volume one: contributed papers || ayer and russell on naive realism

Ayer and Russell on Naive RealismAuthor(s): Michael BradieSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1976, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1976), pp. 175-181Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192360 .

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Ayer and Russell on Naive Realism

Michael Bradie

Bowling Green State University

In his book, Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage, A. J. Ayer takes issue with Russell's defense of scientific realism and his re- jection of naive realism. ([1], pp. 126f.) Russell's position is succinctly stated in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth ([3], p. 13) as follows:

Scientific scripture, in its most canonical form is embodied in physics ( including physiology). Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call 'perceiving objects' are at the end of a long causal chain which starts from the objects, and are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in certain very abstract ways. We all start from 'naive realism,' i. e. , the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience, but something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus science seems at war with itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore, naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. And therefore the behaviorist, when he thinks he's recording observations about the outer world, is really recording observations about what is happening to him.

The latter half of the argument, beginning with "Naive realism...," I shall call the IMT argument. Ayer asserts that Russell took the causal theory of perception to refute naive realism, and he cites the IMT argument in support of his contention. ([1], p. 126) But, he cautions, it is not clear that the premisses of the argument are true. Thus, Ayer is concerned about the soundness of the argument and not

if we may take silence for assent) with its purported validity.1

Ayer begins his critique by distinguishing what we may call an

PSA 1976, Volume 1, pp. 175-181 Copyright?0 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association



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epistemological version of naive realism from an ontological version. The epistemological version of naive realism is a theory of perception. The ontological version of naive realism is a theory about what really is. Ayer takes Russell to be denying both versions. He himself agrees with Russell that naive realism as a theory of perception is untenable. However, he is not willing to follow Russell so glibly in denying the ontological version.

Ayer takes naive realism, as a theory of perception, to consist of a single negative thesis, i. e. , that "the perception of the physical objects of common sense cannot be analysed in terms of the presentation of sense-qualia." ([1], p. 126) Russell, Ayer says, denies this thesis. That is, on Ayer's view, Russell is commited to the thesis that the perception of the physical objects of common sense can be analysed in terms of the presentation of sense-qualia. In this, Ayer agrees with Russell, although he notes that he has reservations about the details of Russell's analysis. Ayer is here apparently refer- ring to Russell's early attempts to "construct" the external world out of sense-data and sensibilia. Since Ayer wants to reject the epistemological version of naive realism but keep the ontological version, he must clearly separate the epistemological issues from the ontological issues involved. With respect to Russell's early attempts to "construct" the world out of sense data, this separation is not easily achieved. Indeed, Ayer does not always draw a sharp line either. In The Origins of Pragmatism, he suggests that "the point at issue between different philosophical theories of perception comes down to a preference for one or another of a set of rival pictures. The naive realist pictures things as continuing to exist in very much the same form as that in which we perceive them . . ." ([2], p. 41). This latter is surely an ontological thesis and is treated as such by Ayer in some brief remarks at the end of that book ([2], p. 317). Be that as it may, since this doctrine, whatever it may be, is not a point of dispute between Ayer and Russell, we may proceed to a consideration of the ontological version of naive realism.

Ayer says: "Naive realism . . . is also a theory about what there is, it consists, as Russell puts it, in such beliefs that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold, and I am not per- suaded that physics shows these beliefs to be false, in the way that common sense interprets them." ([1], p. 126) Ayer then quotes that section of the IMT argument which asserts that "Physics assures us that the greenness of grass . . . is . . . not the greenness . . . that we know in our own experience, but something very different." This, he says, can be interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with our continuing to hold a naive realistic view of what there is. This would be the case, if the quoted passage amounted to no more than the claim that physics "explains" our perceptual experiences in terms of the behavior of entities which have different properties from those we associate with our perceptions. In other words, the truth of physics, interpreted as a viable explanatory model, is not necessarily inconsistent with a naive realistic ontology. At least



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that is what Ayer claims.

The first thing to note is that Russell would not agree with Ayer's construal. I take it that when Russell says that physics is ( prob- ably) true, he means more than that it explains our perceptual experiences in a certain way. Believing in the truth of physics, for Russell, also commits the believer to a particular ontology, namely, that which can be roughly characterized as "scientific realism." And, from an ontological point of view, scientific realism is inconsistent with naive realism, as Ayer admits ([2], p. 321). The question is, does the truth of physics ( in its broad outline, at least) com- mit one to some form of scientific realism? For Russell, I think, the answer is an unequivocal "yes," although I shall not argue for this thesis here. I shall return to consider Ayer's views on the matter of ontological commitment later. First, I wish to consider Ayer's claim that, contra Russell, the naive realistic way of locat- ing objects is, for the most part correct.

The naive realist doctrine identifies perceptual space with physical space. This is Ayer's interpretation and agrees with at least one of Russell's statements on the matter ([1], p. 125-6; [3], p. 284). The net effect is that for the naive realist physical objects are located at positions in perceptual space. This is the thesis that I take Ayer to be defending against Russell. Ayer's defense rests on the contention that the alternative view, which Russell takes, and which requires the causal theory of perception, is unacceptable.2 Ayer states three grounds for rejecting Russell's doctrine ([1], p. 126). The first two are:

1. "the postulation of unobservable entities as causes of our percepts is inconsistent with Russell's own derivation of the concept of cause from observed regularities."

2. "The postulation of unobservable entities as causes of our percepts is also inconsistent with Russell's principle tthat a concept is intelligible to us only if it is exemplified in our experience or is reducible to concepts which are so exemplified."'

Ayer is willing to let these objections pass and rest his case on his third ground. However, a few words can be said about them. Both points seem to hinge on the Russellian "principle" stated in 2. It seems clear, however, at least from most of Russell's writings on the matter since 1927, that if it came down to a choice between accepting the principle in 2 or accepting physics and the causal theory of perception, then the principle would go. But, as Ayer does not wish to rest his 5ase on these objections, I shall not argue against them any further.

This brings us to the third consideration, which Ayer considers telling:



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3. Russell's doctrine commits us to the view that the unobservable entities ( postulated by our physical theories) are in an unobservable space.

a. There is no justification for this inference.

b. The concept "unobservable space" seems to be unintelligible.

I can see no good reasons for accepting either of Ayer's objections. Consider 3a. What can Ayer mean by saying that there is no justification for the inference to unobservable entities located in an unobservable space? Does not the assumed truth of physics justify such an inference, as Russell claimed? Not, it must be admitted, if Ayer's construal of the significance of "Physics is true" is accepted. According to Ayer, the truth of physics cuts no ontological ice. As we shall see, Ayer holds that we are free to take the ontology of the scientific world view or to leave it. But, if that is what he means by saying that the inference is unjustified, then the inference to a naive realist ontology is also unjustified. For it too, is a matter of take it or leave it. Thus, Ayer may be right that there is no justification for the inference to Russell's scientific ontology, but, in the same sense, there is no justification for the inference to any ontology, and hence, 3a is defused as specifically telling against Russell's position.

How about 3b? I must confess I tend to find unintelligibility arguments themselves somewhat unintelligible, but I think that Ayer's can be disposed of rather handily. There is one sense in which the concept "unobservable space" is unintelligible and that is in the light of the principle attributed to Russell in 2. Certainly, on Russell's own grounds, the "unobservable space" in which physical objects are located is not exemplified in our experience. Is it reducible to concepts exemplified in our experience? Well, that hinges on what you mean by "reducible" ( assuming that we are going to saddle Russell with this principle in the first place ). If "reducible" means "exhibitable as a logical construction out of," then perhaps Russell's unobservable space fails of reducibility. But, it is clear that by 1941 Russell had given up his earlier dream of constructing the physical world from sense-data and sensibilia, and, hence, it would be unfair of us to demand that the later Russell dance to the tune of the earlier Russell. As a matter of fact, in [3], it is ex- pressly urged that physics, and science in general, demands the use of "principles of inference which are neither demonstrative nor deriv- able from experience." ([2], p. 289) These principles, among them principles of causality and induction, put physics on a firm basis and it is part of physical theory in its general outline ( as Russell saw it ) to countenance "unobservable physical space." Thus, as far as I can see, the only grounds for holding the concept of "unobservable space" to be unintelligible, rest on accepting a principle which Russell was no longer commited to, and which is far from self- evident. Perhaps Ayer has other reasons for thinking the concept to



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be unintelligible, but I do not see what they are.

This brings us to Ayer's views on ontological commitment. In [2], Ayer argues that "the only point of having an ontology is to obtain a viable picture of the world . . . , the only serious candidates are naive realism . . . and scientific realism." ([2], p. 323) According to Ayer, we start from a base of what he terms "qualia" which are roughly analogous to what Russell called "percepts." ([2], pp. 317-324) On this basis, we formulate our common sense picture of the world as a theory about these qualia. The scientific world view is an alternative theory. But, they are not alternative theories in the sense that some matter of fact could be utilized to decide between them. Rather, they are alternative "orders of discourse." ([2], p. 322) From an epistemological point of view, according to Ayer, there is no conflict between these orders of discourse because we can specify in- dependent tests of truth and falsehood for both common sense statements and scientific statements, " and these different groups of tests can each be satisfied." ([2], p. 321) But, when it comes to opting for an ontology, Ayer sees scientific realism in conflict with naive realism. ([2], p. 321) He then goes on to argue that the choice between the two ontologies is not a matter of "experience" or the "facts,' but reflects a decision on our part to reify one or the other of the orders of discourse. "We are no longer raising a question which can be settled by a recognized experimental procedure." ([2], p. 322) This Russell failed to realize, according to Ayer, when he opted for the truth of physics as entailing a theory about the probable struc- ture of the world. ([1], p. 132) Russell certainly did fail to re- cognize that, in opting for scientific realism, he was only making a conventional decision; he thought ( rightly or wrongly ) that his decision was a factual decision. ([3], pp. 264-270)

If which picture of the world we adopt is merely a matter of conventional decision, then Ayer's reservation about Russell's argument is well taken. The "if," however, is a big "if." Ayer says: "We must not be misled into thinking that we are pronouncing on a matter of fact . . . Given two different orders of discourse, we are asking which of them we want to reify. This is not a purely arbitrary question. One can give reasons for going one way or the other. But they are not compelling reasons. In the end it comes down to a matter of choice." Ayer characterizes his own view of ontological commitment as "pragmatic." "It is pragmatic in the sense that once it has been established by the appropriate criteria that a given set of propositions is true, and there being no means of translating out the entities which figure in them, the question whether these entities are to be reified is treated as a matter of convenience." ([2], p. 323)

The issue between Ayer and Russell boils down to the question of whether ontological commitment is factual or conventional. The dispute over the nature of ontological commitment is too convoluted to pursue here, but one point deserves mention. If we have learned any- thing from the writings of Quine, Kuhn, and others, it is that a clear separation of matters of convention from matters of fact is not



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easily achieved. Any argument, such as Ayer's, which appears to rest on the assumption that such separation is clearcut, should be immedi- ately suspect. The significance of Russell's later work on epis- temology and ontology has been ( too long ) undervalued, and deserves to be re-examined in the light of these recent developments.

Notes

'For a discussion of the validity of the IMT argument, see H. J. McLendon, "Has Russell Proved Naive Realism Self-Contradictory?," in the Journal of Philosophy, 53, 1956, pp. 289-302. McLendon claims the IMT argument is, in fact, invalid.

2For a discussion of Russell's scientific realism and its connec- tion with his advocating a causal theory of perception, see "Russell on Perception: A Study in Philosophical Method,t" by Grover Maxwell, in D. Pears (ed.), Bertrand Russell, Anchor, 1972.

3See B. Russell, The Outline of Philosophy, Meridian, 1960, pp. 155-6, for a discussion of the appropriate concept of "cause" in perception. This undercuts Ayer's first point.



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References

[1] Ayer, A. J. Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage. Cam- bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972.

[2] Ayer, A. J. The Origins of Pragmatism. San Francisco, California: Freeman, Cooper & Company, 1968.

[3] Russell, B. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. Baltimore, Mary- land: Penguin, 1962.



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