called in close air support fromMarine aircraft of Marine NightFighter Squadron 513, whichbombed and rocketed the NKPA'spositions. Once again the NKPAfled. The presence of the aircraftwas a great boost to Koreanmorale.

During the short sojourn nearPohang, the regiment was a logis-tical beggar. While the regimentwas supposed to be supplied andequipped by the ROK army or theEighth Army, the 1st MarineDivision "furnished what items ofequipment and supplies wecould." In the case of food, theROK army quartermaster suppliedonly rice. The regimental com-mander was given an allotment ofabout 250 won per day to buywhat was known in Korea as side

dishes, e.g., eggs, fruit, meat, kim-chi, and vegetables. There weretwo things wrong with this system:first, the troops had already eatenthe country bare and there wasalmost nothing to buy; and sec-ond, rampant inflation had pricedfood out of the range of the regi-mental purse. Much later, the armyquartermaster began issuing foodfor side dishes.

On 12 February, the regiment(less the 5th Battalion) receivedorders to prepare for its movementby landing ship to Samchok, upthe coast near the 38th Parallel,where it would be attached to theSouth Korean army's CapitalDivision. Arriving on the 15th, theregiment went into divisionreserve. During the period of itsattachment, the Korean Marines

engaged in some fairly heavyfighting and contributed consider-ably in preventing the collapse ofthe eastern end of the UnitedNation's defensive line. It was atsuch places as Yungil, Hongchon,Hwachon, Dosolsan, DaewusanKimilsung Hill, Motaekdong Hill,and Wolsan Pass that the KoreanMarines earned the reputation that"when there is a Marine, there is noenemy before them."

Meanwhile, the 5th SeparateKIvIC Battalion took part in a sec-ondary landing at Inchon on 16February and reported to theEighth Army's 2d LogisticalCommand, while other UnitedNations forces reoccupied Seoul inthe wake of the retreat of the CCFand NKPA from the South Koreancapital. The battalion subsequently

now held a strategic island north of the 38th Parallel inWonsan harbor.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-427265

On the morning of 24 February 1951, an unopposed land-ing by 110 South Korean Marines on the island of Sin-do fol-lowed two hours of bombardment. United Nations forces

37

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was used to man defensive posi-tions on the Kimpo Peninsula anddid not rejoin the regiment untilthe 1st Marine Division movedwest in March 1952.

Even as the 1st KMC Regimentwas transferred yet again to anoth-er command, Rear Admiral SohnWon-Yil, Republic of Korea Chief ofNaval Operations, requested on 21February of General Matthew B.Ridgway, Commanding General,U.S. Eighth Army, that to preventthe frequent shifting of the regi-ment or any of its attached unitsbetween other units, it be perma-nently attached to the 1st MarineDivision. General Ridgwayapproved Admiral Sohn's request,and from 17 March 1951 until thearmistice, the KIVIC remainedunder the tactical control of the 1stMarine Division. However, EighthArmy turned down Colonel Shin'srequest to regain control of the 5thKMC Battalion. Eighth Army'sapproval to permanently attachthe 1st KMC Regiment to the 1stMarine Division came as theKorean War settled down intopositional warfare along the 38thParallel on the main line ofresistence, and the assumption bythe division of a sector of respon-sibility after being placed underoperational control of X Corps,then IX Corps, and finally I Corps.It was at this time that LieutenantColonel Harrison was directed toreorganize and reassemble a KMCliaison group.

To provide the 1st KMCRegiment with direct artillery sup-port, division headquarters as-signed the 3d Battalion, 11thMarines, commanded by Lieuten-ant Colonel William McReynolds,the task. When the advanceresumed in what Eighth Army

Division."

dubbed Operation Ripper, theKMC occupied the center of thefront and attacked between the 1stMarines on the right and the 5thMarines on the left.

The zone of the 1st KMCRegiment, now under the com-mand of Colonel Kim Sung Un,was a wilderness without roads,making it necessary to airdropammunition and supplies for theattack on Hill 975. (The reasonoften given for the assignment ofthe Korean Marines to the sectorwith the roughest terrain was thatKoreans were better "mountaingoats" than the U.S. Marines, andthat the Koreans had no experi-ence operating with tanks.) Thisturned out to be the hardest fight of

38

the division's advance as it movedtoward Cairo Line. McReynolds'battalion provided excellentartillery support for the 2d and 3dKMC Battalions as they inchedtheir way forward in three days ofbitter combat. Not until the morn-ing of 24 March was the issuedecided by maneuver when the1st Battalion moved around theleft KMC flank into a positionthreatening the enemy's right.Resistance slackened on Hill 975and the South Korean Marinestook their objective without fur-ther trouble.

The 1st and 5th Marines werealready on Cairo Line, having metcomparatively light oppositionfrom NKPA troops who had

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A157 570

South Korean Marines employed all available weapons in the attack on Hill 975,including the 81mm mortar. Their success in forcing the enemy to withdraw fromthe strategic Kari-san mass 'raised their stock considerably with the 1st Marine

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1st KMC Regiment Returns

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relieved the 66th and 39th CCFArmies. The enemy was apparent-ly using the NKPA as an expendabledelaying force while massing inthe rear for an offensive that couldbe expected at any time. Even asEighth Army had achieved all ofthe objectives set forth inOperation Ripper, Genera!Ridgway planned to continue theoffensive to keep the enemy offbalance by applying as much pres-sure as possible, thus denying anyrespite to regroup and counterat-tack. In short, Ridgway wanted tomaintain momentum and orderedthe Eighth Army forward with littlepause or interruption.

On 26 March, in keeping withthis strategy, IX Corps ordered the1st Marine Division to a new CairoLine. This was simply a northeastextension of the old line to theboundary between IX and XCorps. While the 5th Marinesmaintained their positions, the 1stMarines and the 1st KMC Regimentmoved up to the new line onschedule and without opposition.During the last weeks ofOperation Ripper, Eighth Armyunits, which included U.S. andSouth Korean Marines, gainedabout 35 miles of additionalfrontage as they drove toward the38th Parallel. On the 29th, GeneralRidgway published a plan forOperation Rugged, a continuationof Ripper aimed at achievingKansas Line, the new objective.While the bulk of the 1st MarineDivision was to be relieved by XCorps elements, the 7th Marineswas to move up from reserve nearHongchon and join the 1st CavalryDivision in an attack aimed atChunchon to drive the remainingenemy out of the area.

But instead of being relieved,General Ridgway ordered the 1stMarine Division to continue theadvance with two infantry regi-ments as well the 1st KMC

Regiment. The 1st MarineDivision's new mission called forthe relief of the 1st CavalryDivision (with the 7th Marinesattached) north of Chunchon. Thisgave General Smith's 1st MarineDivision the responsibility fornearly 20 miles of front.

Further IX Corps instructionsdirected the 1st Marines into divi-sion reserve near Hongchon whilethe 5th Marines and 1st KMCRegiment attacked. After fordingthe Soyang River, the 5th Marinesand the 1st KMC Regimentreached their objectives with onlylight enemy opposition. On 4April, the Marines and their SouthKorean counterparts were amongthe first Eighth Army troops to re-cross the 38th Parallel. The follow-ing day marked an importantevent in Korean Marine Corps his-tory when 10 officers and 75 menjoined 3d Battalion, 11th Marines,for a month of on-the-job trainingin field artillery. "Korean officerswere rotated through all the jobspeculiar to artillery," notedLieutenant Colonel Harrison.During the cycle, the enlisted menwere trained as cannoneers, firedirection control operators, com-municators, and motor transportmechanics. This was the beginningof what later grew into a KMCartillery regiment.

Meanwhile, General Ridgwayissued yet another operationalorder, which designated newobjectives for the Eighth Army tothe north. The purpose of this newoffensive was to put pressure onexpected Chinese preparations fora spring offensive behind the so-called "Iron Triangle." While aerialbombardment could hamper thisCCF build up somewhat, GeneralRidgway correctly surmised thatonly with the use of ground forces

39

could the CCF be brought to battle.On 8 April, in preparation for thisnew offensive, the 1st MarineDivision, along with the 1st KMCRegiment, relieved the 1st CavalryDivision on Kansas Line and pre-pared to renew the offensive withan attack toward Quantico Linenear Hwachon. The 1st and 2dBattalions took positions generallyalong Kansas Line, while the 3dBattalion prepared the regimentalreserve position on a ridgeline tothe rear. The Korean Marines dug inand for the next 10 days sentpatrols forward to the PukhanRiver looking for suitable crossingsites. On the 18th, Korean Marinepatrols crossed the river, securedkey terrain on the north bank, andentered the town of Hwachon,unoccupied except for 11 Chinesewho were captured.

At 0700 on 21 April, the 1stMarine Division renewed theattack toward Quantico Line withthe 7th Marines on the left, the 5thMarines in the center, the 1st KMCRegiment on the right, and the 1stMarines in reserve. As aircraft fromMarine Fighter Squadron 312 fly-ing off the USS Bataan (CVL 29)pummeled CCF troops, both U.S.and Korean Marines met littleopposition as they advanced thefirst 5,000 to 9,000 yards. TheKorean Marines crossed thePukhan River using rubber boatsand amphibious trucks and occu-pied the high ground east andnortheast of Hwachon in the usualformation of two battalions up andone back. Colonel Richard W.Hayward's 5th Marines, and the7th Marines, commanded byColonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.,achieved both of their objectiveson Quantico Line.

The long expected Chinesecounterattack began late on 22April. As the 1st Marine Divisionprepared to advance beyondQuantico Line, a CCF prisoner

taken by the Korean Marines con-vinced General Smith and his staffthat the CCF's offensive was onlyhours away from being launched.Smith canceled the advance andordered all of his units on fullalert. By 1930, the 1st Marines hadbeen placed on full alert and by2400 the reserve unit was on itsway to reinforce the division's leftflank to meet the expected enemyassault. While the 1st Marineswere enroute, the Korean Marinesand the 5th Marines began toabsorb the full impact of theChinese counterattack. Althoughthe first blows fell on the 2d KIvICBattalion on Hill 509, the 1stBattalion on Hill 313 also cameunder heavy attack, was partiallyencircled, and forced from thehigh ground. Major Kim Jung Shikquickly notified Colonel Hay-ward's 5th Marines of the possibil-ity of an enemy breakthrough.

After a furious nightlong battle

that pitted squad-sized U.S. Marineand KMC units against a well-armedenemy on Hills 313 and 509, theU.S. and Korean Marines gained theupper hand by dawn of 23 April.During the assaults, Marine platooncommanders and squad leadersdemonstrated the soundness ofMarine training as three squads ofCompany B, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, led by Second LieutenantsHarvey W. Nolan and Patrick T.McGahn, attacked Hill 313 andeventually dislodged the Chineseforces who had emplaced machineguns in the seesaw battle. In one ofthe assaults, led by SergeantWilliam Piner, Marine riflemenadvanced slowly under a blanket ofwell-directed machine gun fire byChinese troops. After three at-tempts, the Marines forced theChinese to withdraw as reinforce-ments arrived from Company F, 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, to assist inthe final assault.

40

Even as the 1st and 2dBattalions, 5th Marines, took Hill313, a vigorous counterattack byKorean Marines, who displayedexcellent tactical proficiency in theassault, forced the Chinese fromHill 509. General Smith, who wasshortly to turn command of the 1stDivision over to Major GeneralGerald C. Thomas, commendedthe 1st KJVIC Regiment for theirstubborn defense and spiritedcounterattack. In a message toColonel Kim Suk Bum, the KMC'ssecond commandant, Smith wrote:"Congratulate you and your fineofficers and men on dash and spir-it in maintaining your positionsagainst strong enemy attacks. Weare proud of the Korean Marines."

As a result of the Chineseattacks, the division's forwardunits were ordered to withdraw ashort distance, in most cases less ana mile. In the Korean Marine zone,the 3d Battalion took up positions

in the left of the regiment's sector,while the 1st Battalion withdrewthrough the 3d to a position in therear as regimental reserve. On themorning of 24 April, the battalionswithdrew again, this time crossingthe Pukhan River. By late after-noon, two battalions were in posi-tion on the crescent-shaped ridge-line south of the river with one tothe rear in reserve. Although therewere rumors of Chinese poppingup everywhere by the thousands,it was not until the night of 24April that sizeable numberscrossed the Pukhan. On the after-noon of 26 April, a further with-drawal was ordered, and the bat-talions moved off their mountainpositions, forded the Soyang, andoccupied the high ground southof the river. The following day,the KMC regiment, with the rest ofthe 1st Marine Division, receivedorders for a third and final with-drawal to the high groundbetween the Soyang andHongchon Rivers. Patrols to thefront had no enemy contact sincethe rapid U.N. withdrawal asperennial CCF logistical problemshad left the Chinese far behind.

To fill the gaps in the rankscaused by the recent fighting, adraft of more than 200 replace-ments joined the regiment on 6May. They arrived, however, with-Out weapons or equipment (can-teens, haversacks, helmets, andcartridge belts). Out of the regi-ment's meager stores, collectedprimarily from casualties, thereplacements were fitted withweapons, although they were stillshort of a number of equipmentitems.

Meat in the troops' diet alsowas a problem; there was very lit-tle. At the beginning of the conflict,the Korean government agreed itwould be responsible for all classI (rations) supplies for its troops. Agood agreement, but it did not

put meat in the KMC mess kits.What was supplied was theOriental counterpart to AmericanC-rations manufactured in Japan,which the Koreans disliked. AsColonel Harrison later noted: "thetruth of the matter was that theKoreans despised everythingJapanese and abhorred thethought of Nips making profits offthe Korean War." Consequently,Korean Marines often forciblytook the few remaining cattlefrom local farmers and slaugh-tered them. Since GeneralThomas would not tolerate thistype of action, he sanctioned theissuance of the meat can in the C-rations from time to time. As theassistant division commander,General Puller, said: "If you'regoing to fight 'em you got to feed'em." By the end of the first weekof May, the Korean Marines hadestablished patrol bases overlook-ing the vital Chunchon-Hongchonroad and strong defensive posi-tions to the rear.

The blunting of the Chinesecounteroffensive by the counter-attack of the U.S. 3d InfantryDivision to the east was followedimmediately by a resumption ofthe advance by U.N. forces. On 22May, the 1st KMC Regiment, sup-ported for the first time by a pla-toon of five tanks, jumped off toseize two limited objectives—Hills248 and 463—just three milesfrom the front. The objectiveswere occupied and the followingday the regiment was relieved byelements of the 31st Infantry andmoved by truck four miles north-east of Hongchong, only a milefrom where it started the offensivetwo months before. About thistime, Colonel Kim Tae Shik, a bat-talion commander during theSeoul and Wonsan operations,

41

assumed the post of regimentalcommander.

The regiment's rest in reservewas not long, and on the 25 Mayit started north. The three KoreanMarine battalions moved rapidlythrough two valleys leading to theSoyang River—history was repeat-ing itself practically over the sameground. In the advance, an ever-increasing number of Chineseprisoners were being rounded upby Korean Marine patrols. On 29May alone, 59 prisoners weretaken. Even a Chinese paymasterwith his bags full of money wascaught in the net. To press theadvantage, the 1st MarineDivision ordered the advance tospeed up, and on 30 May, the 1stand 3d KMC Battalions crossedthe Soyang River and movedalong the axis of the Yanggu roadtoward the east end of theHwachon Reservoir. The 2dBattalion plunged directly northinto the wilderness leading to thesouth bank of the reservoir withthe 7th ROK Regiment on its left.By the last day of May, KoreanMarine patrols had reached thereservoir's south bank.

On 2 June, the 3d ROKRegiment arrived and relieved theMarines, who were shuttled to anassembly area south of Yanggu.The next afternoon, the three bat-talions moved forward and occu-pied positions on the high groundin preparation to relieve the 5thMarines on 4 June.

The KMC demonstrated itsgrowing tactical proficiencybeginning on 4 June in the assaulton Hill 1122 or, as it is known byKorean Marines—the Battle forTaeam-san Ridge. In support ofthe renewed effort of the 1stMarine Division to extend its zone5,000 yards to the east of theSoyang River valley, the KMC wasbrought out of division reservenot only to relieve Colonel

Hayward's 5th Marines, but also tofree the 2d Infantry Division forthe mission of mopping up in XCorps' rear. Three Marine regi-ments were now in line, the 1stMarines on the left, the KMC in thecenter, the 5th Marines on theright, and the 7th Marines inreserve.

The 1st KMC Regiment drew themost difficult sector of the mainline of resistance, a rather extensive,gruesome looking mountain rangethat extended northeast fromYanggu to Hill 1316 (Taeam-san),the highest point in that part ofKorea. Along the ridgelines, theChinese had placed NKPA troopswith only one order: "Hold untildeath." From the air, the ground in

front of the South Koreans resem-bled a monstrous lizard, rearingupon its hind legs. The two cametogether at the rump, Hill 1122.From this position, the backboneran northeast to the shoulders, Hill1218. Still farther northeast, alongthe neck, was the key terrain fea-ture—Taeam-san, the head of thereptile.

Despite liberal use of artilleryand close air support during theirfirst assault on Taeam-san, thethree battalions ran into stiff oppo-sition from elements of an NKPAregiment of the 12th NKPADivision, commanded by MajorGeneral Choe Am Lin. The craftyNKPA commander was quick torealize the tactical value of the

42

height and sought to make theKMC pay dearly for every inch ofground. This can be seen in themanner in which the NKPA dealtwith the Korean Marines, whoupon capture were summarily exe-cuted with a pistol shot to theback of the head.

For five days, 4-9 June, fightingraged around Taeam-san and thesurrounding ridgelines. Because ofthe rugged, narrow terrain, theSouth Korean Marines were forcedto attack in a formation that resem-bled a long thin spear rather thanthe blow of a heavy battering ram.Even when they managed to scalethe heights, the enemy launched afurious counterattack and pushedthem off. Not since the ill-fatedattack of the 1st KMC Battalion inSeptember 1950 against Hill 104on the western outskirts of Seoulhad the Korean Marines been upagainst such an entrenched anddetermined enemy. With lossesmounting, the regimental com-mander decided to change tactics tobreak the back of the enemydefenses.

At 2000 on 10 June, the SouthKoreans decided to gamble on anight attack. Since the Chinese andNorth Koreans had used nightattacks more frequently than U.N.forces, Colonel Kim concluded thiscould possibly catch the enemy offguard. He was right, for when theKorean Marines launched the nextattack at 0200 on the morning of 11June, most North Korean troopswere either attending to garrisonduties or were asleep. The threebattalions fell upon the unsuspect-ing enemy "like an avalanche."Hill 1122, the center of resistance,fell to the KMC, and when it did, sodid the remainder of the ridgeline.The North Koreans paid a heavyprice that night, while KMC casu-alties were relatively light—fivekilled and 37 wounded. By themorning of 12 June, the battle for

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156047

Col Kim The Shik assumed command of the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimentin late May following the blunting of the second Chinese counteroffensive. A bat-talion commander during the Seoul campaign, Col Kim would lead the regimentin the battle for Taeam-san Ridge, where it would earn acclaim.

— ...

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Taeam-san was over and mop-upoperations cleared the remnants ofthe enemy forces off the mountainwithout difficulty. In recognitionof the bravery displayed by theKorean Marines, General Thomassent the following dispatch:

Congratulations to theKMC Reg{imenlt on a difficultjob well done. Your seizureof objectives on the KansasLine from a determinedenemy was a magnificentdash of courage andendurance. Your courageousand aggressive actions justifyour pride in the KoreanMarines.

The bitter fighting on Taeam-san was to become typical of thefighting in Korea. While U.S. andKorean Marines slugged their way

ahead during the day, the NKPAprobed Marine lines by night, witheach advance requiring a massiveamount of firepower. This patternlasted for several days before theMarines finally broke the resis-tance of the NKPA, who then fledfrom the hills surrounding Taeam-san.

As truce talks between theCommunist and United Nationsnegotiators began, the fightingraged on. The defensive sectoralong Kansas Line west of theYanggu road and north of thereservoir, which was assigned tothe 1st Marines, left the enemyholding the high ground to thenorth. The regiment began pushingfor a modification of the line togain a better defensive position.The division bought the proposaland ordered Major Kong JungShik's 1st KMC Battalion to seize

43

Hill 1304 and then attack north-west to Tusol-san, the dominatingpiece of ground of the western rimof the strange geological formationsoon to be christened the"Punchbowl." On 15 June, MajorYun Yung Jun's 2d KMC Battalionattacked north toward Hill 1304,which it seized the following day.Meanwhile, Major Kim Yun Kun's3d KMC Battalion, following the2d in trace, struck northwest alongthe ridgeline toward Tusol-san. Asit approached the mountain,enemy resistance stiffened andfrontal probes met with little suc-cess. On the night of 18 June,Major Kim's 3d Battalion launchedan attack to capture the tacticallyimportant mountain. The battal-ion's 10th Company attackedstraight along the ridgeline fromHill 1304. Meanwhile, its 11thCompany, led by Captain Pak Kun

Table of Organization June

1st RegimentRegimental CO Go! Kim Tae Shik

Regimental NO LtCol Kim Dong Ha

1951

1st BattalionCC) Nlaj H mu Jung Shik

XO Capt An Chang K\\ anS-3 Capt Sn Jung Narn

1st Company— istLi Lee Sa Kuen

r1st Li

— 3d CompanylstLt Urn 1 unig lun

2d BattalionCC) \laj 'fun Ytinc. Jun

NO Capt Pack sung Chul5-3 lstLt Su Sang Kuk

5th CompanylstLt Cho Yung (1n

6th CompanylstLt CLing Hong 1k

7th ConipanylstLt Pack Jung Mo

3d BattalionCO Maj Kim Yun Run

NO Capt Nun Ynng Shik5-3 lstLt Pack Dung Rye!

10th Companylsth Pack Ri Jik

11th CompanI stLt Pack Run Sub

CompanyLee trig Duk

9th CompanylstLt Kang Bok Ku

Weapons CompanyisiLt Lee Ye Kvun

J Weapons CompanyLee Won Hung H

Weapons CompanylstLt Lini Doug Run

Sup, made a turning movementthrough the valley then up towardthe ridgeline north of Tusol-san.The simultaneous attack from thesoutheast and north so surprisedthe enemy that his resistance col-lapsed.

As U.N. forces consolidatedtheir gains after pushing back acombined CCF-NKPA offensive,Eighth Army adopted a defensivestrategy in wake of the armisticetalks that began at Kaesong thatsame month. In keeping with thisstrategy, General Thomas issuedan order on 22 June that directed allthree infantry regiments to establishbattalion-sized patrol bases alongthe line. The KMC did the same.They dug trenches and erectedbunkers, strung barbed wire,planted mine fields, and patrolleddaily to the front, particularlytoward Taeu-san (Hill 1179),where the enemy maintained astrong outpost.

On the morning of 7 July, theMarine liaison officer with X Corpsalerted Colonel Richard G. Weede,the division G-3, to expect anorder directing the seizure andestablishment of a patrol base onTaeu-san the next day. The 1stKMC Regiment, warned by tele-phone, had very little time to planand prepare for an attack. Sincethe Koreans could not be relievedof the responsibility for their sector,it was necessary to form amakeshift battalion of three com-panies (from the 1st and 2dBattalions). Unfortunately, theycontained a large proportion ofrecruits and the battalion comman-der had only recently reported onboard to take command.

There were two avenues ofapproach. The obvious avenue ofattack was down the ridgelineleading north from Tusol-san andthen west to Taeu-san. The othercalled for a descent from Tusol-san into a valley generally parallel-

battle for Taeam-san.

ing the main line of resistance andthen up the steep sloops of Hill1100, about a half-mile south ofTaeu-san. The Koreans used bothroutes of approach. While onecompany advanced on the right byway of the valley, the other twotook to the ridgeline on the left.The assault, which was to havebeen preceded by air strikes and anartillery bombardment, kicked off at1030 on 8 July minus the air sup-port, which had been canceleddue to a soupy fog that cast itsgray shadow over the entire bat-tlefield. Despite heavy enemyresistance, the attack achievedsome initial success as the compa-nies gained a toehold on Hill 1100where the advance ground to ahalt.

The Korean Marines dug in forthe night and repulsed a series ofcounterattacks. On the morning of9 July, as one company broke con-tact and returned under orders torejoins its battalion, the regimentalcommander, Colonel Kim Tae

44

Shik, committed the 2d Battalion,which jumped off from Hill 1100toward Taeu-san. Strong enemycounterattacks drove the battalionback and off the hill. Meanwhile,the 1st Battalion, led by MajorKong Jung Shik, jumped offtoward Hill 1001, but encounteredbooby traps, mines, and heavysmall arms fire. Once again, theKorean Marines advanced withoutair or artillery support as the fogthat hindered the previous day'sattack remained over the battle-field.

Colonel Gould P. "Pappy"Groves, who replaced ColonelHarrison as the senior U.S. Marineliaison officer with the 1st KMCRegiment, recommended the bat-talion be withdrawn. Although the1st Battalion had managed to cap-ture Hill 1001, it was obvious to allthat the enemy's continued heavyresistance made the recapture ofHill 1100 impossible, at least forthe moment, and that the KMCcould not take Taeu-san as

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jun 1951

Anytime there was a break in the action, U.S. Marines, assisted by interpreters,would hold familiarization school for Korean Marines on current or newweapons, such as the 75mm recoilless rifle, which the regiment received after the

planned. On 12 July, the 1stMarine Division informed X Corpsthe position held by the KoreanMarines just north of Hill 1001 ful-filled the requirements for anadvance patrol base and recom-mended that no further efforts bemade to capture Taeu-san. XCorps concurred.

The Korean Marines sufferedmore than 220 casualties in theirvaliant assault on Taeu-san andHills 1100 and 1001. Shortly afterthe actions near Taeu-san, the 1stKMC Regiment, along with the restof the 1st Marine Division, wentinto corps reserve as the U.S. 2dInfantry Division assumed controlof the sector occupied by Marines.It subsequently would require the

entire division to wrest Taeu-sanfrom the enemy.

In reserve, the 1st KMCRegiment received what oneobserver described as "its mostthorough training it had everknown," this given that all thewhile it had been fighting alongsideits U.S. Marine counterparts. Each ofthe 1st Marine Division's three reg-iments sent four training teams tothe four KMC battalions. Begin-ning on 22 July, these trainingteams consisted of a first or secondlieutenant, a noncommissionedofficer, and an interpreter. The 12teams, one assigned to each KMCcompany, remained with theirSouth Korean counterparts until 20August. During this period, the

U.S. Marine advisors cross-trainedmembers of each company in theuse of small arms, company-levelweapons, weapons maintenance,small unit tactics, and administra-tion.

As it trained hard, it likewiseexpanded in size. According toGeneral Kang, by 1 August, theKorean Marine Corps numberedapproximately 4,000 men, with3,200 of them assigned to the 1stKMC Regiment, while 800 servedwith the 5th Separate KMCBattalion, which was assigned toman defensive positions in andaround the Kimpo Peninsula. Asfor the regiment's organizationalstructure, it now resembled that ofa U.S. Marine regiment, consisting

A three-man Korean Marine crew fires a .50-caliber to keep one company out on a patrol base, rotating thismachine gun at aforwardpatrol base. Regimental policy was assignment every few days.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156474

45

of three infantry battalions, a regi-mental headquarters, a 4.2-inchmortar company, and a 75mmrecoilless rifle platoon. The regi-ment's new commanding officerwas Lieutenant Colonel Kim DongHa, who replaced the woundedColonel Kim Tae Shik.

On 27 August, the 1st MarineDivision, along with the KMC,returned to the line in time for therenewed effort in the Punchbowl.

The 7th Marines and 1st KMCRegiment were assigned to relieveU.S. and Korean army units alongthe Kansas Line, while the 5thMarines had orders to reinforcethe 7th Marines as it marched upthe narrow Soyang Valley.

Despite having to march in atorrential downpour to its objec-tives, both the 7th Marines and the1st KMC Regiment reached theirassigned positions by afternoonon the 29th. The 2d KMC Battalionrelieved the French battalionassigned to the 2d Infantry

46

Division, while the 2d and 3dBattalions, 7th Marines, completedthe relief of elements from the 8thROK Division.

Division Operations Order 22-51 directed two assault regiments,the 7th Marines and the 1st KMCRegiment, to attack at 0600 the fol-lowing day and seize assignedpositions on corps Objective Yoke,the ridgeline running from Hill 930on the west through Hills 1026 and924 on the east. The 1st Battalion,7th Marines, already occupiedObjective 1, a hill mass one-and-a-half miles northeast of Tonpyong.The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, wasordered to seize Objective 2, gen-erally that part of Yoke Ridge eastof Hill 924. The 1st KMC Regimentwas assigned Objective 3, whichwas the seizure and occupation ofHills 924 and 1026. As both U.S. andKorean Marines moved towardtheir objectives, small arms fireand land mines slowed theiradvance. Meanwhile, a number ofprisoner reports indicated theenemy planed to hit the Marinesalong the Kansas Line on 1

September, which prompted thedivision's intelligence officer,Lieutenant Colonel James H.Tinsley, to suspect the enemy'sSixth Phase Offensive might beabout to begin. Consequently,both the 7th Marines and 1st KMCRegiment prepared for the expect-ed enemy onslaught.

In preparation for of that attack,the two KMC battalions receivedpriority for close air support mis-sions. As the two battalionsjumped off in columns on 31August with Marine aircraft over-head, they met only moderateresistance on their advance up Hill924. Enemy minefields gave theKorean Marines more trouble atfirst than the scattered enemy mor-tar and machine gun fire. The 1stKMC Battalion conducted a pas-sage of lines through the 3d

Battalion and met increasingenemy resistance as it pushedtoward its objective. On its rightflank, the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, also encountered lightresistance, which increased as theMarines neared their objective.Taking advantage of the slopingterrain, the enemy commanderplanted mines along the most like-ly avenues of approach on Hill702. Forced to take alternate posi-tions, which had been bracketedby the enemy, the forward ele-ments of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,were hit by a concentration ofmortar and artillery fire. East of theSoyang, on the regiment's rightflank, where Objective 1 had beenoccupied without a fight, the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, supportedthe attack of 3d Battalion withmortar fire. The 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and the Korean Marineswere within 1,000 yards of theirobjectives late in the afternoonwhen a halt was called for the day.Minimal losses were due in largemeasure to the excellent air andartillery support.

When the attack resumed on 1September, Major Kim Yun Kun's 3dBattalion conducted a passage oflines through positions occupiedby 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, toreach a ridgeline on the flank of theregimental objective. While the 3dBattalion advanced from thenortheast, Major Kong Jung Shik's1st Battalion closed in from thesoutheast. Both battalions sufferedheavy losses from enemy minesand mortars, as well as frommachine gun and automaticweapons fire from hidden bunk-ers. The converging attack madeslow but steady progress until onecompany of the 3d Battalion drovewithin 200 meters of the top of Hill924 at 1700. It took four morehours of hard fighting to securethe objective. That evening, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, relieved the

2d KMC Battalion of its defensiveresponsibilities, enabling the bat-talion to join in the attack.

Throughout the day, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Bernard T.Kelly, slugged it out in the vicinityof Hill 702 with an NKPA battal-ion, which launched four differentcounterattacks with as many as500 men. While some of theenemy troops briefly penetratedthe battalion's lines, they werebeaten back with the help of sup-porting air and artillery strikesfrom Colonel Custis Burton, Jr.'s11th Marines, which poured adeadly concentration of 105mmartillery fire on the North Koreantroops. Kelly's battalion continuedto fight off the enemy attacks untildusk.

The tenacity of the NKPA'sdefense was again demonstratedon the KMC when they were drivenfrom the top of Hill 924 by a sur-prise enemy counterattack at mid-night. But the Korean Marinesshowed their own determinationon the morning of 2 September,and following a terrific firefight,

47

the North Koreans were evictedaround noon. The guns of MajorGordon R. Worthington's 1stBattalion, 11th Marines, fired 1,682rounds of 105mm ammunition indirect support of the KMC assaulton Hill 924. At the same time, theguns of Lieutenant ColonelMcReynolds' 3d Battalion, 11thMarines, fired 1,400 rounds in sup-port of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines.The 11th Marines' other battalions,reinforced by elements of the U.S.Army's 196th, 937th, and 780thField Artillery Battalions, broughtthe total number of rounds firedduring the 24-hour period to8,400.

After Major Kim Byong Ho's 2dBattalion secured Hill 924, it con-ducted a passage of lines throughthe 1st and 3d Battalions to spear-head an attack toward Hill 1026. Inthe 3d Battalion, 7th Marines'zone, Company H repulsed anenemy counterattack at 0700 withmortar and machine gun fire, andthen moved out to resume theattack on Hill 602. LieutenantColonel Kelly ordered his battal-ion's heavy machine guns to set

Department of Defense (USMc) A157705

Following a U.S. Marine artillery preparation, Korean Marines charge anenemy bunker complex as part of the 1st Marine Division 'splan to seize a seriesof commanding ridgelines surrounding the Punchbowl.

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up in battery order to deliver over-head supporting fires. In less thantwo hours, the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, swept the crest of Hill602 and secured the division'sObjective 2. After taking Hill 602,the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,repulsed three company-sizedenemy counterattacks before theNorth Koreans withdrew to thenorth at 1500.

The 2d KMC Battalion fought itsway to a point within 800 yards ofHill 1026 before dusk. So aggressiveand persistent was the NKPAdefense that several light enemyprobing attacks were launchedduring the night of 2 September, not

only against forward Marine ele-ments, but also against the 5thMarines on the Kansas Line, fivemiles to the rear. The fluid nature ofthe front meant fighting coulderupt anywhere and everywhereand at any time.

While Kelly's Marines construct-ed emplacements and obstacles onHill 602, the South Korean Marinescontinued their attack toward Hill1026 on the morning of 3

September. With the extending ofthe 7th Marines zone to the left todecrease the width of the KIVICfront, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,was brought up from regimentalreserve to help cover a new sector

that included Hill 924. The attackled by Major Kun's 2d Battalioncollided with a large-scale enemycounterattack. The fighting ragedfor more than three hours beforethe NKPA broke off contact, andby mid-morning on 3 September,the Korean Marines were in pos-session of the division's Objective 3.They quickly consolidated defens-es for the expected enemy coun-terattack, which came at 1230 andlasted for two hours before theNKPA once again broke contactand retreated. This action by theKMC completed the battle forcorps Objective Yoke. At 1800, on3 September, the 1st Marine

Korean Marine Corps mortar men prepare to launch amortar shell. Along the main line of resistance during the win-ter of 1951-1952, three battalions of Korean Marines con-

tinued to maintain a vigorous forward patrol effort whileimproving their defenses in case of an enemy counterattack.

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A160234

48

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Division was in full possession ofthe Hays Line, which dominatedthe western side of thePunchbowl.

On 4 September, with all objec-tives consolidated, 1st MarineDivision units patrolled northwardfrom defensive positions. Divisionplanners already had been layingthe groundwork for the secondphase of its attack on thePunchbowl, which was to advancea further 4,000 to 7,000 yards toseize the next series of command-ing ridgelines. As for the price ofthe last offensive, it was notcheap. During the four-day battle,a total of 109 Marines (U.S. andSouth Korean) were killed and 494were wounded. North Koreancasualties were even higher with656 killed and 40 taken prisoner. Asthe U.S. and ROK Marines consol-idated their positions, replacedworn equipment, and replenisheddepleted stocks of ammunition,the next phase of the fighting in thePunchbowl resumed. For theremainder of September, the 1stKMC Regiment occupied the HaysLine and conducted vigorouspatrols north of the division's posi-tions as it awaited new orders toresume the attack.

By 1 October, seven infantrybattalions manned the division'smain line of resistance—threeKMC battalions on the left, twobattalions from the 5th Marines inthe center (relieved by the 7thMarines on 11 October), and twobattalions from the 1st Marines onthe right. The mission of the KMCand of the 1st Marine Divisionremained virtually unchanged asthey conducted numerous footpatrols far into enemy territory andinitiated company-strength tank-infantry raids supported by Marineaircraft and artillery. In one suchraid, conducted on 17 October, areinforced KMC company, sup-ported by tanks, air, artillery, and

combat engineers, attacked enemypositions about 875 yards north-west of Hill 751 and 1,500 yardssouth of Hill 1052. During the day-long raid, the Korean Marinesdestroyed 25 NKPA bunkers, killed15 enemy troops, captured 3 pris-oners of war, and netted 5

machine guns.On 21 October, the front of the

1st Marine Division was reduced amile when elements of the 3dROK Division relieved Major Kim's2d Battalion on the Marine leftflank in accordance with instruc-tions from X Corps. A total of sixinfantry battalions now mannedthe 12-mile front.

Throughout the remainder of1951, the 1st Marine Division con-tinued to occupy the eastern por-tion of the X Corps defense sectorin east-central Korea. From left toright the 1st KMC Regiment, 7thMarines, and 1st Marines held themain line of resistance with twobattalions each. The 5th Marinesremained in reserve until 11

November when it relieved the 1stMarines, which went into reserve atMago-ri. As Marines continuedpatrols and efforts to improve theirdefenses, the KMC added its ownartillery support—the 1st KoreanArtillery Battalion consisting oftwo medium (155mm) and twolight (105mm) howitzer batteries.The 2d KMC Regiment, command-ed by Lieutenant Colonel Kim DooChan, was organized as were engi-neer and medical companies. Inthe spring of 1952, the 1st MarineDivision, along with the 1st KMCRegiment, received orders to moveacross the peninsula to westernKorea. The regiment was the firstunit to move to its new positionsalong the extreme left flank of theEighth Army, where it was given themission of guarding the approach-es to Seoul along the JamestownLine. By 24 March, the 1st MarineDivision and 1st KMC Regiment

49

had relieved elements of the 1stROK Division along the left sectorof the main line of resistance, adja-cent to the British 1st Common-wealth Division, and were in posi-tion to continue sector outpostsecurity and ground defense inwhat had become a war of attrition.

As the Marines of the 1stDivision prepared to occupy posi-tions along the Jamestown Line,the efforts of the Marine liaisongroups began to take noticeableeffect on the KMC's battlefield pro-ficiency, which was increased ten-fold. On 11 February 1952, inresponse to a request from theCommandant of the KoreanMarine Corps, the 1st MarineDivision activated the KoreanMarine Corps Advisory Group(KMCAG), which consisted of sixofficers and 11 enlisted Marines.The U.S. Marine advisors providedassistance in an advisory capacity tothe Commandant of the KoreanMarine Corps and his staff. Shortlythereafter, the KMCAG came underthe administrative control of theCommander, Naval Forces, FarEast, which had a similar teamproviding advice to the ROK Navy.

Along the Jamestown Line, ele-ments of the 1st KMC Regimentand units of the 1st and 5thMarines manned security outposts,dug field fortifications, built defen-sive positions, conducted aggres-sive foot patrols, and drove backsmall enemy probing attacks. Thedivision, now commanded byMajor General John T. Selden, con-sisted of 1,364 officers and 24,846enlisted Marines, 1,100 attachednaval personnel (doctors, corps-men, and Seabees), and 4,400 offi-cers and men of the 1st KoreanMarine Regiment. It also had oper-ational control of several I Corpsreinforcing artillery units in its sec-

Camouflaged Korean Marines on patrol pause of check theroute. The Koreans frequently drew the sector with theroughest terrain and least number of roads. The reason

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A161982

often given for the assignment was that the Koreans were bet-ter "mountain goats" than US. Marines.

tor. On 31 March, another majorinfantry unit, the KimpoProvisional Regiment (KPR), wasorganized to augment the fightingstrength of the division.

General James A. Van Fleet'stransfer of the 1st Marine Divisionto western Korean aimed tostrengthen the defenses of theapproaches to Seoul and theKimpo Peninsula. Several units,the 5th KMC Battalion, the U.S.Marine 1st Armored AmphibianBattalion, and the 13th ROKSecurity Battalion (less one com-pany), had been assigned to theprotection of the peninsula. Theiroperations, while coordinatedwith I Corps, were of a more inde-

pendent nature. The fixed nature ofthe Kimpo defenses provided forneither a reserve maneuver ele-ment to help repel any enemyattack that might occur nor a singlecommander to coordinate theoperations of the defending units.

These apparent weaknessesprompted concern for the securityof the Korean capital, which layjust east of the bases on the KimpoPeninsula, separated only by theHan River. Also located on Kimpowas the key port of Inchon andtwo other vital installations, thelogistical complex at Ascom Cityand the Kimpo Airfield. All ofthese facilities were indispensableto the U.N. war effort. To improvethe security of Kimpo and providea cohesive, integrated defensiveline, General Selden formed these

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independent commands into theKimpo Provisional Regiment andplaced Colonel Edward M. Staab, Jr.,in command. This unique com-mand functioned in a tacticalcapacity only and had no adminis-trative duties.

In addition to maintaining secu-rity on the division's left flank, theKPR was given the mission of pro-tecting the support and communi-cations installations in that sector"against an airborne or groundattack." To support the KPR's tacti-cal mission, General Selden placedthe division's artillery and motortransport assets at its disposal.

For ease of control, the KPRcommander divided the peninsulainto three sectors. The 5thSeparate KJvIC Battalion occupiedthe northern sector, dominated by

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51

Training a Republic of Korea Marine

The training of a Republic of Korea Marine was pat-terned after that of a I'S. Marine. Like his U.S.Marine counterpart, recruits for the Korean Marine

Corps (KMC) reported to the Marine Recruit TrainingCenter at Chinhae, near Pusan. There, recruits underwenta grueling eight weeks of basic training patterned afterthat of the U.S. Marine Corns recruit training at MarineCorps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina. andSan Diego, California. Upon completion of recruit train-ing, the basic Marine reported to the 1st KMC Regimentor the 5th KMC Battalion. Upon arrival at the regiment,the Marines were formed into a provisional recruit com-pany for additional infantry training, much like thatreceived by a U.S. Marine at the Infantry TrainingRegiment aL either Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, orCamp Pendleton, California. Here, the basic Marinereceived classes in small unit tactics, weapons familiar-ization. first aid, field hygiene, and field sanitation.

Training cadre for the provisional organization com-prised assigned officers and noncommissioned officersof the different battalions under the direction of the reg-iment's operations officer. This training period usuallylasted about four weeks, at which time the Marine wasassigned to a permanent regimental unit. After joining acombat organization, the new Marine received addition-al on-the-job training. Korean Marine officers coupledthis training with as much formal instruction and practi-cal work as possible for units occupying a sector of themain line of resistance. In view of the static situation dur-ing the winter of 1951-1952, and the increased numberof replacements, small unit instruction among the unitsincreased considerably.

As time permitted, the Marine was given more com-prehensive rraining while his battalion remained in regi-mental or division reserve. Corps training cadre carriedout all instruction under the direction and supervision ofthe battalion commander and his staff.

U.S. Marine Corps personnel performed an importanttraining role, but only through the Korean Marine CorpsAdvisory Group's battalion liaison officer. This officercontributed materially to the training of the battalionthrough his continuous contact with and influence onthe battalion staff. The t.S. Marine Corps officer's rolewas one of advisor, with final decisions resting with theKMC battalion and company officers. When they wereavailable, the 1st Marine Division and Commander, NavalForces, Far East, provided additional Marine officers,noncommissioned officers, and corpsmen to the KMC forspecialized training.

During July and August 1951, when the 1st MarineDivision was in reserve, an extensive training programwas undertaken by the 1st KMC Regiment. During thisperiod, the division assigned a U.S. Marine Corps advi-

sory to each KMC company. The teams consisted of anofficer, a noncommissioned officer, and an interpreter.This further enhanced the training of the KMC thoughthe team's expert advice and on-site demonstrations ofvarious infantry techniques. This demonstration-styleinstruction proved to work well among Korean Marines,as did the use of training aids such as disassembled MlGarand rifles, machine guns, mortars, and sand tables.

Marine advisors also provided classes in infantry' tac-tics for KMC platoon, company, and battalion comman-ders. This training was carried out exclusively by U.S.Marine Corps officers selected from the various regi-ments that were on the main line of resistance. Theseofficers prepared outlines of instruction, which they thensubmitted to the I .S. Marine liaison teams for review andrevision to make them relevant to their KMC comrades.The liaison teams ensured these instructions were basicin content and terminology, and that they were deliveredeffectively to the KMC officers. For their part, the KMCofficers designated to attend classes were not required tospeak English. Instead, the lecture by the U.S. Marineinstructor was delivered in English and then translatedinto Korean by the interpreter. After each thought or ideawas presented to the students, the instructor stopped toallow the interpreter to explain it in Korean. In this man-ner, maximum emphasis was given by the instructor andtransmitted to the students. As a means to reinforce thelessons presented in class, every KMC officer attendingthe class received a set of translated lecture notes for hispersonal use.

St

Department ol Defense Photo (tSMC A8215

commanding terrain. The ROKarmy battalion occupied the south-ern portion and was assigned theprotection of Kimpo Airfield andthe containment of any attemptedenemy attack from the north. Boththe KMC and the ROK army unitsprovided security for supply andcommunication installations withintheir sectors. The western sectorwas held by Company A, 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion, lesstwo platoons. The company hadthe mission of screening trafficalong the east bank of the YomRiver, which flanked the westernpart of the peninsula. Providingflexibility to the defense was 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, the desig-nated maneuver battalion, then inreserve and on call in case of anenemy attack.

The unit adjacent the KPR in thedivision line in late March was the1st KMC Regiment. Commandedby Colonel Kim Dong Ha, the reg-iment assumed responsibility forits portion of the Jamestown Line at0400 on 20 March with orders toorganize and defend its sector. Theregiment placed the 1st and 3dKMC Battalions on the main lineof resistance, with the 2d Battalionin the rear as regimental reserve.Holding down the regimental rightflank was the 1st Battalion, whichshared the boundary with the 1stMarines until 29 March when the5th Marines entered the lines andassumed the defense of the sectorbetween the regiment and 1stMarines. To bolster the defensesalong the Jamestown Line, GeneralSelden added the remaining com-panies of the 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion to the four regi-ments on line, making a total offive major units manning the front.Inserted between the KPR and the1st KMC Regiment, the amphibiantractor companies added to thedivision's maneuverability alongthe line.

Enemy units facing the Marinesalong the Jamestown Line wereboth tough and considered first-rate by the division's intelligenceofficer, Lieutenant Colonel Tinsley.The units located directly beyondthe 1st Marine Division's sectorincluded elements of the 65th and63d CCF Armies. Together, theenemy armies numbered 49,800troops. Opposite the west andcenter sectors of the division'slines was the 65th CCFArmy, withelements of the 193d Divisionopposing the Kimpo ProvisionalRegiment and the 194th Divisionfacing the 1st KMC Regiment. TheU.S. Marine regiments faced the1 95th Division, 65th CCF Army,which had placed two regimentsforward. North of the division'sright lay the 188th Division, 63dCCF Army, which also had tworegiments forward. In support ofthe estimated 15 enemy infantrybattalions were 10 artillery battal-ions with a total of 106 guns ofvarying calibers (75mm to155mm). Intelligence reported thepresence of the 1st CCF ArmoredDivision and an unidentified air-borne brigade located nearenough to the front to providesupport if needed.

Surprisingly, the Chinese didnot interfere with the 1st MarineDivision as it dug in along theJamestown Line. This changedtoward the end of March as theenemy increasingly probed theMarines' lines. From 25-31 March,the first week along theJamestown, the division reportedfive separate attacks that includedsome 100 Chinese soldiers perprobe. Most of these occurredagainst the 1st KMC Regiment, afront the Chinese believed was theweakest sector of the line.

52

The 1st KMC Regiment held thearea containing Freedom Gate, thebest of three bridges spanning theImjin River. Both of the other two,X-Ray and Widgeon, were furthereast in the division's sector. If theChinese could exploit a weakpoint in the KMC lines, captureFreedom Gate Bridge, and turn thedivision's left flank, enemy forcescould pour into Eighth Army's rearand possibly retake Seoul. Withoutthe bridge in the KMC sector, thedivision would "be hard pressed,even with helicopter lift, to maintainthe regiments north of the Imjin."

At about 2130 on 1 April, theCCF launched its offensive,pounding KMC positions with amassive artillery barrage. A halfhour later, Chinese troopslaunched a ground assault, hittinga Korean outpost and the mainline. Marines of the 1st Company,1st KIvIC Battalion, were the first tofeel the brunt of the Chineseattack on the regiment's rightflank. There, a Chinese companyforced an opening between friend-ly outposts and reached a pointabout 200 yards short of the mainline of resistance and just north ofa road leading to the main bridgeover the Imjin. While this attackwas in progress, another CCF com-pany hit the outpost line furthersouth. This attack proved less suc-cessful, as the South KoreanMarines were able to quicklymuster sufficient strength to repelthe invaders short of their objective.Battered and beaten, both Chinesecompanies withdrew at about2345 to their own lines.

To the left of the 1st Battalionwas Major Paik Nam Pyo's 3dBattalion, which received the forceof the Chinese attack. The battal-ion's 9th, 10th, and 11thCompanies (deployed in thatorder from west to east in the leftbattalion sector), had beenengaged by the same preliminary

Fighting Along the

Jamestown Line