uses of history

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The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent TendenciesAuthor(s): John H. GoldthorpeReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 211-230Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/590368 .

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John H. Goldthorpe

The usesof history n sociology:reflectionson somerecenttendencies*

ABS I RAC IThis paperquestions he nowwidelyheldviewthatno meaningfuldistinctionsare to be drawnbetweenthe disciplinesof historyandsociology.It is arguedthatone - highlyconsequential differenceconcerns the nature of the evidence on which historiansandsociologists ypicallyrelyor, more precisely, he wayin whichthisevidence comes into being. This argument is developed andillustrated with reference to various examples of sociologistsresorting to historicalresearch and the difficulties they haveencountered;and further in the context of a critiqueof 'grandhistoricalociology'whosepractitioners aveso farfailedtoprovidetheirworkwithany adequatemethodological asis.

To takeup againthequestionof the usesof history n sociologymaywell appear regressive.For to do so implies,of course, makingadistinctionbetweenistoryand sociologywhichwouldnowbe widelyregarded as untenable.Thus, for example, Philip Abrams,in hishighly influentialbook, Historical ociology,as advancedthe argu-ment thatsince 'historyand sociologyare and alwayshavebeen thesamething',anydiscussionof therelationship f one to theothermustbe misguided;and Abrams n turnquotesGiddensto the effect that'There simply are no logical or even methodologicaldistinctionsbetweenthesocialsciencesandhistory appropriatelyonceived'.As Abramsis indeed aware, the position he adopts is in sharpcontrastwith that which would have been most common amongsociologists two decades or so previously. At this earlier time,sociologistswere for the most part anxious to differentiatetheirconcernsfromthoseof historians.Forexample,muchuse wasmadeof the distinctionbetween'idiographic' nd 'nomothetic'disciplines.Historywas diographic:historians oughtto particularisehroughtheBJu5 Volu t&O.42 I.s.sut&O.2 Jut&e 991


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212 JohnH. Goldthorpedescription of singular, unique phenomena. Sociology was nomo-thetic: sociologists ought to generalzsehrough formulating heoriesthatappliedto categoriesof phenomena.2However,all this was n theperiod before the British sociologicalcommunity (anticipatingSirKeithJoseph)ost tsnerveoverthe ideaof 'social cience' before,thatis, the so-called reaction gainstpositivism' f the late 1960s and 1970screateda new mood in which politicalradicalismwent together withintellectual onservatism.My first contribution o the debate on 'historyand sociology'datesback to this prelapsariantime, and was in fact a crztzquef theidiographic-nomothetic istinction.3My remarkswere not especiallywell received by either historiansor sociologists,and this presentcontributionmay,I fear,provesimilarly ncongenial.ForwhatI wouldnow think important s that attempts, such as that of AbramsandGiddens, to present history and sociology as being one andindistinguishablehould be stronglyresisted.4To avoid, f possible,being misunderstood,et me stress hatI do notseek here to re-establish he idiographic-nomotheticistinction,or atleast not as one of principle. I do not believe, for example, thatsociologists an ever hope to producetheories that are of an entirelytranshistorical ind; nor that historianscan ever hope to producedescriptions hat are free of general deasaboutsocialaction,processand structure.However,good groundsdo stillremainfor refusingtoaccept the position that any distinctiondrawn between history andsociologymustbe meaningless.To begin with, I would argue that the idiographic-nomotheticdistinction s still pertinent if taken as one not of principle but ofemphasts. istorians o - quiterightly regard t as mportant hatdatesand places should be attached to the arguments they advance aspreciselyas possible; as E. P. Thompson has aptly remarked, thediscipline f history s abovealla discipline f context'3Sociologists noless rightly believethat they are achieving omething f the time andspaceco-ordinates ver which heir argumentsapplycan be widened.And from thisone use of history n sociology s immediately uggested.Historymay serve as, so to speak, a 'residualcategory' or sociology,marking he point at whichsociologists, n invoking history', herebycurb their impulse to generalise or, in other words, to explainsociologically, ndaccept he roleof the specific ndof the contingentasframing that s, as providingboth the settingandthe limits of theirown analyses.fiHowever, t is not on such issuesthat I wishhere to concentrate.Myaim is ratherto focus attentionon anothermajordifferencebetweenhistoryand sociologywhich has, I believe, been much neglectedbutwhichcarries ar-reaching mplications or sociologicalpractice.Thisdifferenceconcerns he natureof the evidence hatthe twodisciplinesuse or, moreprecisely, he way n which hisevidencecomes ntobeing.7


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Theusesof htstotyn sociologyAs a traineehistorianat UniversityCollege London in the 1950s, 1 213underwent a standardcatechismon method, which began with the

question:what s a historical act?The answer hathad to be givenwas:a historical act is an inferencefrom the relics.This answerstruckmethen - and stillstrikesme - as the best thatcan be given, and as one ofconsiderable ignificance.Whatthe answerunderlines s the obvious,but still highlyconsequential,point that we can only knowthe pastonthe basisof what has physically urvived rom the past:that is, on thebasis of the relics- or of what may be alternativelydescribedas theresidues,depositsor traces of the past.8These relicsare of very different kinds They may,for example,besimply natural remains, such as bones or excrement; or again,artefacts, uch as tools,weapons,buildingsor worksof art.But of mostgeneral importanceare what one might call 'objectified ommuni-cations': hat s, communicationsn some written orm and, especially,'documents' f all kinds. Whatever heir nature, it is these relics,andonly these relics,that are the sourceof our knowledgeaboutthe pastStatementsabout the past- historical facts' are inferences rom therelics,and can have no other basis.In short:no relics,no history.So far as the practiceof history s concerned,there are two pointsabout relics that it seems important o recognise: irst, they areJiniteandssecond, they are incomplete.he relics hat exist are ust a limitedselectionof all that could have survived a sample,so to speak, of atotal universeof relics,where, however,neither the propertiesof theuniversenor of the sampleare, or can be, known.9The relicsof a givenperiod may diminish,by being physicallydestroyed,but they cannotincrease.It is true of coursethat not all the relics hatexist at any one time areknown about. Historianshave alwaysthe possibilityof discovering'new' relics of adding to the known stock: and it is indeed animportantof their metiero do so. It is also true that from any set ofrelics,the inferences hat can be made are infinite.The 'facts' hat therelicsyield will tend to increasewith the questions hat historiansputto them and, in turn, with the range of the problems hey addressandwith the developmentof their techniquesof inquiry.However,noneof this alters he situation hatthe relics hemselves, n a physical ense- what s thereo be discoveredand interrogated are finiteand are, torepeat, a selection,and probablyonly a quite small and unrepresen-tative selection,of all that could have survived.It must therefore bethe case that limitationson the possibilitiesof historicalknowledgeexist simply because it is knowledge of the past- because it isknowledgedependent on relics.There are things about the past thatnever can be known simplybecause the relics that would have beenessential o knowing hem did not in fact survive.Historians, we may then say, are concerned with Jindingtheirevidence from among a stock of relics. In contrast-and this is the


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214John.Goldthorpe

differencewant ostress sociologists aveopentothemapossibilitythat sargelydenied to historians.Whilesociologists an,and often

do,rawn relicsasevidence, njust thesamewayashistorians,hey

can,n additiongeneratevidence.This is of course what they aredoinghentheyengagein 'fieldwork'. heyareproducing,asabasis

fornferences,aterials )zat zdnotexistbefore."'nd it is,I would

argue,uchgeneratedevidence,ratherthanevidence n theformof

relicsinotherwords,evidence hat s'invented' ather hanevidence

thatsdiscovered- thatconstituteshemainempiricaloundationsof

modernociology.Themmediatereason for this difference in the way inwhich

historicalnd sociologicalevidencecomes into being is obvious:

historiansork'in the past',whilesociologistscanalsowork'in thepresent'.owever,behindthis mmediate eason iesthedifferenceof

emphasishatI earlierreferredto:sociologistsdo notseektotietheir

argumentsospecific imeandspacecoordinatesomuchastotestthe

extentf their generality. rhus, if a sociologistdevelopsa theory

intendedoapply,say,toallindustrial ocieties, twillbeonlysensible

atll ventsto beginhe examinationof thistheorythroughresearch

conductedn contemporary atherthan in past industrialocieties;

andencethroughresearchwhichpermits hegenerationof evidence

ratherhanimposinga relianceuponrelics.If, then, there is here, as I would wish to maintain,amajor

differenceetween historyand sociologyas forms of disciplinedinquiry,hatfollowsfromit for the usesof history n sociology?The

mainmplications, I believe,clearenough.Becausesociologistshave

theossibility f producing heirownevidence overandabovethat

ofxploitingrelics they re napositionfadvantagehat houldotbe

disregardedrlightlyhrownway.In other words,sociologistshould

noteadilyandunthinkinglyurntohistory: heyshoulddoso,rather,

onlywithgood reasonsand in full awarenessof the limitationshat

they illthereby ace.HereagainIam,I suspect, nsomedangerof beingmisunderstood.Letme thereforeatonceaddthatI do not in anywayseektosuggest

thatociologysinsomesensea 'superior' iscipline ohistory:ather,

Iamconcerned obringoutjust howdifficulthistory s- since,aswill

lateremerge, I believethat some sociologistshave clearlyfailed to

appreciatehis.Nordo Isupposethatgeneratedevidence, ncontrast

tothatin the formofrelics, s unproblematic. amwellaware hatit

toomustalwaysbecritically iewedasregards tscompletenessswell

as its reliability nd validity,and indeed thatin these latterrespectsspecialproblemsresultpreciselyfrom the processesof generation.However,whatI do wishto emphasiseare the veryrealadvantagesthataregainedwherethe natureand extentof available videnceis

not restrictedby the mere accidentsof physicalsurvival;where,

moreover,hecollectionof evidencecanbe'designed' oastomeetthe


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The usesofhistoryn sociology215specificrequirements f the inquiry n hand;andwherequestionsofthe qualityof evidence can alwaysbe addressed, as they arise, by

generatingyet furtherevidencethroughwhichto checkand testtheoriginal."II

To developthesearguments, nowturnto particular ases.To beginwith, tmaybehelpfulif I giveanexampleof whatI wouldregardas amistaken one mightsay,perverse recourse ohistoryon thepartofasociologist. takehereKaiErikson's ook,Waywarduritarzs,hich sa study of social deviancewithin the seventeenth-centuryPuritancommunityof Massachussets ay.InhisPreface,Erikson tateshisaimsclearly.Hebeginswithcertainhypothesesabout socialdeviancedrawnfrom a Durkheimianpos-ition,andhe aimsto examinetwohypotheses n particular:irst,thatsomeamountof deviance sfunctional oracommunity nhelping t todefine its moral and socialboundaries,and thus in preservingitsstability;and second, that, becauseof this functionality,deviancewithinany communitywill tend to be at a fairlyconstant evelovertime.Erikson henproposes otakeMassachussetsayas acase-study.'Thepurposeof thefollowingstudy',hewrites

is to use the Puritancommunityas a setting in whichto examineseveral ideas about deviantbehaviour.In this sense the subjectmatterof the bookis primarily ociological, ven thoughthe datafoundin mostof itspagesarehistorical . .And,he goeson

The datapresentedhere havenotbeen gathered n orderto thrownew lighton the Puritancommunity n New Englandbut to addsomethingto our understandingof deviantbehaviour n general,and thus the Puritanexperiencein Americahas been treatedinthesepagesasanexampleof human ifeeverywhere.'2Judged in the light of this statement,Waywarduritanss, I wouldargue, a failure- and indeed a necessaryfailure - because of itsrelianceon historicalmaterials.The hypothesesthat Eriksonstartsfrom are not seriouslyexamined,and could not be, simplybecauseEriksondoesnothavetheevidenceneededforthisamongtherelicsathisdisposal.Thus, as regards the first hypothesis,on the functionalityofdeviance, Eriksondraws largely on court records, indicatingtheresponseof theauthoritieso antinomianism,Quakerism ndallegedwitchcraft.But he has littleevidenceof howthecommunityt large,asdistinctfrom the authorities,reactedto such devianceor, for that


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216 John. Goldthorpematter,o its treatmentbythe authorities. n otherwords,he hasnoadequateasison whichtodeterminewhether, nconsequenceof thedevianceerefersto,therewas,orwasnot,astrongerdefinitionof themoralndsocialboundariesof thecommunity.Sofaraspopularper-ceptionsndevaluations reconcerned,he iswithoutmeansof access.Likewise,n treating hesecondhypothesis,on theconstant evelofdeviance,riksonhastorelyonofficial rimestatistics,which, orwell-knowneasons,giveonlyaveryuncertainndication f theactual evelofocialdeviance,and are influenced n their trendby a varietyofotheractors.However,unlikethesociologistof devianceworking ncontemporaryociety,Eriksoncannot investigate n any detail theprocesseshroughwhichthe officialstatisticswere constituted,

norcane collectdataof his own whichcould providealternativeesti-matesas,say,throughsomeformof 'victim urvey'.To besure,thehypotheses hatEriksonaddressesarenotonesthatwoulde easilytestedunderanycircumstances.But, giventhattheyderiveroma theorythatpretendsto a veryhighlevelof generality,theres all the morereasonto askwhyErikson houldimposeuponhimselfhe limitations hat must follow from choosinga historicalcase.Why should he deny himself the possibilityof being able togenerateisownevidence, ohisowndesign,andunderconditions

nwhichroblemsof reliability ndvalidity ouldbestbegrappledwith?Anyociologist, wouldmaintain,whoisconcernedwithatheory hatcanbetested nthepresent houldsotest t,inthefirstplace; oritis,inallprobability,n thiswaythat tcanbetestedmostrigorously.:Iwouldnowliketomoveon toconsidercaseswheretherecourseofsociologistso historywould ppearto havethe good reasonswhich,Iearliermaintained, houldalwaysbe present.Heremyaimis to illus-tratewhatsuchreasonsmightbe,butalso- whentheyareactedupon- thedifficultieshatmaybeexpected.Sociologists,nemightthink,willmostobviouslyneedtoturntohis-torywheretheirinterests ie in socialchange.However, t shouldbekept nmindthatarecourse othepast- or,that s,totherelics hereof- isnottheonlymeansthroughwhichsuchinterestsmaybe pursued:life-course, ohortor panelstudies, orexample,areallwaysof study-ingsocialchangeon thebasisof evidence hat s,orhasbeen,collectedinthepresent.Sociologists, wouldargue,arecompelled ntohistori-calresearchonly wheretheirconcern s withsocialchangethatis infacthistorically efined: hat s,withchange

notoversomeanalyticallyspecified engthof time- suchas, say, 'thelife-cycle'or 'twogener-ations' butwithchangeoveraperiodof pasttimethathasdates(evenif not verypreciseones)and thatis relatedto a particularplace.So-ciologistshavea legitimate,andnecessary, oncernwithsuchhistori-callydefinedsocialchangebecause as I haveearliersuggested,theywishto knowhowwidelyover timeand spacetheirtheoriesand hy-pothesesmightapply. 4


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Theusesof histoty n sociology217One illustration f what I have in mind here is providedby MichaelAnderson's book, Family Structure n Nineteenth CenturyLancashire.

Anderson is concerned with the hypothesis that in the process ofindustrialisation, re-existing orms of 'extended' amilyand kinshiprelationsare disrupted.Specifically, e is interested n whetheror notthis hypothesis holds good in the British case - that of the 'firstindustrial nation'. Thus, to pursue this issue, Anderson aims toexamine ust whatwas happening o kinshiprelations n Britainat thetime when, and in the place where, the 'take-ofF nto industrialismsclassically ocated. In contrast, then, with Erikson,Anderson has aquite clear rationale or turningto historical esearch.A second illustration is provided by Gordon Marshall'sbook,Presbyteriesnd Profits.Marshall s concernedwith the 'Weber hesis'that a connection exists between the secular ethic of ascetic Prot-estantismand 'the spiritof capitalism'. n the long-standingdebateonthis thesis, the case of Scotlandhas severaltimes been suggestedas acriticalone, in that, in the early modern period, Scotlandhad a greatdeal of asceticProtestantism that is, Calvinism yet showed little inthe wayof capitalist evelopment.Marshall's im s then to re-examinethe Scottishcase for the period from around 1560 down to the Act of

Union of 1707. Marshall points out that Weber himself alwaysemphasised hathis argumenton the role of the Protestant thic n theemergenceof moderncapitalismwas ntended to applyonlyto theearlystagesof this process:once a predominantly apitalisteconomy wasestablished, ts own exigencies in the workplace nd market wouldthemselvescompel behaviourgenerallyconsistentwith the 'spiritofcapitalism'withoutneed of help from religion.Again, then, Marshall,like Anderson,hasobviouslygood groundsfor his recourse o history.Now before proceedingfurther, I should make it clear that I havethe highest regard for the two studies to which I havejust referred.Both makesignalcontributions o the questions hey address;and, forme, they stand as leading examplesof how in fact historical ociologyshould be conceivedand conducted.I say this becauseI want now togo on to emphasise he severe imitations o which he analysesof bothauthorsare subject: otbecauseof theirdeficiencies s sociologists, utsimplybecauseof the fact that they were forced into using historicalevidence- forced into a relianceon relics ratherthan being able togeneratetheirown evidencewithina contemporary ociety.

The relics on which Anderson chiefly relies are the originalenumerators' ooksfor the censusesof 1841, 1851 and 1861. On thisbasis,he can reconstructhouseholdcompositionaccording o age, sexand kinship relations,and he can also to some extent examine theresidentialpropinquity f kin. But this still eaveshim a long wayshortof adequateevidenceon the partactuallyplayedby kinship n the livesof the people he is studyingand on the meaningsof kinship or them.He attemptsto fill out the essentiallydemographicdata that he has


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218 John. Goldthorpefromhe enumerators'books by materialfrom contemporaryac-counts.utthesewould,I fear,haveatbesttobecategorisedas'casualempiricism'ndatworstaslocalgossipor travellers'

ales.TitlessuchasWalksn SouthLancashire nd on itsBorders,A V^sito LancashirenDecember862, andLancashire ketches ivetheflavour.Andersons in factentirelyfrankaboutthe problemhe faces.'Itmustf coursebe stressed',he writes,'that ust becauseinteractionwithin occurred it is no necessaryindicationthat kinship wasimportant.he realtest,which squiteimpossiblen anyprecisewayinistoricalork,wouldbe to examinethe extent to whichkinshipwasivenpreferenceoverotherrelational ontacts andthe reasonsforhispreference),andtheextenttowhichcontacts

withkinfulfilledfunctionshich were not adequatelymet if kin did not providethem'.9ThepointI want omakeherewouldperhapsbestbebroughtoutifoneeretocompareAnderson's tudyof kinshipwithonecarriedoutinontemporary ociety- let us say, for example, ClaudFischer'sstudyf kinshipand of other'primary' elations n present-daySanFrancisco,oDwellAmongFriends.fi The onlyconclusion ouldbethattheatter sgreatly uperior ntherangeandqualityof dataonwhich tdraws,ndin turnin therigourandrefinement

of theanalysestcanoffer.ndthispoint s,of course,notthatFischersabettersociologistthanndersonbutthathe hasan enormousadvantageoverAnder-sonnbeingabletogeneratehisowndatarather hanhaving orelyonwhateverelicsmighthappento beextant.Turningto Marshall, ne findsthathe hasproblems ssentiallyhesames thoseof Anderson.One of Marshall'smainconcerns s thatWeber'sosition should be correctlyunderstood- following thevulgarisationsf Robertson,Tawney,Samuelsonand other critics;andn thisrespectMarshallmakes wo

mainpoints.First,Weberwasnoto muchconcernedwithofficialCalvinistdoctrineon economicactivityswiththeconsequencesof beinga believingCalvinistor theindividual'sonduct of everyday life - consequenceswhich theindividual ightnotevenfullyrealise.Inotherwords,Weber'shesiswasultimatelynot about theologybut subsultureand psychology.Secondly,Weber'sargumentwas that the Protestantethic was anecessary, ut not a sufficientcause of the emergenceof moderncapitalism;herewerenecessarymaterial'actorsalso- suchasaccesstophysicalresourcesand to

markets, he availability f capitalandcredit tc.Thus, Marshallargues, in evaluatingthe Weberthesis, it is notenoughtolooksimply orsomeovertassociation etween heology,onthe one hand, and the developmentof capitalistenterpriseon theother.Whatis required s moresubtle.It is evidencethatbelievingCalvinists, n accountof theiracceptanceof a Calvinistworld-view,weredistinctively rientedto workin a regular,disciplinedway,to


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Theusesof history n sociology219pursue economic gain rationally,and to accumulaterather than toconsume extravagantly- so that, if other conditions were also met,

capitalist nterprisewould then flourish.Marshall's ositionhere is, I believe,entirelysound. But it leads himto problems of evidence that he can in fact never satisfactorilyovercome despite his diligence n searchingout new sourcesand hisingenuity is using known ones. And the basic difficulty s that relicsfrom which inferences can systematicallybe made about theorientations o workand to moneyof earlymodernScotsare very fewand far between.In other words,what is crucially acking-just as it was lackingforAndersonand indeed for Erikson-is material rom which nferencesmightbe made, with some assuranceof representativeness, bout thepatternsfsoczal ction hatare of interestwithinparticular ollectivities.As Clubb has observed, the data from which historianswork onlyrarelyallowaccess o the subjective rientations f actorsenmasse, ndinferencesmade in this respectfrom actualbehaviour end always obe question-begging.7And Marshall,t shouldbe said, ike Anderson,sees the difficulty learlyenough. He acknowledges hat t maywellbethat 'the kindof datarequired n order to establish he ethos in whichseventeenth-centuryScottish business enterprises were run simplydoes not exist'- or, at least, not in sufficientquantity o allowone totest empiricallywhether Calvinismdid indeed have the effect onmundaneconductthat Weberascribed o it.lSIIILet me at this point recapitulate.I have argued that history andsociology differ perhaps most consequentially n the nature of theevidence on which they rely, and that this difference has majorimplications or the use of history n sociology. have presenteda caseof what, from this standpoint,must be seen as a perverserecoursetohistory on the part of a sociologist;and I have now discussed twofurthercaseswhere, n contrast, ucha recoursewasjustifiable,ndeednecessary, iven the issuesaddressed,but where,none the less,seriousdifficultiesarise becauseof the inadequacyof the relicsas a basis fortreating hese issues.

To end with,however,I would ike to move on from these instancesof sociologistsresorting to history in the pursuit of quite specificproblems o consider-with my initialargument till n mind- a wholegenreof sociology which is in fact dependent pon historyn its veryconception.refer here to a kindof historical ociology learlydifferentto that representedby the workof Andersonor Marshall, nd whichhas two main distinguishing features. First, it resorts to historybecause it addresses very large themes, which typically nvolve the


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220 John. Goldthorpetracingut of long-term developmental' rocessesor patternsor themakingf comparisonsacrossa wide rangeof historical ocietiesorevenivilisations.And secondly, t is basedlargelyor entirelynot oninferencesrom relicsbut ratheron 'history' n the sense of whathistoriansavewritten or, in other words,not on primarybut onsecondary,ryetmorederivative, ources.The idea that sociologistsmight proceedby takingthe resultsofhistoricalesearchas their main empiricalresourcein developingwide-rangingeneralisationsndtheories s notof coursea newone.Itwas in fact a nineteenth-century ommonplace.Its plainestex-pression as perhapsprovidedby HerbertSpencerwhen he wrotethat,or him, sociologystood to worksof history'muchas a vastbuildingtandsrelatedto the heapsof stonesand bricksaroundit',andurther hat thehighestofficewhich hehistorian andischargesthatf so narrating he livesof nations,as to furnishmaterials or aComparativeociology.'lsFromtheend of the nineteenthcentury,thisunderstanding f therelationshipetweenhistoryand sociologymet withseverecriticismand atherrapidly ost support.Historianshad indeed nevertakenkindlyo the idea thattheyshouldserveas some kindof intellectualunder-labourers;nd sociologistsbecameincreasinglynterested ndevelopingheirownmethodsof datacollection.2" owever, n morerecentimes,anotablerevivalof whatmightbecalled grandhistoricalsociology' as occurred.This wasled by the appearance n 1966ofBarringtonMoore'sTheSocialOrgans fDictatorshipndDemocracy,ndthenconsolidated n the USAby the subsequentworkof ImmanuelWallersteinnd Theda Skospol,and in thiscountrybythatof PerryAnderson,withotherauthorssuchasJohn Halland MichaelMannfollowingn the wake.2lWhatI wouldnowwishto argueis thatthepracticeof these authorsdoes in fact raiseagainall the difficultiesinherentin Spencer'sprogramme,and that the use of historyinsociologyas exemplifiedin theirworkis problematicn a far morefundamentalwaythaninanyof thestudiesearlierconsidered.The authors nquestionwouldcertainlynotwishto represent heirpositionin terms similarto those of Spencer.They would ratherinclineto the ideathathistoryand sociologyareone and indivisible;and,insteadof viewinghistorians ehaut nbas, heywouldsurelywishto includethemin thejoint enterpriseas equalpartners.22 one theless,the factremainsthatgrandhistorical ociology n its

twentieth-century form,just as in its nineteenth, takes secondaryhistoricalsourcesas its evidentialbasis, and must therefore encounter themethodologicaldifficultiesthat are entailed- even though its ex-ponents have thus far shown little readinessto address,or evenacknowledge,hem.The root of their predicament s richlyironical.The revivalofgrand historicalsociology can be seen as one expression of the


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The usesof historynsociology 221'reactionagainst positivism'within the sociologicalcommunitytowhich I referred at the start;and yet its practitioners' wn mod2lsoperandi- the use they seek to make of secondarysources - mustdepend upon whatis an essentiallypositivistic onception of histort-ography- to which they would, I suspect,be reluctantto give anyexplicitsupport.The catechism hat I was putthrough as an undergraduatehadaclearobjective. twas to prompta rejectionof the viewthat the past-or at least certainwell-documented spectsof the past,such as 'high'politics- could in principlebe reconstructed, act by fact, so thatthedistinctionbetweenhistory n the sense of whatactuallyhappened nthe pastand historyn the senseof what swrittenabout he pastmightbe elided. Againstthis 'positivist'onceptionof historiography as itwas ndeed labelled23 it wasurged upon us thathistorical actscouldnot be cognitivelyestablishedas a collectionof well-defined temsorentities,each independent of the rest, which, when takentogether,wouldthen dictateaspecificanddefinitiveversionof thepast.Rather,historical actsshouldberecognisedas no more than'inferences romthe relics';and inferenceswhich had always to be weighted, so tospeak,according o the securityof theirgrounding,whichwereofteninterdependent that is, stoodor fell together- and which wereofcourse atall timesopen to restatement,whetherradically r throughthe mostsubtlechangesof nuance.Now, to repeat, I very muchdoubt if grandhistorical ociologistswould wish to take up the defence of positivisthistoriographyasagainst his latterview.But it isdifficult o seehow, inpractice,heycanavoid assumingan essentiallypositivistposition. For even if theproceduresthey follow in producingtheir sociologydo not actuallyrequire he elisionof the twosensesof history, hey stillcannotaffordto recognisea too indeterminate elationbetweenthem.Grand historicalsociologistshave to treat the facts, or indeedconcatenations f factsor entire accounts',hat they findinsecondarysourcesas if thew ere elativelydiscreteand stableentitiesthat canbe'excerpted' and then brought together in order that some largerdesign may be realised. In anti-positivistvein, Carl Becker hasexpressly warned that historicalfacts should not be thought of aspossessing solidity',definiteshape' or 'clearpersistentoutline',andthat it is thereforeespeciallynapt to likenthem to buildingmaterialsof anykind.24 utthe veryproceduresof grandhistorical ociologistspushthem back,willy-nilly, o Spencer'sdea of usingthe stonesandbricksof history to constructthe great sociologicaledifice - andconstructionalmetaphorsdo indeed reappear. Thus, for example,one finds Skospol remarkingthat 'primaryresearch' which thecomparativisthasneitherthetime nor (allof) theappropriate kills odo' - 'necessarilyonstitutes, n largeamounts,the foundationuponwhichcomparativetudiesarebuilt'.25


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222 John H. GoldthorpeHowever,I would then wish to respond that the constructions hatresult are likely to be dangerouslyunsound. In particular, would

argue that in grand historical ociology he links,that are claimed,orsupposed, between evidence and argument tend to be both tenuo2lsand arbitraryo a quite unacceptable egree.As regards the first charge, it is, I would suggest, instructive oconsidersome fairlyspecificargumentadvancedby a grand historicalsociologist,and to note the 'authorities'hat are invokedas providingits factual basis; then, to work back from these citations throughperhaps other intermediatesources that are involved - until onecomes to directreferences o relicsof some kind. What,I believe,onewill typically ind is that the trail is longer and harder to follow thanone might have expected, and that, not infrequently, t reaches noverysatisfactory nd.For example, in SocialOrigzns f Dictatorshipnd Democracy, oorespends several pages reviewingaspectsof Englisheconomic historyover the late medievaland earlymodernperiods,and then concludesas follows:

In the light of this generalbackground here wouldseem to be littlereason to question the thesis that commerciallyminded elementsamong the landed upper classes,and to a lesser extent among theyeomen, were among the main forcesopposingthe Kingand royalattempts to preserve the old order, and therefore an importantcause,though not the only one, that produced he CivilWar.26However, f one actually xaminesthe sourcesthat Moorecites, bothbefore and after this passage, he groundingof his argument s veryfar from apparent. ndeed, it is quiteunclearjustwhat s the evidence,at the levelof relics, n the lightof which herewouldbe 'littlereason oquestion' he thesisthat Mooreadvances. n the 'authorities' eferredto-the main ones are Tawney'sAgrarianProblems f the SixteenthCentury, is essay on 'The Rise of the Gentry'and Campbell'sTheEnglishYeoman there is in fact remarkablyittle evidence'bearing nanydirectwayon the crucial inkthatMoore eeksto establishbetweeneconomicpositionand political ction.2'And suchas there s cannotberegardedas evidence in the sense that relicsthemselvesare evidenceor, for that matter,the data of a social survey are evidence. Rather,whatone has are seriesof inferences,often complexand indeed oftenquite speculative,which are drawn from relics that are manifestlyincomplete,almost certainlyunrepresentative, nd in variousotherwaysproblematic as the authors n questionare very well aware.Inother words,such 'facts'as are here available annotbe understoodasseparate, well-defined modules',easily carried off for sociologicalconstruction urposes,but wouldbe betterregarded implyas strandsin heavily angled,yet stilloften ratherweakskeinsof interpretation.In effect, then, what grand historical ociologists eem to me to be


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Theusesof historyn sociology 223generally doing is not developing an argument on the basis ofevidence - in the manner of 'primary' historians or again ofsociologists working on their 'own' research data - but rather,engaging n interpretation hat s of, at least,a second-orderkind: hatis, in interpretationof interpretationsof, perhaps, interpretations.And in consequence,I would maintain, he connectionbetween theclaims hey makeaboutthe pastand relics hatcould conceivably erveas warrant or these claims s often - as in the passage rom Moore hatI havequoted-quite impossibly oose. Following he practices hatarehere illustrated,history must indeed become, in Froude'swords, 'achild'sbox of letterswithwhichwe can spell an word we please'.28

As regards my second charge, that of arbitrariness, he idea ofhistoriography s a matterof inferences rom relics hatare finiteandincomplete is again directly relevant. It follows from this thathistoriansworkingon the same topic, and indeed on the same relics,may quite reasonablycome to quite different conclusions- as ofcoursethey mayfor other reasons oo. But it further ollows hattheremaybe littleor no possibility f theirdifferencesever being resolvedbecause he relics hat would be necessary o settle the disputed ssuessimplydo not exist. For grand historical ociologists, his then raisesamajorproblem:where historiansdisagree,and may have perhapstoremain n disagreement,which econdary ccount houldbe accepted?By whatcriteria hould the grand historical ociologistopt for one oftwo, or more, conflicting nterpretations?Thus, to return to Moore and his treatmentof the economic andsocial origins of the EnglishCivil War, the question one may ask is:why, on this notoriouslycontroversialmatter,and one plagued by alack of relevantevidence, does Moore choose largely to follow whathas come to be thought of (not altogether fairly) as the 'Tawney'interpretationrather than any of its rivals?By the time Moore waswriting, it should be said, the idea that the 'rising', commerciallyorientedgentrywere keyactors n the parliamentary pposition o theKing and his defeat in the Civil War was in fact fast losing groundamong English historians, both to interpretationsthat gave theleading role to other socio-economicgroupings and, more import-antly, to ones that questionedwhetherpoliticalallegiance n the CivilWarperiodhad anyclose association t all witheconomicpositionandinterest.29

The answer o the questionI have posed is, I believe,as obviousas itis unsatisfactory.Moore favoursthe interpretation hat fits best withhis overall thesis of the 'three routes to modernity'; n other words,that which allows he EnglishCivilWarto be seen as an instanceof asuccessful bourgeois evolution'.However,he stillfailsto presentanyserious case for this choice. Supportive sources simply receiveaccolades, uch as 'excellentanalysis' r 'unsurpassed ccount',whileless congenialones are disparagedas 'conservative istoriography'.3"


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JohnH. Goldthorpe24This clearly will not do. But if mere tendentiousness s not thesolution,what s?In the end, of course,any rationalwayof evaluating

a secondarysource must involve some judgment on the inferencesmade from the primary ources that s, from the relics.But once thisis recognised, the methodologicalbind in which grand historicalsociologists ind themselvesbecomesonly more apparent.Their largedesignsmean, they tell us, that they cannotthemselvesbe expected toworkdirectly rom the relicsbut must rely on the studiesof specialistauthorities. However, they are then either forced into positivisticassumptionsconcerning the 'hardness'and 'solidity' and also the'transportability' of the evidence that these workscan yield; or, ifthey accept that what these sources provide is no more than rivalcomplexes of inference and interpretation, hen they must explainhow they propose to choose among them without nowledgef theprimary ources.lSince I have been so criticalof the methodologicalbasis of grandhistorical sociology, I should, before finishing, consider what itsexponentshave themselveshad to sayon the matter.In fact,as I havealready implied, they have said remarkably ittle. Methodologicalissues end to raised, f at all, in the earlypagesof theirbooks,but thenonly to be dealt with in a quite perfunctory and unconvincing-manner.' However, there is one statement by Skospol, from theconcludingchapterof the collectionshe edited, Vision ncSMethodnHistorical ociology, hich s of interest n severalrespects.Skospolwritesas follows

Becausewide-ranging omparisons re so often crucial or analytichistorical ociologists, hey are more likely o use secondary ourcesof evidence than those who apply models to, or develop interpre-tations of, single cases.... From the point of view of historicalsociology, . . a dogmatic nsistenceon redoing primaryresearchfor every investigationwould be disastrous; t would rule out mostcomparative-historicalesearch. If a topic is too big for purelyprimary esearch and f excellentstudiesby specialists re alreadyavailable n some profusion secondary ourcesare appropriate sthe basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them is notdifferent from survey analystsreworking he results of previoussurveysrather han askingall questionsanew . . . I would note, firstof all, aboutthis passagehow clearly t showsthepressurethat bears on grand historical ociologists o move towardsthe positivistic, pencerianprogramme-'excellent' historical tudiesby specialists an be 'thebasicsourceof evidence' or the wide-rangingsociologist.And also revealing s the reference o 'redoing he primaryresearch' as if it were apparent hat the same resultas before wouldnecessarily merge.Secondly,I would point out that Skospol is quite mistaken n the


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The usesof historyn sociology 225analogyshe seeksto drawwithsurvey-based esearch.The 'secondaryanalysis' f surveydatato whichshe refers s different from the grandhistoricalsociologist'suse of secondarysources, preciselybecause itdoesentail going back to the 'relics': hat is, at least to the originaldata-tapes nd perhapsalso to the originalquestionnaires r interviewschedules. And it is then these materialsthat serve the secondaryanalystas evidence - not the interpretations f the original analyst,which may be, and indeed often are, disputed.Thus, a closerparallelwould be between the secondaryanalystof surveysand the historianwho againworks hroughand reinterprets body of sourcematerialsdiscoveredand initiallyanalysedby a predecessor.

Thirdly,I wouldremark hatby wayof providinga rationale or themethodologyof grand historical ociology,Skospol has little at all tooffer. Apart from her - mistaken tu quoque rgument directed atsurveyresearchers, ll she in factsays s that t wouldbe 'disastrous'orgrand historical ociologists f they were to be forced backto primarysources which s scarcelya wayof convincing ceptics.What is actually of greatest interest is what Skospol goes on toacknowledge n the paragraph hat immediately ollows he one fromwhich I quoted: namely, that 'it remains true that comparativehistoricalsociologistshave not so far worked out clear, consensualrules and procedures for the valid use of secondary sources asevidence' and further that in this respect 'varyinghistoriographicalinterpretations' s one obvious problem to be addressed. 'Certainprinciples',Skospol believes, 'are likely to emerge as such rules aredeveloped'. But, one must conclude, so far at least, grand historicalsociology is not significantly ule-governed; ts practitioners njoy adelightfulfreedom to play pick-and-mix'n history's weetshop.34IV

To sum up, then, I have argued that the view that history andsociology areand alwayshave been the same thing' s mistakenand-dangerously - misleading. Sociology must, it is true, always be ahistoricaldiscipline; ociologists an never 'escape' rom history.It istherefore highly desirable hat they should be historically ware bywhich I mean, aware of the historical ettings and limits that theiranalyseswill necessarilypossess,even if they may never be preciselydetermined. But history and sociology can, and should, still beregarded as significantlydifferent intellectualenterprises.A crucialsourceof the difference,I havesoughtto show, ies in the natureof theevidence that the two disciplinesuse - in the fact that historianshavefor the mostpartto relyon evidence hattheycan discover n the relicsof the past, while sociologistshave the considerableprivilegeof beingable to generateevidence n the present.


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226 John. GoldthorpeAsregards, hen,theuseof historyn sociology,whatI havesoughttotress s thatsociologists houldnot underestimate, r readilygiveup,he advantages hat they can gain from havingevidehcethat is'tailor ade', whereas historianshave usually to 'cut their coatsaccordingo their cloth'. Where sociologistsare compelled intohistoricalesearch,by the verylogic of their inquiries,then, I havesuggested,heymustbeready oraharder ife- forresearch ypicallyconducted,sone historianhasput it, 'below he datapoverty ine'.35Theymust not only learn new techniquesbut also to accept newfrustrations;nparticular,hosethatcomefromrealising hat ssuesofcrucialnterestare,andwillprobably emain,beyondtheircognitivereach.Historicalsociologistssuch as Andersonand Marshallhavelearnt ell;and muchof whattheycan in turnteachus stemsfromtheirensitivityojustwhatmannerof inferences herelicsavailableothem, nd cannot,sustain.In contrast,grand historical ociologistsseem o me to have, so far at least, shied away from the majorintellectualhallenges hathistoriography oses,and to havetradedimplicitlyn a conceptionof it thatI doubtif theywouldwishopenlytodefend. Until,then,theydo meetthechallengesbeforethem,andprovide coherentmethodologyfor theirwork,the questionmustremainf howfarthisdoespossessarealbasis ntherelicsof thepast-ormerelyanillusoryone ina scattering f footnotes.(I)ateaccepted:ebruary1990) JohnH.GoldthorpeNuffieldCollegeOxfordNOIES

* This paperis basedon the text oftheT. H. MarshallMemorialLecture,givenat the University f Southampton,May , 1989.Versionsof the paperwerealsogivenatseminars t the UniversitiesofOxford,ExeterandStockholm, nd Ibenefited greatly from comments byparticipantsFurther hanksare due toKlasAmark,RobertErikson,StephenMennell,PatrickO'Brienand,especially,GordonMarshallndLuciaZedner.1. P. Abrams, Histoncal SociologR,Bath, Open Books, 1980, p. x; A.Giddens,CentralProblemsn SocialTheory,London,Macmillan,979,p. 230.2. The distinctionoriginates n theMethodenstreitn nineteenth-century er-manuniversities.Fora briefdiscussion,seeR.G.(ollingwood,TheIdeaofHistoty,

Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1946,pp. 165-83.Aninterestingxampleof itsuse in the periodreferred o in the text,withthe aimof differentiating etat thesametimeshowing he complementarityof historyand sociology, s R. Bierstedt,'Toynbee ndSociology', ntishJournalfSociolofy, ol. 10, no. 2 (June 1959),pp.99104.3. J. H. (,oldthorpe, TheRelevanceof History to Sociology', CambndgeOpinion,o.28, 1962,pp.26-9.4. (learly, mypositionhas nimport-antrespects hanged ince hetimeof myearlierpaper- asa result,I would iketothink, of my having had much moreexperience, whether first- or second-hand,of researchntosocietiesbothpastand present.However,bothhistoryandsociology, ndthe typicalorientations f


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Theusesof htstorynsociology 227their practitioners,have also changed.Today, interdisciplinary, r rather a-disciplinary, nthusiasmwould seem tome to havegone much oofar,at leastonthe sociologicalside. And I find it ofinterest hata similarview hasalsobeentaken from the side of history by adistinguishedpractitionerwho is by nomeansunsympatheticosociology: eeL.Stone, History nd theSocialSciencesnthe TwentiethCentury' nd 'TheRevivalof Narrative:Reflections n a New OldHistory'n ThePast and Pre.sentRevisited,London,Routledge,1987.5. Quoted n Stone, Historyand theSocial Sciencesin the Twentieth(en-tury',p. 31.6. This use of history s thatwhichIhavein fact been mostconcerned n myownworkoncomparativeocialmobility.Theclassicprogrammeor acomparativemacro-sociologys that set by A. Prze-worski and H. Teune, The Logic ofComparativeSocial Inquity, New York,Wiley, 1970, which has as its idealobjectivethereplacement f the namesof nationswith henamesofvariables'.nso far as, in explainingcross-national

. . . . .varlatlonIn soclal structureor process(e.g. in mobility atesand patterns), hesociologist s forced into invoking nsti-tutionalor culturalfeatures,or indeedevents, as specificfeaturesof nationalhistories, hen pro tanto the Przeworski-Teune programmemust fall short ofrealisation.(f. R. Eriksonand J. H.Goldthorpe, 'Commonalityand Vari-ation in Social Fluidity in IndustrialNations.PartI: A Modelfor Evaluatingthe "FJH Hypothesis";Part II: TheModel of Core SocialFluidityApplied',EuropeanSociologicalReview,vol. 3, nos. 1and2, MayandSeptember, 987,pp.5F77, 145-66.7. Forpertinentbutbriefcommentsby previousauthors, ee T. H. Marshall,'Sociology the RoadAhead' n Sociologyat the Cro.s.sroads,ondon, Heinemann,1963, p. 38 esp.; and C. Bell and H.Newby, 'Narcissismor ReflexivityinModern Sociology', Polish SociologicalBulletin,no. 1 1981,pp. 5-19.8. I was myself put through thecatechismby G. J. Renier,a remarkableteacher,whose book Histoty: its Purpose

and Method,London,Allenand Unwin,1950, was our main text and is nowunduly neglected.Also influentialwasCollingwood,The Idea of Histowy,es-peciallyheEpilegomena.9. Cf. M. J. Murphey,OurKnowledgeof theHistoncalPast, Indianapolis,BobbsMerrill,1973;J. M. Clubb, The "New"QuantitativeHistory:SocialScienceorOldWine n NewBottles?'nJ. M.Clubband K. Scheuch,eds., Histoncal SocialRe.search,Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta,1980,pp. 13-24.

10. The one instanceof which I amaware n whichhistoriansikewise ener-ate theirevidence swhentheyengage n'oral'history.Heretoo, though, tmaybenotedthat problemsof survival,and inturnof representativeness,re of largeimportance.11. Anotherwayof puttingmuchofthisis to say,as doesClubb 'The "New"QuantitativeHistory',p. 20) that 'Thesourcematerialsupon whichhistoriansmust rely are virtuallyby definition"processproduced"'and that they are,moreover, 'the residual process-produceddata that have survivedtheravagesof time'.Clubbnotes that his-toriansoccasionallyaveat theirdisposaldatathat werecollected or socialscien-tificpurposes, ndthat his slikely o be amore commonsituation or future his-torians.However,he then rightlycom-ments that'. . . we canalso imaginethathistoriansn the futurewillregard hesedata as no less process-producedn thiscaseby the processof socialresearchasarchaicallyracticedn the mid-twentiethcentury and willbemoanthe fact thatthe wrongdatawerecollected,hewrongquestions asked, and that underlyingassumptionsndmethodswerenotbetterdocumented.'12. K.Erikson,Wayward uritans,NewYork,Wiley,1966,pp. vii-iii,emphasisn

. . .Orlgmal.13. Skospol reatsErikson'sntentionsas being 'characteristicf historical o-ciologistswho apply general modelstohistory'.See 'EmergingAgendas andRecurrentStrategiesin HistoricalSo-ciology' n T. Skospol,(ed.), Vi.sion ndMethodn HistoncalSociology,Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1984,


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228 John. Goldthorpep.64.Therecanof coursebelittlevaluein uch a procedureunless there areindependentrounds orbelievinghat hemodelsavesomevalidity.Butis shouldinany event be noted that Eriksonhimselfs clear that his concernis (seetext)to examine several ideas aboutdeviantehaviour' for whichhe doesnotppear oclaimanypriorvalidity.14. It mayalsobe argued hatsociolo-gistsavea legitimate ecourse o historywhereheirconcern s withphenomenasuchas revolutions,major economiccrises,masspanicsor crazesetc., whichnot nlyhappenrather nfrequently utarein any event more amenable to. . . .Investlgatlon retrospect 1anas t1eyoccur. am not fullyconvincedby thisargumentut,forpresentpurposes,t isnotnecessaryo contest t. Nordo I takeupherea concernwithhistorydisplayedbysome sociologists hat I would mostcertainlyegardas illegitimate:hatis, aconcernwith theorising'istory oas, tishoped, o securea cognitivegraspon its'movement'or 'logic'. I have writtencriticallylsewhereon the persistence fsuch historicism: ee e.g. J. H. (Jold-thorpe, Theoriesof IndustrialSociety',Archive.suropeenne.se Sociologte, ol. 12,no. 2, 1971, pp.26>88, and 'Intellec-tualsand the WorkingClass n ModernBritain', Fuller Memorial BequestLecture,Universityf Essex,1979.15. M. Anderson,FamilyStructure nNineteenthCentutyLancashire,Cambridge,(,ambridgeUniversity ress,1971,p.62.16. C.Fischer,ToDwellAmongFnends,Chicago,ChicagoUniversity ress,1982.17. 'The"New"QuantitativeHistory',p.20.18. (J. Marshall, resbyterie.sndProgits,Oxford,Oxford UniversityPress,1980,p.35.19. H.Spencer,AnAutobiography,on-don,Williams ndNorgate,1904,vol.2,p.185 and E.s.say.sn Education,London,Dent,1861,newed. l911, p. 29.20. Anearlybutcogent,and,Isuspect,highly nfluential, ttackon Spencerbyapre-eminenthistorianwas F. M. Mait-land,'The BodyPolitic',Collected apers,(ed. H. A. L. Fisher),Cambridge,Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,1911. Note alsoCollingwood'sritique f thelastphaseof

'scissors-and-paste'istoriography,hatofhe 'pigeon-holers',whose approachwas:Verywell: etusputtogetherallthefactshatare knownto historians,ookfor atterns n them,and thenextrapo-late hese patterns into a theory ofuniversalistory.'The Idea of Histoty,pp.63-6. On the sociological ide, thelate ineteenthand earlytwentieth en-turiesaw of course the beginnings nBritainf samplesurveymethodsandagrowingnterest n othermeansof datacollection.f.S.andB.Webb,Methods fSocial tudy,London,LondonSchoolofEconomics,1932.21. B. Moores The Social Origins ofDictator.shipnd Democracy,Harmonds-worth, enguin,1966; . Wallerstein,heModernWorldSy.stem, vols.,New York,AcademicPress, 1974, 1980, 1989; T.SkospolsState.sand Social Revolutions,Cambridge,ambridgeUniversityPress,1979;P.Anderson,Pas.sage.sromAntiquitytoFeudali.sm,LondonsNew Left Books,1974and Lineage.s f the Ab.soluti.sttate,London,New LeftBooks,1974;J. Hall,Power.sand Libertie.s,Harmondsworth,Penguin,1985;M.Mann,TheSource.s fSocial Power, (,ambridge, CambridgeUniversityPress, 1986. It might beargued that this 'new wave' of grandhistoricalociologywas nfact edbyS.N.Eisenstadt'study,ThePoliticalSy.stem.sfEmpire.s, ewYork,FreePress,1963.ButEisenstadt'snfluencewould eem ohavebeen clearlyless than that of Moore-chiefly, I suspect, because his highlyacademic structuralfunctionalismac-cordedfar less well with the prevailingmood of the later 1960s than did themarxi.sant one and explicitly 'radical'commitmentf Moore'swork.22. Thus, for example,in the collec-tion of essaysedited by Skospol,VisionandMethodn Historical ociologyonsider-ationis givento the workof historianssuchasMarcBloch,(harles TillyandE.P. Thompsonalongside hatof authorssuch as Eisenstadt,Moore,Wallersteinand Anderson.Admirersof Bloch, inparticular,mightwellbe led to ask 'Quediableallait-ilfairedanscette alere2'23. See, for example, Collingwood,TheIdeaof Histoty,pp. 126-33. Then, asapparentlyater(cf. E. H. (,arr,Whati.s


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Theusesof historyn sociology 229withdiversities f economic nterestandsocialclass'.Moore hen tries(pp.51 1-2)to rework Brunton and Pennington'sstatisticsto save what he takes to beTawney'sthesis against Tawney'sownabandonmentf it- butsucceedsonly inprovidinga niceexampleof the ecologi-calfallacy.It might be added here that thetreatmentof the English CivilWar byboth Wallersteinand Anderson is nomore satisfactory. Wallerstein, whoclaims that 'contrapuntal ontroversialwork' is a positive advantagefor hisenterprise TheModernWorld ystem,ol.1, p. 8) reviews widerrangeof literaturethan Moorebut by an eirenical ourdeforcestillends up wherehe wantsto be:i.e. able to claimthat the English CivilWar, though not a direct strugglebe-tweenclasses,nonethe lessresulted romtheformation f an agriculturalapitalistclasswhich he oldaristocracy asforcedto accommodate nd in part to mergewith,thusleading o theearlycreation nEnglandof a 'nationalbourgeoisie'seeesp. pp. 256, 269, 282, 297). It must,however, be pointed out that of the'authorities'whom Wallerstein ites, atleastas manywouldreject hisconclusionaswouldaccept t.Anderson, n contrast, efersto onlyavery limited numberof secondary(ortertiary)sources and then, effectivelydisregarding ll controversy, landlyas-serts (Lineage.s f the Ab.solutisttate,p. 142): EnglishAbsolutismwasbroughtto a crisisby aristocraticarticularismndclannic desperationon its periphery;forces hat ayhistoricallyehind t. But twas felled at the centre by a commer-cializedgentry,a capitalist ity, a com-monerartisanate nd yeomanry: orcespushingbeyond t. Beforeit couldreachthe age of maturity,EnglishAbsolutismwas cut off by a bourgeoisrevolution.'Oncemore, t mustbe emphasisedhat tis essentiallythe interpretationof theEnglishCivilWaras a 'bourgeois evol-ution'that has been challengedby 're-visionist'historiansover the last twodecadesormore.My own judgmentwouldbe that therevisionistshave indeed succeeded inundermining he supposedevidencefor

Histowy?,LondonMacmillan,1961,ch.1),theclassic xpositors f suchpositivismnhistoriographywere taken to be vonRanke nd, in'Britain,LordActon.24. C. Becker, 'What are HistoricalFacts?'n H. Meyerhoff, ed.),ThePhilos-ophyof Histowyn our Time, New York,Doubleday,1955,pp. 12z}37.25. T. Skospol,Staks arutSocialRevol-utions,p. xiv.26. B. Moore,Social Onginsof Dictator-shipand Democracy,. 14.27. R. H. Tawney,TheAgrarianProb-lem in the Sixteenth Centuty, London,Longmans,1912, and 'The Rise of theGentry,1558-1640',EconomicHistotyRe-view,vol.11, no. , 1941,reprintedwitha'Postscript'n E. M. Carus-Wilson,.s.saysin Econamic Hi.stowy,London, Arnold,1954;M. Campbell,TheEnglish Yeoman,NewHaven,YaleUniversityPress,1942.Itmustbe emphasisedhatnoneof thesethreestudies s in factconcernedwith heCivil War in any direct way, and thatreferencesto it occur only ratherinci-dentally.28. J. A. Froude,ShortStudieson CreatSubjects,London,Longmans,1884, ol. l,p.21.29. Anessay mportantor itscatalyticeffect wasJ. H. Hexter, Stormover the(^entry',which initiallyappeared n En-counter,no. 10 (1958) and then in anenlargedversion n Hexter'sReapprai.satsin Histoty,London,Longmans,1961.Fora more recentcritiqueof 'socialchangeexplanations' f the English ivil War-but certainly not one that could bedismissed as sociologically unsophis-ticated seeJ. C. D. Clark,Revolution ndRebellion,Cambridge, ambridge Uni-versityPress,1986,ch.3 esp.30. See, for example,SocialOriginsofDictator.shiprutDemocracy, p.6, 14 andtheAppendix.In the Appendix, A Noteon Statisticsand ConservativeHistori-ography',Moore akesup the difficultiesposedfor his interpretation f the CivilWar by D. Brunton and D. H. Penn-ington'sMember.sf the Long Parliament,London,Allen and Unwin,1954,which,as Moore notes, led Tawneyhimselftoacknowledge hat the divisionbetweenRoyalistsnd Parliamentariansithin heLong Parliamenthad little connection


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230 John. Goldthorpesuchn interpretation.But, further, Iwouldoubt hateven f therewereavalid'socialhangeexplanation'f theEnglish(ivilar,adequate elicscouldbefoundtollowts validity o be demonstrated.Whatexterremarked 'Storm vertheGentry',. 149)apropos he initialTaw-neyer.svsTrevor-Roper ebateis likelytoemain he lastword: Andwhatsuchmastersf the materials f seventeenth-centuryistory ndof historicalorensicscannotrovewhen heysettheirminds oit,snotlikely vertobeproved.'31. Wherehistorianshemselvesdrawonecondary ources,as forexample, nsituatingheirown'primary'esearchorinritingsurveys' f a field, ssuesof theavailability,ualityetc. of sourcesaretypicallyiscussed. Moreovers n thelatterase at least,and likewise n thewritingf textbooks,authorsare notunder ressureto defend a particularinterpretationutcanpresentareview fdifferentositions. ^randhistorical o-ciologists,n contrast, usually cannotafforducheven-handedness;heyneedtouse - that is, to choose am(>ngsecondaryources as evidence for oragainst particularhesis.Furthermore,the entral hesesthatarearguedforbyauthorsuchas MooresWallersteinndAndersonreoneswhich hey hemselvesclearlysee as being politicallyhighlyconsequential,o thatquestionsof howfar their use of secondarysources ispoliticallynfluenced, ndof whatchecksonpolitical ias heywouldbelieveappro-

. . .. .prlate, Inevlta Iy arlse.32. See, e.g., Moore,Social OriginsofDictator.shipndDemocracy,p.x-xi; Skoc-pol, State.s nd SocialRevolutions,pp.xiv-xv; Anderson,Pas.sage.srom Antiquity oFeuzlali.sm,. 8;Mann,TheSource.sfSocialPower,pp.vii-viii,3-4, 31-2.33. T. Skospol, ed.),'EmegingAgen-dasandRecurrent trategiesnHistorical

Sociology99.382.34. UnlikeSkospol, heotherauthorsearlier cited do not even appear to

recognisehe need for a methodology.Theirainustificationorgrandhistori-calociologywould eem obesimply hatit ivesthe broadview'and is thus anecessaryomplemento'specialists"is-tory.husMoorewrites SocialOngztsofDictator.shipnd Democracw, . xi): 'Thatcomparativenalysiss no substitute ordetailednvestigation f specificcasesisobvious.'uthegoeson:'Generali7ationsthatresoundresemble large-scalesic)mapf an extendedterrain,suchas anairplaneilot might use in crossingacontinent.uch maps are essentialforcertainurposes ust as more detailedmapsre necessaryor others.'Moore'scartographynspiresnomoreconfidencethanishistoriography.ssuminghat nthebovehemeanssmall-scale'ot'largescale', small-scalemap, useful for an'extendederrain', s dependentfor itsaccuracyn the detailedsurveyingromwhicht is built up. And likewise,as a'cliometric'nda 'conventionalsistorianhave ritten ogether, thequalityof anhistoricalnterpretations criticallyde-pendentn the qualityof thedetailsoutofwhichit is spun.Time and againthe.

. , .. . .nterpretatlont maJor1lstorlcalvents,sometimesof whole areas, has beentransformedy thecorrection f appar-ently rivialdetails...' See R. W. FogelandG. R. Elton,WhichRoadto thePast2,NewHaven,YaleUniversityPress,1983,p.125.

Itshouldalsobesaidthatthemethod-

ologyof grand historical ociologyhasattractedlittle attention from writersconcernedwiththe methodology f thesocialsciences n general.One essaybyJohanGaltungmaybe noted,thoughitscontributiono practicedoes not seemlarge: Ommakrohistorienspistemologiog metodologi: n skisse',NordiskFag-konferansefor Historik Metodelaere,Makrohistorie, slo, Universitets-forlaget,1979.35. (,lubb, 'The "New"QuantitativeHistory', . 20.

uses of history

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