transportation law (first 10 cases).docx

Upload: kkk

Post on 13-Apr-2018

218 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    1/31

    CASE 01 SPOUSES TEODORO1and NANETTE PERENA, Petitioners,

    vs.

    SPOUSES TERESITA PHILIPPINE NICOLAS and L. ZARATE, NATIONAL

    RAILWAYS, and the COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.

    D E C I S I O N

    BERSAMIN,J.:

    The operator of a. school bus service is a common carrier in the ees of the la!. "e is bound

    to observe e#traordinar dili$ence in the conduct of his business. "e is presumed to be

    ne$li$ent !hen death occurs to a passen$er. "is liabilit ma include indemnit for loss of

    earnin$ capacit even if the deceased passen$er ma onl be an unemploed hi$h school

    student at the time of the accident.

    The Cae

    % petition for revie! on certiorari, Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Perefia &Perefias' appeal

    the adverse decision promul$ated on November (), *++*, b !hich the Court of ppeals &C'

    affirmed !ith modification the decision rendered on December ), (--- b the Re$ional Trial

    Court &RTC', %ranch *+, in Para/a0ue Cit that had decreed them 1ointl and severall liable!ith Philippine National Rail!as &PNR', their co2defendant, to Spouses Nicolas and Teresita

    3arate &3arates' for the death of their (42ear old son, aron 5ohn 6. 3arate &aron', then a

    hi$h school student of Don %osco Technical Institute &Don %osco'.

    Ante!edent

    The Pere/as !ere en$a$ed in the business of transportin$ students from their respective

    residences in Para/a0ue Cit to Don %osco in Pason$ Tamo, 7a8ati Cit, and bac8. In their

    business, the Pere/as used a 9I Ceres :an &van' !ith Plate No. P; =4 .7. of u$ust **, (--, !ithin the vicinit of the 7a$allanes

    Interchan$e in 7a8ati Cit, 7etro 7anila, Philippines

    &=')t the time of the vehicularFtrain collision, the sub1ect site of the vehicularFtrain

    collision !as a railroad crossin$ used b motorists for crossin$ the railroad trac8s

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt1
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    2/31

    &4')Durin$ the said time of the vehicularFtrain collision, there !ere no appropriate

    and safet !arnin$ si$ns and railin$s at the site commonl used for railroad

    crossin$

    &')t the material time, countless number of 7a8ati bound public utilit and

    private vehicles used on a dail basis the si te of the collision as an alternative route

    and short2cut to 7a8ati

    &@')The train driver or operator left the scene of the incident on board the commutertrain involved !ithout !aitin$ for the police investi$ator

    &

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt3
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    3/31

    &(' &for' the death of aron2 Php4+,+++.++

    &*' ctual dama$es in the amount of Php(++,+++.++

    &)' or the loss o f earnin$ capacit2 Php*,(+-,+@(.++

    &=' 7oral dama$es in the amount of Php=,+++,+++.++

    &4' E#emplar dama$es in the amount o f Php(,+++,+++.++

    &' ttorne?s fees in the amount of Php*++,+++.++ and

    &@' Cost of suit.

    SO ORDERED.

    On 5une *-, *+++, the RTC denied the Pere/as? motion for reconsideration, =reiteratin$ that the

    cooperative $ross ne$li$ence of the Pere/as and PNR had caused the collision that led to the

    death of aron and that the dama$es a!arded to the 3arates !ere not e#cessive, but based on

    the established circumstances.

    The CA( R"#$n%

    %oth the Pere/as and PNR appealed &C..2H.R. C: No.

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    4/31

    I. The lo!er court erred !hen i t upheld the trial court?s decision holdin$ the petitioners 1ointl

    and severall liable to pa dama$es !ith Philippine National Rail!as and dismissin$ their

    cross2claim a$ainst the latter.

    II. The lo!er court erred in affirmin$ the trial court?s decision a!ardin$ dama$es for loss of

    earnin$ capacit of a minor !ho !as onl a hi$h school student at the time of his death in the

    absence of sufficient basis for such an a!ard.

    III. The lo!er court erred in not reducin$ further the amount of dama$es a!arded, assumin$petitioners are liable at all.

    R"#$n%

    The petition has no merit.

    1.

    We)e the Pe)e*a and PNR +&$nt#

    and e-e)a## #$a#e '&) da/a%e

    The 3arates brou$ht this action for recover of dama$es a$ainst both the Pere/as and the

    PNR, basin$ their claim a$ainst the Pere/as on breach of contract of carria$e and a$ainst the

    PNR on 0uasi2delict.

    The RTC found the Pere/as and the PNR ne$li$ent. The C affirmed the findin$s.

    Ae concur !ith the C.

    To start !ith, the Pere/as? defense !as that the e#ercised the dili$ence of a $ood father of the

    famil in the selection and supervision of lfaro, the van driver, b seein$ to it that lfaro had

    a driver?s license and that he had not been involved in an vehicular accident prior to the fatal

    collision !ith the train that the even had their o!n son travel to and from school on a dail

    basis and that Teodoro Pere/a himself sometimes accompanied lfaro in transportin$ thepassen$ers to and from school. The RTC $ave scant consideration to such defense b

    re$ardin$ such defense as inappropriate in an action for breach of contract of carria$e.

    Ae find no ade0uate cause to differ from the conclusions of the lo!er courts that the Pere/as

    operated as a common carrier and that their standard of care !as e#traordinar dili$ence, not

    the ordinar dili$ence of a $ood father of a famil.

    lthou$h in this 1urisdiction the operator of a school bus service has been usuall re$arded as

    a private carrier,-primaril because he onl caters to some specific or privile$ed individuals,

    and his operation is neither open to the indefinite public nor for public use, the e#act nature of

    the operation of a school bus service has not been finall settled. This is the occasion to la the

    matter to rest.

    carrier is a person or corporation !ho underta8es to transport or conve $oods or persons

    from one place to another, $ratuitousl or for hire. The carrier is classified either as a

    privateFspecial carrier or as a commonFpublic carrier.(+ private carrier is one !ho, !ithout

    ma8in$ the activit a vocation, or !ithout holdin$ himself or itself out to the public as read to

    act for all !ho ma desire his or its services, underta8es, b special a$reement in a particular

    instance onl, to transport $oods or persons from one place to another either $ratuitousl or for

    hire.((The provisions on ordinar contracts of the Civil Code $overn the contract of private

    carria$e.The dili$ence re0uired of a private carrier is onl ordinar, that is, the dili$ence of a

    $ood father of the famil. In contrast, a common carrier is a person, corporation, firm or

    association en$a$ed in the business of carrin$ or transportin$ passen$ers or $oods or both, b

    land, !ater, or air, for compensation, offerin$ such services to the public.(*Contracts of

    common carria$e are $overned b the provisions on common carriers of the Civil Code, the

    Public Service ct,()and other special la!s relatin$ to transportation. common carrier is

    re0uired to observe e#traordinar dili$ence, and is presumed to be at fault or to have acted

    ne$li$entl in case of the loss of the effects of passen$ers, or the death or in1uries to

    passen$ers.(=

    In relation to common carriers, the Court defined public use in the follo!in$ terms in Gnited

    States v. Tan Piaco,(4viB>

    KPublic useK is the same as Kuse b the publicK. The essential feature of the public use is not

    confined to privile$ed individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite or

    unrestricted 0ualit that $ives it it s public character. In determinin$ !hether a use is public, !e

    must loo8 not onl to the character of the business to be done, but also to the proposed mode

    of doin$ it. If the use is merel optional !ith the o!ners, or the public benefit is merel

    incidental, it is not a public use, authoriBin$ the e#ercise of the 1urisdiction of the public utilit

    commission. There must be, in $eneral, a ri$ht !hich the la! compels the o!ner to $ive to the

    $eneral public. It is not enou$h that the $eneral prosperit of the public is promoted. Public

    use is not snonmous !ith public interest. The true criterion b !hich to 1ud$e the character

    of the use is !hether the public ma en1o it b ri$ht or onl b permission.

    InDe Guzman v. Court of Appeals,(the Court noted that rticle (@)* of the Civil Code

    avoided an distinction bet!een a person or an enterprise offerin$ transportation on a re$ular

    or an isolated basis and has not distin$uished a carrier offerin$ his services to the $eneralpublic, that is, the $eneral communit or population, from one offerin$ his services onl to a

    narro! se$ment of the $eneral population.

    Nonetheless, the concept of a common carrier embodied in rticle (@)* of the Civil Code

    coincides neatl !ith the notion of public service under the Public Service ct, !hich

    supplements the la! on common carriers found in the Civil Code. Public service, accordin$ to

    Section (), para$raph &b' of the Public Service ct, includes>

    # # # ever person that no! or hereafter ma o!n, operate, mana$e, or control in the

    Philippines, for hire or compensation, !ith $eneral or limited clientLle, !hether permanent or

    occasional, and done for the $eneral business purposes, an common carrier, railroad, street

    rail!a, traction rail!a, sub!a motor vehicle, either for frei$ht or passen$er, or both, !ith

    or !ithout fi#ed route and !hatever ma be its classification, frei$ht or carrier service of an

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt16
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    5/31

    class, e#press service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and !ater craft, en$a$ed

    in the transportation of passen$ers or frei$ht or both, shipard, marine repair shop, ice2

    refri$eration plant, canal, irri$ation sstem, $as, electric li$ht, heat and po!er, !ater suppl

    and po!er petroleum, se!era$e sstem, !ire or !ireless communications sstems, !ire or

    !ireless broadcastin$ stations and other similar public services. # # #. (@

    Hiven the breadth of the afore0uoted characteriBation of a common carrier, the Court has

    considered as common carriers pipeline operators,( &a' en$a$ed in transportin$ passen$ers $enerall as a

    business, not 1ust as a casual occupation &b' underta8in$ to carr passen$ers over established

    roads b the method b !hich the business !as conducted and &c' transportin$ students for a

    fee. Despite caterin$ to a limited clientLle, the Pere/as operated as a common carrier because

    the held themselves out as a read transportation indiscriminatel to the students of a

    particular school livin$ !ithin or near !here the operated the service and for a fee.

    The common carrier?s standard of care and vi$ilance as to the safet of the passen$ers is

    defined b la!. Hiven the nature of the business and for reasons of public polic, the common

    carrier is bound Kto observe e#traordinar dili$ence in the vi$ilance over the $oods and for the

    safet of the passen$ers transported b them, accordin$ to all the circumstances of each

    case.K**rticle (@44 of the Civil Code specifies that the common carrier should Kcarr the

    passen$ers safel as far as human care and foresi$ht can provide, usin$ the utmost dili$ence of

    ver cautious persons, !ith a due re$ard for all the circumstances.K To successfull fend off

    liabilit in an action upon the death or in1ur to a passen$er, the common carrier must prove

    his or its observance of that e#traordinar dili$ence other!ise, the le$al presumption that he

    or it !as at fault or acted ne$li$entl !ould stand .*)No device, !hether b stipulation, postin$

    of notices, statements on tic8ets, or other!ise, ma dispense !ith or lessen the responsibilit

    of the common carrier as defined under rticle (@44 of the Civil Code. *=

    nd, secondl, the Pere/as have not presented an compellin$ defense or reason b !hich the

    Court mi$ht no! reverse the C?s findin$s on their liabilit. On the contrar, an e#amination

    of the records sho!s that the evidence full supported the findin$s of the C.

    s earlier stated, the Pere/as, actin$ as a common carrier, !ere alread presumed to be

    ne$li$ent at the time of the accident because death had occurred to their passen$er.*4The

    presumption of ne$li$ence, bein$ a presumption of la!, laid the burden of evidence on their

    shoulders to establish that the had not been ne$li$ent.*It !as the la! no less that re0uired

    them to prove their observance of e#traordinar dili$ence in seein$ to the safe and secure

    carria$e of the passen$ers to their destination. Gntil the did so in a credible manner, the

    stood to be held le$all responsible for the death of aron and thus to be held liable for all the

    natural conse0uences of such death.

    There is no 0uestion that the Pere/as did not overturn the presumption of their ne$li$ence b

    credible evidence. Their defense of havin$ observed the dili$ence of a $ood father of a famil

    in the selection and supervision of their driver !as not le$all sufficient. ccordin$ to rticle

    (@4- of the Civil Code, their liabilit as a common carrier did not cease upon proof that the

    e#ercised all the dili$ence of a $ood father of a famil in the selection and supervision of their

    emploee. This !as the reason !h the RTC treated this defense of the Pere/as as

    inappropriate in this action for breach of contract of carria$e.

    The Pere/as !ere liable for the death of aron despite the fact that their driver mi$ht have

    acted beond the scope of his authorit or even in violation of the orders of the common

    carrier.*@In this connection, the records sho!ed their driver?s actual ne$li$ence. There !as a

    sho!in$, to be$in !ith, that their driver traversed the railroad trac8s at a point at !hich the

    PNR did not permit motorists $oin$ into the 7a8ati area to cross the railroad trac8s. lthou$h

    that point had been used b motorists as a shortcut into the 7a8ati area, that fact alone did not

    e#cuse their driver into ta8in$ that route. On the other hand, !ith his familiarit !ith that

    shortcut, their driver !as full a!are of the ris8s to his passen$ers but he still disre$arded the

    ris8s. Compoundin$ his lac8 of care !as that loud music !as plain$ inside the air2

    conditioned van at the time of the accident. The loudness most probabl reduced his abilit to

    hear the !arnin$ horns of the oncomin$ train to allo! him to correctl appreciate the lur8in$

    dan$ers on the railroad trac8s. lso, he sou$ht to overta8e a passen$er bus on the left side as

    both vehicles traversed the railroad trac8s. In so doin$, he lost his vie! of the train that !as

    then comin$ from the opposite side of the passen$er bus, leadin$ him to miscalculate his

    chances of beatin$ the bus in their race, and of $ettin$ clear of the train. s a result, the bus

    avoided a collision !ith the train but the van $ot slammed at its rear, causin$ the fatalit.

    6astl, he did not slo! do!n or $o to a full stop before traversin$ the railroad trac8s despite8no!in$ that his slac8enin$ of speed and $oin$ to a full stop !ere in observance of the ri$ht

    of !a at railroad trac8s as defined b the traffic la!s and re$ulations. *

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    6/31

    The test b !hich to determine the e#istence of ne$li$ence in a particular case has been aptl

    stated in the leadin$ case of Picart v. Smith,)=thus!ise>

    The test b !hich to determine the e#istence of ne$li$ence in a particular case ma be stated

    as follo!s> Did the defendant in doin$ the alle$ed ne$li$ent act use that reasonable care and

    caution !hich an ordinaril prudent person !ould have used in the same situation If not, then

    he is $uilt of ne$li$ence. The la! here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied

    b the ima$inar conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman la!. The e#istence of

    ne$li$ence in a $iven case is not determined b reference to the personal 1ud$ment of the actor

    in the situation before him. The la! considers !hat !ould be rec8less, blame!orth, or

    ne$li$ent in the man of ordinar intelli$ence and prudence and determines liabilit b that.

    The 0uestion as to !hat !ould constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a $iven situation

    must of course be al!as determined in the li$ht of human e#perience and in vie! of the facts

    involved in the particular case. bstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this

    much can be profitabl said> Reasonable men $overn their conduct b the circumstances

    !hich are before them or 8no!n to them. The are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient

    of the future. "ence the can be e#pected to ta8e care onl !hen there is somethin$ before

    them to su$$est or !arn of dan$er. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,

    foresee harm as a result of the course actuall pursued If so, it !as the dut of the actor to

    ta8e precautions to $uard a$ainst that harm. Reasonable foresi$ht of harm, follo!ed b the

    i$norin$ of the su$$estion born of this prevision, is al!as necessar before ne$li$ence can be

    held to e#ist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determinin$ the e#istence of

    ne$li$ence in a $iven case is this> Conduct is said to be ne$li$ent !hen a prudent man in the

    position of the tortfeasor !ould have foreseen that an effect harmful to another !as

    sufficientl probable to !arrant his fore$oin$ the conduct or $uardin$ a$ainst its

    conse0uences. &Emphasis supplied'

    Pursuant to thePicart v. Smithtest of ne$li$ence, the Pere/as? driver !as entirel ne$li$ent

    !hen he traversed the railroad trac8s at a point not allo!ed for a motorist?s crossin$ despite

    bein$ full a!are of the $rave harm to be thereb caused to his passen$ers and !hen he

    disre$arded the foresi$ht of harm to his passen$ers b overta8in$ the bus on the left side as to

    leave himself blind to the approach of the oncomin$ train that he 8ne! !as on the opposite

    side of the bus.

    Gnrelentin$, the Pere/as cite Phil. National Rail!as v. Intermediate ppellate Court,)4!here

    the Court held the PNR solel liable for the dama$es caused to a passen$er bus and its

    passen$ers !hen its train hit the rear end of the bus that !as then traversin$ the railroad

    crossin$. %ut the circumstances of that case and this one share no similarities. In Philippine

    National Rail!as v. Intermediate ppellate Court, no evidence of contributor ne$li$ence

    !as adduced a$ainst the o!ner of the bus. Instead, it !as the o!ner of the bus !ho proved the

    e#ercise of e#traordinar dili$ence b preponderant evidence. lso, the records are replete

    !ith the sho!in$ of ne$li$ence on the part of both the Pere/as and the PNR. nother

    distinction is that the passen$er bus in Philippine National Rail!as v. Intermediate ppellate

    Court !as traversin$ the dedicated railroad crossin$ !hen it !as hit b the train, but the

    Pere/as? school van traversed the railroad trac8s at a point not intended for that purpose.

    t an rate, the lo!er courts correctl held both the Pere/as and the PNR K1ointl and

    severallK liable for dama$es arisin$ from the death of aron. The had been impleaded in the

    same complaint as defendants a$ainst !hom the 3arates had the ri$ht to relief, !hether 1ointl,

    severall, or in the alternative, in respect to or arisin$ out of the accident, and 0uestions of fact

    and of la! !ere common as to the 3arates. )lthou$h the basis of the ri$ht to relief of the

    3arates &i.e., breach of contract of carria$e' a$ainst the Pere/as !as distinct from the basis of

    the 3arates? ri$ht to relief a$ainst the PNR &i.e., 0uasi2delict under rticle *(@, Civil Code',

    the nonetheless could be held 1ointl and severall liable b virtue of their respective

    ne$li$ence combinin$ to cause the death of aron. s to the PNR, the RTC ri$htl found the

    PNR also $uilt of ne$li$ence despite the school van of the Pere/as traversin$ the railroadtrac8s at a point not dedicated b the PNR as a railroad crossin$ for pedestrians and motorists,

    because the PNR did not ensure the safet of others throu$h the placin$ of crossbars, si$nal

    li$hts, !arnin$ si$ns, and other permanent safet barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians

    from crossin$ there. The RTC observed that the fact that a crossin$ $uard had been assi$ned to

    man that point from @ a.m. to 4 p.m. !as a $ood indicium that the PNR !as a!are of the ris8s

    to others as !ell as the need to control the vehicular and other traffic there. :eril, the Pere/as

    and the PNR !ere 1oint tortfeasors.

    .

    Wa the $nde/n$t '&) #& &'

    Aa)&n( ea)n$n% !a2a!$t 2)&2e)

    The RTC a!arded indemnit for loss of aron?s earnin$ capacit. lthou$h a$reein$ !ith the

    RTC on the liabilit, the C modified the amount. %oth lo!er courts too8 into consideration

    that aron, !hile onl a hi$h school student, had been enrolled in one of the reputable schools

    in the Philippines and that he had been a normal and able2bodied child prior to his death. The

    basis for the computation of aron?s earnin$ capacit !as not !hat he !ould have become or

    !hat he !ould have !anted to be if not for his untimel death, but the minimum !a$e in

    effect at the time of his death. 7oreover, the RTC?s computation of aron?s life e#pectanc

    rate !as not rec8oned from his a$e of (4 ears at the time of his death, but on *( ears, his

    a$e !hen he !ould have $raduated from colle$e.

    Ae find the considerations ta8en into account b the lo!er courts to be reasonable and full

    !arranted.

    ;et, the Pere/as submit that the indemnit for loss of earnin$ capacit !as speculative and

    unfounded.1wphi1The cited People v. Teehan8ee, 5r.,)@!here the Court deleted the

    indemnit for victim 5ussi 6eino?s loss of earnin$ capacit as a pilot for bein$ speculative due

    to his havin$ $raduated from hi$h school at the International School in 7anila onl t!o ears

    before the shootin$, and !as at the time of the shootin$ onl enrolled in the first semester at

    the 7anila ero Club to pursue his ambition to become a professional pilot. That meant,

    accordin$ to the Court, that he !as for all intents and purposes onl a hi$h school $raduate.

    Ae re1ect the Pere/as? submission.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_157917_2012.html#fnt37
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    7/31

    irst of all, a careful perusal of the Teehan8ee, 5r. case sho!s that the situation there of 5ussi

    6eino !as not a8in to that of aron here. The C and the RTC !ere not speculatin$ that

    aron !ould be some hi$hl2paid professional, li8e a pilot &or, for that matter, an en$ineer, a

    phsician, or a la!er'. Instead, the computation of aron?s earnin$ capacit !as premised on

    him bein$ a lo!l minimum !a$e earner despite his bein$ then enrolled at a presti$ious hi$h

    school li8e Don %osco in 7a8ati, a fact that !ould have li8el ensured his success in his later

    ears in life and at !or8.

    nd, secondl, the fact that aron !as then !ithout a histor of earnin$s should not be ta8en

    a$ainst his parents and in favor of the defendants !hose ne$li$ence not onl cost aron his

    life and his ri$ht to !or8 and earn mone, but also deprived his parents of their ri$ht to his

    presence and his services as !ell. Our la! itself states that the loss of the earnin$ capacit of

    the deceased shall be the liabilit of the $uilt part in favor of the heirs of the deceased, and

    shall in ever case be assessed and a!arded b the court Kunless the deceased on account of

    permanent phsical disabilit not caused b the defendant, had no earnin$ capacit at the time

    of his death.K)

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    8/31

    as e#penses for his medical treatment, and P),+++ as the cost of an artificial arm, or a total of

    P

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    9/31

    "emos e#aminado mu detenidamente las pruebas presentadas en la vista,

    principalmente, las declaraciones 0ue hemos acotado arriba, hernos Ile$ado a la

    conclusion de 0ue el demandado ha hecho, todo cuanto estuviere de su parte para

    evitar el accidente, pero sin embar$o, no ha podido evitarlo.

    EI hecho de 0ue el demandado, antes del cho0ue, tuvo 0ue hacer pasar su truc8

    encima de los montones de $rava 0ue estaban depositados en la orilla del camino,

    sin 0ue haa ido mas alla, por el $rave ries$o 0ue corrian las vidas de sus pasa1eros,

    es prueba concluente de lo 0ue tenemos dicho, a saber> 0ue el cuanto esuba de

    su parte, para evitar el accidente, sin 0ue haa podidoevitardo, por estar fuera de su

    control.

    The evidence !ould appear to support the above findin$. Thus, it appears that %us No. )(,

    immediatel prior to the collision, !as runnin$ at a moderate speed because it had 1ust stopped

    at the school Bone of 7atacon$, Polan$ui, lba. The pic82up car !as at full speed and !as

    runnin$ outside of its proper lane. The driver of the bus, upon seein$ the manner in !hich the

    pic82up !as then runnin$, s!erved the bus to the ver e#treme ri$ht of the road until its front

    and rear !heels have $one over the pile of stones or $ravel situated on the rampart of the road.

    Said driver could not move the bus farther ri$ht and run over a $reater portion of the pile, the

    pea8 of !hich !as about ) feet hi$h, !ithout endan$erin$ the safet of his passen$ers. nd

    not!ithstandin$ all these efforts, the rear left side of the bus !as hit b the pic82up car.

    Of course, this findin$ is disputed b appellant !ho cannot see ee to ee !ith the evidence

    for the appellee and insists that the collision too8 place because the driver of the bus !as

    $oin$ at a fast speed. "e contends that, havin$ seen that a car !as comin$ from the opposite

    direction at a distance !hich allo!s the use of moderate care and prudence to avoid an

    accident, and 8no!in$ that on the side of the road alon$ !hich he !as $oin$ there !as a pile

    of $ravel, the driver of the bus should have stopped and !aited for the vehicle from the

    opposite direction to pass, and should have proceeded onl after the other vehicle had passed.

    In other !ords, accordin$ to appellant, the act of the driver of the bus in s0ueeBin$ his !a

    throu$h of the bus in s0ueeBin$ his !a throu$h bet!een the oncomin$ pic82up and the pile of

    $ravel under the circumstances !as considered ne$li$ent.

    %ut this matter is one of credibilit and evaluation of the evidence. This is evidence. This is

    the function of the trial court. The trial court has alread spo8en on this matter as !e have

    pointed out above. This is also a matter of appreciation of the situation on the part of the

    driver. Ahile the position ta8en b appellant appeals more to the sense of caution that one

    should observe in a $iven situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such ho!ever can not

    al!as be e#pected from one !ho is placed suddenl in a predicament !here he is not $iven

    enou$h time to ta8e the course of action as he should under ordinar circumstances. One !ho

    is placed in such a predicament cannot e#ercise such coolness or accurac of 1ud$ment as is

    re0uired of him under ordinar circumstances and he cannot therefore be e#pected to observe

    the same 1ud$ment, care and precaution as in the latter. or this reason, authorities abound

    !here failure to observe the same de$ree of care that as ordinar prudent man !ould e#ercise

    under ordinar circumstances !hen confronted !ith a sadden emer$enc !as held to be

    !arranted and a 1ustification to e#empt the carrier from liabilit. Thus, it !as held that K!herea carriers emploee is confronted !ith a sudden emer$enc, the fact that he is obli$ed to act

    0uic8l and !ithout a chance for deliberation must be ta8en into account, and he is held to the

    some de$ree of care that he !ould other!ise be re0uired to e#ercise in the absence of such

    emer$enc but must e#ercise onl such care as an ordinar prudent person !ould e#ercise

    under li8e circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to e#ercise the best

    1ud$ement the case renders possible does not establish lac8 of care and s8ill on his part !hich

    renders the compan, liable. . . . &() C. 5. S., (=(* (+ C. 5.,-@+'. Considerin$ all the

    circumstances, !e are persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has done !hat a

    prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and in our opinion this relieves appellee

    from le$ibilit under our la!.

    circumstances !hich miliates a$ainst the stand of appellant is the fact borne out b the

    evidence that !hen he boarded the bus in 0uestion, he seated himself on the left side thereof

    restin$ his left arm on the !indo! sill but !ith his left elbo! outside the !indo!, this bein$

    his position in the bus !hen the collision too8 place. It is for this reason that the collision

    resulted in the severance of said left arm from the bod of appellant thus doin$ him a $reat

    dama$e. It is therefore apparent that appellant is $uilt of contributor ne$li$ence. "ad he not

    placed his left arm on the !indo! sill !ith a portion thereof protrudin$ outside, perhaps the

    in1ur !ould have been avoided as is the case !ith the other passen$er. It is to be noted that

    appellant !as the onl victim of the collision.

    It is true that such contributor ne$li$ence cannot relieve appellee of its liabilit but !ill onl

    entitle it to a reduction of the amount of dama$e caused &rticle (@*, ne! Civil Code', but

    this is a circumstance !hich further militates a$ainst the position ta8en b appellant in this

    case.

    It is the prevailin$ rule that it is ne$li$ence per se for a passen$er on a railroad

    voluntaril or inadvertentl to protrude his arm, hand, elbo!, or an other part of his

    bod throu$h the !indo! of a movin$ car beond the outer ed$e of the !indo! or

    outer surface of the car, so as to come in contact !ith ob1ects or obstacles near the

    trac8, and that no recover can be had for an in1ur !hich but for such ne$li$ence

    !ould not have been sustained. &(+ C. 5. (()-'

    Plaintiff, &passen$er' !hile ridin$ on an interurban car, to flic8 the ashes, from his

    ci$ar, thrust his hand over the $uard rail a sufficient distance beond the side line of

    the car to brin$ it in contact !ith the trun8 of a tree standin$ beside the trac8 the

    force of the blo! brea8in$ his !rist. "eld, that he !as $uilt of contributor

    ne$li$ence as a matter of la!. &7ala8ia vs. Rhode Island Co.,

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    10/31

    CASE 03 ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS, 2et$t$&ne),

    -.

    COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO, )e2&ndent.

    S;66%GS

    (. CI:I6 6A CO77ON CRRIERS DEINED TEST TO DETER7INE CO77ON

    CRRIER. rticle (@)* of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as K&a' person,

    corporation or firm, or association en$a$ed in the business of carrin$ or transportin$

    passen$ers or $oods or both, b land, !ater or air, for compensation, offerin$ their services to

    the public.K The test to determine a common carrier is K!hether the $iven underta8in$ is a part

    of the business en$a$ed in b the carrier !hich he has held out to the $eneral public as his

    occupation rather than the 0uantit or e#tent of the business transacted.K . . . The holdin$ of

    the Court in De HuBman vs. Court of ppeals is instructive. In referrin$ to rticle (@)* of the

    Civil Code, it held thus> KThe above article ma8es no distinction bet!een one !hose principal

    business activit is the carrin$ of persons or $oods or both, and one !ho does such carrin$

    onl as an ancillar activit &in local idiom, as a KsidelineK'. rticle (@)* also carefull avoidsma8in$ an distinction bet!een a person or enterprise offerin$ transportation service on a

    re$ular or scheduled basis and one offerin$ such service on an occasional, episodic or

    unscheduled basis. Neither does rticle (@)* distin$uished bet!een a carrier offerin$ its

    services to the K$eneral public,K i.e., the $eneral communit or population, and one !ho offers

    services or solicits business onl from a narro! se$ment of the $eneral population. Ae thin8

    that rticle (@)* deliberatel refrained from ma8in$ such distinctions.K

    *. ID. ID. DI6IHENCE REGIRED IN :IHI6NCE O:ER HOODS TRNSPORTED

    A"EN PRESG7PTION O NEH6IHENCE RISES "OA PRESG7PTION

    O:ERC7E A"EN PRESG7PTION 7DE %SO6GTE. Common carriers are

    obli$ed to observe e#traordinar dili$ence in the vi$ilance over the $oods transported b them.

    ccordin$l, the are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted ne$li$entl if the $oodsare lost, destroed or deteriorated. There are ver fe! instances !hen the presumption of

    ne$li$ence does not attach and these instances are enumerated in rticle (@)=. In those cases

    !here the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it e#ercised

    e#traordinar dili$ence in order to overcome the presumption . . . The presumption of

    ne$li$ence !as raised a$ainst petitioner. It !as petitioners burden to overcome it. Thus,

    contrar to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce an evidence to prove her

    ne$li$ence. "er o!n failure to adduce sufficient proof of e#traordinar dili$ence made the

    presumption conclusive a$ainst her.

    ). ID. ID. "I5C9INH O HOODS CRRIER PRESG7ED NEH6IHENT "OA

    CRRIER %SO6:ED RO7 6I%I6IT;. In De HuBman vs. Court of ppeals, the

    Court held that hi1ac8in$, not bein$ included in the provisions of rticle (@)=, must be dealt

    !ith under the provisions of rticle (@)4 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to have

    been at fault or ne$li$ent. To e#culpate the carrier from liabilit arisin$ from hi1ac8in$, he

    must prove that the robbers or the hi1ac8ers acted !ith $rave or irresistible threat, violence, or

    force. This is in accordance !ith rticle (@=4 of the Civil Code !hich provides> Krt. (@=4.

    n of the follo!in$ or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, un1ust and

    contrar to public polic . . . &' That the common carriers liabilit for acts committed b

    thieves, or of robbers !ho do not act !ith $rave or irresistible threat, violences or force, is

    dispensed !ith or diminishedK In the same case, the Supreme Court also held that> KGnder

    rticle (@=4 &' above, a common carrier is held responsible and !ill not be allo!ed to

    divest or to diminish such responsibilit even for acts of stran$ers li8e thieves or robbers,

    e#cept !here such thieves or robbers in fact acted K!ith $rave of irresistible threat, violence offorce,K Ae believe and so hold that the limits of the dut of e#traordinar dili$ence in the

    vi$ilance over the $oods carried are reached !here the $oods are lost as a result of a robber

    !hich is attended b K$rave or irresistible threat, violence or force.K

    =. RE7EDI6 6A E:IDENCE 5GDICI6 D7ISSIONS CONC6GSI:E. In this

    case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she !as in the truc8in$ business, offerin$

    her truc8s to those !ith car$o to move. 5udicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is

    re0uired to prove the same.

    4. ID. ID. %GRDEN O PROO RESTS AIT" PRT; A"O 66EHES CT.

    Petitioner presented no other proof of the e#istence of the contract of lease. "e !ho alle$es a

    fact has the burden of provin$ it.

    . ID. ID. ID:ITS NOT CONSIDERED %EST E:IDENCE I INTS

    :I6%6E S AITNESSES. Ahile the affidavit of 5uanito 7orden, the t ruc8 helper in

    the hi1ac8ed truc8, !as presented as evidence in court, he himself !as a !itness as could be

    $leaned from the contents of the petition. ffidavits are not considered the best evidence if the

    affiants are available as !itnesses.

    @. CI:I6 6A O%6IHTIONS ND CONTRCTS CONTRCT IS A"T 6A

    DEINES IT TO %E. Hrantin$ that the said evidence !ere not self2servin$, the same !ere

    not sufficient to prove that the contract !as one of lease. It must be understood that a contract

    is !hat the la! defines it to be and not !hat it is called b the contractin$ parties.

    D E C I S I O N

    C7POS, 5R., 5 p>

    This is a petition for revie! on certiorari of the decision QQ of the Court of ppeals in

    KRODO6O . CIPRINO, doin$ business under the name CIPRINO TRDINH

    ENTERPRISES plaintiff2appellee, vs. ESTRE66IT 7. %SCOS, doin$ business under the

    name of %SCOS TRGC9INH, defendant2appellant,K C..2H.R. C: No. *4*(, the

    dispositive portion of !hich is 0uoted hereunder>

    KPRE7ISES considered, Ae find no reversible error in the decision appealed from, !hich ishereb affirmed in toto. Costs a$ainst appellant.K (

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    11/31

    The facts, as $athered b this Court, are as follo!s>

    Rodolfo . Cipriano representin$ Cipriano Tradin$ Enterprise &CIPTRDE for short' entered

    into a haulin$ contract * !ith 5ibfair Shippin$ $enc Corporation !hereb the former bound

    itself to haul the latters *,+++ mFtons of soa bean meal from 7a$allanes Drive, Del Pan,

    7anila to the !arehouse of Purefoods Corporation in Calamba, 6a$una. To carr out its

    obli$ation, CIPTRDE, throu$h Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted !ith Estrellita %ascos

    &petitioner' to transport and to deliver =++ sac8s of soa bean meal !orth P(4,=+=.++ from

    the 7anila Port rea to Calamba, 6a$una at the rate of P4+.++ per metric ton. Petitioner failed

    to deliver the said car$o. s a conse0uence of that failure, Cipriano paid 5ibfair Shippin$

    $enc the amount of the lost $oods in accordance !ith the contract !hich stated that>

    K(. CIPTRDE shall be held liable and ans!erable for an loss in ba$s due to theft, hi1ac8in$

    and non2deliver or dama$es to the car$o durin$ transport at mar8et value, . . .K )

    Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pa. Eventuall,

    Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of mone and dama$es !ith !rit of preliminar

    attachment = for breach of a contract of carria$e. The praer for a Arit of Preliminar

    ttachment !as supported b an affidavit 4 !hich contained the follo!in$ alle$ations>

    K=. That this action is one of those specificall mentioned in Sec. (, Rule 4@ the Rules ofCourt, !hereb a !rit of preliminar attachment ma la!full issue, namel>

    K&e' in an action a$ainst a part !ho has removed or disposed of his propert, or is about to do

    so, !ith intent to defraud his creditorsK

    4. That there is no sufficient securit for the claim sou$ht to be enforced b the present action

    . That the amount due to the plaintiff in the above2entitled case is above all le$al

    counterclaimsK

    The trial court $ranted the !rit of preliminar attachment on ebruar (@, (- that there !as no contract of

    carria$e since CIPTRDE leased her car$o truc8 to load the car$o from 7anila Port rea to

    6a$una that CIPTRDE !as liable to petitioner in the amount of P((,+++.++ for loadin$ the

    car$o that the truc8 carrin$ the car$o !as hi1ac8ed alon$ Canoni$o St., Paco, 7anila on the

    ni$ht of October *(, (-

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    12/31

    trial courts decision that petitioner !as a common carrier, 7oreover, both courts appreciated

    the follo!in$ pieces of evidence as indicators that petitioner !as a common carrier> the fact

    that the truc8 driver of petitioner, 7a#imo San$la, received the car$o consistin$ of =++ ba$s

    of soa bean meal as evidenced b a car$o receipt si$ned b 7a#imo San$la the fact that the

    truc8 helper, 5uanito 7orden, !as also an emploee of petitioner and the fact that control of

    the car$o !as placed in petitioners care.

    In disputin$ the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner !as a common

    carrier, she alle$ed in this petition that the contract bet!een her and Rodolfo . Cipriano,

    representin$ CIPTRDE, !as lease of the truc8. She cited as evidence certain affidavits !hich

    referred to the contract as KleaseK. These affidavits !ere made b 5esus %ascos < and b

    petitioner herself. - She further averred that 5esus %ascos confirmed in his testimon his

    statement that the contract !as a lease contract. (+ She also stated that> she !as not caterin$ to

    the $eneral public. Thus, in her ans!er to the amended complaint, she said that she does

    business under the same stle of .7. %ascos Truc8in$, offerin$ her t ruc8s for lease to those

    !ho have car$o to move, not to the $eneral public but to a fe! customers onl in vie! of the

    fact that it is onl a small business. ((

    Ae a$ree !ith the respondent Court in its findin$ that petitioner is a common carrier.

    rticle (@)* of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as K&a' person, corporation or firm, or

    association en$a$ed in the business of carrin$ or transportin$ passen$ers or $oods or both, b

    land, !ater or air, for compensation, offerin$ their services to the public.K The test to

    determine a common carrier is K!hether the $iven underta8in$ is a part of the business

    en$a$ed in b the carrier !hich he has held out to the $eneral public as his occupation rather

    than the 0uantit or e#tent of the business transacted.K (* In this case, petitioner herself has

    made the admission that she !as in the truc8in$ business, offerin$ her truc8s to those !ith

    car$o to move. 5udicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is re0uired to prove the

    same. ()

    %ut petitioner ar$ues that there !as onl a contract of lease because the offer their services

    onl to a select $roup of people and because the private respondents, plaintiffs in the lo!er

    court, did not ob1ect to the presentation of affidavits b petitioner !here the transaction !as

    referred to as a lease contract.

    Re$ardin$ the first contention, the holdin$ of the Court in De HuBman vs. Court of ppeals (=

    is instructive. In referrin$ to rticle (@)* of the Civil Code, it held thus>

    KThe above article ma8es no distinction bet!een one !hose principal business activit is the

    carrin$ of persons or $oods or both, and one !ho does such carrin$ onl as an ancillar

    activit &in local idiom, as a KsidelineK'. rticle (@)* also carefull avoids ma8in$ an

    distinction bet!een a person or enterprise offerin$ transportation service on a re$ular or

    scheduled basis and one offerin$ such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.

    Neither does rticle (@)* distin$uish bet!een a carrier offerin$ its services to the K$eneral

    public,K i.e., the $eneral communit or population, and one !ho offers services or solicits

    business onl from a narro! se$ment of the $eneral population. Ae thin8 that rticle (@)*

    deliberatel refrained from ma8in$ such distinctions.K

    Re$ardin$ the affidavits presented b petitioner to the court, both the trial and appellate courts

    have dismissed them as self2servin$ and petitioner contests the conclusion. Ae are bound b

    the appellate courts factual conclusions. ;et, $rantin$ that the said evidence !ere not self2

    servin$, the same !ere not sufficient to prove that the contract !as one of lease. It must be

    understood that a contract is !hat the la! defines it to be and not !hat it is called b the

    contractin$ parties. (4 urthermore, petitioner presented no other proof of the e#istence of the

    contract of lease. "e !ho alle$es a fact has the burden of provin$ it. (

    6i8e!ise, Ae affirm the holdin$ of the respondent court that the loss of the $oods !as not due

    to force ma1eure.

    Common carriers are obli$ed to observe e#traordinar dili$ence in the vi$ilance over the

    $oods transported b them. (@ ccordin$l, the are presumed to have been at fault or to have

    acted ne$li$entl if the $oods are lost, destroed or deteriorated. (< There are ver fe!

    instances !hen the presumption of ne$li$ence does not attach and these instances are

    enumerated in rticle (@)=. (- In those cases !here the presumption is applied, the common

    carrier must prove that it e#ercised e#traordinar dili$ence in order to overcome the

    presumption.

    In this case, petitioner alle$ed that hi1ac8in$ constituted force ma1eure !hich e#culpated her

    from liabilit for the loss of the car$o. In De HuBman vs. Court of ppeals, *+ the Court held

    that hi1ac8in$, not bein$ included in the provisions of rticle (@)=, must be dealt !ith under

    the provisions of rticle (@)4 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault

    or ne$li$ent. To e#culpate the carrier from liabilit arisin$ from hi1ac8in$, he must prove that

    the robbers or the hi1ac8ers acted !ith $rave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. This is in

    accordance !ith rticle (@=4 of the Civil Code !hich provides>

    Krt. (@=4. n of the follo!in$ or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable,

    un1ust and contrar to public polic

    ### ### ###

    &' That the common carriers liabilit for acts committed b thieves, or of robbers !ho do not

    act !ith $rave or irresistible threat, violences or force, is dispensed !ith or diminishedK

    In the same case, *( the Supreme Court also held that>

    KGnder rticle (@=4 &' above, a common carrier is held responsible and !ill not be

    allo!ed to divest or to diminish such responsibilit even for acts of stran$ers li8e thieves or

    robbers e#cept !here such thieves or robbers in fact acted !ith $rave or irresistible threat,

    violence or force. Ae believe and so hold that the limits of the dut of e#traordinar dili$ence

    in the vi$ilance over the $oods carried are reached !here the $oods are lost as a result of arobber !hich is attended b K$rave or i rresistible threat, violence or force.K

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    13/31

    To establish $rave and irresistible force, petitioner presented her accusator affidavit, ** 5esus

    %ascos affidavit, *) and 5uanito 7ordens *= KSalasaK. "o!ever, both the trial court and

    the Court of ppeals have concluded that these affidavits !ere not enou$h to overcome the

    presumption. Petitioners affidavit about the hi1ac8in$ !as based on !hat had been told her b

    5uanito 7orden. It !as not a first2hand account. Ahile it had been admitted in court for lac8 of

    ob1ection on the part of private respondent, the respondent Court had discretion in assi$nin$

    !ei$ht to such evidence. Ae are bound b the conclusion of the appellate court. In a petition

    for revie! on certiorari, Ae are not to determine the probative value of evidence but to resolve

    0uestions of la!. Secondl, the affidavit of 5esus %ascos did not d!ell on ho! the hi1ac8in$

    too8 place. Thirdl, !hile the affidavit of 5uanito 7orden, the truc8 helper in the hi1ac8edtruc8, !as presented as evidence in court, he himself !as a !itness as could be $leaned from

    the contents of the petition. ffidavits are not considered the best evidence if the affiants are

    available as !itnesses. *4 The subse0uent filin$ of the information for carnappin$ and robber

    a$ainst the accused named in said affidavits did not necessaril mean that the contents of the

    affidavits !ere true because the !ere et to be determined in the trial of the criminal cases.

    The presumption of ne$li$ence !as raised a$ainst petitioner. It !as petitioners burden to

    overcome it. Thus, contrar to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce an

    evidence to prove her ne$li$ence. "er o!n failure to adduce sufficient proof of e#traordinar

    dili$ence made the presumption conclusive a$ainst her.

    "avin$ affirmed the findin$s of the respondent Court on the substantial issues involved, Aefind no reason to disturb the conclusion that the motion to liftFdissolve the !rit of preliminar

    attachment has been rendered moot and academic b the decision on the merits.

    In the li$ht of the fore$oin$ analsis, it is Our opinion that the petitioners claim cannot be

    sustained. The petition is DIS7ISSED and the decision of the Court of ppeals is hereb

    IR7ED. SO ORDERED.

    CASE 07 LI5HT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY 8 RODOLFO ROMAN,petitioners,

    vs. MAR9ORIE NA:IDAD, He$) &' the Late NICANOR NA:IDAD 8

    PRUDENT SECURITY A5ENCY, respondents.

    D E C I S I O N

    :ITU5, 9.6

    The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of

    ppeals, promul$ated on *@ pril *+++ and (+ October *+++, respectivel, in C2H.R. C:

    No. +@*+, entitled 7ar1orie Navidad and "eirs of the 6ate Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo

    Roman, et. al., !hich has modified the decision of (( u$ust (--< of the Re$ional Trial Court,

    %ranch *, Pasi$ Cit, e#oneratin$ Prudent Securit $enc &Prudent' from liabilit and

    findin$ 6i$ht Rail Transit uthorit &6RT' and Rodolfo Roman liable for dama$es onaccount of the death of Nicanor Navidad.

    On (= October (--), about half an hour past seven ocloc8 in the evenin$, Nicanor

    Navidad, then drun8, entered the EDS 6RT station after purchasin$ a to8en &representin$

    pament of the fare'. Ahile Navidad !as standin$ on the platform near the 6RT trac8s,

    5unelito Escartin, the securit $uard assi$ned to the area approached Navidad.

    misunderstandin$ or an altercation bet!een the t!o apparentl ensued that led to a fist

    fi$ht. No evidence, ho!ever, !as adduced to indicate ho! the fi$ht started or !ho, bet!een

    the t!o, delivered the first blo! or ho! Navidad later fell on the 6RT trac8s. t the e#act

    moment that Navidad fell, an 6RT train, operated b petitioner Rodolfo Roman, !as comin$

    in. Navidad !as struc8 b the movin$ train, and he !as 8illed instantaneousl.

    On +< December (--=, the !ido! of Nicanor, herein respondent 7ar1orie Navidad,

    alon$ !ith her children, filed a complaint for dama$es a$ainst 5unelito Escartin, Rodolfo

    Roman, the 6RT, the 7etro Transit Or$aniBation, Inc. &7etro Transit', and Prudent for the

    death of her husband. 6RT and Roman filed a counterclaim a$ainst Navidad and a cross2

    claim a$ainst Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its ans!er, denied liabilit and averred that it

    had e#ercised due dili$ence in the selection and supervision of its securit $uards.

    The 6RT and Roman presented their evidence !hile Prudent and Escartin, instead of

    presentin$ evidence, filed a demurrer contendin$ that Navidad had failed to prove that

    Escartin !as ne$li$ent in his assi$ned tas8. On (( u$ust (--

    A"EREORE, 1ud$ment is hereb rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and a$ainst the

    defendants Prudent Securit and 5unelito Escartin orderin$ the latter to pa 1ointl and

    severall the plaintiffs the follo!in$>

    a' (' ctual dama$es of P==,

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    14/31

    Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holdin$ the 6RT and Roman 1ointl and severall liable

    thusl>

    A"EREORE, the assailed 1ud$ment is hereb MODIFIED, b e#oneratin$ the appellants

    from an liabilit for the death of Nicanor Navidad, 5r. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and

    the 6i$ht Rail Transit uthorit &6RT' are held liable for his death and are hereb directed to

    pa 1ointl and severall to the plaintiffs2appellees, the follo!in$ amounts>

    a' P==,

    I.

    T"E "ONOR%6E COGRT O PPE6S HR:E6; ERRED %; DISREHRDINH T"E

    INDINHS O CTS %; T"E TRI6 COGRT

    II.

    T"E "ONOR%6E COGRT O PPE6S HR:E6; ERRED IN INDINH T"T

    PETITIONERS RE 6I%6E OR T"E DET" O NICNOR N:IDD, 5R.

    III.

    T"E "ONOR%6E COGRT O PPE6S HR:E6; ERRED IN INDINH T"T

    RODO6O RO7N IS N E7P6O;EE O 6RT.)U

    Petitioners !ould contend that the appellate court i$nored the evidence and the factual

    findin$s of the trial court b holdin$ them liable on the basis of a s!eepin$ conclusion that the

    presumption of ne$li$ence on the part of a common carrier !as not overcome. Petitioners

    !ould insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, !hich caused the latter to fall on the trac8s,!as an act of a stran$er that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The 6RT !ould add

    that the appellate courts conclusion on the e#istence of an emploer2emploee relationship

    bet!een Roman and 6RT lac8ed basis because Roman himself had testified bein$ an

    emploee of 7etro Transit and not of the 6RT.

    Respondents, supportin$ the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of

    carria$e !as deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the 6RT station and

    entered the premises of the latter, entitlin$ Navidad to all the ri$hts and protection under a

    contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctl held 6RT and Roman liable for

    the death of Navidad in failin$ to e#ercise e#traordinar dili$ence imposed upon a common

    carrier.

    6a! and 1urisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its

    business and for reasons of public polic, is burdened !ith the dut of e#ercisin$ utmost

    dili$ence in ensurin$ the safet of passen$ers. =UThe Civil Code, $overnin$ the liabilit of a

    common carrier for death of or in1ur to its passen$ers, provides>

    rticle (@44. common carrier is bound to carr the passen$ers safel as far as human care

    and foresi$ht can provide, usin$ the utmost dili$ence of ver cautious persons, !ith a due

    re$ard for all the circumstances.

    rticle (@4. In case of death of or in1uries to passen$ers, common carriers are presumed to

    have been at fault or to have acted ne$li$entl, unless the prove that the observed

    e#traordinar dili$ence as prescribed in articles (@)) and (@44.

    rticle (@4-. Common carriers are liable for the death of or in1uries to passen$ers throu$h the

    ne$li$ence or !illful acts of the formers emploees, althou$h such emploees ma have acted

    beond the scope of their authorit or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

    This liabilit of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that the e#ercised all the

    dili$ence of a $ood father of a famil in the selection and supervision of their emploees.

    rticle (@). common carrier is responsible for in1uries suffered b a passen$er on account

    of the !illful acts or ne$li$ence of other passen$ers or of stran$ers, if the common carriers

    emploees throu$h the e#ercise of the dili$ence of a $ood father of a famil could have

    prevented or stopped the act or omission.

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/feb2003/145804.htm#_ftn4
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    15/31

    The la! re0uires common carriers to carr passen$ers safel usin$ the utmost dili$ence

    of ver cautious persons !ith due re$ard for all circumstances. 4USuch dut of a common

    carrier to provide safet to its passen$ers so obli$ates it not onl durin$ the course of the trip

    but for so lon$ as the passen$ers are !ithin its premises and !here the ou$ht to be in

    pursuance to the contract of carria$e.UThe statutor provisions render a common carrier

    liable for death of or in1ur to passen$ers &a' throu$h the ne%#$%en!e &) ;$#'"# a!t &' $t

    e/2#&ee or < &n a!!&"nt &' ;$#'"# a!t &) ne%#$%en!e &' &the) 2aen%e) &) &'

    t)an%e)$' the !&//&n !a))$e) e/2#&ee th)&"%h the e4e)!$e &' d"e d$#$%en!e !&"#d

    ha-e 2)e-ented &) t&22ed the a!t &) &/$$&n.@UIn case of such death or in1ur, a carrier is

    presumed to have been at fault or been ne$li$ent, and

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    16/31

    !ere done under sedation. "er confinement in the hospital lasted from u$ust *) toSeptember @, (-

    &(' P4+,+++.++ as actual and compensator dama$es

    &*' P4+,+++.++ as moral dama$es

    &)' P(+,+++.++ as attornes fees and

    &=' P(,+++.++ as e#penses of liti$ation and

    &4' to pa the costs.

    SO ORDERED.

    "ence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the rulin$ in Civil Case No. )=-+ that thene$li$ence of :erena !as the pro#imate cause of the accident ne$ates his liabilit and that to

    rule other!ise !ould be to ma8e the common carrier an insurer of the safet of its passen$ers."e contends that the bumpin$ of the 1eepne b the truc8 o!ned b Salva !as a caso fortuito.Petitioner further assails the a!ard of moral dama$es to Sun$a on the $round that it is notsupported b evidence.

    The petition has no merit.

    The ar$ument that Sun$a is bound b the rulin$ in Civil Case No. )=-+ findin$ the driver andthe o!ner of the truc8 liable for 0uasi2delict i$nores the fact that she !as never a part to that

    case and, therefore, the principle ofres juicatadoes not appl.

    Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. )=-+ and in the present case the same. The issue in CivilCase No. )=-+ !as !hether Salva and his driver :erena !ere liable for 0uasi2delict for thedama$e caused to petitioners 1eepne. On the other hand, the issue in this case is !hether

    petitioner is liable on his contract of carria$e. Thefirst, 0uasi2delict, also 8no!n as culpa

    aquiliana or culpa e"tra contractual, has as its source the ne$li$ence of the tortfeasor.

    Thesecon, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the ne$li$ence in theperformance of a contractual obli$ation.

    Conse0uentl, in 0uasi2delict, the ne$li$ence or fault should be clearl established because itis the basis of the action, !hereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merel

    b provin$ the e#istence of the contract and the fact that the obli$or, in this case the commoncarrier, failed to transport his passen$er safel to his destination.*In case of death or in1uries to

    passen$ers, rt. (@4 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to havebeen at fault or to have acted ne$li$entl unless the prove that the observed e#traordinardili$ence as defined in rts. (@)) and (@44 of the Code. This provision necessaril shifts tothe common carrier the burden of proof.

    There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the rulin$ in Civil Case No. )=-+, findin$ Salva

    and his driver :erena liable for the dama$e to petitioners 1eepne, should be bindin$ onSun$a. It is immaterial that the pro#imate cause of the collision bet!een the 1eepne and thetruc8 !as the ne$li$ence of the truc8 driver. The doctrine of pro#imate cause is applicableonl in actions for 0uasi2delict, not in actions involvin$ breach of contract. The doctrine is adevice for imputin$ liabilit to a person !here there is no relation bet!een him and another

    part. In such a case, the obli$ation is created b la! itself. %ut, !here there is a pre2e#istin$contractual relation bet!een the parties, it is the parties themselves !ho create the obli$ation,and the function of the la! is merel to re$ulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contractsof carria$e are concerned, some aspects re$ulated b the Civil Code are those respectin$ the

    dili$ence re0uired of common carriers !ith re$ard to the safet of passen$ers as !ell as thepresumption of ne$li$ence in cases of death or in1ur to passen$ers. It provides>

    rt. (@)). Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for

    reasons of public polic, are bound to observe e#traordinar dili$ence inthe vi$ilance over the $oods and for the safet of the passen$erstransported b them, accordin$ to all the circumstances of each case.

    Such e#traordinar dili$ence in the vi$ilance over the $oods is further

    e#pressed in articles (@)=, (@)4, and (@=, Nos. 4, , and @, !hile thee#traordinar dili$ence for the safet of the passen$ers is further set forthin articles (@44 and (@4.

    rt. (@44. common carrier is bound to carr the passen$ers safel as faras human care and foresi$ht can provide, usin$ the utmost dili$ence ofver cautious persons, !ith due re$ard for all the circumstances.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt2
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    17/31

    rt. (@4. In case of death of or in1uries to passen$ers, common carriersare presumed to have been at fault or to have acted ne$li$entl, unless the

    prove that the observed e#traordinar dili$ence as prescribed b articles(@)) and (@44.

    In the case at bar, upon the happenin$ of the accident, the presumption of ne$li$ence at oncearose, and it became the dut of petitioner to prove that he had to observe e#traordinardili$ence in the care of his passen$ers.

    No!, did the driver of 1eepne carr Sun$a Ksafel as far as human care and foresi$ht couldprovide, usin$ the utmost dili$ence of ver cautious persons, !ith due re$ard for all the

    circumstancesK as re0uired b rt. (@44 Ae do not thin8 so. Several factors militate a$ainstpetitioners contention.

    #irst, as found b the Court of ppeals, the 1eepne !as not properl par8ed, its rear portionbein$ e#posed about t!o meters from the broad shoulders of the hi$h!a, and facin$ themiddle of the hi$h!a in a dia$onal an$le. This is a violation of the R.. No. =(), asamended, or the 6and Transportation and Traffic Code, !hich provides>

    Sec. 4=. $%struction of &raffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle

    in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passa$e of an vehicle, nor,!hile dischar$in$ or ta8in$ on passen$ers or loadin$ or unloadin$ frei$ht,obstruct the free passa$e of other vehicles on the hi$h!a.

    Secon, it is undisputed that petitioners driver too8 in more passen$ers than the allo!edseatin$ capacit of the 1eepne, a violation of V)*&a' of the same la!. It provides>

    '"ceein! re!istere capacit(. No person operatin$ an motor vehicleshall allo! more passen$ers or more frei$ht or car$o in his vehicle than its

    re$istered capacit.

    The fact that Sun$a !as seated in an Ke#tension seatK placed her in a peril $reater than that to!hich the other passen$ers !ere e#posed. Therefore, not onl !as petitioner unable toovercome the presumption of ne$li$ence imposed on him for the in1ur sustained b Sun$a,

    but also, the evidence sho!s he !as actuall ne$li$ent in transportin$ passen$ers.

    Ae find it hard to $ive serious thou$ht to petitioners contention that Sun$as ta8in$ anKe#tension seatK amounted to an implied assumption of ris8. It is a8in to ar$uin$ that the

    in1uries to the man victims of the tra$edies in our seas should not be compensated merelbecause those passen$ers assumed a $reater ris8 of dro!nin$ b boardin$ an overloaded ferr.This is also true of petitioners contention that the 1eepne bein$ bumped !hile it !asimproperl par8ed constitutes caso fortuito. caso fortuitois an event !hich could not beforeseen, or !hich, thou$h foreseen, !as inevitable.)This re0uires that the follo!in$

    re0uirements be present> &a' the cause of the breach is independent of the debtors !ill &b' theevent is unforeseeable or unavoidable &c' the event is such as to render it impossible for thedebtor to fulfill his obli$ation in a normal manner, and &d' the debtor did not ta8e part incausin$ the in1ur to the

    creditor.=Petitioner should have foreseen the dan$er of par8in$ his 1eepne !ith its bodprotrudin$ t!o meters into the hi$h!a.

    inall, petitioner challen$es the a!ard of moral dama$es alle$in$ that it is e#cessive and!ithout basis in la!. Ae find this contention !ell ta8en.

    In a!ardin$ moral dama$es, the Court of ppeals stated>

    Plaintiff2appellant at the time of the accident !as a first2ear colle$estudent in that school ear (- &(' in cases in !hich the mishapresults in the death of a passen$er, as provided in rt. (@=, in relation to rt. **+&)' of theCivil Code and &*' in the cases in !hich the carrier is $uilt of fraud or bad faith, as providedin rt. ***+.

    In this case, there is no le$al basis for a!ardin$ moral dama$es since there !as no factualfindin$ b the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the

    contract of carria$e. Sun$as contention that petitioners admission in open court that the driverof the 1eepne failed to assist her in $oin$ to a nearb hospital cannot be construed as anadmission of bad faith. The fact that it !as the driver of the IsuBu truc8 !ho too8 her to thehospital does not impl that petitioner !as utterl indifferent to the pli$ht of his in1ured

    passen$er. If at all, it is merel implied reco$nition b :erena that he !as the one at fault forthe accident.

    A"EREORE, the decision of the Court of ppeals, dated 7arch )(, (--4, and its resolution,dated September ((, (--4, are IR7ED, !ith the 7ODIICTION that the a!ard ofmoral dama$es is DE6ETED.

    SO ORDERED.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/may2000/gr_122039_2000.html#fnt6
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    18/31

    CASE 0> He)/$n$& Ma)$an& -. I#de'&n& Ca##e+a, 5.R. N&. 1>>>70, 9"# 31, 00?

    PUNO, C.J.>

    On appeal are the Decision @1and Resolution@of the Court of ppeals in C2H.R.C: No.

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    19/31

    dama$es to plaintiff2appellee "erminio E. 7ariano, 5r., is RE:ERSEDand SET SIDE and another one entered absolvin$ them from an

    liabilit for the death o f Dr. relinda Car$o 7ariano.@?

    The appellate court also denied the motion for reconsideration filed b petitioner.

    "ence, this appeal, relin$ on the follo!in$ $round>

    T"E DECISION O T"E "ONOR%6E COGRT O PPE6S,

    SPECI6 OGRTEENT" DI:ISION IS NOT IN CCORD AIT" T"ECTG6 %SIS O T"E CSE.@10

    The follo!in$ are the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to the case at bar>

    RT. (@)). Common carriers, from the nature of their businessand for reasons of public polic, are bound to observe e#traordinardili$ence in the vi$ilance over the $oods and for the safet of the

    passen$ers transported b them, accordin$ to all the circumstances of eachcase.

    RT. (@44. common carrier is bound to carr the passen$erssafel as far as human care and foresi$ht can provide, usin$ the utmostdili$ence of ver cautious persons, !ith a due re$ard for all the

    circumstances.RT. (@4. In case of death of or in1uries to passen$ers,

    common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have actedne$li$entl, unless the prove that the observed e#traordinar dili$ence

    as prescribed in articles (@)) and (@44.

    In accord !ith the above provisions, Celrosa E#press, a common carrier, throu$hits driver, respondent De %or1a, and its re$istered o!ner, respondent Calle1as, has the e#press

    obli$ation to carr the passen$ers safel as far as human care and foresi$ht can provide, usin$the utmost dili$ence of ver cautious persons, !ith a due re$ard for all the circumstances,@11and to observe e#traordinar dili$ence in the dischar$e of its dut. The death of the !ife ofthe petitioner in the course of transportin$ her to her destination $ave rise to the presumption

    of ne$li$ence of the carrier. To overcome the presumption, respondents have to sho! that theobserved e#traordinar dili$ence in the dischar$e of their dut, or that the accident !as caused

    b a fortuitous event.

    This Court interpreted the above 0uoted provisions in P$#a2$# -. C&")t &' A22ea#.@1Ae elucidated>

    Ahile the la! re0uires the hi$hest de$ree of dili$ence from

    common carriers in the safe transport of their passen$ers and creates apresumption of ne$li$ence a$ainst them, $t d&e n&t, h&;e-e), /ae the!a))$e) an $n")e) &' the a"te a'et &' $t 2aen%e).

    rticle (@44 of the Civil Code 0ualifies the dut of

    e#traordinar care, vi$ilance and precaution in the carria$e of passen$ersb common carriers to onl such as human care and foresi$ht can provide.

    Ahat constitutes compliance !ith said dut is ad1ud$ed !ith due re$ard toall the circumstances.

    rticle (@4 of the Civil Code, in creatin$ a presumption offault or ne$li$ence on the part of the common carrier !hen its passen$er isin1ured, merel relieves the latter, for the time bein$, from introducin$

    evidence to fasten the ne$li$ence on the former, because the presumptionstands in the place of evidence. Be$n% a /e)e 2)e"/2t$&n, h&;e-e), thea/e $ )e"tta#e 2)&&' that the !&//&n !a))$e) had e4e)!$ed

    e4t)a&)d$na) d$#$%en!e a )e"$)ed #a; $n the 2e)'&)/an!e &' $t

    !&nt)a!t"a# $%at$&n, &) that the $n+") "''e)ed the 2aen%e)

    ;a e# d"e t& a '&)t"$t&" e-ent.

    In fine, !e can onl infer from the la! the intention of the CodeCommission and Con$ress to curb the rec8lessness of drivers and

    operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.

    Th", $t $ !#ea) that ne$the) the #a; n&) the nat")e &' the

    "$ne &' a t)an2&)tat$&n !&/2an /ae $t an $n")e) &' the

    2aen%e) a'et, but that its liabilit for personal in1uries sustained bits passen$er rests upon its ne$li$ence, its failure to e#ercise the de$ree ofdili$ence that the la! re0uires.

    In the case at bar, petitioner cannot succeed in his contention that respondents failedto overcome the presumption of ne$li$ence a$ainst them. The totalit of evidence sho!s thatthe death of petitioners spouse !as caused b the rec8less ne$li$ence of the driver of the IsuBu

    trailer truc8 !hich lost its bra8es and bumped the Celrosa E#press bus, o!ned and operatedb respondents.

    irst, !e advert to the s8etch prepared b PO) 7a$no S. de :illa, !ho investi$ated

    the accident. The s8etch@13sho!s the passen$er bus facin$ the direction of Ta$ata Cit andlin$ on its ri$ht side on the shoulder of the road, about five meters a!a from the point ofimpact. On the other hand, the trailer truc8 !as on the opposite direction, about 4++ metersa!a from the point of impact. PO) De :illa stated that he intervie!ed De %or1a, respondent

    driver of the passen$er bus, !ho said that he !as about to unload some passen$ers !hen hisbus !as bumped b the driver of the trailer truc8 that lost its bra8es. PO) De :illa chec8ed outthe trailer truc8 and found that its bra8es reall failed."e testified before the trial court, asfollo!s>

    TT;. ESTE6;DI3>

    0 ;ou pointed to the IsuBu truc8 beond the point of impact. Did ouinvesti$ate !h did )sic* the IsuBu truc8 is beond the point of

    impact

    a %ecause the truc8 has no bra8es.

    COGRT>

    0 Ahat is the distance bet!een that circle !hich is mar8ed as E#h. (2c tothe place !here ou found the same

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/166640.htm#_ftn13
  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    20/31

    a 7ore or less 4++ meters.

    0 Ah did ou sa that the truc8 has no bra8es

    a I tested it.

    0 nd ou found no bra8es

    a ;es, sir.

    # # #

    0 Ahen ou !ent to the scene of accident, !hat !as the position ofCelrosa bus

    a It !as lin$ on its side.

    COGRT>

    0 Ri$ht side or left side

    a Ri$ht side.

    TT;. ESTE6;DI3>

    0 On !hat part of the road !as it lin$

    a On the shoulder of the road.

    COGRT>

    0 "o! man meters from the point of impact

    a Near, about 4 meters.@17

    "is police report bolsters his testimon and states>

    Said vehicle ( passen$er busU !as runnin$ from 7anila to!ard

    south direction !hen, in the course of its travel, it !as hit and bumped bvehicle * truc8 !ith trailerU then runnin$ fast from opposite direction,causin$ said vehicle ( to fall on its side on the road shoulder, causin$ the

    death of one and in1uries of some passen$ers thereof, and its dama$e, aftercollission )sic*, vehicle * continiousl )sic* ran and s topped at

    appro#imatel 4++ meters a!a from the piont )sic* of impact.@1=

    In fine, the evidence sho!s that before the collision, the passen$er bus !as cruisin$ on its

    ri$htful lane alon$ the $uinaldo "i$h!a !hen the trailer truc8 comin$ from the oppositedirection, on full speed, suddenl s!erved and encroached on its lane, and bumped the

    passen$er bus on its left middle portion. Respondent driver De %or1a had ever ri$ht to e#pectthat the trailer truc8 comin$ from the opposite direction !ould sta on its proper lane. "e !as

    not e#pected to 8no! that the trailer truc8 had lost its bra8es. The s!ervin$ of the trailer truc8!as abrupt and it !as runnin$ on a fast speed as it !as found 4++ meters a!a from the pointof collision. Secondl, an doubt as to the culpabilit of the driver of the trailer truc8 ou$ht to

    vanish !hen he pleaded $uilt to the char$e of rec8less imprudence resultin$ to multiple sli$ht

    phsical in1uries and dama$e to propert in Criminal Case No. ***)2-*, involvin$ the sameincident.

    IN :IEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 7a *(, *++=and the Resolution dated 5anuar @, *++4 of the Court of ppeals in C2H.R. C: No.

    On September =, (-@

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    21/31

    hatch of the vessel !hich !as flooded !ith !ater about one foot deep that the !aterentered the hatch !hen the vessel encountered heav !eather enroute to 7anila

    &E#hibits H, *, *, *%2RaBon' that upon re0uest, a surve of bad order car$o !asconducted at the pier in the presence of the representatives of the consi$nee and thedefendant E. RaBon, Inc. and it !as found that seven coils !ere rust on one sideeach &E#hibits and (+2RaBon' that upon surve conducted at the consi$nees!arehouse it !as found that the K!ettin$ &of the car$o' !as caused b fresh !aterK

    that entered the hatch !hen the vessel encountered heav !eather enroute to 7anila&p. ), E#hibit H' and that all thirteen coils !ere e#tremel rust and totallunsuitable for the intended purpose &p. ), E#hibit H', &pp. *(@2*(

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    22/31

    rt. (@)4. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. (, *, ), =, and 4of the precedin$ article, if the $oods are lost, destroed or deteriorated,

    common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have actedne$li$entl, unless the prove that the observed e#traordinar dili$enceas re0uired in article (@)).

    Since the carrier has failed to establish an caso fortuito, the presumption b la! offault or ne$li$ence on the part of the carrier applies and the carrier must presentevidence that it has observed the e#traordinar dili$ence re0uired b rticle (@)) of

    the Civil Code in order to escape liabilit for dama$e or destruction to the $oods thatit had admittedl carried in this case. No such evidence e#ists of record. Thus, thecarrier cannot escape liabilit.

    The Court a$rees !ith and is bound b the fore$oin$ findin$s of fact made b the appellatecourt. The presumption, therefore, that the car$o !as in apparent $ood condition !hen it !asdelivered b the vessel to the arrastre operator b the clean tall sheets has been overturned

    and traversed. The evidence is clear to the effect that the dama$e to the car$o !as suffered!hile aboard petitioners vessel.

    The last assi$ned error is untenable. The interest due on the amount of the 1ud$ment shouldcommence from the date of 1udicial demand.

    A"EREORE, the petition is DIS7ISSED, !ith costs a$ainst petitioner.SO ORDERED.

    CASE 0 PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION,petitioner,

    vs. UNGNOWN OWNER OF THE :ESSEL M: NATIONAL HONOR,

    NATIONAL SHIPPIN5 CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and

    INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SER:ICES, INC., respondents.

    D E C I S I O N

    CALLE9O, SR.,J.6

    This is a petition for revie! under Rule =4 of the (--@ Revised Rules of Civil Procedure

    assailin$ the Decision(Udated 5anuar (-, *++= of the Court of ppeals &C' in C2H.R. C:

    No. 4@)4@ !hich affirmed the Decision dated ebruar (@, (--@ of the Re$ional Trial Court

    &RTC' of 7anila, %ranch )@, in Civil Case No. -42@)))

    (*. This %ill of 6adin$ shall beprima facie evidence of the receipt of the Carrier in

    apparent $ood order and condition e#cept as, other!ise, noted of the total number of

    Containers or other pac8a$es or units enumerated overleaf. Proof to the contrar shall be

    admissible !hen this %ill of 6adin$ has been transferred to a third part actin$ in $ood faith.

    No representation is made b the Carrier as to the !ei$ht, contents, measure, 0uantit, 0ualit,

    description, condition, mar8s, numbers, or value of the Hoods and the Carrier shall be under

    no responsibilit !hatsoever in respect of such description or particulars.

    (). The shipper, !hether principal or a$ent, represents and !arrants that the $oods are

    properl described, mar8ed, secured, and pac8ed and ma be handled in ordinar course

    !ithout dama$e to the $oods, ship, or propert or persons and $uarantees the correctness of

    the particulars, !ei$ht or each piece or pac8a$e and description of the $oods and a$rees to

    ascertain and to disclose in !ritin$ on shipment, an condition, nature, 0ualit, in$redient or

    characteristic that ma cause dama$e, in1ur or detriment to the $oods, other propert, the ship

    or to persons, and for the failure to do so the shipper a$rees to be liable for and full

    indemnif the carrier and hold it harmless in respect of an in1ur or death of an person and

    loss or dama$e to car$o or propert. The carrier shall be responsible as to the correctness of

    an such mar8, descriptions or representations.=U

    The shipment !as contained in t!o !ooden crates, namel, Crate No. ( and Crate No. *,

    complete and in $ood order condition, covered b Commercial Invoice No. ;52@)4=

    DTD4Uand a Pac8in$ 6ist.UThere !ere no mar8in$s on the outer portion of the crates e#cept

    the name of the consi$nee.@UCrate No. ( measured *= cubic meters and !ei$hed ),*+ 8$s. It

    contained the follo!in$ articles> one &(' unit 6athe 7achine complete !ith parts and

    accessories one &(' unit Surface Hrinder complete !ith parts and accessories and one &(' unit7illin$ 7achine complete !ith parts and accessories. On the floorin$ of the !ooden crates

    !ere three !ooden battens placed side b side to support the !ei$ht of the car$o. Crate No. *,

    on the other hand, measured (+ cubic meters and !ei$hed *,++ 8$s. The 6athe 7achine !as

    stuffed in the crate. The shipment had a total invoice value of GSW-+,+++.++ CX 7anila.

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    23/31

    !inch crane. The crane !as operated b Ole$ario %alsa, a !inchman from the ICTSI,(*Uthe

    e#clusive arrastre operator of 7ICT.

    Denasto DauB, 5r., the chec8er2inspector of the NSCP, alon$ !ith the cre! and the

    surveor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the car$o. ()UThe inspected the hatches,

    chec8ed the car$o and found it in apparent $ood condition. (=UClaudio Cansino, the stevedore

    of the ICTSI, placed t!o slin$ cables on each end of Crate No. (. (4UNo slin$ cable !as

    fastened on the mid2portion of the crate. In DauBs e#perience, this !as a normal procedure.(Us the crate !as bein$ hoisted from the vessels hatch, the mid2portion of the !ooden

    floorin$ suddenl snapped in the air, about five feet hi$h from the vessels t!in dec8, sendin$all its contents crashin$ do!n hard,(@Uresultin$ in e#tensive dama$e to the shipment.

    %7ICIs customs bro8er, 5R7 Incorporated, too8 deliver of the car$o in such dama$ed

    condition.(

  • 7/26/2019 Transportation Law (first 10 cases).docx

    24/31

    attached.)=UThe C concluded that common carriers are not absolute insurers a$ainst all ris8s

    in the transport of the $oods.)4U

    "ence, this petition b the PCIC, !here it alle$es that>

    I.

    T"E COGRT O PPE6S CO77ITTED SERIOGS ERROR O 6A IN NOT

    "O6DINH T"T RESPONDENT CO77ON CRRIER IS 6I%6E OR T"E D7HESGSTINED %; T"E S"IP7ENT IN T"E POSSESSION O T"E RRSTRE

    OPERTOR.

    II.

    T"E COGRT O PPE6S CO77ITTED SERIOGS ERROR O 6A IN NOT

    PP6;INH T"E STTGTOR; PRESG7PTION O G6T ND NEH6IHENCE IN T"E

    CSE T %R.

    III.

    T"E COGRT O PPE6S HROSS6; 7ISCO7PRE"ENDED T"E CTS IN INDINH

    T"T T"E D7HE SGSTINED %; T"E S"IP7ENTU AS DGE TO ITS

    DEECTI:E PC9INH ND NOT TO T"E G6T ND NEH6IHENCE O T"E

    RESPONDENTS.)U

    The petitioner asserts that the mere proof of receipt of the shipment b the common

    carrier &to the carrier' in $ood order, and their arrival at the place of destination in bad order

    ma8es out aprima faciecase a$ainst it in such case, it is liable for the loss or dama$e to the

    car$o absent satisfactor e#planation $iven b the carrier as to the e#ercise of e#traordinar

    dili$ence. The petitioner avers that the shipment !as sufficientl pac8ed in !ooden bo#es, as

    sho!n b the fact that it !as accepted on board the vessel and arrived in 7anila safel. It

    emphasiBes that the respondents did not contest the contents of the bill of ladin$, and that the

    respondents 8ne! that the manner and condition of the pac8in$ of the car$o !as normal andbarren of defects. It maintains that it behooved the respondent ICTSI to place three to four

    cables or !ire slin$s in e0ual settin$s, includin$ the center portion of the crate to prevent

    dama$e to the car$o>

    U simple loo8 at the manifesto of the car$o and the bill of ladin$ !ould have alerted

    respondents of the nature of the car$o consistin$ of thic8 and heav machiner. E#tra2care

    should have been made and e#tended in the dischar$e of the sub1ect shipment. "ad the

    respondent onl bothered to chec8 the list of its contents, the !ould have been nervous

    enou$h to place additional slin$s and cables to support those massive machines, !hich !ere

    composed almost entirel of thic8 steel, clearl intended for heav industries. s indicated in

    the list, the bo#es contained one lathUe machine, one millin$ machine and one $rindin$

    machine2all comin$ !ith complete parts and accessories. ;et, not one amon$ the respondents!ere cautious enou$h. "ere lies the utter failure of the respondents to observed e#traordinar

    dili$ence in the handlin$ of the car$o in their custod and possession, !hich the Court of

    ppeals