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TRANSCRIPT
by Luke Corbin
[WATER SECURITY IN CAMBODIA]
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Although progressing in some areas, the Kingdom of Cambodia remains one of the
most disadvantaged nations in contemporary Southeast Asia. The country depends heavily
on international aid for survival, receiving over $500 million in assistance each year.
Cambodian citizens continue to suffer egregiously and in deprivation of their most
fundamental security needs. By using the human security paradigm to analyse primarily
water, but also energy and food security in Cambodia, an understanding can be gained of
the progress and measures being taken by the Cambodian government and other actors in
securing these assets. This will lead to an informed assessment on the efficacy of this
securitisation and shine light on the future prospects for the living standards of the average
Cambodian citizen.
The theory and practice of security has changed significantly in recent decades,
thanks in large part to the widespread adoption of the human security framework by
analysts and practitioners. Human security encompasses not only freedom from war and
violence, but also an individual’s basic needs for other forms of security, such as community
security, health security, economic security, and food security - in other words a person’s
fundamental freedoms. Human security has evolved security studies to a different level,
relegating the traditional methodology to the sub-field strategic studies and opening the
floodgates for new referent objects to be securitised. This evolution of security studies has
incited considerable debate which can be generalised as whether the UNDP focus is simply
too broad to have any useful analytical application and whether it risks making everything
and anything a potential security issue. Accordingly, some human security referents receive
more controversy than others.
Water, food, and energy have an established literature in Security Studies and form a
nexus of security referents within the broader human security framework. In particular,
water constitutes the bridge linking together food, energy, climate, economic growth, and
human security challenges that the world economy faces over the next two decades. As
tangible referent objects water, food and energy face direct commodification and
contestation, giving rise to a substantially different security discourse than more immaterial
security referents such as that of the “community” or “personal”.
Driving this discourse is the certainty of the principle of supply and demand and the
uncertainty of the future – some studies claim that within two decades the collective
demand for water will exceed foreseen supply by about forty per cent. If water becomes
less accessible, food becomes more expensive and/or energy resources deplete, then a
nation’s previous and ongoing management of these necessities will profoundly affect its
prosperity. In Cambodia water, food and energy are intertwined even further, as
hydropower developments (potentially positive achievements in water/energy security)
often threaten fisheries (negative impact on food security).
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Cambodia is still climbing back from the defining devastation of the late
1970s, when a communist utopian regime known as “Angkar Padevat” or “the Organisation”
governed. Over three years, eight months, and twenty days the rulers of the new
Democratic Kampuchea abolished money, markets, formal education, Buddhism, books,
private property and freedom of movement. This unprecedented attempt at social
engineering is now identified as an example of genocide, with approximately 2.12 million
people estimated to have lost their lives during what is now commonly called the Khmer
Rouge era. Although potential justice is finally within grasp thanks to a United Nations
hybrid tribunal, the tumultuous experience of the Khmer Rouge continues to mar the
country. It directly shaped the enduring political order of Prime Minister Hun Sen, and while
some believe Hun Sen’s power is finally reaching its limits, this does not imply an
improvement in governance or that said power will weaken in the near future.
In addition to the country’s troubled internal circumstances, Cambodia’s
regional history and geographic position also permeate the nation’s ability to respond to
security threats. Although powerful for a time, the empire, protectorate and republic
antecedents of present-day Cambodia were usually subordinate to either the Thais in the
west, or the Vietnamese in the east. Since the eighteenth century in particular Cambodia
has been an important buffer state between Thailand and Vietnam, competing to manage
its own interests against those of its more powerful neighbours. These power patterns
remain, but Cambodia’s immediate neighbours are not the only regional actors affecting the
nation’s current decision-making.
Just as France and the United States rerouted Cambodian history in the
twentieth century, the People’s Republic of China is staking enormous claims in the
Cambodia of today, encouraging at least a limited alignment. China is investing copiously in
Cambodia, rapidly increasing foreign aid, forgiving debt on loans and cementing itself as
Cambodia’s predominant foreign influence with a right to interfere in the nation’s affairs.
Cambodia has welcomed the attention, perhaps because China aims to prevent the
emergence of an Indochina dominated by Vietnam, a mission conducive to Cambodia’s own
core interests. It isn’t all free money and collusion, however, with the close partnership
profoundly affecting Cambodia’s autonomy, and causing friction within ASEAN, especially on
the South China Sea issue. But even so, China is believed to be the primary guarantor of
Cambodia’s national security and clearly influences Cambodia’s stance on human security
issues more than any other nation.
Ever since a United Nations committee reinterpreted articles eleven and
twelve of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2002, water
has gradually gained credence as a basic human right by people around the world. This boils
down to the fact that everybody needs water to survive, and to some degree, water stress is
as old as time. Additionally, water’s role as a necessary condition for food security and as a
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sufficient condition for energy security (through hydropower) means that water security
logically encompasses, or at least profoundly influences, food and energy security. Looking
at Cambodia in particular, where the majority of livelihoods are water-dependent and will
remain so for the foreseeable future, water can be seen as absolutely crucial to the national
economy and at the heart of Cambodia’s economy and culture. This is not to mention the
fact that as Cambodia develops economically there will be a higher demand for water and
energy and an increased generation of solid waste and wastewater to be dealt with –
evidently, securing access to water is of prime importance for all.
The biggest and most contested group of water resources in the country, and the
entire Southeast Asia region, is the mammoth Mekong River. This epic stream cascades
from the frosty heights of Tibet in the People’s Republic of China southwards, either
bordering or running directly through the countries of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam, where it discharges millions of litres of water and sediment into the Mekong
Delta and out to the tropical South China Sea. The river drops a total of 5000 metres in
altitude throughout the journey and is the twelfth longest in the world. The vast majority of
Cambodia’s land area is in the Mekong river basin, contributing to a severe reliance on the
waterway for water resources. This reliance is jeopardised by the shared nature of the river.
There has been a lot of talk, but crucially no binding transgovernmental
agreements, on sharing the Mekong’s water resources between the countries of mainland
Southeast Asia. Such talks were enabled by the relative peace and subsequent economic
development drive that hit in the region in the 1990s, resulting in a range of national,
bilateral and multilateral plans for building dams on the mainstream and major tributaries
of the Mekong. These dams, useful for energy production as well as irrigation, are highly
desirable to the low-income countries of mainland Southeast Asia. However, the flow-on
effects of building a dam is often cause for concern by downstream nations, who believe
their own water resources could be adversely affected.
Vietnam, the nation furthest south and home to the mouth of the Mekong, appears
to be the most vocal country opposing Mekong dam construction, particularly since 2010,
going so far as to call for a ten-year moratorium on all Mekong dam construction. This
proves assertions that hydropower development upstream threatening the livelihoods of
downstream states cause said states to engage in securitisation activity. At present it may
be true that water is abundant in most parts of the Mekong basin and there is no sense at
the political level of a crisis, but the potential of such a crisis is enough to cause Vietnam to
willingly conflate water security with national security.
Cambodia takes upstream dams just as seriously, as exemplified recently by its
objection to the Xayaburi Mekong dam nominated by Thailand and, a project scorned by
regional experts for its potential impact on Cambodia’s food security. Cambodia falls short
of criticising the ongoing hydropower developments on the Mekong river in China, however,
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even though it claims concern about their impact. Part of this impact is a potential
disturbance to the annual floods that provide water to eighty per cent of the rice paddy
grown in Cambodia, something that should be of high concern given the country reported
that food imports had shot up 42 per cent year-on-year through February 2012, and current
production has been decried as inadequate.
As it stands today, China is the only country to have successfully dammed the
mainstream Mekong, with four dams in Yunnan province and more to come. These and
other dams on the Tibetan plateau have a direct bearing on the quantity and quality of river
water flows countries in southeast Asia. These dams are not one-off disturbances, but tools
for control. With its dams China is able to exercise ongoing command over the quantity of
water released to downstream countries, with any such flows disproportionately affecting
those furthest downstream, i.e. Vietnam and Cambodia.
Record seasonal river flooding hit Cambodia in 2008 (and again more recently) and
was blamed on water released from China’s dams during a time when the Mekong was
already high due to monsoon storms. China was later exonerated from causing the floods,
but the event still strengthened criticism of China’s dams. Vietnam sees the elemental
power wielded by China as a threat; Cambodia sees it as a cold reality, and a motivation for
closer ties. Cambodia’s lack of any strident criticism against China’s Mekong dams, when
taken in conjunction with its passionate advocacy against similar dam proposals in the Laos
P.D.R., smacks of realpolitik, but makes sense for Cambodia as long as the China alliance
continues, and is hardly the biggest hypocrisy committed by Hun Sen’s government.
This honour may fall on the fact that Cambodia itself has plans for two major
dams along the Mekong. The Sambor dam in Kratie province has been in various stages of
planning and development since the 1960s, but has recently inched closer to reality thanks
to the interest of Chinese investors. The second proposal is the Stung Treng gravity dam, to
be constructed on a Ramsar wetland site in northern Cambodia. It has been the subject of
two feasibility studies, but little has been written since the studies, and the reality of its
current status is opaque. Opposition from advocacy groups such as International Rivers
against both dams is strong and usually focused on the risks posed to fisheries and food
security, with flooding and population relocation also being warned of.
Concerns about fisheries are well founded as the freshwater fish catch of the
Mekong Basin is the largest in the world and makes up sixteen per cent of the country’s
entire GDP. Fish and other aquatic animals constitute the most important source of animal
protein for the average Cambodian citizen, who eats 30-70kgs of fish each year. Given that
there is no existing fishway technology able to overcome the obstacle created by a dam on
the Mekong mainstream, NGOs warn of an ultimatum: “fish or dams”. Taking this into
account, one wonders if the Cambodian government is making the right choice. Building a
dam on the Mekong may enhance Cambodia’s energy security, increase government
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revenues (through sale of electricity) and bolster the flexibility of its water resources, but if
it also destroys the nation’s fisheries then these benefits would be coming at a potentially
crippling price.
Furthermore, any benefits gained by a dam on the Cambodian Mekong would be
diluted by any and all dams further upstream, making their own overall effectiveness
contingent on China, and on any other constructions to come. Realistically, Cambodia’s
development of a dam on the Mekong would only slightly increase the state’s water and
energy security, and substantially weaken its food security. Perhaps Cambodia has already
identified this risk factor and is no longer planning on going ahead with the construction of
the dams – but as the progress of the proposals is opaque, only time will tell.
As has been shown above, any and all developments on the Mekong have
water, food and energy security consequences across the entire region of the river. To
facilitate dialogue surrounding these concerns, the Mekong River Commission (“MRC”) was
founded in 1995 by Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand with a mandate for sustainable
development and management of the river and its resources. There was excitement in the
international community at this landmark event, but in years subsequent the MRC has let
down many observers by allegedly deviating from its original premise, exhibiting a
reluctance to take further action towards a more regulatory water governance role.
Such criticisms allude to the fact that the MRC is not directly accountable to the
public, that it has no authority over its member states, and that it may be shirking its
responsibilities by not obstructing mainstream dam proposals further. Cambodia’s lack of
interest in bolstering the MRC on the issue of mainstream dams reflects a belief that the
best way to achieve water security in Cambodia is by keeping management of the Mekong
within its borders independent of its close neighbours. This may yet backfire, for there is
little doubt that if the lower Mekong calls home to multiple dams in the future and the river
system is affected detrimentally then major complications will arise for regional security of
all kinds.
Another risk threatening Cambodia’s ability to provide all of its citizens with access
to food, water and energy, one that is also tied to industrial development, is climate change.
The reality of man-made climate change is sinking in around the world, creating a new
lexicon of buzz-words that permeate politics, academia, and the media. The industrial
revolution has left the planet in a lurch, and the poorer the country, the deeper the ditch.
Climate change models for Cambodia predict serious impacts such as higher than average
flood season flows, a problem which requires “climate proofing”. Floods and rising sea
levels will threaten existing freshwater resources such as the Tonle Sap lake, Cambodia’s
lifeline, and severely disturb the nation’s fisheries and agriculture. The Cambodian
Government itself recently stated that “addressing climate change makes sense, politically,
economically, environmentally and technologically … we can turn the climate change crisis
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into a new opportunity for more sustainable development”, indisputably encouraging words,
but no substitute for deeds.
In 2006 Cambodia’s Ministry of Environment published the National Adaptation
Programme of Action to Climate Change (“NAPA”), which has the central goal “to provide a
framework to guide the coordination and implementation of adaptation initiatives through
a participatory approach”. In evaluating the NAPA and subsequent activity scholars have
concluded that most of the identified measures focus on water and health issues but that
serious governance problems obstruct progress. In the five years since the NAPA was
established very few of the proposed projects have been implemented, a record probably
due to insufficient funding. According to Sum Thy, Director of the Climate Change
Department at the Cambodian Ministry of Environment, the Ministry is presently writing an
updated national plan on the country’s responses to climate change, and Environment
Minister Mok Mareth hopes it will be funded through the global fund discussed last year in
the 17th Conference of the Parties in South Africa. This would be a fortuitous outcome for
addressing climate change threats to water security in Cambodia, but the writing of more
plans doesn’t address governance issues, nor preclude a repeat of damning inaction.
It should also be stressed how intrinsic the economic development of a nation is to
enhancing its people’s human security. Cambodia can instigate any number of policies and
build any number of dams, irrigate any number of paddocks, or install any number of flood
dikes - but if these measures are not complemented by development initiatives, or not
undertaken with development in mind, then they will have only marginal impact on the day-
to-day life of the average Cambodian citizen. This is especially so for the third of the
population that still lives in poverty.
Cambodia is a troubled country still trying to break free from its bruising past. If this
is to happen, Cambodia must get its water management right, as this basic element has
flow-on effects on the nation’s food and energy security. Water directly impacts the
wellbeing, even survival, of the most vulnerable of Cambodia’s population. Shared threats
that Cambodia’s water security faces, such as extreme weather events and climate change,
are being compounded by a lack of regional cooperation on the management of the Mekong,
the river and catchment Cambodia is unavoidably dependent on. China’s mainstream
Mekong dams directly threaten Cambodia’s (and its neighbours’) water security, as do any
other upstream dams constructed in the future. Cambodia’s attempts to build its own dams
on the Mekong are of questionable benefit to its water security, and may even do more
harm than good. A crucial factor that permeates all of the above is the country’s alignment
to Beijing and its extreme governance issues.
The prospects are bleak for water security in Cambodia, and they will
probably remain so, or even worsen, unless steps are taken. Water is getting scarcer
worldwide, and Cambodia cannot go it alone – nor can it rely solely on China. The fact that
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there are so many groups pledged to saving the Mekong and increasing regional
cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia is not a conspiracy or coincidence. The survival of
the river may not be in the best economic interests of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen
or the Cambodian elite, but it is definitely in the best interests of Cambodia in the long-term.
The Cambodian People’s Party has succeeded on delivering economic growth, if little else.
Now it needs to deliver on securing the basic needs of its citizens. Otherwise, Cambodia will
be forced to add yet another government to its already substantial list of exploitative, self-
destructive regimes.