. The Uniting of Europe

ERNSTB. HAAS

Ernst B. Haas (University o( Calí(ornia-Berkeley), an immigrant bornin Frank(urt, was among the U.S. social scíentists applying behavioralmethods to international relations in the 19505. In 1958 he publíshedél book entitled The Uniting of Europe: Política\' Social, and Eco-nomic forces, 1950-1957 in which he used the European Coal andSteel Community as él case study in an attempt to dissect the "actual'integration process'. . . to derive propositions about its nature. ., Haas

recognized that (unctional integration was taking place ¡''n Europe,but that (unctionalísm as a theory had (aíleq to explain why deo::ision-makers chose to integrate in some areas and not others. Functional-ism needed a theory o( polítics, which Haas provided.

Haas first defined polítical integration as "the process wherebypolítical actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded toshi(t their loyalties, expectations and polítical activities toward a newcenter, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over thepre-existing national states.H Then he drew on democratic theory, sys-tems theory, group theory, and a host o( other approaches to producea scíenti(ically rigorous explanation (or European polítical integrationthat he also belíeved held predictive power. This neo(unctionalíst ap-proach (here introduced by Haas in the pre(ace to The Uniting of Eu-rope and described in greater detaíl by Leon Lindberg in Chapter 16)views the integration process as group driven. Federal institutions areestablíshed because important polítical groups see tangible benefits(rom joint governance in speci(ic areas. The integration processpushes (orward when (ederal institutions affect the interests o( groups

Rc:printc:dwith pc:rmissionof Stanford Univc:rsityPress from The Uniting off"lrope: Political, Social, and Economic Porces, 1950-1957 (Stanford Univer.sity Press, 1958). Copyright 1958, 1968 by Ernst B. Haas. Notes omitted.

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140 ERNST B. HAAS THE UNITING OF EUROPE 141

"United Europe" is a phrase meaning many things to manymen. To some it implies the creation of a full-fledged federation ofthe independent stai:esof Western Europe, either'theSix of "Schuma-nia" or the Fifteen of the Council of Europe. To others the phrasemeans no more than the desirability of creating a loose concert orconfederation. Somesee in it the guarantee for future greatness, a po-litica], economic and cu]tural renaissance for the Old Continent,about to be eelipsed by the United States, the Soviet world, and per-haps the Arab-Asians. But others identify it with the death of cher-ished patterns of national uniqueness. Even government policy, onboth sides of the Atlantic, sometimes hesitates between endorsing thecreation of a new center of economic and political power and fearingthe evolution of a high-tariff region or of institutionalized "thirdforce" sentiments. One must add the still lively controversy overwhether eeonomic or military unification, or both, is possible with-out prior or simultaneous politica] federation. The arguments overthe merits and types of unification have continued since the end ofWorld War 11;they are unlikely to be exhausted soon.

But for the political scientist the unification of Europe has a pe-culiar attraction quite irrespective of merits and types. He may see init, as Ido, an instance of voluntary "integration" taking place beforehis eyes, as it were under laboratory conditions. He will wish tostudy it primariJy because it is one of the very few current situationsin which the deeomposition of old nations can be systematically ana-lyzed within the framework of the evolution of a larger polity-apolity destined, perhaps, to develop into a nation or its own. Hence,my purpose is not the evaluation of the virtues and drawbacks of aUnited Europe in terms of European, American, national, interna-tional, free-enterprise,or welfare-state values. Nor is it an analysis ofthe advantages of federation over intergovernmental cooperation,economic over military unity. My aim is merely the disseetion of theactual "integration process" in order to derive propositions about itsnature. Hence, 1 focused my analysis on seleeted groups, institutionsand ideologieswhich have already been demonstrated to act as unify-

ing agents in politica] systems clearly "integrated" by any applicablestandard. Further, I confined the anaIysisto the impact of the one or-ganization whose powers, functions and composition make it a prior;capable of redireaing the loyalties and expeCtationsof political ac-tors: the European Coal and Stee] Community. My study, then, at-tempts to advance generalizations about the processes by which po-litical communities are formed among sovereign states, and mymethod is to select specificpolitica1groups and institutions, to studytheir reaaions to a new speeiesof "federal" governmeQt,and to ana-Iyzethe impact of that government in terros of the reactiom caused.On the assumption that "integration" is a two~wayprocess in whichthe centra] institutions affect and are affeeted by [he subjecr'groups,the Coal and Steel Community is to serve as a case study iIIustratingthe effeetson the totality of interactions.

that respond by organizing across national boundaries and pushingfor more integration. Thus integration in one area spills over into an-other when groups perceivé it in their interest.

Haas wrote proJifically on integration in the 1960s and early1970s as the acknowledged leader of the neofunctionalist school.

,NeofunctionaJism, while no longer as dominant as it was in the19605, is stil/ very influential. And Ernst Haas is sUIIwidely read.

The essential conclusions may be briefly summarized. The initiationof a deliberate scheme of political unificatian, to be accepted by the'key g..oups that make up a pluralistic society, does nor...recluireab-solute majority support, nor need it rest on i(lenticalaims on the partof all participants. The European Coal and Stee1Community was ini-tially accepted beeause it offered a multitude of different advantagesto different groups. Acceptance of a federal scheme is facilitated ifthe participating state units are already fragmented ideblogi(:allyandsocially. Moreover, the acceptance of such a scheme is com:iderablyeased if among the participating industrial, political, or labor groupsthere is a tradition, however vague, of mutual consultation and ofrudimentary value sharing. A helpful, but by no means indispensable,condition is rhe existence of an external rhreat, real or imagined.

Once establíshed, the central institution will affeet political in-tegratíon -meaningful1yonly íf it is willing to follow policies givingrise to expectations and demands for more-or fewer-federal mea-sures. In either case, the groups concerned will organize across na-tional state boun.daries in order to be able to influence,policy.]f thecentral institution, however, fails to assert itself in any way so as tocause strong positive or negative expectations, its impact on unitywill be as small as the integrative role of such technically powerfulinternational administrative unions as the Danube Commissions orthe Universal Postal Union. As far as the industrial groups-businessand labor-are concerned, they tend to unite beyond their former na-rional confines in an effort to make common policy and obtain com-mon benefits. Thus perhaps the chief finding is that group pressurewill spiUover into the federal sphere and thereby add to the integra-

142 THEUNITINGOF EUROPE 143ERNST B. HAAS

tive impulse. Only industries convinced that they have nothing togain from integration will hold out against such pressures. But indus-trial sectors initially opposed to integration for a variety of motivesdo change their attitude and develop strong positive expectations ifthey feel that certain cornmon problems can be more easilymet by afederal authority. More cornmonly still, groups are likely to tum tothe federal authority for help in the solution of purely national prob-lems if the local goveroment proves uncooperative. Groups withstrong initial positive expectations do not necessarilyturn against theprincipie of integration if their hopes are disappoioted: they merelyintensify their efforts to obtain the desired advantages 00 me federallevel, thus integrating themselves into organizations less and less de-pendent 00 aod identified with the national state. Polítical parties. ifallowance is made for their varying ideologies and constituencies,tend to fall into the same pattero. National goveroments, operatingin the nexus of all these forces, may 00 occasion attempt to sidestep,ignore. or sabotage the decisioos of the federal authority. The studyof the Coal and SteelCommunity shows, however, that goveromentsalso recognize a point beyond which such evasions are unprofitable,and mat in the long run they tend to defer to federal decisions, lestthe example of tbeir recalcitrance set a precedent for other govero-ments.

Aher five years of activity, the pattero of supranational pres-sur:eand counter-pressure has become apparent: groups. parties, andgovernments have reassessed and reformulated their aims in such away that the drive for a United Europe has become the battle.cry ofthe Leh. The "sinistration" of federalism has been accomplished inthe recognition of trade unions and Socialistparties that their versionof the welfare state and of peace can rationally be achieved ooly in afederated Western Europe. Perhaps the most salient condusion wecan draw from the community-building experiment is the fact thatmajor interest groups as well as politicians determine their supportoi, or opposition to, new central institutions and policieson the basis.oi a calculation of advantage. The "good Europeans" are not themain creators of the regional community that is gro\\ting up; theprocess of cornmunity formation is dominated by nationally consti-tuted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to ad-just their aspirations by tui'ning to supranarional means when tbiscourse appears profitable.

Our study thus substanti~tes the pluralistic thesis that a largerpolitical cornmunity can be developed if the crucial expectations. ide-ologies, and behavior patterns of certain key grOUPScan be success-fully refocussed on a new set of central symbols and institutions. Yet

tbis condusion also begsthe question of the generality of tbe processlaid bare. Can larger political communitiesbe creatOOon tbis basis inall sectionsof the world, in all ages. irrespectiveof the specificpow-ers initiallygiven to the central authority? 1suggestmat me value ofthis case study is confined to the kind of setting wbich reproduces inessencethe physical condidons, ideologies,dass structure, group re-lations, and polítical traditions and institutions of contemporaryWestern Europe. 10 short, 1 maintain that these findings are suffi-ciendy general in terms of the socio-political context to serve aspropositions conceming the formadon of polítical communities-provided we are dealing with (1) an industrialized economy deeplyenmeshed in intemational trade and finance,' (2) societies in whichtbe masses are fully mobilized politically and tend to channel theiraspirations through permanent interest groups and polítical parties,(3) societies in which these groups are habitually 100by idendfiableelitescompeting with one another for influence and in disagreementon many basic values, and (4) societies in which relations amongtbese elites are governed by the traditions and assumptions of partia-mentary (or presidential) democracy and constitutionalism. lt maywell be that the specific economic conditions under which the Euro-pean coal and steel industries operate act as additional factors limit-ing the possibilityoi generalizing. Monopolistic competition and meprevalence of private ownership are such factors, though isolatedpockets oi nationalized industry exist in the total industrial ~mplex.It may also be true that the impact of an overwhelminglypowerfulextemal economic center acts as a limidng condition. Economic inte-gration in Europe might have been much slower if the govemmentshad becn compellOOto come to grips with investment, currency andtrade questions--decisions which were in effect spared tbem by thedirect and indirect role of United States economic policy. Hence, 1would havé little hesitation in applying tbe technique of analysis hereused to the study of integration under NATO, the Scandinavian set-ting, the Organizarion ior European Economic Co-operation, orCanadian-United States relations. 1 would hesitate to claim validityfor it in the study oí rCgionalpolítical integradon in Latin America,the Middle East, or South-East Asia.

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