transferring technology: costs and benefits

Technology In Society 20 (1998) 99–112

Transferring technology: costs and benefits

O. W. Jensen, C. A. Scheraga

Abstract

The cost of transferring technology within and among firms participating in the global mar-ketplace is a topic of considerable and continuing interest to business. Two dominant themesin the literature — the economic environment and the cultural environment — are broughttogether in a conceptual model. In this paper, the economic environment is cast as the nexusof market structure and government intervention. Market structure includes consideration ofthe number of competitors, the extent of the market, and the cost structure of the industry.To market structure is added the consideration of government intervention. Such intervention,once negligible, has become a major factor in some industries and now includes voluntaryquotas, punitive tariffs, and intervention on behalf of an industry to balance biases imposedby other governments. The second theme, the cultural environment, highlights the differencesin culture among firms that desire to transfer technology. These differences can impede orencourage the transfer. When formulating strategy, consideration of these two themes simul-taneously can aid in improving competitiveness which, more and more, is driven by the dynam-ics of technology transfer. 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

At least since Schumpeter [1] innovation has been at the center of any explanationof the dynamic nature of a market economy. He traced the long-term fluctuations inbusiness activity associated with the macroeconomy to the creative activities ofinvention and innovation and identified the innovator as an entrepreneur. The entrepr-eneur unleashes, according to Schumpeter, “the gale of creative destruction” frominnovation, which he defined broadly to include new technical methods, new pro-ducts, new sources of supply, and new forms of industrial organization.

0160-791X/98/$19.00 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.PII: S0160-791X(97 )00031-0

100 O.W. Jensen, C.A. Scheraga/Technology In Society 20 (1998) 99–112

Innovation has also held a central place in explaining why firms in the sameindustry or line of business differ from one another. As has been noted by Rumeltet al. [2] and Mueller [3] these differences persist over long periods of time andallow some firms to consistently outperform other firms in the same business. Oneexplanation for the differences is that each firm possesses its own unique ability toaccommodate innovation.

Nelson [4] discusses how innovation might create and then eliminate differencesamong firms in the same industry. Based on his experience, when innovation andrapid technical advance occur, many competing firms apply the new technology.Firms differ in how they implement a successful innovation because each is madeup of a different set of capabilities.

An imitating firm will go through many, if not all, of the same design and develop-ment activities as an innovator and thus create similar production and support activi-ties. Firms with somewhat similar core capabilities will be in a better position tolearn from each other than those whose core capabilities differ from the innovator(see Nelson and Winter [5]). From this point of view, differences among firmsdepend on their past history of innovation and the variety of core capabilities thatexist in the industry (see Tushman and Anderson [6] for a discussion of this point).Innovation affords one explanation for the dynamic nature of growth and change inthe economy and the dynamic response to change by the firms within an industry.It is clear from the extensive literature that innovation is costly and requires not onlycapital but special human capital and extensive support as well. The more recentliterature emphasizes the importance of human capital, as we shall see.

We contend that the transfer of technology brings with it both costs and benefits.Like Schmookler, [7] we argue that the transfer of technology is largely an economicactivity. In this discussion, technology is anything that increases one’s knowledgeor practical experience. Conceptual technology creates theories; implemental tech-nology reduces theory to practice; practice technology guides their routine appli-cation. The transfer of technology will take place when the perceived benefits out-weigh the perceived costs of the transfer; the firm that moves early to transfertechnology foresees greater benefits or lower costs than other firms.

Acknowledging the benefits, in this article we focus on the cost of transferringtechnology. We argue that the cost of acquiring and processing information differsfrom firm to firm, even among firms in the same line of business. In any givencircumstance, some firms will see the opportunity to earn economic rent from thetransfer of technology and other firms will not. This article surveys the existingliterature on technology transfer with the goal of developing a strategic model thatincludes the cost of cultural differences, the influence of market structure on costs,and the cost of government intervention. It is our contention that these factors willprovide a serviceable framework for discussing the cost of transferring technologyin today’s global marketplace.

101O.W. Jensen, C.A. Scheraga/Technology In Society 20 (1998) 99–112

2. Literature review

There are periodic gaps in the literature when the technology transfer processseems to be of more interest at one time period than another. While the reason forthis gap varies with each observer’s telling, one possible explanation is that thoseinterested in economic development “owned” the discussion of technology transferduring and after the U.N. decade of development in the 1960s. In their view, tech-nology was transferred by the direct investment of a multinational firm. It proceededby fiat and flowed to the receiving nation as a natural consequence of that investment.Technology and economic development were both of the same piece of cloth; if acountry wanted economic development, it needed technology.

An increasingly competitive global marketplace has brought the discussion of tech-nology transfer back into the literature. Many benefits are seen to accrue to thosecompanies and countries that can successfully compete in the global market. Highwage employment for a nation’s citizens and the survival of entire industries maybe at stake. It has also been noticed that technology transfer no longer primarilytakes place within the multinational firm but rather is increasingly between relativeequals although they reside in different countries. Others contend that after severaldecades of technology transfer between Western companies and Japanese companies,the benefits have not been equally shared by the partners in the transfer. Westernfirms have, in general, been weakened and the Japanese firms have, in general, beenstrengthened (see Pucik [8] for a discussion of this view and a review of the empiri-cal literature). From this perspective, the technology transfer process needs closerexamination; something has been overlooked.

Throughout this discussion we take the larger and more expansive view of tech-nology, choosing to follow Porter [9] who found that technology can lead to anabsolute cost advantage as well as product differentiation, rather than with Com-anor [10] who associated technology primarily with product differentiation.

Here, we will pause to discuss the distinction between transfer of technology andthe diffusion of technology. In our view, the distinction made in the literaturebetween transfer and diffusion is the distinction between a supply orientation and ademand orientation. Thus, the transfer of technology is concerned with the abilityand willingness of the supplier to transfer, while diffusion is concerned with thewillingness and ability to receive technology (see Stewart and Nihei [11] for furtherdiscussion). For the purposes of this discussion, transfer and diffusion are seen asthe two blades of the Marshallian shear and remind us that we cannot have onewithout the other.

3. Market structure and government intervention

For this discussion it is helpful have a framework for considering the nexus ofmarket structure and government intervention. Such a framework has been suggestedby Yoffie [12] and is presented in Fig. 1. We suggest that the cost of technologytransfer correlates directly to the quadrant it occupies in this model.


Fig. 1.

In this framework the oligopolistic competition quadrant, characterized by fewcompetitors and little government intervention, would contain industries such as con-struction equipment, copper, and bearings. The personal computer industry, withmany competitors and little government intervention, would be placed in the com-parative advantage quadrant. Much attention is directed toward the regulated compe-tition group of industries where there is a great deal of intervention by governmentsthat perceive that technological survival is at stake. Examples of such industrieswould be the mainframe computer industry as well as the integrated circuitry andtelecommunications industries. The insurance industry, characterized by heavygovernment regulation and few competitors, would be found in the political compe-tition quadrant.

3.1. Market structure

Hypothesis I: The cost of transferring technology is dependent on marketstructure. The expected benefits of technology transfer are morelikely realized in concentrated industries where market stabilityand potential are significant.

Corollary: For any given market structure the transfer of technology isencouraged or tempered by the organizational form andstrategic choices of the firm.

The extent of the market, the number of competitors in the industry, and theindustry cost structure are market structure issues. Each is important, both separatelyand collectively. An industry characterized by few competitors tends toward oligop-oly and, given the size of the market, has a higher cost per unit of production thanan equivalent competitive industry. The literature indicates that technology transferis more likely to take place when it is perceived that a dependable, sizable market


exists. [13] We would argue that market stability is more likely to occur as a conse-quence of an oligopolistic market rather than a competitive market.

It should be noted that not all the technology transfer literature directly orindirectly concerns itself with the costs involved. It appears that the costs of transfer-ring technology are zero, or at least negligible. Rather, the discussions focus on thereasons for success or failure within a direct foreign investment or multinationalmodel. Attention is given to the form, organization, and strategy of the firmattempting a transfer of technology. Marton [14] found that the strategic fit of foreigndirect investment is an important predictor of its success. There are costs and benefitsthat apply if the intention is to create a source of supply as a substitute for imports,and another set of costs and benefits if the foreign direct investment is intended toserve as an export platform. Adoption of new technology can be painfully slow, asexemplified by the fact that it took some two hundred years to eliminate scurvy inthe Royal Navy even after the prevention was known. [15]

The economics of technology transfer can be traced back at least to Mansfield [16]and Gruber. [17] Mansfield notes that expenditures on research and developmentare influenced by the expected profits to be gained from these research and develop-ment projects. He defines the factors that “influence an industry’s rate of technologi-cal change.” They are market structure, legal arrangements, and the attitude towardtechnological change on the part of management, workers, and the public. Gruberalso sees the decision to invest in research and development as an economic activityinfluenced by competitive pressures, size of market, and potential profitability, aswell as the size of the firm. He presents evidence that the research and developmentfunction resides primarily in the largest firms in a country.

The transfer of technology between more or less equal partners is discussed byHall and Johnson. [18] They found that in aerospace technology, the knowledgeneeded for building a military fighter is transferred from a company in the UnitedStates to a company in Japan. The authors investigate the costs and benefits of thistransfer and conclude, contrary to expectations, that the Japanese were able to reducethe cost of producing the aircraft. They explain that the American supplier overesti-mated the importance of American engineering efficiency and underestimated thecost savings from substituting Japanese labor for American labor. In an often over-looked comment on this paper, Harry Johnson [19] points out that if such miscalcu-lations are commonplace in management, then we have to question whether or notthe technology transfer process can be treated as a rational economic process.

In discussing the tensions created by global competition, Simon [20] points outthat the transfer process is complex because neither the process for transferring tech-nology nor the technology itself is homogeneous.

Thus far, the arguments put forward implicitly assume that innovation flows fromresearch and development activities, and that research and development activitiesreside in the few largest firms. The possessor of knowledge (the large firm) thenconsiders the transfer of technology. von Hippel demonstrates how quickly suchassumptions can come into question. He found that, depending on the industry, muchof the innovation was accomplished by the customer. The firm that receives processmachinery, test equipment, and measurement devices embodying the latest tech-


nology will modify and alter this equipment to increase its ease of use, the accuracyof the device, and the speed of operation. The supplying firm must find the “leadusers,” the users that have made improvements in the product they received. [21]

Underlying von Hippel’s search procedure [22] is the assumption of a free marketin information about user improvement and modifications: nonproprietary innovation.First, a trend must be identified, one that will have “an important effect on a givenproduct area that...is not yet well developed.” In the case of industrial goods “theneeded data on important trends are clear to those with expertise.” There is greaterdifficulty identifying this trend for consumer goods because there is not always areadily identifiable standard available. Having identified a trend, the next step forthe supplying firm is to find the lead users by “identifying the subset of these userfirms positioned at the forefront of the trend.” The lead users will have madeimprovements because there is an economic benefit to do so; there is a net benefitto the innovator.

Studies carried out over a period of time included nine industries that wereobserved for evidence of product innovation either by manufacturers or by users. Innearly half of these industries the bulk of product innovation came from the productusers. These user innovations, if identified, can be exploited by the manufacturer soas to become more competitive in the global marketplace.

3.2. Government intervention

Hypothesis II: The cost of technology transfer is dependent upon governmentintervention and is increased or decreased depending on theextent and intent of government intervention.

We expect that government will provide a stable and well-defined environmentfor business activity. Frequently, providing that environment requires governmentintervention through participation in international rule-making bodies and other inter-national institutional arrangements. Within the established framework, this is notheavy government intervention. Heavy government intervention consists of suchthings as encouraging voluntary quotas, assessing punitive tariffs, and interveningon the behalf of a particular industry to balance biases imposed by other govern-ments. Such government intervention can affect the cost of transferring technology,not only through such mechanisms as tax code preferences, but also by applyingpressure in the marketplace.

The influence of government has long been recognized. Aharoni [23] reports that“...the effective transmission of technology may be hindered by all sorts of costs,some of which may be reduced by governmental action.” According to Godkin, [24]government intervention may include information control, governmental funding, andregulation. She further points out that the receiving country’s leaders may interferein the transfer process because they fear that “decisions affecting the economy oftheir nation are being made by foreigners whose loyalties lie with the multinationalcorporation rather than with the individual participating countries.”


Concentration of an industry in a small geographic area has been found by someto stimulate rapid technological innovation. Located near one another encourageseasier interaction and expands the skilled labor pool and necessary specialized sup-pliers. Rodger [25] finds that for all the entrepreneurial activity that has been docu-mented, government still plays a key role in the innovation process. Governmentparticipates by making “direct purchases, planning collaborative research and devel-opment activities, making research grants, and supporting research institutions.” Thegeographically concentrated areas he refers to are the Silicon Valley near San Jose,California and around Route 128 in Boston.

Yoffie [26] reports that his research found that government intervention varies bythe type of industry, that is, by market structure. In less-concentrated industries, mostroutine government intervention “merely accelerated existing trends affecting tradeand investment decisions only on the margin.” By “routine government intervention”he means tariffs, voluntary restraints, tax breaks for foreign direct investment, andenvironmental policy. Industries with scale economies and other market imperfec-tions benefit greatly from government intervention, especially infant industry policieswhere the learning effects are great. He maintains that the evidence shows that stra-tegic government intervention can encourage, support, and build businesses thatwould not otherwise exist.

3.3. Culture

Hypothesis III: The cost of technology transfer is dependent upon the culturaldistance between the transferring and receiving parties. Thelikelihood that culture will overwhelm other factors in thetechnology transfer process increases as the cultural distanceincreases.

Corollary: The movement from product-embodied technology to process-embodied and person-embodied technology increases theimportance of cultural distance between transferring andreceiving parties.

National culture is a complex subject, with broad influence on such disparate topicsas how we rank decision alternatives and how we relate to one another. If, forinstance, we make the analogy that the printing on this page represents our thoughts,words, and deeds, then the paper on which these characters are printed would rep-resent our culture. No matter what other factors are considered, we suggest that thebasic model for technology transfer includes both the economic and cultural factorsthat influence the transfer.

While some recognition has been given to the economic factors that influence thetransfer of technology, Kedia and Bhagat [27] observe that almost no attention hasbeen given to the constraining influence of the “cultural factors involved in suchtransactions.” They contend that culture can go a long way toward explaining why


some technology transfers work when, on a purely economic basis, they should fail,and other transfers fail when they should succeed. They also suggest that culturedoes not act uniformly on all types of technology transfers. There is a differentialeffect depending upon whether the technology is product-embodied, process-embodied, or person-embodied. Their contention is that “compared to product-embodied technologies, process-embodied and person-embodied technologies areconsiderably more difficult to transfer across nations because cultural and strategicmanagement factors play larger roles in such transfers and diffusions.”

There is additional evidence to suggest that they are correct. The anecdotes ofTrompenaars [28] continually emphasize the difficulty encountered in transferringcompany policies across borders, a process-embodied technology. On the other hand,culture is not an issue in the product-embodied transfers studied by von Hippel.

Hofstede [29] maintains that mankind’s survival depends on the ability of peoplewho think differently to work together. “Exploring the way in which nationalitypredisposes our thinking is therefore not an intellectual luxury.” It is our contentionthat there are costs and benefits associated with cross-cultural relationships, and thecosts will be lower and benefits higher when more similar the cultures are involved.

According to Adler, [30] the study of management behavior began with Laur-ent’s [31] study of managers in nine European countries, the United States, and twoAsian countries. This work was expanded by Hofstede to include managers in forty,and then 60, countries. He found significant differences in the behavior and attitudesof employees and managers from different countries who worked for the same multi-national corporation. These differences remained fixed over time. More important,he found that variations in work-related values and attitudes were better explained bynational culture than by position within the organization, profession, age, or gender.Hofstede developed four dimension to characterize culture: individualism/ collec-tivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/feminity.

The individualism/collectivism dimension deals with the relationships betweenpeople and their society. It determines the way people live together, whether innuclear families, extended families, or tribal groups. In some cultures, individualismis believed to be a blessing and a source of well-being; in other societies it is thoughtto be alienating.

The power distance dimension considers how different societies solve the problemof human inequality, that is, differences in wealth, power, and prestige. The extentto which less powerful members of a society accept an unequal distribution of wealth,power, and prestige as a normal feature of their society is a measure of the powerdistance in that society. In theory, subordinates try to reduce this power distance,while superiors try to maintain or enlarge it. Hofstede finds that the equilibriumbetween these forces is determined by society.

The uncertainty avoidance dimension measures the extent to which members ofa society strive to avoid ambiguous situations. Among the methods for avoiding suchsituations are career stability, formal rules, rejection of deviant ideas and behavior,acceptance of the possibility of absolute truths, and attainment of expertise.

The masculine/feminine dimension gauges the way in which societies attempt tobring the differences between the sexes into balance. According to this dichotomy,


a society with dominant masculine values emphasizes assertiveness, acquisition ofmoney and status, and achievement of organizational awards. A society dominatedby feminine values is concerned with quality of life and other less-tangible outcomes.

To the mix of these four dimensions, Glenn and Glenn [32] have added anabstractive/associative dimension to measure the predominant method society usesto organize and transmit its ideas. Communication in an associative culture takesplace face-to-face and between individuals who share a common existence, and there-fore relies on associations among events that may leave Westerners perplexed. Theeffectiveness of communication in an associative culture depends much more oncontext and a more global view of the world. Information arrives on the airwavesor in written form, and there is an assumption that a cause-and-effect rationality isshared by all. Without discussing how it might be measured, Pucik [33] makes anargument for the importance of yet another dimension of culture: the learning abilityof a society. From his point of view, the traditional sources of competitive advan-tage — economies of scale, low factor cost, and priority technology — are notsources of a sustainable advantage in today’s global marketplace. The only sus-tainable advantage is the competitive advantage appropriated through the “learningcapacity” of the organization. Firms that master new competencies more quicklythan others will derive greater benefits from technology transfer.

In the past, alliances that were formed to transfer technology typically transferredit from a large multinational to a small local partner who played only a marginalrole in the global strategy of the firm. In contrast, today’s alliances “often involvean intense technological cooperation beyond the scope of the local market.” Theseexchanges between partners can be distinguished as those that leverage resourcesand those that leverage competencies. Competencies are fundamentally information-based, invisible assets that cannot easily be purchased in the marketplace and whosemarket value is difficult to determine. Examples would be knowledge of the market,knowledge of manufacturing process, or knowledge required to speed up new productdevelopment. These competencies, or invisible assets, are embodied in people.Teece [34] points out that such assets represent knowledge that is difficult to under-stand and that can only be appropriated over time, if at all. Itami, [35] like Pucik,sees the accumulation of these invisible assets as the foundation of a sustainablecompetitive advantage.

Much work has been done to document and understand business relationships thathave been established between the United States and foreign countries. A glimpseinto the building of such relationships between the United States and China is pro-vided by Von Glinow et al. [36] They found that cultural factors ultimately playedan important role in determining whether or not the attempt to establish an alliancewould be a success or failure.

The technology transfer process they describe requires the passing from one groupto another of documentation describing the technology, the “know-how” for con-verting this documentation into a product, and the hardware, such as equipment andcomponents. These stages rely heavily on negotiating and establishing people-to-people relationships, a “fit,” as they call it, between the negotiators. This “fit” has


a great deal to do with the cultural understanding established between the two nego-tiating parties. [37]

While the technology being offered must, of course, meet the engineering andeconomic needs of the Chinese purchasers, Grow [38] clearly speaks about the desir-ability of establishing a “fit” between the deal-makers. He points out that at leastpart of success in the Chinese market has to do with “...the ‘fit’ between the supplyingfirm and the receiving Chinese enterprise. Some foreign firms (and their managers)and some Chinese (and their managers) are simply well-suited to one another,whereas other foreign/Chinese relationships are ‘odd-couple’ partnerships that cometogether like oil and water, even when the foreign technologies fit particular needsof the Chinese purchasers.” Describing both successes and failures, he goes on toexplain the differences between Japanese and American approaches for gaining entryinto the Chinese market.

4. A conceptual model

No matter what other factors are considered, it is our contention that the basicmodel for technology transfer must include both the economic and cultural factorsthat influence the transfer. The framework proposed for considering these factors isshown in Fig. 2.

Following the solid lines from the innovating firm to the recipient of this tech-nology we can trace the steps in the innovating firm’s decision-making process. Thetime value of the stream of benefits expected by the innovating firm must be greaterthan the time value of the perceived steam of costs. The firm considering a transfer of

Fig. 2.


technology must consider both the cost imposed by market structure and governmentintervention and the costs imposed by the cultural environment.

In some cases, the cultural environment willadd costs to the transfer and in othercases will lower the costs of the transfer. We argue that transfers are most easilyaccomplished between similar cultures; thus, dissimilar cultures will likely engenderhigher costs unless potential problems are realized and accommodated; for example,when cultural differences are greater, the costs of negotiation increase.

Similar reasoning would apply to market structure characteristics and the degreeof government intervention. A large and stable market for a new product wouldencourage a transfer. Such desirable circumstances may be derived from an oligo-polistic position based on brand-name recognition and lack of competition. It mightalso be the result of benefits bestowed by government through preferential treatmentand guaranteed purchases.

The receiving firm’s decision process is traced by the dashed lines in the figure.This assumes that the receiving firm is a free-standing entity and not the extensionof a larger firm residing in another political jurisdiction. If the firm receiving thetechnology is indeed an extension, the dashed lines in the conceptual model woulddisappear, signifying that the decision to transfer technology is made by the innovat-ing firm alone. If the recipient is a free agent, then the perceived stream of benefitsmust exceed the expected stream of costs just as it must for the innovating firm.Both decisions must favor the transfer for it to be successful.

This framework seems to be a comfortable fit for some of the stylized facts aboutthe global marketplace that are not easily explained by classical trade theory.Markusen and Venables [39] comment that “multinationals are more important intotal economic activity when countries are more similar in incomes, relative factorendowments, and technologies.” This would seem to be an intuitive result withinthe proposed framework. Equally intuitive would be the dynamic suggested byGruber and Vernon. [40] They reason that “...it may well be that when manufacturedproducts first enter international trade, they tend to find their initial export marketsin areas very like that of the exporter...our results suggest...that this is no more thana transitional stage; eventually, imports are cut back by domestic production and theexport moves on to other more remote markets.”

5. Conclusion

Sustaining a competitive advantage in the new global marketplace is important forboth companies and countries. Technology is seen as key to constructing competitiveadvantage, but little importance has been attached to the technology transfer processitself. In this article, the argument for the technology transfer process assumes thatan increasingly dynamic marketplace will require technology transfers, both betweenfirms and within a firm.

We have brought together two of the dominant themes in the literature and haveproposed a conceptual model that allows both themes to be considered simul-taneously. We contend that any realistic appraisal of the costs and benefits of a


technology transfer must include a consideration of market structure and governmentintervention as well as the cultural differences that may exist. Consideration of thesefactors simultaneously when formulating strategy, we have argued, will aid inimproving competitiveness. In a global marketplace more and more driven by thedynamics of the technology transfer process, it is important that we learn from othersand make the most of these transfers.

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[36] Von Glinow, Cf, MA, Schnepp, O, Bhambri, A. Technology transfer in international business. Theseauthors describe the typical participants in such negotiations. Usually a key individual will be foundon the American side of the negotiation. This person enjoys strong support from the home officeand has wide-ranging authority to make decisions. Being in the spotlight, the person can reasonablybe expected to want to achieve visible results as quickly as possible, preferably through the exerciseof individual authority. For Chinese negotiators, the decision-making process is not nearly as trans-parent, and information concerning this decision-making process is not easily available to foreignparticipants. The delegation is usually led by a senior official, but decisions are based on a consensus


among the agencies and government bureaus concerned with the transfer of a particular technology.While time-consuming, the consensus process protects the Chinese participants from later criticismand possible recriminations.

[37] Schnepp, O, Von Glinow, MA, Bhambri, A. US-China transfer (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1991).

[38] Grow, RF. “Comparing Japanese and American technology transfer in China: Assessing the ‘fit’between foreign firms and Chinese enterprises,” in Agmon and Von Glinow (eds.), Technologytransfer in international business, op. cit.

[39] Markusen, JR, Venables, AJ. “Multinational firms and the new trade theory,” National bureau ofeconomic research, Working paper No. 5036 (1995).

[40] Gruber, WH, Vernon, R. “The technology factor in a world trade matrix,” in Vernon (ed.), Thetechnology factor in international trade (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1970).

Dr Jensen is Professor of Business Strategy and Technology Management in the School of Business at FairfieldUniversity, Fairfield, Connecticut. He has been a consultant for GTE and United Technologies. He holds aPh.D. in Economics, an MSEE, and a BSEE. He teaches courses in the Management of Technology andBusiness Strategy and has had numerous articles published.

Dr Scheraga is Assistant Professor of International Business Strategy and Technology Management in theSchool of Business at Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut. He has been advisor to several researchprograms at the University of Maryland. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Economics, and an Sc.B. in Math-ematics and Engineering. He has had numerous articles published in various management and technology per-iodicals.

transferring technology: costs and benefits

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