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Understanding and combatingterrorism: Definitions, origins andstrategiesPete Lentini aa Monash UniversityPublished online: 21 May 2008.

To cite this article: Pete Lentini (2008) Understanding and combating terrorism: Definitions,origins and strategies, Australian Journal of Political Science, 43:1, 133-140, DOI:10.1080/10361140701842615

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Review Essay

Understanding and Combating Terrorism:

Definitions, Origins and Strategies

PETE LENTINI

Monash University

Akbar Ahmed and Brian Forst (eds), After Terror: Promoting Dialogue AmongCivilizations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), xxviiiþ 196 pp., $35.95, ISBN0745635024

Beau Grosscup, Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment(London; New York; Kuala Lumpur: Zed Books/Sird, 2006), xivþ 226 pp.,£16.99, ISBN 184277543

Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), viiþ 261 pp.,$44.95, ISBN 0745633838

Terrorism, and the means by which to confront it, are areas of intense, and attimes divisive, political contest. Moreover, especially since 9/11 there has beenan expansion of academic and other literature that addresses terrorism. AndrewSilke has indicated that a new book on terrorism appears nearly every six hours,and Richard Jackson notes that, during this period, peer-reviewed papers haveincreased by approximately 300% (Guardian Weekly, 21 September 2007, 44).1

Such information suggests that terrorism studies is an increasingly importantsubfield within many disciplines, politics especially. Moreover, the rapid rate ofgrowth in the literature enhances the significance of identifying works thatmake substantial conceptual and empirical contributions. It is with these factorsin mind that this article limits itself to engaging in a critical examination of theworks listed above, around three central questions: What constitutes terrorism?What causes terrorism? And how can societies reduce the chances for terrorismto emerge, or from re-emerging, in places where it has already occurred? I centremy arguments on the first question with an engagement with Beau Grosscup’sStrategic Terror. Ami Pedahzur’s Suicide Terrorism is the central point of thediscussion around the second question. Engaging with Ahmed and Forst’sedited collection will establish a basis for investigating question three.

Dr Pete Lentini is Director at the Global Terrorism Research Centre, School of Political andSocial Inquiry Monash University.1I am grateful to John Cooney, MA student, Global Terrorism Research Centre and Politics, forbringing this source to my attention.

Australian Journal of Political Science,Vol. 43, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 133 – 140

ISSN 1036-1146 print; ISSN 1363-030X online/08/010133-8 � 2008 Pete Lentini

DOI: 10.1080/10361140701842615

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What Constitutes Terrorism?

Although there is general consensus that political groups have used terrorismfor nearly two thousand years (Laqueur 2001, 1 – 48; Rapoport 2003), there isfar less consensus on how to define the term. However, just as there is nouniformity among academics as to how to define terrorism, it is also absentamong some individual states’ bureaucracies. For instance, the United StatesState Department, Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation all have differing definitions of what constitutes terrorism,broadly reflective of their areas of competence and operation. That there areso many agencies involved is not surprising because terrorism is a multifacetedphenomenon (Lentini 2003). It shares many qualities with military andparamilitary groups’ actions, as well as criminal organisations and activities,constituting what is often referred to as grey-area phenomena becauseterrorism’s multifaceted qualities permit it to fall between the cracks of hard-and-fast identification and definition (Laqueur 2001, 210 – 25; Hoffman 1998:27, 28).Beau Grosscup attempts to address the relationship between strategic

bombing and terrorism in his book Strategic Terror. Grosscup’s volume is avery competent and engaging study of the history of aerial bombardment, andhow, from the beginning of the aviation age, military planners have consciouslytargeted civilians and civilian areas in order to inflict psychological damage onopponents, as well as to damage infrastructure essential to enemy war efforts.There are many positive attributes to Grosscup’s research. He provides a verysolid, and erudite, historical narrative around the topic and provides ample casestudies, including the present Iraq war, to demonstrate the amount of damagethat state-sanctioned military campaigns have inflicted on civilians. Grosscup’sstudy is also refreshing because he addresses the fact that often these types ofattack bear with them some form of gender, racial and class biases. Hence, inaddition to providing important historical and empirical detail on strategicbombing, Grosscup presents a nuanced interpretation that broadens how it ispossible to interpret this tactic. Also, using such an approach, he raisesimportant questions about the nature of power and the politics of culture: thosewho have won cultural struggles have the ability to name and define contentiousarguments (see Jordan and Wheedon 1995). Indeed, his analysis helps enhanceknowledge on how states can gloss over certain civilian populations’ victims.Throughout the book, Grosscup makes a strong case that states have oftenbeen unethical and in violation of international conventions.Overall, Grosscup has written a competent study investigating strategic

bombing’s origins, providing ample case evidence, and discussing the moralitysurrounding his topic to advance his argument.However, Grosscup’s study loses its impact when he moves his argument

from a critique of strategic bombing’s morality as being despicable, immoraland illegal like terrorism, to the case he attempts to make: that it should belabeled as terrorism. At this stage I should note that my preferred definition ofterrorism, based largely on Bruce Hoffman’s and others’ work, is that it occursin conditions when a sub-state group or an individual uses or threatens to useviolence against innocent people or non-combatants – or even property – toeffect political change and achieve political goals by creating an atmosphere of

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fear. However, as indicated below, I am not dismissive of such a term. Mydisappointment in Grosscup’s work is that he has not confronted some coreworks in terrorism studies to make a clear enough case why his argumentdeserves more attention.Ultimately, there are several conceptual and structural flaws that impede

Grosscup’s research from reaching its potential. First, there appears to be abroad – but not universal – consensus among terrorism analysts, andinternational law, that terrorism is perpetrated by non-state actors. In onesense, this point certainly reinforces Grosscup’s observations on the nature ofpower and politics. He correctly identifies that establishing what constitutesterrorism relies on who has the power to name. Moreover, he identifies that,within the international system, states have a legitimate monopoly of violence.As states are the major players in the international system, it is understandablethat they are hardly going to establish state activity as terrorism. Moreover,Grosscup does a good job pointing out that, in the 1990 – 91 Gulf War, bothIraqi and US politicians were not shy in labeling the other state as terrorist.There are some scholars, notably Paul Pillar, who contest that, once anacknowledged state’s military forces are involved in aggressive attacks,arguments on these activities shift from the realm of terrorism to war (Pillar2001, 14).This leads to the second reason undermining Grosscup’s interpretation of

terrorism. There are various forms of legislation that already address stateviolence, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity (Schmid 1993)2 evenif the international community may have difficulties (or even a reluctance) inenforcing these laws.Third, Grosscup has not engaged with the broad range of terrorism literature

to provide an adequate basis from which to make a persuasive argument thatstrategic bombing is terrorism. Regrettably, Grosscup is dismissive of much ofthe literature concerning terrorism, labeling it as the ‘terrorism industry’ – forwhich he fails to provide a substantive definition. However, he could havebolstered his argument by substantive scholarship that ‘the terrorism industry’readily accepts. There are credible journals in this field, such as Terrorism andPolitical Violence, which engage with some of the core conceptual dilemmas,and the contributors to its nearly 20 volumes do not share uniform perspectiveson such crucial matters, such as terrorism’s definitions and causes. Some evensupport the possibility that state terrorism is a valid term. For instance, had heengaged with articles by David Claridge (1996) and Peter Alan Sproat (1997)that address the issue of state terrorism, Grosscup would have developed amuch more nuanced conceptual framework for his argument. Igor Primoratzwould contend that state violence is of a higher level of immorality becausestates are bound by legal conventions (Primoratz 2002). By failing to engagewith such works, his strong narrative often lapses into polemic, rather thansustaining substantive political analysis.

2Nevertheless, despite the fact that war crimes, crimes against humanity and terrorism sharecommon features, they require separate sets of legislation. It is possible to prosecute perpetratorsof war crimes, crimes against humanity and terrorism, ex post facto. However, terrorism alsorequires measures for early intervention to prevent violence being inflicted. Therefore, lawsconcerning terrorism must be pre-emptive as well as punitive.

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Fourth, the book often lacks context on specific conflicts. The war inChechnya is a case in point. Grosscup is correct in acknowledging that manyWestern governments were reluctant to criticise Russia for its violence inChechnya, particularly after 9/11, and he is to be commended for condemningthe savage attacks that Chechens endured. However, he fails to address the factthat the second conflict, which began in 1999, was prompted by a series ofterrorist acts on Russian soil, and that a group of jihadists launched anincursion from Chechnya into Dagestan, in the hopes of establishing an Islamicstate within the North Caucasus (see Sakwa 2005 for the best collection ofessays on the conflict). These were clearly acts that threatened to fracture theRussian state and inflict harm on Russian citizens. My statements are notintended to absolve Russian actions where they were taken against innocentpeople. However, Grosscup’s lack of background information on Chechnyamakes it appear as if the assault came out of nowhere. The post-1996agreements between Russia broke down due to both parties’ fault (Evangelista2002). The ensuing violence was the result of a protracted series of incidents.

What Causes Terrorism?

Ami Pedahzur’s articulate and groundbreaking work not only addresses howterrorism occurs, but also why terrorist groups have chosen suicide terrorism asa tactic throughout the globe. Pedahzur’s study has much to commend it.Suicide Terrorism is an outstanding fusion of empirical data on a range ofsuicide attacks, as well as qualitative methods such as suicide terrorists’ lifehistories. The author demonstrates that terrorism is a process. People do notjust simply wake up and decide that they are going to commit acts of terrorism.Rather, he persuasively argues that, although virtually all terrorists – includingsuicide terrorists – do not have any substantial mental incapacities, or sufferfrom any personality disorders, they do tend to come to choose to be involvedin terrorism as a result of personal crises. Examining terrorists’ individual lifehistories, Pedahzur debunks the notions that most terrorists, particularlysuicide terrorists, engage in acts of violence for financial reasons, and when theydo, they often do not go through with the acts. However, he acknowledges thatvarious factors, such as rapid transitions in their lives, the loss of loved ones inviolent conflict with perceived enemies, humiliation and the desire for revenge,all play significant roles in influencing a minority of people to engage in acts ofpolitical violence, including suicide terrorism. In many circumstances, thosewho become suicide terrorists do so for redemption. His analysis of severalfemale suicide terrorists who have been accused of illicit activities or whohave gone through divorces in highly patriarchal societies, supports hisinterpretation.However, Pedahzur also notes that there are other institutional and social

factors that influence people’s choices to become terrorists. Like MarkSageman’s outstanding study, Understanding Terror Networks (Sageman2004), Pedahzur’s sample indicates the importance of pre-existing social bondsin coming to terrorism. In the case of some of the Palestinian suicide bombershe examines, he notes the importance that family members, friends, andbonding in prisons, play in bringing people into terrorist activity or to theattention of existing terrorist groups.

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Pedahzur places a prime importance on the role of specific organisations ingenerating suicide terrorism. They play significant roles in recruiting, training,and facilitating operations from finances to logistics, as well as providing thepsychological support necessary to conduct a suicide operation. However,suicide bombers also served functions for the groups themselves. For instance,many suicide bombers were often not core members of the groups. Therefore,the groups were able to inflict casualties and disorder among their enemies withminimal impact on their own resources. Additionally, the groups becamestronger because they could provide ‘heroes and hope’ (p. 159) through thebombers to societies where they were lacking. The role of bombers’ video wills,therefore, plays important functions for the organisations. On the one hand,they provide the society with a ‘martyr’. On the other hand, Pedahzur arguesthat they constitute a mechanism in which the organisation is able to make thebomber commit more fully to the cause, by adding more pressure through apublic statement. Pedahzur also notes that for suicide terrorism to be seen as alegitimate form of struggle, it requires populations that feel that they aresuffering at the hands of an oppressor, and that this is the only option availablefor overcoming that suffering. In this respect, his work complements RobertPape’s outstanding Dying to Win (2005), which emphasises that most suicideattacks are launched against countries that are perceived to be occupying land.Throughout the work, Pedahzur includes examples from a range of politicalstruggles, including such secular groups as the PKK and LTTE, as well asFatah, to illustrate that suicide bombing is not confined to any particularidentity, especially grounded in Islam.Pedahzur argues that groups select suicide bombings because they generate

fear, and they provide platforms for their causes because they generate mediaattention. Most of all, they generate many casualties, and elevate the victim-to-perpetrator ratio, in favour of the terrorists:

While the average fatality quotient in shooting attacks is 2.11 individualsand in attacks executed by means of delaying mechanisms 2.01, the averagenumber of fatalities in a suicide attack committed by a terrorist wearingan explosive belt is 8.11 . . . [I]n most instances in which explosive belts areused, the organization does not lose more than one terrorist, unless one isspeaking of an operation that is executed in several places at the same time.(p. 17)

Overall, Pedahzur argues that suicide terrorism is a ‘rational tactical strategy’(p. 33) that is the product of organisational actors’ planning, individual choicesand social dynamics (p. 193).In addition to an outstanding examination of suicide terrorism, Pedahzur

provides some suggestions for reducing the factors that can cause suicideterrorism. Like other terrorism scholars (i.e. Pillar 2001), Pedahzur acknow-ledges that it is impossible to eradicate terrorism (p. 191). Nevertheless, hesuggests long-term and short-term approaches. The former include offensivemeasures, such as intelligence gathering and targeted military strikes, anddefensive initiatives, such as prevention, crisis management and reconstruction.Among the long-term measures, he recommends implementing the eradicationof terrorist networks and imprisoning leaders among his offensive tactics, as

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well as negotiation, humanitarian aid to populations and the establishment oftrust (p. 189). This latter point would involve trust between the population thatsuffered the attack and its government, which could not prevent the strike, aswell as between the antagonists in the conflict.

How Can Societies Reduce the Chances for Terrorism to Emerge, or From

Re-emerging, in Places Where it Has Already Occurred?

Since 9/11 there has been a significant amount of inter-faith activity that hasbeen geared towards fostering greater familiarity between adherents of differentideologies, religions and cultures within states, and at the international level, inthe hope of increasing trust and reducing tensions that could cause violence.The contributors to Akbar Ahmed and Brian Forst’s After Terror engage inthese topics. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks argues that dialogue is a religiousimperative. Drawing on the biblical story of Cain and Abel, he suggests thatviolence occurs when there is an absence of conversation (p. 115). Queen Noorof Jordan (p. 130), former World Bank president James Wolfensohn (p. 162)and Saudi Prince El Hassan bin Talal (p. 149) all acknowledge that themonotheisms all respect the importance of religious diversity. Indeed, thenature of contemporary nation states, the international system, technologicaldevelopments, and migration patterns mean that no group can live in isolationand that interactions between cultures will become more frequent (Kofi Annan,94, Wolfensohn, 160). Moreover, as Judea Pearl argues, such patterns ofglobalisation will generate further opportunities for dialogue as diasporacommunities become effective conduits between different nationalities, culturesand religious traditions (p. 143). This is particularly the case when nation-states‘risk hospitality’ (Martin Marty, 186 – 90), by welcoming those of new statesinto the host culture, but use religion as a basis from which to appreciate theother’s difference. Annan is right to acknowledge that these processes will notalways be easy, and it may involve acknowledging some unpalatable viewpointswhen attempting to gain ‘a genuine appreciation of the other side’s grievances’(p. 95).When talking breaks down and terrorism occurs, sometimes these

unpalatable viewpoints can include engaging with former terrorists who havebegun the process of moving away from violence, and have made commitmentsto persuade others to put down their weapons. Former terrorists have theadvantage of being able to speak the same language as militants and would-beterrorists. Hence, in many instances, they would have a degree of respectabilityamong radicals that mainstream clerics would not possess. Indonesia,Singapore and Yemen have implemented such measures, yet there is diversityin each country’s approaches. For instance, in Yemen it is mostly clerics whoengage with the terrorists, and get them to renounce violence based on religiousgrounds. In Indonesia, those who have withdrawn from the struggle work inconjunction with police to try to persuade others from continuing their violentactivities. In the Indonesian and Singaporean cases, the police attempt toestablish trust by looking after the financial needs of the families of thoseincarcerated on terrorism charges, especially their children’s education and jobprospects. Some former Indonesian terrorists actively participate in theserehabilitation activities in face-to-face contact with other militants.

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In Singapore, they are currently assisting a Muslim Religious RehabilitationGroup, which not only engages in attempts to have jihadis renounce violence,but to maintain civic vigilance among its Muslim population, which already hasa strong track record of renouncing violence, and a commitment to the multi-ethnic and multi-faith composition of the state. These measures have helped toestablish good faith between the parties and have created bases for discussionbetween former antagonists. However, such de-radicalisation initiatives do notwork in all instances. For instance, many convicted Yemeni terroristsabandoned their jihads. Yet a small number of them did so only in respect toactivities against the Yemeni state. Subsequently, they have been caught orkilled on battlefields elsewhere after their release (Taarnby 2005; bin Hassan2006; bin Hassan and Pereire 2006; International Crisis Group 2007). Such de-radicalisation measures must be viewed cautiously, yet their potential forreducing terrorism must not be overlooked.

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussing terrorism’s definitions, origins and means to reduce its occurrenceunderscores the importance of rationality. It is imperative to use rationalappraisals and depoliticise how terrorism is defined. Acknowledging thatindividuals and groups make rational, strategic choices to specific tactics –including suicide bombing – based on a rational calculus necessary to achievepolitical and military objective, as well as attracting publicity, is essential tounderstanding why terrorism occurs. Finally, rational measures are necessary toreduce terrorism. These include inter-cultural dialogue. Moreover, when suchfactors fail (or may not be available), it is rational, if so forced, to takeunpalatable initiatives, such as engaging with former terrorists who haverenounced violence. Terrorism relies on the emotion of fear to achieve itspolitical objectives and to fragment societies. Transcending the emotional withthe rational may be a powerful means of identifying, understanding andcombating terrorism.

References

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Evangelista, M. 2002. The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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