tracking u.s. humanitarian aid responding to disaster in haiti

TRACKING U.S. HUMANITARIAN AID: RESPONDING TO DISASTER IN HAITI 1

Tracking U.S. Humanitarian Aid: Responding to Disaster in Haiti

Genevieve N. Dejean

Bradley University

IS 495

Fall 2011

Charles Bukowski


The small Caribbean nation of Haiti is regularly presented with challenges that prevent

major hopes of significant progress. Old conflicts never seem to be fully resolved and are

constantly tantalized by new conflicts, essentially portraying that “nature has never smiled on

Haiti” (Austin, 2003, para. 12). The Failed States Index of (2011) reported that Haiti ranks as

number 5 with an index rating of 108.2 (“The Failed States Index”). As a failed state, this is a

clear indication that Haiti is in dire need of assistance and relief. President of the World Bank,

Robert B. Zoellick quoted in a World Bank article (2008), addressed failed states in his

recognition of the six global challenges the organization faces; he defined failed states as “the

toughest development challenge of our era” (“Fragile states”, 2008, para. 5). Directly related to

the fulfillment of development is humanitarian aid which can be used to achieve gradual stages

of secure development.

This excessive need in Haiti is demonstrated on a daily basis. This notion has kept Haiti

on the United States foreign policy radar today. Haiti is extremely dependent on foreign

assistance to reach bare minimum levels of subsistence. Lowenthal, Piccone, and Whitehead

(2009) published that “about ninety percent of [Haiti] government budget comes from foreign

aid and seventy percent of that is channeled through NGOs or international organizations” (p.

208).

In research of Haiti, many scholars have focused on why Haiti remains so poor when

there are other characteristically similar nations in the world that have made positive strides

away from poverty to a world of brighter possibilities and progress. Many of these scholars

vitiate and condescend Haiti’s progress, or lack thereof, without obtaining sufficient information

to make appropriate conclusions, simply demonstrating an overreaching of analytical boundaries.


Many do not properly measure the impact Haiti has had on the international system and how,

specifically, its unique history has prevented it from emerging as a leader in this international

system, namely after becoming the world’s first black republic in 1804.This is the case with

David Brooks (2010), in his analysis of Haiti in regards to the violence of the earthquake. In his

evaluation he concludes that Haiti’s culture is to blame and other researchers on Haiti speculate

that his conclusions on the country are incomplete (as cited in Heuvel, 2010, p. 5).

Haiti truly is a “project for the Americas”; a small nation located in an area of the world

that seemingly does not seem to pertain much to the United States, implores to indicate otherwise

(Lowenthal et al., 2009, p. 209). There have been many instances in Haiti throughout the past 18

years that have commanded worldwide and Western attention. These issues in Haiti over the

course of time have had significant implications on national security as well as foreign policy

interests of the United States, therefore warranting the attention and response of Washington.

Involvement and response should not only be a “function of the urgent” but established as a

political standard (Lowenthal et al., 2009, p. vii).

This comparative study will closely examine the three most recent U.S. presidents and

their administrations. President William J. Clinton, January 20, 1993-January 20, 2001; George

W. Bush, January 20, 2001- January 20, 2009; and Barack Obama, January 20, 2009-present,

and their respective presidential administrations will be carefully evaluated in order track

humanitarian aid contributions to Haiti in response to three designated events in history. These

natural disasters in history have been selected as independent variables for the analysis because

they necessitate a global humanitarian response in humanitarian assistance. The selected events

per administration are as follows:


1) William J. Clinton Administration: Paramilitary coup and junta human rights violations in

1993

2) George W. Bush Administration: August and September 2008 tropical storms

3) Barack Obama Administration: January 12, 2010 earthquake

Fundamental to this evaluation is this study’s single criterion, which will answer the

question of how each administration structured their aid efforts. Sub-categories of this criterion

include whether or not the administration provides aid directly to Haitian recipients through

bilateral programs; if humanitarian assistance is allocated through multilateral development

banks; whether or not UN aid programs are used as instruments to deliver aid; if the

administration has created new programs or agencies in the relief efforts to alleviate

humanitarian conflicts; and lastly, if armed forces were utilized in the aid effort.

In this comparative study, all foreign aid and humanitarian aid intended to serve

humanitarian needs will be evaluated. The study of humanitarian aid over time is validated by

the ability to evaluate a policy that spans across presidential administrations and therefore can be

compared. To conduct the evaluation of humanitarian aid the extensive definition of

humanitarian aid provided by Steven Hansch (2007)will be used:

The boundary line between humanitarian and development assistance is undefined. The

U.S. military employs the term humanitarian to refer to any military action meant to help

a civilian population overseas, which effectively subsumes all forms of development

assistance, as well as security, and even active combat operations under the humanitarian

rubric. Most civilian aid workers do not apply this very broad humanitarian application to

military related action; rather they limit the definition of humanitarian aid to responses to


refugee crises, famine, and other catastrophic disasters. …Humanitarian aid is defined as

any aid intended for the reduction of suffering and death resulting from large hazards that

threaten large loss of life above normal levels. Those hazards may be brief in duration,

such as earthquakes, or recurrent, as what happens during protracted civil conflict. In

recent years, the humanitarian level has been applied ever more broadly to include

disaster risk mitigation and post-crisis recovery in instances where the intention of the aid

is to reduce vulnerability to specific, abnormal hazards, even for nonimmediate threats.

Humanitarian aid by civilian agencies, therefore, tends to address peoples affected by

war, refugee flight and settlement, disease epidemics, civil strife, mass persecution,

natural disaster, famine, and failed government institutions. (as cited in Brainard, p. 122-

123)

Determining when, how, and where to appropriate humanitarian aid is a difficult task.

The amount of aid distributed in competing crises emerges as a prominent issue when

appropriating aid assistance. The necessary funding to save the most lives routinely does not

correlate with the amount of funds donated. According to Hansch (2007), “the driving force is

familiarity” for the generation of private donations by Americans, which becomes increasingly

difficult to achieve when “the vast majority of disasters receive little or no news coverage” (as

cited in Brainard, p. 143). Generally, funds provided by donor governments are politically-driven

or formulated according to national interest. To attempt to mitigate the unbalanced fund

distribution of competing crises, the U.S. has ostensibly taken on the role act as the balancing

element.


The evaluation of different presidential administrations in the U.S. maintains with

assistance policy to Haiti has significant value because it can show distinct differences in foreign

policy construction in response to different events in the internationa l system. Additionally, it

can offer insight/allow for comprehension as to how policies can change as power changes

hands, specifically in response to pressing humanitarian needs. For this study, the evaluation of

the administration includes the transition period where campaigns and campaigning takes place.

Authors Campbell and Steinberg (2008) offer insight to the importance of the transitions of U.S.

presidencies:

While transitions present challenges for domestic policy, they can be deadly in the arena

of foreign policy. There is an acute sense of vulnerability when power changes hands,

accompanied by an extended period of uncertainty about how well the new team will

handle the challenges of office. There may be a so-called honeymoon period on the

domestic front as the new president sorts out the policies and candidates for senior

government jobs, but there is rarely time for a honeymoon or learning curve in the

international security realm. (p. 2)

Presidential Administration Number One:

President William J. Clinton, January 20, 1993-January 20, 2001

Independent Variable #1: 1993 human rights violations by Haitian military junta in Haiti

Upon receiving the White House, President Clinton and his administration in Washington

were already challenged with pervasive Haitian refugee concerns, passed along from the

previous Bush Sr. administration, as well as terrorist activities being carried out by the junta in

Haiti. Primarily, in Haiti there were multiple attempts to overthrow the formally elected Haitian


president, Jean-Bertrand Artiside. The first overthrow attempt occurred in December1990 after

winning his first presidential election. Dissatisfaction with Artiside’s rise in power in Haiti

resulted in the appearance of many opposition factions.

Emerging as the prominent leader of these factions was General Raoul Cédras, appointed

by President Artiside. He attained this position while holding a position as a SIN covert member.

Artiside made this appointment without this vital knowledge. While Artiside had support of the

Lavalas Party in Haiti and the National Front for Democracy and Change (FNCD) the SIN had

the support of Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and the U.S. CIA.

Many of the SIN members were physically on CIA payroll and actively worked in Haiti against

Artiside.

Under General Cédras many brutal terrorist acts and oppositions were led in Haiti. They

demonstrated extreme displeasure with the governing system in Haiti, Artiside, and his many

supporters. They typically included army uprisings reached such calamitous levels that many

lives were taken and eventually Artiside was forced into exile. While the Haitian president

escaped the intense conflict, his followers remaining in Haiti incurred undesirable fates of

imprisonment, torture, or death.

In 1993 the numbers of crises in Haiti were growing rapidly. The terrorist destruction

structured by Cédras was relentless. The most notable attack took place in December of 1993 in

the largest slum area in the capital of Haiti, Cité Soleil, where many Lavalas supporters resided.

As reported by Brune (1998) the right-wing FRAPH, with U.S. CIA-DIA advocacy, attacked

and killed 70 residents, wounded many more, and burned 1,000 shanties, leaving 10,000 people

homeless” (p. 46).


Poignantly, the actions that the Clinton administration took dealing with and against the

1993 paramilitary coup and human rights violations were not widely supported. The President

initially did not have Democratic support to invade the country. “Clinton’s handling of Haiti

involved many policy reversals that culminated with the Carter mission” (Fick, 2000, p. 164). In

his guiding evaluation of Haiti and Post-Cold War interventions, Brune (1998) discusses the

disaccord present in the inner depths of Washington during this time where “sharp disagreements

among Washington’s factions centered on whether the U.S. should encourage democracy in Haiti

or support Haiti’s authoritarian regime to protect U.S. investments” (p.37). These opposite

requests dictating foreign policy arose from agents within the United States Intelligence

Community, specifically in the CIA and DIA on one side in support of the authoritarian regime

of Artiside rivals against officials in the United States State Department, on the other side,

wanting to promote democratic ideals and the reinstatement of the Haitian president that was

formally elected.

Also influential in the command of foreign assistance policy of the Clinton administration

was the end of the Cold War. This era considerably altered the way the world approached

humanitarian intervention. To display the significance of foreign policy to this administration

prior to entering the White House, President Clinton characterized “foreign policy is domestic

policy” (Klein, 2002, p. 78-79). 1993. In accordance with this proclamation of the importance of

international issues, Haiti was nominated by the president and his administration as an explicit

national interest in U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, the U.S. intervention of Haiti had morally

justified interests. Hardy-Jackson (1997) described crisis in Haiti as playing an elemental role for

the U.S. because it “served as catalyst for a more humane U.S. foreign policy” (para. 1).


During the transition period of Clinton’s presidency, he addressed in campaign his

disapproval of the previous administration’s “immoral” dealings in Haiti with refugees (Fick,

2000, 164). This type of message during a transition period can have a less than positive effect

by presenting false or mixed messages. Campbell and Steinberg (2008) in their evaluation of

Campaign Trials and the Clinton administration projected that these “off-the-cuff responses to

hypothetical questions set the stage for a foreign policy crisis early in the Clinton presidency” (p.

26).

Daniel P. Erickson (2009) states that before 1995 the U.S. had circulated $1,000,000,000

into the country committed to Haiti to “build its police and judicial institutions, strengthen

democratic practice, alleviate widespread poverty, and forge a sustainable economy” signifying

the administration’s commitment to a more humane policy (as cited in Lowenthal et al., p. 97).

Response by the international community was to impose economic sanctions on Haiti. The UN

became involved in negotiations with the OAS, namely on the successful return of Artiside to

Haiti and to the presidency.

Initially the Clinton administration did not enforce economic sanctions too strictly. After

failed agreement between OAS-UN, U.S. and Cédras on negotiations, Clinton initiated harsher

UN sanctions. UNSC Resolution 841 in June 1993 implemented a worldwide oil and armaments

embargo against Haiti. The Governors Island agreement between Artiside and Cédras, mediated

by the UN, took place from June 28, to July 3, 1993 (Brune, 1998 p. 49). Seemingly successful,

other international actors, specifically the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the

U.N. Development Agency, and the U.S. AID, began to plan for economic recovery for Haiti.

The major flaw of the July 1993 accords was the exclusion of a requisite for Haitian militants to


disarm. When terrorist acts continued throughout the latter part of the year, specifically at official

UN meetings by paramilitary groups led by police chief Michel Francois, the UN found itself

unable to coerce action; the UN had no jurisdiction to “restrain the militants” (Brune, 1998, p.

49).

To satisfy the demands of the July accords President Clinton administered the

deployment of “1,200 ‘peacekeeping’ soldiers, police, and technicians to Haiti” and “U.S.

Defense Secretary Aspin announced 600 U.S. military engineers, medical technicians, and

civilian affairs experts” (Brune, 1998, p. 50). The intention and outlined procedure for protocol

was not as combat troops; the purpose for engineers and technicians from the U.S. and Canada

were to “train Haitians and help rebuild roads, bridges, communications systems, schools, and

other essentials” (Brune, 1998, p. 50). The developed mission was UN approved and had the

specific goals of returning democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Artiside to the presidency as

well as to embolden Haiti’s democracy. These peacekeeping forces were lightly armed and

consequently were potential targets for those rallying against Artiside. This proved true in

regards to Haitian militants and U.S. CIA-DIA agents.

In October the UN troops (including the 1993 constructed operation called the United

Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)) and vessels were blockaded at the docks and ports where

they were arranged to disperse throughout Haiti. A strike against the arrival had convened in

efforts by militants and roadblocks by the Haitian police. Clinton was faced with two

administrational choices: have the peacekeepers break through the barrier in attempt to continue

the aid mission or send the troops home and ask for the UN renewal of the severe economic

sanctions that had recently been lifted. Brune (1998) stated that “Clinton opted for strong


economic sanctions and their strict enforcement, aimed at Haiti’s ruling elite, while preparing to

use a multinational invasion force if necessary” (p. 51). Many of the presidential advisors

supported this but hoped to avoid military intervention.

While trying to formulate humanitarian aid policy in Haiti, Clinton was often found at

odds because of the disagreement in Washington’s bureaucracy. Clinton and his administration

progressively vowed on the behalf of Artiside. Conversely, CIA-DIA had a physical presence of

military attachés in Haiti, and as a result intentionally distorted much of the available

information regarding Artiside and his actions reported back to the United States.

Issues with escaping Haitian refugees revitalized in the final month of 1993 and extended

into the beginning of 1994. A parallel increase in terrorist campaigns could be seen. As exhibited

by the event dubbed the Bahaman Issue. The Bahaman Issue arose with Haitian refugees

attempting to seek solace in the Bahamas prior to crossing into Florida as a route to avoid U.S.

Coast Guard ships. The Bahaman government responded by implementing laws that preventing

Haitians from working in the country, obtaining status as residents, and asylum. Haitians were

arrested in the Bahamas. Because of the drastic increase of refugees in this area, the U.S. at the

start of the crisis began screening refugees for asylum in Florida (Brune, 1998, p. 52).

The results of other policies put into practice by the presidential administration,

specifically, the economic sanctions did not seem to be fulfilling their intentions; the people

impacted the most were not the elite in Haiti but the poorest people. Living standards decreased

as widespread famine, disease, and malnutrition, and specifically, death of children drastically

increased. Cédras in fact grew stronger with “monopolistic control over both Haiti’s supply of


food and fuel” while opposition forces weakened (Lee, para. 2). This augmented demands for

more attention to human rights and the current economic sanctions.

The targeting of displaced persons in humanitarian aid became a top priority because it is

this populated group of people that “tend to have the highest death rates over protracted time

periods” (Hansch, 2007, p. 123). To respond to the human rights demands, Clinton at this time

decided to instill a plan to grant asylum to Haitians. The Haitian refugees picked up by the Coast

Guard each week would have their eligibility for asylum evaluated in hearings on-board. This

policy started in May and by June on average the Coast Guard was picking up 2,000 refugees

weekly (Brune, 1998, 53). Because of the growing amount of refugees, the enforcement process

could not be completed quickly and neighboring countries and cities, including cities at

Guantanamo, were employed for refugees waiting to be processed. In May of 1994 the Clinton

administration was also supporting UNSC tightening economic embargo of Haiti. This

worldwide embargo instead included all exports to Haiti except for “essential food and medical

supplies and called on the Dominican Republic to close its borders to Haiti” which eventually

followed suit of the embargo in the final days of the month of May (Brune, 1998, 55). Although

positive action was taken to mitigate the human rights issues, this embargo had detrimental

implications to the poorer Haitian classes as well as those seeking asylum.

Due to the unwillingness to cooperate by Cédras and military leaders of Haiti, Clinton’s

ability was again limited. Coercive action against militants in Haiti was not a viable option for

Clinton because he lacked congressional support to act in this manner. “Excepting the Black

Caucus, most members of congress opposed sending U.S. forces to Haiti and were influenced by

the CIA-DIA testimony to opposite or be indifferent to Artiside’s return” (Brune, 1998, p. 52).


Although the militants continued to pay no heed to the drastic sanctions, Clinton did not want to

disband the Haitian army until the presidency was returned to Artiside. Clinton emerged with

additional economic sanctions of cancelled U.S. commercial flights to Haiti and frozen U.S.

financial transactions and Haitian bank accounts, which included the National Bank of Haiti

(Brune 1998, p. 54). As long as Cédras held power these sanctions against the wealthy classes

would continue. Similar sanctions were employed by the Canadians and the French. Military

intervention finally became a feasible option to choose for the Clinton administration after these

additional sanctions were implemented. To intervene, Clinton needed global support for a UN

force of action as well as support by the Congress and public.

On July 31, 1993 the UNSC gave the U.S. the permission to lead a global force to restore

the former president. Backed by fifteen OAS nations willing to contribute forces and operations

again including the UNMIH, this essentially represented a two weeks’ notice for Cédras until the

U.S. would intervene. This also gave Cédras the opportunity to accept last minute discussions if

he desired to prevent military action. Invasion was postponed to deal with Cuban refugee issues,

who at the time were freely admitted into Florida to become U.S. residents; this granted close

watch by the international community because of the restrictive process instituted for Haitian

refugees.

Mid-September Clinton addressed television audiences of the failure of sanctions and

talks to change actions by Haitian’s military leaders. Consequentially, the U.S. lead international

force had to intervene and the U.S. was forced to implement “globalized application of national

values” (Hardy-Jackson, 1997, para. 1). There were two stated stages to the intervention as

described by Brune (1998). For the first stage 20,000 combat troops planned to attack to end the


violence caused by the militant groups along with creating a new police organization. Second, on

a more humanitarian level, peacekeeping forces by the UN would be positioned to ensure the

return of President Artiside and assist in the establishment of a government that could help

alleviate the refugee issues. The U.S. specifically would employ 4,000 Army troops in addition

to the U.S. Navy that would watch the surrounding waters (p. 56).

These definitive plans did make Cédras seek negotiation with three prominent U.S.

political figures. The junta of Haiti had two days to agree to a scheduled exit of Cédras and other

military leaders and Artiside’s peaceful return. Barely satisfying the 48-hour timeline, Haiti’s

acting President Jonassaint, General Cédras, and Army Chief of Staff Brigadier General Philippe

Biamby signed an agreement to step down from their respective positions and leave Haiti by

October 15 (Brune 1998). After this was satisfied, the UNSC economic sanctions would again be

lifted.

Clinton, time again, was confronted with enforcement issues of Haitian policy and

“Carter’s hastily drawn agreement” when Artiside supporters were still being tortured and killed

upon arrival of the U.S. and international troops coming for the intervention (Brune, 1998, p.

57). A major flaw was the lack of a formal agreement with Haiti’s police chief. Michel Francois

never signed Carter’s pact and allowed the mistreatment of Haitians to continue. Because of the

rules of engagement of mission, U.S. soldiers were to simply remain bystanders of the various

human rights violations and abuse of the Haitian people occurring regularly.

Clinton intervened to change the rules of engagement to express that violence would no

longer be allowed and that there would be consequences if the violence continued. This

exemplified a commitment by multinational forces to use weapons if unreasonable forces or


actions were being used by the militants. This allowed the U.S. Army and Marine personnel to

purchase weapons turned in by Haitian citizens and to dismantle Haiti’s most-equipped forces. It

was the action of U.S. military during this time that attributed to the return of security in Haiti

and as a result, the completion of intentions of the intervention.

Artiside was reinstated as president on October 15, 1994, but his power capabilities

looked significantly different because they were considerably lessened. There were more

restrictions because of the U.S. structured financial activity of Haiti. “U.S. support for the return

of Aristide was conditioned on the implementation of a structural adjustment program”

(McGowan, 1997, para. 10). Results of the Clinton administration actions in 1993-1994 resulted

in a democratic Haiti dependent on foreign aid and paved the way for a Haiti that would later

face extreme food crisis.

An obvious impediment to the aid process was the U.S. inability to disarm every single

militant and also the high unemployment for citizens previously employed as soldiers. Clinton

responded to the challenge of the reformation of the Haitian police force by recruitment of

Haitians to receive formal police training in U.S. schools, specifically, the U.S. International

Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance school at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. With the

removal of U.S. forces from Haiti, UN peacekeepers would conduct supervision of the

reconstruction effort. The U.S. also established an International Police Monitors group in order

to make police conduct more conducive and responsive to Washington’s advice, ideas, and

control (Brune, 1998, p. 58). For the training effort the UN and Washington spent $65 million

provide only 4 months of training for over 5,000 police “rookies” back to Haiti although experts

recommended a yearlong training program would be most sufficient (Brune 1998, p. 59). The


human rights abuses continued, and the concentration of SIN and FRAPH groups inside of the

newly constructed police force was also a persistent impairment (Brune, 1998, 59). By some,

Clinton’s results of actions in Haiti are classified as an embarrassment.

Presidential Administration Number Two:

President George W. Bush, January 20, 2001-January 20, 2009

Independent Variable #2: August and September 2008 four tropical storms in Haiti;

Hurricane Gustav, Hurricane Ike, and tropical storms Fay and Hanna

Prior to inauguration in the White House President Bush expressed, in October 2000,

sentiment that he would have handled policy procedures in Haiti during the previous decade

differently had he been president. Specifically he stated, “the mission needs to be clear and the

exit strategy obvious”; it is wrong for a declared humanitarian mission to turn into a “nation-

building exercise” with the use of troops (Fick, 2000, 164). Bush policies in Haiti in the previous

decade would have contrasted greatly from Clinton’s because his policy preferences for Jean-

Bertrand Artiside do not support of his holding the Haitian presidency. Moreover, Bush

administration policies are characteristically bilateral. Charles Flickner (2008) elaborated on

some of these administrational policies where “President Bush has convinced Congress to

establish independent federal agencies or autonomous programs created specifically to bypass

the State Department and USAID” (p. 235).

In 2002 in President Bush’s National Security Strategy address, he made the claim that

the U.S. and its foreign policy are “threatened less by states than we are by failing ones” (as cited

in Traub, 2011, para. 1). This seemingly speculates his constructed foreign policy initiatives (that


will be evaluated here in terms of humanitarian aid to Haiti) will seek to alleviate states such as

these, specifically Haiti, out of the extreme levels of degradation the country is wedged in.

Early on in the first term of his presidency, President Bush denounced the far-reaching

abilities of foreign aid. Foreign aid, subsequently, is not implemented for the right reasons and

does not continue until results are seen. The president’s top aide officials denounced the World

Bank, IMF, and other international loaning organizations making the claims that they engage in

“excessive lending that drives many poor nations into a ditch” (as cited in Bovard, 2005, para. 3).

Counteracting this statement, a report of the Heritage Foundation published that “most recipients

of U.S. development assistance are poorer now than they were before first receiving U.S. aid”

while estimations for international loans by the WB and the IMF “actually boosted poverty

worldwide by a total of 14 million people” (as cited in Bovard, 2005, para. 10).

Upon arrival into the White House, the Bush Administration configured a unique policy

plan that would freeze assistance for multilateral development in Haiti. This seemingly avoided

providing Haiti with the humanitarian assistance it clearly need at the time. Prior to the August

and September devastating tropical storms, Washington was found to be “tampering with Haiti’s

sovereignty and democratic processes” by intentionally blocking aid to Haiti specifically with the

intentions of controlling political affairs (Vortman & Johnson, 2010, para. 10). A June 2008

report, published by the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and the Robert F. Kennedy

Memorial center for Human Rights (RFK) addressed the $146 million in loans that was approved

by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for Haiti, the poorest nation in the Western

hemisphere with some of the worst water in the world. Aid loans were to be structured for

undoubtedly necessary sanitation and water projects. Haiti was refused these loans. There is


“clear and detailed evidence of egregious intervention by the US government and the IDB to stop

life-saving funds to Haiti”; included in the IDB’s charter that it is a violation to allow member

states’ political matters to dictate or influence Bank decisions (Vortman & Johnson, 2010, para.

14).

Former advisor for the IMF and World Bank, Jeffrey Sachs (2004), addressed the

activities by the presidential administration very openly and in his perception that “From His

First Day in Office, Bush Was Ousting Artiside”, the administration acutely measured for a

“balance-of-payments crisis, a rise in inflation and a collapse of living standards, all of which fed

the rebellion” (para. 13). Seemingly working in conjunction with this acute effort was the U.S.

media. Although the Congressional Black Caucus members continually called for investigations

of United States role in the overthrow of Artiside (demands had been made in previous

presidential administrations as well), these conjectures of the manipulation of the Haitian

government were dismissed. The mainstream media “failed to ask questions” resulting in gained

legitimacy for the administrational effort despite evidence of the claims that could be traced back

to the United States (Sachs, 2004, para. 14). Silence of the media was seemingly used as a

method to keep the U.S. public uninformed and misinformed of humanitarian policies.

The Bush administration supported the transition in 2006 to the successive president,

René Garcia Préval, with U.S. Democratic Congressional support allowing the opportunity for

the formulation of a renewal of foreign assistance to Haiti. With a Republican-controlled

Congress, Bush had more support from Congress in his Haiti foreign policy initiatives than did

Bill Clinton with another political party controlling this entity. USAID focused more on the

capacity to promote democratization as well as a disaster preparedness program for Haiti. “The


latest budget for allocations for fiscal year 2008 to Haiti from USAID show a much more

thoughtful approach to that country’s needs” which are exhibited in a large discrepancy in the

amount of budget requested in 2008 ($222.9 million) in comparison with aid requested in the

fiscal year two years prior ($205.5 million) (Buss & Gardner, A, 2008, p.).

Mid-April 2008 Haiti was experiencing civil unrest greatly attributed to high

augmentations of prices for two clear necessities, food and fuel. Following these issues four

unexpected tropical storms hit the country hard. In August and September these four hurricanes

“killed 800, affected nearly one million, exacerbated food shortages and pushed yet more

Haitians into poverty” (2009, para. 20). In figures provided by Morales (2009) in a

Congressional Research Service Report, these four storms reiterated the types of obstacles

constantly challenging the survival of the country:

The storms caused flooding in all ten of the country's departments. Tropical Storm Fay

struck Haiti on August 16 while Hurricane Gustav struck on August 26 with heavy rains

and winds. In the first days of September, Tropical Storm Hanna brought more torrential

rain, causing floods as deep as almost ten feet in Gonaives. Hurricane Ike did not directly

strike Haiti, but significantly increased water levels in areas that were already flooded. (p.

5)

Because of the overwhelming flooding caused by the storms during harvest season the

already heightened crises in Haiti were drastically aggravated. As a result, many were negatively

affected in more ways than one. Haitians experienced the destruction of 10,000 houses, and the

loss of 90% of crops in many areas and the loss of hundreds of lives and “today, there are 4


million people—mostly children—at risk for malnutrition as a result of the 2008 hurricane

season” (AmeriCares, 2001, para. 6).

In response to this immense disaster Haiti too exhibited leadership to seek reconstruction

and relief plans, supported by Haitian Prime Minister Pierre-Louis. Outstanding effects of relief

plans were great enough to characterize Haiti as having ‘relative stability’ on the international

front. To keep Haiti moving in the right direction From Natural Catastrophe to Economic

Security the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, had an economic development strategy

drafted for Haiti. An economic growth plan, embraced by Haiti, with the help of the Inter-

American Development Bank, was brought to the attention of all donors. The operation called

for donor assistance for the Haitian government by “investing in the country’s roads, export

zones, agriculture, electricity, schools, hospitals, and ports” and to help lead this effort the

United States emerged former President William J. Clinton, named the UN Special Enjoy for

Haiti to manage coordination with donors and bring private investment into the country (Bureau

of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 2010, para.). President Clinton also spearheaded the Clinton

Global Initiative (CGI) to engage response of major businesses, leading NGOs, and

humanitarians that together delivered more than $100 million dollars to supply short and long-

term assistance to Haiti.

In response to humanitarian and foreign policy action by the Bush Administration,

Senator Clinton shared her perception of a lag in response time exhibited in crises in Haiti,

clearly forfeiting the potential for greater successes (as cited in Boyd, 2004, p. 1, 36). Jocelyn

McCalla, executive director for the National Coalition for Human Rights, articulated her

agreement with Senator Clinton and that aid should provide this to Haiti: “functioning,


accountable, and responsive government, as well as emergency humanitarian assistance to meet

basic food, shelter, medical, and potable water needs, among other things” (Amsterdam News,

2004, p. 1).

The food crisis in Haiti was amplified because of these four disastrous tropical storms.

The Bush Administration provided $6.5 million in development assistance aid funds to advocate

the subsidization of the cost of rice as well as create employment programs for Haitian citizens.

Specific efforts by Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), petitioned for the U.S. to reengage in

attending to humanitarian crisis in Haiti. She advocated the support of the OAS mission to Haiti

for “international development agencies and financial institutions to launch a new and

sustainable humanitarian initiative” and for the release of the $146,000,000 in loans that had

been proportioned for health, education, water and sanitation, as well as transportation in Haiti

(April 2003: Still no aid for Haiti, 2003, para. 3).

In 2004 the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), operating

closely with Global Health Initiative, was created and Haiti was incorporated as one of the 15

principle countries the program would be established in. Currently, PEPFAR operates in 30

countries. Since the establishment of this humanitarian effort to combat widespread AIDS in the

impoverished country, the millions invested per fiscal year have grown have steadily increased

each year, and grown tremendously. Haiti received $100.6 million in the total $3,681.9 million

of funds circulated to the principle 15 countries in 2008 (“PEPFAR”, 2011). This means of

humanitarian aid employs a significantly bilateral effort by the presidential administration. This

was seen to “undervalue the integration of U.S. efforts with others and dangerously downgrades

U.S. commitment to the new multilateral financing instrument, the Global Fund” (as cited in


Brainard, 2007, p. 79). This reveals tensions that existed between the United States and the

Global Fund and multilateral aid procedures.

Another UN operation created in 2004, named the United Nations Stabilization Mission

in Haiti (MINUSTAH), employed after the fall of the Artiside presidency, played a vital role in

the sustainable development of democracy. This Mission had the support of the Bush

administration, international community, and UN forces to bring humanitarian relief to Haiti in

this time of need because of its efficient, leading ability to provide emergency response to natural

disasters. MINUSTAH was specifically created to fulfill the assignment of “coordinating the

international agencies to promote a coherent development program in accordance with its

mandate (Valdés as cited in Lowenthal, Piccone, & Whitehead, 2011, p. 135).

Exhibited throughout the Bush Administration is the issue of the appropriation of aid in

competing emergencies. Generally, the amount of public support generated for humanitarian

response influences congressional support and in turn adequate administration reaction. If the

emergency is not properly publicized then the American public will exhibit disinterest because of

their lack of knowledge on the matter and incomprehension of the severity of a given issue. Two

clear messages in the media that could easily divert attention and capture the emotions and hearts

of every American in the beginning of the 21st century were the War in Afghanistan and the

invasion of Iraq. Valdés (2011) discussed this change in engagement of the U.S. in Haiti by

keeping “a low profile after the fall of President Jean-Bertrand Artiside, not only because of its

involvement in his downfall, but mainly because its engagement in Iraq prevented it from

addressing other priorities” (as cited in Lowenthal, Piccone, & Whitehead, p. 135).


Presidential Administration Number Three:

President Barack Obama, January 20, 2009-Present

Independent Variable #3: January 12, 2011 earthquake in Haiti

Similar to George W. Bush, President Obama seemed to formulate the same mindset in

his transition period into the presidency. The Obama administration “has repeated his claim and

has sought to reorient policy toward the prevention of state failure” (Traub, 2011, para. 1). To

drive focus on fragile states in the international system Stewart Patrick (2011) observed that the

U.S. has strengthened its capabilities to tend to these types of issues by enhancing efficiency in

use of “military’s combatant commands as platforms for heading off state failure or bolstering

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and a civilian expeditionary corps

within the State Department” (Failed States: The Brutal Truth para. 3).

On January 12, 2010, “one of the most destructive natural disasters in history”, an

earthquake of 7.0 magnitude shook Haiti causing instant severe destruction (USAID, 2010).

Figures provided by the USAID (2010) report that the government of Haiti estimates that nearly

230,000 people died, 300,000 were injured, and over 1.5 million were displaced after their

homes were damaged or destroyed” (USAID Post-Earthquake response, 2010, para. 1). The

desperate cries for help came from millions of Haitians and American inhabitants as well.

In response to the unexpected natural disaster, President Obama underlined the

importance of the relief effort for three reasons. Initially, this was because of the life-saving

assistances in need. Next, importance materialized because American leadership necessitates the

exhibition of commitment and action. And lastly, importance prevailed because of the deep


historical roots that the United States has with Haiti (Frumin, 2010, para. 16). The Obama

Administration would achieve this through multilateral means. Lowenthal (2011) reported that

through cooperation with other Caribbean nations the U.S. would seek to provide “rapid,

substantial, and effective aid while letting the United Nations take the lead” (p. 20).

Prioritized as the number one task for all agencies, Obama clearly established his

commitment to the nation of Haiti. President Obama When speaking with President Préval of

Haiti, on January 15 “underscored his commitment to supporting the government and people of

Haiti through his team on the ground” (Frumin, 2010, para. 27). Presented by Valdés (2011) was

an unavoidable obstruction completing the on the ground commitment. The loss of lives of many

MINUSTAH staff, including the mission chief, the representative of the secretary general, and

the managing team, left Haiti without MINUSTAH military forces in the immediate aftermath of

the earthquake (as cited in Lowenthal et al., p. 132).

Merely days after the devastation occurred, Obama publicized that U.S. armed forces

were already well on their way to Haiti, including members of the Coast Guard and the Army as

well as the Marines and “ordered an immediate investment of $100 million in U.S. aid” (Silva,

2010, para. 1). Less than 24 hours after the earthquake the U.S. deployed assets and staff from a

total of 17 different government divisions and agencies. The leading agency of this relief effort

was USAID. Expansion of American commitment in many different agency programs

demonstrates widespread support of U.S. assistance to Haiti with Congressional support of this

assignment.


For this earthquake that has arisen as a monumental component of modern-history, the

relief effort necessary to combat this earthquake has too received a lot of acknowledgement

being deemed one of the largest relief efforts in history to date. Heuvel (2010) stated that in

immediate response to the earthquake the Obama administration employed troops in his foreign

policy and humanitarian aid efforts. “US troops initially militarized the Port-au-Prince airport,

leading to complaints that they were prioritizing planes bringing in security personnel and

weapons instead of humanitarian aid” (para. 2). This element of the immediate humanitarian aid

response was essentially branded by some as attempted occupation. In order to mitigate wariness

of the presence of American GIs for an occupation attempt, in a 2010 documented on What Haiti

is Owed, it was reported that “soldiers distributing aid have reportedly removed their helmets,

body armor and ammunition in an attempt to signal their intentions” and to unreservedly make

this clear, the Obama administration had shared an important message “the US milita ry should

amplify this message at all levels: this is a humanitarian mission only, and the United States has

no intention to “secure” Port-au-Prince or any other part of Haiti” (Heuvel, 2010).

In comparison to pledges from around the world for other humanitarian aid crises, the

response was inferior. Andrew Stephen (2010) expressed his concern on the thoroughness of

modern U.S. foreign policy construction in the assertion that “U.S. foreign policy rarely looks

more than 24 hours ahead” (p. 16). He added that the people of Haiti have been and continue to

be “nickel and dimed” and aid in Haiti is not serving as much of a purpose as it should (p. 16). It

is specifically not being dispensed on the sole assessment of humanitarian need. The implications

of this conjecture impede the resolution of any issues through aid. He continues to make the

claim that in foreign policy projects and assignments in Haiti sought by the past two presidents


have failed. As of January 25, 2010 when writing about the prevailing issue of the earthquake in

Haiti, he claims that former President Bill Clinton had “a genuine affection for the country and

tried more valiantly than any modern U.S. president to bring economic growth to Haiti”

(although he) “failed hopelessly” (Stephen, 2010, p. 16). This crisis spanned across U.S.

presidential administrations, with the development of the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund a project to

help bring brighter futures to Haitians (2010).

The American people were also employed as a strong tool to offer humanitarian

assistance and foreign aid to the country. Obama and his administration summoned the

compassion of his American citizens and within two short days this compassion was validated.

In an article endorsing that “this is only the start of one of the largest relief efforts in history”

confirmed that in American contributions of “more than $3 million in $10 donations through text

messages” (Silva, 2010, para. 6).

Challenges continue to present themselves to the Obama administration and its employed

agencies and departments but the continued leadership of USAID and its established partnership

with Haiti, its government framework and people, as well as the international community, slowly

but surely commit to continue to guide Haiti in the right direction of growth in change and

prosperity. Today the U.S. response incudes “20,000 civilian and military personnel who

supported key early efforts such as the largest urban food distribution in history to 3.5 million

people; emergency shelter distribution to 1.5 million people; and a vaccination campaign for

more than 1 million people” (USAID Post-earthquake response, 2010, para. 2). Regularly

updated by the USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, as of February , 2010,

USAID along with the Department of State and the Department of Defense Humanitarian


Assistance to Haiti had provided $1,172,983,375 (USAID Post-earthquake response FAQ, 2010,

para. 26).

As discussed in a report completed by the Office of Inspector General in regards to the

Bureau of Western Affairs (2010), the United States continues to support peacekeeping efforts of

the UN. Haiti receives the most attention of the Caribbean nations, prioritized by the U.S.

Secretary of State, and the Haiti Stabilization Initiative described briefly in this report, makes

evident this attention in its intentions to address problems in Haiti within a majorly multilateral

framework (p. 13). Complementing a multilateral means to providing assistance to Haiti is the

Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDN) engaged in by the U.S.

and other international actors. It an international initiative demonstrating the multilateral

attention directed to Haiti. The complete proposal published in 2010 defines actions to be

achieved on an 18 month scale in 4 major areas. By 2030 Haiti is envisioned to be an emerging

country. For all projects within the designated 18-month period, $3864 will be invested in

addition to the $1180 of budgetary support and $809 in other funding (“Haiti Action Plan”, p. 8-

10).

Despite all of the attention and assistance that Haiti as received, almost two years later,

many feel it is still inadequate. First, the immediate relief effort was central in areas only

immediately surrounding Port-au-Prince. Secondly, in addition to the earthquake, aid workers in

Haiti have the additional challenge of competing with the extreme crisis of cholera. Thirdly, the

country struggles to maintain food security for its people because of the large fluctuations of

food prices and access to water, resulting in lower levels of food production as well as higher

dependency on imports. “According to the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment led by the World


Bank, the earthquake caused a total of $.78 billion in losses, amounting to 120% of Haiti’s 2009

GDP”. To “build back better”, the World Bank estimates that Haiti “requires at least $11.5

billion from all sources (public, non-governmental organization, and private)” (USAID Post-

earthquake response FAQ, 2010, 2).

Conclusion

Haiti has been branded a “republic of NGOs”, characterized as a state that “barely

functions”, has been typified as the “island of death”, and with its frighteningly low rank on the

failed state index, Haiti typifies the word that ails it the most: disaster (Campbell & Steinberg,

2008; “Haiti: A Republic of NGOs?”, n.d.). This evaluation demonstrates the very complicated

and intimate relationship between Haiti and the United States over the past few decades,

focusing on the policies involved in the resolution of humanitarian crises correlating closely to

bringing full- fledged democracy to Haiti.

“Haiti has always been too poor to even protect its people, because in this blighted

nation, man has been just as damaging as nature” (Austin, 2010, 14). The pervasive presence of

uncontrollable natural disasters presents unrelenting, unremitting obstacles to (the) sanctuary of

the nation. The United States is elemental to the development as well as the survival of the

Caribbean nation as it continues to pursue aid proactively. The three events in history evaluated

in this study demonstrate the United States’ government and agencies abilities to command a

leading effort in foreign aid assistance as well as the ability to maneuver a response in a timely as

well as efficient manner.


In this comparative study, all foreign aid and humanitarian aid intended to serve

humanitarian needs will be evaluated. The study of humanitarian aid over time is validated by

the ability to evaluate a policy that spans across presidential administrations and therefore can be

compared. In order to complete the comparative analysis of how each administration attempted

to build back Haiti better, it is necessary to revisit each administration.

Fundamental to this evaluation is this study’s single criterion, which will answer the

question of how each administration structured their aid efforts. Sub-categories of this criterion

include whether or not the administration provides aid directly to Haitian recipients through

bilateral programs; if humanitarian assistance is allocated through multilateral development

banks; whether or not UN aid programs used as instruments to deliver aid; if the administration

has created new programs or agencies in the relief efforts to alleviate humanitarian conflicts; and

also, if armed forces were utilized in the aid effort.

Clinton

While attempting to serve the need for humanitarian assistance, the Clinton Administration

was able to provide over $1 billion to Haiti. A reoccurring strategy of the Clinton Administration

during this period involved economic sanctions directed to weaken General Cédras, the Haitian

military, and elite. Initial sanctions unfortunately seemed to have more lasting negative effects

on the poverty stricken citizens. The U.S. implemented these sanctions under UN control and the

policies toward Haiti during the military coup exercised multilateral efforts. The Administration

also reached out to the Haitian militants numerous times to seek agreement. After the accords of

Governors Island were erected, international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF

began to make contributions to help the relief effort. Following this agreement peace keeping


forces were distributed to Haiti, with the responsibility of training Haitians and transferring

knowledge to build Haitian infrastructure, technology, and education. The growing number of

displaced persons and refugees in Haiti begged the Administration to proceed with more caution

to alleviate this with humanitarian assistance. To cite a previous source the U.S. Coast Guard

would pick up thousands of refugees on a weekly basis for evaluations to grant asylum to Haitian

immigrants.

In July of 1993, the U.S. led humanitarian intervention into Haiti, with UN charter and

the support of fifteen OAS nations and UNMIH. Stages of this intervention included the

disbursement of combat troops to attack against violence by Haitian militants and create a new

Haitian police force in addition to supplementary peacekeeping forces to return President

Artiside and offer assistance to refugees and those affected most by the human rights violations.

Over 5,000 Haitian police were trained in the United States, for $65 million, for a 4-month

period to attempt to achieve this goal.

Additionally important, the covert activity of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the

lack of Congressional support inhibited the proper and complete allocation of aid in response to

the 1993 junta crisis. Moreover this demonstrates sacrificing necessary progress and

advancement of the Haitian country relating to efficient democracy and economic stability.

Aforementioned by previous sources, divergence arose from strong conflicting conceptions of

U.S. national interest desiring to encourage democracy while encouraging an authoritarian

regime.

Results of the analysis of the Clinton Administration depict that this direct response of

the U.S. to the 1993 military coup, had negative consequences that would transition into the next


U.S. presidency. Artiside would not remain in power in Haiti for too much longer, and the

implementation of structural adjustment in Haiti would work against any type of disaster

preparedness. Instead it would assist in the emergence of extreme food crisis during the next

decade, offering interesting insight to the second administration analyzed in this study, that of

President George W. Bush. To conclude this analysis, the actions of this presidential

administration set the tone for post-Cold War (humanitarian) interventions.

Bush

When George W. Bush obtained the presidency he initiated a freeze on multilateral

assistance for development in Haiti. It was discovered that these actions were accommodating

U.S. political interests in the country, rather than multifaceted development for the country itself.

Blocked funds included millions of USD loans approved by the IDB for Haiti. President Bush’s

characteristically bilateral formulation of policy for Haiti had more support in Congress than

President Clinton did initially in his assistance plans for the nation.

Facing dangerous food crisis and as a result, civil unrest, the four hurricanes of August

and September 2008 brought with them high levels of death, and homelessness and intensified

food shortages. Had the loans of the IDB been received in an appropriate fashion, this could have

represented an element of disaster preparedness in the country and therefore could have been a

means to provide life-saving funds. The severity and consequences of the 2008 disaster, affecting

nearly one million people in Haiti, could have been greatly lessened. The Bush administration

provided $6.5 million in aid to mitigate food issues and unemployment. A specific humanitarian

issue sought by this administration was to bring AIDS relief to Haitian citizens. In 2004 the U.S.


President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was created to undertake this

responsibility.

In terms of an international effort after the experienced devastation of the hurricanes, the

Bush Administration supported UN initiatives to bring economic development and strategies for

necessary assistance to Haiti. These initiatives were embraced by Haitian recipients and the IDB.

The UN created the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to operate as a

consistent peacekeeping force to bring humanitarian release to the country. An apparatus for

global relief to Haiti was former President Clinton, engaged in the Clinton Global Initiative

(CGI) to provide short and long term assistance to Haiti. He was named the UN Special Envoy

for the country.

Reacting to this necessity for assistance after these 2008 disasters, President Bush and his

administration did not place the United States as a leading international figure to conduct the aid

process, as had been done in the previous administration. The Bush administration maintained a

low profile in Haiti after the fall of President Jean-Bertrand Artiside, because of U.S.

involvement in his loss of the presidency as well as competing emergencies in the international

community, namely, Afghanistan and Iraq.

A perception of the transition of the presidency from President Clinton to President

George W. Bush is the desire for the successor to have policies constructed on the basis that they

did not parallel with those of the predecessor. The American public during these two

administrations were utilized in distinct ways; while the Clinton Administration used the media

to gain advocacy for the intervention against Cédras and Haitian militants, the 2008 storms in

Haiti were not as publicized, therefore the administration was not forced to make certain actions.


Obama

In the final U.S. presidential administration evaluated in this study, the Obama

administration, assumed the responsibility of “refounding” the nation of Haiti after one of the

most destructive natural disasters in history, the January 12, 2010 earthquake (Valdés, as cited in

Lowenthal, et al., 2011, p. 137).

The Administration confirmed this commitment through the deployment of armed forces

to Haiti merely days after the destruction took place. Troops militarized in Haiti given specific

instructions to complete a humanitarian mission in Haiti and not as combat troops. In addition to

an immediate investment estimated to be $100 million dollars in U.S. aid. The USAID lead the

U.S. effort of aid to Haiti bringing security and aid to those in need.

Interesting for the comparison of the U.S. presidential administrations is the involvement

of the President Clinton and President Bush in current President Obama’s policies in Haiti. The

earthquake crisis has spanned across these presidential administrations and the Clinton Bush

Fund for Haiti has been created to initiate more of a national and global response directed by

prominent U.S. figures.

When comparing the three administrations evaluated in this study, it is beneficial to look

at the support of the Haitian government or governing parties in regards to the humanitarian

assistance received from the United States. Of the three presidential administrations, Haitians

played significantly more of an active role in relief efforts while working during the George W.

Bush and with the Obama Administrations. Haitian leadership was revealed in order to relieve

disaster, namely complementing multilateral efforts by Obama and his administration.

Final Thoughts


As presented by Buss and Gardner (2008) there is consensus among a grouping of

international donors to Haiti. This group, including prominent donor countries (inclusive of the

U.S.), multilateral organizations (i.e. international banks), as well as regional organizations,

contends the success of foreign assistance to the country because of prevailing elements that

drive failure. This idea and my comparative study can encourage more research tasked to find the

best tool to bring successful development to the nation; this development needs to be focused on

progress in response to natural and humanitarian disasters. As Haiti is subject to an annual

hurricane season, research needs to be developed to bring efficient disaster preparedness plans

and strategies to Haiti. Future research in this topic of humanitarian assistance aid to Haiti may

lead to foreign policy formation for other humanitarian crises in the developing world with the

demand of the appropriation of funds and/or intervention.

This study also offers increased comprehension of the changing relations between the two

governments. Specifically this can provide a basis and gateway for additional research on the

current U.S. presence and role in the Caribbean. The security threat and implications of a failed

state in the Western Hemisphere can stimulate more research on how to bring sustainable

development to Haiti and gradually change the number its rank on the Failed State Index.

Furthermore, research of the small Caribbean nation should not cease until Haiti can become an

emerging country.

To conclude this analysis, it’s vital to remember that “emergencies don’t have a defined

beginning and an end” (Spence, 2011, para. 9). An emergency will not disappear. It pleads for

the persistence of survivors and demands for the involvement of bystanders. Research on the

topic should prevail in a strikingly similar fashion. Analysis should not cease on the small


Caribbean nation until Haiti can become an emerging country. Disasters are bound to revisit

Haiti; for the next disaster it is just a question of when and how.


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Documents