warmth of the welcome: attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy in the united states

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Warmth of the Welcome:Attitudes Toward Immigrantsand Immigration Policyin the United StatesElizabeth FussellSociology Department, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington 99164-4020;email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2014. 40:23.1–23.20

The Annual Review of Sociology is online atsoc.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043325

Copyright c© 2014 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

Keywords

prejudice, group threat, contact theory, symbolic politics, socialidentities, context of reception

Abstract

Natives’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy are im-portant factors in the context of reception of immigrants because theycontribute to a warm or chilly welcome, which potentially shapes im-migrant and ethnic identities and intergroup relations. Public opinionpolls show a recent “warming” of Americans’ traditional ambivalenceabout immigration. Empirical research on attitudes toward immigrantsand racial groups formed by recent waves of immigrants resonates withthe dynamic nature of Blumer’s (1958) theory of prejudice as a sense ofrelative group position. To better understand this dynamism, researchthat intentionally contrasts study sites on conflict and contact conditionsand the presence or absence of symbolic politics, as well as research ondifferent native-born racial and ethnic groups, would reveal a broaderrange of natives’ attitude formation processes and the role they play inimmigrant reception.

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Review in Advance first posted online on April 14, 2014. (Changes may still occur before final publication online and in print.)

Changes may still occur before final publication online and in print

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INTRODUCTION

Current research on attitudes toward immi-grants and immigration policy in the UnitedStates dates to the 1970s, when the effects oftwo immigration policies were manifestingin increased immigration by Latin Americansand Asians. First, in 1964, the United Statesterminated the Bracero Program, a seasonalguest worker program established duringWorld War II to provide farmers with a sub-stitute labor force after millions of Americanmen were drafted into military service.Agricultural producers continued to employMexican farm laborers, but instead of beingguest workers, they were now unauthorizedimmigrants. Then, in 1965, Congress passedthe Immigration and Nationality Act, whichreplaced restrictive immigration policies thatgave preference to Western and NorthernEuropean countries with quotas for countriesin both hemispheres, allowing entry of moreimmigrants from non-Western countries.Consequently, between 1970 and 2010, thenumber of foreign-born residents of the UnitedStates grew from 9.6 to 40.0 million, an increasefrom 4.7% to 12.9% of the total population(Gibson & Jung 2006, US Census 2013).

As the population’s racial and ethnic ori-gins diversified, social scientists asked whethernative-born Whites would develop anti-immigrant prejudices that resembled anti-Blackprejudice. So I begin this review by describ-ing trends in attitudes toward immigrants andimmigration. Then I review classic theories ofracial prejudice before turning to how those andnewer theories explain attitudes toward immi-grants and immigration policy. My goal is to as-sess the relevance of classic theories of prejudice(group threat and contact) and newer theories(symbolic politics and social identity theory) forcontemporary research on attitudes toward im-migrants and immigration policy.

Although the causes of attitudes toward im-migrants and immigration are the focus of thisreview, it is motivated by the consequences ofthese attitudes for immigrants. Most researchshows that immigrants’ reception depends

on current immigration policies, demandfor immigrant labor, and the presence of acoethnic community, overlooking the effect ofnatives’ attitudes toward immigrants (Portes& Rumbaut 2006, pp. 92–101). When nativeshold prejudices that emphasize cultural, pheno-typical, and other real or imagined differencesbetween themselves and immigrants, theirwelcome is cooler. Such prejudices informpreferences for exclusionary and punitive im-migration policies. Together, natives’ attitudesand national policies shape the warmth withwhich immigrants are received and potentiallyshape immigrants’ identities—with a chillyreception producing reactive identities—aswell as the ethnic identities of their children(Alba 2009, Alba & Nee 2003, Bashi Treitler2013, Deaux 2006, Massey & Sanchez 2010,Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Schildkraut 2011).Hence, attitudes toward immigrants andimmigration are influential in producing andreproducing the tone of intergroup relations.

I limit my review of this literature by fo-cusing mostly on US-based research by soci-ologists, political scientists, and psychologists.Further, I concentrate on research building onBlumer’s (1958) theory of prejudice as a senseof relative group position and Allport’s (1954)contact theory. Research in these traditions ismainly based on surveys and experiments, al-though when relevant I also reference ethno-graphic research. Although attitudes towardimmigrants and immigration are closely relatedto nativism and intergroup relations, I do notreview those literatures because they focus onbehaviors as much as attitudes, stereotypes, orprejudices.

TRENDS IN ATTITUDESTOWARD IMMIGRANTSAND IMMIGRATION

Historically, Americans have favored limitingimmigration, either by placing qualitative lim-its on the types of immigrants allowed to enterthe country or by placing quantitative limitson their numbers (Simon & Alexander 1993,Simon & Lynch 1999). Nativism—a preference

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for protecting the interests of the native-bornagainst those of immigrants—was behind theImmigration Act of 1924, which effectivelyprohibited immigrant admissions from Asia andAfrica and severely limited those from Southernand Eastern Europe (Zolberg 2006). Nativismis also evident in one of the first polls about im-migration policy. During the Great Depressionand just before the 1938 Kristallnacht pogromagainst the Jews in Germany and Austria, a pollasked whether political refugees from Nazi-occupied countries should be allowed to enterthe United States. Fully two-thirds of thosepolled replied, “With conditions as they arehere, we should try to keep them out,” 18% feltthat only as many as the national quota allowedshould be admitted, and only 5% said quotasshould be raised and refugees encouraged tocome (Roper/Fortune Survey 1938). AfterWorld War II, despite Americans’ preferencesfor limiting immigration, politicians felt pres-sure to allow more immigration as the countrygained international influence, the economyexpanded, the foreign-born population reachedrecord lows, and support for civil rights grew.

Pollsters have asked repeatedly whether cur-rent immigration levels should be decreased,kept at present levels, or increased (Figure 1).In 1955, 76% of those polled wanted immigra-tion either decreased (39%) or kept at presentlevels (37%). Only 13% wanted immigrationincreased, and 11% had no opinion. Responsedistributions were similar in the 1960s and1970s. In 1982, when the nation was debatinghow to limit unauthorized immigration orig-inating mostly in Mexico, the desire to limitimmigration peaked: 89% of respondents ei-ther wanted immigration decreased (66%) orwanted it maintained at current levels (23%).Only 4% wanted it increased, and very few hadno opinion (7%). Restrictivist sentiment wasstrong until the mid-1990s, when the percent-age wanting immigration decreased or main-tained at current levels began to decline; itreached a low of 67% in 2013. Over these twodecades, the percentage wanting to increase im-migration levels quintupled from 5% to 25%.Although this is hardly a mandate for increas-

ing immigration, it shows that a growing num-ber of Americans do not perceive threats fromimmigrants themselves or from their increasingpopulation.

This shift in attitudes comes, at least in part,from weakening concerns that immigrants posean economic threat. In 1993, about two-thirdsof Americans agreed that “immigrants todayare a burden on our country because they takeour jobs, housing and health care,” while onlyone-third agreed with the contrasting state-ment that “immigrants today strengthen ourcountry because of their hard work and talents.”Since 2003, roughly equal percentages (45%and 44%, respectively) agree with each of thesestatements (author’s data compiled from theRoper Center Public Opinion Archive). Overthe same period, a growing percentage agreedwith the broader statement that “immigrationis a good thing” for the country. Between 1993and 2001, agreement grew from 29% to a peakof 66%, averaging about 59%. Indeed, am-ple research suggests that immigration’s posi-tive impacts outweigh the negative (Card 2005).The view that immigration and immigrants aregood for the country was controversial for muchof US history, but as these poll results illustrate,a growing proportion of Americans now holdthis opinion.

THEORIES OF PREJUDICE: THEGROUP THREAT AND CONTACTHYPOTHESES

Research on attitudes toward immigrants andimmigration policy is rooted in Blumer’s (1958)theory of group position or, more generally,group threat theory, and Allport’s (1954) the-ory of prejudice. Both theories seek to explainin-groups’ attitudes toward out-groups, specif-ically Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks and theracial policies aimed at eliminating racial dis-crimination. The theories differ in their con-ceptualization of what causes prejudice, which iscommonly defined as an adverse or hostile atti-tude toward a group and its individual membersthat is unsupported by evidence, although it canalso be a positive attitude. Blumer, a symbolic

www.annualreviews.org • Attitudes Toward Immigrants 23.3


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Figure 1“Should immigration be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?” Survey results from 1955 to 2013. Source: iPOLL Databank,accessed June 19, 2013, at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu. Survey results were available for the years shown. Multiple surveys,with the number in parentheses, were averaged in the following years: 1986(2), 1995(4), 1996(3), 2001(6), 2002(5), 2003(2), 2004(4),2005(5), 2006(8), 2007(3), 2008(4), 2010(2), 2011(2), 2012(2), 2013(2).

interactionist, viewed prejudice as an expressionof group identity that emerges when conflictmakes group differences salient. Allport, a so-cial psychologist, considered prejudice to be aproduct of socialization that resides in individ-uals’ beliefs, attitudes, and values, which can bemodified by contact with members of the out-group under propitious circumstances. Thesetheories have generated the threat and contacthypotheses, respectively.

The threat hypothesis proposes that prej-udice occurs in an in-group when membersperceive a threat from an out-group (Blumer1958). The threat consolidates their sense ofthemselves as an in-group and reinforces theirfeelings of superiority; their sense of entitle-ment to rights, statuses, and resources; theiralienation from the out-group; and their per-ception of a threat by the out-group. Blumer’sconflict hypothesis is associated with Blalock’s(1967) power threat hypothesis, which proposes

that the larger the size of an out-group, thestronger the sense of threat experienced by thein-group. The hypothesis received empiricalsupport from findings that the proportionof Blacks in an area is positively associatedwith lynchings (Reed 1972), opposition toracial integration (Giles & Evans 1986,Fossett & Kiecolt 1989), racial prejudice, andopposition to affirmative action policies (Quil-lian 1996, Taylor 1998, Taylor & Mateyka2011). It is also supported by research thatmeasures dominant group members’ percep-tion of threat to their individual resources,rights, and statuses (e.g., Bobo 1983, Bobo &Zubrinsky 1996) as well as those of their group(e.g., Rosenstein 2008, Smith 1981).

The contact hypothesis proposes thatinteraction between groups, under optimalconditions, reduces racial prejudice (Allport1954, Pettigrew 1998). Just as racial prejudiceis learned through socialization, it can be

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http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu


unlearned through positive contact betweenin-group and out-group members. Whenin-group and out-group members interact in asituation in which they have equal status, pursuea shared goal, engage in intergroup coopera-tion, and receive the support of authorities, law,or custom, prejudice among in-group membersis predicted to decrease through the falsifica-tion of in-group members’ prejudiced views ofthe out-group (Allport 1954). Although contacttheory developed from experimental research,survey research supports its generalizability(Pettigrew 1998, Pettigrew & Tropp 2011).In surveys, respondents with cross-racialfriendships report lower levels of prejudice(Emerson et al. 2002, Ellison et al. 2011), asdo those living in more racially and ethnicallyintegrated neighborhoods (Oliver & Wong2003). However, whereas living in a morediverse neighborhood reduces prejudice, livingin a more diverse metropolitan area increases it(Fossett & Kiecolt 1989, Quillian 1996, Taylor1998). The key to explaining this apparentcontradiction is whether the context facilitatesface-to-face contact between in-groups andout-groups (McDermott 2011b, Pettigrew &Tropp 2011, Rocha & Espino 2009).

Even without direct contact, threat can bereduced by the absence of zero-sum conditions.Blumer (1958) argues that group threat is pro-duced when an in-group perceives that gains byan out-group will result in the loss of their ownresources, rights, or statuses. These zero-sumconditions exacerbate in-group members’sense of threat in the presence of an out-groupand, hence, increase prejudice. It follows thatin the absence of these zero-sum conditions,group threat and prejudice are minimal. Sincethe 1950s, fewer Americans express racialprejudice, even in the historically prejudicedSouth (Firebaugh & Davis 1988, Quillian 1996,Schuman et al. 1997). Per capita income growthand, to a lesser extent, increased educationalattainment—what Alba (2009) calls “nonzerosum mobility”—explain reduction in nationallevels of anti-Black prejudice. Similarly, compe-tition may be heightened or mitigated by the in-group’s characteristics. For example, Branton

& Jones (2005) find that the racial diversity of acounty strongly affects non-Hispanic Whites’racial policy attitudes, but the direction of effectdepends on whether the county has high orlow percentages of college-educated residents.Racial policy attitudes become more liberal asdiversity increases in high-education counties,consistent with the contact hypothesis, butthey become more conservative as diversityincreases in low-education counties, consistentwith the threat hypothesis (see also Oliver &Mendelberg 2000). These contextual variablesare far more important than individual-levelvariables in explaining variation in levels ofprejudice (McDermott 2011b, Quillian 1996).In short, the threat and contact hypotheses areincomplete without measures of context.

RESEARCH ON ATTITUDESTOWARD IMMIGRANTS ANDIMMIGRATION POLICY

How Are Theories of PrejudiceRelevant to Attitudes TowardImmigrants and Immigration Policy?

Although race and ethnicity are not equiva-lent to nativity, they overlap. Currently, in theUnited States 67% of Asians and 38% of His-panics of any race are foreign-born, comparedwith only 8% of Blacks and 4% of non-HispanicWhites (US Census Bur. 2013). Furthermore,the correlation between race, ethnicity, and na-tivity varies widely across geographic units andregions, with stronger correlations in new im-migrant destinations and weaker correlationsin traditional Hispanic and Asian destinations.Consequently, researchers and research sub-jects often conflate immigrants with Asians andLatinos and conflate natives with Whites andBlacks. Furthermore, they use theories devel-oped to study racial attitudes—conflict and con-tact hypotheses—to study natives’ attitudes to-ward the two largest racial and ethnic groups ofthe post-1965 immigrants, Latinos and Asians.

In general, researchers conclude that theeffects of group threat and contact on Whites’prejudice toward Latinos and Asians are not



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as strong as their effects on Whites’ prejudicetoward Blacks. Both Taylor (1998) and Dixon(2006) find that Whites living in areas withhigher percentages of Blacks express moreanti-Black prejudice, but the presence of largerpercentages of Hispanics or Asians do notaffect Whites’ prejudices toward those groups.Dixon (2006) finds that whereas just knowinga Hispanic or Asian person reduces Whites’prejudices toward those groups, Whites mustknow and feel close to Blacks to feel less anti-Black prejudice. Dixon & Rosenbaum (2004)also find that a higher percentage of Blacks orLatinos in an area increases Whites’ anti-Blackbut not anti-Hispanic stereotypes. WhereasWhites’ stereotypes are diminished by moreformal work-based contact with Blacks, theirstereotypes of Hispanics are reduced by morecasual community contact. In short, Whitesfeel greater animus toward Blacks than towardHispanics and Asians. Dixon (2006, p. 2179)argues that “a historically and culturally rootedracial/ethnic hierarchy differentially shapesWhites’ present-day threat of, contact with,and ultimately, prejudice towards blacks,Hispanics, and Asians.”

Indeed, Blumer (1958) proposes that form-ing a sense of group position is a lengthy anddynamic process. Although White–Black racerelations in the United States are as old as thenation’s history, relations between Whites andLatinos or Asians are recent in most parts ofthe country, with some notable exceptions. Forexample, Mexicans and their descendents livedin the Southwest well before the United Statesacquired that territory in 1848 (Camarillo2007). Chinese began arriving on the WestCoast in 1820 when the shipping trade beganwith China, and Chinese immigration surgedwith the California Gold Rush in 1849 (Yin2007). Bobo (1999, p. 461) argues that “witha longer history of relations between domi-nant and subordinate group members comes amore fully crystallized sense of relative groupposition.” Thus, when we consider how preju-dice theory is relevant to the study of attitudestoward immigrants and immigration, we mustkeep in mind that we are observing an ongoing

process of intergroup positioning with differentlengths of historical contact between groups aswell as different contexts involving more or lessconflict and contact. The hypotheses of conflictand contact continue to be relevant, but they areideally viewed in a dynamic and spatial frame-work in order to best understand variability inrelative group positions and attitude formation.

Threat and Contact HypothesesApplied to Immigrants, Hispanics,and Asians

The most common threat from immigrantsthat natives report is economic. The fear thatimmigrants “take jobs” from natives and lowerthe wages of those with whom they competehas generated a large empirical literature anda lively debate (e.g., Borjas 1987, Card 1990).Social psychologists have shown that the mereperception (accurate or not) of threat fromimmigrants powerfully shapes attitudes (Braderet al. 2008, Esses et al. 2001, Stephan et al.2005). Bonacich (1972) argues from historicaland cross-cultural evidence that immigrantswho accept lower wages and worse workingconditions than native workers cause ethnicantagonism between natives and immigrantsby allowing employers to split the labor marketand undermine the negotiating position ofnative workers. This self-interest hypothesis issupported by research showing that those mostlikely to compete for jobs with immigrants—theunemployed and workers with below-college-level education, blue-collar occupations, orlower earnings—are more likely to viewimmigrants unfavorably and prefer restrictiveimmigration policies (Chandler & Tsai 2001,Espenshade & Calhoun 1993, Espenshade &Hempstead 1996, Scheve & Slaughter 2001).Indeed, an experiment isolating perceived jobthreat by immigrant guest workers amonginformation technology workers shows thatself-interest very strongly predicts immigra-tion policy preferences (Malhotra et al. 2013).However, although self-interest explains theviews and policy preferences of those with themost at stake, those not directly threatened

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more frequently base their views and policypreferences on group identifications andvalues (Chong et al. 2001). Consequently, theself-interest hypothesis provides only a partialexplanation of anti-immigrant sentiment andpolicy preferences.

The group threat hypothesis proposes thatbroader contextual threats affect attitudes to-ward immigrants. In a multi-level model ofanti-immigrant prejudice in the European Eco-nomic Community, Quillian (1995) concludesthat individual-level measures corresponding toself-interest explain little variation in prejudicetoward minority racial groups and immigrants.Instead, the size of the racial or immigrantgroup and national economic conditions inter-act to increase prejudice against minorities andimmigrants during difficult economic times. In-dividuals’ perceptions of group threat also ap-pear to matter more than self-interest. Burns& Gimpel (2000) show that pessimism aboutthe national economy, rather than one’s per-sonal economic prospects, more consistentlyinfluences negative stereotyping of Blacks,Hispanics, and Whites by members of otherracial groups and increases preferences to re-duce immigration. These economic threats of-ten overlap with cultural threats.

Cultural concerns about immigrants typ-ically focus on whether they harm society.Those who think immigrants mostly causeproblems want to decrease immigration levels,whereas those who welcome immigrants wantto raise or maintain current levels (Espenshade& Hempstead 1996). When people perceivethat immigrants need language accommo-dations in schools or at the ballot box, theyare more likely to favor reducing legal andillegal immigration (Chandler & Tsai 2001). Incontrast, people who reject ethnocentrism areless likely to believe that immigrants increasecrime rates or take jobs from natives and aremore likely to believe they are good for theeconomy and make America more open to newideas and cultures (Haubert & Fussell 2006).Using a scale indicator of cultural threat andcomparing it with other indicators of economicthreat, ethnic affect, group contact, core values,

and prejudice, Buckler et al. (2009) concludethat cultural threat is the strongest explanationfor favoring stronger enforcement of restrictiveimmigration policies. Although this researchstream measures culture inconsistently, it nev-ertheless shows that cultural concerns are quitepowerful independently of economic concerns.

Researchers who have tried to reconcilegroup threat and contact theory find that threatis weakened (although not always eliminated)by intergroup contact, especially face-to-facecontact (Dixon 2006, Hood & Morris 1997,Pettigrew et al. 2010, Stein et al. 2000). Forexample, Whites who live in counties with largepercentages of Spanish-speaking foreign-bornHispanics and low levels of White–Hispanicsegregation, and who are therefore more likelyto have contact with immigrants, are less likelyto support making English the official languageof the United States or to believe that there aretoo many immigrants (Rocha & Espino 2009).Further, Whites’ sense of threat is diminishedwhen they have Hispanic or Asian friends, workcolleagues, and neighbors (Dixon 2006). How-ever, intergroup contact between native Whitesand Hispanics does not reduce threat if His-panic immigrants are unauthorized (Stein et al.2000). Whites in counties with larger percent-ages of unauthorized immigrants tend to fa-vor decreasing immigration levels. In contrast,those in counties with larger percentages ofauthorized immigrants are less likely to wantimmigration levels decreased (Hood & Morris1998). Prejudice-reducing intergroup contactrequires equal status (Allport 1954), so unau-thorized immigrants’ marginalized legal statusprevents contact from mitigating threat as itdoes when native Whites interact with autho-rized immigrants. In short, familiarity—in theabsence of conflict or alienation—levels one’ssense of relative group position and thereby re-duces anti-immigrant sentiment and preferencefor restrictive or punitive immigration policy.

Prejudice or, more mildly, ethnic affectand stereotyping has an independent effect onimmigration policy attitudes above and beyondgroup threat. Regardless of whether researchersmeasure ethnic stereotypes (Berg 2012,



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Buckler et al. 2009, Burns & Gimpel 2000,Hood & Morris 1997, Lu & Nicholson-Crotty2010, Schildkraut 2011), group feeling ther-mometers (Citrin et al. 1997), or generalviews of Hispanics and Asians (Buckler et al.2009), prejudice is consistently related topreferences for less immigration and morepunitive enforcement policies. For example,people with cooler feelings toward Hispanicsand Asians strongly prefer restricting immi-gration and delaying immigrants’ eligibilityfor government benefits, net of controls forpolitical orientation, economic and culturalthreat, and socio-demographic characteristics(Citrin et al. 1997). Similarly, natives whoresent immigrants for violating norms suchas learning English, paying taxes, and tryingto fit in are more likely to favor restrictiveand punitive immigration policies (Berg 2012,Schildkraut 2011). Immigrants’ racial originmay also affect how much prejudice influencespolicy; research comparing stereotypes ofimmigrants from four global regions showsthat, among Ohio voters, stereotypes of Asiansare most positive, followed by those of MiddleEasterners and Europeans, whereas those ofLatinos are most negative (Timberlake &Williams 2012). The impact of the stereotypecontent of different racial and ethnic groupson attitudes toward immigration needs moreresearch.

The current literature shows that threat,contact, and context are all salient in the pro-duction of attitudes toward immigrants and thatin addition to these factors prejudice also in-forms attitudes toward immigration policies.However, trying to assess the relative impor-tance of multiple indicators of each of these hy-potheses by including them all in a regressionanalysis of cross-sectional data is hampered bycollinear indicators and inconsistent measuresof central concepts (Lu & Nicholson-Crotty2010). A return to the theoretical underpin-nings of the field is warranted. In particular,closer modeling of Blumer’s (1958) causal or-dering, in which threat produces prejudice andprejudice affects policy attitudes, would at leastpartially address the problem of endogeneity.

Panel data, though rare, could potentially dis-entangle the effects of group threat and con-tact on prejudice (e.g., Lancee & Pardos-Prado2013). However, the importance of these mod-eling issues pales in comparison to the largerconcern that the production of attitudes towardimmigrants is dynamic and spatially variable. Ifthat is the case, the threat and contact hypothe-ses may each be more or less salient in differenttimes and places. What makes them salient isoften a political process.

Symbolic Politics

An in-group’s sense of threat from immigrantscan be elicited not only by their presencebut also by politics. Symbolic politics theoryproposes that political elites employ symbols,words, and laws to evoke predictable emotionalreactions in target audiences and assign blameor responsibility for social problems (Edelman1964, Gusfield 1963). In this way, symbolic pol-itics offers a framework for explaining how anti-immigrant attitudes are activated. For example,in 1994, conservative politicians in California,led by Governor Pete Wilson, introduced aballot initiative—Proposition 187—that soughtto bar unauthorized immigrants from receivingsocial services. Although the proposition wasapproved by a large margin, it was quickly foundunconstitutional and never enforced. Calavita(1996) argues that voters felt Proposition 187was a symbolic political object that sent a mes-sage to unauthorized immigrants. Citrin et al.(1997) credit the Proposition 187 controversywith the nationwide increase in support forrestrictive immigration policies between 1992and 1994. This scapegoating of unauthorizedimmigrants from Mexico and Central Americaby politicians and the media hardened negativestereotypes of Latinos (Ayers et al. 2009;Chavez 2008; Massey & Pren 2012a,b).

Stereotypes depend on knowledge of a spe-cific group and therefore can be manipulatedto some extent by additional information. In aseries of experiments with volunteer researchsubjects, Stephan et al. (2005) found that at-titudes toward an unfamiliar immigrant group

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were easily manipulated by prompts for realisticand symbolic threats, negative stereotypes, andconditions provoking intergroup anxiety—allof which made attitudes more negative. How-ever, when research subjects were prompted toempathize with the immigrants, as opposed tothe host group, the cues for intergroup anxietyevinced weaker effects. In contrast, whenstudy participants have pre-existing prejudicestoward an immigrant group, their views areless malleable. For example, when ethniccues prompt associations about either LatinAmerican or European immigrants’ potentialtax burden or skill level, research subjectsreceiving the Latin American cues offer morenegative opinions of immigrants and preferharsher policy than those receiving Europeancues (Brader et al. 2008). When an experi-mental scenario combines unauthorized statusand Mexican origin, research subjects expressstronger anti-immigrant views than when thehypothetical immigrants are authorized and/orCanadian (Short & Magana 2002). Theseresults are consistent with neuropsychologicalresearch on stereotype content, which finds thatimages of unauthorized immigrants, Latinos,Mexicans, South Americans, farm workers, andpoor people all register in research subjects’brain images as despised out-groups (Lee &Fiske 2006). Evidently, these deeply ingrainedstereotypes of Latino immigrant groups areeasily exploited to influence public opinion.

Just as some types of immigrants are moreharshly stereotyped, some people are moresusceptible to viewing immigrants as threats.Citrin and colleagues (Citrin & Green 1990,Citrin et al. 1997, Citrin & Wright 2009) findthat Republicans, conservatives, and chauvinistswho tend to identify with ethnic symbols—having been born in the United States, speakingEnglish, and being Christian—prefer lower lev-els of immigration and access to citizenship. Incontrast, Democrats, liberals, and nonchauvin-ists who identify with civic symbols—respectingUS laws, voting, getting ahead by one’s ownwork—prefer the opposite (see also Kunovich2009). Thus, symbolic politics adds to thethreat hypothesis: Some in-groups may be more

susceptible to a sense of individual or groupeconomic or cultural threat, and political actorsmay use symbols to raise threat perceptions,thereby increasing support for more restrictiveimmigration policies. In this way, social iden-tities can be exploited for political purposes.

To capture spatial and temporal variabil-ity in symbolic politics, Hopkins (2010) mod-els preferences for maintaining or increasingversus decreasing current immigration levelsbetween 1992 and 2009 for a series of geo-coded attitudinal surveys, which he supple-ments with an index of national media cover-age of immigration issues. He shows that whenimmigration is in national news headlines, re-spondents living in counties with growing im-migrant populations more strongly prefer de-creasing immigration levels. Furthermore, hefinds that localities with fast-growing immi-grant populations are far more likely to con-sider anti-immigrant ordinances, leading himto conclude that “local anti-immigrant politi-cal activity comes from rapidly changing places,especially at times when immigration is captur-ing national headlines” (Hopkins 2010, pp. 55–56). Political partisanship is similarly activatedby growing immigrant populations, such that incounties with larger immigrant populations Re-publicans tend to increase and Democrats tendto decrease their support for immigration re-strictions (Hawley 2011). Evidently, local andnational politics and political party affiliationactivate processes of attitude formation in local-ities experiencing rapid growth of foreign-bornpopulations.

Social Identities in Attitude Formation

Social identities are central to both Allport’sand Blumer’s theories of racial prejudice.Social identity formation involves catego-rizing oneself as an in-group member andaccentuating in- and out-group differences inattitudes, beliefs, values, behaviors, and othercharacteristics, especially those that favorthe in-group (Stets & Burke 2000). For theformation of attitudes toward immigrants andimmigration policy, the most salient social



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identities are race, ethnicity, gender, religion,political orientation, and social class.

Although most Americans have an immi-grant past, race, ethnicity, and nativity differ-entiate those who identify with one of the morerecently arrived groups from those with manygenerations of ancestors in the United States.Given their status as the dominant in-group,native-born Whites are the research subjectsin most studies of attitudes toward immigrantsand immigration. Indeed, the conflict and con-tact hypotheses pertain to the dominant in-group, which is most often defined as native-born Whites, whereas Blacks, despite beingnative-born for the most part, are excluded as anout-group. When survey samples include suffi-cient numbers of non-Hispanic Blacks to com-pare their views to those of Whites, dependingon the specific issue, Blacks are found gener-ally to be more liberal than Whites (Berg 2010,Buckler et al. 2009, Burns & Gimpel 2000,Citrin et al. 1997, Diamond 1998, Espenshade& Hempstead 1996) or no different (Cummings& Lambert 1997, Diamond 1998).

However, Blacks’ attitudes are complicatedand contingent. For example, Blacks in local-ities experiencing rapid Hispanic populationgrowth have cooler feelings toward Hispanics,perhaps because of unfamiliarity and percep-tions of conflict, but Blacks in localities withlarger shares of Hispanics have warmer feel-ings toward Hispanics, presumably because ofgreater contact (Taylor & Schroeder 2010).The perception that Blacks and Latinos com-pete for resources may instigate Blacks’ coolinitial reaction to Latinos, but this is bal-anced by Blacks’ sympathy for fellow minorities(Mindiola et al. 2002, Thornton & Mizuno1999). Blacks’ mixture of feelings is contin-gent on how they feel they are doing as agroup; Blacks living in neighborhoods of LosAngeles in which Latinos are economically ad-vantaged relative to Blacks tend to hold morenegative views of Latinos than do Blacks liv-ing in neighborhoods in which they are eco-nomically advantaged relative to Latinos (Gay2006). Similarly, Blacks with a large numberAsian neighbors express more anti-immigrant

prejudice than do those with few Asian neigh-bors, although Whites with a large numberof Asian neighbors express less (Ha 2010).Asian entrepreneurship in low-income major-ity Black neighborhoods accounts for Black–Asian antagonism (Lee 2002). Although Blacksmay hold more pro-immigrant sentiments thanWhites do, their sense of threat is still raisedby economic concerns, such as those triggeredby contexts in which Asians or Latinos aremore economically successful or their num-bers are increasing rapidly (McDermott 2011a,Rodriguez & Mindiola 2011).

Latinos’ attitudes have received more schol-arly attention than those of other subordinateracial or ethnic groups. Although Latinos areexpected to find common cause with immi-grants, especially those from Latin America,their diverse national origins and experiences ofreception in the United States also distinguishtheir political views and party preferences,which may in turn affect their policy prefer-ences (Rouse et al. 2010). Some research showsthat Latinos are more likely than non-HispanicWhites to reject restrictive immigration poli-cies (Buckler et al. 2009, Rocha et al. 2011), butother research finds no difference, especially af-ter immigrant generation, assimilation, and po-litical views are taken into account (Burns &Gimpel 2000, Citrin et al. 1997, de la Garza1998, Espenshade & Hempstead 1996). Gener-ally, the most important predictors of attitudestoward immigration policy among Latinos areassimilation and proximity to other native-bornLatinos, but national origin groups differ verylittle in their immigration preferences (Hoodet al. 1997, Knoll 2012). Jimenez’s (2007) in-terviews with Mexican Americans reveal a morenuanced perspective than that found in sur-vey data. Mexican Americans are concernedthat Mexican immigrants, particularly unautho-rized immigrants, produce harmful stereotypesof Mexican Americans generally, but they alsofeel empowered by the political and economicinfluence of the growing Mexican Americanpopulation. Latino views of immigrants and im-migration policy depend on cultural affinity butalso on assimilation and group threat, neither of

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which is uniquely measured by a respondent’srace or ethnic identification.

Gender also predicts attitudes, but it showsless consistent relationships than most socialidentities. In some studies women favor moreliberal immigration policies (Buckler et al.2009, Chandler & Tsai 2001), but othersfind no difference between men and women(Berg 2009, Espenshade & Calhoun 1993;Espenshade & Hempstead 1996; Haubert &Fussell 2006; Hood & Morris 1997, 1998;Scheve & Slaughter 2001), and still others findthat women favor more restrictive immigrationpolicies (Buckler 2008, Burns & Gimpel 2000,Chandler & Tsai 2001, Hood et al. 1997).Berg (2010) offers an intersectional explana-tion for this inconsistency by showing thatsocial identities—specifically race, class, andgender—combine to produce countervailingeffects. Further, these identity combinationsdepend on the percentage of foreign-bornresidents in an area. For example, in areas withgreater numbers of foreign-born residents,women with higher education are more likely tohold pro-immigrant attitudes than are men withequivalent levels of education, but this gendergap is smaller in areas with fewer foreign-bornresidents and for men and women with lowerlevels of education. In general, Berg (2010) ar-gues that, especially in places with greater pro-portions of immigrants, higher levels of educa-tion lead Blacks and women to sympathize withother less privileged groups and feel less threat-ened by them. In other words, individuals’ senseof group position vis-a-vis immigrants dependson both their social identity and their context.

Religious and political identities also in-fluence Americans’ views of immigrants andpreferences for immigration policy. Membersof minority religious traditions that accentuatein- and out-group differences, such as Jewsand Mormons, tend to favor more liberalimmigration policies than do Protestants,Catholics, Greek or Russian Orthodox,Muslims, and atheists (Knoll 2009). Similarly,among non-Hispanic White Christians, thosefrom minority traditions tend to hold morepositive views of Asians and Latinos than

do Catholics, Evangelicals, and mainlineProtestants (McDaniel et al. 2011). However,McDaniel et al. (2011) argue that the truecause of anti-immigrant sentiment among non-Hispanic White Christians is not their religiousdenomination per se, but rather adherence to“Christian nationalism,” the belief that Americahas a divinely inspired mission and its successdepends on finding God’s favor. Indeed, thosewho hold values such as individualism, pridein being American, and ethnocentrism—allassociated with political conservatism—tendto express more anti-immigrant sentimentand preferences for restrictive immigrationpolicies (Buckler 2008, Citrin & Wright2009, Haubert & Fussell 2006). Similarly,political conservatives and those identifiedwith the Republican Party are more likely toexpress anti-immigrant sentiment and to prefermore restrictive immigration policies (Berg2009, Buckler et al. 2009, Burns & Gimpel2000, Chandler & Tsai 2001, Espenshade &Hempstead 1996, Haubert & Fussell 2006).The similar effects of religious and politicalidentities suggest that both are closely relatedto a common set of values, but there is still noconsensus on which values are most salient.

Education is an imperfect proxy for socialclass because there are multiple ways in whichit influences how individuals interpret the pres-ence of an out-group. Nevertheless, it is one ofthe most consistent predictors of attitudes to-ward immigrants and immigration policy. Likecontact, higher levels of education, especiallycollege education, strongly diminish natives’sense of threat from immigrants, an effect thatis produced in multiple ways. Education is oneof the socioeconomic statuses related to labormarket competition or individual economicthreat. Because many immigrants have lowlevels of education, threat is most likely feltby natives with secondary education or less,whereas those with higher education levelsfeel less labor market vulnerability. Educationis also related to direct and indirect contactwith immigrants and their cultures. In par-ticular, exposure to the university curriculumas well as to members of the heterogeneous



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groups attending universities produces moretolerant views of different racial, ethnic, andnational origin groups (Cote & Erickson2009, Quillian 1996). The more cosmopolitanworldview of the college-educated individualis likely to be reinforced through living abroad(Haubert & Fussell 2006), belonging to amore educated social network (Berg 2009),and living in areas with higher percentagesof college graduates (Moore & Ovadia 2006).Finally, education checks misperceptions ofthe size of the non-White population thatdrive anti-immigrant attitudes (Alba et al.2005). However, education is also correlatedwith a predisposition to express more tolerantattitudes, a subject that I return to in the sectionon social desirability bias. Because educationstrongly shapes lifetime earnings trajectories,tastes, and lifestyles, Fischer & Mattson (2009)argue that it represents a growing divide amongAmericans that is expressed in their attitudesand policy views—and perhaps in increasinglydivided preferences for limits on immigration.

Social Identities or AmericanIdentities?

The literature reviewed in the previous sectionreveals some slippage between social identitiesconceptualized as a sense of relative group po-sition and social identities used as atheoreticalcontrols for group differences. Most social sci-entists would agree that race, ethnicity, religion,political views, and education define shared cul-tural worldviews or values that shape attitudes.However, the role of values in public opinionresearch is controversial; some argue that val-ues cannot serve as attitude predictors becausevalues and attitudes are too similar, althoughothers see values as guiding principles that serveas the basis for more malleable attitudes (Hitlin& Piliavin 2004).

Despite this controversy, a few studies ofattitudes toward immigrants and immigrationpolicy include values. These show that egali-tarianism and humanitarianism are associatedwith more sympathetic views of unauthorizedimmigrants and with preferences for maintain-

ing or increasing immigrant admissions as wellas allowing immigrants to receive governmentservices. In contrast, the values of individual-ism, pride in being American, ethnocentrism,and authoritarianism are associated with lessfavorable views of immigrants and with prefer-ences for restrictive and punitive immigrationpolicies (Buckler 2008, Citrin & Wright 2009,Haubert & Fussell 2006, Pantoja 2006). Thesevalues resonate with political views and partyaffiliations, as well as American identities thatare either ethnic (defined by birth place, an-cestry, and religion) or civic (defined by feeling“American,” speaking English, and respect-ing national laws and institutions) (Citrin& Wright 2009, Kunovich 2009). TheseAmerican identities, or value-based world-views, strongly influence immigration policypreferences (Kunovich 2009).

American identity is a construct that tapsinto how Americans draw boundaries aroundmembership in the polity (Citrin & Wright2009, Kunovich 2009, Masuoka & Junn 2013,Schildkraut 2011). In her study of Americanism,Schildkraut (2011) finds that Americans aremore alike than different in their views of whatit means to be American, despite increasinglydiverse origins. The majority believe that thefollowing are “very important” to Americanidentity: respecting American political insti-tutions and laws (80.9%), respecting otherpeople’s cultural differences (80.1%), havingAmerican citizenship (76.0%), seeing peopleof all backgrounds as American (73.1%),being able to speak English (71.0%), pursuingeconomic success through hard work (69.0%),thinking of oneself as American (68.9%), toler-ance for others’ views (65.9%), being informedabout national and local politics (65.3%), andfeeling American (62.1%). Only a minor-ity endorses an ethnocultural definition ofAmericanism in which the following are “veryimportant”: being born in America (24.2%),being Christian (19.3%), having Europeanancestry (7.0%), and being White (3.8%).Despite the more achievement-based view ofAmerican identity held by the majority, manyAmericans, and not only the minority who

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define being American in ethnocultural terms,harbor resentment against contemporary im-migrants, who they believe do not uphold thesevalues. Schildkraut finds that these Americannorms and values strongly predict preferencesfor making English the official language,English-only ballots, and English-immersionclassrooms, as well as policies to intern ArabAmericans or Arab immigrants suspected ofterrorism, and to allow police stops of motoristswithout any justification other than their Arabor immigrant identity. Schildkraut’s (2011)detailed study of American identities showsthat values are central to both social identityformation and the modeling of attitudes towardimmigrants and immigration policies.

Masuoka & Junn (2013) emphasize the roleof racial and ethnic identity in the formation ofAmerican identities. They theorize that differ-ing perceptions of national belonging betweenAmerican racial and ethnic groups shape theirattitudes toward immigration, influencing notonly their strength but also the direction ofeffect (Masuoka & Junn 2013, pp. 26–27). Al-though all native-born Americans are in-groupmembers, racial minorities sense that their in-group membership is conditional and reflectedin the American racial hierarchy. Racial mi-norities who have a stronger sense that theirown fate is linked to that of their racial groupare more likely to recognize and object to theexclusionary practices implicit in immigrationpolicies. Consequently, their immigration pol-icy views differ from those of Whites (Masuoka& Junn 2013, pp. 142–43). Whites who defineAmerican boundaries more exclusively stronglysupport decreased immigration levels, and al-though the effect is similar for Asians, Lati-nos, and especially Blacks, it is much smallerthan for Whites. Moreover, Whites who per-ceive their life chances to be linked with thoseof other Whites are more likely to favor de-creasing immigration, whereas the opposite istrue for Blacks, Asians, and Latinos who per-ceive their fates to be linked with other mem-bers of their racial group. Masuoka & Junn’s(2013) “racial prism of group identity” theorysubstantially advances research on attitudes to-

ward immigration by expanding the focus ofthis literature not just to include but also to ex-plain in a theoretically sophisticated way, thedivergence in attitudes toward immigration be-tween Whites, Blacks, Asian Americans, andLatinos.

SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS

Although fewer Americans admit to overt prej-udice against members of racial groups nowthan in the past, persistent opposition to poli-cies favoring racial minorities suggests that at-titudes may still be shaped by prejudice, even ifsurvey respondents do not express socially un-desirable prejudice overtly (Firebaugh & Davis1988, Quillian 1996, Schuman et al. 1997). This“social desirability bias” occurs when survey andinterview respondents offer nonprejudiced an-swers when in fact they hold prejudiced views(Krysan 2000, Quillian 2006). If social desir-ability bias leads to underreporting of preju-dice, researchers may incorrectly reject preju-dice as a cause of racial or immigration policyattitudes.

Most research on social desirability bias con-cerns attitudes toward racial policies, with at-tention only recently being paid to immigra-tion policy. Janus’s (2010) list experiment elicitsobtrusive and unobtrusive measures of whetherrespondents support cutting off all immigrationto the United States. Survey respondents arerandomly assigned into two groups, in whichthey receive a list of either three or four state-ments and count the number with which theyagree. The control group is read three non-controversial statements; the treatment groupis given an additional statement about cuttingoff all immigration. The difference between thetreatment and control group provides an un-obtrusive estimate of support for immigrationrestriction. Janus finds that college graduateswithout professional degrees and political lib-erals are particularly likely to underreport theirpreference for restrictive immigration policies.Knoll (2013a) uses a similar list experiment toexamine nativist views in a sample of Kentuckyvoters and, in contrast to Janus (2010), finds



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that nativism is socially desirable and thereforeoverreported, especially by respondents age 65and older, conservatives, people with annualfamily incomes of less than $50,000, and thosewith less than a college degree. Furthermore,Knoll (2013a) finds that Kentuckians who aremore afraid to express undesirable opinionsare even more likely to express nativist views.Apparently, social desirability bias exaggeratesgroup differences, but it does not predict thedirection of bias. The list method estimates thesize and direction of social desirability bias forgroups, not individuals. Therefore, although itshows that social desirability bias threatens thevalidity of research on attitudes, it does not offera means of eliminating it.

Social desirability bias can be “controlled” inexperiments in which research subjects’ implicitbiases can be compared against their explicitprejudices. Two methods are used: primingtechniques, which prompt unconscious racialassociations before asking a set of questions,and implicit association tests, which measureresponse delays when subjects are asked to pairconcepts with a racial category (Quillian 2006).Only recently have these approaches been ap-plied to study immigrant affect. Using implicitassociation tests, Perez (2010) finds evidenceof unreported negative attitudes toward Latinoimmigrants but not toward White immigrants.Perez further finds that implicit negativeattitudes toward Latino immigrants predictopposition to both illegal and legal immigrationnet of conservatism, socioeconomic concerns,ethnocentrism, and education. Likewise, Knoll(2013b) finds that implicit preferences forAmerican culture over Latin American cultureare associated with more conservative immi-gration policy preferences independently ofexplicit nativism, political ideology, economicthreat, and anti-Hispanic affect. These studiesindicate not only that prejudice is underre-ported but also that stereotype content is animportant factor influencing attitudes towardimmigration policy. How much implicit prej-udice affects Whites’ or other groups’ attitudestoward different race, ethnic, or immigrant

groups is likely to depend on the history ofcontact, conflict, and the context in which thosegroups have encountered one another and howit has informed the in-groups’ stereotypes of theout-group.

CONCLUSION

Traditional theories of prejudice produced aset of hypotheses and findings that provided apoint of departure for social scientists study-ing attitudes toward immigrants and immigra-tion. Accumulated evidence shows that non-Hispanic White Americans’ attitudes towardimmigrants, Latinos, and Asians are akin toprejudice against Blacks but are not as deeplyrooted or pervasive. Theories of symbolic poli-tics and social identities have usefully expandedon threat and contact hypotheses to show howpeople and places interact in ways that increaseor decrease negative stereotyping. These newerstudies are consistent with Blumer’s (1958) as-sertion that prejudice stems from a sense of rela-tive group position that emerges out of a specificcontext and changes over time—in other words,that the process of group positioning is dynamicand spatially uneven. This leaves us with thequestion of whether prejudice against immi-grants is weaker than anti-Black prejudice be-cause attitudes are being measured earlier in thegroup positioning process or because uniqueand historically specific processes of group po-sitioning for each racial and ethnic group resultin stereotype content invoking different levelsof threat and animus. Data and modeling ap-proaches that allow for cross-level interactionsprovide traction in addressing this question, andanswers will shed light on how native in-groups’attitudes affect the context of immigrant out-groups’ reception and incorporation.

How researchers conceptualize group posi-tioning has been complicated by the growingdiversity of the US population. In research onanti-Black prejudice, the focus is on Whites’attitudes toward Blacks, with Whites definedas the in-group. In research on attitudes to-ward immigrants, native-born residents should

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define the in-group, although many researchersnevertheless conceptualize the in-group as non-Hispanic Whites. New theories of Americanidentities and new data that allow for racialand ethnic group comparisons are promis-ing developments that will enable a more nu-anced understanding of attitude formation (e.g.,Masuoka & Junn 2013, Schildkraut 2011). Evenso, most attention has been paid to the at-titudes of African Americans, Latinos, andAsian Americans, while those of Arab Amer-icans, Native Americans, and other smallergroups, not to mention all the national-origin groups within these pan-ethnic groups,are absent from the literature. The uniquegroup identities shaped by different racializa-tion experiences suggest that attitudes of thesesmaller groups will differ in important ways(Bashi Treitler 2013, Bozorgmehr et al. 2012,Masuoka & Junn 2013). Thus, a more dy-namic and spatial approach to attitude forma-tion could be complemented by a broader con-ceptualization of who constitutes the in-groupor in-groups.

These new directions in the study of attitudeformation have the potential to better connectattitudes toward immigrants with research onimmigrant reception and intergroup relations.In the past decade, a rich body of research onnew immigrant destinations has investigatednatives’ attitudes toward new immigrant popu-lations (e.g., Fennelly 2008, Grey & Woodrick2005, Hernandez-Leon & Zuniga 2005,Marrow 2011, Massey & Sanchez 2010, Shutika2005). Effectively, these are studies of the earlystages of attitude formation in contexts whererecently arrived, low-skilled Latino immigrantsare competing with low-skilled natives for jobs,maximizing the potential for group threat.The high number of unauthorized immigrantsamong Latino immigrants, especially in newdestinations, means there is limited potentialfor contact to mitigate prejudice. Nativesand unauthorized immigrants differ in theirstatuses and goals and lack opportunities forintergroup cooperation, and unauthorized im-migrants lack the support of authorities, laws,

or customs. Consequently, these case studiesmaximize conditions for prejudice formation.In contrast, old destinations, such as New YorkCity, often minimize such conditions and showgreater acceptance of immigrants (Waters &Kasinitz 2013). Research that intentionallycontrasts field sites on conflict and contactconditions would reveal a broader range ofnatives’ attitude formation processes and howthese play a role in immigrant reception.

Such research might explain the surprisingfindings that a growing minority of Americanssupports increasing immigration levels andfewer Americans want to reduce immigrationlevels. Several trends potentially explain thiswarming of Americans’ attitudes. On oneside of the equation, the potential for native–immigrant contact is greater because of theincreasing number of immigrants and theirgeographic dispersal; fewer natives experienceeconomic and cultural threat as their increasedlevels of education and the postindustrial globaleconomy have taken them out of competitionwith low-skill immigrants and imbued themwith more cosmopolitan world views; andfinally, shifts in the racial and ethnic compo-sition of the population have increased thenumbers of minority in-group members whohold more pro-immigrant attitudes. On theother side of the equation, symbolic politics,particularly rhetoric around and use of federaland state laws that criminalize unauthorizedimmigrants and exacerbate perceptions ofthreat and conflict, contribute to a heightenedsense of in- and out-group differences thatinform prejudice. These politics may hardenethnoculturalists’ views, but they may pushothers with more liberal views to form morepositive attitudes toward immigrants andimmigration, thus polarizing public opinion.Although it is difficult to predict the overalldirection of public opinion, there is ampleevidence that the formation of attitudes towardimmigrants is dynamic and context dependent,and these attitudes will shape the context of im-migrant reception and the future of intergrouprelations.



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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that mightbe perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am especially grateful to Helen Marrow for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of thisarticle, as well as to Vilna Bashi Treitler, Justin Berg, Jessica Tollette, and Tom Wooton. Anyerrors and omissions are my own. This article was completed while I was a Visiting AssociateProfessor in the Global Health Systems and Development Department in the School of PublicHealth and Tropical Medicine at Tulane University. I am grateful to Washington State Universityfor granting me a sabbatical.

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