what can intelligence tell us about the cuban missile crisis, and what can the cuban missile crisis...
TRANSCRIPT
This article was downloaded by: [Cornell University Library]On: 06 November 2014, At: 18:25Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK
Intelligence and NationalSecurityPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20
What can intelligence tellus about the Cuban missilecrisis, and what can theCuban missile crisis tell usabout intelligence?James G. Blight a & David A. Welch ba Professor of International Relations (Research)at the Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute forInternational Studies , Brown University , USAb Associate Professor of Political Science ,University of TorontoPublished online: 02 Jan 2008.
To cite this article: James G. Blight & David A. Welch (1998) What canintelligence tell us about the Cuban missile crisis, and what can the Cubanmissile crisis tell us about intelligence?, Intelligence and National Security, 13:3,1-17, DOI: 10.1080/02684529808432492
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432492
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,
completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
What can Intelligence tell us about theCuban Missile Crisis, and what can the
Cuban Missile Crisis tell us aboutIntelligence?
JAMES G. BLIGHT and DAVID A. WELCH
The Cuban missile crisis is one of the most intensively studied events of alltime. If our understanding of it stood in strict proportion to the shelf spacedevoted to it, then surely by this point there should be little or nothing leftto know. But our experience, as two people who have spent more than adecade studying it, is quite the reverse: the more closely we look at it, theless confident we can be of our understanding. This is not to say that wehave made no progress. Every year it is possible to say more about whatactually happened in October 1962, and why. But for every questionscholars answer, two or three arise or must be reopened. The storyconstantly evolves in complex and surprising ways.1 The mind reels withmetaphors. Imagine Sisyphus opening Russian nesting dolls designed byM. C. Escher.
The greatest obstacle facing students of the missile crisis has beenimbalance. For more than 25 years, virtually all of the sources available toscholars were American. Only with Mikhail Gorbachev and glasnost' wasit even possible to have an interesting conversation with knowledgeableSoviets about the crisis, and only very recently have Cubans begun tospeak.2 Soviet archives have been open for a few years now, sporadicallyand incompletely, but Cuban archives, such as they are - this we do not evenknow - remain closed. Most scholars of the crisis are in any case themselvesAmericans, professionally and culturally predisposed to look at it primarilythrough the lens of American politics and diplomacy. It is therefore hardlysurprising that most of the questions we have asked and attempted to answerconcern the American side of the crisis.
There are other dimensions of imbalance as well. Scholars of the crisishave tended to ask a great deal about the decisions and actions of nationalleaders (John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and Fidel Castro, in thatorder), somewhat less about the preferences and activities of senior officials
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
2 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
(cabinet officers, military commanders and so on), and very little about theactivities of the hundreds of thousands of soldiers and bureaucrats on whosedecisions and actions, it now appears, the fate of the world may very wellhave hinged in 1962.3 We have paid very close attention to the high politicsof the missile crisis, but relatively little to its seemingly mundaneoperational dimensions. Again, this imbalance reflects both the availabilityof sources and our natural interests. The works that first captured ourattention were memoirs, court histories, or journalistic overviews.4 The firstsignificant body of documents declassified in the 1980s focused on WhiteHouse decision making.5 Relatively few have sought out information on theimportant minutiae of the crisis, and when they surface, they have haddifficulty competing with high politics for our attention.6
For similar reasons, there is a great imbalance between the importanceof intelligence in the missile crisis and the attention scholars have paid to it.Intelligence lurks in the background throughout. Virtually every interestingdecision or action that has captured our attention has turned upon, or relatedin some interesting way to, intelligence and intelligence assessment.7 In thatsense, the story of the Cuban missile crisis is a story about intelligence - itscollection, analysis, use, non-use, or abuse. But for obvious reasons, good-quality information about intelligence has emerged slowly. Governmentsdislike revealing secrets. A comprehensive story of intelligence assessmentin the Cuban missile crisis has never properly been told. It has not been thefocus of a single major scholarly effort. There is a small body of literatureon intelligence in the missile crisis, some of which is both fascinating andimportant. We briefly review it below. But it is overwhelmingly narrow andtechnical.8 It does not attempt to take in the big view: to compare, explain,and evaluate the organization, activities, assessments, and policy roles ofthe professional intelligence communities in the three countries mostcrucially concerned in the crisis (the United States, the Soviet Union, andCuba).
We believe the time has come to try to rectify this last imbalance. Wenow have enough of a critical mass of evidence and testimony to permit afirst telling of the 'big view' intelligence story. Such is the primary goal ofthis volume.
Imbalances remain. For example, while it is possible to document theAmerican intelligence story extensively, the Soviet story can bedocumented only to a much lesser extent, and the Cuban story - while it canbe told - cannot yet be documented at all.9 Within the available body ofAmerican and Soviet documents, there are notable gaps. Neither the US northe Russian government has declassified details of signals intelligence(Sigint) in 1962, nor information on human intelligence (Humint) thatwould compromise certain by-now-surely-defunct sources and methods.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 3
Nevertheless, working within the limitations of the available materials, webelieve that it is possible to tell an enlightening and surprising story aboutintelligence in the missile crisis that must, in certain respects, make us onceagain rethink the event.
Our purpose in putting together this collection of essays is not merely toenrich our understanding of the Cuban missile crisis by bringingintelligence 'in from the cold', however: it is also to see what the missilecrisis can tell us about intelligence. While an irreducible element of mysteryenshrouds the event, and while imbalances in sources remain, the Cubanmissile crisis remains the most thoroughly documented historical encounterof all time. It presents us with a unique opportunity to reflect in anempirically rich way upon the collection, analysis, and use of intelligencefrom a comparative and longitudinal perspective. It is possible to identify alarge number of crucial moments, issues, processes, tendencies, and patternsin the processing and exploitation of intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis,and to reflect upon them in unusual detail. It is always dangerous togeneralize from a single case, of course. But the Cuban missile crisis is notyour average single case. The intelligence story of the Cuban missile crisisis the story of literally hundreds of important individual judgments, and ofalmost constant interaction between intelligence professionals and nationalleaders in all three countries, over a period of time extending both wellbefore and well after the famous 'Thirteen Days' of lore. We believe somevery interesting insights emerge from a longitudinal and comparativeexamination of the activities and judgments of American, Soviet, andCuban intelligence. We take these up in our concluding essay.
A BRIEF HISTORIOGRAPHY
For 25 years, scholars working with open sources could see but a glimmerof the workings of intelligence in the missile crisis. Memoirs and historiesreferred vaguely to crucial actions, reports or judgments of (almostexclusively American) intelligence at various stages of the confrontation,but the details remained classified. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however,documents on American intelligence began to appear in quantity, partly asa result of routine declassification, and partly as a result of requests filedunder the Freedom of Information Act.10 In 1992, the Central IntelligenceAgency's Center for the Study of Intelligence hosted the first scholarlysymposium on intelligence in the missile crisis." This was an importantmilestone. It was the first opportunity for scholars and practitioners todiscuss the performance of American intelligence against the backdrop of asignificant documentary record. Soviet documents on the missile crisisbegan to appear in the late 1980s. Owing to political turmoil first in the
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
4 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
USSR, and then in post-Soviet Russia, Western scholars have had onlypatchy and sporadic access. They have mined some archives relatively well(most notably Foreign Ministry archives), and merely scratched the surfaceof others (e.g., those of the Ministry of Defense).12 Only very recently havescholars had access to KGB documents.13
Scholars are rarely deterred by limits on information, however, and formany years there has been active discussion of certain issues concerning theperformance of the American intelligence community. Two issues stand out:the failure to predict the Soviet deployment; and the late, but ultimatelytimely, discovery of the deployment.
The issue most widely debated is the failure of American intelligence topredict that the Soviet Union would attempt to deploy strategic nuclearmissiles to Cuba in 1962. Had American intelligence predicted the Sovietmove, the Kennedy administration certainly would have attempted toforestall it more energetically, through clearer and stronger deterrent threats,through active back-channel diplomacy, or both. Hence many are inclinedto see this as a failure of the first magnitude.14 In a sense Americanintelligence certainly did fail policy makers by failing to estimate that theSoviet Union would attempt to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba. But whilethe crisis might have been avoided had American intelligence anticipatedthe deployment, it would be a mistake to conclude that a crisis would havebeen avoided. Much would have depended upon how the Kennedyadministration played its hand, and when. Khrushchev's motives for thedeployment now appear to have been primarily defensive, reflecting deepanxiety about Soviet strategic nuclear inferiority and the vulnerability ofCuba to an American invasion.15 Khrushchev appears to have been deeplycommitted to his gambit, and insensitive to warnings.16 Counterfactualhistory is a tricky business, but our hunch is that Kennedy could haveforestalled the Soviet deployment only by making clear his unwillingness totolerate it very early in the game (not later than in the early summer of1962),17 and only in conjunction with adequate and credible assurancesdesigned to assuage Khrushchev's fears and insecurities. Since Kennedywas evidently unaware of Khrushchev's fears, and since Khrushchev wasevidently deeply suspicious of Kennedy, it is difficult to imagine whatcarrots Kennedy might have brandished alongside his impressive arsenal ofsticks. In any case, Kennedy did not need a formal estimate from the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) that the Soviet Union would attempt a strategicdeployment to Cuba in order to take timely steps to prevent it. He couldhave attempted to send clearer and stronger warnings on the mere suspicionof the possibility. Thus it would be a mistake to place much importanceupon this particular failure.
What makes this failure titillating is that Director of Central Intelligence
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 5
(DCI) John A. McCone - unlike his analysts - did anticipate a Sovietnuclear deployment. Beginning in August 1962, McCone consistentlyvoiced his belief within the intelligence community and at the White Housethat the Soviet Union was in the process of deploying strategic nuclearmissiles to Cuba.18 McCone brought to his position no professionalintelligence experience. His credentials as an anti-communist wereimpeccable, but he could claim no authority on the Soviet Union, or onSoviet foreign and military policy. The fact that a rank amateur got it rightwhile the professionals got it wrong was a storyline too intriguing to resist,and one that could be pursued without much in the way of sensitiveinformation. Hence scholars have paid it a good deal of attention.
McCone's hunch, while correct, in fact rested upon a faulty inference.The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted in August 1962 that the SovietUnion was deploying its most advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM)system, the SA-2, around the perimeter of the island, rather than simplyaround airfields and other vital military installations, and also that Soviettroops were taking elaborate measures to conceal the nature of theiractivities in Cuban ports. McCone concluded from these two facts that theSoviets wished to hide something of extreme importance from the UnitedStates, and decided that this must mean that they were deploying strategicnuclear missiles. But McCone's conclusion did not follow logically from hispremises. First, there were many reasons why the Soviets would go to greatlengths to disguise their activities in Cuban ports - for example, so as not toalarm the United States, or even the Cuban people, about the Soviet militarybuildup. Second, protecting strategic nuclear missile sites from prying eyeswas not the only conceivable function of a SAM system: another was todefend the island from air attack.19 Third, it was natural for the Soviets todeploy SAMs around the perimeter of Cuba, since Cuba's geography didnot offer any meaningful opportunities for defense in depth, and the UnitedStates, should it choose to mount an attack, might do so virtually anywherealong its vast coastline. Fourth, the Soviets had also deployed SA-2 missilesto Egypt, Syria, and Indonesia, and in none of those cases had they alsodeployed strategic nuclear weapons. Indeed, the US intelligence communityexpected that the Soviet Union would deploy SA-2 missiles to Cuba,precisely because it had done so elsewhere.20 Fifth, if the purpose of theSAM deployment had been to prevent American U-2s from observing theconstruction of strategic missile sites, the Soviets should have attempted toshoot down the U-2s that wandered over Cuba with impunity in Septemberand October 1962. But they did not.
McCone's instincts were good, but his reasons were bad, and whileMcCone's willingness to disagree with his analysts without interfering intheir estimates may provide a good example of how a DCI should
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
6 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
intermediate analysis and policy making,21 his discrepant judgment holds nointeresting general lesson for intelligence assessment and hardly seemsworth the attention it has received.
A second issue which has attracted considerable attention is the questionof whether American intelligence should have detected and identifiedSoviet strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba earlier than it did (on 15 October1962, on the basis of aerial photography taken the previous day). WhileAmerican intelligence discovered the deployment in time to give PresidentKennedy and his advisors an opportunity to ponder their response and toseize the diplomatic initiative, nevertheless they did so quite late in thegame. A common theme in this discussion is that political meddling orbureaucratic infighting hampered intelligence gathering: the CIA wouldhave discovered the Soviet deployment earlier had Secretary of State DeanRusk and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy not tinkered with U-2 flight plans, or if the CIA and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had notfought for control of the missions.22 The latter is a non-issue, because thereis no evidence of a bureaucratic struggle: SAC and CIA cooperated well inthe transfer of responsibility once Secretary of Defense Robert S.McNamara decided that it would be wiser to have military rather thancivilian pilots flying over Cuba, in case the Soviets shot one down.23 Thusthe only real question here is whether Rusk and Bundy prevented earlierdetection. This, too, is for the most part a red herring - less interesting tostudents of intelligence than to followers of sordid Camelot sub-plots.24
The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) did seekpermission to fly missions with extended routes directly over Cuba, andRusk and Bundy did successfully lobby instead for oblique photography ofCuba from international air space, or peripheral missions that dipped intoCuban air space only for brief periods of time. This photography proved tobe of relatively poor quality. But their concerns were well founded: Ruskand Bundy feared that if the Soviets downed a U-2 over Cuba, the UnitedStates would face international pressure to respect Cuban sovereignty anddiscontinue high-altitude surveillance altogether. They knew well thatSA-2 missiles were capable of downing U-2s, because one had done so justthe previous month.25 There was nothing improper in, and nothing irrationalabout, their insistence on caution.
In principle, there can be a trade-off between caution in intelligencecollection and the speed of discovery - although, just as plausibly,aggressive collection efforts may impede discovery, as would have been thecase in 1962 had Soviet air defenses in Cuba shot down American U-2s,preventing photoreconnaissance of the island. But in this particular case, itis far from clear that had Rusk and Bundy not insisted upon a modificationof flight plans, the United States would have discovered the missiles earlier.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 7
Bad weather delayed for four days the flight that discovered the missiles,and the first site identified as a medium-range ballistic missile base was ina low state of readiness. Had a U-2 photographed the area even just a weekearlier, crucial items necessary for a positive identification might not yethave been present.
American intelligence did positively identify Soviet missiles prior totheir becoming operational, which permitted the Kennedy administration toseize the initiative in attempting to secure their removal. For this reason,many consider this a major intelligence success.26 Failing to discover themissiles at all would have been a major intelligence failure, of course: thereal question is whether the CIA should have discovered the deploymentearlier. A full airing of this question requires looking at a much broaderrange of issues than the scheduling and flight plans of photoreconnaissancemissions, as our contributors indicate in the pages that follow, and as wediscuss at greater length at the end of the volume.
The historiography of (American) intelligence assessment in the Cubanmissile crisis, then, raises important questions about how intelligence canserve policy, but it answers them rather unsatisfactorily. It pays too muchattention to personalities, bureaucratic rivalries, and enthralling storylines.The question that dominates the limited historiography of intelligenceassessment in the Cuban missile crisis - what should policy makers be able toexpect from their intelligence analysts? — in any case examines only half ofthe intelligence-policy relationship. Intelligence and policy always interactdynamically. Of equal importance are the questions, What should intelligenceanalysts be able to expect from policy makers? How should policy makers useintelligence? Intelligence cannot serve policy if policy makers do notunderstand it and treat it both with respect and with circumspection. Nationalleaders are rarely passive recipients of information and analysis. In order toget what they want and need from their intelligence communities, they mustalso be willing to direct inquiry, to ask questions, to listen carefully to theanswers, to ask for clarification on technical matters, to challenge, to prod,and to reward both good news and bad. They must also have a sense of thepossibilities and limits of intelligence.27 These possibilities and limits are afunction of the technical and organizational capacity on the one hand, and ofthe human capacity on the other, to observe, organize, and processinformation. On these issues, the historiography of intelligence in the Cubanmissile crisis has largely been silent.28
THE DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF THE VOLUME
To get a handle on these larger questions, we first sought to establish acommon empirical baseline in the form of three essays - one each on
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
8 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
American, Soviet, and Cuban intelligence. We asked the authors of each ofthese essays to sketch the organization of the relevant intelligencecommunity; to describe its interaction with national leaders; to discuss thesources and methods of their intelligence gathering; and to identify andexamine important assessments, inferences, and judgments. We asked themto cover three periods: the period leading up to the acute phase of the crisis(i.e., prior to 22 October 1962); the acute phase itself (22-28 October); andthe aftermath. Beyond this, we invited them to raise and discuss any issuesthat they considered to be of particular interest.
We intended the three empirical essays, supplemented to some extent byadditional primary and secondary materials, to provide the grist for twoadditional analytical essays — one on the politics and organization, and oneon the psychology, of intelligence assessment. The purpose of these essayswould be to bring relevant bodies of organizational and psychologicalresearch to bear on the empirical essays, in order to help us explain theparticular judgments, inferences, and interactions of analysts and policymakers. We, in turn, would use the opportunity of our concluding essay tomake some general remarks about the implications of these five essays forthe history of the Cuban missile crisis, and for the study of intelligence.
We were fortunate early in the process to enlist Raymond Garthoff toprepare the essay on American intelligence. It is difficult to imagine anyonebetter qualified to do so. Garthoff is one of the world's foremost scholars ofSoviet military and foreign policy, and of US-Soviet relations.29 He also hasextensive professional intelligence experience. Prior to the Cuban missilecrisis, Garthoff was an intelligence analyst at the CIA. During the crisis, heserved on the staff of Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson (amember of President Kennedy's special advisory body during the crisis, theExecutive Committee of the National Security Council or 'ExComm').Currently a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution in WashingtonDC, Garthoff is the author of several important books and articles on theCuban missile crisis.30
There is no Russian scholar precisely analogous to Garthoff- namely,someone who combines academic and professional intelligence experienceof the crisis itself - but we were extremely fortunate to enlist AleksandrFursenko and Timothy Naftali, historians at the Russian Academy ofSciences and Yale University respectively, to prepare the essay on Sovietintelligence. These two scholars were the first to gain access to KGB andGRU documents on the crisis, and their recently published book, 'One Hellof a Gamble', is the first and only monograph to make extensive use ofthem.
We had considerably more difficulty enlisting a suitable author for theessay on Cuban intelligence. We had arranged for a senior official at the
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 9
Ministry of the Interior with extensive experience in counterintelligence toprepare the essay, in collaboration with a noted American Cubanologist,whose role it would have been to translate, and to provide background andcontext from the relevant English-language literature. In 1995, however, ourcontributor fell out of favor with his government, and temporarilydisappeared from view.31 While we were attempting to reestablish contact,Cuba shot down an unarmed American aircraft piloted by the exile groupBrothers to the Rescue over the Strait of Florida. As US-Cuban relationsfurther deteriorated, Havana apparently decreed that no Cuban scholar orofficial should collaborate with us further.
As luck would have it, however, a colleague of ours at the University ofMiami put us in touch with Domingo Amuchastegui, who had recentlycome to the United States from Cuba, and who had extensive professionalexperience in Cuban intelligence, in the Cuban foreign ministry, and in theCuban academy.32 Amuchastegui, who is now pursuing a doctorate ininternational relations at the University of Miami's Graduate School ofInternational Studies, arrived in the United States without any documents onCuban intelligence, but with a personal history directly relevant to ourproject, and with excellent contacts within the Cuban intelligencecommunity. Amuchastegui notes forthrightly that the lack of documentationon Cuban intelligence represents a constraint upon his ability to corroboratehis recollections and the testimony of those who helped him prepare hisessay behind the scenes; but we are confident that readers will consider hisessay an important contribution.
We were equally fortunate to enlist the aid of two younger scholarsworking at the cutting edge of their respective disciplines to prepare the twoanalytical essays. James Wirtz, an Associate Professor in the Department ofNational Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,California, is an authority on the organization and politics of intelligence.Wirtz is best known for his in-depth examinations of intelligence-policydynamics in the Vietnam War." Beth Fischer, Adjunct Assistant Professorof Political Science at the University of Toronto is an expert on the politicalpsychology of international relations. Her close study of Ronald Reagan'sdramatic shift in Soviet policy forcefully demonstrates the power ofcognitive and motivational explanations of policy change vis-a-vis morecommon structural, domestic political, and bureaucratic explanations.34
The early drafts of all five essays proved to be even more interestingthan we had anticipated (and our expectations were high). The empiricalessays, which came in first, all made startling claims and advancedprovocative, sometimes highly counterintuitive theses. On some pointsthese essays corroborated each other, and on others they appeared flatly tocontradict each other. They provided abundant material for the authors of
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
10 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
our two analytical pieces, who managed to place it in broader theoreticalperspectives. In many respects, these essays were equally startling andprovocative. We circulated drafts among the authors, immediatelyprecipitating extensive, sometimes animated correspondence between them,as they sought to clarify or to challenge each other's specific claims andinterpretations. This was an editor's dream. With each iteration, the essaysbecame more tightly integrated, and the points of similarity and ofdifference came into ever-sharper focus.
It was apparent to us that, collectively, these essays formed the basis ofa deeper and more extended conversation. We began that widerconversation at the 1997 annual meeting of the International StudiesAssociation in Toronto, where we presented several of the essays (then stillin draft).35 We continued it at a symposium at the Wilson Center for Scholarsin Washington DC, attended by professional intelligence officers, areaspecialists, and scholars noted for their work on related issues andapproaches.36 In a weekend of freewheeling discussion with each other andwith the other participants, the authors test-flew more refined versions oftheir arguments. What you see below are the final versions, in each casehoned and polished to address the more important themes and concerns thatarose at the Washington meeting.
These are final versions, of course, only in a publisher's sense. Weexpect the conversation to continue, and we expect the arguments andanalyses to evolve, especially as more and more documentation becomesavailable against which to check them.
A LITTLE FORESHADOWING
We will resist the temptation here to speak about what we believe to besome of the more interesting and important implications of these essays. Wewill have plenty to say about that at the end of the volume. However, wewould like to foreshadow the three empirical and two analytical essays justa little, to help readers get their bearings and anticipate some of theimportant claims, disagreements, and remaining mysteries.
In his essay, Raymond Garthoff examines the structure, processes,activities, and estimates of the American intelligence community in greatdetail, and in the course of so doing conducts a thorough review of theexisting literature and documentation. Garthoff catalogues what heconsiders to be the strengths and weaknesses of the American intelligenceeffort, arguing that, on balance, American intelligence served nationalleaders well. Crucial estimates that the Soviet Union would not attempt todeploy nuclear weapons in Cuba, while incorrect, were nonetheless largelydefensible, in Garthoff s view, even though American analysts were
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 11
insufficiently sensitive to Khrushchev's defensive motivations forattempting to deploy nuclear weapons secretly to Cuba. The discovery ofthe strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba prior to their becoming operationalwas, in Garthoff's opinion, an important intelligence success, because itenabled American policy makers to take timely preventive measures.American analysts did not correctly gauge the size or nature of the Sovietdeployment at the time, underestimating the number of Soviet militarypersonnel dispatched to the island by a factor of four, and failing toappreciate that the Soviets were in the process of deploying not merelystrategic nuclear missiles and their supporting equipment, but a full battle-capable combined arms group of forces capable of mounting a conventional(and tactical nuclear) defense of the island. However, Garthoff argues, thisfailure was inconsequential to the management of the crisis. In fact, amongGarthoff's more provocative claims is that it facilitated the resolution of thecrisis: the American Congress and public, Garthoff suggests, would nothave been satisfied with the public terms on the basis of which the crisis wasresolved had they been aware of the true size and nature of the Sovietdeployment. Ignorance may not always be bliss - but in this case, Garthoffargues, it was beneficial politically.
In their essay on Soviet intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis,Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali paint a picture of the KGB, and ofits relationship to the Kremlin, that sends chills up and down the spine.According to Fursenko and Naftali, the KGB was largely cut out of thedecision making process leading to the Soviet deployment, and unable toobtain any good-quality information that would have been relevant toSoviet leaders as they attempted to anticipate and then manage theAmerican challenge. Soviet intelligence suffered from a preoccupation withsecret sources, failed to assimilate open source material, conducted little ornothing in the way of real analysis, and did not present the Kremlin withformal estimates. It was inefficient, amateurish, and ineffective.Incompetence and organizational norms can explain the poor performanceof Soviet intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis to some extent; but muchof the blame must rest with Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev disdained,distrusted, or failed to appreciate the value of intelligence. He proceededwith the deployment without any formal analysis of the likelihood that theAmericans would discover it, and without any formal estimate of Kennedy'sprobable response if they did. Khrushchev preferred to conduct his ownanalysis, apparently under the misapprehension that the 'raw' informationthat found its way haphazardly onto his desk provided an adequate basis forpolicy.
Domingo Amuchastegui's essay on Cuban intelligence in the missilecrisis is, to the best of our knowledge, the only scholarly treatment of its
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
12 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
kind. It is, therefore, almost entirely news. Its novelty means that fewreaders will have expectations against which to decide whether or not it issurprising. Certainly we did not. And yet in many ways we found it to bethe most engaging of the three. Amuchastegui describes a nascentprofessional intelligence community, cobbled together from variousrevolutionary groups, forced to find its feet and define itself under the mostdifficult conditions imaginable - in the context of an ongoing civil war, andan acutely threatening international environment. Threatened equally(though in different ways) by American hostility and Soviet friendship,Cuban intelligence performed creditably, given the constraints on resourcesand experience under which it operated, and given its dependency uponforeign technical expertise. The relationship between Cuban intelligenceand the Cuban leadership appears to have been particularly complex. Mostsuch relationships are complex; but Cuban intelligence, in the periodleading up to and during the missile crisis, appears to have had unusualdifficulty speaking Truth to Power - not because of any unwillingness tospeak, but because of Power's unwillingness to listen. Of all three leaders inthe crisis, Castro appears to have been the most willing to meddle inintelligence, and to circumvent and manipulate the intelligence process inaccordance with his transient political needs.
Readers will no doubt notice several apparent tensions andinconsistencies between the empirical essays. For example, Amuchasteguiclaims that, following the Bay of Pigs, Soviet intelligence systematicallyinsisted that an American invasion of Cuba was imminent. This contradictsthe account of Fursenko and Naftali, who maintain that during the sameperiod the KGB issued no dire warnings to Moscow. Indeed, Amuchasteguinotes that Cuban intelligence could itself find no evidence of a waxingAmerican threat, and for this reason became suspicious of the motivesbehind Soviet reports. It is possible, as Amuchastegui suspects, that theKremlin used the KGB to deceive Castro for ulterior purposes (e.g., toencourage Castro to accept a Soviet nuclear deployment); but this is adiscrepancy whose resolution must await further documentation. Similarly,Fursenko and Naftali insist that Khrushchev neither informed the KGB ofthe missile deployment, nor tasked it to assess the likely American response.Amuchastegui, in contrast, credits the KGB with orchestrating an elaboratescheme of deception intended to mask the deployment - something theKGB could hardly have undertaken had it been in the dark.
Interesting and important interpretive differences also arise in the threeempirical essays. For example, while Garthoff is inclined to consider theAmerican discovery of missiles on 15 October an important intelligencesuccess, Amuchastegui interprets the CIA's apparent failure to discover themissiles earlier as evidence of incompetence or conspiracy. This
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 13
disagreement - which the authors have been unable to resolve in anextended correspondence - highlights the difficulty of establishingobjective and exhaustive criteria for 'success' and 'failure'. What, precisely,should we reasonably expect intelligence communities to know, and whenshould they be expected to know it? This is clearly an important questionfor anyone who is interested in reflecting upon ways of improving theperformance of intelligence.
These are just a few of the many fascinating issues that arise within andbetween the three empirical essays. The two analytical essays add severalmore. James Wirtz argues that strategic position, degree ofbureaucratization, and leadership style interact to induce characteristicpolicy dangers and intelligence errors. Wirtz applies an appropriatetypology to the accounts given in the three empirical essays, anddemonstrates how it can help us find deeper patterns in the seemingly verydifferent experiences of the American, Soviet, and Cuban intelligencecommunities. Beth Fischer demonstrates how several misperceptions,misjudgments, and errors of inference - by intelligence analysts and policymakers in all three countries - fit well with certain postulates of cognitiveand motivational psychology. Fischer argues that while many of the mostsignificant errors made by national leaders may have their roots inemotional or psychological needs, the errors made by intelligence analystsmore likely reflect simple information processing errors to which all peopleare prone simply by virtue of being human. Taken together, Wirtz andFischer suggest that organizational and procedural changes may to somedegree enhance the performance of intelligence and its ability to servepolicy makers, but that these are ultimately limited by the human capacityto manage value trade-offs and to process information.
There is much more to be said about these five fascinating pieces andtheir implications for our two subjects - the Cuban missile crisis andintelligence - but we believe that this will suffice both to whet the appetiteand to orient the reader. Or perhaps we should say: to disorient the reader.We have studied the missile crisis long enough and deeply enough todevelop a profound sense of wonderment that the world managed to escapedisaster in 1962, because of the depth and extent of the mistakes andmisunderstandings on all sides, and because of the bloomin', buzzin'confusion both within and between all three countries. The following fiveessays only increase that sense of wonderment, because they further attestto the idiosyncrasy, the incommensurability, the relativity, and perhapsabove all the 'noisiness' of the US, Soviet, and Cuban experiences of thecrisis. These essays require that we rethink our understanding of the eventin important ways: but they equally strongly buttress our conviction that, inthis respect at least, scholarship imitates life. Our own sense of the enduring
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
14 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
mystery of the Cuban missile crisis mirrors its profound mysteriousness tothose who precipitated it, coped with it, and somehow extricated themselvesfrom it. There are paradoxes in here - Escher-esque nesting dolls, for wantof a better metaphor — upon which we reflect further at the end of thevolume.
NOTES
1. See, e.g., Len Scott and Steve Smith, 'Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists,Policy-makers and the Cuban Missile Crisis', International Affairs 70 (Oct. 1994)pp.659-84. For the purposes of this volume, we presume that the reader is familiar with thebroad outline of events. For a useful detailed chronology (with sources), see Laurence Changand Peter Kombluh (eds) The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security ArchiveDocuments Reader (NY: New Press 1992).
2. For pre-glasnost' Soviet sources, see Ronald R. Pope (ed.) Soviet Views on the Cuban MissileCrisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy Analysis (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1982).For post-glasnost' discussion, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban MissileCrisis, rev. ed. (Washington DC: Brookings 1989); James G. Blight and David A. Welch, Onthe Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (NY:Noonday 1990); Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch (eds) Back to theBrink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28,1989 (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1992); David A. Welch, James G. Blight, and Bruce J.Allyn, 'Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis', in Robert J.Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds) The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics,4th ed. (ibid. 1993) pp.234-61; and Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lostthe Cold War (Princeton UP 1994). For the Cuban angle, see Philip Brenner, 'Cuba and theMissile Crisis', Journal of Latin American Studies 22/1 (Feb. 1990) pp.115-42; and JamesG. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis,and the Soviet Collapse (NY: Pantheon 1993).
3. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, 'Risking "The Destruction of Nations": Lessons of theCuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States', Security Studies 4/4 (Summer1994) pp.811-50; Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and NuclearWeapons (Princeton UP 1993).
4. Most prominent among these are Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, A Thousand Days: John F.Kennedy in the White House (NY: Houghton Mifflin 1965); Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy(NY: Harper & Row 1965); Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: Lippincott 1966);Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration ofJohn F. Kennedy (NY: Doubleday 1967); and Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoirof the Cuban Missile Crisis (NY: Norton 1969).
5. The National Security Archive in Washington DC most actively pushed the declassificationprocess, and maintains the largest collection of declassified US documents on the crisis. Itand the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Centerfor Scholars, Washington DC, are the premier repositories of primary information.
6. Good examples of detailed studies with important findings that missile crisis scholarship hasyet to assimilate include Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (NY:Columbia UP 1991); Sagan, Limits of Safety (note 3); and Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov andWilliam Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban MissileCrisis (Chicago: Edition Q 1994).
7. David A. Welch, 'Intelligence Assessment in the Cuban Missile Crisis', Queen's Quarterly100/2 (Summer 1993) pp.421-37.
8. The best and most detailed treatment is Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The InsideStory of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert F. McCort (ed.) (NY: Random House 1991).
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 15
9. The Cuban government has released a few documents selectively in order to rebut, clarify,or amplify interpretations of newly released Soviet documents. None of this informationdirectly bears on Cuban intelligence.
10. See note 5. For useful compilations, see Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.) CIA Documents on theCuban Missile Crisis (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency History Staff 1992);Chang and Kornbluh; The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (note 1); US Dept of State, ForeignRelations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962(Washington DC: GPO 1997); idem, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol.XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (ibid. 1997).
11. Eric Schmitt, 'C.I.A. Holds Talks on '62 Cuban Crisis', New York Times, 20 Oct. 1992,p.A4(N); Karl E. Meyer, 'Inside the C.I.A.: A Bit of Sunlight on the Missile Crisis', ibid., 24Oct. 1992, p.14(N).
12. For overviews of Soviet archival research, see James G. Hershberg, 'Soviet Archives: TheOpening Door', Cold War International History Project Bulletin no.1 (Spring 1992) pp.1,12-15, 23-7; Mark Kramer, 'Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls', ibid. no.3 (Fall 1993) pp.1, 18-39; James G. Hershberg, 'New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis:More Documents from the Russian Archives', ibid. nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/97) pp.270-343.
13. The first major work to make extensive use of Soviet intelligence documents is AleksandrFursenko and Timothy Naftali, 'One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy,1958-1964 (NY: Norton 1997); see also Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 'UsingKGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis', Cold WarInternational History Project Bulletin no. 5 (Spring 1995) pp.58, 60-2. The first symposiumto discuss this material was held in conjunction with the preparation of this volume inWashington DC, 5-7 Sept. 1997, and was sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center, theCold War International History Project, and the Kennan Institute (see p.10).
14. Raymond Garthoff surveys the relevant literature in his essay, below. Cf. also Klaus Knorr,'Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles', World Politics16/3 (April 1964) pp.455-67; and Roberta Wohlstetter, 'Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsightand Foresight', Foreign Affairs 43/4 (July 1965) pp.691-707.
15. There are reasons to believe that overly aggressive deterrent signaling might simply haveintensified Khrushchev's risk-taking. See, e.g., Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink(note 2); Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (note 2).
16. See the discussion in the essay by Beth Fischer, later in this volume.17. Raymond Garthoff argues similarly in his essay later in this volume (pp. 21-22).18. See, e.g., Peter S. Usowski, 'John McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Persistent
Approach to the Intelligence-Policy Relationship', Int. Jnl of Intelligence andCounterintelligence 2/4 (Winter 1988) pp.547-76. Others who were convinced that theSoviet Union would deploy or was deploying strategic nuclear weapons to Cuba includedformer Vice President Richard Nixon and Sen. Kenneth Keating (R-NY). Keating's chargesthat the Kennedy administration was allowing the Soviet Union to establish a major nuclearcapability in Cuba were a constant irritant to the White House. It remains unclear whetherKeating had any hard information on the Soviet deployment, and, if so, where he obtained it.See Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan 1996).
19. As Fischer discusses in her essay later in this volume, the difficulty American officials hadimagining that the Soviets could have defensive motives for their military deployments inCuba may help explain oversights of this kind.
20. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball (note 8), p.99.21. Usowski, 'John McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis' (note 18).22. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball (note 8), p. 164; Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1971) pp.122-3.23. The Stennis Report concluded that there was 'no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any
conflict between the CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photographiccoverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being operated by theCIA prior to 14 October. Likewise there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock betweenthe two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom the flightsshould be flown.' Allison, Essence of Decision (note 22), p.307 n.90. See also Brugioni,
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
16 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Eyeball to Eyeball (note 8), pp. 154-5, 181.24. Chroniclers of Camelot closest to the president - most notably, Robert F. Kennedy, Theodore
Sorensen, and Arthur Schlesinger - have repeatedly characterized Rusk and Bundy as overlytimid, indecisive, ineffective, and obstacles to crisis management. Rusk appears to have beenthe target of deliberate character assassination. 'At first [Rusk] was for a strike; later he wassilent or absent. He had, Robert Kennedy wrote laconically in Thirteen Days, "duties duringthis period of time and frequently could not attend our meetings." Privately, Kennedy wasless circumspect. Rusk, he thought in 1965, "had a virtually complete breakdown mentallyand physically".' Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, Robert Kennedy and His Times (NY: Ballantine1978) pp.546-7. The evidence does not bear this out. Rusk played an active and constructiverole throughout the crisis. See., e.g, David A. Welch and James G. Blight, 'The EleventhHour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts',International Security 12/3 (Winter 1987/88) pp.5-29, esp. pp.22-3; and Ernest R. May andPhilip Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1997) passim.
25. On 8 Sept. 1962, the People's Republic of China shot down a 'Nationalist' U-2 over themainland. On 1 May 1960, another SA-2 brought down a U-2 piloted by Francis GaryPowers over Sverdlovsk, deep inside Soviet territory.
26. See, e.g., Garthoff, in this volume.27. John Macartney, 'Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide', Int. Jnl. of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 2/4 (Winter 1988) pp.457-86.28. Notable exceptions include Klaus Knorr, 'Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The
Case of the Cuban Missiles', World Politics 16/3 (April 1964) pp.455-67; and RobertaWohlstetter, 'Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight', Foreign Affairs 43/4 (July1965) pp.691-707. While the historiography of American intelligence has been preoccupiedwith interesting characters and storylines, it is nevertheless much better than the meagerhistoriography of Soviet intelligence. Prior to the publication of Fursenko and Naftali's 'OneHell of a Gamble', the only substantial work on Soviet intelligence and the missile crisis wasJerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World: How a SovietColonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (NY: Scribner's 1992) - a narrow andsensationalistic treatment fraught with errors. The historiography of Cuban intelligenceassessment in the missile crisis is non-existent.
29. See, e.g., Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations fromNixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington DC: Brookings 1994); and idem, The GreatTransition: American—Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (ibid. 1994).
30. Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1st ed. (Washington DC:Brookings 1987); idem, 'Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story', Foreign Policy no. 72(Fall 1988) pp.61-80; idem, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, rev. ed. (WashingtonDC: Brookings 1989); idem, 'The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis', ColdWar International History Project Bulletin no. 1 (Spring 1992) pp.1, 3; idem, 'SomeObservations on Using the Soviet Archives', Diplomatic History 21/2 (Spring 1997)pp.243-57. See also Detente and Confrontation (note 29), which deals extensively with thevarious 'mini-crises' that have complicated US-Soviet-Cuban relations since the Cubanmissile crisis.
31. While he later resurfaced, he did so too late - and in an inappropriate institutional capacity— to contribute to our study. He has since fallen from grace once again.
32. Amuchastegui provides a more extensive biographical sketch in n. 3 of his essay, below.33. James J. Wirtz, The Tel Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP 1991);
idem, 'Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy During The Vietnam War',Political Science Quarterly 106/2 (Summer 1991) pp.239-63.
34. Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War(Columbia, MO: U. of Missouri Press 1997).
35. The panel was co-sponsored by the intelligence studies section of the ISA and the CanadianAssociation of Security Intelligence Studies (CASIS).
36. See note 13, above. Other participants included Wayne S. Smith, political officer in the USembassy, Havana (until 3 Jan. 1961, when the US broke relations with Cuba), and later
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14
INTRODUCTION 17
Director of Cuban affairs and special assistant to Adolf Berle, President Kennedy's specialenvoy for Latin American affairs; Brian Latell, currently director of the Center for the Studyof Intelligence and a career CIA Latin Americanist specializing in Cuban affairs; SamuelHalpern, executive assistant to William K. Harvey, director of Operation 'Mongoose'; Gen.William Y. Smith (USAF, ret.), special assistant to chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffGen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 1961-64; Oleg T. Daroussenkov, special assistant to CubanMinister of Industries, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, 1961-1962, as well as former staff memberand interpreter in the Soviet embassy in Havana and, later, director of Cuban affairs in theInternational Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion; Thomas Blanton, National Security Archive, Washington DC; Philip Brenner, Schoolof International Service, The American University, Washington DC; Malcolm Byrne,National Security Archive; James G. Hershberg, Department of History, George WashingtonUniversity, Washington DC; Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive; janet M. Lang,Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University; Kathy N. Le, Watson Institutefor International Studies; Richard Ned Lebow, Department of Political Science and theMershon Center, the Ohio State University; John Prados, National Security Archive; WesleyWark, Department of History, University of Toronto; David Wolff, Cold War InternationalHistory Project, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC; and Vladislav Zubok, NationalSecurity Archive.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity L
ibra
ry]
at 1
8:25
06
Nov
embe
r 20
14