Towards a Unified Theory of MetaphorAuthor(s): Christopher M. BacheReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Winter, 1980), pp. 185-193Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/429812 .Accessed: 28/03/2012 10:25

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CHRISTOPHER M. BACHE

Towards a Unified Theory

of Metaphor

AMONG THE MOST STRIKING facts about meta- phors is the extraordinary diversity of con- texts in which they occur and the widely divergent uses to which they are put. On the one hand we find them adding rhetori- cal flourish to ideas which may or may not deserve it, while on the other we find them functioning as creative models at the fron- tiers of human understanding. So great are these differences, in fact, that several stu- dents of metaphor suggested long ago that some metaphors actually "work" differently than others, that they differ in their opera- tional logic. The most significant to do so were Max Black, Monroe Beardsley, and Douglas Berggren, all of whose works on metaphor were either published or antholo- gized in 1962.1 Each proposed complemen- tary theories of metaphor to map the dif- ferences between conceptually creative and uncreative metaphors, creative metaphors usually being said to work in a more com- plex fashion than uncreative ones.2 The thesis that some metaphors work differently than others and that this difference can be correlated with differences in conceptual creativity or functional role has surfaced regularly since 1962, perhaps most notably in the work of Paul Ricoeur. (So far as I have been able to determine, no new argu- CHRISTOPHER M. BACHE is assistant professor in phi- losophy and religious studies at Youngstown State University.

ments for the thesis have been developed since then, as all who subsequently invoked it have explicitly relied on the work of one or more of these three theorists.)

Despite its vintage and its seemingly gen- eral, if tacit, acceptance, I do not find this thesis plausible. It simply does not cut at the joints. I shall argue in this essay that while some metaphors do work differently than others, this difference does not bear on their creativity, or does so only trivially; and furthermore that even this difference does not warrant the construction of com- plementary theories of metaphor. One theo- ry will do if it is sensitive to the changes in metaphor effected by the diachronic phe- nomenon of entrenchment. My argument for this position has two parts. First, I shall briefly describe the historical context in which the thesis emerged. This is not merely an historical exercise because I think we uncover the true source of the thesis's con- siderable appeal only when we view it in its historical context. Secondly, I shall criticize the thesis in some detail as developed by the most influential theorist of the group, Max Black. Finally, I shall close by discussing some variations on the theme of entrench- ment which are significant for our attempts to theorize about metaphor. Before proceed- ing further, however, let me clarify what is meant by saying that two metaphors actually "work" differently.

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It is generally held that the meaning of a term used metaphorically is a function of or a transformation of its "matched" literal meaning.3 In trying to establish the term's metaphorical meaning, we are guided by the inferences which together make up its consti- tutive meaning.4 Determining a metaphor's operational logic is simply a matter of deter- mining exactly how the metaphorical term's new meaning is constructed out of its estab- lished meaning. What semantic gymnastics are involved when a metaphorically used term changes its meaning sometimes radi- cally but intelligibly in a given statement? Proposals for solving this riddle have not been lacking: interaction, comparison, ten- sion, property-transformation, and so on.

To say that two metaphors differ in their operational logic is to assert that they differ in the process by means of which each focus acquires its new meaning. This difference is a difference in the operational logic of the metaphors on the analogy with the oper- ational logic of a computer program. It is a difference in the maneuvers by means of which the semantic metamorphosis peculiar to metaphors takes place. I shall describe metaphors said to differ in their operational logic as constituting distinct logical types of metaphor.

Historical Context

Our conception of metaphor has changed in a strikingly short period of time from that of a mere ornamental trope to that of a critically important instrument of inquiry. Only since I. A. Richards published The Philosophy of Rhetoric in 1936 have we ceased to reduce metaphor to rhetoric and begun to recognize its role in extending the limits of what could be thought.5 So diver- gent were the functions performed by differ- ent metaphors that the suggestion was soon made that there must be more than one logical type of metaphor. It seemed plausi- ble that a metaphor which served merely as a pleasing turn of phrase would not have the same logical structure as a conceptually creative metaphor. The theories which had explained the workings of rhetorical or banal metaphor in terms of substitution or comparison could not do justice, it was

decided, to those metaphors which were capable of providing us with genuinely new information about their subject. Accord- ingly, a typology tended to be established in which the traits attributed to epistemically creative metaphors were largely the reverse of those traits long ascribed to ornamental metaphors. Whereas ornamental metaphors were tensionless tropes saying nothing new and exhaustively paraphraseable, epistemic- ally creative metaphors were tension-filled, conceptually significant and not exhaus- tively paraphraseable. These differences were correlated with the difference in the operational logic of the two types of meta- phor-creativity requiring greater logical complexity and triviality requiring less.6

Each of the three authors mentioned in the introduction tried to incorporate the contemporary reappraisal of metaphor into his theory by attempting to specify that particular feature of a metaphor's logic which would explain the absence or pres- ence of creativity. Beardsley distinguished Class I from Class II metaphors on the basis of whether the connotation intended in a given metaphor was or was not already part of the term's literal "marginal meaning." Black distinguished nontrivial from trivial metaphors according to whether they worked by means of interaction or mere substitu- tion (or comparison). Finally Berggren dis- tinguished vital from nonvital metaphors by whether or not the metaphor possessed an essential tension.7 But this entire venture, I believe, is misconceived. Differences in epistemic creativity, I shall argue below, cannot be explained in terms of differences in operational logic, and the typologies which have resulted from attempts to do so are misleading. While some metaphors do work differently than others, these differ- ences cannot bear the weight placed on them in the above theories. The "two- logical-types" thesis seems an excess born of the pendulum's swing as we hastily moved to correct our underestimation of meta- phor's creative potential, and I suspect that it has gone unchallenged only because of the momentum behind this discovery.

An historical overview is no substitute for a detailed criticism of the thesis, and for this I turn to Max Black's important and often

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quoted essay "Metaphor." Before doing so it must be conceded that in certain respects Black fits the pattern least well. He avoids many of the over-generalizations which mar the work of the other two theorists. In addi- tion the distinction between logical types of metaphor is not emphasized in his theory, entering as it does almost as an afterthought. It is there, however, and Black does appear to correlate if not attribute a metaphor's epistemic creativity (and unparaphraseabil- ity) to its interactionist logic. It should be mentioned, too, that while this essay is now twenty-five years old, Black apparently con- tinues to support the contention that some metaphors actually work differently than others. In his recent essay "More About Metaphors," he makes a distinction between "vital" metaphors and "less vital" meta- phors suggesting indirectly that the former are interactionist and the latter substitution or comparison metaphors. Echoing his ear- lier thinking, he remarks that "It may well be a mistaken strategy to treat profound metaphors as paradigms [for all meta- phors]." 8 While re-presenting his interac- tion theory with clarifying and elaborating annotations, Black makes no changes which affect the argument being analyzed here. While the source is dated, therefore, the assertion is contemporary.

Interaction and Noninteraction Metaphor

The heart of Black's theory, of course, is his description of the interactive process in which an interpretation of the principal subject offered by the subsidiary subject is eventually matched with the capacity of the principal subject to be thus interpreted. The metaphorically used term models our understanding of the principal subject by leading us to draw certain inferences about it which reflect those inferences we custom- arily draw concerning the subsidiary sub- ject. The fact that some inferences are im- mediately blocked by the principal subject, Mary Hesse's "negative analogy," indicates that a dialogue is taking place in our think- ing and that the principal subject does not submit to redescription without a struggle. This interaction can be described as a dou- ble filtering process in which the principal subject is "seen through" the filter of the

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subsidiary subject while itself influencing the system of implications being applied.9

Few who have used Black's insightful ac- count, however, seem to be aware that he also claims that only a "very small handful of cases" of metaphor are actually interac- tion metaphors. Most figures of speech pre- viously called "metaphors," he says, are not this complex. Accordingly, he recommends the adoption of the following distinction in theories of metaphor:

Now it is in just such trivial cases that 'substi- tution' and 'comparison' views sometimes seem nearer the mark than 'interaction' views. The point might be met by classifying metaphors as instances of substitution, comparison, or inter- action. Only the last kind are of importance in philosophy.10

Nontrivial metaphors, therefore, are those which are appropriately described by Black's interaction theory, while trivial metaphors are those which are best articulated by ei- ther the substitution or comparison view. Because Black counts comparison metaphors as a sub-class of substitution metaphors, we are dealing with basically two categories of metaphor.

The operational logic of nontrivial meta- phors is more complex than that of trivial metaphors because, as Black puts it,

the use of a 'subsidiary subject' to foster insight into a 'principal subject' is a distinct intellectual operation . . . not reducible to any comparison between the two."

In terms of our earlier discussion, the inter- action process which is responsible for trans- forming the metaphorically used term's con- ventional meaning is distinct from and more complex than either the comparison or sub- stitution processes of trivial metaphors. Black also thinks that this distinction in the logic of metaphors correlates with and perhaps explains other differences in metaphors. In the passage quoted, for example, he says that only nontrivial metaphors are of inter- est in philosophy. Why is this so?

In the first place, nontrivial metaphors are the only metaphors which provide us with new information about their subject, information which might have gone undis- covered but for the metaphor. Hence, non- trivial metaphors are "not expendable" be- cause they perform a valuable epistemic

BA C HE

function, while trivial metaphors are merely rephrasing what we already know.12 In the second place, nontrivial metaphors are said to be a particularly effective means of trig- gering insight. They have a unique power "to inform and enlighten." Anyone who has had his understanding of an issue crystal- lized or jarred by a particularly striking metaphor will know what trait Black is re- ferring to. Some metaphors have this capac- ity to enlighten while others simply do not, and this difference is said to conform to the distinction between interaction and nonin- teraction metaphors.13

In sum, then, Black proposes to recognize two types of metaphors which are distin- guished by their (1) operational logic, (2) epistemic creativity and, (3) effectiveness as catalysts of insight.14 Let us consider each point in turn.

Black's contention that trivial metaphors function according to the description pro- vided by comparison and substitution theo- ries of metaphor contradicts his earlier cri- tique of the comparison theory where he seemed to argue that this theory of meta- phor is not an adequate description of the logic of any metaphor. Black had argued that the comparison theory suffers from a "vagueness that borders upon vacuity." 15 A theory of metaphor purports to explain how a metaphor accomplishes its particular se- mantic transference, but how informative is it, he asks, to be told simply that "A is like B" or that "A is being compared to B?" This does not tell us how it is that we learn from the metaphor in what respects A is like B, etc. (The same criticism could be made of the substitution theory though Black does not do so.) If the comparison theory is flawed, then, because it fails to explain in sufficient detail how a metaphor works, how credible is Black's sudden de- cision at the end of his essay to reintroduce the theory for trivial metaphors? He seems to have decided that the vagueness of the comparison and substitution theories is ap- propriate or acceptable for some metaphors after all, indeed for the majority.

I would argue, on the contrary, that all living metaphors function according to the dynamics of interaction.16 Epistemically cre-

ative metaphors, rhetorical metaphors, taste- less metaphors, boring metaphors, root meta- phors all "work" in basically the same way. The meaning of a metaphorically used term is always idiosyncratic to its context and thus is largely determined by the subject to which it applies. The green carpenter's helper will be inexperienced whereas the green boyfriend is more likely to be jealous and the green thumb to belong to one hor- ticulturally inclined. Nor will this interac- tion of subjects vary according to the role

performed by the metaphor. Consider the following examples which differ widely in their epistemic creativity, scope, and inge- nuity of expression: "Electrons are charmed

particles," "Thoughts are the shadows of our sensations" (Nietzsche), "Money is life's

report card" (The NRew Yorker), "The clouds are crying" and "That meeting was a joke." All involve the same interaction of

systems of commonplace or stipulated asso- ciations which marks Black's paradigm "Man is a wolf." 17 Poetic metaphors too are interactionist even when they operate on an emotive not cognitive level. Associ- ated commonplaces can be emotional va- lences instead of cognitive beliefs. If some

metaphors are exclusively cognitive, others emotive, still others a combination of both, the interactionist mechanism is still the same. Every metaphor effects a double fil-

tering process as it organizes our conception of and feeling for its principal subject. Rhe- torical metaphors do so no less than con-

ceptually inventive metaphors, insipid meta-

phors no less than insightful metaphors.

Only dead metaphors and cliche metaphors truncate this interaction, but I will suggest below that we do not need to construct a different theory of metaphor for these cases.

If it is true that all metaphors work in an interactionist fashion, the correct re-

sponse to Black's second contention that

only interaction-metaphors are capable of

providing us with new information about our subject is clear. Because all living meta-

phors function in an interactionist fashion, and because only some living metaphors

provide us with new information about our

subject, we can conclude only that some interaction-metaphors are novel in this re-

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spect and others are not. Insipid metaphors are as interactionist as conceptually creative metaphors. There are no grounds for cor- relating the absence or presence of epistemic creativity with supposed differences in the metaphors' operational logic.

The same argument holds against Black's third point that only interactionist meta- phors have a unique capacity to trigger sudden insight. If all living metaphors are interactionist and if only some living meta- phors function successfully as a catalyst of insight, we can conclude only that some in- teraction metaphors are novel in this respect and others are not. This fascinating differ- ence in metaphors cannot be held to corre- spond to any difference in the metaphors' operational logic.

While all living metaphors are interac- tionist in their operational logic, "meta- phors" at the other end of the spectrum of vitality are no longer so. Our dead meta- phors such as "skyscraper," "leg of a table," "hard-hearted," and "soft-headed" are too semantically straightforward to be realisti- cally described as interactionist. They have the semantic directness of literal discourse and indeed are literal discourse. They are no longer metaphors because they are se- mantically independent of their original literal meanings. Nelson Goodman aptly de- scribes the dying process in Languages of Art:

As times goes on, the history [of predication] may fade and the two uses tend to achieve equality and independence; the metaphor freezes, or rather evaporates, and the residue is a pair of literal uses . . .18

Entrenchment'9 does not always produce a pair of literal terms, however. Becoming part of literal discourse is only one type of success to which an ambitious metaphor may aspire. Another is a type of habit-induced banality, producing what Goodman else- where calls "frozen metaphors." 20 "Used to death" but not converted into literal dis- course, such metaphors become insipid and colorless, e.g. "high class," "a cold color," or "the light of reason." They are not tech- nically dead, but they have no life left in them. Though not part of literal discourse,

they share with their dead cousins the se- mantic directness of literal discourse. What bars their entry into the domain of accepted literal discourse while other metaphors pass we need not explore here, but grammatical form might play a part. I can see no other reason why "lightheaded" has received the imprimatur while the equally familiar "light of reason" has not.

Practically speaking, then, metaphors can die more than one type of death. Whether converted into literal discourse or merely "used to death," they share the semantic transparency of literal discourse. The ques- tion at this point is, do we require a non- interactionist theory of metaphor to do jus- tice to those entrenched metaphors which remain metaphors and which Black cor- rectly describes as less complex than vital interaction-metaphors? While it may not be completely inappropriate to say, as Black does, that these metaphors work through the substitution of fixed association, I think there is a more economical and revealing route to follow. Rather than multiply our theories of metaphor, we ought simply to modify our interactionist theory by intro- ducing a diachronic variable. Complemen- tary theories of metaphor divide at just that point where the diachronic perspective is most needed. While these metaphors do, in the final analysis, work differently than liv- ing metaphors, this difference is best under- stood as the abridgment of the interactive process rather than as a basically different type of process.

While all living metaphors are interac- tionist, familiarity may abbreviate this in- teraction if they become more deeply en- trenched in our language through repeated projection. The meaning of the metaphori- cal term once determined through the inter- action of subjects becomes established in our memory so that we can move directly to it without reviewing the original interaction. Familiarity breeds abbreviated access. The metaphor begins to take on the semantic immediacy of literal discourse and to the extent that it does so it may or may not cease to be a metaphor. It is misleading to conjure distinct theories of metaphor to mark these changes effected by time and ex-

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posure for at least three reasons. First, it cloaks the similarity between habituated and literalized metaphors, and encourages a dis- torted typology of metaphor by making dis- continuous what must be viewed organically. It distracts our attention from the dia- chronic dimension of metaphor and lan- guage in general. Second, it encourages the mistaken attempt to correlate this difference in operational logic with other differences in metaphor such as degree of epistemic cre- ativity or the different functional roles meta- phors may have. The inevitable outcome of such endeavors will be either error or trivi- ality. Finally, and decisively, one must have recourse to some theory of interaction to explain the stereotyped meaning found in supposed substitution and comparison meta- phors. The vagueness Black noted in these theories of metaphor is a fatal flaw. The etymologist must rely on some theory of interaction to explain the semantic history of what are now extinct metaphors.

Metaphors vary widely in their complex- ity, and this variance is determined by several factors including, for example, the inherent complexity of either system of com- monplace (or stipulated) associations and the "remoteness" of the subsidiary subject from the principal subject. Perhaps most importantly, the apparent complexity will be largely determined by our familiarity with the metaphor and its implications. The more our use of the metaphor is guided by habit, the less complex the metaphor will be to us because of the "immediacy" of its semantic and conceptual consequences. If instead of formulating a separate theory of metaphor for these entrenched metaphors we integrate them into an interactionist theory, remembering that Black's is not the last word on interaction, we realize greater theoretical economy, simplicity, and coher- ence. This move also encourages a more precise formulation of the differences be- tween metaphors by discouraging reduction- ist typologies.

The proposal that we avoid promiscu- ously multiplying theories of metaphor by incorporating a diachronic variable into an interactionist theory obviously draws heav- ily on the promissory note that we shall be

able to map the effects of entrenchment on metaphor. While the distinction between liv- ing and dead metaphors is familiar enough, it is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Nothing less than a long, detailed study of entrenchment, fully informed by diachronic semantics, is required. The following ob- servations are the beginning of such an in- quiry which will have served their purpose if they stimulate more adequate discussion of this complex phenomenon.

Entrenchment: Varintions on a Theme

The tendency of living, insightful meta- phors to become dead metaphors has often been noted. Even those who appreciate the importance of entrenchment, however, usu- ally fail to realize that entrenchment is matched by a parallel but reverse process- let us call it "displacement" for want of a better name. Terms work themselves into our language and out again. A term often loses its place in our literal discourse and sometimes in our active language altogether.

The dynamics of entrenchment and dis- placement reflect, in part, the vicissitudes of words as instruments of knowledge.21 Words which would shape our thinking are subject to the fortunes and mishaps of an intense competition for our allegiance. They are proposed, tested, and eventually either retained or weeded out. Labels for aban- doned ways of carving up the world are dis- placed by new labels and new theories. The term 'phlogiston," for example, has passed out of our active language with the demise of Priestly's theory of phlogiston. Any dis- cipline old enough to have recognized some of its mistakes can provide numerous other examples. On the other hand, many in- stances of displacement reflect changes of fashion rather than warrant. Styles change, words fall out of favor, and dictionaries mark the stages of abandonment with the designations "archaic" and "obsolete."

For various reasons, then, metaphors of- ten work their way into our literal discourse, and literal terms sometimes work their way out of our active language altogether. Usu- ally, however, terms displaced from literal discourse are not completely abandoned. We

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Towards a Unified Theory of Metaphor

often conserve vocabulary by converting fail- ing literal predicates into viable metaphori- cal predicates. Thus do the witchdoctor's talents for charming his victim yield to the wiles of the fairer sex. Of course, one speaks of terms becoming entrenched in or dis- placed from "our language" only at consid- erable peril because each process is always relative to the many sub-domains which make up this language. Given the diverse beliefs of our speaking population, an ear- lier literal usage will typically persist "in the language" alongside a later popular- ized metaphorical innovation. Frequently, though, the literal predication will eventu- ally cease to reflect the beliefs of large num- bers of speakers. If they use the term liter- ally at all, they are not articulating their beliefs but only the beliefs of other people or other times. They will, however, continue to use the metaphorical derivative which by now may have assumed independent lit- eral status. One who does not believe in witchcraft may nevertheless find his lady be- witching (still metaphorical). Or one who refuses to believe in spirits may still com- plain of ghosts on his television screen or employ a ghost writer to assist him in his memoirs (both now literal). The same con- servation of vocabulary occurs when dis- placement reflects changes in taste not shifts in theory. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, we have not used since 1653 the word "bit" as a noun for the act or action of biting, but we still use the term in its derived senses of "the biting part of any- thing," such as a drill bit, and the mouth- piece of a horse's bridle. These now dead metaphors have persisted even after the orig- inal predication has ceased to please us.

Terms which no longer reflect the beliefs of a population, then, typically become dis- placed as obsolete and then archaic usage, surviving only in historical or metaphorical (and later literal) reference. In this way language accommodates shifts in conceptual scheme. Often, however, the displacement to metaphoric status is subtly disguised by a seeming continuity of extension. It some- times happens that while a term's "work- ing" extension remains the same across a conceptual shift, the logic of its intension

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for part of its extension changes. This is not as peculiar as it at first sounds.

Much of the discussion of the entrench- ment of metaphors contains an implicit de- scription of the diachronic development of language which is too simplistic. It suggests that a natural language at time t1 contains a core of literal terms some of which are projected at t2 over a new extension via metaphor. Those metaphors which stick be- come ingrained in the language, with the result that at t3 our language has boosted its number of literal terms by the number of dead or near-dead metaphors acquired. Thus, language grows by extensional expan- sion and diversification.

It seems to be the case, however, that the development of language is also marked by a kind of extensional contraction. As our understanding of the world has developed, we have tended to increase the number of our categories and distinctions while refin- ing our terminology to reflect these concep- tual changes. This refining process has some- times involved contracting the extension of our terms. Two objects previously grouped together under one label become classified as separate kinds with the result that a label which had applied literally to them both can no longer do so. Often the original label will be retained for one of the objects and a new label adopted for the other.22

If in our revised conceptual scheme the original label is once again predicated of the reclassified object, it cannot be predi- cated literally of that object. If the term is retained despite the reclassification, it is predicated metaphorically. Suppose, for ex- ample, that at t1 we customarily say of both humans and rivers that they can be angry, believing them both capable of feeling and showing emotions. Later our scientific and theological concepts change so that at t2 we begin to classify rivers as inanimate and in- capable of emotion. The literal extension of "angry" has changed, for the term is no longer properly predicable of rivers. If we decide at to to continue calling the river angry, the logic of its predication has shifted to that of metaphor. At that point in time, the correct analysis of the predication would involve a description of the interaction of

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the revised systems of associations for "river" and "angry."

In contrast to our initial picture in which the extension of a certain term is expanded via metaphor, this account portrays a situa- tion in which the "working" extension of the term remains the same, but the logic of its predication for part of that extension changes. That is, it will continue to apply properly to part of that extension (men), but now metaphorically to the other part (riv- ers). Technically, of course, the literal term's extension has shrunk and is now supple- mented by the metaphorical term's exten- sion. I have spoken equivocally of the term's "working" extension remaining the same in order to draw attention to the fact that this change in the term's logic of intension often passes unnoticed because of the seeming continuity in its extension. The widely held conviction that metaphorical usage presup- poses an historically prior literal usage is preserved in this analysis even while admit- ting that there might never have been a time that men but not rivers were called angry. The metaphorical application of "angry" to the river was historically pre- ceded by a literal use of the term, in this case a literal use which allowed the term to be predicated of both men and rivers. This is not a conjurer's trick because our per- spective is diachronic.

It is important to recognize, therefore, that some predications become metaphors after a long history of literal application to the same referent-but now differently conceived. This seems to be the situation for God-predicates which were attributed to God over a period of time during which the conception of God changed in such a way as to transform a simple, literal predication into a complex, metaphorical one. It is ob- vious to the student of Western religions that God was thought quite literally to love and forgive men long before such predi- cates became philosophically problematic. God-talk became philosophically problem- atic for Western theism primarily with the adoption of the seemingly incompatible predicates of transcendence-'immutable," "uncompounded," "impassive," "nonspa- tial," "nontemporal," etc.-and this occurred

only in the first centuries of the Christian era.

To summarize, the thesis that some meta- phors differ in their operational logic tends to suffer from a form of synchronic myopia. In trying to account for the fact that meta- phors vary widely in their epistemic roles and their creativity in these roles, it does not adequately take into account the dia- chronic evolution of language. Some meta- phors do eventually abbreviate their inter- actionist logic, but not without influencing their quality of life as metaphors and not so as to warrant postulating a second theory to explain their new mode of operation. The best antidote to the temptation to mul- tiply complementary theories of metaphor is to sharpen our understanding of the many things that happen to metaphors in their long career. Entrenchment is only half the story. Entrenched literal terms, some of which were once metaphors, are sometimes displaced from active literal usage leaving behind only their metaphoric shadows to mark their past achievements. While such changes often reflect only trends in linguistic fashion, more interesting to the philosopher and historian are those changes which re- flect shifts in belief systems. Important to our understanding of God-predicates, for example, is the realization that a term can be predicated metaphorically of its subject after a long history of being predicated lit- erally of the same referent.

' Max Black, "Metaphor" in Models and Meta- phor (Cornell University Press, 1962); Monroe Beardsley, "The Metaphorical Twist," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 22 (1962), 293-307; Douglas Berggren, "The Use and Abuse of Meta- phor I & II," The Review of Metaphysics, 16 (Dec. 1962), 237-58; 16 (Mar. 1963), 450-72. Although numerous theorists of metaphor have adopted Philip Wheelwright's terminology of "epiphor" and "diaphor" to make this distinction (e.g., Berggren, J. Edie, E. MacCormac, and P. Olscamp), a close reading of Metaphor and Reality (Indiana Univer- sity Press, 1962), Chapter 4 reveals that Wheel- wright is definitely using these terms to map the movements of poetry, not metaphor, despite occa- sional appearances to the contrary. He is not con- cerned with how metaphors work so much as how we work with metaphors.

2 In Berggren the distinction in theories is more implicit than explicit as he is concerned to form-

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ulate a theory only for vital, tension-filled meta- phors, not for nonvital metaphors. For an extended discussion of this thesis in all three authors plus Wheelwright, see my "The Logic of Religious Meta- phor," Chapter 3, dissertation, Brown University, 1978.

3Because most terms in a natural language are customarily polysemous, we are always assuming an appropriate pairing between its metaphorical sense in a given utterance and (at least) one of its several literal senses.

4 This is an oversimplification, of course, be- cause as several theorists have pointed out, we typ- ically must know more than the literal meaning of the focus to comprehend the metaphor. See Black, op. cit.; Peter Mew, "Metaphor and Truth," British Journal of Aesthetics, 11 (1971), 189-95.

6 On the central role of metaphor in the origin and development of theories see, e.g., Max Jammer, Concepts of Force (New York, 1962); Stephen Pep- per, World Hypotheses (University of California Press, 1942); Donald Schon, The Displacement of Concepts (London, 1963); and Colin Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor (Yale University Press, 1962).

6 Nowhere is this dichotomous typology more explicit than in Paul Ricoeur's essay "Parole et symbol," Revue des Sciences Religieuses 49 (1975), 142-61.

7 The work of these three theorists continues, often collectively, to influence students of metaphor on this issue. This influence can be seen, e.g., in the work of Earl MacCormac, James Edie, Paul Olscamp, Paul Ricoeur, and J. J. A. Mooij. Mooij in A Study of Metaphor (New York, 1976) has car- ried this jigsaw puzzle approach to metaphor fur- ther than anyone else, even to the extent of plotting a three dimensional graph of different logical types of metaphor (178).

8Dialectica, 31 (1977), 434; see 433-34. 9Though widely hailed as the key to metaphor,

the interactive process per se is not unique to metaphor. It also characterizes literal discourse as well simply because practically all natural language tokens are used polysemously. Hence, much care and thought must be given to specify exactly what differentiates the interaction of literal predication from that of metaphorical predication. While not offering such an analysis here, I think it may even- tually come down to the availability of an already intact system of inferences, or a meaning. The in- teraction of literal predication selects from among available meanings, while the interaction of meta- phorical predication actually overhauls one such meaning, and sometimes more than one simultane- ously. Even this distinction is too rough as is,

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however, because the interaction of literal predica- tion also often reshapes an inference scheme to some degree, though to a lesser degree than do metaphors.

'0 Black, p. 45. " Ibid., p. 46. 12 Not all new information about x, however,

will be significant information, as Black's own ex- amples show. Epistemic creativity admits of degrees.

13 Black, op. cit., p. 46. I may be reading more than Black intended into these words. If so, the second point would collapse into the first.

14 Black also contends that nontrivial metaphors cannot be exhaustively paraphrased without loss of cognitive content while trivial metaphors can, an assertion he repeats in "More About Metaphor." Because I deal with this aspect of his argument in a forthcoming essay, I shall not address it here.

15 Black, op. cit., p. 37. 16 Black's description of this interaction, how-

ever, even his revised description, may require modification.

17 Although Black originally demonstrated his interaction theory on this metaphor (op. cit., pp. 39-41), he classifies it in his recent essay as a "trivial example" analyzable in terms of substitu- tion or comparison theory ("More," p. 433). Is Black correcting himself or has the metaphor ac- tually changed its operational logic in twenty-odd years of debate? Perhaps the latter. See below.

18 Goodman, Nelson, Languages of Art (India- napolis, 1968), p. 71.

"9'"Entrenchment" is Goodman's term, of course -Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Indianapolis, Inc., 1973), 3rd ed., pp. 94-107. Though he does not use the term in Languages of Art, Goodman discusses the phenomenon of metaphor entrenchment (op. cit., pp. 68-71, 74, 80) and the concept seems to apply equally well to literal and to metaphorical predicates. In both cases entrenchment is a measure of actual projection. Metaphors too may "earn" or "inherit" entrenchment. Indeed, are not some "metaphors" stillborn because of their inheritance? In adopting Goodman's concept of entrenchment, however, I do want to import his, to my mind separable, extensional approach to meaning.

20 Languages of Art, op. cit., p. 68. 21 See Goodman, Languages of Art, op. cit., pp.

259-60. 22 See Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key

(Harvard Univ. Pr., 1957), p. 142. I wish to thank Phil Quinn of Brown University

and Brendan Minogue of Youngstown State Uni- versity for their helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this essay.