what every sagd engineer should know ... - applied · pdf filerpsgroup.com/canada mike carlson...

rpsgroup.com/canada

Mike CarlsonManager, Reservoir Engineering

May 5th, 2010

What Every SAGD Engineer Should Know About Condensation Induced Water Hammer

2What Every SAGD Engineer Should Know About CONDENSATION INDUCED WATER HAMMER

Objectives• Understand basic mechanism

– Causes steam pipes to burst

• Know conditions under which CIWH will occur

• Incorporate in design of operating procedures and facilities

• Potential implications for horizontal wells and drilling

• Need for oilfield specific research


History of CIWH:• Boilers original application – foundation for

most pressure vessel codes• Steam traps have been used for a long

time – practical experience• Nuclear reactor failures (U.S.A.) led to …

• Fundamental research at MIT, Ph.D. Dissertation of Robert Bjorge

• Design procedures and computer programs• MEG Energy failure and Joslyn?


Species of Steam TrapsKeep condensate and steam separated!

Inverted Bucket

Ball Float

Thermodynamic

SpiraxSarco diagrams


Why? Water Cannon

Originally a waste heat line, venting to water pool (in nuclear power plant)

http://www.kirsner.org


Water Cannon – MIT Thesis

Note statistical nature of measurements


Bubble collapse can also cause spikes

Another MIT thesis!


Steam injected at bottom – bubbles travel up and collapse. Pressure measured near top.


Condensation induced water hammer

• Number of failures in the U.S. – in the nuclear industry

• Feed water into reactor core (shutdown and cooling)

ReactorCold Water Feed


Horizontal Hammer In Pipe

http://www.kirsner.org


Griffiths and students - MIT

CIWH is a function of rateand condensate subcool.



Power plant failure in Washington State(Courtesy Mr. Wayne Kirsner - Georgia)


Key Points• Source is 1 psi steam off stove

– The pressure at “top of the well” is not affected by water hammer– water hammer will not show up in surface recorders or in all

recorders at the heel

• Notice the bubble of air – non condensable gas– Shows pressure spikes

• Note effect of pipe on right– Acts as a reservoir of cold water – which under-rides the steam

• Note rhythmic / repetitive nature of water hammer


Gramercy Park, New York CityNot only can CIWH break lines – it can make a decent hole in the ground

Steam traps failed – corrosion and scaling


Other accidents

• MEG Energy – steam distribution line• Grangemouth Refinery, Scotland• Fort Wainwright – Alaska*• San Diego military base• Hanford Site U.S. Dept. of Energy 1993*• Brookhaven National Laboratory (U.S.)

1986*• Georgia Hospital - 1991*

*indicates fatalities


Screening criteria

(SBCIWH) Steam bubble collapse induced water hammer


Calculation of pressure transients

For a shallow SAGD project, maximum pressure is 17 MPa or 2600 psi


Nuclear power plant design:

Computer code developed to predict water hammers by US Government


Application to Horizontal Well


0.00E+00

1.00E+06

2.00E+06

3.00E+06

4.00E+06

5.00E+06

6.00E+06

7.00E+06

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Series1

busted

Modelling with WAHAPressure (Pascals)

Time (seconds)

WAHA has gravity segregation and heat transfer from vapour to liquid phase.

80 m3/day of CWE into 7.5” liner

Computer program developed by European Nuclear Regulatory Agency

Temperature differential of 25 degrees Celsius


Real SAGD wellsReal wellpairshave temperature gradients

Real wellpairsdrop in temperature with shut-ins

Li, P., Stroich, A., Vink, A., Nespor, K., S. BhadauriaM. McCormack, “Partial SAGD Applications in the Jackfish SAGD Project”, CIPC 2009-190

CIWH spikes are caused by differences in temperature


Pressure measurement devices


Pressure data - gathering

Time (seconds)

0.00E+00

1.00E+06

2.00E+06

3.00E+06

4.00E+06

5.00E+06

6.00E+06

7.00E+06

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Series1

busted

Pressure (Pascals)

∑∑==

iP

n

i 1.

• Promore – half second average, RTU variable storage• Spartek – averages 15 readings, frequency and averaging period programmable• Database – polls RTU and provides averaged, filtered and raw data

Transients are short and high – difficult to measure – too much data


What well data will look like:Off scale

Time

Pressure

Expected operating pressure Void collapse


Wellbores are inherently unstable(Edmunds and Good)

Intermittent Flow

Edmunds recommends avoiding intermittent flow region


What are the implications of short term transients?


Hydraulic fracturing

Tensile failure of bore hole wall

Failure is affected by fluid movement –poro-elasticity.


Propagation caused by stress concentration –different than initiation

Dumbbell shape of stress concentration


Fracs will start horizontal:


More than ISIP pressure neededto frac!

Frac (ISIP) pressure is a conservative maximum pressure – no propagation,Historical factors of safety are 10 percent

Pressure of 261 psi –1800 kPa

“heel” “toe”

ISIP = Instantaneous shut-in pressure


Liner slots – closed system?Surrounding fluids are of low compressibility

• In a mature steam chamber leakoff will limit the propagation of fractures• Therefore expect this to be problem during circulation and immediately after conversion to full (or partial) SAGD

31What Every SAGD Engineer Should Know About CONDENSATION INDUCED WATER HAMMERReservoir Engineering

Implications of pressure pulsesIf operating pressure is close to ISIP, fracs initiated by water hammer will not heal – extent of propagation is

affected by operating pressure

Likely multiple fracs initiated from different points along wellbore

ISIP pressure


Shallow horizontal frac trajectory

Dumbbell shape of stress concentration

Is less energy required to propagate in higher – lower stress regions?

Cornell


Detailed geological analysis:

?

Both!

Discrete?

Connected?


Geological study of sills and dykesSeismic Models

AnalyticalDescriptive


Final interpretation – Numac test


Mitigation


0.00E+00

1.00E+06

2.00E+06

3.00E+06

4.00E+06

5.00E+06

6.00E+06

7.00E+06

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Series1

busted

Mitigation

(Doesn’t work)

With mitigation

Downward deviations

Upward deviations


Well layout – likely significant

Some wells will be self mitigating. Slightly toe up likely promotes hammer


Mitigation – non condensable gas

“SPRONG”

Gas bubbles act as shock absorber


Conclusions• Presented fundamental mechanism. It is

difficult to visualize• History of catastrophic failures. Many

fatalities.– Over 20 failures in nuclear industry before understood– Numerous incidents in refineries, universities and power plants

• There are well developed tools from other industries

• Requires specific conditions• Horizontal pipes• Subcool (temperature difference)• Minimum rates• Pipe fill


Conclusions (continued)• CIWH can happen very easily in surface

facilities.• Well pressure recorders, observation wells,

theory and computer programs indicate that this is likely occurring in wells

• Potential wellbore problems that may be a result of CIWH:

• Liner failures– in a subcool event, hot steam enters liquid in wellbore - CIWH

• Sand production• Hydraulic fracture complex to surface• Shale fluidization in caprock (fracs terminate in caprock)• High pressure drops into producing wells


Conclusions (continued)• Catastrophic failures of wellbores rare to

date.• Since wells are buried difficult to see or

hear and very difficult to measure. Wellbores are inherently unstable.

• Likely not difficult to solve - untested• Potential to be of benefit in breaking

through IHS• May be possible to reduce liner hanger

and sand influx failures


Conclusion• Recommend that fundamental research on

wellbores be conducted• Other potential areas include drilling – for

blowout preventers and kill operations• Normal production / injection procedures

need to account for CIWH particularly during start-up or change of operations

• Every engineer involved in SAGD should have a good working knowledge of Condensation Induced Water Hammer


Epilogue

• Complex interaction between production engineering, drilling and completions, reservoir, and geomechanics

• Limited time in presentation – have therefore provided a list of further references …


BACKUP SLIDES


Bibliography-11. http://www.kirsner.org2. NUREG/CR-6519: Screening Reactor Steam/Water Piping

Systems for Water Hammer, P. Griffiths, MIT, Sept. 19973. The nature and control of geyser phenomena in Thermal

Production Risers, JCPT 96-04-04, N.R. Edmunds and W.K. Good, April 1996, Volume 34 No. 4

4. Bjorge, R.W., “Initiation of Water Hammer in Horizontal or Nearly-horizontal Pipes Containing Steam and SubcooledWater”, Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT, January 1983.

5. Kirsner, W, “What caused the steam system accident that killed Jack Smith?”, Heating/Piping/Air Conditioning, July 1995.

6. Kirsner, W., “Condensation-Induced Waterhammer”, HPAC, Heating/Piping/AirConditioning, January 1999.

7. Griffith, P., Silva, Robert J., “Steam Bubble Collapse Induced Water Hammer in Draining Pipes”, PVP Vol. 231, ASME, 1992.


Bibliography-28. Giot, Prof. Michel, “Two-Phase flow water hammer

transients and induced loads on materials and structures of nuclear power plants (WAHAloads)”, European Consortium, UCL/TERM Batiment Simon Stevin, 2, Place du Levant, B-1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique

9. Total Canada, “Summary of investigations into the Joslyn May 18th, 2006 Steam Release”, TEPC/GSR/2007.006, December 2007, available on ERCB website.

10. “MEG Energy Corp. Steam Pipeline Failure, License No. P 46441, Line No. 001, May 5th, 2007”, ERCB Investigation Report, September 2nd, 2008, available on ERCB website.

11. “Total E&P Canada Ltd., Surface Steam Release of May 18th, 2006, Joslyn Creek SAGD Thermal Operation”, ERCB Staff Review and Analysis, February 11th, 2010, available from ERCB website.

12. Chhina, H.S., Luhning, R.W., Bilak, R.A. and Best, D.A., “A horizontal fracture test in the Athabasca Oil Sands”, CIM Paper No. 87-38-55, Preprint, Annual Technical Meeting of the CIM, June 7-10, 1987.


Bibliography-3

13. Bunger, Andrew P., Jeffrey, Robert G., and Emmanuel Detrournay, “Evolution and morphology of saucer-shaped sills in analogue experiments”, Geological Society of London, Special Publications, 2008; v 302, p 109-120, doi: 10.1144/SP302.8

14. Malthe-Sorenssen, A., Planke, S., Svensen, H, Jamtveit, B. “Formation of saucer-shaped sills”, Physical Geology of High-Level Magmatic Systems, Geological Society of London, Special Publications 234, 215-227, 0305-8719.

15. Galerne, Christophe, Neumann, E-R, Planke, Sverre, “Emplacement mechanisms of sill complexes: Information from the geochemical architecture of the Golden Valley Sill Complex, South Africa, Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, Elsevier.

16. Goulty, N.R., Schofield, N., “Implications of simple flexure theory for the formation of saucer-shaped sills”, Journal of Structural Geology 30 (2008), 812-817, Elsevier.


Bibliography-4

17. Hansen, D.M. Cartwright, J, “The three dimensional geometry and growth of forced folds above saucer-shaped igneous sills”, Journal of Structural Geology 28 (2006), 1520-1535, Elsevier.

18. Tan, Qingfeng, “Two Dimensional Hydraulic Fracture Simulations Using FRANC2D”, M.Sc. Thesis, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina,

19. Murdoch, L.C., Richardson, J.R., Tan, Qingfeng, Malin, S., Fairbanks, C, “Forms and sand transport in shallow hydraulic fractures in residual soil”, Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 43: 1061-1073 (2006).


Simplified Analysis

Coupled FEM reservoir simulation modelling does not show this failure occurring


Expansion dominant force

Shearing at contact with overburden and underburdenimportant, as is heave.


Spargers (hole / slots in pipes) – don’t work

Note that fluid temperature varies with hammers


Pressure histories and statistics

Little spikes

Lead to BIG spikes

About 44 percent of nuclear plants encountered a problem – statistical element


Liner design issues

Due to high compressive axial stress induced by temperature changes with plastic deformation. Casing is very sensitive to applied external (and hence internal) loads


Joslyn source was small:Volume of Blowout

Rate for Blowout: 100 mmscfdRate, m3/day 2,817,399.0

Duration minutes 5Duration (days) 0.003472222

Volume of Steam 9,782.6

Steam Chamber Pressure 1700Atmospheric Pressure 101Water to Steam 1905.769231

M3 of Condensate Required 5.133168967

Volume of Blowout

Rate for Blowout: 500 mmscfdRate, m3/day 14,086,995.1

Duration minutes 5Duration (days) 0.003472222

Volume of Steam 48,913.2

Steam Chamber Pressure 1700Atmospheric Pressure 101Water to Steam 1905.769231

M3 of Condensate Required 25.66584484

Volume in Wellbore

Length 600 mm3/meter 0.019958 m3/m"Quality" 0.25 fractionCondensate Available 8.9811 m3

Volume of Frac

Frac Width 0.003 metersFrac Radius 100 metersVolume 47.1885 m3

Volume of Frac

Frac Width 0.003 metersFrac Radius 40 metersVolume 7.55016 m3


Interpretation of ISIP can be difficult ...

Minifrac tests require considerable interpretation

what every sagd engineer should know ... - applied · pdf filerpsgroup.com/canada mike carlson...

Documents