turkey, the middle east and the gulf crisis

Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf CrisisAuthor(s): William HaleSource: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 68, No. 4(Oct., 1992), pp. 679-692Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2622709 .

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Turkey, the Middle East and the

Gulf crisis

WILLIAM HALE

Can Turkey act out a new role centre stage in the Middle East? William Hale looks at Turkey's attitude to foreign policy-making in the past and its present relations with NATO and the West. He asks whether the Gulf crisis and the Kurdish question have given fresh impetus to Turkey to become more actively involved in the Middle East.

Ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it has been a generally accepted judgement that Turkey is in the Middle East, but not fully part of it. Culturally and politically, Turkey and the other Middle Eastern countries have tended to follow separate paths. By the I99os, and in comparison with the rest of Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Turkey has become economically successful, democratic and stable. Hence, its position has sometimes been compared to that of Japan-as a potentially powerful actor which prefers not to play a commensurate regional role and stays on the edge of a regional subsystem. The events of the last three years have undermined some of the assumptions on which this policy of aloofness was based. On one hand, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have made it possible for Turkey, like other former Soviet neighbours, to consider more flexible regional policies. On the other hand, the Gulf crisis of I99o-9I demonstrated that, even if the superpower conflict has ended, the Middle East is still a prime source of global instability. During the last two years, Turkey has also emerged as an important actor in the politics of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, the Black Sea region and the Balkans. A full discussion of Turkish policy in all these areas would require far more space than is available here. This article therefore restricts itself to examining Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours, by considering first some of the factors which shaped Turkish regional policy in the postwar era, and then the implications of Turkey's experiences during the Gulf crisis of I990-9I.

International Affairs 68, 4 (I992) 679-692 679



William Hale

Turkish foreign policy and the Middle East

Historically, Turkish security concerns have been focused on the perceived threat from Tsarist, and then Soviet Russia, rather than on the Middle East. After the Second World War, the danger of an attack by the Soviet Union dominated Turkish foreign policy thinking and defence planning, leading to Turkey's accession to full membership of NATO in I952. This focus is supplemented by a continued attempt to enter the European Community. Turkey became an associate member in I964, and in I987 made a formal application to Brussels for full membership. Although Turkish accession to the EC remains an uncertain and, at best, rather distant prospect, it seems unlikely that Turkey will abandon the ambition.'

The disintegration of the USSR has radically enhanced Turkey's strategic security, but it has not altered this fundamentally pro-Western orientation. Nor has the development of Turkish ties with the Muslim peoples of the former Soviet Union presented Turkey with a realistic alternative. There is broad sympathy in Turkey for the peoples of the Muslim republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, but the idea of a pan-Turkish union is still only a distant dream in the minds of some ultra-nationalist politicians in Turkey. For the time being, Turkey is adopting a cautious policy towards the Com- monwealth of Independent States, balancing its relations with Muslims and Slavs, and concentrating on building up economic and cultural links with the Muslim republics. Hence, Turkey's political interests will probably remain focused on its relations with the Western powers, as the main component of a broad regional strategy. For most Turkish foreign policy-makers, the principle enunciated by Ataturk in I923 is still a dominant theme: 'The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks ... but we Turks have always and consistently moved towards the West ... In order to be a civilised nation, there is no alternative. '2

This assumption inevitably influenced Turkey's policy towards the Middle East, in that relations with the Middle Eastern states were normally of secondary importance to Turkish foreign policy-makers after I945. Admittedly, since the Arab-Israeli war of I973 they have moved up the foreign policy agenda, mainly for economic reasons. The rise in oil prices in I973-4 vastly increased the value of Turkey's imports from the region, besides creating an important new market for agricultural products and consumer goods, areas which Turkish exporters developed during the I980s. Even with the decline in

In its official Opinion on the Turkish application for full membership, issued in December i989, the EC Commission concluded that no enlargements could be considered until after completion of the Single Market at the end of I992. This policy was later adopted by the EC Council of Ministers. Even after December I992, it seems unlikely that serious accession negotiations could begin for some time. See Commission of the European Communities, Avis de la Commission stir la demande d'adhe'sion de la Turquie a la Commutiaute' (Brussels, i8 Dec. i989, SEC[89] 2290). In December i99i Hikmet C, etin, foreign minister in the new coalition government, confirmed that Turkey still sought full membership eventually, but admitted that 'various problems' would have to be overcome first: Milliyet (Istanbul, daily), iO Dec. i99i.

2 Quoted in Altemur Kilic, Tuirkey and the world (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, I959), p. 49.

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Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf crisis

oil prices in recent years, trade with the Middle East still accounts for about 20 per cent of Turkey's total foreign trade. These economic interests have naturally led to increased emphasis on improving political relations. Never- theless, Turkey has tended to adopt a very cautious and hands-off approach to the region. As Philip Robins suggests, its main features are strict adherence to the principles of non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of all countries in the region, and to the development of bilateral political and commercial relations with as many states in the region as possible. Since the end of the I95Os, successive governments have also tried to detach their role in the Western alliance system from their Middle East policies, and to preserve a balance in their relations with Israel and with the Arab states.3 On the other side, most of the other regional states have tended to adopt a rather wary and suspicious attitude towards Turkey, mixed with recognition of its important strategic situation. These approaches have been determined by modern historical experiences, as well as current political and economic interests on both sides.

Ideologically, Turkey's separation from the Middle East after I923 was largely the result of Ataturk's determination to end the link between the Turkish state and the notional leadership of the world Islamic community, symbolized by the abolition of the Caliphate in I924. In a speech delivered on this occasion, Ataturk dwelt on the price the Turks had paid for commitment to a pointless cause: 'For centuries our people have been compelled to act in accordance with this absurd point of view. And what happened? Millions of them died, in every land they went to. Do you know how many Anatolian boys perished in the sweltering heat of the deserts of the Yemen? '-and so on.4 Since then, the message that Turkey should keep out of the Middle East has sunk deep into the national consciousness; as a folk song laments: 'Before the barracks, the sad guitars are playing / My feet are bare and my heart is breaking / For those going to the Yemen, the young girls do cry / ... Those who go never return. I wonder why.'5 In I990-9I, this folk memory was to prove a powerful factor in public reactions to the Gulf crisis, and made it difficult for the government to apply an activist policy.

In I955, the then Democrat Party government under Adnan Menderes appeared to reverse this assumption when it signed what became the Baghdad Pact for military cooperation with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Britain, in which the United States served as a principal patron and paymaster. Clearly, the pact failed to achieve its original objective of bringing together the main Arab states in a common front with Turkey, Iran and the Western powers-on the contrary, it actually pushed them towards the Soviet camp. After the overthrow of Adnan Menderes in I960 it was widely recognized in Ankara that the Baghdad pact had been a mistake, since it had strengthened anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East and alienated Turkey from the Arab states at a

3 Philip Robins, Tuirkey antd the Middle East (London: Pinter for Royal Institute of International Affairs, I99I), pp. 65-7. 4 Quoted in Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey (London: Benn, I955), p. 8I.

5 Quoted by Hugh Pope, The Independent, I2 Oct. I990.

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William Hale

time when it badly needed their support over Cyprus.6 During the following decades, Turkish governments were anxious to convince both domestic opinion and the Arab regimes that Turkey's alliance with the West did not pose a threat to its Middle Eastern neighbours. This caution was summed up by repeated assertions, in the press and elsewhere, that Turkey would not allow itself to act, or be seen as acting, as America's policeman in the Middle East.

A factor of more immediate importance in Turkey's relations with the other Middle Eastern nations is the position of the Kurdish minorities in Iraq and Iran, and their relations with Turkey's Kurds, who probably account for about I5 per cent of the total population. Until very recently, the policy of all Turkish governments was to deny the Turkish Kurds any separate cultural or political identity, and to try to maintain an entente on the Kurdish question with both Tehran and Baghdad, on the assumption that all three governments had a joint interest in opposing Kurdish nationalism. In particular, Turkish relations with Iraq were generally close partly because of common opposition to Kurdish nationalism, and partly because of the states' economic interdependence. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was normally Turkey's most important market in the Middle East. Iraq also depended on the pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalik, on the Turkish Mediterranean coast, for about half its oil exports. Conversely, the fact that Syria is widely recognized to have provided bases and other support to the Kurdistan Workers' party, or PKK, which is the main Kurdish guerrilla organization in Turkey, has caused a long-running argument between Turkey and Syria.7

Disputes over the waters of the Euphrates are also a potent source of friction between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, since the river rises in central Turkey, and then flows across Syrian and Iraqi territory to the Gulf. All three countries rely on the Euphrates for irrigation and electricity generation. Turkey's involvement began in I980, when the South Anatolia Project for the development of the Turkish part of the Tigris and Euphrates basins was launched. Its centrepiece is the giant Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates, some I30 km upstream of the border with Syria. The dam itself was finished in I992, though the associated irrigation works will take many years to complete. A crisis arose in January-February I990, when the dam's sluice gates were shut for 30 days, to allow the reservoir behind the dam to begin filling. This reduced the flow into Syria to a fraction of its normal level, and provoked sharp protests from Damascus and Baghdad. Earlier, in I987, Turkey had agreed with Syria to maintain an average cross- border flow of 500 cubic metres per second, but it appears that the Syrians expect a larger flow once the dam is working at full capacity. Attempts to reach

6 Kemal H. Karpat, 'Turkish and Arab-Israeli relations', in Kemal H. Karpat and contributors, Turkey's foreign policy in transition, 1950-1974 (Leiden: Brill, I975), pp. I23-5.

This dispute seems to have taken a turn for the better in April I992, when the Turkish minister of the interior Ismet Sezgin visited Damascus and secured an undertaking that Syria would not continue to support the PKK, nor allow it to use Syrian territory to launch attacks in Turkey. The PKK base which had been established for some years in the Beka'a valley, in Syrian-controlled Lebanon, would also be closed down. Subsequently, it was reported that the PKK had transferred its main base to Shengal, near Mosul-that is, an area of northern Iraq still controlled by Saddam Hussein's regime (Milliyet, I9 Apr., I4 May I992).

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a trilateral accord on this question have failed to make progress. Since Turkey is unlikely to abandon the South Anatolia project, prospects for a tripartite settlement do not look bright, even though the three countries may reach a measure of accord on other issues.8

Finally, the somewhat unusual internal position of the Turkish government at the time of the Gulf crisis needs to be noted, since it had some important effects on Turkish reactions. In November I989 Turgut Ozal, the founder and leader of the ruling Motherland Party, had succeeded ex-General Kenan Evren, the leader of the I980 coup d'etat, as President of the Republic. Constitutionally, his election was perfectly legal, but it broke with political tradition, in that Ozal was the first president of Turkey since I960 who was an important politician in his own right, rather than a retired military commander. It also threatened to produce a change in the constitutional balance, in which the president had normally played a mainly figurehead role, and the main political power was wielded by the prime minister. To conform to the constitution, Ozal was obliged to sever all his official links with the Motherland Party on assuming the presidency. However, it was clear from the start that, in practice, he would continue to exercise a predominant power over the government from behind the scenes. The new prime minister, Ylldlrim Akbulut, was never regarded as much more than a colourless stand-in for the president (and, incidentally, had no experience of foreign affairs). This situation set up tensions between the president on the one side, and the cabinet and government backbenchers on the other, which came to the fore during I990-9I.

Turkey and the Gulf crisis: August i9gg-February I99I

Faced with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August I990, it was never likely that Turkey would issue anything other than a strong condemnation of the occupation of territory by force: however, at the outset, it was not clear whether it would take any effective action to reverse it. Immediately after the invasion, the government appears to have expected that the crisis would soon blow over, or would be settled by diplomacy. A meeting of the national security council, which includes the president, prime minister, cabinet members and armed forces chiefs, was held on 3 August. On the following day, it was reported that Turkey would not close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, or take other steps against Iraq.9 At this stage, the government appears to have assumed that it could preserve its traditional neutral attitude in what was seen as a purely inter-Arab dispute, without damaging its links with the Western powers.

This assumption was rapidly reversed by Saddam Hussein's refusal to evacuate Kuwait, and the unexpectedly strong and united reaction at the United Nations. Security Council Resolution 66i, passed on 6 August, which prescribed a complete economic embargo on Iraq, posed some tricky questions

8 See Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, pp. 49-53, 87-99, and David Kushner, 'Conflict and accommodation in Turkish-Syrian relations', in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds, Syria under Assad (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, I986). 9 Milliyet, 4 Aug. I990.

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for Turkey, granted the political and economic constraints which have already been explained. In fact, it was not until 8 August that the government announced that the crucial Kirkuk-Yurmurtalik pipeline would be closed, and all other commercial links with Iraq and occupied Kuwait would be suspended. Moreover, it appears that this decision was taken unilaterally by President Ozal, without prior consultation with the cabinet.10 The incident highlighted some serious divisions within the government. On one side, Ozal was anxious to stress the important role which Turkey could play in the crisis, and prepared to give full support to the coalition powers to demonstrate this. On the other side, the foreign ministry, parliament and public opinion were all anxious to preserve the now traditional posture of neutrality, and were not prepared to risk direct involvement in the Gulf for the sake of American favours or a higher international profile. In effect, Turkish policy-makers had to seek a compromise between these two viewpoints.

The closure of the pipeline, and the ending of all regular trade with Iraq, was undoubtedly a vital element in the economic campaign against Saddam. Without Turkish cooperation, any effective embargo would have been quite impossible. On the other hand, it also created some severe economic costs for Turkey. Allowing for the loss of exports to Iraq and Kuwait, and also of invisible exports and pipeline royalties, the direct costs to the Turkish balance of payments probably ran at the rate of around $2.o billion to $2.5 billion per year11 (Turkish government spokesmen claimed a far higher figure). The search for international compensation from the Western powers and oil-producing countries thus became a major preoccupation for the government.

While Turkey's role in the economic embargo was certainly essential, it was clear before long that it would probably not be sufficient, and that some military action would eventually have to be taken against Iraq. In contemplating this prospect, three immediate questions were raised for the government. First, would Turkish troops or naval ships be sent to the Gulf, to join the coalition forces? Second, would Turkey allow the United States or other Western air forces to use NATO bases on Turkish soil for offensive operations, given that this would provide the coalition with a great advantage in attacking important targets in northern Iraq? Third, would Turkey be prepared to open a second land front against Saddam Hussein, in the event of a general war against Iraq? Even if it were not, it was clear that defensive preparations had to be made against a possible retaliation by Saddam.

Although there was occasional press speculation about the possible opening of a 'northern front' on land, it appeared from the start that Turkey would be most unlikely to expose itself in this way. On the other hand, purely defensive measures caused the least political trouble for the government, since it could reinforce its troops along the I5o-mile border with Iraq without infringing any

0 Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, pp. 69-70. 1 Writer's estimate, made at the time for the Economist Intelligence Unit. It was made up as follows:

direct exports to Iraq and Kuwait-$i billion: pipeline royalties-$300 million: other invisibles-$700 million-$i,ooo million.

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of its international treaty obligations, or requiring any special authorization from parliament. During the last months of I990, troop levels along the frontier were built up to around I20,000 men, with air support, armour and transport. Although, as it turned out, these forces were never moved into action, they pinned down about eight Iraqi divisions in the north of the country which could otherwise have been used against the coalition forces in the south, and were thus of some value to the coalition cause.

For the Turks, the main concern was that if Iraq did decide to attack in the north, they would have insufficient planes and anti-aircraft defences to hold off the far superior Iraqi air force. Hence, it was important to secure a pledge from NATO that, if Iraq attacked Turkey, then the other allies would come to its assistance under the NATO treaty. This was confirmed in principle at a NATO summit held in Brussels on i i August. Turkey officially asked for the defensive deployment of NATO air forces on 30 November, and on 2 January I99I it was announced that Germany, Italy and Belgium would be sending 40 aircraft as part of an allied mobile force. However, most of the planes sent were obsolescent F-IO4 and Alpha-Jet aircraft. The move also triggered off complaints in Germany, where there was strong opposition to any military involvement in the Middle East. This, in turn, provoked some sharp attacks by Ozal on the Germans as unreliable allies."2 On the other hand, it was clear that the far larger and more modern American and British squadrons which were in any case stationed at Incirlik, near Adana, which is the main NATO air base in Turkey, would be brought into action if Turkey were attacked (US aircraft are permanently stationed at Incirlik, but during the crisis they were reinforced, and joined by a British air detachment). This was the most powerful deterrent facing Saddam Hussein, and illustrated the value of Turkey's membership of NATO-both to itself, and to the alliance as a whole.

Sending troops to the Gulf, or allowing the United States and other air forces to use Incirlik for offensive operations against Iraq, was far more problematic for the government, since it required specific authorization from parliament. Under Article 92 of the constitution, the national assembly must authorize any declaration of war, as well as the despatch of Turkish troops abroad or the reception of foreign troops on Turkish soil, except when these are necessary to fulfil international treaty obligations (in other words, the NATO treaty). If parliament is not in session, the president may declare war on his own, but only if Turkey is first attacked by an outside power. As Ozal admitted in a television interview in January I99I, he had wanted to send a Turkish contingent to join the coalition forces in the Gulf."3 However, he was unable to realize this, thanks to determined opposition in parliament and the cabinet. From the opposition benches, Suileyman Demirel, leader of the centre-right True Path Party, and Erdal Inonii, head of the Social Democrat Populist party, both attacked Ozal's alleged adventurism. More crucially, the president's policy was also opposed by a powerful group of Motherland party backbenchers, led by Mesut Yllmaz, a

12 Le Monde, I2 Aug. I990: The Guardian, 25 Jan. I99I. 13 Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 22 Jan. I99I.

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former foreign minister who had left the government in February I990, apparently in protest at constant interference by the president in the work of his ministry.

These disputes first came to a head on I2 August, when parliament was hastily reconvened to discuss a government bill, giving it war powers under Article 92. This was passed, but only after a large-scale backbench rebellion, headed by Yllmaz, had forced it to add the rider that it could only exercise these powers if Turkey were attacked. In effect, the government was left with no more authority than the president would anyway have had during the recess, and unable to send troops to the Gulf as part of the coalition build-up. After this setback, prime minister Akbulut returned to the charge on 5 September, when parliament reconvened for its normal autumn session. On this occasion, Yllmaz and his supporters decided to give ground, and a bill was passed allowing the government to send troops abroad, and receive foreign troops on Turkish soil, though not to declare war (the last was probably a pointless restriction, since most modern wars have been undeclared).14 The government thus gained its war powers, but the parliamentary battle had indicated the large scale of opposition to direct involvement in the Gulf, and probably did more than anything to persuade Ozal to drop his more ambitious plans.

During the following months, it became clear that this reaction was not confined to parliament or the press. On i i October, Ali Bozer, who had taken over the foreign affairs portfolio from Yllmaz, also announced his resignation. Bozer's departure had been widely expected, since it had been reported earlier that he had strongly resented the fact that Ozal had virtually cut him out of conversations with President Bush when they had both visited Washington in September. His resignation triggered off further speculation to the effect that it reflected widespread misgivings in the foreign ministry about Ozal's Gulf policy, and the fear that he had taken over the direction of policy from the ministry professionals.15 A further shock for the government followed on 3 December when the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Necip Torumtay, also announced his resignation. This caused a major political storm, since the resignation of a CGS was an almost unprecedented event in Turkey, where the armed services chiefs nearly always serve out their four-year terms. Although Torumtay was reticent about his reasons, it was widely suspected that he had disagreed with the president about Gulf policy-in particular, as to whether Turkey should allow the US air force to launch offensive raids against Iraq from Turkish bases, if a general attack became necessary. Later on, Ozal hinted that there had indeed been serious policy differences between himself and Torumtay; as he put it, 'some Generals are not keeping in step and are acting to preserve the status quo. While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put the brakes on. '16

Torumtay's resignation left open the question as to whether Turkey would allow the use of Incirlik by coalition air forces-the third area of doubt, which

14 Milliyet, I3 Aug., 6 Sept. I990. 1 Milliyet, 9 Oct., I2-I3 Oct. I990. 16 Quoted in Milliyet, 7 Dec. I990.

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had been implicit from the start of the crisis. Granted the sensitivity of this issue, the government was unwilling to declare its hand until the last minute. As late as I5 January, when the UN-imposed deadline was expiring, prime minister Akbulut stated that no decision had been taken on the use of Turkish bases. However, two days later, parliament renewed its war powers vote to the government, and it was made clear that this would include allowing the use of Incirlik and other bases against Iraq."7 On i 8 January, with the opening of the air war, the first allied air raids from Incirlik were duly launched. Although the foreign ministry originally claimed that the aircraft were merely on a training mission, this pretence was later dropped, and it was openly admitted that the 'second front' was now a reality, at least as far as the air war was concerned. Regular sorties from Incirlik by coalition planes continued up to the time of the ceasefire in the Gulf. There was naturally a good deal of anxiety that Iraq might counterattack, and that the second front would also become a land war, but Saddam evidently realized that this would be suicidal. Accordingly, much to Turkey's relief, the guns stayed silent along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The beginning and rapid end of the land war in the Gulf also left Turkey unaffected so that, by the end of the war, it could feel pleased with the outcome, even though the future was still very cloudy.

The aftermath: March-August I99I

In a broadcast on Turkish television on 2 March, soon after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, President Ozal claimed that 'our country has passed a test with flying colours and has proved to the world at large that it is a country that can be trusted '.18 At the time, he seemed to have every reason for basking in the glow of success. Turkey had clearly demonstrated its strategic importance, and had rendered important services to the coalition cause, without having itself fired a shot in anger. In Ankara, brave hopes were expressed that Turkey could play an important part in helping to build a more stable, prosperous and democratic order in the Middle East.

During the following months, these hopes were dashed by a wave of problems which the half-finished Gulf War had thrown up. Of these, the Kurdish tragedy was easily the most important for Turkey. Saddam's brutal suppression of the Kurdish rebellion faced the Turks with a humanitarian problem of unprecedented dimensions. The vast exodus of refugees towards the Turkish and Iranian frontiers began during the first two weeks of April, so that by the middle of the month it was reported that around 500,000 were massed along the frontier with Turkey. Their plight was desperate, and made still worse by the fact that most of them were cooped up in remote valleys and mountainsides, where the transport and distribution of supplies was an almost impossible task. The Turkish Red Crescent, local villagers and (later on) international aid agencies did their best to cope, but it soon became clear that the situation was unsustainable. ' SWB, I7 Jan. I99I: Financial Times, i8 Jan. I99I. 18 SWB, 4 Mar. I99I.

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The flood of Kurdish refugees faced the government in Ankara with some acute dilemmas. On one hand, it could not ignore a heart-rending humanitarian problem, brought home every evening on the world's television screens. On the other, the government was most reluctant to allow the refugees to move to more accessible sites within Turkish territory. If it did so it would acquire the long-term responsibility for their care and accommodation, with next to no international assistance once the world's attention moved on to other problems.

By the middle of April it was becoming accepted that the only solution would be to move the refugees back to northern Iraq. However, there was no chance they would do so without protection against the Iraqi forces: then, as now, their main need was security, not just food and shelter. For Turkey, this meant going back on what had hitherto been a fixed point in policy towards Iraq-that is, firm opposition to any sort of partition of the country, either implicit or explicit, which would imply acceptance of the idea of Kurdish autonomy. Nevertheless, Ozal decided to grasp the nettle on 7 April, when he suggested that the UN should take over territory in northern Iraq to provide a haven for the refugees. This idea was taken up by Britain, and eventually by the United States. At the end of April, around I7,000 coalition troops in and around northern Iraq began 'Operation Bring Comfort' by establishing a security zone to which the refugees could return."9 In a catalogue of disasters for the Kurds, this was a remarkably successful operation: by the end of May virtually all the refugees had returned to Iraq. The experience also prompts the conclusion that, in spite of the appalling suffering which the Kurds endured, the Turkish government's policy was probably the right one, since it forced the scale of the problem on to the attention of the world's media, and that of the Western governments. Had the Kurds been moved to organized camps in Turkey, then it is likely that another equivalent of the Palestinian or Afghan refugee problem would have been created on Turkish and Iranian territory, with ominous long-term consequences for both countries.

In July, 'Bring Comfort' was succeeded by 'Operation Poised Hammer ', in which coalition troops were withdrawn from Iraqi territory, but succeeded by a coalition duty force of 2,000 men from five different countries, including 8oo Turkish troops, which was stationed at the border town of Silopi. In addition, extra coalition air forces were installed at Incirlik. The purpose was clear: if Saddam tried to launch a second onslaught against the Kurds, then he would be faced by overwhelming coalition air power, plus some ground support. The 'Poised Hammer' force at Silopi was gradually withdrawn during the autumn, as it did not seem to be serving any useful purpose, but the special air detachment at Incirlik was retained. Its mandate was duly renewed by the Turkish parliament at the end of September, and then in two six-monthly instalments in December I99I and June I992.

In the meantime, Turkish policies towards the Kurds were also affected by continuing discontent among Turkey's own Kurdish minority, and a renewed

19 The Independent, 8 Apr. 199I: Hugh Pope, 'Turkey and the Kurds', Middle East Itnterniationial, 3 May I99I.

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campaign of attacks by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). During the spring and summer of I99I, the PKK inevitably exploited the collapse of Saddam's power in northern Iraq, as well as the availability of arms from retreating Iraqi troops. On 4 August, PKK militants attacked a gendarmerie post at Samanli, in the border province of Hakkari, killing nine Turkish soldiers and abducting seven of their comrades to PKK bases in Iraq. In retaliation, the Turkish army and air forces launched a large-scale raid against alleged PKK units in northern Iraq, which lasted from 5 to i6 August, and caused some 20-3 0 civilian casualties.20 This triggered off a round of protests in Western Europe, and further complicated Western efforts to aid the Kurds. By the autumn of I99I the Kurds, Turkey and the coalition powers all seemed to be stuck in a messy and potentially dangerous impasse, in which agreement between the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad appeared to be postponed indefinitely, and a renewed campaign by Saddam against the Kurds could not be ruled out.

Effects and prospects

During the summer and autumn of I99I, domestic politics again began to affect Turkish policies on the Kurdish problem, and the Middle East in general. After a fierce struggle within the Motherland Party, Ylldlrlm Akbulut was ousted from the party leadership and premiership in June, and succeeded by Mesut Yllmaz. The new prime minister decided to opt for early general elections in the autumn, in the hope of renewing his mandate before a harsh belt-tightening campaign became necessary to reduce Turkey's chronic inflation rate. The elections were held on 20 October, and reduced the Motherland Party to II2 of the 450 parliamentary seats. After several weeks of bargaining, Suileyman Demirel and Erdal In6nii formed a coalition government, in which Demirel became prime minister with In6nii as his deputy. Several members of the new cabinet were of Kurdish origin, including the foreign minister, Hikmet (;etin. Initially, the government was supported by a group of Kurdish MPs who had formed a separate splinter party in the previous parliament, though these later broke away to form a separate parliamentary bloc. Cultural rights for the Kurdish minority were also granted by the new government, including freedom to issue books and newspapers in Kurdish and the establishment of a Kurdish cultural institute. However, Turkish would remain the sole official language, and Turkey would be preserved as a unitary state.21 There thus seemed to be greater substance now in the Turkish claim that the Kurds enjoyed democratic rights, albeit no political autonomy, within the Turkish republic. On the other hand, the Motherland Party's defeat in the elections sharply reduced President Ozal's effective power in the political system. Although there was no constitutional change in his position, the loss of his parliamentary support severely restricted his ability to make policy independently, as he had done during the Gulf crisis. 20 The Gtuardian, S Aug., I4 Aug. I99I: The Independent, io Aug., I4 Aug. I99I: Financial Times, I9

Aug. I99I. 21 Milliyet, io Dec. I99I.

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William Hale

For most Turks, questions of foreign policy took second place to bread-and- butter domestic issues-in particular, the relentless rise in inflation. Never- theless, the Demirel government was still faced with some difficult policy choices in the Middle East. In the short term, it had to decide how to react to the fact that, like it or not, Saddam was still in power in Baghdad, and that Iraqi Kurdistan was still in political limbo, with no agreement on autonomy foreseeable (or maybe even feasible). In the longer term, it needed to assess the affects of the Gulf crisis on Turkish policy in the Middle East, and the options for change.

In an ideal world, Turkey would almost certainly like to see the overthrow of Saddam, and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in which the Kurds would enjoy full participation, but no territorial autonomy. The emergence in the spring of I992 of what is, in effect, an unofficial Kurdish government in Iraq was not welcome to Ankara, since the establishment of an independent Kurdish state would probably weaken the Turkish government's authority over its own Kurdish minority. Granted realities, however, it appears to be accepted in Turkey that Iraqi Kurdistan will probably continue to enjoy de facto independence from Baghdad, at least in the medium term. In these circumstances, Turkey's best policy is to try to maintain a working relationship with the main Kurdish leaders. On their side, Talabani and Barzani appear to recognize that their own position is heavily dependent on Turkish goodwill, given that virtually all supplies to northern Iraq have to be routed through Turkey, and that Turkey is the dominant military power in the area. In return, they have frequently undertaken to deny support to the PKK, though the degree to which either they or the Turkish security forces can physically suppress it is limited. In these circumstances, an entente between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds, which was formerly anathema in Ankara, may be emerging. However, events over the last few months have suggested that the PKK's campaign is unlikely to subside, and that it enjoys increased sympathy from the Turkish Kurds. Attacks by the PKK have continued on an increased scale, with harsh counter-measures by the Turkish forces.

The possibility of an important change in Turkish policy was hinted at by Demirel in a visit to Diyarbakir, the main city of south-eastern Anatolia, on 8 December I99I. Talking to journalists, Demirel stated that 'the people in the south-east are our brothers, the people in northern Iraq are their brothers and ought to be our brothers too. We now speak of the Kurdish identity. It is impossible to oppose this. Turkey must recognise the Kurdish reality'. Criticizing previous policy, he admitted that in the past, 'faced with events in northern Iraq, Turkey was just a bystander. For instance, there was the Halabja incident. We said " that's outside our frontiers, it's nothing to do with us ". This policy ought to change. Turkey's new policy should be as follows: if Baghdad commits another barbarity in northern Iraq, it will find us opposing it.'22

Admittedly, it would probably be a mistake to read too much into Demirel's remarks. It was not at all clear, for instance, what he meant by 'opposing' 22 Quoted in Milliyet, 9 Dec. I99I.

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Baghdad. Quite probably, his words were intended mainly to deter Saddam from launching another full-scale onslaught against the Kurds, which would have landed Turkey with yet another refugee problem. From another point of view, his remarks were indicative of some fundamental changes in official thinking-in particular, the recognition that Turkey could no longer go on pretending that the Kurdish problem did not exist, and that it could not simply fold its arms and maintain an attitude of rigid non-involvement towards events in neighbouring Arab states. In effect Turkey, like other UN members, was being driven into some revision of the traditional emphasis on respect for the absolute sovereignty of states, regardless of their internal policies, which had been adhered to since the I95Os.

Hints of broader changes in Turkish policy also appeared in the television address which Turgut Ozal had delivered on 2 March, just after the ceasefire in the Gulf. In this speech he stated: As I have always reiterated, my conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy. The reason I made this call is because we are a powerful country in the region. Let me also point out that there are conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to' these passive policies. The reason these circles accuse us of dragging the country into an adventure is because I generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country.23

Although Ozal's suggestions were short on specifics, they were interesting as indicators of the distance Turkish policy had travelled since the start of the Gulf crisis. Policies which would once have been described as 'responsible' or 'careful' were now stigmatized as 'passive' and 'hesitant': what would once have been opposed as 'adventurist' was now lauded as 'active' and 'dynamic'. Critics of the old policy could argue that it had left Turkey as marginalized in the Middle East as it was in Europe. Apparently, Ozal was anxious to draw Turkey out of the wings, onto centre stage. In effect, he was trying to endow Turkey with a regional role commensurate with its political and economic strength.

It was far from clear, however, what the new policies would amount to. Occasionally, it was suggested that Turkey might seek territorial aggrandize- ment, in particular in northern Iraq. But this ambition was denied in Ankara on every possible occasion. Apart from broad considerations of respect for international law and Turkey's previous treaty commitments, it would have had disastrous effects on Turkey's relations with Iran and the Arab world.24 Similarly, there were suggestions that after the Gulf War the United States might seek to develop Egypt and Turkey as the regional pillars of a new Gulf security system, as part of President Bush's 'New World Order'. However, it 23 SWB, 4 Mar. IggI. 24 See, for instance, The Independent, 28 Jan. I99I. At the Lausanne Conference of I922-3, Turkey had

contested the attachment of Mosul province to Iraq, and the issue had been left undecided by the Lausanne Treaty. However, Turkey accepted the present border with Iraq in a treaty signed with Britain and Iraq in I926, and confirmed it in several subsequent agreements with Iraq. See Stephen F. Evans, The slow rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the age of Kemal Ataturk, 1919-38 (Walkington: Eothen Press, I982), pp. 80-97, and J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy itn the Near and Middle East: a documentary record, 1914-1956 (Princeton: Van Nostrand, i956), vol. 2, pp. I43-6, 390-9I.

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was hard to see how such schemes could avoid the mistakes of the I950S and I960s, since they would almost certainly create suspicion and hostility in those states not included in a Western-sponsored security structure.25 For Turkey, such a plan would almost certainly be branded with the mark of the Baghdad Pact, and unacceptable on those grounds alone. As foreign minister Hikmet (etin pointed out in December I99I, US strategic plans for the Middle East were still very vague and abstract. He added that even if they became more concrete, then 'strategic cooperation should not lead to strategic dependency '26 It seemed likely that if Turkey were to play a part in any new regional grouping, then this could only be realized with the active support and cooperation of all the main Middle Eastern states, and not just the Western powers. Yet how this could be achieved was quite unclear. Potentially, the Gulf crisis had brought about important changes in Turkey's role in the Middle East, but it had raised more questions than it answered. 25 Shireen Hunter, 'The post-war Middle East: the flaws in US thinking', Middle East International, 8

Feb. I99I. 26 Quoted, Milliyet, Io Dec. I99I.

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turkey, the middle east and the gulf crisis

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