the operation of the Bombay PlortTrust Railway. Similarly, the proposal to abandon the Plort Trust kilwaywas consi(lered independently of the problems of the other railroads.

182. 'rhe problems of D'Mello Road reflect a broader and more generalproblem of planning transportation projects in Bombay. Perhaps by furtherstudy and coordination of the solutions to the railroads' problems, r:heroads' problems, and the port's problems, common solutions can be foundthat improve the entire operation of the eastern Bombay corridor. This isnot to say that sucih solutions will come easily or, indeed, that thiey maybe workable. Until they have been explored in this way, it does not seemappropriate to commiit large, new govenimenit expenditures to solve parts ofthe problem.

Table 1

GRC'WTH OF SUBUPBANI PASSSENG;P. TRAFFIC

CENTR"L RAILWAY WESTERB' ?2AILWAYPercent Percent, Fercent PercentPassengers Increase Trains Increase Passengers Increase Trains Increase

Year (1000's per day) over 1950-51 per day over 1950-51 (1000's per day) over 1950-51 per day over 1950-51

1950-51 395.1 - 525 - 437.6 - 216 -

1955-56 442.2 12 5$9 8 487.2 13 301 hO

1960-61 607.7 54 592 13 641.9 50 369 71

1961-62 695.5 77 609 16 742.8 72 385 78

1962-63 765.3 97 649 24 765.0 77 393 82

1963-64 855.4 117 657 25 870.2 102 Lol 86

1964-65 939.8 138 681 30 925.0 11l b3a 101

1965-66 1,012.7 151 682 30 976.3 127 150 109

1966-67 1,038.2 163 690 31 1,096.0 154 469 117

SOURCZ: Report on Edsting Mass Transportation System - Bcnbay; Metropolitan Transport Team, Planning Commission.

Table 2

"IPAJSI'r PASSFRJGER TRIPS CR(O6SSIG SCRE1OILINES (BtS AND RAII.)

Screenine Daily two-way volumie crossing screenjine Raziollumiber 196b 196111 1981/1968

1 132,C00 1,078,000 B.2,

2 880,000 1,892,000 2.2

3 1,'l'17,000 2,6h8,000 2.3

h 1,1j0,COO 2,977,000 2.'

5 1,266,C00 3,190,000 2.5

6 1,157,000 3,26b,ooo ?.&

7 981,000 3,181,000 3.2

8 538,COO 1,991,000 3.7

9 ,.A. 936,000 .A.

S,-Th:tCE: Traffic C(ell Report and Eetropolitan iraitsporL Project *..tu

I [ncludes 21C,000 daily trips acru3s all screenlines, fro,i areas beyond.hana, which reportedly re umitted from T'raffic Cell daLta.

Table 3

DAILY TRANSIT PAS33EGER ASSIGNMIEIS (1981)

P .A 11 A

Crossing WesLern Eas te rnScreenline Transit Western Central Harbor Transi t

tlumber Corridor Railwa Railway Line Corridor-

1 335,920 - - - 329,9t40

2 5.3,60OL/ 3,760 204,440 - $60,420

3 1,301, J,1 3,920 223,260- 98,260 56,O0Xo

14 1,327,940 15,340 461,680 lhl,620 634,900

5 1,552,9L4Q 7,900 361,22C 141,460 768,94W-

6 r ,081,8&6 14,000 324,680 199,4 40 606,200

P L A N B

Crossing Western *^entral Eas ternScreenline Transit Western Transit Cent ral Harbor Tiai:si t

Numrber Corridor !Rilway Corridor Railwav Line Corridor

1 335,920 - - - - 329,9 4 0

543,800 3,760 - 204,400 - 46o,120

3 741,537 3,920 559,603 22 4,87 2/ 98,260 566,250

4 83h,,?29 15,3h0 490,OCV/ 223,26V. 1)L,020 634,900

5 1,209,030 7,900 491,885 381,220 14,460 5n0,000

6 731,860 10,700 350,000 324,680 199,44O 636,200

1/ 1imrrabcd, fijare not. recorded

2/ .losesL recorded figure

SCUR.tCE: Traffir. Cell ReporL, Volwue 2

Table 4

DAILY AVRAGE PAKSENGERS CARRIED

By RES&T 1/1966/67 Do 1969/70

Year Passengers

1969/70 2,22s,826

1968/69 2,044,355

.19f,,/68 1,837,811

1966/67 1,805,490

1/ 3ee text for clarificatioN para 77.

SO.JRCE: Administration De'port and Statement ofIA counts, B;&T Undertaking 1967/68,1368/69 and 1969/70

Tal ie r

CONSVIRJCTI(ON ROE)YA-iVIED BY 3OMRAY 1TULFFIC AID T'RAN4SMiRTATIoIJ S'TUMY

Length Cost (fts. Crores)-/_Prject Description (Miles) Constructicn Fight-of-way i.i

West Islmnd Freeway 10.32 23.42 .70 2L. 2

EastL Islar,d Freeway 8.91 29.72 3.15 32.68

?ik'hinm Greek ConnecLor 1.84 1.63 .06 .6'}

Crcss Isla.nd Connect,or 0.95 41.80 .05 4-85

Central Is',4nd Freeway 7.69 3.27 2.47 .7)l

Eastern Expressway 2.0 1.02 1.02

'eWestern Exqpressway 4.0l 1.35 1.35

Sewri Ex4ressway 4.89 2.61 1.55 It.16

Tardc Ebcpresswar 0.68 .17 1.80 1.97

Freeway- ExpesswpySub-total hl.78 67.99 9.79 77'.78

Major SLreet Lv rovements 7h.3b 6.68 11.46 18.l4

GRAND TO'TAL 116.12 7h.67 21.25 95.92

1/ 1963 estinmates

SOURCE: Traffic and Transportation Study; Wilbur Smith and Associates, 1963

'Fable o

32)MJ.Y ROAD PROGGPY

Estima 5 .d Proposed 1 xpenditures Present Prog ranI tern _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ l,_ Item Cost- lVth Plan-' Carr;-over IVth Plan Carry-sver

(Rs. crores)

1. Malabar Hill Tunnel and WestIsland Freeway to Haii Ali 8.ho 6.00 2.O 5.142 .98

2. East Island Freeway (CarnacRoad - Reay RDad) 9.00 3.30 5-70 1.99 7.01

3. Link Roads joining ExpressHighways

(Bandra - Dharavi, 0.40)(Andheri - Ghatkcpar, 1.20)(Goregaon - Mulund, 1.40) 3.00 3.00 - 2.21 0.79

4. Chembur - Mankhurd Link to ThanaCreek Bridge 1.50 1.50 - 0.82 O.68

S. East Island Freeway (land ano.structures) 4.60 3.70 0.90 1.38 3.22

6. Engineering Surveys 0.50 0.50 _ 0.50 _

TOrAL 27.00 18.00 9.00 12.32 IL.68

1/

2/ Costs based on 1963 estimates. The Malabar Hill Tunnel and West Island Freeway Haji kli arecurrently estimnated to cost Rs. 10.6 crores.

SOURC-: JNctes, YahŽrrash-ra Road Board

Table 7

BOMBAY ROAD 'OflKS IN PRWGFdSS

Estimated Lc-- diture BudgetDescription Cost (Rs.crorea) to March 1970 for 1970-71 Status

1. Survey Works- 0.21 .03 .02 Surveys for the first phase works arecompleted except for the East IslandFreeway for which the feasibilitystudy report has been submitted toGovernment for decision on the alter-native to be adopted. The survey fcrthe remaining works cf the repcr: cfWilbur Smith is in progress.

2. Soawall ccmBtructlon and The estimate has been sanctioned andland reclamation near Napeap the work awarded on contract inSea Road (West Island February 1969; expected to be com-Freeway) 1.07 .40 .18 pleted during the 1971 working

season.

3. Overbridge ccnstrurtJ.cn for The estimate has been sanctioned andNapean Sea Road .24. .05 .05 the work awarded on contract in

January 1970. The diversion of trai-fic is conpleted and foandation of themain bridge work is started. The workis expected to be completed in theyear 1971-72.

1/ Survey work is reported in progress on the following projects: (a) West Island Freeway - portion between Chcwpz.ttyand Haji Ali. (b) West Teland Freeway - portion between Nariman Point to Chowpatty. (c) Wee1 Island Freeway -

portion between Haji Ali and Mahim. (d) East Island Freeway - porticn between Carnac Bridge to the junction ofD'Mello Road and Reay Road. (e) East Island Freeway - r maining length (excluding portion from Carnac Bridge -,Junction of D'Mello Road and Reay Road. (f) Cross Island Connectur. (g) Cherbur l,ankurd Link Rcad. (h) SewriExYressway. (i) Ghatkcpar lankhurd Link Road. (j) Tardec -cpressway. (k) Borival.i ullund Link Road.

-2-

Estimated Expenditure BudgetDescription Cost (Ps.crores) to ,¶arch 1970 for 1970-71 Stiatus

4. Construction, Bandra-Dharavi Tile esLimate has been sanctioned andLink Road .49 .06 .07 the road and bridge workb have been

awarded on contract in January 1967and February 1969 with a time limitcf 30 months for both.

5. Construction, Andheri-Ghatkopar The estimate has been sanctioned anaLink Road, Stage I .60 .05 .08 the work was awarde' on contract in

June 1969; scheduled tO be cozpletedin 1971-72. The entire road will becopleted by 1973. Earth work is inprogress. Railw.- overbridge is yetto be started.

6. C'nstruction, Goregaon- The estimate hes been sanctioned andMulund Link Road, Stage I .58 .02 0C8 the road work was awarded on contract

in April 1969; scheduled to be cco-pleted in 1971-72. The entire roadincluding the overbridge will be cot-pleted by 1973. Earth work is inprogress. Railway overbridge estimateis yet tc be sanctioned.

7. Ccnstruction, Chembur- The estimate has been sanctioned andMankhurd Link Road 1.09 .01 .05 the land acquisition started. Road

construction will be started afterstudying the behavior of a testembankment.

8. Construction, Andheri- Administrative apprcval is received.Ghatkopar Link Road, Stage II .84- .03 Detailed plans and estimates for

technical sanction are under prepara-tion. Land acquisition is in progress.

9. Construction: Goregaon- The work is adninistrativelv approvedMulund Link Road, Stage II 1.17 - and plans and estimates are under pre-

paration for technical sanction.

-3-

Estimated Expenditure Budget

Descripticn Cost (Rs.crores) to March 1970 for 1970-71 Status

10. Land acquisition, East Technical sanction was recently received

approach, Falabar Hill Tunnel .28 .93 and the Land Acquisiticn proposal is

under finalizaticn.

11. Seawall ccnstruction and land The estimate las been administratively

reclamnation, Eribassy Apt. to approved and tenders for the work bet-

Haji Ali 4 .11 ween Breach Candy and Haji Ali are in-

vited.

12. Construction, Malabar Hill Plans and estimates submitted for

Tunnel 3A.0 obtaining administrative approval.

Table 8

BOMBAY ROAD PROGRAM

RECOMMENDED STAGE DEVELOPMENT

F4 rst Stage - 1963-1966

1. Projections and enactment of rules, laws, and by-lawsneeded to carry out the proposed traffic r:gulationsand restrictions, and route development.

2. Intersection re-design and signalization.

3. Commencement of right-of-way acquisition for all por-tions of the freeway and expressway plan. Specialattention should be given to acquisition of land thatis to be put t o new ises, or on which improvementsare to be made.

4. Preparation of design and preliminary survevs forStage B programmes.

Total cost of First Stage - 6.9 crores of rupees.

Second Stage - 1967-1971

1. Construction of Malabar Hill Tunnel and West IslandFreeway between Malabar HiU and Haji Ali.

2. Construction of the Last Island Freeway between Museumand Matunga.

3. Construction of CentrA Island Expressway between Sionand Matunga.

4. Construction of the Sion-Trombay arterial from theEastern Expressway and the Thana Creek Bridge.

5. Construction of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Road, betweenthe East Island Freeway and Bhendi Bazar.

6. Improvements to Victoria Road, King Edward Road, HughesRoad, BeUasis Road, Delisle Road (north), Tulsi PipeRoad and Elphinstone Road extension.

Total cost of Second Stage - 47.1 orcres of rupees.

-2-

Third Stage - 1972-1976

1. Upgrade southern sections of the Eastern and WesternExpressways to freeway standards.

2. Construction of Mahilm Creek connector and rerainder ofEast ls!and Freeway between Sion and Western Expressway

3. Construction o. Sewri Expressway between Thana CreekBridge and East Island Freeway.

4. Constructicn of Etit Island Freeway from Mahim Creek toMatunga.

5. Construction of the West Island Freeway fram Haji Ali toMahim Creek.

6. Improveients to Delisle Road (south), Sardar VallabhbhaiPatel Road, Shankar Sett Road, Waudby Road, Cross MaidanRoad, Princess Street, Carnac Road, and Lady JehangirRoad extension.

Total cost of Third Stage - 24.8 crores of rupees.

Fourth Stage - 1977-1981

1. Construction of West Island Freeway between Halabar HiLland Back Bay area.

2. Construction of a Cross Island connector.

3. Construction of the Central Island Expressway betweenChowpatty and Matunga.

4. Construction of the Tardeo Expressway.

5. Construction of connector between West Island Freeway atMafatlal Bath, to Folkand Road.

Total cost of Fcurth Stage - 17.2 crores of rupees.

SOURCE: Bombay Traffic and Transnortation Study; Wilbur Smith andAssociates, 1963.

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