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WAYS FORWARD IN RECRUITMENT OF LOW-SKILLED MIGRANT WORKERS in the Asia-Arab States corridor ILO White Paper Dr Ray Jureidini Regional Office for Arab States

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Page 1: WAYS FORWARD IN RECRUITMENT OF LOW …...Ways forward in recruitment of low skilled migrant workers in the Asia Arab State corridor 6 Introduction The large-scale migration of workers

W A Y S F O R W A R D I NRECRUITMENT OF LOW-SKILLED

M I G R A N T W O R K E R S

in the Asia-Arab States corridor

ILO White PaperDr Ray Jureidini

Regional Office for Arab States

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Introduction

1

Copyright © International Labour Organization 2016 First published 2016 Publications of the International Labour Office enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to ILO Publications (Rights and Licensing), International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland, or by email: [email protected]. The International Labour Office welcomes such applications. Libraries, institutions and other users registered with reproduction rights organizations may make copies in accordance with the licences issued to them for this purpose. Visit www.ifrro.org to find the reproduction rights organization in your country. ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data Jureidini, Ray. Ways forward in recruitment of 'low-skilled' migrant workers in the Asia-Arab states corridor: ILO white paper / Ray Jureidini; International Labour Organization, ILO Regional Office for the Arab States. - Beirut: ILO, 2016. ISBN: 9789221312994; 9789221313007 (web pdf) International Labour Organization; ILO Regional Office for the Arab States. labour migration / recruitment / migrant worker / manual worker / Asian / international migration / private employment agency / trafficking in persons / unfair labour practices / workers’ rights / Arab countries 14.09.1 The designations employed in ILO publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Labour Office concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. The responsibility for opinions expressed in this paper rests solely with the author, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Office. Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the International Labour Office, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval. ILO publications and digital products can be obtained through major booksellers and digital distribution platforms, or ordered directly from [email protected]. For more information, visit our website: www.ilo.org/publns or contact [email protected]. For ILO Regional Office for Arab States publications, contact: ILO Regional Office for Arab States P.O.Box 11-4088 Riad El Solh 1107-2150 Beirut – Lebanon

Publications are available on: www.ilo.org/arabstates

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WaysforwardinrecruitmentoflowskilledmigrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor

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Ways forward in recruitment of low-skilled migrant workers in the Asia-Arab States corridor ILO White Paper Dr Ray Jureidini

Regional Office for Arab States

In collaboration with the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific

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Introduction

3

CONTENTS

FOREWORD 4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5

LISTOFFIGURES 5

LISTOFBOXESANDTABLES 5

INTRODUCTION 6

SECTION1:OVERVIEWOFRECRUITMENTCHALLENGESTOBEADDRESSED 8

SECTION2:WAYSFORWARDTOADDRESSRECRUITMENTCHALLENGES 144

SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDATIONS 355

CONCLUSION 377

ANNEXI: FEES,COSTSANDCHARGES 399

REFERENCES 422

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WaysforwardinrecruitmentoflowskilledmigrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor

4

Foreword

AsthefirststepinacyclethatbringsmillionsofAsianmigrantworkerstotheArabStates

region,therecruitmentstagecandeterminewhetheraworkerhasapositivemigration

experience,withtheopportunitytoacquireskillsandremittances;oranexploitativeone,

characterizedbydebt,bondage,andlowearnings.Whilehigh-skilledmigrantworkerstendto

farewell,itisthewomenandmenmigrantsinmanuallabourwhoaremostvulnerableto

exploitativerecruitmentpractices.

PrivaterecruitmentagenciesintheinterconnectedregionsofAsiaandtheArabStateslieat

theheartoftherecruitmentprocess,actingasimportantandoftenpredominantlabour

marketmediatorsinaglobalizedprocessofrecruitinganddispatchingworkersacross

nationalborders.Whilesomeareethicalandlegallycompliantoperators,manyifnotmost,

intentionallystructureagreementswithemployerssothatlow-skilledworkersareforcedto

payhighchargesforrecruitment.Incontrast,recruitmentfeesandcostsofhigh-skilled

workerstendtobepaidforbyemployers.Inaddition,somerecruitmentagencies,employers

andlaboursupplyagenciesengageinillegalpracticessuchascontractsubstitution,where

the(low-skilled)migrantworkersareobligedtoacceptdifferentandworsecontract

conditionsonarrivalinthedestinationcountrytowhattheyhadbeenpromisedbefore

departure.

TheILOanditsconstituents–187memberStatesalongwithworkers’andemployers’

organizations–haveidentified‘fair’recruitmentascrucialinensuringfairmigration.

Subsequently,theILO’sGoverningBodydecidedin2016onthedevelopmentoffair

recruitmentprinciplesandguidelinesthroughaTripartiteTechnicalMeetingofExperts(in

September2016).Loweringmigrationcosts,includingthoseduringrecruitment,willalso

featureasoneofthethemesoftheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopmenttobeheldin

Dhaka,BangladeshinDecember2016.

Inter-regionally,thecountriesoftheGulfCooperationCouncil–whichhostmorethan15

millionmigrantworkers–andAsiancountriesoforigin,have“resolvedtoworktogetherto

preventandsanctionexploitativerecruitmentpracticesthatplaceworkersatgreatriskand

underminetheirfundamentalrights”(ThirdMinisterialMeetingoftheAbuDhabiDialogue,

November2014).Recruitmentwillfeatureprominentlyagainontheagendaoftheupcoming

FourthMinisterialMeeting(inJanuary2017),andintheILO’squadrennialAsiaandthe

PacificRegionalMeetinginIndonesia(December2016).Thecommitmentoftheinterrelated

ArabandAsianregionstotacklingflawedrecruitmentmeansthatthereisnowrealpotential

forradicalchange.

Withitscomprehensiveanalysisofcoreissuesintherecruitmentindustryandinnovative

solutions,thispaperonthe“Waysforwardintherecruitmentoflow-skilledmigrantworkers

intheAsia-ArabStatescorridor”comesatanopportunetime,andwehopewillhelpto

facilitatemeaningfulpolicydialogue,reform,andultimately,concretechangeinthelivesof

womenandmenmigrantworkers.

RubaJaradat TomokoNishimoto

AssistantDirector-GeneralandRegionalDirector AssistantDirector-GeneralandRegionalDirector

ILORegionalOfficeforArabStates ILORegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific

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Introduction

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Acknowledgements

ThisreportwasdevelopedbyDrRayJureidini.1

TheauthorisgratefultoHansvandeGlindandNilimBaruahfortheiroverallguidance,and

thanksarangeofILOcolleaguesfortheirsupport,withspecialthankstothefollowingfor

theircommentsandsuggestionsonpreviousdraftsofthispaper:HansvandeGlind,Eliza

MarksandSophiaKagan(RegionalOfficeforArabStates),RyzsardCholewinskiandMaria

Gallotti(MIGRANT),AlixNasri(FUNDAMENTALS),NilimBaruah,AnnaEngblom,Heike

Lautenschlager,ManuelImsonandMaxTunon(RegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific).

ThereportwasfundedwithsupportfromtheRegionalOfficeforArabStates,withagenerous

contributionfromtheSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperationthroughtheFAIRWAY

project.

AfinalwordofthankstoRehamRachedandWadihaToumafortranslationassistanceforthe

Arabicversionofthereport.

Listoffigures

Figure1:Exampleoffraudulentrecruitmentflowofcharges 16

Figure2:Exampleoffairandcompliantrecruitmentflowofcosts 20

Listofboxesandtables

Box1:Nepal-Qatarcasestudyonrecruitmentchargesandcosts 22

Table1.Examplecostsforlow-skilledworkerrecruitmentperperson:

Nepal-Qatar

38

Table2.Examplecostsforlow-skilledworkerrecruitmentperperson:

Bangladesh-Qatar

39

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WaysforwardinrecruitmentoflowskilledmigrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor

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Introduction

Thelarge-scalemigrationofworkersfromAsiatotheArabStatesisincreasinglyfacilitatedby

aninterregionalnetworkofprivaterecruitmentagencies.aPrivaterecruitmentagencies,when

appropriatelyregulatedatbothoriginanddestination,playanimportantroleintheefficientand

equitablefunctioningoflabourmarkets.Howeverlow-skilledbmigrantworkerscinsectorssuch

asconstruction,agricultureandservices(includingdomesticwork)intheArabStatesareprone

to abuse by recruitment agencies, as well as placement agencies, employers andmanpower

outsourcingagencies.d

Fraudulent practices at the recruitment stage can leave low-skilled workers extremely

vulnerable. These practices might include debt bondage linked to payment by low-skilled

migrantworkersofexcessive recruitment fees, costsandchargeseanddeceptionabout the

natureandconditionsofwork,oftenleadingtodetrimentalcontractsubstitutionandhuman

traffickingforlabourexploitation.Acomplexandopaquewebofintermediariesincludingsub-

agentsandoutsourcingagentsfacilitatevisatradinganddriveuprecruitmentchargesforlow-

skilled migrant workers. Collusion between labour brokers at origin and destination can

perpetuatethesepractices, throughsuchmethodsaskickbackpayments.National lawsand

enforcementmechanismshaveproventobeinadequateinpreventingorrespondingtothese

crimes, and with the difficulties migrant workers face to access complaints mechanisms,

unscrupulousactorscancontinuetoprofit.

Practicessuchastheseareinbreachofinternationalstandardspertainingtohumanandlabour

rights,andhavebeenheavilycriticizedinternationally.Theexcessivepaymentsbylow-skilled

migrant workers and other recruitment related abuses significantly reduce the amount of

money that workers are able to spend at the destination country, or remit home. In the

constructionsector,fraudulentpracticesattheprojecttenderingstageandrelianceonlayers

of intermediaries mean that large corporate contractors are profiting from a lack of

transparencyintheirsupplychains.Thesepracticesalsoleadtodistortionsandinefficiencies

inlabourmarketmobilityandinefficientjobmatching.

Inresponsetothesechallenges,theInternationalLabourOrganizationhaslaunchedaglobal

“FairRecruitmentInitiative”tohelppreventhumantrafficking;protecttherightsofworkers,

a “Privaterecruitmentagency”isusedasamorespecifictermtodescribetheentitythatthisreportinmainlyconcerned

with.ThisisincontrasttotheILO’smoregenericuseof“labourrecruiter”,whichincludesbothprivateandpublicentities;

or“privateemploymentagency”,whichincludesmanpoweroutsourcingagencies.b Thedefinitionoflow-skilledworkersisbased“eitherontheskillsrequiredforthejobperformed,oraccordingtothe

educationalleveloftheworker…[namely]lessthanuppersecondary.”OECD(2008)ManagementofLowSkilledMigration,

InternationalMigrationOutlook,PartII,SOPEMI2008Edition:127.‘Low-income’(lessthanUS$549permonth)hasalso

beenusedtocharacterizethesamesegmentoftheGCCworkforce-seeGardner,Andrew,Pessoa,Silvia,Diop,Abdoulaye,

Al-Ghanim,Kaltham,LeTrung,KienandHarkness,Laura,“APortraitofLow-IncomeMigrantsinContemporaryQatar”,

JournalofArabianStudies3.1(June2013),pp.1–17:3.cThispaperusestheterm“migrantworker”inaccordancewiththeinternationaldefinitionintheUNMigrantWorkers

Convention(1990),as"apersonwhoistobeengaged,isengagedorhasbeenengagedinaremuneratedactivityinaState

ofwhichheorsheisnotanational”.ItisnonethelessimportanttonotethatanumberofArabStatesprefertousetheterm

“temporarycontractworker”or“expatriateworker”.d Thedistinctionismadeherebetween“recruitmentagencies”thatoperateandrecruitinorigincountriesand“placement

agencies”thatoperateandplacemigrantworkerswithemployersindestinationcountries.e Forthepurposesofthispaper,"fees"aredefinedaspaymentstoprivaterecruitmentandplacementagencies,andother

intermediariesfortheirservices."Costs"aretheactualcostsforrecruitmentprocessing,suchasdocumentation,workvisa

andcontractattestation,medicaltests,insurance,transportationfeesandtransportcosts."Charges"aretheamountsthat

migrantworkersarechargedforlabourrecruitmentthatcanvarywidely,butwhichcanincludefraudulentchargesfor

kickbackpayments.Inotherwords,“charges”areoftenfarmorethanthefeesandactualcostscombined.

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Introduction

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especiallymigrant workers, from abusive and fraudulent practices during the recruitment

process; and reduce the cost of labourmigration and enhance development outcomes for

migrantworkers and their families, aswell as for countries of origin anddestination. This

multi-stakeholder initiative is implemented in close collaboration with governments,

representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, the private sector and other key

partners. The initiative is embedded in the Fair Migration Agenda presented by the ILO

Director-General to the International Labour Conference in 2014 (and endorsed by that

Conference),whichincludesfairrecruitmentasoneofitsmainpillars.2Underthisinitiative,

ILOGuidelinesforFairRecruitmentarecurrentlybeingdevelopedfordiscussionwithaview

toadoptionatatripartitetechnicalmeetinginSeptember2016.Theseguidelinesareenvisaged

toincludeaclarificationthat‘fair’recruitmentmeans‘recruitmentcarriedoutwithinthelaw

and with respect for human rights, without discrimination and protecting workers from

abusivesituations’.f

WithintheAsia-ArabStatescorridor,theILORegionalOfficeforArabStates(ROAS)andthe

ILORegionalOffice for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) have collaboratedwith constituents to

promote fairmigrationduringseveral forums.Thiswhitepaperserves to furtherstimulate

policydialogue for fairmigration in the interlinkedAsia-ArabStatesregion. Itoutlines– in

Section 1 - the main challenges to fair recruitment in the Asia-Arab States corridor, and

proposes concrete measures for reform (in Section 2). Reform will require harmonizing

legislation,accreditationandmonitoringbetweencountriesoforiginanddestination,aswell

as significant cooperation with the private sector for the review of business practices by

corporatecontractorsandemployersofdomesticworkers.

f Recruitmentisusuallythefirstactinestablishinganemploymentrelationship.TheILO’srecruitmentguidelinesarelikely

tocovertheselection,transport,placementintoemploymentandreturntothehomecountryofworkersifneeded.This

includesbothjobseekersandthosewhoestablishanemploymentrelationship.Thefullphaseoftherecruitmentprocess

includes:selection,transportation,placementintoemploymentandreturnifneededorwanted.Itdoesnotinclude

conditionsofworkandtreatmentofworkers,exceptastherecruitmentprocessmayinfluencethis.Recruitmentoccursin

threemainways:a)directrecruitmentofaworkerbyanemployer:b)recruitmentthroughlabourrecruiters,including

bothpublicemploymentservicesandprivateemploymentagentsofdifferentkinds,includingvariousintermediariesand

thoseoperatinginsideandoutsidethelaw;c)assignmentofworkersbyoutsourcemanpowersuppliers(private

employmentagencies)touserenterprisesastemporaryworkers.

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Section1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed

8

SECTION1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed

1.Workerpaymentstorecruitmentagencies

The current practice of private recruitment agencies charging low-skilledmigrantworkers

amountsfarbeyondthemaximumallowablebyorigincountrygovernmentsgisattheheartof

fraudulent behaviour within the recruitment industry. While employers of higher-skilled

migrant workers normally cover recruitment costs, lower-skilled migrant workers in

construction, agriculture and services (including domestic work) pay agencies between

US$500to$5,000,orequivalenttobetween1to15monthsoftheirearningsabroad.3Thiscan

beseenasstatusorclassdiscrimination,baseduponskill-level,educationandtrainingandis

theexploitationofthevulnerability(anddesperation)ofthemuchlargersupplyofpoor,low

educated,low-skilledmigrantlabourfromAsiancountries.Thepracticeoflow-skilledworkers

paying for recruitment services has been the norm for decades, which has had a deep

intergenerational impact that will be discussed further below as a ‘culture’ of payment

expectations.Althoughnotaddressedhere,evidenceshowsthatlow-skilledworkersstillpay

when recruitment is through social and familial networks.4 Preliminary results from the

InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)(2016)studyofrecruitmentbetweenUnited

ArabEmirates(UAE)andNepal;andUAEandIndia(Kerala)suggestedincreasingpreference

by smaller companies to recruit through family and friends who act as ‘referees’ for the

candidates,butwhostillpaythemasintermediaries.5

It is important to understand why so much money is taken from migrant workers. First,

contractorsandsubcontractors“outsource”recruitmentcoststoprivaterecruitmentagencies

inorigincountriesasameanstocircumventlocallabourlawsthatprohibitworkerspaying

recruitment fees.6 Second, employing companies save money and increase their

competitiveness by not paying for recruitment costs. Third, private recruitment agencies

competeinternallyandinternationallytoobtainlaboursupplycontractsbyprovidingkickback

payments to employing company personnel and placement agencies in the destination

countries. The costs of this collusion between the private recruitment agencies, employing

companiesandplacementagenciesarepassedontolow-skilledworkers.Theremittancesthat

migrantworkers send home are thus partly offset by hundreds ofmillions of dollars from

worker payments being sent by private recruitment agents to employers and agents in

destinationcountriesaskickbackpaymentsforlaboursupplycontracts.AWorldBankstudy

in2011estimatedthatUS$17to$34millionperyearwastransferredfromNepaltoQatar(5

percentofrecordedremittancesfromQatartoNepal)inkickbackpaymentstoemployersand

placementagenciesinQatarusingtheinformalhawalasystemofmoneytransfer.7Thesame

observationshavebeendocumentedforIndia.8

Anumberofstudieshaveshownthatmigrantworkerstakeloansfrommoneylendersandtheir

recruitmentagenciesathighinterestrates(30to60percent),9sellfamilyassets,andusetheir

savingsinordertopaythechargesforrecruitment.10Workerpaymentsarealsoavitalelement

inthecontroloverthelow-skilledlabourforcethatcanfacilitateotherformsofexploitation,

suchaslonghourswithoutovertimepay,non-paymentofwagesorwageslessthanstipulated

inthecontract.Some,whoaretrappedinapositionof‘indebtedlabour’or‘debtbondage’,are

oftenforcedtoacceptlowerwagesandpoorerconditionsthantheyhadbeenpromised.11Wage

g Regulationsthatallowprivaterecruitmentagenciestochargeworkersbreachinternationallabourstandards,i.e.ILO

PrivateEmploymentAgenciesConvention,1997(No.181).

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Section1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed

9

deductionsbyemployerstopayforrecruitmentcostsarealsoacommonandinvisibleformof

exploitation,particularlywithmigrantdomesticworkers.Thisvulnerabilityisexacerbatedby

a lack of adequate and safe complaints mechanisms, as well as the absence of workers’

organizationsandprobonolegalclinicstorepresentworkers.12

DespitelocallabourlawsinQatar,13theKingdomofSaudiArabia14andtheUAE15thatprohibit

charging fees toworkers,16 these lawshave sometimesbeen interpretedbyemployersand

recruitmentagenciesasaprohibitionof thedeductionofwages forrecruitment fees in the

destinationcountry.Thus, the feesare takenprior todeparture in theorigincountries.The

exception is the UAE, where the law includes the prohibition of accepting or demanding

paymentfromworkers“whetherbeforeorafterrecruitment”(Article18ofUAELabourLaw

No.8,1980). ILOConvention181(Article7)stipulatesclearly thatworkersshouldnotpay

recruitmentfeesorcosts-anywhere.17Itshouldbethecombinedresponsibilityofbothorigin

and destination country governments, agencies and employers to ensure this principle is

compliedwith.Someanalystsmakereferencetotheactualamountspaidas“excessivefees”.18

Somehavereferredtoworkerpaymentsasa‘bribe’forthejob,19butitismoreappropriateto

view it as ‘extortion’ that has become an acceptable institutionalizedbusiness norm in the

labourrecruitmentindustry.

Employersatdestinationareobligedtopaycertainrecruitmentcosts,suchastheworkvisa

andcostsassociatedwithobtainingtheresidencypermitandarethusseentobeoperating

within the law.Thekickbackpaymentsby recruitment agenciesmaybewholly orpartly a

reimbursementofthesecoststhatgototheemployingcompany,buttheyaremorelikelyto

justgointothepocketsofparticularindividuals.Further,whereemployerspayallrecruitment

feesandcostswithoutrequiringkickbackpaymentsorreimbursement,privaterecruitment

agenciescanstillchargeworkersbecauseworkersexpecttopay.Thus,theagencycanprofit

fromboththeemployerandthemigrantworker,takingfrombothsides.20

Thereisalsoacontrolfactor.Employersarewellawarethatiftheyarenotpayingrecruitment

costs, their employeesarepaying them.Theyarealsowell aware that their employeesare

trappedindebtandunabletoleaveiftheyareinpoorworkingorlivingconditions,orifthey

arereceivingasalarylessthantheywerepromised.21

Arecruitmentagencymaybeselectedontheassumptionthatnotonlywilltheworkerspay

highrecruitmentcharges,butalsothepaymentswillbesufficienttopayoffpersonnelatthe

employingcompany.22Themigrantworkersaregenerallynotgivenreceiptsfortheamounts

ofmoney theypayrecruitmentagencies,23so the transactionsareopaque,even though the

practiceiswell-knownbyallstakeholders.Workerpaymentsarealsousedbysomeprivate

recruitmentagenciestopayvariouslocalofficialsinoriginanddestinationcountriestoprocess

paperworkmorequicklyortopreventdeliberatedelays.24Thereislittleornooversightofsuch

fraudulent practices by origin or destination country governments. It is often accepted as

merelyafunctionof‘free’marketforcesofsupplyanddemandthatcannot,orshouldnot,be

interferedwith.

Indirect payments can also be made by colluding with employers to illegally deduct

recruitmentfeesandcostsfromworkers’wagesoveraperiodoftimethatcanlastforovera

yearorforthetermoftheemploymentcontract.Therehasbeenlittlegovernmentregulation

overthesepracticesbecausethemonitoringandinspectionofpay-slipsmaybebeyondthe

scope of destination country governments. Electronic bank transfers that automatically

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reconcile payments with contracts and include overtime pay and deductions may be an

efficientmeansofsurveillance,butneedconsistentmonitoring.

AssumingthatthetotalnumberofforeignnationalsintheGCCworkforceisaround13million

and80percent25(around10million)are fromAsiancountrieswhereworkerspayprivate

recruitmentagencies;andassumingeachworkerpaysanaverageofUS$1,000overandabove

the actual costs,26 we can conclude that unauthorized cash transactions have potentially

amountedtoaroundUS$10billionoverthepastdecadeorso,andcontinuesonadailybasis.

Thus, fraudulent charges by private recruitment agencies feed a multi-billion dollar

recruitment industry, largelypaid forby its low-skilled foreignworkforce.27Recruitmentof

low-skilledmigrantworkersthustakeplacenotsolelyonthebasisofqualifications,skilland

experience,butalsoonthebasisofwhoiswillingandabletopay.Thisskewsthelabourmarket

in termsofproper skill-jobmatchingaswell as impactingon thedevelopmentpotentialof

migration.

2.Projecttendering–thebeginningoflabourdemand

Anyanalysisoftheproblemsinrecruitmentshouldbeginatthepointwherelabourdemandin

the destination countries begins. In the case of construction, this is when a

building/engineering project has been decided upon and a budget drawn up. Competitive

tenderingforcapitalprojects lacksadequatetransparencyinrelationto labourrecruitment

and recruitment costs, as these costs are only aggregated at the end of the commercial

evaluationphaseoftenders,wherethelowestbidismostlikelytobeawardedthecontract.

Cost-cuttingmeasures by tendering contractors often include non-payment of recruitment

costs,relyingonworkersthemselvestopaythosecostsinordertomaximizethecontractors’

competitiveness in the bidding process. The same applies to subcontractors that are a

fundamentalbutindirectpartofthetenderingprocess.Thefinancialandtimepressureson

contractorsandsubcontractorsaremajorfactorsinseekingsuchcost-cuttingmeasures.There

is a responsibility to maintain a transparent oversight of procurement and facilities

management departments in the awarding of building/engineering projects and any other

projects that call for competitive tenders. This responsibility extends from government to

governmentinstrumentalities,contractorsandsubcontractorsthroughoutthesupplychain.

Thepracticeofcontractorsandsubcontractorsnotpayingrecruitmentcostsisfacilitatedby

twofactors:first,thethousandsofprivaterecruitmentagenciesinorigincountriescompeting

withoneanotherforbusinessinsupplyinglabourtotheArabStates;andsecond,thealmost

infinitesupplyofpoorlypaidorunemployedworkersinAsiancountrieswhoarewillingor

forcedtopayfortheirrecruitment.

3.Manpoweroutsourcingagenciesh

Manpower,orlabouroutsourcingfirmsarethedirectemployersofmigrantworkersandact

asthirdpartyintermediariesbetweenorigincountryrecruitmentagenciesandcontractorsin

the destination country. They are responsible for recruitment, negotiation of employment

contracts, payment ofwages, housing, food and insurance. As an alternative to direct hire,

hSometimesreferredtoasa“laboursupplyagencies”,“manpowerlaboursuppliers”,“temporaryworkagencies”,“private

employmentagencies”,“staffingagencies”or“staffingcompanies.”SeeGordon,Jennifer(2015)GlobalLabourRecruitment

inaSupplyChainContext,ILO,Geneva.“Manpoweroutsourcingagency”isusedherebecauseitismorecommonlyused

andunderstoodinconstructionandotherindustrysectorsintheregion.

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Section1:Overviewofrecruitmentchallengestobeaddressed

11

contractors in the construction industry use outsource labour suppliersmainly for ad hoc,

temporary and short-term needs, butmay also be engaged long term. Destination country

governments determine who is issued a license to operate. Some firms do not identify

themselves asmanpoweroutsource agencies, but register as contractorsor traders, obtain

visas(whichmayinclude‘freevisas’discussedbelow)and‘warehouse’themigrantworkersin

labourcampsorotheraccommodationsites,untiljobscanbefound.

Workersarethenhiredouttoothercompanies,typicallyinconstructionbutalsoinservices

suchascleaning(companiesandhouseholds)andsecurityguards.Themanpoweroutsource

firmchargescontractorsforthelabourhire,buttheformerpaysthewagesoftheworker.Thus,

workers from an outsource supplier are typically not included by contractors (or

subcontractors)inheadcountsbecausetheyarenotontheirpayrollbutemployedindirectly

fromathirdpartybroker.28Theprocesscanactasa‘corporateveil’wherethecontractordoes

notformallyacknowledgeoutsourcedworkersattheirworksitesnorcheckwhethertheymay

bevictimsoftraffickingorotherformsofexploitation,orlivinginsubstandardconditions.29

Thepracticeofoutsourcingisahigh-riskelementinglobalsupplychainsbecauseofthelackof

transparency.The involvementofmultiple intermediaries shouldbe viewedas a “red flag”

warranting investigation and monitoring. Reports of fraudulent practices by outsource

manpowersupplycompanies includewithholdingofpassports, lowwages,non-paymentof

wages,pooraccommodationandlackofwork,duringwhichtimeworkersmaynotgetpaid.30

4.Contractsubstitution

WhilecorrectivemeasuresarebeingundertakeninsomeGCCcountries,contractsubstitution

iscommon.Withthelackofcentralregulationanddocumentmonitoringfromrecruitmentto

arrivalinthedestinationcountry,itisveryeasyforcontractsubstitutiontotakeplace.Thisis

madepossiblebecauseworkersarenotinapositiontocomplainorrefuseacontractdueto

therecruitmentdebtstheyhaveincurred.Electronicregisteringandmonitoringofcontracts

andactualwagepaymentscanassistinovercomingthisproblemwithoutrequiringmigrant

workerstoinitiateaformalcomplaint,astheyareoftennotinapositiontodoso.IntheUAE

theletterofjoboffer,giventoworkersbeforedeparture,isnowtobesignedandfiledwiththe

UAEMinistryofHumanResourcesandEmiratizationpriortoissuingoftheworkpermit.The

UAEgovernmentadvisesworkersthatthesignedcontractmustmatchthejobofferandthisis

checkeduponarrival.Requiringemployerstopaywagesintobankaccountsoffersafurther

measure for oversight (for example, by reconciling paymentswith original contracts). The

extenttowhichtheArabStates’authoritiesareabletoperformelectronicauditsthatreveal

contract substitution is not yet clear. For example, there must be a mechanism whereby

migrantworkerscanreportirregularitiesintheirelectronicpaymentsthatdifferfromtheir

contracts.

5.Tradingof‘freevisas’

‘Freevisas’arenotfreeinthemonetarysense,butfreeofanemployerorjob.Thesponsor

named on the visa does not actually employ the worker. Sometimes, fake companies are

registeredsimplytoobtainandsellfreevisas.31ThisisapracticethatisillegalinmostArab

States,whichplacestheworkerinaprecariouslegalsituation.MostArabstateshavesoughtto

stopvisatradingandpenalisethoseinvolved.Fromtheperspectiveofrecruitment,thetrading

of‘freevisas’isamajorsourceofirregularity,mainlybysmallandmedium-sizedcompanies.

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Although free visas are well known in the labour origin countries, the critical question is

whetherthemigrantworkerknowsthereisnoactualjobbeforedeparture.Irregularworkers

under these circumstances may or may not be victims of deception, fraud and possibly

trafficking.

Ithasbeenestimatedthatupto15percentoftheworkforceintheGCCstateshaveinthepast

enteredonfreevisas,amountingtohundredsofthousandsofirregularworkers.32Thescaleof

thisproblemisdifficulttoquantify,particularlywhenthereareregularcrackdownsthatresult

indeportationaswellasamnestiestoregularizepapersorallowirregularworkerstoreturn

home without penalties. These measures indicate a concern by destination countries to

addresstheproblem,butgreatertransparencyofthedataforanalysiswouldbewelcomed.33

Inthislocalundergroundlabourmarket,unscrupuloussponsorsnotonlyreceiveanincome

fromthesaleofthevisaitself,butthemigrantworkerhascontinuingvalueintheeventheor

sheobtainsemploymentbyfurtherchargingtheworkerforanoobjectioncertificate(NOC)to

change sponsors/employers, returnapassportor returnhome.Workers arewilling topay

thesecoststogettheworktheyneedandtoensureregularizationoftheirpapers.

6.Migrantdomesticworkers

MigrantdomesticworkersintheArabStatesworkascleaners,carersofchildrenandtheaged,

cooks,gardeners,housesecurityguards,driversandotherswhoareemployedtoworkina

household for thebenefitof theiremployer/sponsorandhis/her family.Withanestimated

totalof3.16millionmigrantdomesticworkersintheArabregionin2013,justoverhalf(50.6

percent;1.6million)arewomen.34Farmoreattentioninrecentyearshasbeengiventofemale

domesticworkers.Domesticworkers’ particular vulnerabilities and invisibility frompublic

viewhasresulted inanILOConventionfordomesticworkers.35However,mostArabStates

excludedomesticworkfromtheprotectionofthelabourlawanddomesticworkerregulation

fallsunderthemandateofinteriorministriesratherthanlabourministries.

Inthedomesticworksector,agencieshaveavestedfinancialinterestinpreventingworkers

from‘absconding’duringtheirprobationperiod,andmayencourageemployerpracticessuch

asdelayedpaymentofwagesandpassportconfiscation.

Most female migrant domestic workers in the Arab States are recruited from Indonesia,

Bangladesh,SriLanka,India,Nepal,thePhilippinesandEthiopia.Duetothemanycomplaints

and violations of domestic workers’ rights, some countries have issued bans against their

deploymenttoArabStates.36Mostofthesebanswereliftedafteroneortwoyearsandsome

almostimmediately.InthecaseofthePhilippines,forexample,theliftingofthebanoccurred

aftera‘householdreformpackage’wasintroducedthatincludedincreasesinagelimits,higher

wages,upgradedtrainingandnopaymentoffees.37Agelimitshavealsobeenlegislated,38and

SriLankabannedwomenwithchildrenbelowtheageoftwofromtravellingabroadforwork.39

Theageandchildlimitationshavefacedcriticismfromwomen’sorganizationsincludingUN

Womenasconstitutinggender,age,maritalandmaternitydiscrimination.40ArabStateshave

alsoenforcedrestrictionsonwomen’smigration.Forexamplein2011,theKingdomofSaudi

ArabiastoppedissuingvisasfordomesticworkersfromthePhilippinesandIndonesiabecause

theycouldnotagreeontermsofwagesandconditions.Agreementswereeventuallysigned

withthePhilippinesin2013andIndonesiain2014.41

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Historically,suchbansandlimitationshavenotpreventedpeoplefrommigratingabroadfor

work.Workerswill find irregularmeans to leave, rendering themevenmorevulnerable to

humantraffickingandforcedlabour.ArecentILOstudyfoundthatNepalesewomensimply

travelled to IndiaorBangladeshandweredeployed fromthere.42Thosewhoareunderage

commonly obtain false birth certificates.43Womenmigrants are particularly vulnerable to

beingforcedintothesextrade.

Origincountrygovernmentshavedonemuchtotryandspecificallyaddresstherecruitmentof

migrantdomesticworkers,suchasrequiringtheworkerstohaveagenciesinbothoriginand

destination countries as third party points of contact. Most have also banned recruitment

agenciesfromchargingmigrantdomesticworkersalthoughsomearesurreptitiouslycharged

and others have wages withheld or deducted.44 Destination country governments such as

Jordan(2015)andKuwait(2015)havemadesome(limited)legislativeeffortstorecognizeand

improve the rights of migrant domestic workers, and domestic worker-specific bilateral

recruitment agreements have been developed. Bahrain’s labour law does cover domestic

workers ina limitednumberofarticles,coveringcontracts, termination,paymentofwages,

annual leave and individual labour disputes. It is sometimes argued that the cultural

constraints of gender-based attitudes and beliefs in Arab States make reform for migrant

domesticworkersdifficult.However,gender-basedexceptionalismcannotbeacceptableifitis

discriminatoryandcontrarytointernationalstandards.

While this section focussed on the key challenges experienced by migrant workers, the

followingsectionofferswaysforwardtoaddresssomeoftheseissues.

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SECTION2:Waysforwardtoaddressrecruitmentchallenges

ILOConventionsrecognizethelegitimacyofprivaterecruitmentagencies,butalsonotethatit

isessentialtocarefullyregulatetheirestablishmentandoperationsandholdthemaccountable

fornon-complianceandcriminalactions.45This isnecessarynot justtopunishwrongdoing,

buttopreventabusesandprotectworkers.46Moreeffectivemeasuresarerequiredtoensure

adherence to the rule of law and effective enforcement as a deterrent against abuse by

recruiters.Changingthemindsetsofmigrantworkers,employersandrecruitmentagenciesto

compliant, fair and ethical recruitmentwhereworkers do not pay for their recruitment is

crucial.ThefundamentaltenetoftheILOPrivateEmploymentAgenciesConvention,1997(No.

181)isthat“…agenciesshallnotchargedirectlyorindirectly,inwholeorinpart,anyfeesor

coststoworkers.”47

Recruitmentlegislationandpracticesmustcomplywithinternationallabourstandards48and

must contain explicit provisions relating to the protection of migrant workers, such as

stipulationsonemploymentcontracts,aswellasdecentworkingandlivingconditions.49

TheUNGuidelinesonBusinessandHumanRightsmake it clear thatgovernmentshavean

obligationtoprotectagainsthumanrightsabusesbybusinessenterprisesintheirterritory.

TheGuidelinesspelloutthedutiesofgovernmentsandbusinessestoprotecthumanrights.

TheseGuidingPrinciplesaregroundedinrecognitionof:

(a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and

fundamentalfreedoms;

(b) the role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing

specializedfunctions,requiredtocomplywithallapplicablelawsandtorespecthuman

rights;and

(c) the need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective

remedieswhenbreached.

TheseGuidingPrinciplesareintendedtoapplytoallStatesandtoallbusinessenterprises,both

transnationalandothers,regardlessoftheirsize,sector,location,ownershipandstructure.50

Recruitmentreformsmustalsobenefitmigrantdomesticworkersandtakeintoconsideration

thegenderdimensionsofemploymentandrecruitment.51Althoughtherehavebeenreports

andproposals toestablish special lawsor comprehensiveprovisions tograntprotection to

migrantdomesticworkers,nonehavebeenforthcoming,except for JordanandKuwait,and

coverageofdomesticworkersunderthelabourlawofBahrain.Theseareelaboratedbelow

(Part9).

Itisimportanttonotethatreferencesto‘migrationcostsformigrantworkers’,forexampleas

referredtointheWorldBankKNOMADstudyonrecruitmentcosts,52areoftenanaggregate

ofactual‘costs’(fixedcostsandvariablecosts,includingfeesforservices)andextra‘charges’

thatmigrantworkerspaytorecruitmentagencies,employersorofficials.Thus,migration

costsreferstoboththeregulatedcostofrecruitmentaswellas‘informalpayments’-referred

tobysomeeconomistsas‘leakage’.Assuch,thelargediscrepanciesbetweentheamounts

migrantworkerspayandtheregulatedcostsmaybeexplainedbyfraudulentkickback

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paymentstoemployerpersonnel,placementagenciesoroutsourcingfirmsatdestination,as

wellasofficials.

Whatfollowsaresuggestedwaysforwardtoimprovemigrantworkerrecruitmentpractices:

1.Employer-onlypaymentstorecruitmentagencies

Labourorigincountrygovernmentsshouldrepeallegislationthatcurrentlyallowsrecruitment

agents to charge workers for recruitment. Destination country governments should set

recruitmentfeesandcostsandmandatethatnovisaswillbeissuedtoworkerswhoarerequired

topayanythingfortheirrecruitment.Theonusonestablishingaprohibitionofworkerpayments

doesnotjustapplytotheorigincountries,butalso(perhapsmoreimportantly)todestination

countries.Exploratoryresearchintoworkersnolongerpayingfeesandtheimpactonrecruitment

industrystakeholdersshouldbeconducted.

Therequirementofworkerpaymentstorecruitmentagencieshasbecomeentrenchedinthe

expectationsofpotentialandreturneemigrantworkerstoArabStates.Thereisacultureof

employing companies not paying for recruitment fees and charges53 to increase their

competitiveness,andacultureintheorigincountriesofworkersexpectingtopay-somuchso,

thatoffersofjobswithoutpaymentaremistrusted.54Onlywhenorigincountrygovernments

ban worker payments altogether, will the expectation by workers to pay for jobs change.

Officiallyallowingworkerstobechargedone,twoorthreemonth’ssalaryforservicefeeshas

ledtoasmuchastentimesthisamountbeingcharged,withnodemandforaccountabilityby

regulatorybodies.Ano-feepolicy is far easier to implementandmonitor thana ceilingon

fees.55

However,thecurrentstatusquoisperceivedasawinningsituationforallstakeholders.The

employingcompanyreducesitscostsbynotpayingrecruitmentfeesandothercosts,givingit

anadvantageinprojecttendering;employingcompanypersonnelgetpaidforissuinglabour

supplycontracts;theintermediaryrecruitmentandplacementagenciescanextortlargeprofits

fromworkersandemployingcompanies;andthemigrantworkerseespaymentasaguarantee

of,orinvestmentin,obtainingworkandanincomethatwillrepaytheinitialcostovertime.

Changingthiscultureisimperative:first,byrepealingregulationsinorigincountriesthatallow

recruitmentagentstochargeworkers;second,alarge-scaleeducationandawareness-raising

program informing prospective migrant workers paying agents for jobs in Arab States is

prohibited; and third, informing employers at destination that they are required to pay

recruitmentcostsandmustensurethattheirprospectiveemployeeshavenotpaidanything.It

is the employer that contracts for the services of the agency to recruit. The contractual

conditionsshouldspecifythatonlytheemployerpayfortheagency’sfeeforserviceandother

costs.

Importantly, education and awareness-raising programs must be introduced prior to

recruitment. Perhaps beingmade aware of how theirmoney is spent, not just on costs of

recruitment but on fraudulent activities, migrant workers may better understand reasons

behindthepolicyandbegintotrustno-costforworkersrecruitment.Forexample,in2016the

UAEdistributed a “welcomepamphlet”56 to all newworker airport arrivals inUAE. In this

pamphlet, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization explained its new labour

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regulations,includinganewministerialdecreeonterminationconditionsforemployersand

employees.57Itstatesclearly:

UAE lawrequiresyouremployer topay thecostsof your recruitmentanddeployment.

These include any fees paid to a private recruitment agency that is accredited by the

governmentofyourcountry,thecostsoftheissuanceofanentryvisaandtraveltothe

UAE,andthecostsofpostarrivalprocessingrequirementssuchasmedicaltestsintheUAE

andtheissuanceofyourresidencypermit.

ThepamphleturgesworkersinneedofhelptoattendanyLabourOffice,adding,“YourLabour

Officewillbothassistyouandprotectyou.”Thepromiseofprotectionisimportantasitcan

provide workers with the confidence to raise questions about their circumstances. Under

“ImportantThingsforYoutoKnow”itstates:

“YouremployermustpayforyourrecruitmentcostsandtraveltotheUAE.”

“Youremployermustpayforyourresidencypermit.”

“Keepthereceiptsforanythingyouareaskedtopayfor.”

“Keepacopyofyoursignedjoboffer.”

“Yourcontractmustmatchyourjoboffer.”

“Keepacopyofyoursignedcontractinasafeplace.”

“You have the right to leave your job at any time but be aware of your contractual

obligations.”

The UAE’s effort in establishing a program of education and support for arrivingmigrant

workers such as this is welcome progress. However, informing workers on arrival of the

employers’dutytopayrecruitmentcostsandtheneedforreceiptsisratherlate.Itwouldbe

more effective if it was distributed before recruitment, and if it was accompanied with

informationonremedies.58Oncerecruitmenthasbegunandworkersarecommitted,theyare

vulnerable and likely to followwhatever demands aremade on them. Prospectivemigrant

workersshouldnotmakeanypaymentstorecruitmentagencies.Inthosecaseswhereworkers

dopay,theyshouldbeinformedthatitisintheirintereststoaskforreceiptsforthefullamount

thattheypaidandthatit isagainstthelawnottoprovidethesereceipts.59Origincountries

shouldmandatethatallpaymentstorecruiters(whetherfromworkersoremployers)should

bemadethroughbanktransferalongthesamelinesasthewageprotectionsystemsintheGCC,

forproperauditing.

Thejointandseveralliabilityarrangementsmayovercomethisbyforcingrecruitmentagents

toreimbursetheworkerstheyhavereceivedmoneyfrom(seePart7below).Thedifficultyin

this,ashasbeenshowninthepast,istheburdenofproofofpayment,forreceiptsarerarely

givenfortheamountsthatworkerspay.60Ifanyreceiptisgiven,itwillonlyshowthemaximum

allowablebylaw.

Countriesoforiginarelosinghundredsofmillionsofdollarsthataretakenfromtheircitizens

(migrantworkers)andpaidtoagentsandemployerpersonnelinthedestinationcountries.If

onlyemployerspaidrecruitmentagenciestherewouldbeasubstantialfinancialgainfororigin

countriesinforeigncurrencyearnings.

Proponentsofrecruitmentreformthatadvocatezero-costformigrantworkersoftenreceive

responsesbyemployers, recruitmentagenciesandgovernmentofficials lamenting that it is

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“toodifficult”toabolishthepractice.Ithasalsobeenarguedthata‘sudden’banningofworker

payments will drive the practice ‘underground’.61 However, given the current and past

practicesasdescribedinthispaper,theredoesnotseemtobeanyeasilyenforceablemaximum

recruitmentfeesmechanismforworkersbecausetheextrachargesarealreadyunderground

duetothelackofreceiptsandaccountability.

EmployersandauthoritiesinArabcountriesareimplicatedinthedebtandusurypracticesin

theorigincountries.Even if thedebt isbeing incurred in thecountryoforigin, ithasbeen

shown thatmuchof it is being siphoned awayonbribery and extortionby employers and

agentsindestinationcountries.62SuchpracticesarearguablycontrarytoIslamicfinanceethics

rulesagainstcharginginterest(riba)orusury.Thus,allowing,encouragingorturningablind

eye to the usurious debt thatworkers accrue can also be considered contrary to religious

obligations.More effective, of course, is the elimination of these recruitment payments by

workersaltogether,obviatingthedebt.63

Figure1.Exampleoffraudulentrecruitmentflowofcharges

Comparisonscanbemadefrommodelsofhigh-skilledworkerrecruitment,wherefeestendto

bepaidbyemployersandperhapsasmallfeeforthejobseekertoregisterwiththeagency.As

hasbeensuggested,multinationalagenciessuchasAdecco,ManpowerGroupandRandstad

Holdings(allthreewithofficesinArabStates)couldprovidelarge-scalerecruitmentservices

forlow-skilledworkers,64iftheycanbeassuredofcompliancewithfairsourcingfromAsiaand

otherorigincountries.Asdemand for low-skilled labourremains in theAsianregion, these

Lowskilledmigrantworkers

pre-departure charges

Sub-agent/s

Employer/

agencykickback

paymentsand

reimbursework

visa&residency

permit

Employer

accommodation

andexpensesin

origincountry

Advertising,

training,

medical,

orientation,

transport,etc.

Employerpays

allorpartof

recruitment

costs

Private

recruitment

agency

Wagedeductions

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multinationalsmustrelyonexistingfairandethicalagenciesthatdonotusesub-agentsorthey

mustestablishtheirownlocaloffices.65

Banning worker payments will also require addressing the level of influence that private

recruitment associations may have over origin country governments. The Nepal-Qatar

agreementonfairandethicalrecruitmenthasnotbeensuccessfultodatebecauseofprivate

sector pressure (seeBox 1). Given they have superior bargaining power,66 theArab States

whichwanttoabidebytheprinciplethatworkersshouldnotpayanyrecruitmentfeesmust

make it clear toorigin countrygovernments, recruitmentagencyassociationsandagencies

themselvesthatitisnotacceptable.Itisrecommendedthatdestinationcountrygovernments

setrecruitmentfeesandcosts,andmandatethatnovisaswillbeissuedtoworkerswhoare

requiredtopayanythingfortheirrecruitment.Itshouldbespecifiedthatonlyemployersat

destinationaretopayallrecruitmentfeesandcosts.InthespecificcasesofQatar,UAEandthe

Kingdomof SaudiArabia, it shouldbemade clear that it isunlawful to chargeworkers for

recruitmentunderthecountries’ labourlegislation.Inthissense,theonusonestablishinga

prohibitionofworkerpaymentsdoesnotjustapplytotheorigincountries,butalso(perhaps

moreimportantly)todestinationcountries.

Establishinga“no-costforworkers”practicecanbeamultilateralprocessbetweentheArab

StatesandAsianorigincountries,whereonlyemployerspay.The fact thatorigincountries

allowworker paymentswhile destination countries do not is highly problematic. Bilateral

labouragreementstopromotefairmigration67canprovidespecificprovisionstoaddressthe

gaps and contradictions in legislation between origin and destination countries.68 Bilateral

agreements aredeemed tohavemore contractual traction thanMemorandaofUnderstand

(MOUs)becauseobjectivesandoutcomesaretypicallymonitoredandassessedandallowfor

more focused ongoing dialogue.69 Such agreements or MOUs should include appropriate

measures for fair and ethical recruitment, coordinating rights-based contracts with clear

terminationconditionsaswellasprocedurestopreventcontractsubstitution.70

Incaseswherethereisaplacementagencyiinthecountryofdestination,theamountreceived

inkickbacksbyemployersmaybereducedbecauseoftheextraintermediaryinvolved.Insuch

cases, theplacement agencywill receive thekickbackpayments from the countryof origin

recruitmentagencyandpassaproportionofthistotheemployingcompanypersonnel.For

example,fromarecentinterviewwithaplacementagencyinQatar,awrittenquotationwas

provided fromaBangladeshrecruitmentagentofferingakickbackpayment,perworker,of

$1,500for‘helpers’(labourers)and$1,800forelectriciansandplumbers,aswellasproviding

five-staraccommodation for theirvisit toDhaka.Thequotation stipulated that40per cent

wouldbepaidonprintoutofthevisaand60percentonarrivaloftheworkeratdestination.71

AnnexIprovidesestimationsoftheactualfeesandcostsandcomparesthesewiththecharges

thatmigrantworkersarerequiredtopaytorecruitmentagencies.

TheIOMhasundertakenresearchintothebusinesscoststhatagenciesseektorecover,such

as the costs of maintaining an office, international travel, including hospitality costs,

“entertainment”andbusinessclassairfaresforemployerrepresentatives.72Suchtransactions

arelikelytobeformsofbriberyandwillinvariablybebornebythemigrantworkers.Itmaybe

arguedthatitisnotmerelya“flawedbusinessmodel”,buta“fraudulentbusinessmodel”.A

iA‘recruitmentagency’isreferredtoastheintermediaryinthelaborsourcecountry,whilea‘placementagency’residesinthedestinationcountry.

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moreobjectivemodelofaservicefeestructureforrecruitmentagentsneedstobedeveloped

inconjunctionwithemployerstoascertainwhattheyarewillingtopayandhowagentscan

recovertheircostswithareasonablemarginofprofit.Employersshouldbewaryofagentswho

quotelowservicefees,becausetheywillinvariablychargeworkerstobecompetitiveandto

maintaintheiroperations.Recruitmentagents,ontheotherhand,shouldnotaccepttopayfor

employerrepresentatives’travelandlivingexpensesrequestedtoundertakeskillstestingand

selectionofworkers in thecountryoforigin.Thus, it is incumbentuponallstakeholders in

destinationcountriestoidentifyandpreventcompanypersonnelandplacementagentsfrom

takingorreceivingkickbackpaymentsfromprivaterecruitmentagenciesinorigincountries.

Withincreasingdemandforfairandethicalrecruitmentwhichstipulatesthattheemployer

mustpayforallrecruitmentcosts,itisimportanttomakeclearthatonlyemployersaretopay

forrecruitment.

Asignificantexpansionofsystematicempiricalresearchisrequiredtogeneratemoreprecise

dataonthedifferencesbetween“fees”,“costs”and“charges”inthevariouscorridorsoflabour

migrationfromAsianorigincountriestoArabStates.Suchstudiesmustconductinterviews(or

audits) with a large range of recruitment agencies and check the veracity of their cost

quotationswithgovernmentministriesanddepartmentsoforigincountriesthatarededicated

toregulatingrecruitment.

2.Projecttenderingprocurementprocedures

Projecttendersshouldincludeaseparatedetailedtransparent‘LabourRecruitmentCostAnalysis’

withinthebiddingproposalthatdetailsvariableandfixedcostsofrecruitment,includinglabour

costsofsubcontractors.

Complyingwiththisrecommendationwouldensurethattheintentionoftenderersandtheir

subcontractorsistopayforallrecruitmentfeesandcostsrelatedtolabour,accommodation,

recruitment,andtraining.Labourcostdetailsmaybeanintermediarystepintroducedbetween

the technical and commercial evaluation phases, or alongwith the commercial evaluation.

Clearly,labourrecruitmentcostsshouldnotbecalculatedafteratenderhasbeenawarded.If

properlydocumentedandaudited,unfairrecruitmentcanbemoreeasilydetectedbeforethe

projectsareawarded.

InawhitepapertotheUSgovernment,FSIWorldwide73arguedforraisingthethresholdinthe

evaluationofcontracttenders.Usinga“lowestpricetechnicallyacceptable”(LPTA)policycan

missandpossiblyfacilitatetraffickingviolationsunlessthereisatransparentbreakdownof

recruitmentfeesandcostswithinthetenderwherean“auditabletrailshouldbecreatedand

inspected in relation to suchpayments.”The recruitmentagencies tobeusedmustalsobe

documentedwithinthetenderandshowntobelicensed,auditedandaccreditedasfair,ethical

andcompliantrecruitmentpracticesthatdonotchargefeesorcoststoworkers.Anycontractor

orsubcontractorindicatinginabidthattheywillconductthelabourrecruitmentthemselves

shouldcomeunderspecialscrutiny.FSInotesthat“inourexperiencesuchadeclarationisoften

used toescape the requirement tonameanunscrupulousorunlicensedrecruitmentagent.

Veryfewprimeorsub-contractorsholdlicensestorecruitinsourcecountriesandnearlyall

willrelyonagents.”74

Itmaybethatsomecontractorsdonotarrangesubcontractorsuntilmonthsafterthecontract

hasbeenawarded.Yetcontractorsmustpracticeduediligencewiththeirsubcontractorswho

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shouldgo throughthesametenderevaluationprocedures including labourcostevaluation.

Typically,timeandfinancialpressuresbuildup,givingsubcontractorsmorebargainingpower

tocutcostsbyforcingworkerstopayrecruitmentfees,costsandotherchargesandthusthe

cycleoffraudulentpracticescontinues.

“Blockchain” technology75 that isused for transparency inproduct supply chainshasmuch

potentialasappliedtosubcontractingsupplychains inconstructionandother industriesto

ensure transparencyanddetect fraudulentactivity. Itmayofferasolution toovercomethe

problemsassociatedwithmultiplepartiesthatdonottrusteachother,suchasinfragmented

supplychains.76Theapplicationisincreasinglybeingtestedinlabourrecruitmentandhuman

resourcemanagementtoprovidesecuretraceabilityofcertificationandotherdata.77

Governments of Arab States should legislate tendering policy procedures that mandate

transparency inmigrant labour recruitment costs for both contractors and subcontractors.

Lowestbidsshouldbemorecarefullyscrutinizedtoascertainwhethercostreductionsareat

theexpenseofmigrantworkersbeingrecruited.

3.Fairandethicalrecruitmentincompliancewithlaws

Regional coordination is required between origin and destination country governments to

establishlicensingandaccreditationoffairandethicalrecruitmentagenciesinorigincountries

asexclusivelaboursupplierstoArabcountries.Thisshouldalsoapplytoplacementagenciesand

manpoweroutsourcingagenciesindestinationcountries.Multilateralcooperationisneededto

establish consistent lawsbetweenorigin anddestination countries in a harmonization of fair

recruitmentregulationandenforcement.

The idea of ‘ethical’ recruitment has come to be accepted as a method of reforming the

recruitmentindustry,particularlyprivaterecruitmentandplacementagencies.However,the

term‘ethical’isoftenconsideredtobevoluntaryandsubjective–whatisacceptablebusiness

practiceandwhatisnot.Inthissense,theethicalfocusisuponthepersoninsteadoftheprocess

andcanleadtomisguidedtrust.Therecommendationhereisontheneedforamulti-layered

systemicapproachtoaddressingproblemsinlabourrecruitment.Itisthereforeappropriate

for ethical recruitment to include ‘compliance’ with laws, regulations and contractual

obligations in the recruitment process. Indeed, compliance is contained within the ILO

definition of ‘fair recruitment’, namely: “recruitment carried out within the law and with

respect for human rights, without discrimination and protecting workers from abusive

situations”. The ILO’s FairRecruitment Initiative alsoprovides for other actions, including:

improvinglaws,policiesandenforcementtopromotefairrecruitment;promotingfairbusiness

practices; and empowering and protecting workers through social dialogue.78 Compliance

requires internal controls, checksandbalances, externalaudits, trainingandreportingasa

minimumforanycorporatecomplianceprogram.79

However,arecruitmentagencycanbe‘compliant’undernationallegislationthatmaynotbe

inlinewithinternationalstandardsandhencenotbe ‘fair/ethical’.Compliancesuggeststhe

existenceofasoundlegislativeframework,whichisnotthecaseinmanycountriesoforigin

and destination alike, particularly where national legislative frameworks and enforcement

mechanismsareweak.Therefore,multilateralcooperation isneededtoestablishconsistent

lawsbetweenoriginanddestinationcountriesinaharmonizationoffair/ethicalrecruitment

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regulationandenforcement–withahigherbenchmark thancurrentlyexistsandscope for

continuousimprovement.

Fairandethicalrecruitmentincompliancewiththelawisthebestmeansbywhichrecruitment

atnochargetotheworkercanbetrusted.Anumberofagenciesdoexistthatarestrictlyethical

andcompliantintheirrecruitmentoflabourbynotchargingworkersandabidingbynational

laws and international conventions that pertain to labour rights of migrants. Large

multinational companies such Manpower, Adecco and Randstad and members of the

InternationalConfederationofPrivateEmploymentAgencies(CIETT)exist,but theymainly

serveworkersinhigherskilledsectors.SmallerexamplessuchasFSIWorldwide(specializing

insecuritypersonnel,butexpanding),thenewFairHiringInitiativeinthePhilippines,80and

theFairEmploymentAgencyfordomesticworkersinHongKongwereestablishedpreciselyto

offerfairandethicalrecruitmentservices.Morecommonisforrecruitmentagenciestoaccept

fairandethicalrecruitmentpracticesbasedondemandfromemployers.Thismeanstheymay

be ethical for business in one country, orwith one employer, but unethicalwhen it is not

specificallyrequiredordemandedofthem.Itisthereforeincumbentonemployerstoensure

theyaredealingonlywithfair,ethicalandcompliantrecruitmentagenciesandmonitortheir

activities.

Figure2.Exampleoffairandcompliantrecruitmentflowofcosts

To assist in this, thedevelopmentof an extensiveofficial accreditationprogram for ethical

recruitmentagenciescanbeestablished,eitheronacountry-by-countrybasis,orasastandard

model for all Arab countries. Fair and ethical recruitment agencies in origin countries

accreditedbythedestinationcountriescanbelistedastheexclusivelaboursupplierstoArab

States.Governmentauthoritiescaneitherconducttheseaccreditationprogramsthemselves,

or authorize credible and independent authorities to do so, but this should not be seen as

relieving origin countries of their obligations to regulate recruitment and protectworkers.

Lowskilled

migrantworkers

pre-departure

charges

Sub-agent/s

Privaterecruitment

agency

Employer/agency

kickbackpayments

and

reimbursement

Employer

accommodation

andexpensesin

origincountry

Advertising,

training,medical,

orientation,

transport,etc.

Employerpaysall

recruitmentcosts

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Suchprogramswillofferanaccreditationframeworkforfairrecruitersthatrequirenofeesfor

workers,nopassportretention,transparencyinsupplychainsandacomplaintsandreferral

mechanismformigrantworkers. Ideally,suchprogramswillbebasedonILOguidelineson

howtoachievefairrecruitment.

In addition to an accreditation system, all recruitment agencies shouldmeet standards for

registration and licensing, with criteria that ensure fair recruitment and decent work at

destination.81Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,Nepal, thePhilippinesandSriLankaall require

private employment agencies to obtain a licence prior to sendingworkers abroad.82 ‘Good

character tests’83without relyingsolelyonpolice checks, aswell asprovisionofeducation,

trainingandexaminationonindustrystandardsandlabourlawshouldalsobeapartofthe

licensingprocedure.SomeArabStateshave takensteps to regulate theactivitiesofprivate

employment agencies with ministerial decrees in the UAE and Qatar requiring private

employmentagenciestoacquirealicenseinordertocarryouttheiroperations.84Thisiscritical

fortherecruitmentofmigrantdomesticworkers,whereacorrespondingplacementagencyin

thedestinationcountryisrequired.However,forthemajorityofworkers,itisimperativethat

both recruitment and placements agencies are licensed and accredited in both origin and

destinationcounties,toallowforbilateralmonitoring.

Origin country government accreditation85 of fair and ethical recruitment is likely to face

resistancefromexistingagencies,particularlyprivatesectoragencieswhoseprimaryincome

isderivedfrommigrantlabourrecruitmentandwhoarereliantupontheextraincomefrom

exorbitantworkerpayments(seeexperienceofNepaloutlinedinBox1below).Thus,relying

upon origin country governments to introduce or mandate zero-fee recruitment may be

difficultbecauseofthecollectiveinfluenceoftheindustry.Thishighlightstheimportantrole

ofgovernmentsofdestinationcountriesinthedeterminationoffairandethicalrecruitment

practices.

Destinationcountriesthroughanaccreditationandlicensingprocesscanmandatepreferred

fair and ethical labour suppliers in both origin and destination countries. For example, in

February2016,theBahrainLabourMarketRegulatoryAuthoritypubliclylisted120approved

manpower firms.However,such listsmust includeaccredited fairandethicalcompanies in

destinationcountrieswithlinksto(orbranchesof)fairandethicalagenciesinorigincountries.

Such arrangements can be determined by bilateral agreements after more rigorous

registrationandlicensingprocedures.

Associations of recruitment agencies are important in the dissemination of reform of the

industry.However,theyareofteninfluencedbytheirmembershipandbysub-agentstoresist

zero-feespolicy.Whileassociationsmaypubliclyindicatethattheyaretakingtheleadonfair

andethicalrecruitment,thereislittleevidencethatactionhasbeentaken.Ascanbeexpected,

thereislittleappetiteforzeroworkerfeerecruitmentbecauseitissolucrativeforsub-agents,

privaterecruitmentagenciesandtheirclientsindestinationcountries.

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Box1:Nepal-Qatarcasestudyonrecruitmentchargesandcosts86

InNepal,on6July2015,aministerialdirectivewasissuedfora“free-visafree-ticket”

policy for seven destinations -Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,

Kuwait,BahrainandOman;pursuanttowhich,workersgoingtothesecountrieswould

havethecostsoftheirvisaandticketcoveredbytherecruitmentagency.Theaverage

one-wayairticketfromKathmandutomostGCCstatesatthetimewasaroundUS$360

and thecostofaworkvisaaroundUS$80.Thedirective included theprovision that

workerscouldpayuptoamaximumofNR10,000(approx.US$100)asaservicefeein

theeventthattheemployerinthedestinationcountryrefusedtopaycommissiontothe

agencyaswellasNR8,000(approx.US$80)tocoverthecostofthewelfarefund,NR

1,000 (US$10) for the health check and NR 7,000 (US$70) for orientation/training-

relatedexpenses.

InFebruary2016,NepalAssociationofForeignEmploymentAgencies(NAFEA)issued

anultimatumthatagencieswillgoonstrikeiftheprovisionwasnotreviewed.Inthe

same month, police raided 18 recruitment agencies for overcharging, tax fraud,

documentfraudandadoptingillegalchannelsfordeploymentofmigrantworkers.87

Privaterecruitmentagencieswentonstrikefor17days.Thestrikeendedwitha31-

pointagreementwiththeNAFEAandtheGovernmentofNepal,includingthepossibility

ofincreasingtheservicefeetobechargedbytherecruitmentagency.Thegovernment

of Nepal established a joint 11-member panel to review the policy, including five

representativesofNAFEA.Thepanelvisitedthedestinationcountriesandfoundallbut

Malaysiawereinfavourofthefreevisafree-ticketpolicy.Thegovernmentarguedthat

the money sent by Nepalese recruitment agencies to ‘agents’ in the destination

countriesamountedtoaroundUS$400-500millionperyear.In2014-15aroundUS$113

millionwastransferredtobrokersinMalaysiaalone.

Itcouldbearguedthatincludinga“freevisa”intheNepalfree-visafree-ticketpolicyis

potentiallymisleading,becausetheemployerwillhavealreadypaidfortheworkvisa

beforeitsissue.Thereisnofinancialoutlaybytherecruitmentagencyfortheworkvisa,

so theyhavenoright toask themigrantworker forreimbursement. If theagency is

underinstructionsfromtheemployertohavetheworkerpayfortheworkvisa(i.e.to

reimbursetheemployer)itwillbeaclearviolationofthelawsinQatar,SaudiArabia

and UAE and the employer should be liable for prosecution. Indeed, given that

recruitment agencies in origin countries are given power of attorney to act on the

employer’s behalf, the legal liability rests with employers in destination countries

whereitisunlawfultochargeworkers.Thus,thepracticeofworkersbeingrequiredto

payforthevisabeforedeploymentmaybeperceivedasvisatrading.

Allowing some payment byworkers and the lack of effectivemonitoring hasmeant

recruitmentagents inNepal are still chargingworkersas theydidbefore theno-fee

policy.

Fairandethicalrecruitmentalsomeansavoidingtheuseofnetworksofsub-agentsbothinside

andoutsidethemaincitieswherethemajoragencieshavetheiroffices.Althoughillegalinmost

origincountries,88networksofsub-agents(dalals)arerelieduponagreatdeal,buttheymay

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deceiveprospectiveworkersandchargethemfeesindependently.Thelargerthenumberof

intermediariesthemoretheworkercanbecharged.Thusdirectrecruitmentispreferable,but

sub-agentscanbebroughtintoalicensedrecruitmentagencyonaformalcontractualbasis,

payingthemasalary,pluscommission,thuslegalizingtheiractivities.89

Theconsequencesforunfairandunethicalpracticesarealsocritical.Giventhescaleoffinances

intherecruitmentindustry,iftheobjectiveistooutlawfraudulentpractices,thepenaltiesmust

besevereenoughtooutweighthefinancialbenefitsthatcanbegleanedbytheillicitmarketfor

low-skilledmigrantworker funds90. Financial penalties for non-fair and ethical practice by

contractorsandsubcontractorsmaynotalwaysproveeffectivebecausetheycanbeoffsetover

thelifeofthecontract,particularlyintheconstructionsector.Forexample,asthereareusually

hundredsofclausesinacontract,thereareoftenrequestsforvariationsthatarecompliedwith

butforextracostsandcharges.Forexample,betweenthebeginningandendofalargeproject,

thecostmayincreasefromUS$50milliontoUS$75millionbecauseofvariationrequests.Fines

can be offset in these extra charges. Thus, there is a need formore effective and credible

enforcement that includes confiscation of assets, suspending or revoking licences, public

blacklistingandbansonfuturetendering,particularlyifthebanisappliedinallArabStates.

4.Standardizedcontracts,contractsubstitutionandminimumwages

Establish standardized contracts for all Arab countries with measures against contract

substitution.

Legal reform in Arab countries should devise or improve standard contracts for migrant

workersindifferentsectors.91Compliancemeansnotonlycompliancewithlaws,butalsowith

the provisions contained in the standard contract. This is critical where there are

contradictionsinthelawsbetweenoriginanddestinationcountries.Therefore,thecontract

(backedbyeffectivecivilorcontract law)createsthestandardtowhichtheemployermust

comply92and the lawshould stipulate that in caseofdisputes, the languageversion that is

understoodbythemigrantworkerwillprevail.

TheQatarFoundation’s2014MandatoryStandardsforMigrantWorkerWelfarerequiresthat

contractorsmake explicit in their contractswith recruitment agencies, subcontractors and

their employees that “workers are not to pay any recruitment fees, costs or charges”. The

statement isalsorequiredonanyadvertising forpositionsavailable inorigincountries.By

establishingthisconditionwithinlegallybindingcontracts,allpartiescanbeheldaccountable

fornon-compliance.

A standardcontracthasbeen recentlydevelopedby theUAEwithextensivearticulationof

terminationconditions.93Alongwithnewlegislationthatconferslegalcontractualstatuson

theletterofofferbeforedeparture,theUAEinitiativeprovidesuniformityforbothoriginand

destinationcountriesthatmilitatesagainstillegalcontractsubstitution.Itisrecommendedthat

otherArab states and countries of originmake similar agreements regarding standardized

contractualarrangements.

Establishment of standardized minimum occupational wage levels, standardized across GCC

countriesandotherArabStates.

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Differentwagelevelsdependentonamigrantworker’snationalitycanbecommon.Whilethe

governments of India and Nepal (and formerly the Philippines) provide guidelines for

minimumwagesaccordingtooccupationanddestinationcountry,discrepanciesaccordingto

nationality still exist. In Qatar, for example, the Indian embassy (2014) lists US$411 for a

labourer and US$460 for a steel fixer, while the Nepal embassy (2014) lists US$247 for a

labourerandUS$301 forasteel fixer.Thismaybeseenasa functionofcompetition in the

international labourmarket,but it results in theviolationof theprincipleof “equalpay for

equalwork”incountriesofdestination.Twopeopledoingthesamejob,buthavingdifferent

wagesbecauseoftheirnationality isdiscriminatory,breachesequityguidelinesandcreates

disaffectionintheworkplace.j

5.Government-initiatedregulationandoversightopportunities:central

clearinghousesande-recruitment

Establish‘centralclearinghouses’inGCCcountriesandotherArabStatesforimplementationand

oversightoffairandethicalrecruitment.

The logic of low-skilled workers paying large sums of money means that non-compliant

recruitmentagentsandemployingcompanypersonnelhaveafinancialinterestinmaximizing

the number of workers recruited. A central clearing house could be established in the

destinationcountriesforrecruitment,runbythegovernmentauthorities,wherepossiblein

conjunctionwithemployerandemployeeassociations.Thecentralclearinghousewouldbe

responsible for registering and monitoring entering and exiting migrant workers, and for

storing information/documentation regarding the workers’ qualifications, experience,

contracts, conditions of their recruitment and other data. This data could be accessed by

government, employers, workers and their representatives and would improve national

statistics on labour migration, allowing for more targeted labour inspection, among other

things. Workers who have completed their contracts, or been made redundant, can be

redirectedthroughtheclearinghousetootheremployers,withouthavingtoleavethecountry.

Utilising centralisation strategies such as this, may offer financial savings for further

recruitmentendeavours.Acentralclearinghousecanserveasapublicplacementagencyand

canofferdirectrecruitmentbyaccreditedemployers.

TheBahrain LabourMarket Regulatory Authority (BLMRA) is an example which could be

replicated. The BLMRA registers and monitors recruitment agencies and can investigate

fraudulentrecruitmentpractices.Theyarerequiredtoattesttothevalidityandauthenticityof

documentation forworkvisasandtoverify theexistenceofanemployerandworkplaceso

workersarenotleftstrandedandundocumented.Ablacklistismaintainedonemployersand

recruitment agencies that have committed offenses ormisledmigrantworkers in the past,

banningthemfromfuturehiring.Anexplanatorybrochureisprovidedtoallarrivingmigrant

workers intheirownlanguage,andaSIMcardwhichcanbeusedtoreportgrievancesand

violations.AllinformationconcerningtheirworkpermitistransferredtotheSIMcard.94

Onlinerecruitmentcanalsobeencouragedtominimizethenumberofintermediariesinvolved.

Themorethenumberofintermediaries,themorethereisariskoffraudulentpracticestothe

detrimentofall.95CountrieslikeBangladesh, forexample,havealreadystartedusingonline

jTheILODiscrimination(EmploymentandOccupation)Convention,1958(No.111),Article1definesdiscriminationas,any

distinction,exclusionorpreferencemadeonthebasisofrace,colour,sex,religion,politicalopinion,nationalextractionor

socialorigin,whichhastheeffectofnullifyingorimpairingequalityofopportunityortreatmentinemploymentoroccupation.

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registration processes for their nationals seeking employment abroad. This government

processinvolvesregistrationbySMSaswellassmartcardscontainingbasicinformationsuch

aspassportnumber,dateofbirth,familyname,andcontactphonenumbersintheircountryof

origin.96

Afewotherexamplesinclude:

• EURES (theEuropean JobMobilityPortal) - aEuropean cooperationnetworkwhich

provides information aswell as labour recruitment andplacement services. It has a

portalnetworkof1,000EURESadvisorswhomaintaindailycontactwithemployees

andemployersacrossEurope.97

• NAKURI.COM,anonlinejobwebsiteinIndiawithadatabaseof41millionregistered

jobseekers’resumes;andNAKURIGULF.COMthatfocusesontheGCCstatesforArab,

EuropeanandSouthEastAsianjobseekers.98

• Ane-hiringsystemannouncedrecentlybetweentheKingdomofSaudiArabiaandSri

Lanka99 and a new e-portal formigrant domesticworkers in the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia.100

• Bayt.com,anonlineapplication for candidates to find jobs in theGCC,alsooffersan

‘online labourmarket’ that allows for faster recruitment, greater transparency, and

simplicitywithbetterjob-candidatematching.101

In addition, although it has come under much critical scrutiny, the early guest worker

(gastarbeiter)programbetweenGermanyandTurkeyandothercountriesinthe1960sisan

exampleofbilateralagreementsfortheorderlyrecruitmentoftemporaryworkerstofilllabour

shortagesinGermanindustry.AjointGerman-TurkishEmploymentServiceofficeestablished

inIstanbuloperatedasaforeignbureaufortheGermanMinistryofLabour.Turkishauthorities

screenedapplicants,pre-selectedthecandidatesandarrangedinterviews.Germanemployers

paidthecostsofsearch,transportationandtraining.102Germanyalsohasashort-termseasonal

foreignworkersprogrambaseduponMOUswithlabourorigincountries(mainlyPolish),but

therehasbeencriticismofthequalityofsomeworkeraccommodationthatisprovided.103The

‘circular migration’ project run by Unió de Pagesos (UP) in Catalonia recruits seasonal

agriculturalworkersfromMorocco,ColombiaandEasternEurope,supportedbyagricultural

worker unions. Government employment agencies organize the reception, travel, job

placementandaccommodationofthemigrantworkers.104Inalegislatedarrangement,theUP

andtheFederationofFarmers(FPS)payallrecruitmentcostsatthebeginning,butlaterdeduct

from the worker’s wages the amount corresponding to half the cost of the international

travel.105

6.Government-to-governmentrecruitment

Destination country governments shoulddiversify arrangements through the increaseduse of

origincountrygovernmentrecruitmentagencieswheretheyexist.

Bilateral agreements andMOUs for government-to-government recruitment andplacement

aretobeencouragedbecausethereisevidencethatsuggestsfarfewerfraudulentactivities

andmuchlowercoststoworkerswhensuchagreementsareinplace.106Theseshouldinclude

harmonizingrecruitmentregulationandenforcementamongtherespectivecountriesoforigin

and destination. Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Nepal have established bilateral

agreementswithArabstatesovertheyears.107 However,recentexamplesfromBangladesh

andNepalindicateprivaterecruitmentagenciesandtheirassociationsarewellorganizedand

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canplacemuchpressureagainstexcluding them. Indeed ithasbeensuggested thatprivate

recruitmentagenciesandtheirassociationsarepowerfulandabletowithstandorigincountry

governmentlegalandpolicyframeworksregulatingrecruitmentfees.108Recruitmentbypublic

employment services such as the Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited

(BOESL)andtheSriLankaForeignEmploymentAgency(SLFEA)havenotbeenparticularly

activeandhaveoftenclashedwithprivateagencyassociations.109Oftenbilateralagreements

are made but the recruitment is conducted by private recruitment agencies110 that more

resembletradeagreementsthatdonotalwayscomplywithinternationallabourandhuman

rightsstandards.111Severalpromisingexamplesexist,includingKorea’sEmploymentPermit

System(EPS)-agovernment-to-governmentrecruitmentprogramfirst introducedin2004,

which brings workers from 15 countries to work in Korea’s small and medium-sized

businesses.112Amajorachievementisthereductionintheaveragecostpaidbyaworkerfrom

US$3,509 under the previous trainee system in 2002 to US$927 under the EPS system in

2011.113 The Government has also introduced standardized employment contracts for

employersandworkers.Whilenotamodelinallrespects,theEPSisabetterconceived,funded

andimplementedforeign-workerprogrammethanmostintheregion.114

AnotherexampleistheGermany-Philippinesbilateralagreementforhealthworkersinwhich

social dialogue plays an important role in implementation. Signed in March 2013, the

agreementfacilitatestheentryofFilipinonursestotheGermanhealthcaresystemthrougha

government-to-government hiring scheme with fair and ethical recruitment and a joint

committeeresponsible formonitoringandevaluating the implementationof theagreement

involvingtradeunions.115

Arabcountriesmaywish toapplygreatergovernment interventionsuchas theseexamples

suggest. By coordinating agreementswith governments of origin countries and employing

companies,muchistobegainedbyreducingthecostsofintermediarybrokerageandensuring

payment of fees and costs by employers,while enhancing the focus on skills, training and

productivityinthemigrantlabourworkforce.

7.Jointandseveralliabilityschemes

Establish joint and several liability schemes in both country of origin and destination for

recruitmentandplacementagenciesaswellascontractorandsubcontractoremployers.

Thelogicofjointliabilityarrangementsisthattheleadenterpriseatthetopofthesupplychain

decideshowtostructureitsoperationsforanygivenproject.Subcontractingdiffusescosts,risk

andlegalliabilitydownthesupplychain.However,leadcompaniesdomaintaincontrolofthe

workthatisoutsourcedwithauthoritytomonitorandcancelcontractsiftheworkisnotupto

standard, particularly in migrant labour recruitment practices. Because the lead company

profits from its subcontractors, they are liable for the standards, abuses and fraudulent

activitiesofthosesubcontractors,andhavethepowertocorrectthem.116Firing,banning,or

suspendingsubcontractorsintheconstructionindustrydoesoccur,117butitisdifficultbecause

oftimepressuretoreplacethem.Insuchcircumstances,contractorsandstateauthoritiesmust

workwiththemtobringthemintolineandfindmodelstocompensatemigrantworkersfor

damages thatmight includecontractors, recruitmentagencies, thestateorcombinationsof

stakeholders.

ThePhilippines,IndonesiaandEthiopiaaretheonlycountrieswherenationallegislationforces

recruitmentagencies tobe financially liable foranywagediscrepanciesbetweenwhatwas

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promisedtothemigrantworkerandwhatwasactuallypaid,althoughfewmigrantworkers

have the confidence to bring a lawsuit against an agency.118 The Philippines law provides

administrative liability for the possible suspension or termination of the license of a

recruitmentagency,aswellascriminalliabilityofmanagersandotherstaffmembersofthe

recruitment agency. This system of “joint and solidary liability” holds that, because the

employer is beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine courts, responsibility lies with the

recruitment agency.119 In principle, this is to deter recruitment agencies fromdealingwith

unscrupulousemployers.120

Thesearrangementsarecriticalforbothworkerandemployerrecoursetocompensationfor

fraudulentrecruitmentandtreatment. In thePhilippines, forexample, licensedrecruitment

agenciesassumejointandsolidaryliabilitywiththeemployerforallclaimsandliabilitiesthat

mayariseinconnectionwiththeimplementationofthecontract,includingwagediscrepancies.

Underthejointandsolidaryresponsibilityclause,thejurisdictionissueisimmaterialasthe

recruitmentagency, ineffect,actsasco-employer.The limitationof the joint liabilityclause

concernsactscommittedbysubcontractorsorintermediariesthatarenotrecognizedbythe

recruitment agency or employer.121 The Philippines arrangement is powerful because

recruitersareheldliableincasesofexploitationatdestinationwheretheexploitercannotbe

charged.k

In the Netherlands, there is a combined legal and voluntary system of joint liability. All

contractorsare liable forviolationsof their subcontractors, includingrecruitmentpractices

wheremigrantworkersatdestinationcanseekcompensationinthecourtsforjointliability

claims. The certification and licensing of recruitment companies is voluntary but regular

governmentauditsdooftenresultinsuspensionsandpenalties.122

InCanada,anotherdestinationcountrytoconsider,agovernment-ledapproachtosupplychain

liability can be seen in theManitobaWorker Recruitment and Protection Act (WRAPA), a

licensing system for agencies recruiting migrant workers that provides for a proactive

enforcementmechanism.WRAPAbansrecruitersfromcharginganyfeestoforeignworkers

and prohibits employers from recovering recruitment fees from workers. Comprehensive

information on all facets of employers, employees and recruitment agents are required.

Employersare liable for recruitment feescharged toworkers if theemployerrecruited the

workerwithanunlicensedrecruiter.TheActalsoincludesspecificoffensesforemployerswho

utilizeunlicensedrecruiters.123

In theUnitedKingdom, the Gangmaster Licensing Authority (GLA) requires origin country

recruitmentagencies“toalsoapplyforalicensewiththeGLAandtocomplywithitstermsand

conditions. In otherwords, the GLA imposed an extra-territoriality aspect to the licensing

conditions.Thishasledtoanumberofcross-bordercontactsandinitiativeswithregulatory

authoritiesinthosecountries.”124

kForexample,inOctober2013,thePhilippinesOverseasEmploymentAdministration(POEA)cancelledthelicenseofa

recruitmentagencybecauseofcontractsubstitutioninthecaseofsevenFilipinawomendeployedtoSaudiArabiaasnurses.

Itemsinthefirstcontractsuchassalary,transportationallowance,foodallowance,andlodgingwereeitherreducedor

totallyomittedinthenewcontract.Theagencyhadalsotakenexcessiverecruitmentfeesfromtheworkersanddidnotissue

receiptsfortheamountspaid.Theseallviolatedthe2002POEARulesandRegulationsGoverningtheRecruitmentand

EmploymentofLand-basedOverseasWorkers.Theagencywassuspendedandorderedtorefundtheworkerstheexcess

chargestheyhadpaid.See“POEAcancelsrecruiter’slicenseforcontractsubstitution”,PressRelease,25October2013,at:

http://www.poea.gov.ph/news/2013/PROct2013AllSkills.pdf

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IntheArabcountriesauthoritieshavealicensingprocedure,butthelawonlyreferstolicensed

recruitment agencies in the Arab States. By expanding the licensing region to recruitment

agenciesintheorigincountries.Arabcountriescouldencouragefairandethicalrecruitment

practicesandensurejointliability.

Although countries of destination often assume they have no jurisdiction over recruitment

practicesinlabourorigincountries,theycandemandthatfairandethicalrequirementsare

metthroughthe joint-liabilityapproach.125Theycan insist that thecontractofemployment

meetstheminimumstandards,complieswithtermsagreedupon,protectstheemployeeand

includes provisions on the ability to change employer. Joint-liability through bilateral

agreementsshouldalso focusoncombatingcontract substitutionandother inconsistencies

andthattheminimumstandardsareunderstoodbyemployersandrecruitersonbothsidesof

the migration corridor.126 Joint-liability practices rely heavily on inter-governmental

cooperation127andrequirecommitmentfromcountriesoforiginandcountriesofdestination

equally.Information-sharingprogramsbetweenthedestinationcountryandcountryoforigin

must support legal reform and joint-liability approaches.128 Addressing concerns by origin

countriesfortheirmarketcompetitivenessformigrantworkers,someexpertsargue,“ajoint

liabilityapproachhasanadvantageovereffortstocontrolrecruitmentbyanoriginnationon

itsown.Suchregimestakerecruitmentcostsoutofcompetition,whichshouldbetheidealfrom

theorigincountryperspective.Whentheemployeristheprincipletargetofenforcement,and

theliabilityattachestorecruitmentfromanycountry(asitshould)…itdoesnotmatterwhere

intheworldthatemployerlooksforworkers:allrecruiterswillhavetocomplywiththesame

baselinestandards.”129

Privaterecruitmentagenciesmaintainresponsibilityforworkersfromdeploymentuntilthe

endoftheprobationperiod(usually3months),foriftheemploymentrelationshipdoesnot

work out, agreements may require a replacement at the agency’s cost.130 Where larger

contractorssendpersonneltotheorigincountriestoconductskillstestingandselection,the

employer usually accepts the replacement responsibility. Increasingly, private recruitment

agenciesinsistonemployerpersonnelvisitingthecountryoforigintoconductskillstesting

andselectionofcandidatesinordertodelegatereplacementresponsibilitytotheemployer.131

Making leadcontractors liable forrecruitmentabuses intheirglobalsupplychainshasalso

beenafocusoflegislationintheUK(BriberyAct,ModernDaySlaveryAct),theEuropeanUnion

(NonFinancialDisclosureDirective),andtheUnitedStates(ForeignCorruptPracticesActand

the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act). International human and labour rights

organizations as well as non-governmental organization, and the media can also bring

violationstotheattentionofthepublicthatmotivateinternalandindependentreviewsand

assessments of supply chain violations. Gordon’s comprehensive study of supply chain

liabilitiesshowedmultipletypesofaction,suchashighmediaprofilecampaignsintheUnited

States by the grassroots basedNational Guestworker Alliance (NGA) targeting large brand

companiestorevealrecruitmentviolations.132Insomecases,voluntarycodesofconducthave

alsobeenestablishedbytheprivatesector,throughwhichmemberspledgethatneitherthey

northeirsubcontractorswillchargeworkersrecruitmentcosts(oneexampleistheCodeof

Conduct by the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition - a nonprofit coalition of leading

electronicscompanies).133

Clientsofthestateandtheircontractorsmustensurefairandethicalrecruitmentandinsist

upon it for all subcontractors in the supply chain. Commercial requirements for proper

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standardsoffairandethicalrecruitmentcanbemorepowerfulthanlegislationbecausethey

canbeestablishedaspre-requisitecontractualrequirementsfordoingbusiness.

8.Addressingmalpracticesthroughfreevisas,visatradingandmanpower

outsourcingagencies

Greater surveillance over the issuing of visas is required by Arab countries to minimize visa

tradingontheblackmarket.

Careful inspectionsofemployers thatmayhavebeenestablishedas tradingcompanies,but

whichtradeinvisasoractasmanpowersuppliers(withouttherequisite100percentlocal

nationalownership)needtobesteppedup.Workerswhoareplacedunwittinglyintoirregular

statuscanberegularizedifstateauthoritiesarewillingtoinquireintothecircumstancesof

their recruitment.134 Destination country governments should ensure due diligence in

ascertainingthereasonsforirregularmigrantworkers’presence,minimizecostlydetention

and deportation and maximize regularization of migrant workers who became irregular

beyond their control with willing employers.135 Wage protection systems mandating that

employers pay wages into bank accounts are one way to check that sponsors are in fact

employingandpayingtheworkersundertheirsponsorship.

Visa tradingarises in anumberofways. For example, companies awardeda contract for a

projectapplyfora“blockvisa”androutinelyapplyformuchlargernumbersofworkvisasthan

is actually required. In addition, visas provided are not always commensurate with the

application in terms of occupation and nationality. Thus visas are given toworkerswhose

actualjobisdifferentfromthatwhichisstatedonthevisa.136

Freevisasareworkvisaswherethereisasponsor,butnorealemployeronarrival,inpractice

enablingmigrantworkerstoforinstancemanageashoporworkforthemselves.Thesellingof

these visas (that may go through a number of intermediaries) is ultimately reliant upon

workersbeingchargedsufficientlytocoveralltheprofitsbeingmade.Greaterdiligenceneeds

to be undertaken by destination government authorities to verify the legitimacy of visa

applicationswithfollow-upthatthesponsoristheactualemployerorthatpropersecondment

arrangements have been granted official approval. Embassies of origin countries also are

requiredtocheckthebonafideofworkvisas,particularlyduringtheattestationprocedures.In

this sense authorities in both countries of origin and destination have responsibilities in

identifyingvisaabusesbeforetheyaremarketed.RegularcrackdownsinArabstatesthathave

resulted in prosecutions of company executives should also result in more stringent

procedureswithchecksandbalancestopreventfreevisasbeingissuedinthefirstinstance.137

The scale of this problem is difficult to quantify, particularly when there are regular

crackdowns that result in deportation as well as amnesties to regularize papers or allow

irregularworkers to returnhomewithoutpenalties.Thesemeasures indicatea concernby

destinationcountriestoaddresstheproblem,butgreatertransparencyofthedataforanalysis

would be welcomed.138 While regularization efforts are a positive step, it is critical that

irregularworkersunderthesecircumstancesarenotcriminalized,butratherdealtwithunder

civillaw.Forexample,aworkerapprehendedbecauseofan‘absconding’noticebythesponsor

shouldnotbeplacedintodetentionandpenalized.Rather,theauthoritiesneedtodetermine

whethertheyarevictimsofabuse,traffickingorunwittingrecipientsof‘freevisas’.139

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Non-workvisasarealsoimplicatedinvisatrading,wherebusinessvisasandtouristvisasare

soldtomigrantworkersforentry.Applicationstoconverttheseintoworkvisasshouldraise

red flags and inquiry into the possibilities of visa trading. Again, if the culture ofmigrant

workerspayingforrecruitmentandthejobstheyareobtainingwerecurtailed,visatrading

willbelargelystopped.

As “third party” employers, greater due diligence by contractors and sub-contractors is

required,throughmeanssuchasinspectionsandinquiriesaboutthepersonneltheyusefrom

manpower outsourcing agencies in destination countries - and should be held legally

responsiblefornon-fairandunethicalpractices.Forexample,contractorsandsubcontractors

shouldrefusetodobusinesswithmanpoweroutsourcingagenciesthatdonotcomplywith

lawsonrecruitment,housingandfoodprovisions;orthosewhodonotagreetothelevelof

transparency required.Of course, criminal laws,particularlyanti-trafficking legislation that

includesexploitation through forcedorcompulsory labour, canbebrought tobearonboth

contractorsandmanpoweroutsourceagencies.140Inthissensethecorporateveilofmanpower

outsourceagenciesneedstobelifted.Governmentsshouldintroducestricterlicensingaswell

as monitoring and inspections of manpower outsource agencies. Manpower outsource

agenciesinturnneedtocarryoutduediligenceonorganizationsthathiremigrantworkers

fromthem.TheproposedILOfairrecruitmentguidelinesstatethat,“itisnecessarytoensure

thattheresponsibilitiesofthetemporaryemploymentagencyandoftheuserenterpriseare

clearlydefined,fortheprotectionoftheworkers,oftheemploymentagencyandoftheuser

enterprise.”

9.Migrantdomesticworkers

Arabcountriesshouldbeencouragedtobringmigrantdomesticworkersundertheprotectionof

theirlabourlaws.

MigrantdomesticworkersinArabstatesareexcludedfromtheprotectionofthelabourlawin

allcountriesexceptBahrain.141InSaudiArabia,aministerialdecision(310)of2013mandates

domesticworkers receiveninehoursof restperday,onedayperweekoff andonemonth

vacationaftertwoyearsofservice.KuwaitenactedaseparatelawfordomesticworkersinJune

2015thatincludesmigrantdomesticworkers’righttoonedayoffperweek,30daysannual

paid leave,amaximum12hourdaywithrestperiodsandanendofservicegratuityofone

monthperyearofservice.142Althoughtherearesignificantlimitationstothelegislation,asit

doesnotaffordfullrecognitionunderthelabourlaw,itisconsideredastepforward.143

Reasons for the exclusion of domesticworkers from labour laws and restrictions on their

freedomofmovementhavebeenthreefold.First,domesticworkersareconsideredtobeina

personalrelationshipwiththemembersofthehousehold,ratherthaninaformalemployee-

employerrelationship.Asecondandrelatedreasonisthatdomesticworkersareprivytothe

intimaterelationshipswithinthefamilyanditisimportanttothemthatsuchinformationis

not shared publicly or to other households. Third, because of the high costs in recruiting

migrantdomesticworkers,restrictionsareseenasameasurebyemployerstopreventthem

fromrunningawayandthusprotectingtheir‘investment’.144Itshouldbenoted,thattheILO’s

EmploymentRelationshipRecommendation,2006(No.198)suggeststhatstates“shouldtake

particular account in national policy to ensure effective protection to workers especially

affectedbytheuncertaintyastotheexistenceofanemploymentrelationship,includingwomen

workers,aswellasthemostvulnerableworkers…”(Article5).

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The ILO has recommended that international cooperation for targeted awareness-raising

campaigns,especiallyforthosewhoaremostatriskofbecomingvictimsofforcedlabour,to

inform them, inter alia, about how to protect themselves against fraudulent or abusive

recruitmentandemploymentpractices.145NGOshavealsobeentakingstepstoimprovepre-

departure rights awareness, grievance mechanisms and communication channels.146

Recruitmentagreementsandcontractualrequirementsshouldguaranteepossessionanduse

ofamobilephonewithaSIMcardinBahrain.Pre-departureorientationprogramscaneducate

domesticworkersandempowerthemtousesuchfacilitiesthatmightalsoincludehotlinesand

humanrightsorganizationsthatareavailabletotheminthedestinationcountry.

Under the Philippines’ active governance of out-migration, it has introduced significant

regulationsfortheprotectionofoverseasFilipinoworkers,particularlydomesticworkers.It

serves as a good case study for origin countries. The Philippines Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA) is the government agency responsible for processing workers'

contracts and conducting pre-deployment checks, as well as for licensing, regulating, and

monitoringprivaterecruitmentagencies.In1995,theMigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinos

Act147waspassedtoprovidealegislativeframeworkforprotectingoverseasFilipinoworkers.

Among other provisions, it promised direct assistance to workers abroad (including legal

assistance), penalties for illegal recruiters, reintegration services and the establishment of

resourcecentresincountriesofdestination.

A specific requirement in thedeploymentofdomesticworkers from thePhilippines is that

recruitment agencies are not to charge them any fees and, since 2006, domestic worker

contractsmust be for aminimum of US$400.148 In reality, agencies in the Philippines can

secretlycharge,eveniftheemployersalsopayanditiscommonfordeductionstobetaken

fromwages.InLebanon,forexample,itiscommonthatthefirsttwoorthreemonth’swages

arenotpaid.149

Attemptsbyorigincountrygovernmentstoregulateandprotectmigrantdomesticworkersin

destinationcountriesareimportant.However,thereisnoempiricalevidencedemonstrating

what difference the establishment of blacklists of employers, recruitment and placement

agencieshasmade,particularlysincenoimpactassessmentshavebeenundertaken.Itremains

the‘luckofthedraw’whethermigrantdomesticworkersareplacedindecenthouseholdsthat

treatthemwell.Itmaybesuggestedthatrenewalofpermitsforemployersofdomesticworkers

be conditional on a visit to the premises and a confidential interview with the previous

domesticworker,whichcouldbeconductedattheairportbeforetheyreturnhome.Thereare

alsopossibilitieswithnewonlineinitiativeswhereemployersandmigrantdomesticworkers

can conduct mutual interviews and hiring on a website with no charge to the domestic

worker.150 Such arrangements, however,will have to be approvedby both destination and

origincountryauthoritieswherethelawrequirestheuseoflicensedrecruitmentagencies.

Thegreatestimpedimenttothemonitoringandprotectionofmigrantdomesticworkersisthat

theworktakesplaceinaprivatehousehold,outofthepurviewoflabourinspectionandother

enforcement and regulatory mechanisms. The isolated work and living environment and

emotionallychargedspaceofthefamilyhomeresultsinmuchoftheabuse,while‘freelance’

domesticworkers have greater independence and report less rights violations.151 Allowing

domesticworkers to liveoutsideof thehouseholdas freelanceworkerswhoorganize their

ownlivingarrangementswouldoffersignificantprospectsforareductioninexploitation,but

it is unlikely tomeetwith cultural acceptance inArab states.Manydomesticworkers also

preferlive-inarrangements,astheysavemoneyonaccommodation,traveltowork,clothing

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andhouseholdexpensessuchasfood.TheILODomesticWorkersConvention,2011(No.189)

urgesMemberStatestoensurethatdomesticworkers:a)are freetoreachagreementwith

theiremployerorpotentialemployeronwhethertoresideinthehousehold;b)whoresidein

thehouseholdarenotobligedtoremaininthehouseholdorwithhouseholdmembersduring

periodsofdailyandweeklyrestorannualleave;andc)areentitledtokeepintheirpossession

theirtravelandidentitydocuments(Article9).l

Another alternative to live-in arrangementsmay bemore encouragement of labour supply

agenciesthatrecruitandhireoutcleaningservicesonanhourlyordailybasis,providedthat

these services are monitored. These could also include workers who have training and

qualificationsinchildcareandcareoftheelderlyanddisabled.Thisofcoursedoesnotcater

forfamiliesthatwantin-houseworkersandrequirethemtobereadilyoncall,eventhough

they should not be on call outsideworking hours. The ILO’s exploratorywork onmigrant

domesticworkerassociationsorcooperativesalsooffersalternativemeansbywhichdomestic

workers themselves can establish organizations that serve both their economic and social

interests.152

10.Crediblecomplaintsmechanisms

Establisheasy,simpleandsafeaccessformigrantworkerstoexpresstheirgrievancesandmake

formalcomplaintsthatarefollowedupwithoutfearofretribution.

Migrantworkershavehadlittleaccesstoeffectivecomplaintsmechanismsinbothinorigin

and destination countries. While telephone hotlines and online complaints facilities on

Ministrywebsiteshavebeenestablished, there is littleevidence thatmore thana fewhave

accessedtheseandnoknowledgeastowhatextenttheyhaveledtocomplaintsremedies.In

Qatar,theNationalHumanRightsCommitteehasestablishedcommunitydesksatitspremises

fordirectpersonal,telephoneandinternetaccessbuttherehasbeennoimpactassessmentto

date and no statistics on the number ofworker complaints that led to further actions and

compensationpaid.Governmentsneedtobemoretransparentwithdataoncomplaintsissues

toallowbetteranalysisandsuggestionsforremedies,andtodemonstratetheeffectivenessof

theirlawenforcement.

InthePhilippines,thePhilippinesOverseasEmploymentAdministration(POEA)hasmandated

that licensed private employment agencies that recruit domesticworkersmustmaintain a

Facebookaccountfortheirbusinesses.Theseaccountsserveasacommunicationplatformfor

domestic workers abroad with the hope of preventing ‘disputes’, official registration of

complaints,andrequiringemploymentagenciestofilereportstothePOEAonthestatusand

conditionoftheirdeployedworkers.153InFebruary2016,theMinistryofOverseasPakistanis

and Human Resource Development (MoOPHRD), developed an online complaint system

allowingmigrantworkersandoverseasPakistanistosubmitlegalcomplaintsincasesduring

recruitment or employment, accompanied by a tracking system that will enable the

complainant to track the status of their complaint.154 Recruitment complaints that are

registeredcouldalsobelinkedtoemployersorplacementagenciesatdestinationtokeepthem

informedofpossiblefraudulentactivitieswiththeircounterparts.

lThereisprovisionintheILODomesticWorkersConvention(189)(Article17)for“effectiveandaccessiblecomplaint

mechanisms…labourinspections…[where]conditionsunderwhichaccesstohouseholdpremisesmaybegranted,

havingduerespectforprivacy.…[and]…enforcementandpenaltieswithdueregardforthespecialcharacteristicsof

domesticwork”

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Again,thekeytoanycomplaintsprovisionistheempowermentofmigrantworkerstomake

complaints-toprovidethemwiththeconfidencethattheycanmakeacomplaintwithoutfear

ofretribution.Thatlevelofempowermentshouldbedevelopedpriortodeparturewithclear

instructionson thekindsof problems theymay facewith their employers aswell as other

employees,supervisorsandmanagementalike.

11.Pre-departuremedicalscreeningandregularhealthassessmentsin

Arabstates

Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldensureproperandmorecomprehensivepre-departure

medicalassessmentsandincludehealtheducationinpre-departureandpost-arrivalorientation

programs.

As amandatory requirement in labour recruitment, allmigrantworkers require amedical

screeningtestbeforetheycanbedeployed.Theyarealsoscreenedagainasapreconditionfor

theresidencypermitincountryofdestination.Examinationscanrequirelaboratorytestsfor

HIVandAIDS,HepatitisBandC,malaria,tuberculosis,druguseandpregnancy.Destination

countriesdogenerallynotacceptresultsfromtestsdoneinorigincountriesbecausethereare

stillpossibilitiesforcontagionandpregnancybetweenpre-departureresultsandarrival.Ithas

been suggested that, “because these mandatory procedures involve interactions with

governmententitiesand thepaymentof fees fordiscretionarydecisions, they representan

elevated risk of corrupt or improper payments.”155 Both origin and destination country

governmentsshouldtakemorecognizanceofinternationallawregardingthediscriminatory

natureofpracticessuchaspregnancytestsandothermedicalscreening,particularlyHIV.For

example, provisions in the ILO’s HIV and AIDS Recommendation, 2010 (No. 200) prohibit

mandatory HIV testing of migrant workers and their exclusion from migration “by the

countries of origin, of transit or of destination on the basis of their real or perceived HIV

status.”156

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Summaryofrecommendations

35

SummaryofRecommendations

Issue Recommendations1 Employer-only

paymentsto

recruitment

agencies

Withinterregionalcoordination:

• Changethecultureofworkerpaymentsforrecruitment,instituting

employer-onlypaymentsforrecruitmentwithwide-rangingeducation

andawareness-raisingprograms.

• Labourorigincountrygovernmentsshouldrepeallegislationthat

currentlyallowsrecruitmentagentstochargeworkers.

• Destinationcountrygovernmentsshouldsetrecruitmentfeesandcosts

andmandatethatnovisaswillbeissuedtoworkerswhoarerequired

topayanythingfortheirrecruitment.Theonusonestablishinga

prohibitionofworkerpaymentsdoesnotjustapplytotheorigin

countries,butalso(perhapsmoreimportantly)todestinationcountries.

• Comprehensiveinstitutionalizationofrecruitmentcosttransparency.

• Identifyandpreventcompanypersonnelandplacementagentsfrom

takingorreceivingkickbackpayments.

• Introduceasignificantexpansionofsystematicempiricalresearchto

generatemoreprecisedataonthedifferencesbetween“fees”,“costs”

and“charges”inthevariouscorridorsoflabourmigrationfromAsian

origincountriestoArabStates.

• Conductexploratoryresearchintotheimpactonrecruitmentindustry

stakeholdersofworkersnolongerpayingfees,costsandothercharges.

2 Projecttendering

procurement

procedures

• Projecttendersshouldincludeaseparatedetailedandtransparent

‘LabourRecruitmentCostAnalysis’withinbiddingproposalsthatdetail

variableandfixedcostsofrecruitment,includinglabourcostsof

subcontractors.

• Lowestbidsshouldbemorecarefullyscrutinizedtoascertainwhether

costreductionsareattheexpenseofmigrantworkersbeingrecruited.

3 Fair,ethicaland

compliant

recruitment

• Multilateralcooperationtoestablishconsistentlawsbetweenorigin

anddestinationcountriesinaharmonizationoffairrecruitment

regulationandenforcement.

• Regionalcoordinationisrequiredbetweenoriginanddestination

countrygovernmentstoestablishlicensingandaccreditationoffairand

ethicalrecruitmentagenciesinorigincountriesasexclusivelabour

supplierstoArabcountries.Thisshouldalsoapplytoplacement

agenciesandmanpoweroutsourcingagenciesindestinationcountries.

• Avoidtheuseofunregulatedandunlicensedsub-agents.

• Employersmustensuretheyaredealingonlywithfair,ethicaland

compliantrecruitmentagenciesthatdonotchargeworkersand

monitortheiractivities.

4 Standardized

contracts,contract

• EstablishstandardizedcontractsforallArabcountrieswithmeasures

againstcontractsubstitution.

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substitutionand

minimumwages

• Establishminimumoccupationalwagelevels,standardizedacrossArab

States.

5 E- Recruitment:

Centrallabour

clearinghouse

• EstablishcentralclearinghousesinArabcountriesforimplementation

andcontroloffairandethicalrecruitment.

• Encourageonlinerecruitmenttominimizethenumberof

intermediariesinvolved.

6 Government-to-

Government

• Destinationcountrygovernmentsshoulddiversifyarrangements

throughtheincreaseduseoforigincountrygovernmentrecruitment

agencieswheretheyexist.

7 Jointandseveral

liabilityschemes

• Establishjointandseveralliabilityschemesinbothcountryoforiginand

destinationforrecruitmentandplacementagenciesaswellas

contractorandsubcontractoremployers.

• Ensureleadcontractorsareliableforrecruitmentabusesintheirsupply

chains,includingmanpoweroutsourceagencies.

• Establishstringentandsubstantialfinancialandreputationalpenalties

fornon-compliancewithfairandethicalrecruitmentpractices.

8 Malpractices

throughfreevisas,

visatradingand

manpower

outsourceagencies

• GreatersurveillanceontheissuingofvisasbyArabstatestominimize

leakagetotheblackmarketof‘freevisas’andotherformsofvisa

trading.

• Greateroversightandauditingofmanpoweroutsourceagencies/firms

toensurefair,ethicalandcompliantrecruitment.

9 Migrantdomestic

workers

• Bringmigrantdomesticworkersundertheprotectionofthelabourlaw

intheArabStates.

• Explorenewfairandethicalonlinerecruitmentinitiatives.

10 Crediblecomplaints

mechanisms

• Establishaccessibleproceduresandimprovesupportservicesfor

migrantworkerstoexpresstheirgrievancesandmakeformal

complaintsthatarefollowedupwithoutfearofretribution.

11 Pre-departure

medicalscreening

andregularhealth

assessments

• Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldensureproperandmore

comprehensivemedicalassessmentsandincludehealtheducationin

pre-departureandpost-arrivalorientationprograms.

• Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldoperatehealthassessments

inlinewithILORecommendationNo.200.

12 ILOConventions • Countriesoforiginanddestinationshouldconsiderratificationof

relevantILOConventions,namelyalltheILOfundamentalConventions,

the2014ProtocoltotheForcedLabourConvention,Private

EmploymentAgenciesConvention(No.181),DomesticWorkers

Convention(No.189),MigrationforEmploymentConvention(No.97)

andMigrantWorkers(SupplementaryProvisions)Convention(No.143).

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Waysforwardinrecruitmentof“lowskilled”migrantworkersintheAsiaArabStatecorridor

37

CONCLUSION

ThehistoryofAsian-Arabstateslabourrecruitmenthasoftenbeencharacterizedasa“blame

game”, where the destination country blames agents in the origin country for charging

workers; and vice versa; orwhereboth agents andgovernments in origin countriesblame

employersforbeingunwillingtopayrecruitmentcosts.Intherealityofamaturemarket,it

seemsclearthatthereiscollusionbetweenintermediariesinorigincountriesandemployers

andagenciesindestinationcountries.Knowingthatworkersareindebtfortherecruitment

charges, employers can be certain of their compliance until their debts have been paid, a

condition that is an indicator of forced labour. In an age of globalization andmultilateral

relations,hidingbehindargumentsthatthesovereigntyofnationstatescannotbeinterfered

withdoesnotseemconvincing.Turningablindeyetothefraudulentcircumstancesbywhich

workersarerecruitedshouldnolongerbeconsideredacceptable.

Further,asapartof this 'blamegame', it isoftensuggestedbyArabnationals that thereal

perpetratorsaretheforeignnationalswhomanagetheemployingcompanies.Afterall,they

areinapositiontoexploittheirownnationals.Thismaywellbetrue,butintheGCC,foreign

companiesarerequiredtobeatleast51%ownedbyaGCCnational.Theroleofthecontrolling

owner, or partner, is often considered to be a passive one that merely allows the foreign

company to operate legitimately, in what has been referred to as a rental (or rentier)

arrangement.157 But just as any landlord, it would seem incumbent upon the controlling

partnertotakeresponsibilityfortheactionsofthetenantcompany;namely,toensurethatthe

othershareholders,managementandpersonnelarenotbreakingthelaworviolatinghuman

andlabourrightsontheirbehalf,orintheirname,forultimatelyitisalsothereputationand

conscienceofArabnationalsandtheirnationsthatisatstake.

To assist reform-minded country of origin governments in resisting the lobbying power of

privaterecruitmentagencies,itisincumbentuponArabstatestoinsistthatastrictcondition

ofentryisthatmigrantworkershavenotpaidtherecruitmentagencyortheemployerforthe

position.Apart fromreputationaland fairandethicalgrounds, it is in the interestsofArab

countries toadopt thispositionbecauseof thecurrent inefficiencies.Forexample,asmuch

recruitmentisbasedupontheselectionoflow-skilledmigrantworkersonthebasisoftheir

willingnessandabilitytopaylargesumsofmoneythatcanbeusedaskickbackpaymentsto

employingcompanypersonnelandothers,thereisahighriskthattheyarelessthanproperly

qualifiedandwillnotbeasproductive.Thisincludesworkersinconstruction,agricultureas

wellasdomesticworkers.Becausemigrantworkerspaysomuch,mostrecruitmentagencies

aremotivatedtodeployhighvolume,ratherthanhighqualitylabour.Typically,thenumberof

workersonconstructionsitesintheArabStatesareabnormallyhigh,inordertocompensate

forlowproductivity.158

Itmaybeanticipatedthatpreventingworkerpaymentsmaymeanthattheprofileofcurrent

recruitswillchange,withemployersseekinghigherskilledworkersandreducingthesizeof

their labour force. Thismaymean reduced job opportunities for low-skilled, low educated

workersfromthepoorerregionsofdevelopingAsiancountries.Itmaybesuggestedthatpast

and current practices of sourcingworkers fromAsia for the construction industry in Arab

countries has been seriously inefficient and costly, at least partly because of the unethical

motivations for current and past decisions on migrant labour recruitment.159 There is a

momentum for reform and as they take place there will no doubt be unforeseen and

unintended consequences. There are always risks of fraudulent behaviour and threats to

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vulnerable migrant workers, so it is important to develop concerted multilateral and

multidisciplinarymodelsthatcanprotectthem.160

Inthisregard,recentinitiativesbythePhilippinesoncertificationthroughnationaloccupation

skills standards as well as pre-employment, pre-departure and post-arrival orientation

modulespromisemoresystematic,comprehensiveinformationprogramsthatwillincreasethe

awarenessofmigrantworkeraccesstofairandethicalrecruitmentanddeployment.161Further

initiativesbytheUAEinestablishingvisaservicescentresincountriesoforiginadvancesfair

andethicalrecruitmenttoArabstates.WithfourcentrescompletedinSriLanka,Indonesia,

Kenya and Bangladesh, plans are underway for further such service provision centres

elsewhere.

Ithasbeenclearlyshownthatlawsinthedestinationcountrythatbanworkerpaymentsfor

recruitmentcostssimplydoesnotstopitfromhappeninginreality.Inthispaper,andinmany

reportsoverthelastfewyears,ithasbeensuggestedthatreformshouldoperateonanumber

oflevelsandarenastowardsfairandethicalrecruitmentpractices.Giventheirrelativewealth

andhumanitarianactivitiesinmanypartsoftheworld,itwouldbeconsistentforArabStates

totakethemoralandpracticalhighgroundwithanactiveinsistencethatintheinterestsof

dignity,adherencetotheruleoflaw,equityandjustice,low-skilledmigrantworkersentering

theArabStatesworkforcemustdo sowithoutpaying anything for their recruitment.They

shouldenterdebt-free,justasthemorehighlyskilledsectorsoftheexpatriateworkforcedo.

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ANNEXI:Fees,costsandcharges

Therearebothfixedandvariablecostsinrecruitment,someofwhicharenegotiable,suchas

agencycommissions.

Table1.Examplecostsforlow-skilledworkerrecruitmentperperson:Nepal-Qatar

Nepal US$ Qatar US$

Variablecosts Variablecosts

Internaltravel,good,

accommodation

50-100 Airfare(oneway) 300-350

Sub-agent

Commission

75-100 Agencycommission 250-450

Total(average) 163 Total(average) 670

FixedCosts FixedCosts

Medicaltest 25 Workvisa 82

Orientation 10 Visaattestations 150

Welfarefund 10 Residencypermit 320

Lifeinsurance 20 Medicaltest 30

Airporttax 5 Healthinsurance

card

30

Advertising 10

Sub-Total 80 Sub-total 612

Combinedtotal 243 Combinedtotal 1,282

OverallTotal:US$1525

Source:placement/recruitmentagencyandemployerinQatar

Table 1 is based on information obtained from interviews with placement agencies and

employersinQatar.ItshowsanapproximationofactualcostsofrecruitmentbetweenNepal

andQatar.Airfarescanvaryinaccordancewithdistancefromdestinationandseason.Thetotal

estimatedrecruitmentcostisaroundUS$1,512fromrecruitmenttoactualemployment(not

justarrivalatdestination).Thisincludesthecoststheemployermustpaybytheendofthe

probation period (3months) for residency permit and ID,medical test, fingerprinting and

healthcard(insurance).Sub-agentandagencyfees(orcommission)inTable1areconservative

estimatesandcanbe farmorewidelyvariable than indicated,dependingon thecountryof

destination, the occupational category andwage level - whatever themarket will bear, or

whatever the migrant worker is willing to pay.162 Internal costs such as transport,

accommodationandfoodareincurredbyworkersfromouterregionsgoingtothecapitalcity

officeoftheagencyforinterviewsandpaperwork.Thesecostsaresometimespaidforbythe

candidate,sometimesbytherecruitmentagencyorsharedbetweenthem.Insomecases,the

employer may reimburse these costs if receipts are obtained. A recent IOM study found

NepaleseworkerswerepayingagentsbetweenUS$800-2,200.163This indicates thatnot all

costsarebeingpaidorreimbursedbychargestomigrantworkersandkickbackpaymentsare

notalwaysbeingmade.

A study by Verité International reported kickback payments for workers from Nepal and

MyanmarofbetweenUS$300-500perworker toemployersor theiragents.Employersand

theiragentsalsopaidbetweenUS$115-600perworkerinkickbackpaymentsto“arangeof

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governmentofficialsinbothoriginanddestinationcountriestofraudulentlyapproveahostof

applicationsorfacilitatediscretionarydecisionsincluding,butnotlimitedto,foreignworker

quotas,demandsetattestations,visas,medicalcertificates,andworkpermits.”164

Itisimportanttonotethat“fixedcosts”inrealitycanbevariable,notonlyaccordingtocountry

oforigin,butalsoaccordingtorecruitmentagentquotationsincountriesoforigin.Forexample,

anotheragencyfromNepalquotedUS$45formedicalexpenses,US$35forlifeinsuranceand

US$15foradvertising.Inotherwords,recruitmentagenciescanmanipulatetheirquotations

(addingextraprofitmargins)forwhataresupposedtobefixedcostsintheirtendersforlabour

supplycontracts.Employerswhodonotrequireofficialreceiptsforthesecharges,ordonot

shoparoundforthelowestcosts,maybechargedmorethanactualcosts.Whereemployersare

notpaying,orbeingreimbursedbytheworkersalongwithkickbackpayments,thesemarginal

differenceswillbeoflittleornoconcern.

Bycomparison,Table2showsapproximationsofrecruitmentcostsfromBangladeshtoQatar.

Differencesincludehigherchargesforalmostallcategories.Significantlyhigherchargesarefor

themedicaltest,orientationseminarandadvertisingandtheadditionofcostsforgovernment

training,emigrationstamping,skillstestandadministration,whichwerenotincludedinthe

costsquotedforNepal.

Table 2. Example costs for low-skilled worker recruitment per person: Bangladesh-

Qatar

Bangladesh US$ Qatar US$

Variablecosts Variablecosts

InternalTravel,Food,

Accommodation

50-100 Airfare(oneway) 360-450

Sub-agent

Commission

75-100 Agencycommission 250-450

Total(average) 163 Total(average) 755

FixedCosts FixedCosts

Medicaltest 70 Workvisa 82

Orientation 25 Visaattestations 150

Welfarefund 10 Residencypermit 320

Lifeinsurance 13 Medicaltest 30

Administration 25 Healthinsurancecard 30

Governmenttraining 85

SkillsTest 35

Emigrationstamping 36

Advertising 108

Sub-Total 377 Sub-total 612

Combinedtotal 540 CombinedTotal 1,367

OverallTotal:US$1907

Source:placement/recruitmentagencyandemployerinQatar

AKNOMADstudycitesBangladeshiworkersgoingtoKuwaitpayingUS$3,136andUS$3,650,

anduptoUS$1,000perworkerinkickbackpayments,arguingthatthelackoftransparency

causesthesediscrepancies.165

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Thus,intheabovescenario,thedifferencebetweenthecostsofUS$1,907(Table2)andcharges

ofUS$3,136beingpaidbyBangladeshiworkersisUS$1,229.Thisdifferencemaybeaccounted

for, or seen as an indicator, by the presence of kickback payments to employers and their

agentsindestinationcountries,toofficialsinorigincountries,andtotherecruitmentagency

(i.e.,extraprofit).

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42

References

1RayJureidiniisaprofessorinmigration,ethicsandhumanrightsattheCenterforIslamicLegislationandEthics(CILE)in

theQatarFacultyofIslamicStudies,HamadBinKhalifaUniversity,Doha.2 ILO:ReportoftheILODirectorGeneraltotheInternationalLabourConference,Fairmigration:SettinganILOagenda(Geneva,InternationalLabourOffice,2014),paras.121-125

3Abella,Manolo,Martin,Philip&Yi,Soonhwa(2016draft)WhyareMigrationCostsHighforLow-SkilledWorkers?Evidence

fromMigrantSurveys.WorldBankKNOMADProgram.4Ibid.5IOM(2016)ResearchontheLabourRecruitmentIndustrybetweenUnitedArabEmirates,Kerala(India)andNepal,Interim

ReportfortheAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeetinginDubai,11-12May2016,InternationalOrganizationfor

Migration.6ILO(2015)IssuePaper:FairRecruitmentforInternationalLabourMigrationBetweenAsiaandtheGulfCooperationCouncil

Countries,ILORegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific;ILORegionalOfficeforArabStates:4;EndoEsaku&Afram,Gabi

(2011),TheQatar-NepalRemittanceCorridor:EnhancingtheImpactandIntegrityofRemittanceFlowsbyReducing

InefficienciesintheMigrationProcess,WorldBank,Washington.7Esaku&Afram,aboven6.8Rajan,S.Irudaya,Varghese,V.J.&Jayakumar,M.S.(2011)DreamingMobilityandBuyingVulnerability:Overseas

RecruitmentPracticesinIndia,Routledge,NewDelhi.9Esaku&Afram,aboven6.10Toaddressthis,thegovernmentProbashiKallyanBank(Bangladesh)wasestablishedtoprovidecheaperloansfor

workerstopayrecruitmentfeesandpresumablytohandleremittances–from9%interest(November2014).Otherbanks

arealsoprovidingloansbutathigherinterestrates(14-15percent).11Farenblum,Bassina(forthcoming)GovernanceofMigrantWorkerRecruitment:ARights-BasedFrameworkforCountriesof

Origin.AsianJournalofInternationalLaw.Onprofitsfromforcedlabour,seealso,ILO(2014)ProfitsandPoverty:The

EconomicsofForcedLabour,Geneva,ILO12ILO(2011)LabourmigrationinSouthAsia:Areviewofissues,policiesandpractices,InternationalMigrationPaper108;ILO

(2015)ReportoftheDirectorGeneral,FairMigration:SettinganILOAgenda.13Article33:“Thepersonwhoislicensedtorecruitworkersfromabroadforothersshallbeprohibited…Toreceivefrom

theworkeranysumsrepresentingrecruitmentfeesorexpensesoranyothercosts.”QatarLabourLaw,2004.14Article40:“Anemployershallincurthefeespertainingtorecruitmentofnon-Saudiworkers,thefeesoftheresidence

permit(Iqama)andworkpermittogetherwiththeirrenewalandthefinesresultingfromtheirdelay,aswellasthefees

pertainingtochangeofprofession,exitandre-entryvisasandreturnticketstotheworker’shomecountryattheendof

therelationbetweenthetwoparties.”SaudiLabourLaw,2005.15Article18:“Itisnotpermissibleforanylicensedlabouragentorsuppliertodemandoracceptfromanyworkerwhether

beforeorafterhisrecruitment,anycommissionormaterialrewardinconsiderationforarrangingsuchrecruitment,nor

mayheobtainfromhimanyexpensesexceptasmaybedecidedorapprovedbytheMinistryofLabourandSocialAffairs.”

(author’semphasis)UAELabourLaw,No.8,1980.Norcananyvisafeebedeductedfromaworker’ssalary(Article60).16SaudiArabia’slabourlawonlystipulatesthatemployersshallpayrecruitmentfees,whileQatarandUAElabourlawsstate

specificallythatemployeesshouldnotpay.However,Sectiona,Article6oftheUAEMinisterialResolution52(1989)also

requires“Anundertakingfromtheemployertotheeffectthatheshallsponsorandberesponsiblefortherecruited

Labourer,thebearingofhisrecruitmentexpensesandhisemploymentinaccordancewiththeemploymentcontractina

waynotprejudicingtheprovisionoftheFederalLawNo(8)/1980referredtoherein.”LabourlawsinOman,Kuwaitand

Bahraindonotmentionrecruitmentfeesandwhoshouldpaythem.17InternationalLabourOrganization,PrivateEmploymentAgenciesConventionC181,1997/2000Article7.1.“Private

employmentagenciesshallnotchargedirectlyorindirectly,inwholeorinpart,anyfeesorcoststoworkers.”Part2of

Article7providesanexceptionclausethatisoftenusedtojustifyworkerpayments,butitshouldonlybewhenitis

deemedtobeintheinterestofworkersconcernedandafterconsultationwiththemostrepresentativeorganizationsof

employersandworkers.In2014theILOurgedmemberstatestotakepreventativemeasuressuchas:“promotionof

coordinatedeffortsbyrelevantgovernmentagencieswiththoseofotherStatestofacilitateregularandsafemigrationand

topreventtraffickinginpersons,includingcoordinatedeffortstoregulate,licenseandmonitorlabourrecruitersand

employmentagenciesandeliminatethechargingofrecruitmentfeestoworkerstopreventdebtbondageandotherforms

ofeconomiccoercion.”ILORecommendationNo.23onSupplementaryMeasuresfortheEffectiveSuppressionofForced

Labour,2014(Article4i;seealsoArticle8).18Martin,Philip(2016)BackgroundPaperonRecruitment,AbuDhabiDialogue,SeniorOfficialsMeeting,Dubai,11-12May19Abella,Manolo(2004)“Theroleofrecruitersininternationalmigration”inD.S.MasseyandJ.E.Taylor,(eds)International

Migration:ProspectsandPoliciesinaGlobalMarket.OxfordUniversityPress,London:201–211.20Jureidini,Ray(2014)MigrantLabourRecruitmenttoQatar,Bloomsbury/QatarFoundation,Doha,Qatar.21Ibid.22ILO(2015)IssuePaper:FairRecruitmentforInternationalLabourMigrationBetweenAsiaandtheGulfCooperationCouncil

Countries,ILORegionalOfficeforAsiaandthePacific;ILORegionalOfficeforArabStates.23Receiptsthataregivenwillonlybeforthelegalamounttheycancharge,notforwhatisactuallypaid.

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43

24VeritéInternational(2016)AnExploratoryStudyontheRoleofCorruptioninInternationalMigration:2.

http://www.Verite-Report-Intl-Labour-Recruitment_0.pdf25Randeree,K.(2012).WorkforcenationalizationintheGulfCooperationCouncilStates,CentreforInternationalandRegional

Studies,Doha,GeorgetownUniversity.26Abella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3.27Apple’sSupplierResponsibility2009ProgressReportshowedthatthe“overcharge”ofrecruitmentfeespaidbyworkersat

sixofitssuppliersamountedtoUS$852,000.AppleendedupreimbursingUS$2.2milliontomigrantworkersto

compensatefortheovercharges,updateditsSupplierCodeofConductandissuedastandardforPreventionofInvoluntary

Labour.SeeUnitedNationsGlobalImpact(n.d.)HumanRightsandBusinessDilemmasForum,CaseStudieshttp://human-

rights.unglobalcompact.org/dilemmas/migrant-workers/28BSR(2008)InternationalLabourMigration:AResponsibleRoleforBusiness,October2008.

http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_LabourMigrationRoleforBusiness.pdf29Jureidini,aboven20.30AmnestyInternational(2016)TheUglySideoftheBeautifulGame:exploitationofmigrantworkersonaQatar2022World

CupVenue.AmnestyInternational,31March2016.31Shah,Nasra(2009).TheManagementofIrregularMigrationanditsConsequenceforDevelopment:GulfCooperationCouncil.

ILOAsianRegionalProgrammeonGovernanceofLabourMigrationWorkingPaperNo.1932Shah,Nasra&Al-Kazi,Lubna(2015)IrregularMigrationtoandwithinKuwait:EnablingandSustainingFactors,Gulf

ResearchMeeting,24-27August2015,CambridgeUniversity.33Shah,aboven31.ILOAsianRegionalProgrammeonGovernanceofLabourMigrationWorkingPaperNo.19;Kapiszewski,

Andrzej.(2001).Nationalsandexpatriates:PopulationandLabourDilemmasoftheGulfCooperationCouncilStates.Garnet

PublishingLimited,ReadingUK.34ILOGlobalEstimateofMigrantWorkers,December2015:18,Table2.9.35ILODomesticWorkerConvention,2011(No.189).Althoughtheconventionrecognisesthat,globally,thisisafemale-

dominatedoccupation,theconventiondoesprovideaframeworkofprotectionforbothmenandwomenindomestic

work,andspecificallyaddressesthechallengesfacedbymigrants.36SomeexamplesarethePhilippinesin2006,2008,2011,2014;Nepalin1998,2008,2010,2012;Bangladeshin1981;Sri

Lankain2013;Indonesiain2011,2014;andEthiopiain2013.37Nepalisalsolikelytoimposeasimilarrestrictiononwomen,bynotallowingwomenwithchildrenbelowtheageoftwo

yearstoleaveforwork.Also,startingfrom2017,Indonesiawillnotallowmigrationoflive-indomesticworkers.38Nepal,under30yearsofagein2012;SriLanka.21yearsincreasedto25yearsin2013;Bangladesh,35yearsin1997,

reducedto25yearsin2003.39Therecentlyamendedandendorsed“GuidelinesRegardingSendingDomesticWorkersonForeignEmployment,SriLanka,

2015”prohibitswomenwithchild(ren)belowtheageoftwofrommigratingforforeignemployment.40UNConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW)1979,General

Recommendation26;ILODiscrimination(EmploymentandOccupation)Convention,1958(No.111).41QatardidthesamewiththePhilippinesin2012,butnoagreementhassincebeensigned.SeeJones,Katherine(2015)

RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance,InternationalOrganizationforMigration,Dhaka,DhakaHouse:40.42ILO(2015)NoEasyExit:MigrationBansAffectingWomenfromNepal,InternationalLabourOrganization,Geneva.

http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_428686.pdf43ForasummaryofrestrictionsandoutcomesinColomboProcesscountries,see:InternationalOrganizationforMigration

(2015)RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance:whatworks?p58.

https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/migrated_files/What-We-Do/docs/Recruitment-Monitoring-Book.pdf44Farenblum,aboven11.Jureidini,Ray(2015)“TheUseandAbuseofDomesticWorkers:casestudiesinLebanonand

Egypt”,inWenonaGiles,MaryRomeroandValeriePreston(eds)WhenCareWorkGoesGlobal:LocatingtheSocial

RelationsofDomesticWork,Ashgate.45Gordon,Jennifer(2015)GlobalLabourRecruitmentinaSupplyChainContext,ILO,Geneva,2015:746ILO(2014)RealizingaFairMigrationAgenda:LabourflowsbetweenAsiaandtheArabStates,Experts’Meeting.Background

paper.47ConventionNo.181,Art.7(1).48ThefollowingILOconventionsarespecificallyrelevanttorecruitmentissues:MigrationforEmploymentConvention,1949

(No.97)anditsrelatedRecommendationNo.86;MigrantWorkers(SupplementaryProvisions)Convention,1975(No.

143)andRecommendationNo.151;PrivateEmploymentAgenciesConvention,1997(No.181)andtherelated

RecommendationNo.188;DomesticWorkersConvention,2011(No.189)andtherelatedRecommendationNo.201;

ProtocolP029andRecommendationNo.203SupplementingILOConventiononForcedLabourNo.29;ILOMultilateral

FrameworkonLabourMigration;Non-bindingprinciplesandguidelinesforarights-basedapproachtolabourmigration

(2006).49ILO,aboven46.OfcoursethereareIslamicprinciplesthatrecognizetherightsofbothemployerandemployee.Islamic

ethicsandjurisprudenceisagainstforcedlabourandtheexploitationoflabouranddictatethatemployersmusthonour

contractualagreementsandpayemployeestheagreeduponwage,andwithoutdelay-seeMattar,Mohammed(2010)

CombattingTraffickinginPersonsinAccordancewiththePrinciplesofIslamicLaw,NewYork,UnitedNationsOfficeon

DrugsandCrime:23.50UnitedNationsGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights:Implementingthe“Protect,RespectandRemedy”

Framework,2011:151ILO,aboven6

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52Abella,Martin,&Yi,aboven353SeeAbella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3;butalso,thereisnodefinitionofrecruitmentfeesininternationallyrecognizedlabour

andhumanrightsstandards.Althoughitistooall-encompassingforpracticalusageandanalysis,theUSSeniorPolicy

OperatingGrouptoCombatTraffickinginPersonsdraftdefinitionofrecruitmentfeesstates:“Recruitmentfeesinclude

butarenotlimitedtothefollowingfees,charges,orcosts:a)forsoliciting,identifying,considering,interviewing,referring,

retaining,transferring,selecting,orplacingpotentialemployees;b)forcoveringthecost,inwholeorinpart,of

advertising;c)forcertifyinglabourapplications;d)forprocessingpetitions;e)forvisasandanyfeethatfacilitatesan

employeeobtainingavisasuchasappointmentandapplicationfees;f)forgovernment-mandatedcostssuchasborder

crossingfees;g)forprocuringphotographsandidentitydocumentation,includinganynongovernmentalpassportfees;h)

feeschargedasaconditionofaccesstothejobopportunity,includingprocuringmedicalexaminationsandimmunizations

andobtainingbackground,referenceandsecurityclearancechecksandexaminations;andi)foranemployer’srecruiters,

agentsorattorneys,orothernotaryorlegalfees.2.Anyfee,charge,orcostmaybearecruitmentfeeregardlessofwhether

itisdeductedfromwages,paidbackinwageorbenefitconcessions,paidbackasakickback,bribeortribute,remittedin

connectionwithrecruitment,orcollectedbyanemployerorathirdparty,includingbutnotlimitedtoagents,recruiters,

staffingfirms(includingprivateemploymentandplacementfirms),subsidiaries/affiliatesoftheemployerandanyagent

oremployeeofsuchentities”.54Jureidini,aboven20.55Jones,Katherine(2015)RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance,IOM,Dhaka,DhakaHouse:87.56ArrivingGuestWorkers,(n.d)UnitedArabEmiratesMinistryofHumanResourcesandEmiratisation.57SeeUAEMinisterialDecree765of2015,RulesandconditionsfortheTerminationofEmploymentRelations.58Thereisaneedtopreventrecruitmentabusesincountriesoforiginatthevillagelevelwhereinformalintermediariesare

oftenpartoftheintimatenetworkofprospectivemigrantworkers.See,forexample,theILOWorkinFreedomProgram

door-to-doorawarenessraisingprograminNepal.http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-

ilo/multimedia/video/institutional-videos/WCMS_217690/lang--en/index.htm59Receiptswillalsoassistforworkerre-imbursementschemes.60Martin,Philip(2016)BackgroundPaperonRecruitment,AbuDhabiDialogue,SeniorOfficialsMeeting,Dubai,11-12May61Martin,Phillip(2013)HowtoReduceMigrantWorkerRecruitmentCosts,DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies,Policy

Brief,August,2013.62SeeWorkerpaymentstorecruitmentagenciesinSection1above.63SeeJureidini,Ray(forthcoming)“IslamicEthicsandMigrantLabourinQatar”inToseefAzidandNecmettinKızılkaya(eds)

IslamicEconomyandLabour/İslamİktisadıveEmek,London,Gower.64Martin,aboven60.65Curiously,in2012,Nepalbannedlicensedrecruitmentagenciesfromestablishingofficesinouterregionalareas,forcinga

greaterrelianceonsub-agents.However,Nepalallowssub-agentstoregistersothattheycanoperateinaformalmanner.

Thereisalsoanationalassociationofsub-agents,althoughveryfewsub-agentsareregistered.Nepaliscurrently

reviewingits2007ForeignEmploymentAct.Oneproposalallowsrecruitmentagenciestoestablishdistrictleveloffices,

andprohibitssub-agents,butitisnotclearwhetherthiswillbeadopted.66Jones,Katherine(2015)RecruitmentMonitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance,InternationalOrganizationforMigration,

Dhaka,DhakaHouse:40.67ILOMigrationforEmploymentConventionNo.97callsforMemberStatestoadoptbilateralagreementswhenthereis

sufficientlylargemovementsofmigrantworkers.TheConventionassumesthattheagreementsshouldconformwith

internationallabourstandards(SeeArticle10).68Gordon,aboven45.69ILO,aboven2270Jones,aboven66:110.71SeealsoAbella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3.72IOM(2016)ResearchontheLabourRecruitmentIndustrybetweenUnitedArabEmirates,Kerala(India)andNepal,Interim

ReportforAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeetingDubai,UAE,11-12May2016.73FSIWorldwideisafair/ethicalrecruiterthatdoesnotchargefeesorcoststoworkersandwithabusinessmodelthatowns

thewholerecruitmentchainfromthevillagelevelinthecountryoforigintotheplacementoftheworkerinthecountryof

destination.74FSI(2015)AddressingTraffickinginPersonsIssues,WhitepaperSubmissionRe:LogcapV,20thNovember2015:8.75Blockchainisadatabaseforstakeholderdistributionthatmaintainsacontinuouslygrowinglistofauthenticated

transactionrecordsencryptedagainsttampering,revisionandmisrepresentation.76Steiner,Jutta&Baker,Jessi(2016)Blockchain:thesolutionfortransparencyinproductsupplychains,ProjectProvenance

Ltd.77SIA(2016)Japan-RecruitTechnologiesandAscribeAnnouncePartnershiptoTestBlockchainTechnologyfortheHR

Industry,StaffingIndustryAnalysts,DailyNews.27April,2016.http://www2.staffingindustry.com/row/Editorial/Daily-

News/Japan-Recruit-Technologies-and-Ascribe-announce-partnership-to-test-blockchain-technology-for-the-HR-

industry-3772878SeeILOFairRecruitmentInitiative:http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/fair-recruitment/lang--en/index.htm79SamMcCahonofMcCahonLawOffices,Washington,-personalcommunication.80In2006,thePhilippinesAssociationforProfessionalisminOverseasEmployment(ASPROE)wasformedwiththe

requirementformembershipbeingthattheycouldnotchargeplacementfees,butithasveryfewmembers.81Gordon,2015:7-8.

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82BeateAndrees,AlixNasri&PeterSwiniarski,RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFoster

FairMigration:Models,ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015:66.83Forexample,anagentmaybedisqualifiedwheretheauthoritiesreasonablysuspectthatthepersonhasbeeninvolvedin

humansmuggling,trafficking,acrimeinvolvingtortureorslavery,oracrimethatisofseriousinternationalconcern,

whetherornottheyhavebeenconvictedofsuchanoffence.Backgroundcheckscanbeobtainedfrombusinessassociates,

formerclients,etc.84Andrees,Nasri&Swiniarski,aboven82.84ILO,aboven46.85Thisofcourseassumesamorerobustsystemofregistration,licensingandregulation,baseduponILOfairrecruitment

guidelinesthatshouldbeinplacefirstbeforeanysupplementaryaccreditationsystem.86Thefollowingsourcesweredrawnuponforthisboxedsection:OmAsthaRai(2015)“Zerocostmigration,really?”Nepal

Times,8April2015.http://www.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2015/04/08/zero-cost-migration-really/;Sijapata,

Bandita,Bhattarai,AshimandPathak,Dinesh(2015)AnalysisofLabourMarketandMigrationTrendsinNepal,September

2015.GLZ,GmbH&InternationalLaborOrganization.

http://ceslam.org/mediastorage/files/Labor%20n%20migration_gizver%203.pdf;RoshanSedhai“Free-visa-free-ticket

policy:Recruitingagenciestellingtwistedtale?”KathmanduPost,14January2016.l;KathmanduPostReport(2016)

“Manpoweragenciesprotestagainst‘uninformedraids’”KathmanduPost,26February2016.http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-02-26/manpower-agencies-protest-against-uninformed-raids.html

87Someofthepointsincludedintheagreementincludethepossibilityofincreasingtheservicefeetobechargedbythe

recruitmentagency.The11-memberteamformed(whichincludes5representativesofNAFEA)isgiventheresponsibilityof

carryingouttheassessmentonthispossibility.TheotherpointincludedrepresentationofNAFEAinthetechnicalcommittee

formedtoreviewandamendtheForeignEmploymentAct,2007.88Gordon,Jennifer(2015)GlobalLabourRecruitmentinaSupplyChainContext,InternationalLabourOrganization,Geneva:

4689Ibid.90Ibid.91Andrees,Nasri&Swiniarski,aboven82:71.92Greaterclarityisrequiredonlegalremediesforbreachofcontractwherethelabourlawdoesnotapply,suchaswith

migrantdomesticworkers.InLebanon,forexample,contractlawhasnotbeeneffective.SeeJureidini,Ray&Moukarbel,

Nayla(2004)“FemaleSriLankanDomesticLabourinLebanon:Contractual,Slavery-likePracticesandConditions”in

JournalofEthnicandMigrationStudies,Volume30, No.4,July,2004,pp.581-607.93Theprovisions,however,needmoreclarification,particularlyregardingunilateralterminationbyanemployeewhere

thereisnoevidenceofabreachbytheemployer.94UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)(2015)TheRoleofRecruitmentFeesandAbusiveandFraudulent

RecruitmentPracticesofRecruitmentAgenciesinTraffickinginPersons,UnitedNations,Vienna.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2015/Recruitment_Fees_Report-Final-

22_June_2015_AG_Final.pdf95VeritéInternational,aboven24.96Jureidini,Ray(2014)MigrantLabourRecruitmenttoQatar,Bloomsbury/QatarFoundation,Doha,Qatar:127.97EURESwebsite.Available:https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/eures-services98Infoedgewebsite.Available:http://www.infoedge.in/businesses-recruitment.asp99SifyNews(2016)“SriLanka,SaudiArabiainke-hiringsystemformigrantworkers”,SifyNews(22March2016)

http://www.sify.com/news/lanka-saudi-arabia-ink-e-hiring-system-for-migrant-workers-recruitment-news-

international-qdwsKpidchdgj.html100MohammedRasooldeen(2016)“OnlineportaltohelpSaudisponsor”,ArabNews,16May2016

http://www.arabnews.com/news/online-portal-help-saudi-sponsors-recruit-domestics#101Ataya,Rabea(2016)PotentialRoleofTechnologyonLabourRecruitmentIndustry,PresentationtoAbuDhabiDialogue

SeniorOfficialsMeeting,Dubai,11May2016.102Martin,Philip(2006)ManagingLabourMigration:TemporaryWorkerProgrammesforthe21stCentury,International

SymposiumonInternationalMigrationandDevelopment,UnitedNationsSecretariat,Turin,Italy,28-30June2006

http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/Symposium_Turin_files/P07_Martin.pdf103“ExamplesofBestPractices,”inILOMultilateralFrameworkonLabourMigration:Non-bindingPrinciplesandGuidelines

ForaRights-BasedApproachtoLabourMigration,Geneva,2006:54.104http://www.uniopagesos.es/organitzacio/fundacio_02.asp;“ExamplesofBestPractices,”inILOMultilateralFramework

onLabourMigration:Non-bindingPrinciplesandGuidelinesForaRights-BasedApproachtoLabourMigration,Geneva,

2006:55.105IOM(2009)TemporaryandCircularLabourMigration:Experiences,ChallengesandOpportunities,International

OrganizationforMigration,SeriesofResearchintoMigration,No.2,December:22.106Jureidini,Ray(2014)MigrantLabourRecruitmenttoQatar,Bloomsbury/QatarFoundation,Doha,Qatar.107Foranoverviewofthesebilateralagreements,seeInternationalOrganizationforMigration(2015)Recruitment

Monitoring&MigrantWelfareAssistance:whatworks?p60-61.

https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/migrated_files/What-We-Do/docs/Recruitment-Monitoring-Book.pdf108IOM(2005)op.cit.:p74.109Wickramasekara,Piyasiri(2013)RegulationoftheRecruitmentProcessandReductionofMigrationCosts:Comparative

AnalysisofSouthAsia.Chapter3,inProceedingsoftheIntergovernmentalRegionalSeminaronPromotingCooperationfor

SafeMigrationandDecentWork,1-2July2013,Dhaka,BangladeshOctober.

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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478461

110AlthoughMOUssignedbythePhilippinescoverhiringofworkersundergovernment-to-governmentarrangementsand

donotinvolveprivaterecruitmentagencies.111Taran,Patrick(2015)Migration:TwentyFirstCenturyKeytoEconomicSuccessandSocialWell-Being,BriefingNoteforthe

133rdAssemblyoftheInter-ParliamentaryUnion,Geneva,18-21October2015.112Park,Young-bumandMyung-huiKim(2016)EmploymentPermitScheme:Korea’sTemporaryLow-skilledForeignWorkerProgram,HumanResourcesDevelopmentServiceofKorea,Seoul,Korea.113K.B.Kyung.UpdateontheEmploymentPermitSystem.Paperpresentedatthe“Effectiveimplementationofthe

EmploymentPermitSystem”,ILO/KoreaMulti-CountryDialogue,3rd-4thDecember2013,Bangkok,2014.114ILO.2015.RegionalguidelinesonthereturnandreintegrationofmigrantworkersparticipatingintheEmployment

PermitSystemoftheRepublicofKorea.Bangkok.Thailand,availableat:http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---

asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_514915.pdf115SeePublicServicesInternational(PSI)websiteathttp://www.world-psi.org/en/psi-symposium-german-philippines-

bilateral-agreement-health-workers.116Gordon,2015:19117SeerecentactionsinQatar,forexample-http://www.sc.qa/en/news/statement-on-behalf-of-the-sc118ItmaybenotedthatthePhilippines’“jointandsolidaryliability”clausedoesnotapplytoanydirecthiringarrangement

orhiringthroughGovernment-to-Government.119SeeLabourCodeofthePhilippinesPresidentialDecreeNo.442,Article109,“SolidaryLiability”.120LawyersBeyondBorders(2011)“BuildingPartnershipsforJusticeforMigrantWorkers”ConferenceReport,23–25

November2011Bangkok,Thailand.121Gordon,2015:32.122Gordon,2015:27-28123BeateAndrees,AlixNasri&PeterSwiniarski:RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFoster

FairMigration:Models,ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015:47-48.124Ibid.,p.79.125Gordon,2015:30;SeealsoAndrees,NasriandSwiniarski,aboven123.126Andrees,NasriandSwiniarski,aboven12.3127 ILO (2014) Realizing a Fair Migration Agenda: Labour Flows between Asia and Arab States: Summary Report of the

InterregionalExperts’Meeting,3-4December2014,Kathmandu:9.128Gordon,2015:48.129Gordon,2015:44130Underjointandseveralliability,thismaynotapplywithPhilippinerecruitmentagencieswhoareaskedtoassumefull

responsibilityforthelifeofthecontracttothereturnoftheworkeratthepointofhire.Philippinelawprohibits

probationaryperiodsformigrantworkersbutallowsprovisionsinthecontracton“justcauses”forterminationbythe

employerandemployee.131Jureidini,aboven20.132Gordon,2015:20-21.133EICCCodeofConduct,availableat:http://www.eiccoalition.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct5_1_English.pdf134 Jureidini, Ray. (forthcoming) “IrregularMigration inQatar: The Role of Legislation, Policies and Practices” in Philippe

Fargues&NasraShah(eds)IrregularMigrationintheGCCStates,GulfResearchCouncil,CambridgeUniversityPress.135Statesshouldformulate“coherentpolicies,suchasemploymentandlabourmigrationpolicies,whichtakeintoaccount

therisksfacedbyspecificgroupsofmigrants,includingthoseinanirregularsituation,andaddresscircumstancesthat

couldresultinforcedlaboursituations.”ILORecommendationNo.203onSupplementaryMeasuresfortheEffective

SuppressionofForcedLabour,2014(Article4h).136ThisisacknowledgedintheUAEArrivingGuestWorkersPamphlet.Itasks,“Noworkuponarrival?…ReporttotheLabour

Office.”137Jureidini,aboven133.138Shah,aboven31;Kapiszewski,Andrzej.(2001).Nationalsandexpatriates:PopulationandLabourDilemmasoftheGulf

CooperationCouncilStates.GarnetPublishingLimited,ReadingUK.139Seeforexample:Crepeau,FrancoisReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthehumanrightsofmigrants:MissiontoQatar.

UnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil,Twenty-sixthsession,24April,2014,Geneva.140UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)(2015)TheRoleofRecruitmentFeesandAbusiveandFraudulent

RecruitmentPracticesofRecruitmentAgenciesinTraffickinginPersons,UnitedNations,Vienna;BeateAndrees,AlixNasri

&PeterSwiniarski:RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFosterFairMigration:Models,

ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015:82.141BahrainLabourLawNo.36,2012.DomesticworkersarecoveredbyArticles(6),(19),(20),(21),(37),(38),(40),(48),

(49),(58),(116),(183)and(185)andinPartsTwelveandThirteen.142KuwaitMinisterialDecreeNo.68,2015.143LabourlawNo.6of2011specifiesan8hourdayandanhourofrestevery5hours.Thedomesticworkerlawrequiresa

maximumof12houradaywithunspecified“hoursofrest”andonedayoffperweek.Insteadof15dayspaidsickleave,

employersofdomesticworkersarerequiredtoprovidemedicaltreatment.HumanRightsWatch(2015)Kuwait:NewLaw

aBreakthroughforDomesticWorkers,June30,2015.https://www.hrw.org;MigrantRights.Org(2015)AnotherLookat

Kuwait’sLawsforDomesticWorkers.http://www.migrant-rights.org/2015/08/another-look-at-kuwaits-new-laws-for-

domestic-workers/

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Annex1:Fees,costsandcharges

47

144Jureidini,Ray(2004)“WomenMigrantDomesticWorkersinLebanon”inSimelEsim&MonicaSmith(eds)Genderand

MigrationinArabStates:TheCaseofDomesticWorkers,InternationalLabourOrganisation,RegionalOfficeforArabStates,

Beirut:63-84.145ILORecommendationNo.23onSupplementaryMeasuresfortheEffectiveSuppressionofForcedLabour,2014(Article

4b).146Asis,Maruja&Agunias,Dovelyn(2012)StrengtheningPre-DepartureOrientationProgrammesinIndonesia,Nepalandthe

Philippines,MigrationPolicyInstitute&InternationalOrganizationforMigration,IssueinBrief,No.5,September2012.147AlsoknownasRepublicAct,orRA8042148InSriLanka,recruitmentagenciesroutinelysolicitpotentialmigrantdomesticworkersbyofferinguptoUS$1,000asan

incentiveandrepaidbysalarydeductions.149Jureidini,Ray(2003)“TheFailureofStateProtection:HouseholdGuestWorkersinLebanon”["L'échecdelaprotectionde

l'Etat:lesdomestiquesétrangersauLiban"]intheEuropeanReviewofInternationalMigration[RevueEuropéennedes

MigrationsInternationales],2003,Volume19,Number3:95-127.150E.g.“HelperChoice”-https://www.helperchoice.com/151Jureidini,Ray(2015)“TheUseandAbuseofDomesticWorkers:casestudiesinLebanonandEgypt”,inWenonaGiles,

MaryRomeroandValeriePreston(eds)WhenCareWorkGoesGlobal:LocatingtheSocialRelationsofDomesticWork,

Ashgate.152ILO(215)Cooperatingoutofisolation:thecaseofmigrantdomesticworkersinKuwait,LebanonandJordan,ILOWorking

Paper,InternationalLabourOrganizationRegionalOfficeforArabStates,Beirut.153BeateAndrees,AlixNasri&PeterSwiniarski:RegulatingLabourRecruitmenttoPreventHumanTraffickingandtoFoster

FairMigration:Models,ChallengesandOpportunities,ILO,2015,p.68.154OnlinecomplaintsystemformigrantworkersandoverseasPakistanis,TVI,February13,2016.Available:

http://tvi.com.pk/online-complaint-system-for-migrant-workers-and-overseas-pakistanis/155VeritéInternationa,aboven24.156ILOHIVandAIDSRecommendation,2010(No.200).Seeparagraphs25,27and28.157Dito,Mohammed(2014)“Kafala:FoundationsofMigrantExclusioninGCCLabourMarkets”,inOmarAlShebabi,Adam

Hanieh,AbdulhadiKhalaf,TransitStates:LabourMigrationandCitizenshipintheGulf.PlutoPress.158Borgogna,Alessandro,Majdalani,Fadi&Bejjani,Marwan(2015)MasteringConstructionCostsandCapabilities:Layingthe

foundationsforsuccess,Strategy&,PWC,21December,2015.http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/mastering-

construction-costs-capabilities159Ibid.160VeritéInternational(2016)AnExploratoryStudyontheRoleofCorruptioninInternationalMigration:1161SeeComprehensiveInformationandOrientationProgram,presentationtotheAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeeting,

May11,2016,Dubai.162‘Fees’maybedistinguishedfromcostsandchargesasonlypertainingtotheservicecommissionfortherecruitment

agency(agencycommission).However,thereisnodefinitionofrecruitmentfeesininternationallyrecognizedlabourand

humanrightsstandards.163IOM(2016)ResearchontheLabourRecruitmentIndustrybetweenUnitedArabEmirates,Kerala(India)andNepal,Interim

ReportfortheAbuDhabiDialogueSeniorOfficialsMeetinginDubai,11-12May2016,InternationalOrganizationfor

Migration:5. 164VeritéInternational,aboven24.165Abella,Martin,&Yi,aboven3.

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SUMMARY

Fraudulent practices at the recruitment stage can leave low-skilled workers extremely vulnerable. These practices might include debt bondage linked to payment by low-skilled migrant workers of excessive recruitment fees, costs and charges and deception about the nature and conditions of work, often leading to detrimental contract substitution and human trafficking for labour exploitation. A complex and opaque web of intermediaries including sub-agents and outsourcing agents facilitate visa trading and drive up recruitment charges for low-skilled migrant workers. Collusion between labour brokers at origin and destination can perpetuate these practices, through such methods as kickback payments.

Within the Asia-Arab States corridor, the ILO has collaborated with constituents to promote fair migration during several forums. This White Paper serves to further stimulate policy dialogue for fair migration in the interlinked Asia-Arab States region. It outlines the main challenges to fair recruitment in the Asia-Arab States corridor, and proposes concrete measures for reform. Reform will require harmonizing legislation, accreditation and monitoring between countries of origin and destination, as well as significant cooperation with the private sector for the review of business practices by corporate contractors and employers of domestic workers.

This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

For more information, contact:International Labour OrganizationRegional Office for the Arab StatesAresco Center, Justinien Street, KantariP.O.Box 11-4088 Riad El Solh 1107-2150Beirut – LebanonTel: +961-1-752400Fax: +961-1-752405Email: [email protected]: www.ilo.org/arabstatesFollow ILO in Arab States on Twitter: @iloarabstates