Violence and complex humanitarian emergencies: implications for livelihoods models

Sue Lautze Director, The Livelihoods Program, US, and Angela Raven-Roberts, Ph.D. Commonwealth of Independent States/Central and Eastern Europe (CIS/CEE) Regional Emergency Officer, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Switzerland

This paper explores the nature of the violence that characterises complex humanitarian emergen­cies and the related implications for modelling livelihoods systems.1 While noting the importance of livelihoods approaches in complex humanitarian emergencies, it deliberates the limitations of sustainable livelihoods frameworks when applied in environments marked by protracted instability. Adaptations to the model are discussed, with a particular focus on the relationships among vio­lence, assets and liabilities within livelihoods systems. Political economy of violence theories intimate that the assets on which livelihoods systems are constructed in peaceful times may instead become life­ and livelihood­threatening liabilities in periods of conflict. Adaptations to livelihood systems in violent settings require that analysts consider violence from policy, institutional and process per­spectives. It is suggested that vulnerability should be re­conceptualised as endogenous to livelihoods systems in violent settings. Building on the work of others, a livelihoods model adapted for complex humanitarian emergencies is presented.

Keywords: complex humanitarian emergencies, coping, livelihoods, sustainable livelihoods framework, violence

Violence and complex humanitarian emergenciesSince the end of the Cold War, academicians and humanitarians alike have produced increasingly sophisticated analyses of the nature, logic and implications of the violence that characterises protracted conflicts throughout the world. In a similar vein, the livelihoods work initiated following the Sahelian droughts and famines of the 1970s has evolved to the point where livelihood interventions are increasingly considered as appropriate disaster responses that not only lay the foundation for recovery but also save lives in the short term. Various analysts and organisations have attempted to provide conceptual frameworks or models to capture the diverse elements of both the house­hold and broader societal dynamics of livelihoods systems. This paper seeks to build on this work by marrying the analytical work on violence with the conceptual develop­ments on livelihoods frameworks to offer a livelihood model suitable for application in complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs). Complex humanitarian emergencies are appropriately named. They involve an intri­cate web of political, economic, military and social forces engaged in violence that is overwhelmingly targeted at civilians, their livelihoods systems and the core institutions

Disasters, 2006, 30(4): 383−401. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Overseas Development Institute, 2006. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

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of society on which households depend for survival. Although definitions vary, the primacy of violence remains the central characteristic of CHEs, fuelled by a ready supply of inexpensive weapons and a generation(s) of easily manipulated, uneducated and unemployed youth (Richards, 1996; Nordstrom, 1997). The targeting of civilians, the manipulation of humanitarian relief efforts for military, economic or political gain, wide­spread environmental destruction and violent processes of disenfranchisement and disempowerment combine to generate widespread vulnerability to dislocation and excess morbidity and mortality in CHEs (Kaldor, 1999; Le Billon, 2000a; Anderson and Zandvliet, 2002). CHEs are perpetuated through systems of inequality and exploitation and can be understood as remarkably violent but rational responses to the inequalities, opportuni­ties and stresses of globalisation (Duffield, 2001) and the end of the Cold War (Reno, 1998). They are characterised by war economies that are controlled by criminalised networks for the illicit extraction of and trade in resources ranging from oil to diamonds to sexual slaves (Le Billon, 2000b). Engagement with these parallel economies is often central to the survival of many individuals and groups within conflict­affected societies, providing people with limited livelihood security in an environment otherwise hostile to more legitimate types of livelihood systems. The various forms of violence that characterise CHEs can be described as functional, that is, they have utility for those controlling it, and specific, that is, they are deeply infused with meaning relating to economic, political and/or social agendas (Keen, 1994; Apter, 1997; Das et al., 1997; Turpin and Kurtz, 1997; Robben and Suarez­Orozco, 2000; Stewart and Strathern, 2002; Richards, 2005). For instance, in the 1970s in Argentina (during the era of the ‘Disappeared’), the military junta sought to stifle civilian groups and opposition parties by kidnapping civilians at night. Bodies were dismembered and scattered without a trace not only as a final act of humiliation and annihilation but also as a way to increase fear, to prevent the dead from becoming martyrs and to preclude the possibility of physical relics inspiring and mobilising the opposition (Simpson and Bennett, 1985; Suarez­Orozco, 1991). A more recent example is the violence that characterises the conflict in northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). With a fighting force that includes abducted children, violence by the LRA is oriented towards ensuring a continued supply of soldiers and porters and pun­ishing the Acholi population for ill­defined infractions that may include perceived support for President Yoweri Museveni’s government, which the LRA leadership appar­ently feels a divine calling to overthrow (Van Acker, 2004). Dolan (2000) has argued that the nature of the violence in northern Uganda has changed over the course of the war, escalating after each successive round of failed peace negotiations. Amputations of cyclists’ legs are thought to be infused with grotesque warnings against riding bicycles in rural areas, lest a cyclist informs on the LRA’s movements (Orach, 2002). Similarly, attacks since 1991 on women working in their fields and the subsequent mutilation of ears, lips and breasts serve not only as cautions to others who would risk cultivating but are also thought to be messages to the UPDF that, despite a spate of recent defections

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and (at the time of writing in 2006) peace negotiations, the LRA is still active and powerful (Kirunda, 2005). Table 1 provides other examples of specific and functional violence in select conflict­affected countries both currently and in the recent past. From a livelihoods perspective, the functional nature of violence entails elements of instrumental organisation and deliberately emotive aspects that suggest violence can be related to policy, institutions and/or process. In general, ‘policies, institutions and pro­cesses’ (or ‘PIPs’ in livelihoods parlance) comprise the external governance environment through which households negotiate the use of their assets and the configuration of livelihoods strategies. A household’s relationship to the violence within and beyond its threshold strongly determines its access to assets and the choice of livelihoods strategies pursued by its members. As households struggle to adapt their livelihoods systems to accommodate violence, the physical and material outcomes familiar to humanitarians become manifest: malnutrition, destitution, humiliation, morbidity, mortality and dis­placement. Humanitarians’ focus on these outcomes frequently masks more in­depth

Table 1 Examples of specific and functional violence in select countries

Nature of violence Examples of function/specificity Select examples

Gender violence (castrating men, mutilating women’s breasts, gang rapes of elderly women and young girls)

Attacks on women as attacks on the nationality/the ‘mother nation’; ethnic cleansing; emasculating male pride/strength; community destruction

Former Yugoslavia; Mozambique; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Sudan (Darfur); Uganda

Assassination, car bombing, lynching, execution, kidnapping

Attacks on private US contractors and humanitarians as proxy attacks on US-led politico-military coalitions; attacks on Iraqis as rejection of US-imposed order

Afghanistan; Iraq; Israel; Lebanon; Somalia

Massacres, mutilation, mass rape, genocide

Terrorise, weaken political opposition, depopulate, ‘ethnic cleansing’

(Eastern) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Former Yugoslavia; Rwanda; Sudan (Darfur)

Forced displacement, impoverishment, asset stripping

Economic benefit to raiders; disempower, weaken/punish political opposition; attract humanitarian assistance for political use; force reliance on exploitative markets

Angola; (Eastern) DRC; Indonesia (Aceh); Liberia; Sierra Leone; Sudan (south, Darfur)

Child soldiers, forcing children to kill Terrorise, increase fighting forces, destabilise communities; indoctrinate new generations

Mozambique; Sierra Leone; Sri Lanka; Uganda

Rumour, random disappearances Shred social fabric of trust; undermine opposition; discourage mobility

Argentina; Columbia; Guatemala;

Trafficking, sexual slavery Economic enrichment of those control-ling networks; terrorise communities; obtain political resources

Burma; DRC; Former Soviet Union; Sudan; Thailand

Source: adapted from Lautze et al., 2004

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analysis of the nature of violence, including the less apparent deeper social implications of widespread violence. Inter­disciplinary research has the potential to afford humanitarians a better under­standing of the impact of violence on community social and cultural systems. Anthro­pological, psychoanalytical, sociological and political perspectives have contributed to understanding the functions and processes of contemporary violence as well as to the ways that communities manage and respond to violence (Broch­Due, 2005). Writers generally categorise violence as:

• Structural violence, for instance, chronic, historical political­economic oppression, or social inequality. This can stem from national as well as international factors such as terms of trade, local working conditions and structural adjustment programmes (Galtung, 1981; Uvin, 1998).

• Everyday violence, for example, interpersonal, domestic or delinquent violence, with a primary focus on how these daily expressions of violence become routine, daily acts of terror with which communities have to live constantly (Nordstrom, 1997).

• Symbolic violence, referring to the ways that communities and individuals inter­nalise humiliation and racial, class and sexual inequalities, including how they act to recognise or ‘misrecognise’ such violence (Bourgois, 2004).

• Direct political violence, for instance, targeted physical violence implemented by offi­cial armies, police and other forms of state apparatus as well as unofficial non­state entities and parties in opposition (Cliffe and Luckham, 2000).

The organisation of violence requires the development and maintenance of practices, social relationships and ideologies to sustain and confirm acts of terror, such as the Second World War­era concentration camps with hierarchies of guards and even inmates who are organised to serve their violent purposes (Taussig, 1987; Foucault 1991). The labour camps, militias, brothels and similar extralegal institutions associated with CHEs are developed and maintained by intricate, distorted networks of violently enforced reci­procity and trust. This is an active process; individuals and communities have to be ‘socialized into living in a state of fear’ (Green, 2002). Green’s work on Guatemala has shown how rumour, gossip and false accusations are powerful institutional mechanisms whereby dominant military groups subdue communities and generate pervasive states of fear, terror, and mistrust even as households and communities maintain their seem­ingly normal, regular routines (Green, 2002). Violence shapes the very nature of society, distorting other processes, institutions and policies. Such effects are similar to those found generally in disasters, including in natu­ral disasters where, according to David Alexander (1997, p. 291), ‘normal social functions are not merely affected, but they undergo a profound mutation, or even outright sus­pension’. Torturing and humiliating individuals in front of their families is a deliberate tool intended to sever family bonds. Forcing family members to witness acts of violence grossly undermines the extensive social and cultural web of respect that grows between people, for example, when the ‘protective’ father is killed before his family or when the ‘nurturing’ mother is raped in front of her children.

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Violence not only affects physical and material factors but also it undermines the basic ‘glue’ that enables social relations and networks to function. This has dramatic implications for livelihoods systems, especially given the importance of social institutions in regulating household access to assets ( Johnson, 1997). Individual and community survival rests on the bonds of reciprocity and obligations that are formed and reformed between individuals and groups; a key element of this is basic trust and faith, both of which are severely jeopardised by violence and the new social relations that violence itself creates and distorts (Kleinman, Das and Lock, 1997; Summerfield, 1999). Social violence lives on through generations and shapes social and political identities. Histories of victimisation and past grievances are powerful factors in shaping politi­cised agendas for revenge and hatred. These affect both the individual and communities at large. Suicide bombers’ aspirations of martyrdom, for instance, are long fed on a diet of historical narratives of past wrong deeds that need avenging and rectifying. Commu­nities can exist for many years on particular historical episodes. Such ‘chosen traumas’ (Volkan, 1996) will be repeated and ritualised in ceremonies, conventions, literature and oral histories, inter alia, which will serve to sustain an ideology of revenge and remembrance. Violence distorts the very process of death and dying, with strong implications for the household and society. Acts of violence require acts of healing. The healing process involves psychological as well as socio­cultural practices that enable closure, for instance, bodies need to be identified and buried, and proper mourning and other procedures need to occur that honour and legitimise the transition from life to death for the living and the dead. Individual and community trauma is created when these processes are incomplete. Mourning and burial practices are expensive in all cultures; they are intense social events that entail considerable outlays of resources. Money is needed to pay for ritual leaders, feasts and other appropriate ceremonies. In CHEs where communities have been stripped of resources and key people such as traditional ritual leaders, priests, imams and other spiritual leaders have been massacred, imprisoned or otherwise made unavailable, this adds to the hardships facing communities.

Livelihoods and CHEsIn war and other violent settings, crisis­affected populations rely extensively on a range of livelihood strategies for survival, resilience and crisis recovery (Ogden, 2000). Among humanitarian practitioners, awareness of the importance of disaster­affected populations’ own livelihood strategies for survival dates to at least the Sahelian droughts and famines of the 1970s, when work on coping strategies received wide recognition among relief workers (Holt, 1979; Davies, 1996). Humanitarians recognise the need to support the livelihoods systems in which these coping strategies are embedded, but challenges remain in routinely incorporating livelihood support into standard humanitarian responses. The focus of emergency interventions remains on serving the needs of the most vul­nerable individual and not necessarily on addressing the components of livelihood systems that render individuals vulnerable, such as social capital, natural assets, institutions,

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policies, processes and physical assets. Le Sage and Majid (2002) have described this as the ‘livelihoods gap’ whereby standard disaster relief interventions fail to address the complex web of spatial and temporal vulnerabilities generated by the ebbs and flows of different manifestations of violent conflict. Instead, humanitarian interventions usually concentrate on the provision of a narrow range of relief supplies and, to a limited extent, emergency welfare services such as health, shelter, nutrition, water and sanitation. In addition to failing to understand and address adequately the immediate nature of crises (Karim, 1996), such approaches have been criticised for potentially undermining rehab­ilitation and development efforts (Anderson, 1999), while a range of disaster relief oper­ations have been critiqued as having a limited impact in some emergencies (Macrae and Bradbury, 1998; Salama et al., 2001; Hammond and Maxwell, 2002). In violent settings in particular, the complex nature of vulnerabilities requires a broad range of both assistance and protection advocacy and intervention strategies in order to meet the fundamental humanitarian imperative of saving lives and reducing suffering with dignity. Support for emergency interventions to facilitate livelihoods systems in times of crises, especially complex emergencies, is uneven (Lautze and Stites, 2003). One reason for this is the persistence of institutional (and personal) assumptions that livelihoods support is inappropriate in humanitarian situations. Some possible reasons why these suppositions persist in the face of extensive suffering directly related to the collapse of livelihoods systems in complex emergencies include:

• concerns that livelihood interventions could conflict with humanitarian principles, especially that of neutrality;

• inadequate institutional awareness of the depth and breadth of emergency livelihoods initiatives already undertaken across a range of disaster settings, contexts and time periods;

• inexperience among humanitarian actors, particularly of livelihood interventions that require engagement with policies, institutions and processes;

• perceived donor unwillingness to fund livelihood interventions in emergencies;• the complexities of conducting humanitarian work in violent contexts; and• a lack of knowledge about livelihoods systems, and how they are threatened and changed

by violence and, in turn, how they demonstrate resilience when confronted with such violence.

Furthermore, one might argue that, despite many good efforts, the humanitarian community still lacks an adequate conceptual framework with which to analyse liveli­hoods in crisis, a point that serves as the focus for the remainder of this paper.

Adapting livelihoods frameworks for CHEsIt is widely accepted that livelihood­based strategies are important in recovery and development contexts. Several major relief organisations have adopted pro­livelihoods policies to guide their disaster relief work, including the International Committee of the

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Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and non­governmental organisations (NGOs) such as CARE and Mercy Corps International. The Humanitarian Response Review 2005 (Adinolfi et al., 2005) notes a gap in the United Nations (UN)’s ability to respond to livelihoods crises and also recognises the challenge of galvanising public support for livelihoods initiatives. However, it reflects some of the conceptual confusion that the idea of livelihoods presents for agencies oriented towards working in sectoral interven­tions. In the Humanitarian Response Review 2005, livelihoods are combined with food aid and nutrition, sandwiched between camp management issues on the one hand and urban search and rescue on the other. The Humanitarian Response Review 2005 (Adinolfi et al., 2005, p. 39) acknowledges the importance of livelihoods approaches as a ‘way to a transition to recovery’ but the significance of livelihood initiatives in saving lives is not recognised. Regardless of at least three decades of experience to the contrary, the notion that livelihoods are strictly a post­crisis development concern persists among some humani­tarian practitioners, donors, policymakers and academics specialising in disasters and vulnerability analysis. This rather discouraging tendency can be explained perhaps by a failure among livelihood specialists to articulate effectively the relationships between saving livelihoods and saving lives, an unwillingness by individuals to learn from avail­able experience, and/or a form of ‘functional ignorance’ (Duffield, 1996) on the part of some who are either unwilling or unable to build greater flexibility into their approaches to or analysis of disaster response. In addition, however, the conflation of livelihoods and development could be partly due to the very success of sustainable livelihoods initiatives, most notably the promotion of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (see Figure 1) supported by the UK

Key: H = Human capital; N = Natural capital; F = Financial capital; P = Physical capital; S = Social capital

Source: http://www.livelihoods.org

Livelihood outcomes

More income

Increased well-being

Reduced vulnerability

Improved food security

More sustainable use of natural resource base

Vulerability context

Shocks

Trends

Seasonality

Policies, institutions, processes

Laws

Culture

Policies

Institutions

Levels of government

Private sector Livelihood strategies

Influence & access

Livelihood assets

H

N

FP

S

Figure 1 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

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Department for International Development (DFID). Much of the SLF is based on the body of intellectual work generated at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex in the 1990s, including the design of the framework itself (based on Scoones, 1998), as well as the earlier work of Chambers and Conway (1988) which first promoted the concepts of livelihoods and people­centred anti­poverty development approaches (de Haan and Zoomers, 2005). The success of the sustainable livelihoods approach in transforming the development community may have contributed (unintentionally) to reluctance by the humanitarian community to pursue livelihoods­oriented programming in emergencies. The main reason is that livelihoods approaches are generally viewed as synonymous with the sustain­able development agenda. DFID clearly states that it is focusing on only one possible application of the livelihoods framework, a point inadequately appreciated in the humani­tarian community. The SLF, according to DFID, has ‘a normative dimension: DFID’s objective is to promote sustainable livelihoods’ (DFID, 1999, p. 25). This leaves open the way to other adaptations of livelihoods work concerned with other objectives (that is, aside from or in addition to sustainability) and in other settings, including adaptations for emergency work where the humanitarian imperative of saving lives and reducing suffering with dignity is paramount. The SLF was not designed for humanitarian work and is not readily applicable to complex humanitarian emergencies. A 2003 review of livelihoods in situations of chronic conflict found that ‘the conventional livelihoods framework (as used in politically stable contexts) needs to be expanded to incorporate the concept of vulnerability more cen­trally, to give greater attention to power relations, and to include a temporal dimension’ (Longley, 2003, p. 6). A range of analysts, including those at the London­based Overseas Development Institute, have worked on developing alternative frameworks, especially those that could incorporate post­Cold War writings on the political economy of con­flict (see, for example, Collinson, 2003). While a useful body of work has been generated, the challenge of developing a suitable framework has not yet been fully met, and so the debate continues here.

Vulnerability: exogenous or endogenous dynamic, or both? In Figure 1, the ‘vulnerability context’ of the SLF is depicted as external to livelihoods systems. In the SLF, the violence that is central to the vulnerability created by the dynamics of complex emergencies is modelled as an exogenous factor, that is, something that is beyond the control of and unrelated to the household­level dynamics of live­lihoods systems (for example, control and ownership of assets, options in livelihoods strategies, and livelihood outcomes). This is suggested by the location of the ‘vulner­ability context’ box, to the left, on the margins of the main body of the model. In the SLF, from the peripheral location of the ‘vulnerability context’ box, vulnerability appears to flow (weakly, as indicated by a thinner arrow) from society’s processes, institutions and policies, exerting in turn an influence (strongly, as indicated by thick arrows) on households (see Figure 1).

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Various analyses of the form and function of violence give rise to challenges of this external construction. Conceptualising violence and other sources of vulnerability as exogenous to livelihoods systems is rooted in the developmentalist bias that informs the SLF. Vulnerabilities are conflated with risks and hazards (‘shocks, trends and season­ality’), which, in turn, seem to emanate from depoliticised, natural and de­socialised origins, external to the bi­directional relationships between households and the micro/meso/macro interactions of society that form the basis of livelihoods models. This developmentalist perspective can be critiqued in a fashion akin to the analysis of the ‘relief to development’ continuum that reached its apogee in 1994, that is, that disasters constitute temporary disruptions to the otherwise assumed smooth and positive pro­cesses of development (Duffield, 1994; Macrae et al., 1997). Indeed, the similarities between the flow of the SLF and the ‘relief to development’ continuum are remarkable, with livelihoods systems operating fluidly until they are ‘shocked’ by the ‘vulnerability context’. In the complicated world of post­Cold War, post­11 September 2001 humanitarianism, the natural advantage of a livelihoods approach in complex humanitarian emergencies is that it does not rely on the problematic distinctions inherent in the languages of relief and development or of war and peace. In a similar vein, analysts working to improve existing livelihoods models need to resist drawing an artificial line between natural and man­made forms of risks and vulnerabilities, for instance, by conceptualising the former as exogenous and the latter as endogenous. Questioning the vulnerability con­text as exogenous is a concept well supported in the literature on war and natural disasters. Duffield (2001) demonstrates that disaster vulnerabilities, especially in complex emergencies, are embedded in a range of processes, especially globalisation. The work of Blaikie et al. (1994) on natural disasters argues against viewing the sources of vulnera­bility as exogenous to social policies, institutions and processes. These classics of disaster studies highlight that while vulnerability manifests itself most starkly in the individual (such as the starving child, the abandoned widow, the dispossessed man), such outcomes often derive directly from the functional and specific aspects of violence. In turn, these outcomes characterise policies, institutions and processes at spatial localities ranging from the local to the global and temporal dimensions ranging from the distant past to the present. In such a world, there can be no neat line between exogenous and endoge­nous sources of vulnerability. Collinson (2003), among others, has recognised and attempted to overcome the prob­lematic location of the ‘vulnerability context’ by directly linking vulnerability to all aspects of livelihoods systems: assets, access/influence, PIPs, strategies and outcomes. Her model is reproduced in Figure 2. This is an improvement. However, the vulnera­bility context (circled) remains problematically conceptualised as external to livelihoods systems and still sits at the margins outside the main flow of the livelihood system. For a livelihoods model to capture successfully the dynamics of myriad households’ lived experiences in complex emergencies, a livelihoods framework must be infused with and informed by the many ways that violence influences household livelihood resources, options, choices and outcomes. As an expression of power, violence influ­ences livelihood pathways, defined by de Haan and Zoomers (2005, p. 45) as:

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Figure 2 A Sustainable Livelihoods Framework in situations of conflict and political instability

Source: Collinson, 2003, p. 20

Vulnerability/contextEnvironmental/political/economic/climatic/military shocks and trends

Transforming structures and

processes

Infrastructure

State/government institution

Kinship networks

Markets

Civic institutions

Traditional authority

Private sector

Ethnic institutions

Religious institutions

Laws

Policies

Culture

Ethnic and religious identity

Conflict and violence

War economy

Displacement

Environmental degradation

Asset transfer

Aid inputs

Foreign investment

Militarisation

Foreign intervention

Trading

Livelihood strategies

Agriculture

Labour

Trade

Migration

Smuggling

Predation and asset stripping

External aid

Livelihood outcomes

Income

Food security

Health and education

Economic vulnerability

Political vulnerability

Vulnerability to violence

Use of natural resources

Livelihood assets of a particular household/

group/community/population

Relative power/wealth/vulnerability/poverty of particular household/

group/community/population

Affects Affects Affects AffectsAffects

Determining/achieving

Influ

enci

ng

Determines

Human assets

Political assets

Determines

Social assets

Physical assets

Natural assets

Financial assets

Affe

cts

and

acce

ss to

and

impa

cts

of/s

igni

fican

ce o

faf

fect

s en

gage

men

t with

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A pattern of livelihood activities which emerges from a co­ordination process among actors, arising from individual strategic behaviour embedded both in a historical repertoire and in social differentiation, including power relations and institutional processes, both of which play a role in subsequent decision­making.

If vulnerability in violent settings is not usefully constructed as exogenous, the challenge then is to infuse each element of the livelihoods framework with notions of violence and related forms of risk and vulnerability. Risks and vulnerabilities must be incor­porated as thoroughly endogenous within and inherent to livelihoods systems writ large rather than being seen as a factor outside of them. One way to model this is to abandon the concept of an external vulnerability context. The nature and dynamics of risks, hazards and vulnerabilities should instead be incorporated into each of the remaining components of a livelihoods model (asset pentagon, influence and access, processes, institutions and policies, livelihoods strategies, outcomes, and the feedback factor). The remainder of this paper considers how to embed vulnerability into two components of livelihoods models, namely the ‘PIP’ box and the asset pentagon. It concludes with a comment on outcomes before presenting a livelihoods model modified for CHEs.

Conceptualising embedded vulnerability in assets and PIPs Livelihoods systems are based on the range of assets owned, controlled or accessed by households. These are generally categorised in livelihoods frameworks as a pentagon of human (the number and capability of productive household members), natural (the goods and services provided by the ‘gifts of nature’), financial (measures of wealth), social (the utility of social affiliations) and physical (capital used for production) assets, as in Figure 3.2 Political capital is often added to this list, in addition to (or at times as a substitute for) social capital. Assets alone do not determine or delimit the nature of disaster vulnerability or the range of livelihood strategies that households are able to pursue. The utility of assets is mediated through the governance environment of the many layers of different societies’ formal and informal policies, institutions and processes (see Figure 4) (Hobley, 2001).

Figure 3 A standard asset pentagon

Natural

Social/Political

Physical Financial

Human

ASSETS

Figure 4 A standard PIP box

POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS,

PROCESSES

FORMAL

INFORMAL

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Formal and informal PIPs enable or hinder livelihood strategies, thereby creating or reducing vulnerabilities. All individuals and households live within and are shaped and influenced by the informal and formal practices, norms and rules that constitute the institutional environment. Households pursue livelihood strategies based not only on their asset portfolios but also on the opportunities and constraints emanating from these various types of processes, institutions and policies. As this paper discusses, critical among these PIPs is the range of violence and insecurity that characterises complex humani­tarian emergencies. To translate research on violence into practical tools for humanitarians, violence must be understood as not outside of the ‘PIP’ box, but rather in terms of its various forms: violence as process, violence as institution and violence as policy. This was perhaps better captured in some earlier livelihoods models—for instance, those of Scoones (1998)—as ‘Transforming Structures and Processes’. Embedding vulnerability within livelihoods models involves taking a broad view of ‘processes’ and seeing them as including the hazards, risks and resulting vulnerabilities generated by humans as well as those in the natural environment. For example, while the earthquake and subsequent tsunami of 26 December 2004 was clearly a natural event, the pattern of vulnerability to these hazards was strongly determined by local, national and international policies and insti­tutions. In a similar vein, the institutionalised schisms in race, class and age in the United States serve to highlight how even natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina have sharply defined man­made vulnerabilities. Livelihoods approaches have been criticised for inadequately analysing the impor­tant structures of power embedded in processes, institutions and policies (de Haan and Zoomers, 2005). As Pain and Lautze (2002, p. 15) explain:

These influencing factors play a key role in mediating access to resources, shaping the con­text of vulnerability, and setting opportunities or constraints to pursuing various livelihood strategies. Customary practices related to marriage, gender roles, inheritance, ownership, management of and access to resources (land, water) and ‘real’ markets all fall within the sphere of informal institutions. These are dynamic rather than fixed institutions, and are sub­ject to continual re­negotiation and change according to context and power. Formal institutions relate to the role of the state, for instance in setting and enforcing laws, regulating markets or extracting taxes. There is a constant interplay between the informal and formal institutions.

Furthermore, institutions themselves can be vulnerable in times of disasters. Gov­ernment ministries responsible for the provision of social welfare—those of health, agriculture or education, for example—are often drained of resources when govern­ments redirect domestic budgets towards war efforts or when implementing structural adjustment programmes. Ethiopia’s war with Eritrea that coincided with the 1999–2000 humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia, reducing economic growth to just one per cent, is an example (World Bank, 2003). The policy environment can be both a source of resilience and vulnerability for house­holds over time. The PIP box of livelihood frameworks is useful for understanding the nature of the impact of a range of policy changes that have characterised an assortment

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of governments in CHE­affected countries. Poorly conceived agricultural policies have led to an intensification of cereal cropping, allowing some to achieve increased total outputs and leaving others with unmanageable debt burdens. Land tenure policies have yet to provide successfully an adequate level of security to induce farmer investment in ecological protection in some countries. Other land­use policies (such as villagisa­tion, resettlement and monopolies on private investment) have prompted large­scale population movement and the construction, destruction and reconstruction of villages and settlement sites. International policies also affect households’ ability to access and utilise assets, such as when the US government’s anti­terrorist concerns prompted, in 2001, the closure of some channels used to send remittances to and receive remittances from the Horn of Africa. Anti­terrorist measures are having extensive impacts on livelihood security in Afghanistan (Mazurana et al., 2004). Other processes that generate household vulner­ability include religious extremism, health crises, militarisation and globalisation (Enloe, 2000; Rashid, 2000; Duffield, 2001). In addition to policies and processes, the livelihoods framework requires analysis of formal and informal institutions. The utility of the framework can be demonstrated through again returning to the example of the institutions of gender and generation in Ethiopia, both of which are strongly socially defined. All Ethiopian agro­ecological livelihood and production systems depend on a division of labour based on gender, age and, in some cases, occupational caste and ethnicity. Divisions of labour are subject to vulnerability relating to natural and man­made hazards. A livelihood framework and mode of analysis enable a better understanding of the dynamics of the household econ­omy as well as the distribution of power (and related resources) within the household. However, humanitarian initiatives to address these forms of vulnerability are excep­tionally challenging, not least because they are hardly media­friendly, for instance, saving vulnerable policies, providing protection to institutions endangered by violence, engaging with processes under threat, and developing alternative livelihoods strategies.

Modifying the ‘asset pentagon’Assets are closely related to vulnerability in complex emergencies in three ways:

1. lack of assets (for example, poor households, farmers who lack marketing skills and pastoralists who have lost livestock);

2. limited diversity of assets/reliance on a limited range of assets (for instance, mono­cropping of drought­susceptible cash crops and landless wage labourers); and

3. ownership (or the perceived or actual possession thereof ) of assets that are either valued (money, weapons, jewellery) or seen as threatening (identity, power, educa­tion, weapons).

CHE scholars have brought to the fore the importance of the third point especially (Keen, 1994; Le Billon, 2000b; Schafer, 2001). Political economy analysis has revealed that the particular nature of violence in complex emergencies has the singular capacity

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to transform livelihoods assets into life­threatening liabilities. A simple way to grasp this concept is to consider the issue of households and credit. When credit is needed, available and manageable, or when access to cash is sufficient for the household to service its debts, access to credit is clearly an asset. However, when households cannot access needed credit, or when existing loans become unmanageable, credit becomes a liability. In emergencies, credit can become a life­threatening liability. The debt burdens of farmers in Ethiopia have significantly augmented famine vulnerability, while accum­ulated debt from multiple years of drought in Afghanistan in 2002 led to increased distress sales of assets, including marrying off girls at younger and younger ages (Lautze et al., 2002; 2003). Elsewhere, leading scholars writing about CHEs have examined the asset/liability paradox. Keen (1994) and Deng (2002) have demonstrated how the livestock assets that are the foundation of Dinka livelihoods in southern Sudan are transformed into famine liabilities in the context of violent raiding. The works of Uvin (1998) and Pottier (2002) on the Rwandan genocide reveal how historical access to power by ethnic Tutsis was translated unequivocally into a liability in late spring 1994. The educated classes in Cam­bodia, the Taliban­supporting pastoral Kuchi populations in Afghanistan, and the myriad populations that live where natural resources abound (such as diamonds, oil and coltan) all had their livelihoods destroyed when their assets were transformed into liabilities by the violence of conflict. This is not a one­way process, however; liabilities can be transformed into assets through violence. Authors such as Turton (1997) and Le Billon (2000a; 2000b) have demonstrated how the politicisation of historical or current marginalisation has been transformed actively into assets, albeit those that benefit the few at the cost of many. Some exam­ples flow from the authors’ works noted above, such as how the Baggara pastoralists of western Sudan, impoverished by droughts in the 1980s, were able to leverage their poverty to attract weapons from successive governments in Khartoum, which led to their eventual enrichment through the raiding of their wealthier Dinka neighbours. To illustrate these concepts, Table 2 provides examples of how each element of the asset pentagon can be turned into liabilities in times of disaster. We have modified the asset pentagon to reflect better this paradox, as per Figure 5, where liabilities are placed alongside assets to form an assets/liabilities pentagon. We

Table 2 The asset pentagon and the asset/liability paradox

Type of capital Example of asset Example of liability

Human Education Education (educated classes in Cambodia under Pol Pot)

Natural Oil Violent exploitation of oil in southern Sudan

Financial Savings Savings (target of looting—widespread)

Physical Farmland Farmland (such as white farmers in Zimbabwe and South Africa)

Social Religion Religion (US-coalition attacks in the ‘Sunni Triangle’ in Iraq)

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believe that this may better echo the reality for households that are surviving in con­flict zones and trying to minimise liabilities while maintaining enough assets to meet household livelihood objectives. For ex­ample, in rural war zones, this may include farming households that must carefully balance crop production to ensure that it is adequate for survival but not enough to attract looting by armed forces, or house­holds in drought­stricken areas that must balance charcoal production against the eroding effects of desertification. The classic

trade­off between saving lives and livelihoods whereby family members (usually women and children first) are deprived of food so that productive assets (usually livestock) may be preserved in times of crisis serves as another example of the delicate balance between assets and liabilities that households facing serious risks and vulnerabilities must manage.

Modifying ‘livelihoods outcomes’In the sustainable livelihoods model, ‘livelihoods outcomes’ are said to include ‘more income, increased well­being, reduced vulnerability, improved food security, more sustainable use of natural resource base’ (DFID, 1999, p. 25). For populations living in conflict zones, these may be remote aspirations. Duffield (1994) refers to this as the ‘myth of modernity’, that is, a staunch belief that conditions confronting society will improve over time. More often than not, the actual outcomes of livelihood systems in complex emergencies include starvation, poor health, mortality, destitution, shame and displace­ment. These outcomes, in turn, are transmitted back to households through society’s policies, institutions and processes, a dynamic that translates these outcomes into assets but more frequently as liabilities for households, for instance, the financial burden of caring for the sick in the absence of functioning health systems, the cost (social, produc­tive, financial) of mourning the dead or the encumbering impacts of social disgrace. In CHEs, if livelihoods frameworks are to be used for assessment, analysis and action, it is best to leave these outcomes to be defined by the population affected by the crises, rather than providing an aspirational list. Identifying the actual outcomes of livelihood systems in crisis is, after all, the very foundation of vulnerability and capacity assessment. It is in the success or failure of livelihoods systems that individual vulnerability is most easily identified by humanitarians, such as malnutrition, morbidity, mortality, dispos­session and shame.

Adapting livelihoods frameworks for CHEsBringing together the adaptations introduced in this paper, we present a livelihoods framework modified for use in complex emergencies in Figure 6. Thus far, we have introduced four adaptations to the SLF:

Figure 5 An assets/liabilities pentagon

Natural

Social

Physical Financial

Human

ASSETS/LIABILITIES

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1. the integration into the PIP box of violence as process, institution and/or policy; 2. the elimination of an external vulnerability context; 3. the expansion of the asset pentagon to include liabilities; and 4. the allowance for greater flexibility in the description of livelihood outcomes.

Based on our work over the past several years, this framework has been applied in a number of field studies (Lautze et al., 2002; 2003; Stites et al., 2005; Young et al., 2005).

The deliberations on livelihoods, violence and complex emergencies are far from complete. Much work remains, including a fuller analysis of how violence shapes household access to assets, how violence influences relationships with society, how households adapt their livelihoods strategies to accommodate and manage the risks and vulnerabilities generated by violence, and how livelihoods outcomes are inter­preted in the context of violence through ‘the feedback factor’ that links livelihood outcomes with PIPs and assets. We look forward to the continuing debate.

CorrespondenceSue Lautze, Director, The Livelihoods Program, 13778 SW Meadowview Drive, Camp Sherman, OR 07730, US. Telephone: +1 541 595 0303; e­mail: Slautze@aol.com.

Endnotes1 The views expressed in this paper are the sole opinions of the authors and do not reflect any institu­

tional perspective. 2 For more on the basic components of livelihoods systems see http://www.livelihoods.org.

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ASSETS/ LIABILITIES

PROCESSES, INSTITUTIONS AND

POLICIES

INFLUENCE AND ACCESS

STRATEGIES

OUTCOMES

FEEDBACK FACTOR

Figure 6 A livelihoods model adapted for violent CHEs

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