what do mind readers know and what do we know about mind readers?
TRANSCRIPT
British Journal of Developmental Psychology (2014), 32, 388–390
© 2014 The British Psychological Society
www.wileyonlinelibrary.com
Commentary
What domind readers know and what do we knowabout mind readers?
Jacqueline D. Woolley*The University of Texas at Austin, Texas, USA
In this commentary, I raise various questions about Kim and Harris’s fascinating findings.
I ask what kind of knowledge children expect telepathic individuals to have, who children
might consider to be good mind readers, why children value telepathy, and how puzzled
children are by telepathy. I suggest potential ways to address some of these questions and
end by reiterating the importance of probing individual differences in scepticism and
credulity.
If two people gave you conflicting information about the world, how would you decide
which person to believe? Perhaps, it would depend onwhat the topic of conversationwas– youmight consider one person to bemore of an expert on a particular topic. Or perhaps
it would depend on your previous interactions with these people – maybe one of them
was your best friend, whereas the other was your know-it-all brother in law. Previous
research has shown that, by a very young age, children consider factors like familiarity,
reliability, and expertise in deciding whom to trust. Kim and Harris (2014b) take this line
of research to a new level in considering whether children also value people with
extraordinary powers or supernatural abilities as trustworthy informants. They find that
children who succeed in differentiating people with telepathic ability from those wholack such extraordinary means of knowing others’ minds also prefer to learn new
information from telepathic individuals.
Kim and Harris situate this finding in the long-standing tendency of adults to appeal to
informants who they believe to possess special powers – Shamans, witchdoctors, fortune
tellers, and gods – stating that these special individuals are sought for their ability ‘to
anticipate or alter the course of events and to bring about desired outcomes. . .’ (p. 4). In away, it’s kind of odd to think that someone would seek someone with special powers for
something as mundane as learning a label. Although one might seek information aboutone’s future from a fortune-teller, one would presumably not employ a fortune-teller
to learn a new language. Although one might attempt to communicate with God to
understand the meaning of a traumatic personal event, one would not seek out God to
brush up on calculus. For themajority of our quests for world knowledge, most of us have
other kinds of experts to whom we might turn – teachers, parents, scientists, and the
Internet. An interesting question is whether children also think this way outside of the
context of this experiment. Because Santa Claus knowswhether we’ve been bad or good,
*Correspondence should be addressed to Jacqueline D. Woolley, The University of Texas at Austin, 108 E. Dean Keeton, StopA8000, Austin, TX 78712, USA (email: [email protected]).
DOI:10.1111/bjdp.12058
388
does he also know the words to the National Anthem? Would he know something about
object labels?WouldGod be a good source of scientific facts? If children really do, as these
results suggest, value telepathic people as sources of information about the world then
presumably God and Santa Claus would also be considered good informants. It’s alsointeresting to think about what would happen if these researchers pitted a telepathic
person against a teacher or a scientist in this experimental paradigm. From whom would
children prefer to learn?
This brings up the question of why children preferred to learn from the telepathic
individual. As the authors acknowledge, as the two differentiator groups did not differ, it’s
not because she’s magic. Is she seen as omniscient? Is it that if she knows one thing, she’s
more likely to know another? This doesn’t seem right, as both informants actually know
the answer. Kim and Harris suggest that children come to trust someone’s competenceand then extend that trust to other domains. But what is the nature of that competence?
The difference between the two informants lies in how they learned the information,with
one appearing to learn with significantly less effort. So is it that one is simply a more
efficient learner? Perhaps, this could be tested by having one telepathic person answer
quickly and the other answer withmore contemplation. Alternatively, one could contrast
two ‘normal’ people, with one participating in a lengthy discussion before revealing the
contents of the other person’s thoughts and the other requiring simply a quick exchange.
It seems important to get a clearer sense of why children preferred to learn from thetelepathic individual.
An important question the research raises is why there are age differences in seeming
to understand that a person could read another person’s thoughts. It’s a bit odd to ask this
question, as of course we can’t actually read someone’s thoughts. But given that the
concept of telepathy is present among adults in our culture, it’s no different than asking
about how children learn about other things adults believe in, from superstitions to
politics to religion. The authors raise two possibilities regarding their developmental
findings: (1) younger children don’t (yet) have a concept of telepathy, and (2) youngchildren think it’s generally possible to know other people’s thoughts and so, when faced
with such a feat, don’t feel compelled to appeal to extraordinary powers. My gut feeling is
that it’s the former, but the authors side with the latter, suggesting also that the older
children found the events more puzzling. Yet, we lack explicit evidence that the older
children did indeed find the events more puzzling. I wonder if it would be possible to
assess puzzlement. This brings up the larger questionofwhat people tend to dowhen they
encounter unusual or seemingly impossible events. One thing people do is appeal to
supernatural explanations, like magic, karma, and miracles. Another thing people doperhaps equally as often, or even more often, is simply deny that the event actually
occurred. It may be that the younger children do find the event puzzling but instead of
appealing to telepathy (since they’ve never heard of it), they essentially deny that
extraordinary communicationhas occurred and instead assert that thepersonwas told the
answer. It would be interesting to look more systematically at when children are more
likely to appeal to extraordinary forces and when they are more likely to simply deny the
existence of unusual events.
The results of the present study conflict with Kim and Harris’s earlier finding thatchildrenwhobelieved inmagicweremorewilling to learn from amagical-seeming person
(Kim & Harris, 2014a). It may simply be that many children, although they find telepathy
to be extraordinary, do not consider it ‘magic.’ Probably, most adults who believe in
telepathy would be reluctant to label it magic as well. Perhaps, a way to assess whether
Kim and Harris’s earlier findings apply in the psychological domain would be to look at
Mind-reading puzzles 389
wishing. Previous research frommy laboratory has shown that children consider wishing
to be a magical process (Woolley, Phelps, Davis, & Mandell, 1999). Researchers could
present children with one informant who wishes to obtain something (e.g., wishes for a
cookie, which instantly appears) and one who obtains an object in a more mundane way,like asking his friend for one. Would children who believe more strongly in wishing be
morewilling to learn from someonewhosewishes appeared to come true? If so, onemight
want to solicit explanations to get a sense of why children would respond this way. Is it
because they view the person as powerful or special, or because they see the person as
similar to themselves in that they also believe in wishing, or for some other reason?
I’ll end with one last puzzle: In both the present paper and in Kim and Harris (2014a),
there were sizable individual differences in level of belief in extraordinary abilities; in the
present paper, these were most evident among the older children and in Kim and Harrisamong the younger ones. These individual differences clearly have the potential to affect
children’s learning in a range of domains. Where do these individual differences come
from?What make one child more likely to believe inmagic, to endorse telepathy, to make
wishes, to have an imaginary friend? And is the child who believes inmagic the same child
who later believes in karma, orwho later believes inmiracles? Essentially, whatmakes one
child credulous and another sceptical? I’m sceptical that the answer will be a simple one,
but I’m certain that with continued research like this we’ll eventually figure it out.
References
Kim, S., & Harris, P. L. (2014a). Belief in magic predicts children’s selective trust in informants.
Journal of Cognition and Development, 15, 181–196.Kim, S., & Harris, P. L. (2014b). Children prefer to learn from mind-readers. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 32, 375–387. doi:10.1111/bjdp.12044Woolley, J. D., Phelps,K. E., Davis,D. L.,&Mandell, D. J. (1999).Where theories ofmindmeetmagic:
The development of children’s beliefs about wishing. Child Development, 70, 571–587. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00042
Received 21 July 2014
390 Jacqueline D. Woolley