Educator Insights:Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next?

In its first 18 months of operation. Euro Disney, a new theme parkoutside Paris, France, lost almost $1 billion. How could an im-proved version of a highly successful enterprise like Disneyland inCalifornia fare so poorly? This article attempts to highlight Disney'smiscalculations in translating its theme park experiences from oneculture to another, and suggests a possible course of action to ad-dress Euro Disney's problems.

ABSTRACT

Euro Disney, which cost almost $4 billion to build, is ownedjointly by a consortium of 60 banks and the Walt DisneyCompany, which is also responsible for its management. Dis-ney operates two wholly owned theme parks in the U.S.: Dis-neyland in Anaheim, California (opened in 1955), and theWalt Disney World resort in Orlando, Florida (opened in1971). The company also earns royalties on revenues fromTokyo Disneyland, a park owned and operated by an inde-pendent Japanese company, the Oriental Land CompanyLimited (opened in 1983).

By December 1993, less than two years affer opening. EuroDisney ran out of cash and had to borrow $175 million just tokeep operating. Three months later, on 15 March 1994, Dis-ney and its partners announced a restructuring agreement,ending speculation that the park might close. The agreementincluded a $1.05 billion capital infusion to be shared equallyby both parties. Although this agreement represents a majorcommitment to Euro Disney's survival, it has virtually no im-pact on the real issues causing Euro Disney's troubles.

The arguments and conclusions presented in this article weresynthesized from an extensive collection of printed sources.Additional research was conducted to identify Euro Disney'sfuture external challenges, using procedures suggested in thepaper, "Strategic Issue Management" (Ansoff 1980).

Earl P. Spencer

Submitted May 1995Revised July 1995September 1995

C> Journal of International MarketingVol. 3, No. 3, 1995, pp. 103-114ISSN 1069-O31X

103

PERSISTENT PROBLEMSAT EURO DISNEY

What Are EuroDisney's Problems?

What Caused These Problems?

A

Euro Disney's ability to generate revenue is determined bytwo primary occurrences:

1. Number of visitors in attendance2. Visitors' average length of stay

Although first year's attendance was substantial (9.5 million),it was below the operating break-even level of 11 million. \^s-itors' average length of stay was also reportedly well belowplan (Toy 1994). It should be noted that the bailout of $1 bil-lion, which will be used to relieve some of Euro Disney'scrushing interest burden ($290 million per year), does noth-ing to address Euro Disney's shortcomings in these two areas.

Shortfalls in visitor attendance and average length of stayseem to be related to a number of miscalculations, based onDisney's U.S. theme park experiences.

1) Quality and design standards of U.S. parks deemed in-adequate for European marketplace. As the park was be-ing constructed, Disney became concerned that theoriginal plans, based on the Magic Kingdom in Galifomia,were too spurious for this land of real castles, kings, andqueens. As a result, enhancements were ordered, and thepark, originally budgeted at $2.0 billion ended up costing$3.8 billion (Economist 1992; Gumbel and Tlinier 1994).This pushed Euro Disney's break-even parameters sharplyhigher, perhaps beyond its ability to deliver.

2) Paris winters are particularly uninviting. The nastycold and rain between November and March depressedattendance far below expectations. Disney seems tohave greatly underestimated the importance of warmweather on winter attendance (Laitamaki 1994; Solo-man 1994). Its Florida and Galifomia experiences werenot discounted enough, especially in winter.

3) Unlike Americans, Europeans will not take their kidsout of school to visit Euro Disney. Europeans take schoolvery seriously. They are far less likely than Americansto pull their kids out of school for frivolous reasons likevisiting a theme park (Laitamaki 1994). This furthererodes Euro Disney attendance, especially during thelong 10-month period when schools are in session.

4) Unlike Americans, European vacation habits runcounter to short, expensive visits to Euro Disney. Euro-pean families strongly favor three- or four-week long va-cations in summer. Their family vacation budgets,which are more modest than in the United States, arecarefully rationed to sustain these longer vacations. Eu-ropeans are far less likely to spend their whole budgeton an expensive two- or three-day visit to Euro Disney,and then return home (King 1993; Soloman 1994). As aresult, many families limit their Euro Disney visit to justone day, on the way to their final destinations.

104 Earl P. Spencer

5) The Magic Kingdom concept, successful in Californiaand Tokyo, is not compelling enough for Europe. Theexisting facility (Magic Kingdom, appealing primarily tokids) is not compelling enough to entice Europeans toextend their stay beyond one or two days, especiallywith their long vacation mentality and budget con-straints (Toy 1994). The original plan for Euro Disneycalled for the delayed addition of a second "gate," theMGM movie theme park, with completion in 1996.Many analysts consider this addition critical for solvingEin-o Disney's length-of-stay problem (Wall Street Jour-nal 1993). Even with the $1.05 billion bailout, this at-traction is on hold, since funds are still insufficient tobegin construction.

Solving Euro Disney's problems is not going to be easy, giventhe sheer size of its losses plus the powerful forces at worklimiting attendance and length of stay. This challenge raises anumber of important, long-term issues for Euro Disney, asdiscussed below.

There are many internal factors that can impact a company'sperformance. In Disney's case, there appears to be one over-riding fault that occurs time after time in its site selectionplanning—a failure to capitalize on all the key opportunitiesinherent in a project and to maximize their return. And theprofits sacrificed by this one shortcoming alone are huge.Consider one example: Tokyo Disneyland. When a Japanesecompany first proposed this park to Disney, Disney opted forthe security of royalty payments in lieu of the risks of owner-ship. In 1992, Tokyo Disneyland earned more than $200 mil-lion during the worst recession in modem Japanese history.(That same year, the entire Walt Disney Company earnedonly $299 million). If we extrapolate Tokyo Disneyland's1992 earnings over the 11 years this park has been in exis-tence, Disney has probably sacrificed well over $2 billion inprofits to date, from this one misstep alone.

Disney's failure to maximize its return from theme park oper-ations results from several management shortcomings, as dis-cussed below.

Disney management relies too heavily on Disney's appeal tocarry a new project, often failing to identify or thoroughlyevaluate the fundamental assumptions on which a project isbased. (Relax, the Mouse will prevail). A prime example inEuro Disney's case is winter weather and its damaging effecton attendance. Although Disney recognized this problem, itfailed to probe deep enough to fully comprehend the threatParis winters posed. In a meeting of senior Disney execu-tives, one official expressed the concern, "I'm not sure Eiu-o-peans will stand in line in winter." One of Eisner's (Disney

DISNEY'S INTERNALCULTURAL ENVIRONMENT

How Did Euro DisneyGetOffn-ack?

Over-Reliance on theDisney Mystique

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 105

chairman) men replied, "the Japanese do" (Soloman 1994).No one raised the fact that the Japanese are not Europeans.

Paris is not Tokyo. Tokyo Disneyland has been open everywinter and has attracted a viable number of visitors each year.Although the designs of Euro Disney and Tokyo Disneylandare quite similar, Paris-based Euro Disney could logically ex-pect far fewer visitors in winter than Tokyo Disneyland be-cause of differences between the two locations. In thefollowing comparison, 1985 figin-es are used, since that is theyear Disney conducted its site evaluation for Euro Disney.

• Tokyo had more than three times as many inhabitants asParis (8.5 vs. 2.3 million).

• Tokyo's average per capita income was 43 percentgreater than Paris's ($10,300 vs. $7,200).

• Tokyo Disneyland is only six miles from downtownTokyo; Euro Disney is 20 miles outside Paris.

• The average Japanese family has no practical alternativeto Tokyo Disneyland since the Disney park in Californiais distant and the expense is great. Europeans have muchgreater access to the closer, bigger, and more appealingDisney World in Florida, especially with the many tourpackages offered by U.S. and European airlines.

Paris Winters Are Not Tokyo Winters. Perhaps the most dra-matic difference affecting winter attendance between Tokyoand Paris is the weather. The average number of rain daysduring the winter is three times greater in Paris than Tokyo,averaging 15 days per month for Paris and only 5 days amonth for Tokyo. Temperature wise, both Paris and Tokyo av-erage a cold 34°F on the low side, while Tokyo's highs are anaverage 5 degrees wanner (52°F versus 47°F). Overall, Paris'scombination of cold temperatures and frequent rainfallwould seem to be anathema for winter attendance, especiallyfor families with small children

What the above comparisons demonstrate is that attendanceat Euro Disney in winter could be expected to be four to sixtimes less than Tokyo Disneyland, that the viability of winteroperations near Paris is suspect, and that Paris itself may nothave been a wise choice for Euro Disney's location.

_ Another cultural impediment at Disney is management'sDifficulty Recognizing/ much-publicized determination to never make the same mis-Anticipatmg Problems ^^^^ twice—an exercise that appears to satisfy their inquisi-

tive thirst. While previous deficiencies are tracked downwith a vengeance and corrected, new problems are frequentlyoverlooked or misjudged. As a result, surprises keep surfac-ing, leaving Disney always scrambling.

106 Earl P. Spencer

From U.S. to Tokyo to Paris to Virginia: New Problems, OldStory. A recent Newsweek article (Haas and Nayyar 1994)cited the following examples in praise of Disney's ability tolearn from past mistakes. From Disneyland, Disney realizedthe importance of owning the land surrounding its parks.From Disney World, Disney learned it should build and ownthe hotels. From Tokyo Disneyland, it learned it should al-ways own the park itself. Finally, from Euro Disney, Disneylearned that big parks involve big risks.

Just a few observations about Disney's pride in lesson learn-ing. Although learning from one's mistakes is admirable, notmaking them in the first place is far more preferable. Thelessons mentioned above, although seemingly unique, are allrelated to the same basic subject: site locations for themeparks, an activity Disney has been engaged in for 40 years. Soas one ponders Disney's record, a question that seems to nat-urally come to mind is: "Will Disney ever get it right?" Dis-ney's latest project, an American historical theme parkplanned for Virginia, is a good case in point. Disney appar-ently failed to learn any lessons about harmonizing with itshost community in France, as Disney has recreated the samekind of animosity in Virginia, by demanding that the commu-nity put up $160 million, or Disney will go elsewhere. Dis-ney's tactics in Virginia have been so overbearing that eventhe New York Times in an editorial (24 February 1994) rec-ommended that the community turn Disney out.

Environmental Issues Raised in France, Ignored in Virginia.But that's not all. Once again, Disney appears to have been to-tally surprised by a controversy it failed to anticipate, this timefrom historians and conservationists over the potential dese-cration the park's sprawl might cause to the Givil War's mosthallowed grounds nearby. Yet in France eight years earlier,farmers staged protests on the environmental impact of EuroDisney on the surrounding region. Will Disney ever get it right?(Editor's note: Disney recently bowed to the "hallowed grounds"pressure in Virginia and is searching for another site).

Disney's shortcomings in learning lessons from its own expe-riences are aggravated by its myopic perspective in the globalarena. Two examples illustrate the point.

Accepted International Marketing Practices "Lost" on Dis-ney. In the late 1970s, exporting companies began to embracethe concept of market integration, adapting their products tothe needs and customs of their overseas clients. Researcherswere also expounding this movement, with breakthroughstudies (Hofstede 1983; Lee 1983). By 1990, this movementwas well in place and Disney stood to benefit from thesegroundbreaking precedents. Instead, Disney alienated mostof France by imposing intact its American standards of dress.

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 107

EURO DISNEY'S EXTERNALENVIRONMENT

Could Changing Conditions inEurope Rescue Euro Disney?

behavior, and morality on the operations of its French-basedpark (Laitamaki 1994).

Euro Disney Denied the Synergy of Global Alliances. Anotherexample of Disney's limited international perspective has todo with strategic alliances. In the 1980s, companies, even for-mer enemies, began capitalizing on the advantages of joiningtogether. One might have expected Disney's theme park divi-sion to be a pioneer in alliance formation since they and theirhost communities are joined for life and have common inter-ests. This did not happen. Right up until Euro Disney's open-ing in mid 1992, Disney's overbearing attitude was alienatingthe French, and it is repeating that performance in Virginiatoday. If traditional rivals like Apple and IBM can findgrounds for cooperation, why can't Disney cultivate a morepositive relationship with the communities it hopes to share?

What the above examples suggest is that Disney's global per-spective is flawed. Disney needs to expand its horizons andtake in the world. (What are other international companiesdoing? What can I leam?) Otherwise, as Euro Disney's resultsmight be foretelling, Disney could see its prosperity decline,as it continues to miss opportunities and make mistakes.

Although Euro Disney's future looks questionable, one factorhas the potential to invigorate attendance and length of stayand generally compensate for all of Eiuro Disney's shortcom-ings. That is its future external environment. If Europe'seconomies were to rebound vigorously. Euro Disney mightrecover. However, as we shall see in this section, the primaryexternal factors determining Euro Disney's future are un-likely to provide much relief. What is worse, management'sconviction that an economic turnaround will solve all of itsproblems is squandering valuable time.

Euro Disney's future will be shaped by many outside influ-ences over time. After weighing each factor's impact on ourtwo primary concerns—visitor attendance and averagelength of stay—four trends and/or events were identified ashaving the greatest potential influence on Euro Disney's fu-ture over the next five years. These are:

1. European Real Disposable Income Per Capita2. Vacation Patterns and Habits3. Oil Prices4. Cultiu-al Hostility

Again, the methodology used to select these four dominantvariables was based on procedures outlined in the paper,"Strategic Issue Management" (Ansoff 1980).

108 Earl P. Spencer

Probably the most critical factor affecting the number of visi-tors to Euro Disney and their length of stay is the cost. Howmany families can afford the experience? As in the UnitedStates, European take-home pay adjusted for inflation has re-mained fairly constant for many years. European economieshave been in a recession since the beginning of the decade.Even as Europe stirs from recession, its long-term competitivepostiu-e remains suspect, since it has put off the painful processof reengineering and right-sizing that American businesseshave been doing for some time. Finally, structural unemploy-ment caused by technological advances will keep many work-ers idle as previous jobs are lost for good. Even as the recoverytakes place, the prospects for a noticeable increase in dispos-able income on a per capita basis do not look good.

Underlying Conditions in United States More Favorable thanEurope. Other factors are likely to dampen any revival of percapita income in Europe. Government debt levels generallyexceed the United States debt levels and need to be reducedthrough tax increases or spending cuts, both of which couldhurt average income. Europeans already pay about half oftheir gross income on taxes. Job creation is also a problem.Since 1970, the United States has generated 41 million newjobs while Europe, with a population a third larger than theUnited States, has added only 8 million new jobs.

Because Euro Disney needs several million additional visi-tors just to break even, continuing stagnation or an actualerosion in average household purchasing power could deal aserious blow to Euro Disney's prospects for recovery.

As a family vacation resort. Euro Disney should have been vi-tally concerned with European vacation habits because oftheir direct correlation with attendance and length of stay ex-penditures. Yet once again, Disney seems to have misjudgedan important variable.

European Vacations Longer, Budgets Lower, than in the UnitedStates. Unlike Americans, Europeans generally take long, four-or five-week vacations in simimer, when many companies shutdown for several weeks. European vacation budgets, which aremore modest than Americans', must stretch over these longerperiods. Families that do stop at Euro Disney appear to do soonly briefly on their way to their final destinations, which ad-versely affects Euro Disney's average length of stay. When visit-ing the park, Europeans also conserve their funds, as food andmerchandise sales are well below the averages at other Disneyfacilities. Finally, with most Europeans taking their entire vaca-tion in summer, Euro Disney attendance at other times of theyear seems to suffer, especially in winter.

Europeans More Conservative than Americans ConcerningSchool Attendance. Parents are not as likely as Americans to

European Real DisposableIncome per Capita: Mirroringthe Overall U.S. Experience

Vacation Habits and Customs:U.S. and EuropeanExperiences Diverge

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 109

Oil Prices: Europe EvenMore Vulnerable than the

United States

take their children out of school for holiday trips, because at-titudes toward education are conservative and strict. Differ-ences in the educational systems, including testingschedules for promotion to the next grade level, also discovu"-age such interference. Finally, while Disney's parks inFlorida and Galifomia offer warm respites from winter'swrath for Americans willing to pull their kids out of school.Euro Disney offers Europeans no such incentive.

Europeans Have an American Option. Europeans who dowant a Disney vacation have another alternative—DisneyWorld in Orlando, Florida. About 20 percent of all visitors toDisney World are Europeans. The attraction: much to do(three major parks instead of one), the sun and beaches ofFlorida, and the opportunity to see America.

Because of Europe's heavy dependence on imported oil (over70 percent vs. 50 percent for the United States), fiuctuationsin world oil prices could directly impact Euro Disney, firstthrough the cost of transportation to and from the park and,most important, through families' discretionary income.When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Gountries(OPEG) triggered the oil crises in 1973 and 1978, they resultedin the worst worldwide recessions since the 1930s. Any eventwith this kind of potential deserves to be taken seriously.

World demand for oil, fiat for the last four years, is expectedto increase by 4 percent, or an additional 3 million barrels in1994, due to economic growth in Southeast Asia, Ghina, In-dia, and the United States.

All these factors point to the strategic importance of OPEG. Ithas 77 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, or 800 billionbarrels. By contrast, the North Sea has only 13 billion barrels.OPEG is the only producer capable of meeting increased worlddemand with its 2.5 million barrels per day in ready reserve.

So what could happen in the next five years? Prices willprobably rise due to increases in world demand. If OPEGwants to force prices even higher, it can. The only restraintholding OPEG in check is one member country—Saudi Ara-bia. With their 11 billion barrels per day capacity, one thirdof OPEG's total, the Saudi's have a strong hand. The realquestion is how long can Saudi Arabia withstand the pres-sure from its 11 OPEG partners?

Bottom line, increases in oil prices would reduce Eiu-opeans'discretionary income and affect Euro Disney attendance andlength of stay. More critically, any sudden, dramatic increasein prices, like those caused by OPEG in 1973 and 1978, couldprove disastrous for Euro Disney on this front.

110 Earl P. Spencer

To be successful. Euro Disney must attract large numbers ofFrench visitors year in and year out. The last thing Disneyneeds is conflict with its French hosts. Yet Exiro Disney oper-ates in an environment of potential cultural hostility. To any-one familiar with the U.S.-French relationship, the followingstatements will come as no siu-prise. The French, in general,harbor a modicum of hostility toward American culture. Thepresent day extension of this phenomenon emanates fromtwo expressions, as aptly described in a speech by France'sCultural Minister Lang who chastised "certain great nations,which have no other morality than that of profit, and seek toimpose a uniform culture on the whole world." (Laitamaki1994). Consistent with this theme. Euro Disney was fre-quently referred to in the French media as a "cultural Cher-nobyl" (King 1993).

Another potential source of hostility in France is the DisneyCompany itself, a film and media behemoth. The French eliteparticularly resent the American film industry, seeing it asthe purveyor of American values that threaten two icons ofFrench culture—its own movie industry and its language.

In short. Euro Disney, as a symbol of American influence, isvulnerable to French agitation. Even a modest ebb in atten-dance by aggrieved Parisians, not to mention the French ingeneral, could have a devastating impact on Euro Disney's re-sults. Cultural hostility could still bring Euro Disney down.

Euro Disney has two primary shortcomings: attendance andvisitor's average length of stay, which are both insufficient tomeet the park's break-even requirements. The recent bailoutby Disney and its partners will reduce Euro Disney's interestburden. However, it will have little impact on its operationaldifficulties with respect to attendance and length of stay.

Although management expects a turnaround in Europe'seconomies to solve all of its problems, there are reasons tobelieve that Europe's recovery may not rescue Euro Disney.Real income on a per capita basis is not expected to improve,and other external factors like vacation habits, oil prices, andcultural hostility all seem poised to exert a dampening effecton Euro Disney attendance.

Given all these factors, it appears that a turnaround at EuroDisney is doubtful. Something needs to be done to address itstwo fundamental operating problems: inadequate attendanceand length of stay.

First and most important, Disney needs to take a large dose ofreality and recognize the precarious situation it is facing. Byinvesting over $1.0 billion in the bailout, the inclination mightbe to assume that the challenge has been met and the worst is

Cultural Hostility: FrenchResentment of AmericanEncroachment

CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? I l l

over. This is not the case. The bailout funds bought time by re-tiring debt cind reducing interest payments. They did nothingto address Euro Disney's two fundamental shortcomings.

Next, Disney should decide whether Euro Disney, as presentlyconstituted, is a viable concept. Does Euro Disney have thepotential to increase attendance and average length of stayenough to exceed its break-even requirements? Will an eco-nomic recovery in Europe really solve Euro Disney's prob-lems? If the answers to these questions are no, Disney shouldquickly focus its attention on its remaining options, includ-ing the addition of a second gate—the MGM theme park.

A second theme park like MGM confronts Euro Disney's twobiggest problems head on. It enhances the attraction of EuroDisney and hence, attendance, by adding a dimension appeal-ing to adiilts. This would make convention business more vi-able (with their multiple-day sessions) while giving familiesand other visitors a compelling reason to extend their stay.Without an attraction appealing to adults, and with its loca-tion 20 miles from, and in the shadow of Paris, it is unlikelyEuro Disney will develop a meaningful convention business.

Of course, the overriding consideration with respect to thesecond attraction is, "Can it pay for itself? Will the increasesin attendance and length of stay generate the $1 billion pricetag for the new park? This will be a difficult call for Disneybut if the answer is no, Disney might start contemplating thefinal solution—closing Eiu-o Disney down.

And it just might happen that pondering the close of EuroDisney might make the risks of a second theme park morepalatable. Euro Disney's closing would be an obvious blow toDisney's pride and reputation, and it would seriously affectDisney's ability to raise financing for future parks. Finally,closing could prove to be an extremely expensive optionsince Disney, as the operator of the park, might be liable forits partners' losses under French bankruptcy laws.

In summary, if Euro Disney does not find a solution to its pri-mary operating problems of attendance and length of stay, itwill be subject to deficits year in and year out. Given the sizeof its losses, only a major effort, like the addition of a secondattraction, would seem practical. Otherwise, Etiro Disney as aprofitable enterprise appears doomed.

s^^^^^=!==^==^== Companies weighing entry into foreign markets can benefitMANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS from Euro Disney's experiences, as discussed below.

1) When considering a new market, preliminary re-search should be directed toward those market condi-tions that represent the greatest risk/ threat to success,and research results should be interpreted objectively.

112 Earl P Spencer

Euro Disney conducted numerous studies but in theend, they were still caught off guard by basic leisuremarket operatives like vacation and spending habits,school attendance, and the weather.2) The more successful a company, the greater the needto ensure objectivity in overseas evaluations. Successcan breed a false sense of security, especially when awhole new operating environment can radically changethe game, as Disney unfortunately discovered.3) Euro Disney "assumed" success without prudent fi-nancial regards for the risks of debuting in unchartedterritory. An excessive number of hotels were built be-fore Etiro Disney was up and running, even though ho-tels in nearby Paris could adequately service this need.When the park's appeal proved lacking. Euro Disneywas faced with an additional liability besides inade-quate attendance—hotel vacancies. Furthermore, thefunds needed to provide a solution, a second themepark, were tied up in the hotels. Glearly, a more conser-vative approach was desirable, like limiting hotel devel-opment, until the park proved successful.

4) In Disney's haste to recoup its investment, it almostcompletely ignored the customer and the marketplace,with disastrous results. Entrance fees were set 20 percenthigher than in the United States, even though conditionsin Europe—lower disposable income, an acute recession,and conservative vacation and spending habits—all sug-gested an alternative approach. As always, the customershould be the first priority, and the final checkpoint.5) Euro Disney's high prices and resulting poor start cre-ated a public relations nightmare, as media criticsthroughout Europe gleefully heaped ridicule on thepark's sagging fortunes. Future bookings began to erodeamid speculation that the park might close. Disneyseemed to make decisions without considering their ef-fect in its new surroundings (unfavorable media cli-mate). Under these circumstances, Disney might haveinvested more to guarantee a successful launch, includ-ing lower prices. A good start and environmental hedgescan be crucial when operating in uncharted territory.6) When all is said and done, there is no substitute forcommon sense, especially when it comes to the con-sumer. Euro Disney was so surprised by poor attendancein winter that it had to unexpectedly close several ho-tels. Gouldn't Disney recognize the possibility that fam-ilies with small children might not fiock to a theme parkin winter, to spend several days in the rain and temper-atures in the 30s?

7) With all the attention afforded the ideology of "Glob-alization" today, international marketers are more likely

Educator Insights: Euro Disney—What Happened? What Next? 113

THE AUTHOR

Earl P. Spencer is a doctoral can-didate in marketing and interna-

tional business at Pace University,New York Gity campus.

to focus on the similarities in consumer attitudes in var-ious markets, versus their differences. Euro Disneyshould serve as a reminder that underestimating con-sumer differences, such as spending habits, can proveembarrassing. And if Disney, a household wordthroughout the world, is xmable to ignore cultural influ-ences in the international marketplace, surely less pres-tigious enterprises should take note.

REFERENCESAnsoff, H.I. "Strategic Issue Management." Strategic Management

Journal [1980): 131-48.

Gumbel, Peter, and R. Turner. "Mouse Trap: Fans Like Euro DisneyBut Its Parent's Goofs Weigh the Park Down." Wall Street Journai,10 March 1994, Al.

Hass, Nancy, and S. Nayyar. "Learning Its Lessons Well."Newsweek, 14 February 1994, 37.

Hofstede, G. "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practicesand Theories." Journal of International Business Studies (Fall1993): 75-89.

King, Thomas R. "Euro Disney 3rd Quarter Loss To Spur Study ofWoes By U.S. Concern." Wall Street Journal, 9 July 1993, A3.

Laitamaki, Jukka M. "Is It Mickey Mouse or Senior Mickey? A Cross-Cultural Case Study of Disney Theme Park Business Plan in Latin-America." New York: Fordham University-Lincoln Center, 1994.

Lee, James A. "Cultural Analysis In Overseas Operations."Reprinted in "Managing Effectively in the World Marketplace."Harvard Business Review (1983): 54-68.

New York Times. "Virginia, Say No to the Mouse." Editorial, 24February 1994, A22.

Soloman, Jolie. "Mickey's Trip To Trouble." Newsweek, 14 Febru-ary 1994,34-38.

The Economist. "The Not So Magic Kingdom." 26 September 1992, 87.

Toy, Stewart, and P. Dwyer. "Is Disney Headed For The Euro TrashHeap?" Business Week, 24 January 1994, 52.

Wall Street Journal. "Euro Disney to Slash 950 Jobs To Cut Costs."19 October 1993, A12.

114 Earl P. Spencer