Truth by P. F. StrawsonReview by: Alice AmbroseThe Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1955), p. 299Published by: Association for Symbolic LogicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2268266 .

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REVIEWS 299

Smith points out is not clearly specified) is claimed to be a disguised account of statements which the sentence-token is used to express. It is hence said not to be in important disagreement with Nowell Smith's own position that the meaning of a sentence must be elucidated in terms of its use. ALICE AMBROSE

A. M. MACIVER. Some questions about 'know' and 'think.' A reprint of III 158(2). Ibid., pp. 88-96.

AUSTIN DUNCAN-JONES. Further questions about 'know' and 'think.' A reprint of IV 37(9). Ibid., pp. 96-106.

A. M. MACIVER. Reply to Mr. Duncan-Jones. A reprint of IV 37(11). Ibid., pp. 106-108.

MAX BLACK. Saying and disbelieving. Ibid., pp. 109-119. (Reprinted from Analysis, vol. 13 no. 2 (1952), pp. 25-33.)

J. 0. URMSON. Two of the senses of 'probable.' A reprint of XIII 176(13). Ibid., pp. 191-199.

C. H. WHITELEY. More about probability. A reprint of XIII 176(15). Ibid., pp. 199-204.

STUART HAMPSHIRE. Subjunctive conditionals. A reprint of XIV 203(2). Ibid., pp. 204-210.

DAVID PEARS. Hypotheticals. A reprint of XV 215(3). Ibid., pp. 210-226.

WILLIAM KNEALE. Natural laws and contrary-to-fact conditionals. A reprint of XVI 64(1). Ibid., pp. 226-231.

C. LEWY. Truth and significance. A reprint of XIII 125(3). Ibid., pp. 242-245.

MAX BLACK. The senzantic definition of truth. A reprint of XIII 150. Ibid., pp. 245-260.

In another reprint of this paper (XV 210(4)) the author refers in an appendix to a technical error pointed out by Geach in XIII 151. The correction, however, is not incorporated in the reprint appearing in the volume under review. ALICE AMBROSE

P. F. STRAWSON. Truth. A reprint of XV 215(2). Ibid., pp. 260-277. The author remarks in a footnote to the present reprint that "an extended and in

some ways modified version of the views here maintained is to be found in the Pro- ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 1950." ALICE AMBROSE

FRANK B. EBERSOLE. Verb tenses as expressors and indicators. Analysis (Oxford), vol. 12 no. 5 (1952), pp. 101-1 13.

The author sets out two theories about verb-tenses: (1) the expressive theory (from Russell, VI 29), according to which different tenses in sentences express different states of the speaker, without these facts being indicated by the sentence, and (2) the

theory that verb-tenses indicate such facts since they are token-reflexive, i.e., that they refer to the speaker's or writer's now via reference to one of their own tokens. It is claimed that both theories arise from an invidious comparison between our ordinary tensed language and an ideal language having no need for words corresponding to verb-tenses. For theory (1) Ebersole sketches the construction of such a language, a semantical system into which all sentences of conversational language can be trans- lated, and which includes a list of expressive signs serving to translate verb-tense endings and auxiliaries. It is criticized for proceeding on the following false assumptions: that verb-tenses are always expressive, that they alone are the expressive device, and that their expressive rather than their assertive function is primary.

Ebersole's discussion of theory (2) begins with a more elaborate analysis of token-

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