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Trait Expectancies andStereotype Expectancies AffectPerson Memory Similarly in aJury ContextCory R. Scherer a , Jeremy D. Heider b , John J.Skowronski c & John E. Edlund da Penn State University-Schuylkillb Southeast Missouri State Universityc Northern Illinois Universityd Rochester Institute of TechnologyAccepted author version posted online: 10 Apr2012.Published online: 18 Jul 2012.

To cite this article: Cory R. Scherer , Jeremy D. Heider , John J. Skowronski & JohnE. Edlund (2012) Trait Expectancies and Stereotype Expectancies Affect PersonMemory Similarly in a Jury Context, The Journal of Social Psychology, 152:5, 613-622,DOI: 10.1080/00224545.2012.678418

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The Journal of Social Psychology, 2012, 152(5), 613–622

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Trait Expectancies and StereotypeExpectancies Affect Person Memory

Similarly in a Jury Context

CORY R. SCHERERPenn State University-Schuylkill

JEREMY D. HEIDERSoutheast Missouri State University

JOHN J. SKOWRONSKINorthern Illinois University

JOHN E. EDLUNDRochester Institute of Technology

ABSTRACT. This experiment, a simulated trial study, examined whether trait expectanciesand stereotype expectancies similarly affected memory for expectancy-relevant behav-iors. Participants read a description of a defendant, which was followed by testimony thatinduced a trait or stereotype expectancy. After viewing the evidence items and giving a guiltjudgment, the participants were asked to recall as many of the evidence items as they couldand to complete a thought listing measure. The results showed that, when overtly applied tothe defendant, trait expectancies and stereotype expectancies had similar effects, produc-ing incongruity effects on recall. Additional analyses examining the participants’ post-hocreports of the thoughts that they had as they processed the behaviors provided little evi-dence that subjects attempted to reconcile items or attempted to reconcile the items withthe expectancy.

Keywords: behavior recall, behavior reconciliation, person memory, trait expectancies

IMAGINE A SITUATION IN WHICH a jury is making a decision about theguilt or innocence of someone accused of assault. One thing that the prosecu-tor can do is try to overtly use characteristics of the defendant’s background and

Address correspondence to Cory R. Scherer, Penn State University-Schuylkill, Departmentof Psychology, 200 University Drive, Schuylkill Haven, PA 17972, USA; crs15@psu.edu(e-mail).

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appearance against him. For example, the defendant’s past behaviors might causethe prosecutor to call acquaintances of the defendant to testify, knowing that thoseare acquaintances who would publicly label the defendant as “mean” in court.Alternatively, the defendant’s appearance and membership in many aggressiveorganizations might induce the prosecutor to call witnesses to testify who wouldapply to the defendant the label of “skinhead.” The prosecutor might expect suchlabels to bias the jury to recall trial evidence that favors conviction.

Interestingly, the person memory literature has yielded inconsistent resultswith regard to this scenario. Research results in the stereotype expectancy litera-ture sometimes showed that when individuals are given a stereotype expectancy,they often preferentially remembered subsequently encountered information thatwas congruent with the expectancy rather than incongruent (e.g., Bodenhausen,1988). However, research in the trait expectancy literature trait often found thatindividuals given a trait expectancy remembered particularly well subsequentlyencountered information that was incongruent with the trait (e.g., Hastie &Kumar, 1979).

Trait-expectancy and stereotype-expectancy memory studies have a ten-dency to be systematically different. Trait and stereotype studies often induceexpectancies in different ways. For example, trait expectancy studies ratherovertly provide the expectancy to participants (see Hastie & Kumar, 1979),whereas stereotyping studies tend to use more subtle methods of expectancyinduction (see Bodenhausen, 1988). Additionally, the different areas of researchoften induce different processing goals, with trait studies employing impressionformation instructions and stereotyping studies utilizing more practically orientedtasks, such as guilt judgments.

Although such procedural differences do not always distinguish thestereotype-expectancy studies from the trait-expectancy studies, the presence ofsuch differences has caused us to be skeptical about the extent to which traitexpectancies and stereotype expectancies themselves produce processing differ-ences that cause differential effects on person memory. From our point of view,there are probably more reasons to anticipate that trait expectancies and stereo-type expectancies affect processing similarly than to anticipate that they do sodifferently. Accordingly, it seemed to us that what was needed were studies inwhich only the content of the expectancies varied: Across expectancy types, thesame behaviors should be used, those behaviors should be presented in the sameway, expectancies should be activated in the same manner, and perceivers shouldhave the same processing goals.

This approach was reflected in Heider and colleagues (2007). Using methodsadapted from the trait expectancy literature that have tended to yield incongruencyeffects in recall (Hastie & Kumar, 1979), some participants in their initial experi-ment received trait-based expectancies, whereas others received stereotype-basedexpectancies. Aside from the trait or stereotype content of the expectancy, all otherelements of the experimental situation were equivalent across expectancy type

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conditions. In such circumstances, people remembered expectancy-incongruentitems well, regardless of expectancy type.

The person memory paradigm that Heider and colleagues (2007) employedin their first study employed an overt form of expectancy induction. They won-dered if this explicit method of expectancy induction may have contributed tothe results of their first study, and more generally, whether this variable mightcontribute to the different results obtained in the trait expectancy and stereo-type expectancy literatures. This thought was sparked by ideas from Skowronski,Carlston, and Isham (1993), who distinguished between different mindsets thatmight be induced by overt versus covert expectancy inductions. Skowronskiand colleagues argued that when expectancies are induced in a heavy-handed,overt way, participants might become more motivated to search for and processitems that violate the expectancy. Many motives might underlie such behavior,but one of them might be the psychological reactance that is induced when aninduction is particularly heavy-handed. Conversely, when expectancies are notactivated in overt ways, there might not be such a tendency to seek out and pro-cess expectancy-incongruent information. Hence, in these latter circumstances,the advantages conferred by the expectancy are likely to influence processing,producing superior recall for expectancy-congruent information.

If this line of reasoning is correct, the tendency to recall expectancy-incongruent information in paradigms adapted from the stereotyping literatureshould be enhanced when stereotype expectancies are overtly induced. Suchdata would help support Heider and colleagues’ (2007) conclusion that stereo-type and trait activation do have the same effect on memory; the differencesthat are typically seen are a result of how they are presented. Accordingly, weadapted Bodenhausen’s (1988) jury decision-making paradigm but changed themanner of expectancy induction from the subtle technique used by Bodenhausen(manipulating the ethnicity of the target’s name) to the heavy-handed paragraphused in Heider and colleagues’ study (2007, Experiment 1). We expect that theovert stereotype presentation used in our experiment should reverse the outcomereported by Bodenhausen (1988). That is, using a subtly activated stereotypeexpectancy, Bodenhausen (1988) reported a congruity effect in recall; in con-trast, we expect that overt application of the stereotype to a target will cause anincongruity effect to emerge.

Direct comparison to the Bodenhausen study can be made because, exceptfor the manner in which the stereotype was activated, we copied Bodenhausen’smaterials and methods exactly in our study. Moreover, to replicate the findingsof Heider and colleagues (2007), showing parallel results for trait and stereo-type expectancies when both are activated in a similar manner, we expandedBodenhausen’s design to use both traits and stereotypes as expectancies. Ourhypothesis was that the relation between item type and recall should not be mod-erated by expectancy type. In other words, Heider and colleagues (2007) showedthat trait and stereotype expectancies that were activated in a subtle manner both

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led to enhanced recall of congruent behaviors. In the present study, we aimed toshow that when traits and stereotype expectancies were both activated in an overtmanner, enhanced recall of incongruent behaviors should emerge.

Obviously, a key issue in the person memory literature concerns the psycho-logical processes responsible for the memory outcomes observed. Might peoplebe reconciling behaviors with expectancies or with other behaviors? To gaininsight into these possibilities, participants provided post-hoc descriptions of thethoughts that they experienced as they thought about the evidence items that theyencountered. These self-reports were examined for evidence that people engagedin any form of reconciliatory thought while performing the judgment task. Ourskepticism about the fact that mental reconciliation routinely occurs led us toexpect that no such evidence would emerge.

Method

Participants

Three hundred twenty-two undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychol-ogy courses at Northern Illinois University and Penn State University-Schuylkillparticipated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Six people wereexcluded from analyses because they failed to follow instructions for the recalltask. Thus, the recall analyses described below reflect data from 316 participants.

Stimulus Materials

Thirteen evidence items allegedly related to a court case were taken fromBodenhausen (1988). Five items suggested exoneration of the defendant (e.g.,“No eyewitnesses could positively identify the attacker”), five incriminated thedefendant (e.g., “The victim and the defendant were observed quarreling by otherbar patrons earlier in the evening”), and three had neutral implications for thedefendant’s guilt or innocence (e.g., “The defendant’s employer stated that thedefendant left work early on the day of the attack.”)

Procedure

Participants were told they would be taking part in a study investigating jurydecision-making. All subsequent instructions and data collection occurred viacomputer, using MediaLab experiment software (Jarvis, 2001).

Participants read a description of a fictional defendant that included his name,city of birth, city of current residence, age, and marital status. This informationwas followed by a paragraph, described as “character testimony,” that inducedone of four expectancies: that the defendant was either pacifistic (trait, positive),hot-tempered (trait, negative), a minister (stereotype, positive), or a skinhead

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(stereotype, negative). The paragraphs were similar to the expectancy-inductionparagraphs used by Heider and colleagues (2007, Experiment 1).

After reading the expectancy induction, participants viewed the 13 evi-dence items. These were presented in a random order unique to each participant.Participants proceeded through these items at their own pace. Once the last itemwas presented, participants judged the likelihood that the defendant was guilty ona scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely to be guilty) to 10 (extremely likely to beguilty). They also rated the confidence with which they made this judgment on a0 (not at all confident) to 10 (extremely confident) scale.

Participants were next given a surprise recall task in which they were askedto recall as many of the evidence items as possible.1 They were told they couldrecall items in the order in which they came to mind, and that they should try torecall evidence sentences as precisely as possible without the necessity of verba-tim recall. Finally, participants completed a thought-listing task. Instructions tothis task indicated to participants that they should report the thoughts they hadwhile they were processing the evidence items.

Results and Discussion

Coding

Free recall responses were coded according to a gist criterion: For a behav-ior to be coded as recalled, the participant merely needed to express the generalmeaning of the behavior.

Analysis of Recall Patterns

An ANOVA focused on main effects and interactions among the variables ofexpectancy type (trait, stereotype), expectancy valence (positive, negative), andevidence type (incriminating, exonerating).1 Analysis of the recall data revealedan unexpected main effect of evidence type, F (1,308) = 42.38, p < .001, par-tial η2 = .12: Incriminating items were recalled more often (M = 3.12, SD =1.34) than exonerating ones (M = 2.51, SD = 1.35). More importantly, however,the evidence type × expectancy valence interaction was significant, F (1,308) =9.86, p = .002, partial η2 = .03. Simple effects analyses using Tukey’s HSD(HSD = 0.27 at α = .05) revealed that the tendency to recall incriminatingitems was significantly stronger in the positive expectancy (M = 3.39, SD =1.22) than the negative expectancy condition (M = 2.86, SD = 1.40); conversely,the tendency to recall exonerating items was not significantly stronger in the neg-ative expectancy (M = 2.54, SD = 1.39) than the positive expectancy condition(M = 2.48, SD = 1.32). Recall was generally better for expectancy-incongruentitems (M = 2.97, SD = 1.31) than expectancy-congruent items (M = 2.67,SD = 1.36).

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Hence, we were successful in altering the effect obtained by Bodenhausen(1988), changing it from a congruency bias to an incongruency bias by alteringthe manner in which the expectancy was presented. Especially important was thefact that these effects were not qualified by an interaction with expectancy type,evidence type × expectancy type F (1,308) = 0.43, p = .51; evidence type ×expectancy valence × expectancy type F (1,308) = 0.12, p = .73. In other words,an incongruency bias in recall emerged, regardless of whether participants weregiven a trait expectancy or a stereotype expectancy.2

An incongruency bias in memory emerged using a paradigm derived from thestereotyping literature. Previous results using this paradigm (Bodenhausen, 1988)evinced congruency effects in memory. This reversal was expected. Previous workthat manipulated the overtness of expectancy induction (Heider et al., 2007) led usto believe that it would be the overtness of the expectancy induction, and not theexpectancy type, that would largely determine recall. Indeed, the incongruencyeffect in our study was not dependent on whether the expectancy was derivedfrom a stereotype or from a trait. Thus, one conclusion that can be drawn from thepresent data is straightforward: When triggered in the same way, trait expectanciesand stereotype expectances similarly affect recall.

It is important to note that it is not easy to discount our results by sayingthat we did not replicate the original Bodenhausen (1988) results. While we didnot do so in the present study, we have achieved a conceptual replication of thoseresults in previous research (Heider et al. 2007). Hence, when viewed in the con-text of the entire research program, in Heider and colleagues’ (2007) article weconceptually replicated the Bodenhausen (1988) results, extending those results totrait expectancies. The contribution of the present study is to show that the resultstypically obtained in the Bodenhausen (1988) paradigm itself can be altered byreplicating the paradigm exactly except for the use of an expectancy manipulationmore typical of that used in the trait expectancy literature.

Thought Listings: Thoughts While Viewing Evidence Items3

Thought coding. Table 1 presents the six categories used in our analyses andexamples of items placed in each category. These categories were chosen foranalysis from among a larger number of categories. The categories’ inconsistencybetween evidence items, and inconsistency between item and expectancy, thoughinstances of this inconsistency were rare, were selected because of their relevanceto earlier models of person memory processes (e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1989). Theother four categories were selected for their frequency of occurrence. All othercategories were omitted because their occurrences were so rare that they wouldnot be of any utility in an analysis.

Analysis of listed thoughts. Results of an ANOVA examining the thought listingresponses are not consistent with the idea that people engaged in any form of

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TABLE 1. Thought Listing Categories and Means

Thought category Example thought Mean

Inconsistency between evidenceitems

One witness said he was drunk, butanother said he was fine.

.024a

Inconsistency between evidenceitem and expectancy

The defendant sounds like he actsnon-Christian sometimes since hewas drinking a lot.

.136a

Judgment regarding defendant’sguilt or innocence

I was pretty convinced he was guilty. .356b

Reviewing favorable evidencewith implication(s)

Since there were no signs of a struggleon the defendant that probablymeans he didn’t do it.

.422b

Reviewing unfavorable evidencewith implication(s)

He probably did attack the manbecause he saw him flirting withhis ex-girlfriend earlier that night.

.985c

General conclusion regardingstrength of evidence as a whole

I didn’t feel there was enoughevidence to make a solid judgmentabout the case.

1.058c

Note. Means with the same superscript designation (a–c) do not significantly differ.

reconciliatory thinking while processing evidence items. The analysis yielded asignificant main effect of thought category, F (5,995) = 48.87, p < .001, partialη2 = .20. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD (HSD = 0.25 at α = .05) indi-cated instances of the two categories reflective of reconciliatory processing (thefirst two categories in Table 1) occurred infrequently. Thoughts that fell into oneof two categories, judgments regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence andreviewing favorable evidence with implication(s), occurred next most often andat roughly the same rate. Finally, participants most often expressed thoughts thatwere classified as either reviewing unfavorable evidence with implication(s) or ageneral conclusion regarding overall evidence strength.

The thought category main effect was not qualified by an interaction withexpectancy type, suggesting similar thought patterns occurred regardless ofwhether participants encountered a trait expectancy or a stereotype expectancy,F (5,995) = 1.08, p > .37. However, the thought category effect was qualifiedby an interaction with expectancy valence, F (5,995) = 2.74, p = .018, partialη2 = .01. Examination of the means revealed that this interaction was causedby the responses in the categories of inconsistency between item and expectancyand reviewing favorable evidence with implication(s). Participants who receiveda positively valenced expectancy were more likely to report an inconsistencybetween an item and the expectancy, but importantly, this mean (M = 0.25, SD =0.59) was still substantially lower than the means for many of the other categories.Thus, this result does not alter the interpretation of the means reported above,

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suggesting that reconciliatory processing was rare. Additionally, participants whoreceived a negatively valenced expectancy were more likely to report thinkingabout the implications of favorable evidence items (Mpositive = 0.31, SD = 0.66;Mnegative = 0.54, SD = 0.83), perhaps providing an explanation for the presenceof an incongruency bias in recall among participants in these conditions.

One addition to the Bodenhausen (1998) paradigm used in the present studywas the collection of thought listing data. In our study, these data showed a patternof mental activity that did not vary by expectancy type. This result suggests thatthe thoughts of participants in relation to the expectancy were similar, regardlessof whether the expectancy was a trait or a stereotype. Such an outcome suggestsa common mechanism underlying the memory effects observed in the trait andstereotype conditions. The thought listing data also suggest that this mechanismis not reconciliation between evidential items and the expectancy—participantreports reflected little of this activity during evidence processing.

Conclusion

Although trait categories and stereotype categories likely differ along anumber of dimensions, including the extent to which these categories could beconsidered testable hypotheses, these differences do not seem to be relevant to theeffects of these categories on person memory. Instead, the findings of the presentstudy converge with the findings of Heider and colleagues (2007) to suggest thatthe manner of category activation—not the type of category activated—has a fargreater impact on whether patterns of recall are indicative of an incongruency biasor a congruency bias.

We concede that in this article, our attack on explanation-based reconcilia-tory mechanisms relies on null effects (e.g., no theory-congruency effects in thethought listings). More importantly, our results do not directly point to the men-tal mechanisms that may be responsible for the effect. However, other researchsuggests the possibility that overt expectancies are likely to prompt allocation ofprocessing resources to expectancy-incongruent events. We speculate that suchprocessing can strengthen one or more of the memory traces that are produced inresponse to the incongruent information, such as the perceptual memory trace (seeAllen, Sherman, Conrey, & Stroessner, 2009; Sherman, Conrey & Groom; 2004)or the episodic memory trace (Almeida, 2007; Silva, Groeger, & Bradshaw, 2006)that is produced after encountering incongruent information. A clue in this regardcomes from the fact that people report expectancy-incongruent memories to bevivid, which is often thought to be indicative of the fact that recall of such infor-mation comes from the episodic store (Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Toglia, &Hawkins, 2002). Accordingly, future research should focus more directly on thepossibility that mechanisms such as processing resource allocation and its effectson memory trace strength, and not incongruency resolution, are responsible forthe usual incongruency effect observed in many person memory studies.

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NOTES

1. The design of the experiment also included a recall delay manipulation.Approximately half of the sample completed the recall task immediately; the other halfcompleted the recall task after a 5-minute distracter task. As this variable was not involvedin any significant effects, it is not mentioned in the method or results sections.

2. Participants’ guilt and confidence judgments were also submitted to ANOVAs.The only effect that approached significance for the guilt judgments was a main effectof expectancy valence, F (1,306) = 3.01, p = .08. Participants who received a negatively-valenced expectancy (M = 6.18) rated the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt as slightlyhigher than those who received a positively-valenced expectancy (M = 5.78). No signifi-cant effects emerged for the confidence judgments.

3. Due to a software malfunction, thought listing responses were available for only207 of the 316 participants whose recall data were analyzed. However, given the stillreasonable size of this subsample, along with the fact that the loss of data was in noway systematic (i.e., participants for whom we lacked thought listing responses were notconcentrated in any particular cell/s of the design), we proceeded with this analysis.

AUTHOR NOTES

Cory R. Scherer is affiliated with the Department of Psychology, Penn StateUniversity-Schuylkill. Jeremy D. Heider is affiliated with the Department of Psychology,Southeast Missouri State University. John J. Skowronski is affiliated with the Departmentof Psychology, Northern Illinois University. John E. Edlund is affiliated with theDepartment of Psychology, Rochester Institute of Technology.

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Received October 19, 2011Accepted March 16, 2012

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