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When Autocracies play Democracy – Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines

Paper prepared for the 6th ECPR General Conference at the University of Iceland; August 25-27 2011

Section 84: Democracy, History, Universality: Beyond the Decline of the West Panel 226: The Future of (Liberal) Democracy: An Asian Perspective

Presenter and Author: Hannah Neumann (FU Berlin) Contact: [email protected]

Abstract: Democracy seems to be lively and stable in the Philippines, if compared to its neighbors. National elections take place every five years, the changes in presidency were peaceful, there have only been few cases of election fraud and election related violence, press laws are liberal as is the constitution and many women are to be found in powerful positions. Compared to Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, the country has become one of the role models within ASEAN. But digging beyond the surface and looking at daily social practices, this democracy can easily be deconstructed as an agglomerate of autocracies interacting within (and sometimes beyond) a democratic constitution. The century-old concept of the clan as immediate political unit has survived Colonialism, Democratisation, Martial Law, Peoples Power and revolutionary movements. It translated to nowadays politics, law making, economy and security structures. Across all political parties, within all religious groupings and on all islands, the clan provides the central element of social categorisation and organisation. What looks like a democracy to the outside, are numerous elaborate bargaining processes and shifting alliances between local clans and their representatives on national level.

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Law or revolutionary unrest

When Autocracies play Democracy – Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines

“Sure enough, we now have free elections, free speech, free assembly. But these are the empty shells of democratic institutions, because the real essence of democracy does not exist here. True to her oligarchic class … she turned EDSA1 into a restoration of the old oligarchy.” (Sionil 2004, 50)

Since the end of Marcos dictatorship, Filipino democracy seems to be lively and

stable – at first glance. Regular elections are conducted every five years, the change in

presidency at minimum every ten years has been peaceful, only a few accounts of

election fraud and election related violence have called international attention, the

press laws and the overall constitution are liberal and many women are to be found in

powerful positions. Popular Policy Indices, such as the Bertelsmann Transformation

Index or the Freedom House Index acknowledge these developments and rank the

Philippines in the top bracket of South-East Asian Countries.2 Compared to Burma,

Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, the country has once more become one of

the role models within ASEAN. But this appearance is deceiving and the Philippines

are an illustrative case for how much more important it is to look at actual social

practices rather than at institutional organs and constitutional provisions.

Autocratically ruled clans have widely managed to transfer their hierarchical system

based on unconditional loyalty in exchange for security and resources to today’s

democracy. What seems liberal to the outside is an elaborate system of bargaining and

shifting alliances between autocratically ruled elite families at the inside. Neither

Colonialism, nor the Commonwealth3, World War Two, final Independence, Martial 4 5 brought an end to such rule. Rather a closer look at

1 EDSA refers to the People Power Revolution which led to a non-violent and of Marcos dictatorship in 1986) 2 For such a comparison, see the Bertelsmann data: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/457.0.html>

and the Freedom House data, where the Philippines have been rated as “Free” from 1996 to 2005, during the “all-

out wars”, online: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_All Scores_Countries.xls>. 3 The Commonwealth period in the Philippines lasted from 1935 to 1946, where the country was a commonwealth

of the United States. 4 The Philippines were under Martial Law from 1972 to 1981 under the rule of Ferdinand Marcos. 5 The most prominent and wide-spread revolutionary movements, active today are the MILF in Muslim Mindanao

(a Muslim group fighting for self-determination) and the NPA (a communist group fighting for regime change).


those historical periods shows elite rule gaining an increased momentum. Autocratic

clan structures have survived democracy and regular elections. A small group of

powerful families continues to rule the masses. Loyalty to ones clan serves as the

common denominator unifying all Filipinos, regardless of regional, ethnic, religious

or linguistic origin. Personalized rule and control persists and the social order is best

described as a coexistence of concurring clans. Each historical period introduced new

ways and means to safeguard resources and legitimise such elite rule. The paper seeks

to explore this ambivalent relationship between changing systems and stable

structures and thus provides an historical explanation for the persistence of clan rule.

It is based on historical and analytical literature of which most is cited in the

following paper, complemented by the authors own experiences while living and

researching in Manila, Cebu, Davao, Butuan, Cotabato and Pikit.6 The focus of the

following paper is on Mindanao, but many of the findings are transferable to other

regions of the Philippines, and as some might realize, to a number of other post-

colonial states.

Early Settlements – where clan equaled community The clan runs through Filipino history like a scarlet threat, like the only scarlet threat

it seems. Clan and residential community had been congruent during early settlement

periods. Members of a clan and their offspring settled close to each other (Zialcita

1998). Ownership of the surrounding lands was community based, with the head of

the clan as custodian of the land (Filipinas Foundation 1975, 58). Land belonged to

the kin group which started using it and members of the family received rights to use

parcels of the land; but not to own it (Abreu 2005; Arumpac 1998). Strangers were

temporarily allocated plots. The mechanisms underlying distribution of land as well

as political power were based on clan custom, as well as Adat Law, the Mindanaon

customary law. Both sets of rules were neither formalized nor universal, but provided

general guidelines for social interaction surprisingly consistent across Mindanao

(CPRM 2004, 51). Power, for example has widely rested on a mix of genealogy, age

and social hierarchy.

6 The author was exchanged student at Ateneo de Manila University in 2004 and 2005. She was further intern with

the German Development Service in Cebu in 2005 and documenting on various projects of World Vision in

Mindanao. She later on returned for research in 2006 and 2009 and remained in close contact with many of her

informants until now.


to rely on the loyalty of the da

Islamisation – the origin of datuship and personal loyalty The arrival of Islam, mostly through trade, starting in the 15th century changed little

(Abubakar 1983, 7). Most communities converted to Islam and Islam slowly melted

into local custom, but without fundamentally challenging any of the underlying

mechanisms. The family remained the main organizing principle, with the head now

called datu7. All persons in a district considered themselves allied to a datu –

organizing them into innumerable petty states, basically reflecting the indigenous

structure of settlements. The datu was a combination of political leader, landlord,

judge and religious functionary. His power was not measured in terms of land or

wealth, but by the number of followers, meaning people upon whose loyalty he could

count. Power rested on the person’s ability to sustain his constituents and on his

personal charisma (Lebar 1972, 23; Jocano 1983, 3). In return for their loyalty, the

datu had to provide aid in emergency and advocacy in disputes with other clans or

chiefs (Dolan 1991). The number of followers thus became a selection criterion

besides genealogy. This was necessary, as in the Philippines status can be inherited

from both – paternal as well as maternal lines, generating a number of potential datus

(Damaso 1983, 81).8

The local datu again, was embedded into a bigger hierarchy through alliances with

other datus and subordinated to the sultan. Those Sultanates united the scattered and

autonomous communities into a political community, called bangsa (nation) (Jocano

1983, 4). Despite the introduction of the sultanates, power and authorities rested on

the local datus and was and distributed upwards based on a precarious system of

alliances (Kiefer 1967, 23). Although the sultan occupied the highest social, political

and religious status in society (Jocano 1983, 3), he depended on personal loyalties and

his own finesse in building and securing alliances (Kiefer 1967: 24}. The sultan had

tus to secure his power. If he would lose the loyalty of

7 Historians dispute the usage and origin of the term ‘datu’ as it may have existed already before the introduction

of Islam and is also used among the non-Islamized communities in Mindanao (Damaso 1983). In either case, the

English equivalent used most often is that of ‘ruler or descendant of rulers’ which gives the term a combined

sociological and genealogical significance (Beckett 1977, 50). 8 The number of followers could be increased following different mechanism. Whereas distributing resources

downwards surely was one, others more normative have been mentioned in literature: (1) Bansawan — belonging

to the royal core lineage, or a pidtaylan (2) Ilmawan — knowledgeable in adat and Shariah to be a fitting vice-

regent of Allah (3) Rupawan — personable, with good features (nonawan) and charisma (4) Hartawan — affluent

to lend prestige and dignity to the exercise of the office.


one datu, he would at the same time loose the loyalty of all his followers (Kreuzer

2011, 8). Securing the loyalty of the datu, thus was his main objective.

The judicial system provided means to stabilize this system of loyalties and ensure the

dependency of the individual on the clan. The codes only made gross distinctions

between ranks (Islamic law distinguishes only between free persons and slaves). In

practice, however, these rules were applied with great attention to rank differences

(Bentley 1992, 103). Islamic law was understood and applied through the rank

sensitive lens of customary law which specified, with striking finesse, the behavior

expected of persons of different ranks. Especially the traditional bang-on (or

maratabat) system of raising one’s life and dignity was one of the social pressures

imposed through the elders to maintain adherence to the informal body of laws.

maratabat, a term usually translated as ‘rank honor’ also carried the connotations of

self-esteem and self-respect. The idea was that each Filipino Muslim, as well as his

clan, possessed maratabat in proportion to his or her rank in the traditional hierarchy,9

which combines genealogical elements with actual lifetime achievements. Such

dignity and prestige are seen as exclusive – meaning one person can only gain if

another looses (Bentley 1985) – until today leading to bloody feuds and long-lasting

violence if an offence on maratabat is not resolved. The logic was and is: If honor is

not restored in a non-violent mechanism of conflict resolution, it needs to be restored

by violent means.10 And such a restoration is only possible through the help of the

clan and the approval of its datu. Naturally, those clans with most followers were in a

better position than those less powerful. Thus, often inferior clans refrained from

taking such action and members of the more powerful lineages got away with their

offences – cementing genealogical hierarchies between the clans.11

9 The maratabat system is best described for the Maranao (Bentley 1985), but compatible, though less elaborately

described systems exist for the other ethnic groups in Mindanao. 10 For many, justice is a matter of honor and restoring ones maratabat it the only way to reach justice. Thus

described for the Tausug: “They do not teach their children to fight. They teach them not to fight. Violence itself,

however it is expressed, is considered morally wrong by the Tausug. To be shamed with-out taking revenge is,

however, as great a wrong.” (Kiefer 1972, 5) 11 This was not only true in the case of clan feud, but according to some accounts even for judicial processes

following customary rule. Here, the number of witnesses was reported to be the key criterion for the decision of

the datu. Those clans with more followers and resources to secure witnesses thus were in better position (Kreuzer

2011, 11)


patronage system, based on t

Colonialism – strengthening patronage Spanish colonialism from 1521 to 1898 had little impact on Mindanao and its power

structures. Aside a few minor wars, Mindanao was widely left on its own. The only

legacy left by the Spanish was the introduction of private land ownership as a central

pillar to their concept of feudalism (Zialcita 1998, 54). In the Northern islands the

effects of this system were felt soon and increased the power of clans. The promotion

of an agrarian, hacienda based society and economy and absentee landlordism

resulted in the concentration of land in the hands of a few, mostly the old elites who

collaborated with the Spaniards. In Mindanao, land continued to be allocated by the

datu and handled as if it were owned by the clan, but this changed towards the end of

American colonialism.

American colonialism started under a more powerful approach, providing a mix of

military force and incentives. The initial policy of the US towards the rulers of

Mindanao was, to rule the different clans and regions by “accommodating” their

leaders (Tan 1983, 124). The idea was to look for “important families through whom

they could control a people they did not understand” (Beckett 2009, 291). Although

Provincial offices were subject to election according to the constitution, this never

was implemented in Mindanao (Beckett 2009, 280–88). In the Bates Treaty between

the Sultan of Sulu and the United States in 1899, the colonialists even promised not to

interfere in Sulu religion, law and commerce in exchange for the sultan’s

acknowledgement of United States sovereignty (The Bates Treaty of 1899 1899).12

Sultans and datus were paid a monthly salary for their administrative support, as long

as they ensured an end to piracy raids and accepted the US flag to be used. The US

representatives widely cooperated with the old datus loyal towards the United States

and provided them with incentives such as pilgrimages to Mecca, a share in revenue

or scholarships for their children(Beckett 2009, 291). The loyalty paid off.

Pilgrimages were increasing prestige, revenue could be distributed downwards to

increase loyalty and the number of followers and scholarships increased the chances

of their offspring in competing against alternative rulers. The American system

provided the datus with extended the means to build up and secure a clan based

he pre-existing family system as a means to distribute

12 Elsewhere in Mindanao, the United States entered into similar, though less formal agreements with local power

holders (Holbrook 2009, 12)


equalled political posts, equa

wealth and power downwards. And the same pattern was valid for Filipino-American

relations in the northern islands.13 Earlier practices of decision-making remained

largely intact and clan politics was strengthened during early American colonization.

The situation started to shift after the Public Land Act of 1903 and the abrogation of

the Bates Treaty in 1904. Both challenged the power of Mindanaon sultans and datus.

The Public Land Act (nos. 718, 926 and 496) introduced the homestead system and

allowed individuals to acquire lots – in the same time declaring null and void all lands

rights granted by datus, sultans or traditional chiefs without authority of the State.

This measure, of which Muslims and Indigenous were widely ignorant, legally

ensured the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few big landlords

(Gomez and Mercado 2001). Naturally the most educated Christian settlers, coming

from the Northern islands and educated Moro elites benefited most. Whereas some of

the incoming Christian settlers could improve their position, land reform cemented

established power structures among the Muslim Mindanoans, but as they had to

compete with the settlers, decreased their overall power.

Those who opposed US American domination and the concept of private land

ownership, or just had no knowledge of the system, failed to title their land. Many

small farmland owners saw their land occupied by these corporations and became

farm workers instead (Ocampo 2011). Christian lowland Filipinos were more adept at

using the modern law for their end and applied for individual titles to various tracts of

“state” land and, after becoming the legal owners of these tracts, enforced eviction of

the original inhabitants (Kreuzer 2006, 41). The same did many Muslim elites apply

for land titles in the names of their clan members and later on rent it out to them. Land

reform, in the whole of the Philippines strengthened elite rule, and until today no

solution to this problem has been found. Cooperation once more paid off. Those who

owned farmland, were able to increase their production of rice, corn, coconuts and

cattle and some of the earlier subsistence farmers turned into big landlords. Business

was made mostly by those owning huge areas of land – predominantly the Christian

and in some cases the Muslim elites – linking land ownership to commercial

ownership and through a huge number of dependants and tenants, to political

patronage. Land ownership equalled richness, equalled a high number of dependants,

lled funds, equalled patronage and strengthening of

13 This is described along the example of Sergio Osmena and the Osmena family in (Cullinane 1989).


meant not having any rights at

patronage network. The landlord as “custodian”, distributing lands among his

dependants in return for loyalty and in many cases tenure, has become the modern

datu; translating the century old concept to Colonialism, throughout the

Commonwealth period, and as further remarks will show, to today’s Filipino

democracy.

The abrogation of the Bates Treaty, putting an end to legal pluralism had comparable

strengthening effects on clan rule. The Bates Treaty was unilaterally abrogated in

1904 and replaced legal pluralism in favor for “integration”, or put bluntly,

assimilation (Holbrook 2009, 12). The resulting Moro14-American war from 1902 to

1913 led to a defeat of the sultans and their final subordination to American power,

which did by no means decrease their power on regional and local level. In 1914 US

administration imposed a uniform law that disregarded Muslim and customary law

(McKenna 1998, 91). Local law was only allowed, as long as it was in accordance

with the laws of the United States of America, a restriction widely ignored on the

ground. Most issues, even those dealing with murder and homicide, were dealt along

customary law and processes. Those permit even the most serious offenses to be

settled by the payments of fines or debt servitude (Scott 1984, 133). The public is not

seen as an aggrieved party. An act is not right or wrong in itself. Offences committed

to outsiders of the kin group usually do not affect the relation between kin-members

and can be negotiated with the aggrieved party (Zialcita 1998, 46). Not punishment,

but compensation and restoration of the loss in resources, prestige or power are the

main motives of the victim. Cases are dealt with based on negotiations between

victim and offender, both represented by elders of their clan. Local datus are

facilitating such negotiations, but compensations have to be debated by the parties in

conflict. Their hierarchical relation to each other, not some formal law serves as

benchmark (Kreuzer 2011, 11).15 Being a member of an inferior clan meant having

less loss in prestige to be compensated for. Not being member of a clan meant not

having any advocacy in these disputes. In a system based on amicable settlement, this

all.

14 The term Moro is a political label for all Muslim Mindanaons. It serves to unify the different ethnic groups of

Muslim belief and to distinguish them from the Christian settlers living in Mindanao. Introduced as a pejorative

term by the Spanish, it now serves as unifying term, used by the Moro revolutionary movements. 15 A number of explanations and legal matters concerning the Muslim Legal System in the Philippines can be

found on this website: http://www.muslimmindanao.ph/sharia_system.html


common interest unifying the

Colonialism might have challenged the authority of the sultans by introducing a

higher level authority on national level and integrating them into national level

politics, but it changed little of the power structures on the ground. Even more so, by

allocating funds and incentives to the former sultans and datus, colonial powers

strengthened their kinship networks. From the beginning of the Commonwealth,

democratic institutions were manipulated not to uplift the ‘humble commoner’ but to

serve the Filipino directing class and American policy (Cullinane 1989, 105). Land

reform cemented elite leadership as it allocated land to those already in power, widely

denying access to the common Mindanaon and Filipino in general. Justice reform

installed a system widely unacceptable to Muslim Mindanaons, thus increasing the

power of informal and customary structures, once more safe-guarding hierarchies

within and between the clans.

Independence – increasing funds, competition and violence There are a number of post-colonial countries in which the fight for independence

provided some unifying elements between its citizens. This was not the case in the

Philippines. For one, there was no revolutionary upraise against the American, but a

rather slow transition of power to the Commonwealth government and later on the

independent Philippines. The little revolution against the Spanish was an elite project,

taking place nearly exclusively in Manila and led to the 1898 Declaration of

Philippine Independence from Spain and continues to be celebrated today. But as that

struggle was a predominantly Christian and Tagalog16 one, the nation-building project

was patterned along this Christian, Tagalog image (Coronel-Ferrer 2005, 7),

culminating in the American-derived values of democracy and individual freedom

(Bankoff and Weekley 2002, 95), coupled with the Spanish legacy of Christianity.

Christianity became the corner-stone of the nation, symbolically excluding religious

minorities (approximately 15 per cent of Filipinos). What remained as smallest

common denominator between all religious, ethnic and linguistic groups of the

Philippines, and thus as only base for national level interaction was there adherence to

the clan.

Safe-guarding clan rule and increasing the outlook of the personal clan was the

Filipinos, thus it comes as no surprise that clan identity

16 Tagalog, the ethnic group living in the region in and around Manila, led the national resistance. Their

vernacular was later on made the national language (Tagalog), although most Filipinos speak Visayan.


ranks much higher than any other loyalty. Asking Filipino Muslims about their

identity, a clear and surprisingly consistent hierarchy appears:17 The most important

level of identification is that of clan affiliation or kinship ties. Second is ethnic group

(being a Maguindanaoan, a Maranao or a Tausug), third is religious identity (being a

Muslim), fourth, closely interwoven with third, is being a Moro, based on political

activity as a Muslim, and in fifth place finally comes being a Filipino (Guilal 1998,

161). The same hierarchy is valid for Christian Filipinos. They are foremost members

of a family and clan. Asked the question “Who are you?” the answer most often is “I

am the son/daughter of...”, followed by an indication to the village / area they live in,

their ethnic group and only lastly their religion18.

Thus, the clan continued to exist as primary organizing principle after independence,

throughout the years of Marcos dictatorship, until today. Democracy, the way it is

practiced in the Philippines, served to strengthen the power of the clans rather than to

diversify power and increase participation. This can be demonstrated along three

sectors key to a state: Security, Land Ownership/Economy and Political Power, all

three closely related to each other in the Philippines to ensure the perpetuity of clan

leadership. Electoral democracy opened state resources for privatization by

established and emerging families, which knitted themselves, during the middle

decades of the twentieth century, into a national oligarchy. The state remained weak,

making it difficult, obviously impossible, to formulate and implement policies

independently of the powerful vested interest groups, especially the powerful

families, clans, and kinship networks (Rivera 1994, 32).

As no real political parties existed at the end of the Commonwealth, voting became a

mere objectification of clan loyalty, especially on the local and regional levels. Being

voted into office served as a further base of legitimacy for continuing elite dominance

and the resources allocated to those in office as additional means to secure the loyalty

of followers. The Philippines as a whole became a distinctly American patterned of

17 The following data is based on research by Wahab Ibrahim Guilal in 1998 entitled “Perceptions on Democracy

and Citizenship in Muslim Mindanao”, based on key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and a review

of literature. 18 This is based on my own experience in the Philippines and confirmed by a presentation of Carolyn Anonuevo,

as quoted in (Grabowski 2006, 67).


subordination to a national le

decentralized democracy19 in which regular and competitive elections are of high

importance. Until today, local agencies of the state are subordinate to elected

municipal mayors and provincial governors, a hierarchy, which guarantees that the

accumulation and mobilization of local personal followers remains a key source of

political power, just as it had been in pre-colonial and throughout colonial times

(Hedman and Sidel 2000, 170). Political office assumed greater importance as the

rewards and powers of these formal political positions increased – mayors had funds

to spend, jobs to allocate, police to command and the courtship of big politicians at

election time (Beckett 2009, 292) The strong reliance on local power holders largely

translated to the electoral system. What had been the datu was the mayor, what had

been the sultan was the governor. Political parties were loose and unstable coalitions

of local power holders with their followers, based on family or other loyalties rather

than on shared ideology or class consciousness (Beckett 2009, 288). Just as with the

rural Christian Filipino, the concept of democracy and citizenship enshrined in most

Muslims is reduced to mere participation in elections (Guilal 1998, 171); although

actual choosing of candidates is usually done in a collective manner where command

votes are a widely accepted phenomenon (Kreuzer 2005, 20, 31).

Electoral democracy had increased the competition between the clans, but not

challenged the logic of clan rule per se. Ruling a certain area or community has

become equal to securing political and economical resources. Especially the so-called

pork-barrel funds (Priority Development Assistance Funds) are widely used as a

means to reward followers for their loyalty: By the president to reward the

parliamentarian for voting him or her into office, and by the parliamentarian to

reword his followers for voting him or her into office. 1,2 Million Euros are allocated

to each parliamentarian which he can distribute rather freely on projects of his choice.

In a region with 70% living below the poverty line, this is an immense amount.

The system of electoral democracy has imposed a new structure on the traditional and

Islamic region of Mindanao, but old elites could to a large extent use these new

structures for their own means (Kreuzer 2011, 14). What was new, was the definite

vel. Those datus who finally succeeded, had learned to

19 It is decentralized in so far as the district/ municipality has a strong basis, but on the other hand, it is directly

dependent on the national government. What is lacking in the case of the Philippines is an intermediate/ regional

level of political organization.


play the game of democracy. They entered in a “wheeling-and-dealing” (Coronel-

Ferrer 2005, 11–12) of funds and resources against loyalty, meaning votes, across all

levels. Datus secured the votes of their followers to either the governor or the

president, and in return could basically rule their regions ad libitum (Kreuzer 2011).20

“Implication in kidnappings, coups, fraud, venality, and murder do a (...) datu’s

reputation no harm, so long as he gets away with it“ (Bentley 2009, 277).

But this situation is not unique to Mindanao. The whole of Filipino politics is

characteristically described as “kinship politics of an oligarchic nature” (Kreuzer

2006: 31), a “collection of clan alliances” (Abinales 2002, 613), or “an anarchy of

families” (McCoy 2009). Political families randomly try to convert the state and its

institutions into “hangers-on of the family” (Kreuzer 2006, 55). The pervasiveness of

family rule all over the country is increasing its persistence. Political families prefer

other families or family-like organizations as political opponents since they, too, have

a vital interest in stabilizing the order in which families have a key political position

(Kreuzer 2006, 55). Coalitions are unstable, formed between different elite families,

oriented along the need for the smallest-needed majority and usually “bought

together” by particular deals (Kreuzer 2008b, 49). Even the metaphors used in

political communication reflect this notion of family ruling. An often used metaphor

for the Philippine nation-state and its local units is that of a family. All Filipinos are

then supposed to be brothers and sisters and the executive being the father (Zialcita

1998). Marcos was playing on this metaphor with him, being the father and his wife

being the mother of the nation. Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos did not continue using

these metaphors, but today’s president Benigno Aquino, who likes to be called by his

nickname NoyNoy is again introducing a notion of informality and closeness. On

local level, such terms as Ama (father), Ina (mother) or Atte (bigger sister) continue

to be used widely.

20 The most prominent example of such an alliance is that between the Ampatuan clan and Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo, the former president of the Philippines. Andal Ampatuan, the clan leader secured the vote of all twelve

senatorial posts in his region to go to Arroyo supporters in 2007, and 100% of the votes during presidential

election in 2004 to Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In turn, he had never been charged for any of the many irregularities

under his rule, such as a killed rival candidate for regional elections, executed prisoners, and suppressed human

rights activists (Kreuzer 2011, 16–17). Only the Maguindanao massacre in 2009, killing 57 people gained

international attention; but so far neither he nor any member of his clan has served a sentence.


But not only had the clan as political entity with its head counting on utmost loyalty

translated to electoral democracy. The same did the private armies of former datus

and sultans, today under the disguise of fully legal paramilitary forces or state forces

protecting important politicians. Elite politicians are buying protection of the Filipino

Army and the National Police. Legal para-military organizations serve as private

army. Political killings are common and some datus command private armies of as

much as 3000-5000 armed men (Kreuzer 2011). Both, police and military, as well as

para-military forces serve as the armed faction of elite politicians. Their loyalty

remains with the clan and they are perceived as representatives of the clan, not of the

state (Kreuzer 2011). Economic violence mingles with political violence, private

violence, ethnic violence, criminal activities and terrorism; constituting a highly

systemized and ironically pretty stable arrangement down to community level. To

start with exploring the systems of violence in brief, economic violence figures most

prominent when it comes to enforcing logging or mining concessions or to developing

farm land for plantation. Stavenhagen, the UN special rapporteur on the

implementation of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act precisely describes quite

common practices of development aggression: “dispossession, forced displacement,

physical abuse, torture (…) summary executions, destruction of houses, including the

bombing of an indigenous village, as well as the practice of hamleting21”

(Stavenhagen 2002, 43) in which even high-level politicians are involved.22

Such practices are often connected to political violence. High-level politicians are

closely connected to such corporations and thus targeted by political activists

opposing economic violence and challenging those behind it. Especially political

activists and parties from the left, as well as critical journalists see themselves faced

with numerous death threats. The number of extra-judicial killings has by no means

decreased since the return to democracy in 1986 (Kreuzer 2007). Rather, the number

of killed activists has become an impact indicator for the work of such groups23. Safe-

21 Hamleting is the forced re-organization of rural residents into special camps 22 The case of the press secretary of the president, Jesus Dureza, was a popular one at the time of field work in

2009. He had held a mountain resort without undergoing the proper legal process of land acquisition. 23 When I asked a human rights activist whether their human rights work had an impact on the regional and

national level, his short answer was revealing: “yes, our organization has lost 35 members due to extra-judicial

killings” This answer was given by Hilao Enriquez, from Karatapan during the Conference Human Rights in the

Philippines – Trends and Challenges under the Aquino Government, June 29 and 30 in Berlin.


president from signing it (Be

guarding political and economic interest against Communist or Moro claims for

change has become a daily routine for local politicians, even if this means to

challenge the authority of the Filipino government (Kreuzer 2008a).24 The border to

private violence is fluent. Political and economic interests are by no means separate of

private enrichment. This spills over to clan conflict on local level. Where resources

can only be secured by the family in political office, competition for such office is

high and means to secure it sometimes drastic. The latest incident of clan-related

violence, linked to political competition seemed to have opened a new dimension.

The so-called “Maguindanao Massacre” in which 57 men and women, approximately

half of them journalists, were killed and buried by a roadside in Mindanao on 23

November 2009 is part of a long-lasting feud between the Ampatuan and the

Mangudaddatu clan (Gutierrez 2009).25

The conflict between the Filipino Army and the MILF is part of this mix of violence

and is often used by the different clans as a means to either disguise or further their

personal agenda. It is hard to say, to what extent the escalation of private violence is a

reaction to the protractedness of ethnic conflict and to what extend the ethnic conflict

is used to disguise private violence on both sides. For sure, the latest outbreak of

supposedly ethnic violence between the government of the Philippines and the MILF

in 2008 can be seen as an indicator for mixing economic, private and ethnic issues.

The situation escalated after the MoA-AD (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral

Domains) was not ratified by the national government, and the conflict is still ongoing

on at low intensity today. This memorandum was the result of a joint panel of

representatives of the MILF and the national government as well as academic experts.

It summarized all previous agreements between the two warring groups and should

have served as a roadmap to peace. Shortly before the designated signing date of the

document in Malaysia, two Christian governors from Mindanao appealed to the

Supreme Court to declare the whole process unconstitutional and discourage the

rnas 2008; Jurand 2008). The Supreme Court ruled in

24 One such case is the reaction of Governor Emanuel Pinol to the MoA-AD. He issued a statement replicated on

his website as well as numerous local newspapers where he announced to take up arms against the MILF in case

the government would be no longer willing or able to do so. 25 Esmael Mangudadatu was challenging Andal Ampatuan Jr., son of the Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan

Sr., as mayor of Buluan town. When Mangudadatus wife was on her way to filing a certificate for his candidacy,

she and her escort were kidnapped and brutally killed.


accordance with their appeal and criticized the MoA-AD as having departed too far

from the constitution (Bernas 2008).26 But this intervention was by no means free of

self-interest. One of the two governors who appealed to the Supreme Court, Emanuel

Pinol, owns vast tracts of land in Mindanao, which might have been redistributed if

the MoA had been implemented (Neumann 2010). When Pinol was trying to

safeguard his plantations by appealing as governor to the Supreme Court, this made

economic violence political. Because he was doing so to safe-guard his very own

benefit, it had a private connotation. When he called on all Christians in his province

to get prepared for self-defense it spilled over to a mix of privatized and ethnic

violence. And openly insulting a local military commander, who was pursuing a

strategy of de-escalation that he wouldn’t “have the guts” to fight the MILF, was

actively escalating the situation. Many in Mindanao have a very fine knowledge of

how to play this game. They are keeping violence at a certain level where it remains

generally acceptable but ensures for all those involved to secure further resources to

their clan. Peter Kreuzer, a sharp and prominent analyst of the situation in Mindanao,

goes as far as to see the continuing violence in Mindanao not as a failure of the

government in securing its monopoly of power, but as a necessary constituent of a

social and political order aiming towards stabilizing the authority of a few over the

many (Kreuzer 2007).

Violence is incorporating democracy. The daily practices of violence have little in

common with the formal character of the democracy written into the Filipino

constitution. But the structures of violence have been there before, they have always

had a stabilizing function and they seem to be surviving democracy. Formal

democracy is incorporated into violent structures in many aspects. Where the state is

still in control of the monopoly of power, it is just because those who have the

monopoly of power have become representatives of the state. If such monopolies are

challenged, as in the case of Pinol or Ampatuan, it is common to revert to, or at least

threaten to revert to, violence. Guns seem to be the only means to be respected:

"In areas like this (...) you have to be like a warlord to be respected. (...) It's a very feudal system. (...) you have to exact fear from your constituents. It gets you respect. Number two it's again economic power. (...) So it's guns, gold and goons. The three

26 Especially the powers envisioned for the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity go beyond those of local governments or

even the ARMM, making it, according to the Supreme Court, a quasi-autonomous state.


National Liberation Front (M

Gs." (leading representative of an international aid organization, working in Mindanao. Cited according to: (Kreuzer 2008b, 51)

And here we can close the circle to the clan. The clan remains the underlying

structure of this system and only as member of a clan, there is a chance to succeed in

it. Land is given to members of the clan, security is provided for members of the clan

and resources are allocated to members of the clan – in return for unconditional

loyalty. Political leaders have remained, what Gonzales calls “sultans of a violent

land”27:

Moro Revolution: challenging clan authority in Mindanao Translating the idea of family to democratic politics, or better, familialistic structures

incorporating democracy, lead to defunct structures. Loyalty without questioning, the

translation of inner-familial hierarchies to decision-making processes, the little

interest for a public good, the strong link between economic, political and military

branches and the exclusion of alternative ways of group alignment, such as ethnicity,

has led to a failure of democracy on the ground; in turn once more strengthening the

importance of the clan as organizing principle. Even ethnic protest, as powerful as it

might be voiced in Mindanao, has little impact on actual decisions and structures.

The clan system in Mindanao increased marginalization on the national level.

Oligarchic politics working through shifting alliances with the main power –

concentrated in the presidency in Manila – clustered power among elites outside of

the Moro ethnic communities. In the national parliament, Moros remained politically

marginalized. Muslim elites managed to gain resources for their region, but their

motivation was simply to strengthen their own paternalistic network. They worked

not to improve the fundamental interests of their ethnic and/or religious group, but

rather to distribute their financial means along paternalistic structures, strengthening

their own positions within this kinship network. (Kreuzer 2008b, 49). Ethnic protest

was without representation in the political sphere. When Marcos further eroded the

political power of Muslim representatives at the national level, it became evident to

many of the traditional as well as Islamic leaders that it would not be possible to

regain independence through political means or institutional mechanisms (Lingga

2007, 43). The Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO) soon became the Moro

NLF) and rapidly grew to tenth of thousands of

27 This is the title of his paper (Gonzales 2000)


Filipinos is defined by their o

members in the mid 1970s. This led to a split within the Moro societies. In the 1960s,

a young Moro elite, educated in Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia or at the University of

the Philippines in Manila, challenged the traditional authority of the datus. This new

elite used their Islamic teachings and the notion of equality inscribed in the Quran to

counter the hierarchical system of datuship and install a new system of leadership.

The upraise was personified by Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF, promoting

Islam as the base for political organisation instead of the clan (McKenna 1998, 133).

It was the first time, the traditional datuship had been challenged in an attempt to

unify all Muslims of Mindanaons as Moros and connect them to the bigger

community of believers in Islam, the ummah. Whereas the logic of the clans always

has been one of cooptation into the national system in return for funds to be handed

down the kinship network, Nur Misuaris network was based on a revolutionary spirit,

aiming towards radically changing the Muslim societies and liberating them from

Filipino domination. But by most, the clans continued to be seen as the bird in the

hand, securing economic safety based on kinship loyalty, whereas the revolutionary

movement symbolized the two in the bush. Both needed each other, to secure

resources. Until today, the revolutionary movement relies on the datus to secure the

constituents for whom it claims to speak. And the clans need the revolutionary

movements as they increase pressure on the government to allocate funds to the

Muslim regions, which are then handled through the clan structures.28 The old MNLF

cadres are now incorporated into the clan system. To what extend the MILF, their

successors, will be able to overcome clan rule remains to be seen. So far, clan rule has

proofed to be the strongest among all alternative organising principles.

The family, deeply enshrined in social practices Making a shift from political and public life, to private values and relationships

changes little. The family is “the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest

loyalties and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands” (Grossholtz

1964, 86–87). It doesn’t matter whether it is about school funding, a new job, a

problem with the boss, a guy one admires or an offence one has committed – Filipinos

usually seek and get support from close family members rather than state agencies,

co-workers or advise centers (Zialcita 1998, 46). The moral universe of many

bligation to their kin, especially to their parents. Such

28 The most prominent example for this unsacred alliance is the ARMM


average citizens and the co

kin-bonds are based on and reinforced by highly reciprocal relationships. Among the

Filipinos in the northern islands, Utang na loob (an unpayable “debt of gratitude”)

defines the lasting moral obligation created when one accepts a voluntary gift or

service. Hiya refers to a complicated concept of shame, where an individual loses

his/her hiya, when he/she fails to repay his/her “debt of gratitude” and is then consid-

ered a shameless person (walang hiya). As a result, another major value is the avoid-

ance of conflict, or pakikisama (getting along). In Muslim Mindanao, authority and

cohesion manifested themselves, just as in general Filipino society, along a complex

system of personal, family, and clan loyalties (Guilal 1998, 164–65). The loob/ hiya

system finds its reflection in the indigenous bangon (or maratabat) system. Social

existence among Muslim, as well as Christian Filipinos, is much concerned with

intragroup (= intra-family) cohesion. Alternative support networks (such as unions,

peers, co-workers etc.) are rather weak (Abad 2005). Not only do the datus

subordinate their followers; they themselves willingly accept such subordination for

the good of their kin. The datu is seen as the father, who knows best what is good for

his children.

Conclusion In a weak nation state, such as the Filipino one, the clan provides the only means to

secure social and economic survival. The family has to allocate what the state fails to

provide for: capital, livelihood, education and formation and medicare. And it

provides stability, as it is based on proven and reciprocal loyalties – anxious to

transfer name, prestige and values to the following generations (McCoy 1994, 7). In

the Philippines, authority and voting behaviour are until today following a complex

system of personal, family and clan loyalties (Guilal 1998, 164–65) and the

decentralized political system encourages such. Partaking in politics in the Philippines

is understood as a necessity for any family or clan to reach its maximum profit and

increase the assets of its kin.29. These familial alliances form a crucial link between

untry’s elites. In societies where personal ties are

29 In a 2009 survey by Transparency International, Filipinos see their political parties and public officials as the

most corrupt aspects of society – scoring a 4 on a scale from 1 (not corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt) – and 77% of

the interviewed judge their government to be ineffective in fighting corruption. Online:

<http://www.transparency.org/content/download/43788/701097>. Adding the data of the Asian Barometer, the

picture becomes even more consistent. Here, only 10% of Filipinos are “consistent democrats”, the lowest rate in

Southeast Asia, pointing to a “very thin cultural legitimization for democracy” (Chu and Huang 2009, 13).


traditionally most important, citizens are often suspicious of politicians or officials

unknown to them personally. As a result, the system seems to lack order and is

instead characterized by “randomness and chaos, with the only operative force being

social ties underlying privilege” (Chikiamco 1998, 17) – privilege being constantly

reproduced through licit and illicit practices of familial relationships. This makes such

“cultural behaviour” of complex transactions of debt and obligation among extended

family or clan members a “rational economic strategy” (Bankoff and Weekley 2002,

77). The problem here is two-fold. (1) Such social patterns undermine any notion of

nationhood or political organization, as well as (2) democratic procedures, which go

beyond family ties and personal relationships. The slow pace of change (in anything

having to do with political processes) often bemoaned by international analysts,

enables elites to adapt to the necessary social change (Kreuzer 2006, 50).

Islamisation in Mindanao failed to change the traditional system of datuship based on

genealogy and prestige. Colonialism provided further incentives for clan leaders and

means to secure their dominance. These funds increased during democracy and

popular vote added an additional criterion of legitimacy. Moral integrity might have

declined, but political power of those in office increased. Especially in regions of war,

the usual civilian was occupied with surviving instead of challenging clan rule. Where

national systems of order weakened or broke down, clan loyalty was the only stable

structure they could count upon. The competitiveness of the American-patterned

democracy stabilized an exchange system of bottom-up, personalized loyalties against

top-down funds with a highly contagious outcome. The structures of Liberalism don’t

pay off, where the notion of a public good doesn’t exist. Democracy in the Philippines

has given those few in power additional means to secure their dominance, in

economics, politics and media. The results are ambivalent: Stability and predictability

despite a weak nation state, at the expense of participation and equality. A Christian

farmer, living in Maguindanao put it quite pointedly after Ampatuan Sr. was put into

jail:

“The Ampatuans have been good to us. They protected civilians. They never did anything to us. I think this thing about the massacre is just due to politics. When they were in power, we felt safe. Now we don’t know who to go to, for help".(local


farmer, interviewed by a BBC Correspondent, Assignment Reporting on Mindanao, aired on December 30, 2010)30

30 The download is still available under the following link:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/arc2010#playepisode2


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