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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17 Table of Contents South China Sea Affirmative Case Summary............................................................... 3 Glossary.............................................................. 4 1AC (1/10)......................................................... 6-15 Inherency Answers to: Strong U.S. Stance Now...................................16 Salami Slicing Advantage Answers to: China isn’t Expanding....................................17 Answers to: No risk of accidental war (1/2)........................18-9 Answers to: SCS isn’t Key to Economy.................................20 Answers to: War won’t Escalate (1/2)...............................21-2 Answer to Interdependence Checks War.................................23 Answers to: War will be limited......................................24 Answers to: Won’t Use Nuclear Weapons................................25 Answers to: No Economy Impact........................................26 Solvency Answers to: Asia Pivot means no engagement...........................27 Answers to: Engagement hurts hegemony................................28 Answers to: US doesn’t matter........................................29 Answers to: U.S. Position encourages China (1/2)...................30-1 Miltary Engagement Advantage Military Engagement Advantage (1/4)................................32-5 Answers to: Meetings Irrelevant......................................36 Answers to: Canceling Meetings irrelevant............................37 Answers to: Doesn’t Solve Mistrust...................................38 1

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Table of Contents

South China Sea Affirmative CaseSummary........................................................................................................................................................ 3

Glossary.......................................................................................................................................................... 4

1AC (1/10)................................................................................................................................................. 6-15

Inherency

Answers to: Strong U.S. Stance Now............................................................................................................16

Salami Slicing Advantage

Answers to: China isn’t Expanding...............................................................................................................17

Answers to: No risk of accidental war (1/2)..............................................................................................18-9

Answers to: SCS isn’t Key to Economy......................................................................................................... 20

Answers to: War won’t Escalate (1/2).......................................................................................................21-2

Answer to Interdependence Checks War.....................................................................................................23

Answers to: War will be limited................................................................................................................... 24

Answers to: Won’t Use Nuclear Weapons...................................................................................................25

Answers to: No Economy Impact.................................................................................................................26

Solvency

Answers to: Asia Pivot means no engagement............................................................................................27

Answers to: Engagement hurts hegemony..................................................................................................28

Answers to: US doesn’t matter.................................................................................................................... 29

Answers to: U.S. Position encourages China (1/2)....................................................................................30-1

Miltary Engagement Advantage

Military Engagement Advantage (1/4)......................................................................................................32-5

Answers to: Meetings Irrelevant..................................................................................................................36

Answers to: Canceling Meetings irrelevant..................................................................................................37

Answers to: Doesn’t Solve Mistrust............................................................................................................. 38

Answers to: Not Key to Relations.................................................................................................................39

Answers to: Relations Irrelevant..................................................................................................................40

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Table of Contents

Off Case Position Answers

Answers to: Topicality Cannot be Military Engagement..............................................................................41

Answer to India Relations Disadvantage (1/2).............................................................................................42

Answer to Credibility Disadvantage.............................................................................................................44

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Summary

Summary

China has been expanding its claims in the South China Sea. They have been doing a number of things in places that other countries – Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos, etc – believe is their space [also known their EEZ]. Those activities include things like – building and making islands, doing military exercises, allowing fishing vessels to go into those areas, sending military ships into those areas – other things that would traditionally be reserved for the country.

The United States, amongst others, has asked China to stop doing it. But, no one is actually doing anything to make them stop. China’s actions are often referred to as “salami-slicing.” Basically, they are doing a lot of small things that make those countries nervous, but not enough to get anyone to force them to stop. Cutting off small bits of the South China Sea at a time instead of claiming large chunks.

The aff plan does two unique things. First, it makes the diplomatic stance of the U.S. clear and absolute. China should stop pursuing the expansion of its sovereignty into parts of the SCS. While the U.S. has made requests in the past, this stance almost creates a red-line for China. It says “do not do this anymore.” Second, the aff establishes permanent military-to-military exchanges with china around the SCS. We do exchanges now. However, those mil-mil contacts are often canceled or threatened to be canceled because of unrelated disputes between the U.S. and China. The aff creates permanent annual exchanges that are separate from disputes.

The first advantage is directly tied to the SCS and the policy of China. China will, at some point, take a step too far and start a small conflict with a country or set of people in the area. That is called miscalculation. The conflict would escalate because Vietnam, or another friend/ally in the region would request that the U.S. get involved. The conflict is likely to drawn in numerous countries because the SCS is a necessary water-way for a large portion of the world’s trade and resources.

The second advantage stems from the relationship benefits of establishing permanent military-to-military ties. If the two countries military are regularly meeting and planning things, then overall relations are likely to be greater because the two militaries can just talk about disagreements, and even if there are other fights, the military is unlikely to get drawn into the skirmish.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Glossary

Glossary

Deterrence – The ability to stop an attack by convincing an enemy that the sheer force of response makes the attack ‘not worth it.’ More specifically, the use of military threats as a means to prevent international crises and war. The U.S. is trying to

EEZ – An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind.

Escalation – In this context, when a conflict grows bigger by incorporating more countries and people. When a fight is between 2 people and then 2 more join and then 4 more join, that fight ‘escalated.’ Escalation can also include an increase in the size or

Military-to-Military / Mil-Mil – Quiet simply, when two militaries get together either for discussions or exercises. This can take place anywhere and can involve any or all branches of the military.

Miscalculation / Miscalc – When a conflict starts by accident. Few countries want to go to war. In this instance, a war starts because someone does something that causes another country to respond. That response then escalates to include other people. Countries are often ‘drawn-in’ because they are committed to protecting allies, or believe they are fighting for what is ‘right.’

Nine-Dash Line – literally: "nine-segment line of the South China Sea" and at various times also referred to as the "10-dash line" and the "11-dash line", refers to the demarcation line for their claims of the major part of the South China Sea. The contested area in the South China Sea includes the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and various other areas including the Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal. The claim encompasses the area of Chinese land reclamation known as the "great wall of sand".

Salami-Slicing – a series of many small actions, often performed secretly, that as a whole produces a much larger action or result that would be difficult or unlawful to perform all at once. In this context, China is cutting off small pieces of the South China Seas and claiming them as their own. By only taking small actions, they hope to avoid backlash. But, also hope to eventually control a much larger space.

Sino – generally refers to China. Often used as a prefix, as in, Sino-American, or Sino-Japanese.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Glossary

South China Sea – part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan. It is:

- south of mainland China, including the island of Taiwan, in the east;- east of Vietnam and Cambodia;- west of the Philippines;- east of the Malay peninsula and Sumatra, up to the Strait of Malacca in the west and north of

the Bangka–Belitung Islands and Borneo

Sovereignty – The full right and power to govern. In this context, it means the right to govern a particular space or area. One country challenges another’s sovereignty when they try to take over their land or area.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (1/10) Contention One – Inherency –

China is expanding into the South China Sea now. The U.S. and other countries are not effectively stopping them now.

Frasure 5 – 3 – 16 - Professor of Government at Connecticut College

[William G. Frasure, U.S. Credibility in the South China Sea, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/u-s-credibility-in-the-south-china-sea/] doa: 5-5-16

China continues to militarize the South China Sea, with the manifest intention of making its claim of sovereignty thereto impossible to challenge. China has made clear that it does not plan to accept a likely unfavorable decision, forthcoming in a month or so, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Moreover, China has so far refused to discuss any sort of multilateral negotiations over the many overlapping, conflicting territorial claims. Nations who contest China’s claims as violations of their own sovereignty are left having to figure out how to confront China’s increasingly threatening military posture in the South China Sea. Must the Philippines, Vietnam, and other contestants either accede to Chinese sovereignty over the Sea or fight to defend their interests? If, indeed, those are the only options, then the choice seems clear. None of the contesting countries can overcome China’s military might, and they must eventually concede the South China Sea to China and hope for the best. Rather steadily, however, Vietnam and the Philippines have moved beyond that simple choice to another option of greater global significance: strengthening military ties with the United States. By drawing closer to the U.S., China’s Southeast Asian adversaries seek to acquire some degree of balance in the region, so as to dissuade China from brazen invocations of military might to enforce its sweeping claims. Which is to say, they hope a more visible, active American military presence will deter China. There is no doubt that the United States has, for the time being, adequate military resources to more than balance anything China can put into the South China Sea. But, as aficionados of the Cold War will recall, a fundamental component of deterrence is credibility. It is one thing to possess assets, it is another to convince an adversary of your willingness to use them, and another still to convince friends of your willingness to use them on their behalf. A further step requires that your friend believes that your adversary is intimidated by your posture. It is this last element that seems to be at play in the South China Sea. The United States seeks to assure the Philippines and Vietnam, perhaps others, that China will be sufficiently intimidated by growing U.S. involvement to move toward more reasonable, more accommodating policies, and accept the need to resolve the conflict through serious multilateral negotiation. There is little to indicate that the approach is working.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (2/10) Contention Two – Salami-Slicing AdvantageSouth China Sea conflict is highly likely – confrontation is inevitable – changing Chinese strategy makes a US-China war highly likely

Blain 15 - Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College, Commanding Officer of the 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment[Jason Blain, The Dragon and The Eagle in the South China Sea: is conflict between China and the US inevitable?, Australian Defence Journal, Jul/Aug 2015] doa 5-6-16

Introduction In 2011, Robert Kaplan proposed that the 21st century’s defining battleground would be located not on the land masses of Europe or Asia but instead on water.2 Kaplan offered that just as German soil constituted the military front line of the Cold War, the waters of the South China Sea may constitute the military front line of the coming decades. Six countries—China, Vietnam, The Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia—lay claim in whole or part to territory in the South China Sea. However, it is the relationships and actions of the two major powers in the region—China and the US—which will determine if Kaplan’s forecast bears true. If it does, the question of whether this future front line will be one of ‘cold competition’ or ‘hot confrontation’ deserves close attention. This article argues that conflict between China and the US is not inevitable during the next decade. To support this proposition, it will first establish the factors that are creating a perception that China is abandoning what has been a ‘peaceful rise’ strategy, and is changing its approach towards historical disputes centered on the South China Sea. The article will contend that Beijing’s strategy is shifting in response to a confluence of drivers, including increasing nationalism and a perceived threat posed by the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific. Based on this changing dynamic, the article will then examine the potential for conflict between China and the US during the next decade and outline the economic interdependencies and military disparities between the two that might prevent this outcome from being inevitable.3 The article will conclude by noting that while conflict is not a given, growing Chinese assertiveness is creating increased friction within the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the US is increasing its military presence in the region and enhancing security cooperation with its allies and partners, several of which also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea.4 While conflict may not be inevitable, this friction has the potential to draw the US and China into a confrontation that neither wants. Abandoning a ‘peaceful rise’ strategy? The South China Sea is regarded as the trade route hub of the industrial revolution of Asia, providing the main artery of transportation for vital energy imports and commodity exports in East Asia.5 It contains potentially vast resources, including gas and oil reserves, as well as protein-rich seafoods, access to which underlies the current territorial and maritime disputes. China and others in the region have growing energy needs, and technological improvements in recent years have made oil and gas development in offshore locations more feasible. At the same time, growing demand for seafood and the depletion of near-shore fishing areas are driving fishing fleets further from domestic shores.6 While nations in the recent past have sought to resolve territorial disputes peacefully, events playing out in the South China Sea may indicate that China is changing its approach to resolving historical disagreements. Beijing continues to emphasise that China’s rise as a global power is based on a strategy of peace. 7

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (3/10) [EVIDENCE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE]

However, increasing tensions in the waters of the South China Sea are seen as the waters of the South China Sea are seen as testing the sincerity of such a claim.8 Carlyle Thayer contends that China commenced a behaviour of aggressively asserting its sovereignty rights in the South China Sea as early as 2011, by targeting the commercial operations of oil exploration ships in waters claimed by The Philippines and Vietnam.9 A more recent example of Beijing’s increasing assertiveness was seen in early May 2014, when a Chinese deep-water oil-drilling rig was constructed some 130 kilometres inside an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by Vietnam near the Paracel Islands; the rig was escorted by more than 80 armed vessels that, in the course of a confrontation with Vietnamese vessels, fired high-power water cannons and rammed civilian ships.10

The conflict will start by miscalculation – and escalateKim 16 - Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University [Kim, Jihyun. "Possible Future of the Contest in the South China Sea." The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2016)] doa 5-11-16On the South China Sea disputes, however, Beijing has never deviated from its position that the given issue is not between China and ASEAN, and thus that Sino-ASEAN relations as a whole should not be aggravated by it. Even in the face of growing concern on the part of China’s neighbours and the United States fuelled by revelations of Beijing’s controversial land reclamation in the South China Sea that could serve a military purpose, Chinese leaders have defended the country’s island-building as legitimate because it falls within its territorial rights. Although China’s island-building is widely interpreted by its neighbours and the United States as a provocative move intended to strengthen its territorial claims and potentially threaten FON, Beijing insists that its construction and maintenance works are designed not to restrict free naval passage but to provide positive public services, including maritime search-and-rescue, disaster prevention, weather forecasting, and navigation security and fishery production for the greater good of the region.33 Such rhetoric, though not widely accepted by outside powers, has been constantly reiterated by Chinese leaders to portray the country as a peaceful rising power, interested in constructive regional engagement and promoting mutual prosperity and a common destiny in Asia. Still, there are a number of important factors that could trigger a future conflict. They include intensification of maritime disputes due to China’s growing popular nationalism, combined with the government’s effort to treat the issue as a matter of national security and pride. For example, China’s grand strategy would evolve in a more comprehensive way to strengthen its national power and establish the country as more than just an economic giant in the 21st century. In this light, the expansion of China’s South China Sea claims, as well as its growing fleet of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, can be interpreted as part of its strategic efforts to create what’s known in military parlance as a ‘bastion’, or a deep-water sanctuary where Chinese submarines could avoid detection.34 Notwithstanding China’s ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons, its neighbours and the United States might see this rapid development of ballistic submarines and nuclear deterrence capability as a threat. This is because China might possibly ‘adopt a bastion strategy in the South China Sea’ and unilaterally declare an ‘air defence identification zone’, which would restrict other countries’ military overflights and abilities to track China’s

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (4/10)

[EVIDENCE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE]

submarines, so inevitably intensifying the security dilemma.35 Additionally, the weak crisis-management structure of the Chinese system and the lack of unity among China’s large and complicated political, foreign affairs, and military bureaucracies could heighten the danger of escalation from an operational miscalculation at sea to a political and diplomatic crisis.36 For example, rising nationalism in China is not only real but also being utilized by a diverse set of actors, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), local governments, law enforcement agencies, resource companies, and fishermen, who are promoting different agendas to advance their own particular parochial interests by seeking increased government funding or enhanced prestige. This means that ‘despite the image of Xi as a strong leader’, it is inevitable that Xi and the central government will be influenced by China’s fractured authority and systemic problems, even in the course of formulating a grand national strategy for maritime security in the South China Sea.37 The problem is that ‘not every action taken by the government agency’ or other related actors would properly reflect ‘the will of China’s leaders’ while it could increase the chances of division among Chinese policymakers at a tactical level.38 In the current nationalist political atmosphere, where Chinese leaders rely heavily on these actors to maintain the legitimacy and unity of the party, almost anything could be justified in the name of safeguarding China’s security and maritime consciousness, even at the risk of deteriorating regional stability and causing foreign policy consequences that might go against China’s long-term national interests. This is what could potentially, though not deliberately, shift the security order in the South China Sea from minor tensions to major confrontations rather than peaceful cooperation, notwithstanding Beijing’s smile diplomacy, buttressed by its charming rhetoric and economic leverage.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (5/10)

US-Sino conflict would escalate and go nuclearCunningham & Fravel 15 - Ph.D. candidate & Associate Professor of Political Science and members of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

[Fiona S. and M. Taylor, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2, Fall, pp. 7–50]

Avery Goldstein analyzes the effects of asymmetric conventional capabilities under the condition of mutual nuclear vulnerability on, among other factors, crisis stability. He identifies three incentives for states to use force first in a crisis: to gain a military advantage that could be translated into a coercive bargaining advantage, to signal resolve, or to preempt an attack.119 Where both states have conventional and nuclear forces, nuclear weapons dampen the incentives for either state to use any kind of force in a crisis to gain bargaining leverage, even if one power has superior capabilities. Mutual possession of nuclear weapons does not , however, entirely eliminate incentives to use conventional force first in a competition in risk taking below the nuclear threshold, which could cross that threshold if miscalculation occurred.120 In the U.S.-China case, Goldstein suggests that crisis instability results from deliberate competition in risk taking for coercive bargaining, played out at the conventional level. 121 Each step in this competition is designed to bring the two states closer to nuclear conflict. For Goldstein, the stakes in a U.S.-China crisis would not be high enough for either side “to choose an unrestrained nuclear exchange.” Nevertheless, he suggests that “ some stakes might be high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions that elevate the risk of escalation to such a disastrous outcome.”122 As the conventionally stronger power, the United States might use conventional force first to gain a bargaining advantage by eliminating China’s ability to escalate using conventional weapons. China would then be required to move immediately to nuclear threats. As the conventionally weaker state, China could use conventional force first to preempt such a U.S. attack, or to signal its resolve over the issues at stake, but it could not improve its bargaining position by altering the balance of conventional forces.123 Neither state would want to take actions that provoked certain nuclear retaliation, but such escalation could occur as the intensity of conventional bargaining escalated.124

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC 6/10 In addition, a conflict over the South China Sea will hamper the global economy slowing growth and killing jobs.Blain 15 - Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College, Commanding Officer of the 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment

[Jason Blain, The Dragon and The Eagle in the South China Sea: is conflict between China and the US inevitable?, Australian Defence Journal, Jul/Aug 2015] doa 5-6-16

Economic interdependencies The economic bonds between the US, China and other nations in East and Southeast Asia are immense, and any serious conflict between them would cripple the global economy, as well as the Chinese and American economies. 25 The economic relations between the US and China have expanded substantially since their signing of a bilateral trade agreement in 1979, with total annual trade between the two rising over the past three decades from US$2 billion to US$562 billion (as of 2013).26 China is currently the second-largest trading partner of the US (after Canada), its third-largest export market, and its number one source of imports.27 China provides a US$300 billion market for US exports and sales and is the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities (approximately US$1.3 trillion); significantly, China’s purchases of US government debt help keep US interest rates low.28 Overall, almost a tenth of US economic output and employment is directly linked to trade with East Asia.29 Moreover, US trade with China will continue to grow and, for the foreseeable future, will continue to be a foundation of US economic stability. While the US economy remains reliant on a growing Chinese economy, China itself is dependent on secure trade flows and imports, essential for a burgeoning economy that has been responsible for bringing many millions of Chinese citizens out of poverty. By 2050, it is expected that China will include 20 per cent of the world’s middle-class consumption and will be the world’s largest economy.30 In order to achieve this growth—and meet the energy and technology demands as it moves from an industrial manufacturing economy to a service-oriented economy—China needs to trade with a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific region. John Lee from the Centre of International Security Studies at Sydney University agrees that ‘China's export sector has been responsible for the creation of hundreds of millions of jobs, and the country still remains deeply dependent on outside technology and know-how’. 31 An example of China’s reliance on a stable environment for imports, particularly through the sea lanes of the South China Sea, can be found in its increasing oil imports. China currently imports over 55 per cent of its oil, half from the Middle East, and has become the largest importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels in the world; furthermore, it is anticipated that Chinese oil imports will rise to 65 per cent by 2020.32 This snapshot of economic and commercial interdependencies highlights the significance of a stable US China relationship. That view is reinforced by Bonnie Glaser from the US Center for Defense and Strategic Studies who has argued, in the context of the importance of the US-China relationship to the global economy, that all parties clearly have a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily.33

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (7/10) Economic growth is good for everyone. Growth increases life expectancy, education and quality of life while allowing the government to fund programs for the public good.

Furchtgott-Roth, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and former chief economist of the U.S. Department of Labor, 2013

(Diana, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and former chief economist of the U.S. Department of Labor, “Only Growth Can Sustain Us” New York Times, February 14, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/16/when-growth-is-not-a-good-goal/only-growth-can-sustain-us)

Economic growth raises standards of living for rich and poor countries alike. The more growth, the better.

In developing countries, higher G.D.P. growth results in lower infant mortality, running water, sewer systems, electricity, better schools and education for children, as can be seen from comparative World Bank data. As electric power plants replace wood stoves, the air is cleared of smog. As girls receive more education, birth rates naturally decline as women choose to make use of their human capital by entering the labor force.

In developed countries, economic growth gives us the tax revenue for cleaner air and water, for missile defense, for health and education programs. Stringent Environmental Protection Agency regulations do not come cheap. Republicans and Democrats both have extensive wish lists for favorite government programs, and the only way to pay for these is from the tax revenue from economic growth.

Here in America, we have all the food we can eat, and more clothes than we can fit in our closets. At the same time, we’re seeing deteriorating family structures that reduce educational performance. About three-quarters of poor families with children are headed by a single parent. Poor children may have cellphones, but they need competitive schools (like KIPP) to make sure they do not fall behind.

Our parents and grandparents are requiring more support as their life expectancies increase. People who live into their 80s and 90s need not just more medical services, but more technology and health aides to be comfortable at home. This also takes economic growth.

Henry Thoreau may be right that we can find God in nature. But it takes economic growth to keep nature pristine and all of us healthy enough to enjoy it.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (8/10) **PLAN – The United States should establish guaranteed annual military-to-military exchanges with the People’s Republic of China demanding that China abandon military expansionism in the South China Seas.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (9/10) Contention Three - SOLVENCY –

Only strong engagement solves the risk of crisisDenmark 14 - Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research

[Abraham M. Denmark, Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?, May 31, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-tensions-the-south-china-sea-spark-war-10572] doa 5-10-16

Chilly Times Ahead The future of these disputes is not promising for long-term peace and stability. Neither side has demonstrated any interest in backing down or compromising, and the potential for future escalation and crisis is high. China’s approach to these disputes is particularly problematic. Its refusal to compromise, its continued reliance on escalation, and its commitment to change the status quo (no matter how gradually) is a recipe for persistent tension. Most troubling is the confidence with which China approaches escalation. Beijing appears to see escalation as a tool that can be used with absolute control and predictability. China’s strategists and policy makers are fairly new to major power geopolitics, and have not learned the lessons their American and Russian counterparts learned during the Cold War: that escalation is a dangerous tool, that an adversary can respond in very unpredictable ways, and that tension can quickly spiral out of control. One problem on the near horizon is how China will react to the arrest of Chinese fishermen by the Philippines. Beijing will certainly react, and will again seek to punish Manila and strengthen China’s claims in the process. One option would be to arrest Philippine fishermen operating in waters claimed by China. Another more likely and more provocative response would be to evict the Philippine forces currently on the grounded Sierra Madre on the Second Thomas Reef. China has already harassed routine efforts by the Philippines to resupply those sailors, and may seek to tighten the blockade on the ship in order to force the sailors to withdraw. The potential for shots to be fired or another ship to be rammed and sunk would be high, and lives may be lost. Without serious engagement, China is unlikely to back down. Beijing has painted this issue as directly related to its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and its recent public marking of the 95th anniversary of the May 4 movement—in which the existing government was overthrown by a popular uprising that judged Beijing as weak in the face of foreign exploitation—strongly suggests that China’s leaders are sensitive to linkages between perceived weakness abroad and instability at home. With the growth of China’s economy likely to slow dramatically in coming years, Beijing appears to see incidents like these as useful in stirring nationalist sentiments at home to buttress the popular legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Should China use force against the Philippines, no matter how much Beijing may try to describe the act as defensive or reactive, the United States would probably be drawn into the crisis—certainly in a diplomatic sense, and potentially in a military sense as well. The United States will be unlikely to back down in such a situation, as the credibility of America’s willingness to intervene overseas has already come into question after decisions to not intervene in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or Assad’s crossing the chemical weapons “redline” in Syria. While Washington would certainly attempt to de-escalate any crisis and prevent the use of force, it will also be sure to demonstrate will and resolve in order to both deter hostilities and reassure its allies.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17First Affirmative Constructive

1AC (10/10) Absent military engagement – the US and China won’t be able to respond to potential crisis, that makes miscalculation likely.Quirk 11 – 9 – 15 – Lieutenant, US Navy, Young Leader and non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS

[Sean P. Quirk, Reconciling China’s PLAN: Strategic Intervention, Tactical Engagement, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/reconciling-chinas-plan-strategic-intervention-with-tactical-engagement/] doa 4-20-16

Ships that pass in the night, and speak each other in passing. Passing, harassing, and shadowing in the case of Chinese vessels meeting U.S. warships. Such exchanges comprise the unfortunate core of U.S.-China military-to-military (“mil-to-mil”) engagement. China’s harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and USS Cowpens in 2013 are but the most prominent cases of its persistent belligerence in the South China Sea. This tactically aggressive behavior from the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) reflects a grander expansion strategy emanating from Beijing. From new Chinese passports with the infamous nine-dashed line, media trumpeting Chinese claims over Japanese-governed Senkaku Islands, and maritime occupation of Scarborough Shoal, China’s maritime expansion is the well-orchestrated foreign policy of the Chinese Communist Party through its national ministries. Betting that war will not result, China is pushing the boundaries – literally – of its maritime claims, incrementally. American military analyst Robert Haddick calls the strategy “salami slicing,” or “the slow accumulation of small changes, none of which in isolation amounts to a casus belli, but which can add up over time to a significant strategic change” (p. 77). By building “facts on the ground” through occupation and declaration of new maritime territory, Beijing builds precedent and physical justification for Chinese claims. Beijing’s recent island construction and aggressive territorial incursions are the most recent events testing the will of the international community and United States. These events are not signals but rather dynamic action by Beijing to unilaterally dominate China’s near seas. Deteriorating U.S.-China Relations Earlier this September, the ninth track-II U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue convened in Honolulu, Hawaii, hosted by the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) and the Naval Postgraduate School. Some fifty U.S. and Chinese officials, military officers, and academics met in their private capacity for the unofficial discussions. The general consensus on both sides was the deteriorating state of U.S.-China relations and the need for both governments to have productive dialogue on their security concerns. This deep and widening chasm of distrust is leading to greater potential for misunderstanding and lethal miscalculation in times of crisis . The demand on both sides is for clear, substantive dialogue and binding agreements to sustain peace, yet one retired senior PLA official articulated the current state of affairs. He said, “If the U.S. wants to make China a threat, China will become a threat. China can only respond.”

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Inherency

Answers to: Strong U.S. Stance Now

(___)

(___) Even if there is some military to military engagement, US hasn’t taken a strong stance on SCS claimsBroderick 15 - Research Intern at the Project 2049 Institute, MS Foreign Service Program @ Georgetown

[Broderick, Kelsey. "Chinese Activities in the South China Sea." (2015), Project 2049, http://www.project2049.net/documents/150511_Broderick_Chinese_Activities_South_China_Sea_Pivot.pdf] doa 5-10-16

Lastly, the U.S. rebalance lacks any defined position on disputed territory and sea claims. Even though the United States and the Philippines share a mutual defense treaty, this treaty does not state whether or not the United States is obligated to come to the aid of the Philippines if the territory the Philippines controls in the South China Sea is under attack.53 The U.S. has not pushed China to account for its nine-dashed line in terms of its UNCLOS commitments, nor has the U.S. taken any steps to label the land formations that are under contention in the sea—a problem further compounded by the fact that the United States has continued to refrain from signing UNCLOS.54

China’s “salami slicing” tactics are likely to continue if left unchecked. The U.S. claims to be committed to its allies and partners as well as to the rule of law, but it has not done enough to dissuade China from continuing its aggressive maneuvering in the South China Sea. If China were to take a military stance in the region or, perhaps more likely, if a U.S. ally decides to retaliate against Chinese encroachment, the U.S. would have to decide just how willing it is to flex its muscle.55 Without a pre-determined, clear stance on this issue, it is unlikely that the U.S. would be able to react quickly and decisively. And without strong U.S. action, China would clearly have won the hand by showing that, in terms of the South China Sea, the rebalance was mostly empty words.

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Answers to: China isn’t Expanding

(___)

(___) China is salami-slicing, the navy continues to push boundaries in the South China Sea.Britz 15 – MA of Military Art & Science – Strategic Studies, MBA – UMASS

[Britz, Jared W. The South China Sea Territorial Disputes: The Catalyst for a United States-Vietnamese Security Partnership. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, 2015] doa 5-11-16

China’s strategy in the SCS, nicknamed Salami Slicing by outside observers, has been effective thus far in meeting China’s goals in the SCS. The goal of China’s Salami Slicing strategy is to establish more credible forces than the other claimants can hope to match and to give China legal credibility for its claims in the SCS.133 China only deals bilaterally with nations concerning territorial dispute. Using incremental steps, China seeks to change the conditions on the ground with the goal of creating de facto conditions of control over time. China puts the onus on the other countries to indirectly counter its efforts. Few nations have been effective at opposing China’s actions in the SCS. One example of this is China’s establishment of Sansha City on Woody Island in the Paracels.134 China created Sansha City as a military garrison that has the capability to protect its claims. Woody Island is symbolic in the struggle for sovereignty in the SCS; China forcefully seized the island from South Vietnam in 1974.135 Incremental steps in China’s Salami Slicing strategy, rarely garner a response from other claimants. Over time, China’s actions in the SCS amount to seizing territory and exercising greater control piece-by-piece. China claims the SCS as part of its sovereign territory and that the sea is vital to its national security and a lifeline for its economic prosperity.136 China does not often use the PLAN but uses the Chinese Marine Surveillance unit. The Chinese Marine Surveillance unit is a maritime law enforcement agency of China that is made of three fleets of patrol vessels that monitor Chinese territorial waters. In the SCS, the Chinese Marine Surveillance unit regularly conducts armed patrols and monitors the disputed islands, which has helped China to established greater control over the disputed area. If China continues to be successful implementing its Salami Slicing strategy, U.S. freedom of navigation in the SCS could be at risk.

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Answers to: No risk of accidental war (1/2)

(___)

(___) SCS risks miscalculation that leads to war – territory claims are spurring Asian arms races

Britz 15 – MA of Military Art & Science – Strategic Studies, MBA – UMASS

[Britz, Jared W. The South China Sea Territorial Disputes: The Catalyst for a United States-Vietnamese Security Partnership. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, 2015] doa 5-11-16

The competing claims in the SCS have raised the risk of armed conflict in the region and resulted in an unofficial arms race.144 Much of the increase in military spending in Asia is allocated towards capabilities in the maritime domain, reflecting the geography of the region and the location of many of the security concerns.145 Military spending increased dramatically across Asia from 2010-2014, increasing over twentyeight percent in the four years and a total dollar amount increase of over $344 billion.146 The largest increases in East Asia came from the sub region of Southeast Asia, which includes many of the countries that border the SCS. Vietnam’s military procurement has centered on improving its naval capability, most notably, purchases of six Kilo-class submarines, upgraded naval patrol vessels, and reconnaissance aircraft. In terms of overall spending, China spends the most on its defense out of all the nations in Asia. Military expenditures reflect the security concerns of a nation. The Asian arms race increases the amount of military equipment that could potentially operate in the SCS and increases the risk of tactical miscalculation that could have strategic consequences. Miscalculation: A Threat to Stability All the nations that operate militarily in the SCS face the threat of miscalculation that leads to conflict. The SCS is congested with military, paramilitary, and commercial vessels and aircraft. Numerous nations have economic interests in the region and competing powers regularly come into contact in the SCS. China’s Salami Slicing strategy especially risks a miscalculation by taking incremental action to gain control over time. These actions may result in a military response if China does not properly assess the situation. States go to war for numerous reasons, and the SCS territorial disputes risks escalation of tensions from powers attempting to assert its claims.

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Answers to: No risk of accidental war (2/2) (___)

(___) Miscalculation risk in the SCS is high

Britz 15 – MA of Military Art & Science – Strategic Studies, MBA – UMASS

[Britz, Jared W. The South China Sea Territorial Disputes: The Catalyst for a United States-Vietnamese Security Partnership. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, 2015] doa 5-11-16

Both China and the United States realize the importance of good relations between the two nations.121 Globalization and the economic interconnectivity, make conflict between China and the United States inexcusably costly and detrimental to the world. Knowing this, Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his desire to build strategic trust between the two nations on his recent visit with the Obama Administration at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting.122 In 2013, President Obama concluded that China and the United States should continue to work on a “new model” for its relationship and seek areas of cooperation, proper management of differences, and expanded trust through dialogue.123 As both sides work to improve trust, each must be careful not to further escalate tensions between the two nations. One possible point where tensions may escalate between US-CN is in the SCS. In the SCS, some believe the best characterization of the US-CN relationship is that of adversaries. Since 2000, naval incidents between the two nations have led to a periodic escalation of tensions.124 Both nations disagree on how the other should operate in the SCS. The United States does not recognize the legality of China’s 9 dash line and China does not recognize the U.S. right to navigate freely in the SCS. As Kaplan pointed out, China has ratified the UNCLOS, but does not adhere to it, while the United States adheres to the UNCLOS, but has not ratified it.125 These two conflicting interests have put the two powerful nations at odds and has heightened the risk of conflict based on miscalculations.

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Answers to: SCS isn’t Key to Economy (___)

(___) SCS is globally significant – trade lanes & resourcesBritz 15 – MA of Military Art & Science – Strategic Studies, MBA – UMASS

[Britz, Jared W. The South China Sea Territorial Disputes: The Catalyst for a United States-Vietnamese Security Partnership. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, 2015] doa 5-11-16

The SCS is strategically important, not only to China, but also to the world. Many factors account for the SCS’s strategic importance, particularly the shipping lane and the natural resources. The United States, because of the importance of the region, has recently increased its engagement with the nations of the region and seeks to build better relations. Recent Chinese reactions to U.S. presence in the SCS have caused increased tensions between the two nations. The relationship between the United States and China is complex. The relationship can be characterized as partners, competitors, or adversaries; depending on the issue.13 Considering the recent assertive stance by China in the SCS, the relationship there appears more adversarial.14 China’s actions in the territorial disputes in the SCS received a response from President Obama in the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), which stated, “we remain alert to China’s military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes.”15 The ongoing tensions between China and other SCS nations revolve around territorial disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. China’s most active rival is Vietnam. 16 Vietnam and China have a history of armed conflict over disputed territorial claims. The two countries fought over disputed island claims in 1974 and 1988, as well as fighting a short ground war in northern Vietnam in 1979.17 In the aftermath of the 1974 conflict, China gained control over the entire Paracel Island chain. The 1988 conflict gave China possession of the Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands. The U.S military is striving to maintain its influence in Asia, but confronts many challenges. The United States has long used its alliances in the Asia-Pacific to underwrite security. Now, instead of increased military spending, the United States seeks new opportunities to partner with nations in order to advance its goals in Asia.18 The 2015 NSS identified Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia as new opportunities to partnering in Asia.19 Vietnam and Malaysia have territorial disputes in the SCS while all three have an Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that overlaps with China’s 9 dash line map.

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Answers to: War won’t Escalate (1/2)

(___)

(___) Risk of escalatory conflict likelyCronin & de la Beaumelle 16 - Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Research Intern at CNAS

[Patrick M. Cronin and Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle, May 02, 2016, How the Next US President Should Handle the South China Sea, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/how-the-next-us-president-should-handle-the-south-china-sea/] doa 5-16-16

Beijing will test the mettle of the next U.S. administration in the South China Sea. At a minimum, China is determined to use “passive assertiveness” to exercise greater control over this jugular of international commerce. Fortifying artificial islands, executing law enforcement operations, and issuing diplomatic broadsides—while dangling economic incentives in an effort to dismantle multilateral cooperation—all appear to be efforts likely to continue and intensify in the immediate future. But more aggressive military maneuvers and the risk of escalation should not be discounted. A new president should expect to be tested early and often over U.S. surveillance operations within China’s 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, the protection of America’s Philippine ally, and support of other claimant-states such as Vietnam. The level of tension President Barack Obama’s successor inherits next January, however, hinges in no small measure on what transpires in the weeks and months ahead. With the coming judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the case that has been dubbed Philippines v. China, President Xi Jinping may prefer to test the will of a distracted lame-duck U.S. leader now, rather than wait for a new one who may have to demonstrate his or her resolve from the outset. As China has so far been successful at pushing a de facto context further in its favor, Beijing is likely to try to have the new U.S. president face a fait accompli in the South China Sea. Perhaps in light of this, the United States is continuing its policy of leaning far forward to reassure friends in the region that Washington is determined to curb China’s excessive claims without precipitating conflict. Accordingly, the Defense Department is investing additional resources in the domain awareness and minimal defensive capabilities of key regional states, and top-level leadership has increased its exchanges with regional powers. The South China Sea has become a litmus test for the Obama administration’s strategy of rebalancing to Asia. Hence, what the United States does or does not do in the waters and corridors of power around Southeast Asia in the coming weeks and months will set the standard by which U.S. credibility and regional policy will be judged during the next administration. Take the issue of Scarborough Shoal, where there have been concerns about China beginning land reclamation on the disputed reef effectively seized from the Philippines in 2012. If the United States were to specify that Scarborough Shoal is covered under the mutual defense treaty with Manila, the demarche could preempt Chinese reclamation of the shoal or catalyze a crisis, or both. Regardless, the issue will still be a flashpoint over the next several years.

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Answers to: War won’t Escalate (2/2) (__)

(__) A misunderstanding in the South China Sea could easily escalate into a great power war.

Kim 16 - Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University

[Kim, Jihyun. "Possible Future of the Contest in the South China Sea." The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2016)] doa 5-11-16

There has been growing concern in recent years about China’s becoming a threat to regional and global security, as its expansionist ambitions could undermine stability in East Asia and beyond. Whereas China claims that it has no hegemonic ambitions or aspirations to territorial expansion, ‘China’s lack of transparency surrounding its growing military capabilities and strategic decision-making’ has made both its neighbours and the United States suspicious of the country’s intentions.1 In particular, territorial disputes in the South China Sea have become a major regional security concern, one which could clash with the US strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, especially in light of China’s flexing its military muscles.2 For Beijing, the power game in the South China Sea is not merely an isolated issue but a significant piece of the overall picture that will complete the process of China’s re-emergence as a dominant power after its century of humiliation. However, a recent upsurge in tension, partly due to Beijing’s greater assertiveness, as manifest in military activities, land reclamation, and energy explorations in what it considers to be its own particular and traditional sphere of influence, has renewed concerns that the area is becoming a minefield with global consequences . Certain states in the region have consequently strengthened their relations with the United States to counter China, in line with Washington’s efforts to rebalance to Asia and reinvigorate America’s security ties with its traditional Asian allies and partners. This has further complicated the issue, making the South China Sea a centre for big power rivalry. Taken as a whole, the South China Sea disputes could be a useful indicator when evaluating the ‘China threat’ thesis. This is also an interesting test case for examining the effectiveness of America’s influence when dealing with what seem to be ‘Asian problems’. It can also shed light on broader issues, including the prospects for Sino-US relations and the future of the regional order in Asia.

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Answer to Interdependence Checks War

(___)

(___) No checks – interdependence and interests won’t stop escalationBlain 15 - Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College, Commanding Officer of the 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment

[Jason Blain, The Dragon and The Eagle in the South China Sea: is conflict between China and the US inevitable?, Australian Defence Journal, Jul/Aug 2015] doa 5-6-16

Conclusion Recent behaviour by China in asserting its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea would seem to suggest that Beijing may be abandoning a ‘peaceful rise’ strategy in favour of using its rapidly developing military power to resolve historical claims. While this behaviour may lead to confrontation with its smaller neighbours, this article has argued that the current economic interdependencies and military disparities between China and the US suggest that conflict in the South China Sea between the two is not inevitable during the next decade. A likely outcome, as proposed by Carl Thayer, is that China and the US will maintain a relationship of cooperation and friction, whereby ‘both countries will work separately to secure their interests through multilateral institutions as well as continuing to engage each other on points of mutual interest’.48 However, as noted by Rory Medcalf and C. Raja Mohan: There is no guarantee that either diplomacy or economic interdependence could stop conflict from beginning or escalating. The 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War is a reminder that seemingly localised security shocks can have unpredictable and devastating consequences.49 With an increasing US presence in the Asia-Pacific and enhanced security partnerships with littoral nations in the South China Sea, notably with The Philippines and Vietnam, the US now has a great deal at stake in any confrontation between these nations and China. Failure to respond could undermine US credibility in the region.50 And while conflict between China and the US serves neither nation’s interests, the potential for the US to be drawn into a conflict through its regional partnerships is a real possibility. This article has argued that it is in the interests of all parties, and indeed the international community, that the waters of the South China Sea not become the military front line of the coming decades. However, within the context of increasing tension between the US and China over the South China Sea, there are indications that China’s rise is unlikely to be a tranquil one.51

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Answers to: War will be limited

(___)

(___) SCS conflict goes nuclear and effects millions.Rando 9/29/15 –U.S. Correspondent and a frequent contributing author for the Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Warfare Journal and the Non-Conventional Threat Newsletter, DHS Certified Weapons of Mass Destruction/CBRNE Instructor, Weapons of Mass Destruction Hazardous Materials Specialist, Radiological-Nuclear HAZMAT Technician, NFPA Certified HAZMAT Defensive Operations and HAZMAT Technician[Frank G., Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, CBRNe Portal, http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation/]

The argument for an increased U.S. naval presence in East Asia is certainly not without precedent. This contested aquatic region has tremendous geopolitical, strategic and economic significance. While, the Persian Gulf has immense importance and global recognition due to its strategic location in the Middle East, as well its significance to global commerce, industry and sought after oil, the South China Sea is crucially important to nations seeking to obtain their economic riches and geopolitical advantages . ¶ The South China Sea is geographically located near the Pacific Ocean and encompasses an area of 1.4 million square miles (3.5 million square kilometers). As a semi-closed area, the South China Sea extends from the Singapore Strait to the Taiwan Strait, with China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan surrounding it. In terms of economic value, fishery stocks and potential fossil fuel reserves are two major commodities that may spark an armed conflict, even to the point of nuclear confrontation. As a rich source of the region’s staple diet, fish, the sea guarantees a steady flow of food to the countries of the region. Control and supremacy of the sea would also assure claiming the much touted hydrocarbon reserves in the seabed, possibly exceeding those of the OPEC nations such as Iraq and Kuwait. The conquest of this vast resource would virtually assure energy independence and high monetary returns for those that would gain supremacy over the South China Sea. Thus, seizing the opportunity to gain dominance will lead to control and manipulation of vital food and energy resources, economic wealth and geopolitical power in the region.¶ A scenario of regional and maritime domination and control could lead to the partial or total exclusion of adjacent nation-states to access any food or natural resources derived from a sea ruled with an iron hand; leading to a massive complex humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions from malnutrition and starvation, limitations in energy production, and economic collapse. These factors make the South China Sea a national security priority for nations in the region, including one of the world’s superpowers, China.

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Answers to: Won’t Use Nuclear Weapons (___)

(___) Conflict will go nuclear – antagonizing is the worst solutionTikhonova 15 - Russia expert at ValueWalk, citing Zhang Baohui, Prof @ Political Science and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies @ Lingnan

[Polina Tikhonova, “US Faces Nuclear War Threat Over South China Sea – Chinese Professor,” 11/28, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-nuclear-war-south-china-sea/] doa 5/9/16

China is willing to start a nuclear war with the United States over the S outh C hina S ea , according to a Chinese professor. Beijing’s rhetoric after an incident with a U.S. warship sailed to the South China Sea suggests that Chinese decision-makers could resort to more “concrete and forceful measures” to counter the U.S. Navy, according to Zhang Baohui, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. “If so, a face-off between the two navies becomes inevitable . Even worse, the face-off may trigger an escalation towards military conflicts ,” the professor wrote in a piece for RSIS Commentary. But, according to Baohui, the U.S. military is “oblivious” to this scenario, since Washington decision-makers think America’s conventional military superiority discourages China from responding to such “provocations” in the South China Sea militarily. However, this “U.S. expectation is flawed , as China is a major nuclear power,” the professor wrote. “When cornered , nuclear-armed states can threaten asymmetric escalation to deter an adversary from harming its key interests,” he added. Baohui then refers to the military parade in Beijing that took place on Sept. 3 and revealed that China’s new generation of tactical missiles – such as the DF-26 – are capable of being armed with nuclear warheads. Moreover, according to the latest reports, China’s air-launched long-range cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. U.S. could provoke nuclear war with China And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in the South China Sea, the disputed islands present China’s strategic interests , which is why this kind of asymmetry in stakes would certainly give Beijing an advantage in “the balance of resolve ” over Washington , according to the professor. And if the South China Sea situation escalates and starts spiraling into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face a choice of either backing down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and the world’s largest military force with a strength of approximately 2.285 million personnel.¶ “Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs, either in reputation or human lives, for the U.S.,” Baohui wrote. So it would be unwise for the U.S. to further provoke China in the disputed area, since China’s willingness to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence credibility could easily escalate the conflict into a military confrontation that would ultimately harm U.S. interests, according to the professor. China will join Russia in nuclear war with NATO With NATO member state Turkey downing a Russian jet in its airspace, there is already a high risk of military confrontation in the world. And with China being so close and allied with Russia, Beijing decision-makers could see the incident with the Russian warplane as an opportunity to avenge the West for the South China Sea provocations.

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Answers to: No Economy Impact

(___)

(___) The uncertainty of the economy emboldens adversaries and scares allies – accesses an impact magnifier to all impacts.Mann 14 – MA –Global Security Studies – Johns Hopkins University

[Eric N. Mann, “Austerity, Economic Decline, and Financial Weapons of War: A New Paradigm for Global Security,” May 2014, https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf]

Conclusion The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states. The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system. The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States. The importance of this paradigm shift in U.S. national security, which places new emphasis on the causal relationships between economics and global security threats, will require innovative strategies. These strategies must involve multilateral and domestic policy solutions in the following key areas: international institutions, threat response, and U.S. fiscal policy.

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Answers to: Asia Pivot means no engagement (___)

(___) The pivot does not represent the end of engagement—the US has interest in cooperating with China because of the implications that come with pushing China too far

Johnson 15, Senior Political Advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific from 2009-2011, 2015

(William, “Why a forceful U.S. response to china’s artificial island-building won’t float” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/21/why-a-forceful-u-s-response-to-chinas-artificial-island-building-wont-float/)

China’s creation of artificial islands on disputed South China Sea reefs — the actual dredging and pumping of sand, ongoing since 2014 — represents Beijing’s latest attempt to extend its territory and exert pressure over the five other countries that claim parts of the Sea. In response to the island-building, members of the U.S. defense community have in recent weeks called for the United States to get tough on China. Earlier this month, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter asked for options for sending U.S. aircraft and ships within 12 nautical miles of the construction. In a May 13 testimony before Congress, Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shear said that the United States planned to station surveillance aircraft and long-range bombers in Australia. (He later claimed to have misspoken, after pushback from Australia.) Rear Admiral Harry Harris, Pacific Fleet Commander, plans to station three additional vessels within patrol range of the Spratly Islands — the archipelago that includes the reefs — to respond to Chinese activity there. This approach is misguided. Neither Carter, Shear, nor PACFLEET Commander Harris appear to be taking seriously the potential for a violent response from the Chinese. The risk in pushing China too far is great, as China has demonstrated on multiple occasions , when U.S. actions led to dangerous confrontations. American military planners’ real concern is that the Chinese will use the newly constructed islands — which certainly include a runway large enough to handle military aircraft, and may include facilities to dock military vessels — to extend the scope of their Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategy. Military installations in the South China Sea would provide platforms for land, air and sea-launched weapon systems sufficient to raise the cost of U.S. military actions in the region to prohibitive levels. The question then becomes how best to deal with this possibility. Today the United States doesn’t have the resources in place for a major effort in the area unless it is willing to take some very great risks. The only naval vessel home-ported within patrol distance of the area is the Fort Worth, a new littoral combat ship. Otherwise, the closest assets are the ships of the U.S. 7thFleet, based in Japan, which would have to sail through areas within the scope of China’s existing A2AD capability in order to reach the area. Ships from further away could not be used in a short engagement. A military confrontation holds little prospect of success.

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Answers to: Engagement hurts hegemony (__)

(__) Empirically denied and the international order is resilientDrezner 13 – Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School and a contributing editor to Foreign Policy. (“The Year of Living Hegemonically”, December 27, 2013, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/27/the_year_of_living_hegemonically#sthash.LZkDlW9c.FXL0THBU.dpbs)Mead is not drawing this kind of conclusion from thin air. What he's saying matches what many Americans and non-Americans believe. All of the public polling in 2013 confirms the trend: more people think the United States is less powerful than it used to be. More than ever, Americans want to focus on domestic problems and leave the rest of the world alone.A quick glance at the 2013 headlines suggests that the Obama administration has been leading U.S. public opinion from behind. On Syria, for example, President Obama first came out in favor of using force against the Assad regime. As the American public made clear their strong aversion to that policy, the administration switched course twice, first seeking a congressional resolution and then accepting a deal that preserved the Bashar al-Assad regime. A single NSA contractor has wreaked havoc on U.S. intelligence capabilities, badly strained relations with Germany and Brazil, and tarnished America's image abroad. And allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim have grown exasperated with the Obama administration's mangled foreign policy process. Everywhere, the United States seemed to be in retreat. Meanwhile, America's rivals have had an industrious 2013. China is busy buying access to the Caribbean, bullying its ASEAN neighbors, and expanding its air defense zones in the East China Sea. Vladimir Putin has done his darnedest to be a thorn in America's side. He granted Edward Snowden asylum, bolstered Assad's regime in Syria, and most importantly, coerced its allies in the near abroad to stay in Russia's economic orbit. Meanwhile, Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, has launched a public relations blitz designed to re-ingratiate the Islamic republic back into the good graces of the international community. At the same time, Tehran is ruthlessly prosecuting the war in Syria while launching cyberattacks in Saudi Arabia. These sorts of trends tend to give U.S. strategists the heebie-jeebies. A staple of international relations thinking for decades has been that U.S. hegemony is the mainstay of global order. A staple of international relations thinking for decades has been that U.S. hegemony is the mainstay of global order. According to this "theory of hegemonic stability," peace and prosperity are only likely to persist when a liberal superpower is prepared to act to keep markets open and stamp out brewing conflict. If Mead or Robert Kagan are correct, then a United States that is both unwilling and unable to stabilize the rest of the world really should be a source of concern.

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Answers to: US doesn’t matter (___) Strong U.S. stance key – prevents Chinese challengesErickson 16 - Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)'s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) [(Andrew S. "America’s Security Role in the South China Sea," Naval War College Review 69.1 (2016): 7] doa 5-15-16)The Need for a Paradigm Shift As Peter Dutton has long emphasized, the way forward for the United States is clear: Even as China advances, we cannot retreat. Together with the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea is a vital part of the global commons, on which the international system depends to operate effectively and equitably. Half of global commerce and 90 percent of regional energy imports transit the South China Sea alone. We cannot allow Beijing to carve out within these international waters and airspace a zone of exceptionalism in which its neighbors face bullying without recourse and vital global rules and norms are subordinated to its parochial priorities. This would set back severely what Beijing itself terms * "democracy" or "democratization in international relations."* Instead, we must maintain the national will and force structure to continue to operate in, under, and over the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas and preserve them as peaceful parts of the global commons for all to use without fear. Accepting Moderate Friction. Here, given China's growing power and our own sustained power and resolve, we must accept a zone of bounded strategic friction and contestation. Such friction is manageable, and we must manage it. To do so effectively, we should develop the mind-set that we are in a great power relationship wherein we need to act to protect our vital interests and support the global system even as China is working to promote its own vital interests. It means preparing to live in the same strategic space together, with overlapping vital interests. This is the essence of great power relations, reflecting a reversion to historical norms after the brief and unsustainable unipolar moment is over-even as the United States remains strong as the world's leading power, and the world remains far from being a true "multipolar" system.[dagger] This robust but realistic approach includes accepting the fundamental reality that we will not roll back China's existing occupation of islands and other features, just as we will not accept its rolling back its neighbors' occupation of other islands and features. Most fundamentally, the United States must preserve peace and a stable status quo in a vital yet vulnerable region that remains haunted by history. Embracing Competitive Coexistence. The paradigm we need to think about is a form of great power relations that I term "competitive coexistence." It is not a comprehensive rivalry, as between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Hence, charges that it constitutes a "containment strategy" driven by a "Cold War mentality" would be inaccurate. Rather, it has specific competitive * aspects that we should not exacerbate gratuitously, yet must not shy away from. China's current leadership is clearly comfortable with a certain level of friction and tension. Given the current unfortunate circumstances, for the foreseeable future we too must accept-and make clear that we are comfortable with-a certain level of friction and tension. The above paradigm has important implications for both U.S. rhetoric and policy. First, American officials must recognize what their Chinese counterparts have long understood: words matter. The United States must not appear to embrace Chinese policy concepts or formulations that make us appear to fear tension, or to be willing to yield to Beijing's principled policy positions in order to mitigate it. Such optics would only encourage Chinese testing and assertiveness vis-à-vis Washington and its regional allies.

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Answers to: U.S. Position encourages China (1/2) (__)

(___) SCS could escalate – U.S. position is keyErickson 16 - Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)'s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI)

[Erickson, Andrew S. "America’s Security Role in the South China Sea," Naval War College Review 69.1 (2016): 7] doa 5-15-16

Tipping Point. My Naval War College colleague, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) director Peter Dutton, characterizes the aforementioned Chinese activities as a "tipping point," meriting U.S. government response. "Militarization of the newly constructed islands," which China appears determined to do, will, he argues cogently, alter strategic stability and the regional balance of power. "It will turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait under threat of land-based power."* This is part of a "regional maritime strategy . . . to expand China's interior to cover the maritime domain under an umbrella of continental control."[dagger] Dutton contends, and I agree, that Beijing's militarization of artificial islands sets the clock back to a time when raw power was the basis for dispute resolution. China's power play, combined with its refusal to arbitrate, its aversion to multilateral negotiations, and its refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations on the basis of equality, undermines regional stability and weakens important global institutions.[double dagger] As bad as things are already, they could get worse-particularly if American attention and resolve are in question. In attempting to prevent China from using military force to resolve island and maritime claims disputes in the South China Sea, the United States will increasingly face Beijing's three-pronged trident designed precisely to preserve such a possibility. Maritime militia and coast guard forces will be forward deployed, possibly enveloping disputed features as part of a "Cabbage Strategy" that dares the U.S. military to use force against nonmilitary personnel.§ Such forces would be supported by a deterrent backstop that includes both China's navy and its "anti-navy" of land-based antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD), or "counterintervention,"* forces, collectively deploying the world's largest arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the region, only Vietnam also has a maritime militia, and the U.S. Coast Guard is not positioned to oppose China's. Meanwhile, China's coast guard is already larger than those of all its neighbors combined, and still growing rapidly. More broadly, worries about China's island construction, developing force posture in the South China Sea, and accompanying official statements exemplify broader foreign concern about China's rise-that as it becomes increasingly powerful, Beijing will * Abandon previous restraint in word and deed * Bully its smaller neighbors * Implicitly or explicitly threaten the use of force to resolve disputes * Attempt to change-or else run roughshod over-important international norms that preserve peace in Asia and underwrite the global system on which mutual prosperity depends China's combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and deployments has corrosive implications for regional stability and international norms. That's why the United States now needs to adjust conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize the situation and balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and influence.

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Answers to: U.S. Position encourages China (2/2) (___)

(___) Only US leadership can solve SCS warGoh 13 - Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University

[Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia. Oxford University Press, 2013 pg. 98-99]

In the South China Sea (SCS), China, Taiwan, and a number of Southeast Asian states stake rival claims to three groups of islands and atolls—the Paracel Islands, claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan and occupied since 1974 by China; the Spratly Islands, claimed in their entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines and Malaysia; and Scarborough Reef and Macclesfield Bank, which the Philippines, China, and Taiwan dispute.94 The wider regional order implications of these conflicting claims arise from their potential militarization and interruption of vital international sea lines of communication (SLOCs). As the United States is a non-claimant and neutral on the territorial disputes between China and its smaller Southeast Asian neighbours, this might be a good case for testing the limits of US authority and the extent of Chinese and ASEAN authority in conflict management. Yet key SLOCs in this area ensure US interest in the issue by way of the foundational public good, freedom of navigation. In this regard, US power will have functioned to limit the dispute to a largely bilateral one with China over the military uses of maritime zones. On the territorial disputes themselves, though, the limits of the evolving international maritime legal regime either to compel resolution or arbitrate amongst competing sovereignty claims, as well as the underdevelopment of regional conflict-avoidance frameworks, have exacerbated unilateral assertions of authority. This has in turn stimulated Southeast Asian demands for the U nited States to exert authoritative influence diplomatically and by military deterrence.

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Military Engagement Advantage (1/4)

Advantage Two – Military Engagement-

The US and China meeting in military-military exchanges – but they are currently tied to political issues. Establishing permanent ones allows them to avoid crisis.Kamphausen & Drun 16 – a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research [Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-to-Military Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16

Areas of Convergence in the Mil-Mil Dimension Setting realistic expectations. A common thread that has emerged from experiences in carrying out mil-mil programs, as well as numerous interviews conducted with senior officers and policymakers on both sides, is that the optimal mil-mil program must recognize the aforementioned challenges and thereby avoid some of the more dramatic swings in the relationship. This necessitates—and both sides have argued for—modest steps, despite the fact that the mil-mil relationship is already more than 30 years old. The first area of convergence is this shared interest in moving mil-mil engagement forward while keeping expectations modest. Demonstrating the value of an enduring mil-mil relationship. A second area of convergence is the judgment that cancelation of mil-mil activities to demonstrate displeasure with policy decisions or military developments by the other side is an approach that has outlived its utility. As noted earlier, both parties have engaged in this practice in the past. It is precisely because both sides perceived the costs of canceling mil-mil to be low that such an approach was so often employed. Mercifully, both sides are realizing that setting a low bar for suspending engagement serves neither country’s interests, nor for that matter the interests of the region, and a higher standard—no cancelations —is now more generally accepted . Indeed, after the most recent U.S. decision to sell a package of weapons to Taiwan, China chose not to cancel mil-mil activities, which is a sign of progress.27 Establishing parameters for the U.S.-China relationship. A third area of convergence is that both countries share an interest in defining and delimiting what the new great-power relationship between the United States and China will become in terms of mil-mil engagement. This includes several dimensions. The first is declaratory and centers on the objectives for what the relationship might become, whether it results in a fourth Sino-U.S. communiqué on the emerging relationship or is defined progressively by presidents after bilateral visits. A second dimension of such an effort is to clarify the intentions each state has for the Asia-Pacific. China desires that the United States continue to avow that it does not seek to contain China’s rise and that it will respect China’s sovereignty, integrity, and system. The United States, for its part, among other things, desires to hear that China does not seek the end of U.S. military presence in the region, that U.S. relationships with allies and strong partners (including Taiwan) will not be threatened, and that freedom of operations in international air and sea are guaranteed. A final aspect of this area of convergence is to discuss what the two militaries might usefully accomplish together that will strengthen the existing international order. Determining an appropriate set of mil-mil activities .

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Military Engagement Advantage (2/4) Mil-Mil engagement boosts overall US-Sino relations – prevents unrelated issue spilloverKamphausen & Drun 16 – Senior Vice President for Research National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research

[Roy D. & Jessica, Sino-U.S. Military-to-Military Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/ publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16

Risk Reduction Mil-mil engagement can also contribute to risk reduction in the overall bilateral relationship, especially in areas of shared threat and vulnerability. Improved mil-mil relations support and facilitate broader collaborative efforts in counterterrorism, antipiracy, disaster response and relief, and, more recently, climate change mitigation. Collaboration between the United States and China can help ensure stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and offers the promise of the provision of public goods for the shared benefit of all in the region. Management of Tensions An effective mil-mil relationship can manage tensions over issues on which the two sides do not agree and cannot make concessions, but which they need the other side to at least understand. For example, the United States has critically important alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific that cannot be sacrificed for improved U.S.-China relations. An example of managing tensions in this regard was the suggestion by a senior adviser to this project that China was willing to engage in trilateral dialogues on a variety of security topics in a “United States + Asian ally + China” formulation. On the Chinese side, Beijing affirms its sovereign right to “rise” and pursue national security goals—such as defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity—that contribute to modernization and development within the current window of opportunity. Beijing often views U.S. actions in the region that appear to endanger these goals as part of a concerted containment policy to prevent China from attaining its development efforts. Thus, U.S. actions and statements that reassure Beijing on this point serve broader purposes of managing tension. This reality of conflicting national interests is compounded by misperceptions and unilateral moves that have largely exacerbated existing distrust in U.S.-China relations. The Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia” is a high priority to Washington. The rebalance, however, is viewed by Beijing as primarily military-focused, not least due to perceptions of increased U.S. military activities in the Chinese periphery. Conversely, the United States is wary of China’s deployment of its military, coast guard, and other security services in the South China Sea and elsewhere—apparently to pursue changes in the status quo to favor Chinese interests—which both threatens U.S. leadership in the region and affects perceptions of U.S. commitment among regional allies. In the absence of real conflict, the usefulness of the United States’ unmatched military power in East Asia is potentially limited. It is worth noting, however, that Washington’s commitment to allies and security partners remains firm, and if called on, the U.S. Armed Forces would execute contingency plans in defense of those relationships. Enhanced mil-mil contacts can reduce the risk of miscalculation through the confidence building that declining security tensions might bring. Neither side wants to engage in a war, given fiscal constraints and high personnel and recapitulation costs, as well as the untold impact on each country and the region as a whole. A U.S.-China conflict would impose unimaginably high costs and prove disastrous for not only the two countries involved but the entire Asia-Pacific.

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Military Engagement Advantage (3/4) Specifically centering that contact around the SCS boosts overall relationsThayer 13—Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defense Academy

[Carlyle, “Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, 13 May 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/]

However, a review of past US–China military-to-military interaction indicates that an agreement to jointly manage security in the South China Sea is unlikely because of continuing strategic mistrust between the two countries. This is also because the currents of regionalism are growing stronger.

As such, a third scenario is more likely than the previous two: that China and the United States will maintain a relationship of cooperation and friction. In this scenario, both countries work separately to secure their interests through multilateral institutions such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the Enlarged ASEAN Maritime Forum. But they also continue to engage each other on points of mutual interest. The Pentagon has consistently sought to keep channels of communication open with China through three established bilateral mechanisms: Defense Consultative Talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks.

On the one hand, these multilateral mechanisms reveal very little about US–China military relations. Military-to-military contacts between the two countries have gone through repeated cycles of cooperation and suspension, meaning that it has not been possible to isolate purely military-to-military contacts from their political and strategic settings. On the other hand, the channels have accomplished the following: continuing exchange visits by high-level defence officials; regular Defense Consultation Talks; continuing working-level discussions under the MMCA; agreement on the ‘7-point consensus’; and no serious naval incidents since the 2009 USNS Impeccable affair. They have also helped to ensure continuing exchange visits by senior military officers; the initiation of a Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the ministerial-level Strategic & Economic Dialogue process; agreement to hold meetings between coast guards; and agreement on a new working group to draft principles to establish a framework for military-to-military cooperation. So the bottom line is that, despite ongoing frictions in their relationship, the United States and China will continue engaging with each other. Both sides understand that military-to-military contacts are a critical component of bilateral engagement . Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two militaries could spill over and have a major negative impact on bilateral relations in general. But strategic mistrust will probably persist in the absence of greater transparency in military-to-military relations. In sum, Sino-American relations in the South China Sea are more likely to be characterised by cooperation and friction than a modus vivendi of collaboration or, a worst-case scenario, armed conflict.

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Military Engagement Advantage (4/4)

US-China nuclear war will destroy the planet – only improved relations prevent itWittner 12 - Professor of History emeritus at SUNY/Albany

[Dr. Lawrence Wittner, Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?, Jan 30, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html] doa 5-10-16

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly 300. Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter ” around the globe — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

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Answers to: Meetings Irrelevant (___)

(___) Regular meetings and military-to-military ties decrease the risk of conflictBin 15 – CCTV Staff Reporter

[Han Bin, Xi Jinping's visit expands China-US military trust, 09-25-2015 00:35 BJT, http://english.cntv.cn/2015/09/25/VIDE1443112437412876.shtml]

China's military hopes to expand trust and cooperation with its US counterpart, in forging the 'new type of military to military relationship' envisioned by the two leaders. The remarks were made by a Chinese military spokesman during Thursday's monthly press conference. Military cooperation has become one of the key issues during President Xi Jinping's visit to the US. As Han Bin reports, despite differences on a number of issues, the two sides have found common understanding for an active engagement. A test for the “new type of major power relations.” Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the US highlights the determination of the top leaders to avoid conflicts. The China-US military-to-military relationship has been subject to constant tests. He says the US military engages in plenty of actions that China views as confrontational. These range from close-in surveillance of Chinese coastal regions, to regular arms sales to Taiwan, from openly criticizing China in the South China Sea, to the disputes on cyber-security issues. China and the US have overlapping interests in the Asia-Pacific. "Two people can’t be dominant at the same time. We have to find a way to work each other, exchange views on the things that trouble us, as China to tell us more on transparency on military activities and the history of the islands," Former US Secreatary of State Colin Powell said. Still, both are trying to re-assure the other with new mechanisms to minimize risks. The two militaries have reached three confidence-building agreements: one on notification on major operations, one on rules governing the behavior of military activities during air and sea encounters, and one regarding land force exchanges. Both have signed a code of conduct, named CUES, that governs unexpected encounters between navies on the open seas. "To build strategic trust, you need to control and manage possible conflicts so that frictions will not become military confrontations. That's very important," He Yafei, vice minister of Office For Overseas Chinese, State Council, said. According to the Chinese military, China is invited to take part in RIMPAC for second time in 2016. The Rim of the Pacific Exercise is the world’s largest international maritime exercise by the US Navy. Xi Jinping’s visit is expected to expand military exchanges and joint drills. But it will be long-term process that requires time and constant adjustments. China-US military-to-military relations have improved markedly in recent years, despite growing tensions between the two countries. And there's been some criticism on the US side over more engagement with China. But most realize that increased, stable communication between the two armed forces can help avoid conflicts, and provide a key source of leverage for both sides.

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Answers to: Canceling Meetings irrelevant (___)

(___) Suspending meetings undermines relations and cooperationLieberthal 11 – Senior fellow in the Foreign Policy and the Global Economy and Development Programs @ Brookings Institution

[Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal (Professor of Poli Sci and Business Administration @ University of Michigan and Former senior director for Asia on the National Security Council) “The U.S. and China -- mending fences,” Los Angeles Times, Janary 17, 2011|pg. http://tinyurl.com/8wlq833]

Many Chinese believe that America is a declining No. 1 that will do anything in its power to prevent China, No. 2, from catching up. They thus bring deep suspicion to the table when they analyze American actions in Pakistan, India, the South China Sea and Northeast Asia . Put simply, while the Obama administration sees itself as reengaging fully in Asia after what it considers the relative neglect of the region under President George W. Bush, Beijing is prone to see this activity instead as an effort to mobilize the rest of Asia against China's growing legitimate interests throughout the region. The United States and most nations in the region, by contrast, see China adopting a harder edge to its diplomacy after years of stressing its "peaceful development." China is also modernizing its military and now is deploying naval vessels, missiles and other capabilities that threaten America's heretofore largely unhindered military access to the Western Pacific. Tensions inevitably result. In this context, Washington has taken heart that countries throughout Asia are urging the U.S. to increase its presence and activities there. Asian nations are engaging with China fully on the economic side while asking the U.S. to make sure Beijing does not convert its economic weight into lopsided diplomatic and military advantage. But America should beware: If the U.S. primarily provides muscle as China expands its economic role in the region, then Asia will be a profit center for China and a cost center for the U.S. American interests require a better-balanced outcome than that, which means we must work more effectively with China. There are both security and economic measures that the upcoming summit can advance to reduce mutual distrust and enhance effective cooperation . The U.S. and Chinese military establishments have habitually suspended their limited high-level contacts to show displeasure whenever significant developments occur (such as the forced landing of an American surveillance plane after a midair collision in 2001 or the U.S. arms sale offer to Taiwan in 2010). The result is military-to-military discussions that are infrequent and anemic . The two militaries are now too powerful and operate in too close proximity in Asia to permit this situation to continue.

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Answers to: Doesn’t Solve Mistrust (___)

(___) Mil-Mil engagement key to combat mistrustFong 13 – Commander, US Navy

[Fong, Arthur C. Dancing with the Dragon: US-China Engagement Policy. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2013] doa 5-15-16

Military-to-military engagement between the U.S. and China must be expanded at multiple levels. These engagements would enable our leaders to clearly communicate their intent in order to avoid misunderstandings and distrust while building positive relationships in the long run. The PACOM commander is in the best position to carry out this warrior-diplomat role. For example, the PLA Navy could be invited to join a RIMPAC exercise; PLA officers could join the Army War College international fellow program; U.S. forces could participate alongside PLA units in UN peacekeeping missions; U.S. could finalize the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement between the two navies; U.S. Navy could increase port calls to Chinese ports such as Hong Kong and Shanghai. Military-to-military engagements are great investments and truly support diplomacy while influencing adversaries during peacetime. They also enhance cooperation and mitigate distrust.

Last but not the least, U.S. leaders must realistically address China’s rise to global prominence and the transition of power with China. They should not hold the belief that the United States is in a zero-sum game with China. We, Americans and Chinese, must invest in the future of both countries through a long-term strategy. Cultivating mutual respect and constructive dialogue is the only way to move forward.

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Answers to: Not Key to Relations (___)

(___) Mil-Mil cooperation locks in overall relationsKamphausen & Drun 16 – a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research

[Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-to-Military Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16

Interests and Challenges in Mil-Mil Relations The U.S.-China relationship faces numerous challenges that are grounded in the very nature of the dynamic between the two countries. The United States is the established power, and China is the rising power. Their military relationship reflects the challenges posed by a power transition. Although the two militaries are not actively engaged in competition, planners on both sides are considering such possibilities. To be sure, the two militaries cannot change this core dynamic, but when they interact this reality makes their engagement fraught with more consequence than might be fair or realistic. Managing Security Challenges The United States’ principal interests in effective U.S.-China mil-mil relations are to avoid conflict, reduce risk, and manage existing and emerging security challenges in ways that avoid security dilemma outcomes and do not undermine the United States’ prerogatives or military posture, nor limit potential future opportunities in the Asia-Pacific.23 Achieving these goals would be a substantive contribution to the broader bilateral relationship. Moreover, it is imperative that the United States engage in mil-mil activities with China because of how consequential both countries’ militaries are; for Washington to do otherwise would be destabilizing in the region and strongly opposed by friends and adversaries alike. The United States perceives that China has similar interests in conflict avoidance, risk reduction, and tension management but expresses these goals in somewhat different terms. For instance, Chinese counterparts in this project have emphasized that the proper framework for managing bilateral issues would be under the rubric of “building a new type of major-power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi). In the process, they emphasize the framework for addressing the issues as much as, or even more than, the outcomes themselves. Moreover, the United States fully understands that China firmly opposes U.S. military operations in the air and sea off China’s coast but outside its territorial waters. The United States hears Chinese assertions that these acts are constituent elements of a strategy to contain China, but it strongly believes that this Chinese perception is belied by more than 35 years—and six presidential administrations—of policy and practice. Finally, U.S. leaders wonder whether China’s historically defensive national security orientation—and the doctrine, disposition, and development that support such an orientation—might be changing as new activities (e.g., land reclamation) are observed and new weapons systems (e.g., anti-ship ballistic missiles) come online.

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Answers to: Relations Irrelevant (___)

(___) US-Sino mil-mil cooperation spreads to influence global issuesKamphausen & Drun 16 – a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research

[Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-to-Military Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16

Advancing Cooperation on the Global Stage A fourth, more limited interest lies in advancing cooperation on shared global security issues, with the Gulf of Aden patrols serving as a notable example. Such an interest does not suggest that the United States regards a “G-2” arrangement as either optimal or desirable. What it does suggest is that the two great powers have militaries with highly complementary capabilities, which, if organized effectively, might make useful contributions to the global good of international security. The challenge, of course, is that each side tends to regard security engagement with the other primarily through the prism of its impact on bilateral relations, and this nips in the bud many potential collaborative endeavors with broader potential benefits. Even so, the United States perceives that such shared global security interests are of growing importance to China but are not necessarily of greatest consequence. In part, this is related to the fact that the global dimensions of China’s military modernization are still only nascent. Additionally, China has endured much criticism for its unilateral military activities outside Asia—for example, the development of bases at ports in the western Indian Ocean and its activities in Africa—and hardly wants to invite more criticism. The United States also perceives that Chinese concerns about nonintervention still play a strong role in arguing against out-of-region deployments of the PLA to deal with security issues.26

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Answers to Negative Off Case

Answers to: Topicality Cannot be Military Engagement (___)

(___) Mil-Mil visits are engagementKamphausen & Drun 16 – a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research

[Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-to-Military Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16

Tensions declined in the aftermath of the mini-crisis, but two important trends were now evident, and these have informed the development of bilateral mil-mil relations ever since. First, military planners in both China and the United States began to consider that a military crisis over Taiwan might involve direct conflict between the United States and China. In 1995–96 the United States was surprised at the apparent use of kinetic force to achieve political effects. For its part, China was surprised at the level of the U.S. response but encouraged that the United States now understood how seriously it regards moves toward independence in Taiwan.5 Intelligence activities increased to support operational military planning, and much of the activity and research of the nongovernmental PLA-watching community focused on understanding PLA modernization efforts so as to better inform U.S. policy and operational responses.6 However, at a policy level, the approach was much different. Following a return to normalcy in early 1997, the United States began to pursue an approach that can best be characterized as “deter by engagement.” The logic of this approach was centered on the idea that if senior PLA leaders fully understood the capabilities of the U.S. military, they would avoid conflict at all costs. It was determined that the best means to convey the power and capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces would be to demonstrate these capabilities directly during official mil-mil visits by senior PLA visitors to the United States. Thus, between 1997 and 2000, six of seven members of China’s top military body—the Central Military Commission—were hosted in the United States for precisely this purpose.7 The United States sought to engage at a high level so as to deter the possibility of conflict, and thus deter by engagement.8 These twin motivations—preparing for conflict while engaging at very high levels so as to avoid this outcome—while not unique to the U.S.-China relationship, form the essential components of the contemporary relationship’s mil-mil domain. A third aspect, the role of the U.S. Congress, derives directly from the tension between these two ideas. In the late 1990s, culminating in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, Congress showed that it did not agree with the policy of deterring by engagement if the engagement could result in direct or inadvertent assistance to the PLA’s own military modernization efforts and in the process threaten Taiwan.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Answers to Negative Off Case

Answer to India Relations Disadvantage (1/2) (___)

(___) India supports US involvement in the SCSSingh 3 – 1 – 16 - Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation where he heads the Maritime Initiative

[Abhijit Singh, India and the South China Sea Dispute, March 01, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/india-and-the-south-china-sea-dispute/] doa 5-17-16

Lastly, the recent developments emphasize the need for India to strike a balance between maritime security imperatives in the Indian Ocean, and its legal stance on freedoms enjoyed by user states in territorial waters. New Delhi’s real dilemma is that while it opposes Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, it also disagrees with Washington’s interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in littoral spaces. In particular, India does not concur with U.S. attempts at claiming a “right to uninterrupted passage” in coastal waters without the prior permission of the subject state – especially in areas that are deemed to be within a nation’s territorial waters. New Delhi’s view on the subject, in fact, broadly corresponds with Beijing’s – particularly on the need for prior notification by foreign warships before entering a coastal state’s territorial waters or EEZ claiming innocent passage. Viewed through an Indian prism, unannounced forays through territorial waters and EEZs under the rubric of “innocent passage” or absolute “freedom of navigation” are a challenging proposition. Even though the UNCLOS permits continuous and expeditious passage – necessitated by the requirements of navigation – New Delhi does not concur with the practice of conducting maritime operations to score political points. New Delhi know it cannot support a U.S. maneuver, whose logic could be used to justify greater Chinese maritime activism near the Andaman Islands. For this reason alone, it is unlikely that U.S. and India will conduct joint patrols any time in the near future, even though New Delhi broadly supports the U.S. position on the territorial disputes.

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Answers to Negative Off Case

Answer to India Relations Disadvantage (2/2) (___)(___) India supports the US involvement in the South China SeaSingh 3 – 1 – 16 - Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation where he heads the Maritime Initiative

[Abhijit Singh, India and the South China Sea Dispute, March 01, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/india-and-the-south-china-sea-dispute/] doa 5-17-16

The South China Sea (SCS) is witnessing a dramatic rise in maritime tensions. Last week, China landed two fighter jets on Woody island – a subset of the Paracel group of islands – just days after the PLA placed surface-to-air missiles at the same location. With a range of about 200 kilometers, the new HQ-9 missiles can target aircraft approaching China’s claimed spaces in the South China Sea. To add to regional worries, the latest satellite images of several of the Spratly Islands showed probable radar infrastructure, suggesting that the PLA may already have established full radar coverage over the SCS. Needless to say, there has been much speculation over China’s “strategic” intentions in the South China Sea. The act of placing missiles on disputed territory has been widely interpreted as a hardening of Beijing’s maritime posture – not just on account of the direct threat the missiles pose to foreign air-operations in the South China Sea, but also because the new armament complements the PLA’s existing air warfare capability on Woody Islands. While India isn’t party to the South China Sea dispute, four aspects of the recent developments might interest New Delhi. First, irrespective of the claims and counter-claims by the United States and China, it is clear that Beijing operates from a position of strength in the South China Sea, wherein it has physical control over critical islands in the region. China has shown the U.S. and its allies that what matters in a maritime territorial dispute is the actual ‘possession’ of the islands, and as long as the PLA exercises military control over the features, it will exploit their location to support broader territorial claims. For New Delhi, which has been concerned about the security of its trade-flows and energy interests in the South China Sea, however, Beijing’s placement of missiles points to a sober reality. As the disputed islands are militarized, it could imperil freedom of navigation, making Beijing the main arbiter of the accepted range of ‘legitimate’ operations in the South China Sea. Second, China’s exertion of authority over areas of maritime interest is mostly through indirect means. In the immediate aftermath of the new radar installations in the Spratly’s and deployment of missiles on Woody Island, it looks increasingly likely that Beijing would impose an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, ensuring the PLA’s dominance over the surrounding air-space and seas. At present, the likelihood of Chinese aggression occurring outside the disputed maritime spaces in Southeast Asia looks remote. Yet, there is no discounting Chinese maritime assertion in other areas where Beijing might have strategic interests – including critical spaces in the Indian Ocean. For Indian observers, it is useful to extrapolate known Chinese positions in the IOR, to assess Beijing’s likely strategic behavior after the PLA has established a foothold in critical Indian Ocean states. Could the PLA, for instance, play a role in assisting Sri Lanka, Pakistan or Maldives in securing vital sea and air pockets in the Indian Ocean? What could the implications of such a move be for India? As a key security provider in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi appreciates the need for greater stability in the region. Will India, however, accept an expanded Chinese role in securing important spaces in its primary area of interest?

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South China Sea Affirmative NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17Answers to Negative Off Case

Answer to Credibility Disadvantage (___)

(___) CCP doesn’t want to be challenged about the South China SeaLayton 16 - Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University

[Peter Layton, South China Sea: Beijing is winning, but here's how to retake the initiative, Feb. 26, 2016, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/02/26/South-China-Sea-Beijing-is-winning-but-heres-how-to-retake-the-initiative.aspx] doa 5-17-16

China appears determined to seek a zero-sum outcome. It wants territorial ownership of the islands it claims, so cooperative strategies in which benefits are shared among all parties appear impractical. So if 'balancing' and 'rule of law' are both ineffective strategies, what will influence Chinese policymakers? Two different approaches to impose costs on China for its behaviour in the South China Sea appear possible. The first strategy would be to target specific issues the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is particularly sensitive about. The fundamental aim of the CCP is regime survival, which hinges both on retaining popular legitimacy and on repression. To this end, the state maintains the 'great Chinese firewall', suppresses dissenters, censors news and rewrites history. Today’s CCP leadership is particularly sensitive to threats to the political status quo, creating pressure points that could be exploited by states wanting to influence China's behaviour in the South China Sea. Meeting the Dalai Lama, openly discussing China's human rights problems, supporting a free press, assisting open internet access or vigorously marketing China’s true history are all options.

(___) CCP wants the SCS – use propaganda to fight for itPhilipp 15 – Epoch Time Staff

[Joshua Philipp, China Answers US Challenge in South China Sea With Propaganda, Epoch Times, October 27, 2015, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1886224-after-us-exercises-in-south-china-sea-china-shows-that-propaganda-is-its-main-weapon/] doa 5-17-16

The Chinese regime was quick to mobilize its own forces after the U.S. Navy sent the USS Lassen destroyer late Monday to patrol within 12 nautical miles of China’s man-made islands in the disputed South China Sea. Rather than send warships or jets, however, the Chinese regime mobilized a very different system—its vast network of propaganda agents, state-run news outlets, and systems to control the flow of information. The response highlights the approach the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has built to fight modern conflicts. It uses what the Pentagon has branded a “non-kinetic” form of fighting, which targets human perception and forms the CCP’s core strategy for taking the South China Sea. Almost all the CCP’s propaganda channels use an identical line.

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