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University of Petroleum And Energy Studies

Tort AssignmentTopic: Case Law Donoughe v. Stevenson

Submitted To: Submitted By:Mr. Radheshyam Prasad Sakshi NayakProfessor BA LLB Sem III Sec BCOLS R450211115Index

Introduction Case Law: Facts, Issue Contentions of the Case Judgment of the Case Ratio Decidendi Negligence Principle Related Cases Referred View of Different Judges on the Case Conclusion Bibliography

Introduction

Meaning of NegligenceNegligenceLat.negligentia, fromneglegere, to neglect, literally "not to pick up something" is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in like circumstances.The area of tort law known asnegligenceinvolves harm caused bycarelessness, not intentional harm. Through civil litigation, if an injured person proves that another person acted negligently to cause his injury, he can recoverdamagesto compensate for his harm. Proving a case for negligence can potentially entitle the injured plaintiff to compensation forharmto their body, property, mental well-being, financial status, orintimate relationships.However, because negligence cases are very fact-specific, this general definition does not fully explain the concept of when the law will require one person to compensate another for losses caused by accidental injury. Further, the law of negligence at common law is only one aspect of the law of liability.

Duty of Care in NegligenceThe case ofDonoghue v. Stevenson [1932] illustrates the law of negligence, laying the foundations of thefaultprinciple around theCommonwealth. The Pursuer, Donoghue, drank ginger beer given to her by a friend, who bought it from a shop. The beer was supplied by a manufacturer, a certain Stevenson in Scotland. While drinking the drink, Donoghue discovered the remains of an allegedly decomposedslug. She then sued Stevenson, though there was no relationship of contract, as the friend had made the payment. As there was nocontractthe doctrine ofprivityprevented a direct action against the manufacturer, Andrew Smith.In his ruling, justice Lord MacMillan defined a new category of delict (the Scots law nearest equivalent of tort), (which is really not based on negligence but on what is now known as the "implied warranty of fitness of a product" in a completely different category of tort--"products liability") because it was analogous to previous cases about people hurting each other.Lord Atkininterpreted the biblical passages to 'love thy neighbour,' as the legal requirement to 'not harm thy neighbour.' He then went on to define neighbour as "persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions that are called in question." Reasonably foreseeable harm must be compensated. This is the first principle of negligence.

Case LawDonoughe (Apellant )v.Stevenson (Respondent)

Facts of The Case:By an action brought in the Court of Session the appellant, who was a shop assistant, sought to recover damages from the respondent, who was a manufacturer of aerated waters, for injuries she suffered as a result of consuming part of the contents of a bottle of ginger-beer.The ginger-beer was] manufactured by the respondent, and which contained the decomposed remains of a snail. The appellant by her condescendence averred that the bottle of ginger-beer was purchased for the appellant by a friend in a cafe at Paisley, which was occupied by one Minchella. The bottle was made of dark opaque glass and that the appellant had no reason to suspect that it contained anything but pure ginger-beer; that the said Minchella poured some of the ginger-beer out into a tumbler, and that the appellant drank some of the contents of the tumbler.After this, her friend proceeded to pour the remainder of the contents of the bottle into the tumbler. This was when a snail, which was in a state of decomposition, floated out of the bottle. As a result of the nauseating sight of the snail in such circumstances, and in consequence of the impurities in the ginger-beer, which she had already consumed, the appellant suffered from shock and severe Gastroenteritis.

Issue of the Case:Is there any liability in negligence for injury caused by another in the absence of any contract.

Contentions of the Case:

The appellant averred that the ginger-beer was manufactured by the respondent to be sold as a drink to the public (including the appellant).It was bottled by the respondent and labelled by him, with a label bearing his [name. The] bottles were thereafter sealed with a metal cap by the respondent. She further averred that it was the duty of the respondent to provide a system of working his business, which would not allow snails to get into his ginger-beer bottles. It was also his duty to provide an efficient system of inspection of the bottles before the ginger-beer was filled into them, and that he had failed in both these duties and had so caused the accident.The respondent objected that these averments were irrelevant and insufficient to support the conclusions of the summons.The Court below has proceeded on the general principle that in an ordinary case a manufacturer is under no duty to [anyone] with whom he is not in any contractual relation. To this rule, there are two well known exceptions,where the article is dangerous per se; and , where the article is dangerous to the knowledge of the manufacturer, but the appellant submits that the duty owed by a manufacturer to members of the public is not capable of so strict a limitation. The question whether a duty arises independently of contract depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. When a manufacturer puts upon a market, an article intended for human consumption in a form which precludes the possibility of an examination of the article by the retailer or the consumer, he is liable to the consumer for not taking reasonable care to see that the article is not injurious to health. In the circumstances of this case, the respondent owed a duty to the appellant to take care that the ginger-beer, which he manufactured, bottled, labelled and sealed (the conditions under which the ginger-beer was put upon the market being such that it was impossible for the consumer to examine the contents of the bottles), and which he invited the appellant to buy, contained nothing which would cause her injury. Mr Stevensons Argument was that in an ordinary case such as this, the manufacturer owes no duty to the consumer apart from contract. Admittedly, the case does not come within either of the recognized exceptions to the general rule, but it is sought to introduce into the law a third exception in this particular case. Namely, the case of goods intended for human consumption that are sold to the public in a form in which investigation is impossible.

Judgment of the Case

Lord Atkins JudgementLord Atkin: Duty of Care At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of culpa, is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. Nonetheless,acts or omissions, which any moral code would censure, cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise, which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. Lord Atkin: The Neighbour PrincipleThe rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyers question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions, which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons, who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.Lord Macmillans JudgementLord Macmillan: Duty of Care Now I have no hesitation in affirming that a person, who for gain engages in the business of manufacturing articles of food and drink intended for consumption by members of the public However, in the form in which he issues them is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles. That duty, in my opinion, he owes to those whom he intends to consume his products. He manufactures his commodities for human consumption; he intends and contemplates that they shall be consumed. By reason of that very fact, he places himself in a relationship with all the potential consumers of his commodities A relationship, which he assumes and desires for his own ends , and imposes upon him a duty to take care to avoid injuring them. He owes them a duty not to convert by his own carelessness an article which he issues to them as wholesome and innocent into an article, which is dangerous to life and health. Lord Macmillan: Reasonable foreseeability It is sometimes said that liability can only arise where a reasonable man would have foreseen and could have avoided the consequences of his act or omission. In the present case the respondent, when he manufactured his ginger-beer, had directly in contemplation that it would be consumed by members of the public. Can it be said that he could not be expected as a Property Rights and the Body Quiz - The case of the snail in the bottle - Kate Jane Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 [2010] QSC 118reasonable man to foresee that if he conducted his process of manufacture carelessly, he might injure those whom he expected and desired to consume his ginger-beer? The possibility of injury so arising ,which seems to me in no sense so remote as to excuse him from foreseeing it. Suppose that a baker, through carelessness, allows a large quantity of arsenic to be mixed with a batch of his bread, with the result that those who subsequently eat it are poisoned. Could he be heard to say that he owed no duty to the consumers of his bread to take care that it was free from poison, and that, as he did not know that any poison had got into it Could he say that his only liability was for breach of warranty under his contract of sale to those, who actually bought the poisoned bread from him.

Lord Macmillan: RemotenessI read this passage rather as a note of warning that the standard of care exacted in human dealings must not be pitched too high than as giving any countenance to the view that negligence may be exhibited with impunity. It must always be a question of circumstances whether the carelessness amounts to negligence, and whether the injury is not too remote from the carelessness. I can readily conceive that where a manufacturer has parted with his product and it has passed into other hands.It may well be exposed to vicissitudes which may render it defective or noxious, for which the manufacturer could not in any view be held to be to blame. It may be a good general rule to regard responsibility as ceasing when control ceases. So, also, where between the manufacturer and the user there is interposed a party, who has the means and opportunity of examining the manufacturers product before he re-issues it to the actual user. But where, as in the present case, the article of consumption is so prepared as to be intended to reach the consumer in the condition in which it leaves the manufacturer, and the manufacturer takes steps to ensure this by sealing or otherwise closing the container Property Rights and the Body Quiz - The case of the snail in the bottle - Kate Jane Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 [2010] QSC 118 For purpose of ensuring that the contents cannot be tampered with, I regard his control as remaining effective until the article reaches the consumer and the container is opened by him. The intervention of any exterior agency is intended to be excluded, and was in fact in the present case excluded

Lord Macmillan: Burden of ProofThe burden of proof must always be upon the injured party to establish that the defect which caused the injury was present in the article, when it left the hands of the party whom he sues To say that the defect was occasioned by the carelessness of that party, and that the circumstances are such as to cast upon the defender a duty to take care not to injure the pursuer. There is no presumption of negligence in such a case as the present, nor is there any justification for applying the maxim, res ipsa loquitur. Negligence must be both averred and proved. The appellant accepts this burden of proof, and in my opinion she is entitled to have an opportunity of discharging it, if she can. I am accordingly of opinion that this appeal should be allowed, the judgment of the Second Division of the Court of Session reversed,

Ratio decidendiThe suggestedratio decidendi(Latin: the reason for the decision) of the case has varied from the narrowest, jokingly suggested byJulius Stone, that there was merely a duty "not to sell opaque bottles of beverage containing dead snails to Scots widows", to the widest, suggested by Lord Normand, who had been one of Stevenson's counsel, that Lord Atkin's neighbour principle was theratio. Although the neighbour principle was a critical part of Lord Atkin's reasoning, and was therefore part of theratioof his judgment, neither of the other judges in the majority expressly endorsed the principle.Robert Heustontherefore suggests that case only supports the claims there can be duties intorteven if there is a contract; that manufacturers owe a duty of care to the ultimate consumers of their goods; and possibly that negligence is a separate tort. "No amount of posthumous citation can of itself transfer with retrospective effect a proposition from the status ofobiter dictum[passing comments] to that ofratio decidendi."

Neighbour PrincipleLord Atkin's neighbour principle, that people must take reasonable care not to injure others who could foreseeably be affected by their action or inaction, was a response to a question a lawyer posed toJesus: it is required that someone wanting to inheriteternal lifemust love their neighbour as themselves, but who is a person's neighbour? Jesus responded with theParable of the Good Samaritan.And Jesus answering said, A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, and went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee.Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves? And the lawyer said, He that shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto him, Go, and do thou likewise. The neighbour principle itself was first mentioned in relation to law byFrancis BullerinAn Introduction to the Law relative to Trials at Nisi Prius, which was printed in 1768.Of Injuries arising from Negligence or Folly.Every man ought to take reasonable care that he does not injure his neighbour; therefore, wherever a man receives any hurt through the default of another, though the same were not wilful, yet if it be occasioned by negligence or folly, the law gives him an action to recover damages for the injury so sustained. In precedent, there was anobitersuggestion byLord EsherinHeaven v Penderthat "whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense ... would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct ... he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger".However, this approach had been rejected by the two other judges in theCourt of Appeal. Lord Esher's attempt to reintroduce the principle in further obiter remarks inLe Lievre v Gould,in which he stated thatHeavenonly established that there may be a duty even if there is no contract and that this duty arose if there wasproximitybetween the parties, was also unsuccessful. Two cases from theNew York Court of Appeals,Thomas v. WinchesterandMacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., were also influential in the formation of the neighbour principle. InThomas, Thomas had purchased and administeredbelladonnato his wife after it was mislabelled by Winchester, the dealer, although not the seller, of the treatment asextract of dandelion. Thomas' wife became seriously ill as a consequence and Thomas successfully claimed in negligence; Winchester's behaviour had created an imminent danger which justified a finding of a duty of care.This principle was relied on inMacPherson, in which a car wheel collapsed, injuring MacPherson. The manufacturer was sued in negligence and the court held that manufacturers could owe their ultimate consumers a duty of care in limited circumstances. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully ... If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow. Lord Atkin used the concept of legal neighbours in an address to theUniversity of Birmingham'sHoldsworth Clubin 9 May 1930, in which he commented that "the man who swears unto his neighbour and disappointeth him not is a person commended by the law of morality, and the Law enforces that by an action for breach of contract". In 28 October 1931, just over one month before he heardDonoghue, Lord Atkin also used the principle in relation todefamation,perjury,fraudand negligence in a lecture atKing's College London.[A man] is not to injure his neighbour by acts of negligence; and that certainly covers a very large field of the law. I doubt whether the whole law of tort could not be comprised in the golden maxim to do unto your neighbour as you would that he should do unto you

Related Cases Referred :

Hedley Byrne v HellerInHedley Byrne, Hedley Byrne,advertising agents, had been indirectly informed by Heller & Partners Ltd, the bankers of Easipower, a company wishing to place a large order, that Easipower was a "respectably constituted company, considered good for its ordinary business engagements".Hedley Byrne relied on this information and subsequently lost over 17,000 when Easipower went intoliquidation. The House of Lords held that Heller owed Hedley Byrne a duty of care as they used a special skill for Hedley Byrne and because this skill was relied upon by the company (although the negligence claim was unsuccessful due to a disclaimer of responsibility included in Heller's letter). The application ofDonoghuewas discussed and, while all the judges agreed that it would be takingDonoghuetoo far to immediately apply it toHedley Byrne,Lord Devlinsuggested that "what Lord Atkin did was to use his general conception [the neighbour principle] to open up a category of cases giving rise to a special duty" and that the case could incrementally expand the duty of care.Home Office v Dorset Yacht CoHome Officewas the culmination of a movement from duties of care being found in specific circumstances to using the neighbour principle as a general duty of care.InHome Office, theHome Officehad taken a group of boys from aborstaltoBrownsea IslandinPoole Harbour, where seven had escaped overnight and collided oneyachtwith another belonging to Dorset Yacht Company.5The company sued the Home Office for negligence and a preliminary issue, whether the Home Office owed a duty of care to Dorset Yacht Company, was found in the company's favour by both theHigh Courtand the Court of Appeal. The case was appealed to the House of Lords, who held by a majority that the Home Office did owe a duty of care. Lord Reid, giving the leading judgment, rejected the argument that there was no precedent for the claim, instead acknowledging "a steady trend towards regarding the law of negligence as depending on principle so that, when a new point emerges, one should ask not whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles fromDonoghue apply to it".Donoghue, he argued, should therefore be applied in almost all circumstances. [Donoghue] may be regarded as a milestone, and the well-known passage in Lord Atkin's speech should I think be regarded as a statement of principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we can and should say that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion. In the sole dissenting judgment,Viscount Dilhorneheld that the neighbour principle could not have been intended to be applied in all circumstances and that it could only be used to determine to whom a duty of care is owed rather than if one exists. Judges, he opined, "are concerned not with what the law should be but with what it is. The absence of authority shows that no such duty [to Dorset Yacht Company] now exists. If there should be one, that is, in my view, a matter for the legislature and not for the courts".Chapman comments "that this conclusion appeared ... distinctly quaint, old-fashioned and even untenable in the light of [Donoghue] shows how far the law had moved in the four decades which separated the two House of Lords decisions".

Caparo Industries plc v DickmanIn 1990, the House of Lords revised Lord Atkin's "neighbour" speech of Lord Atkins principle to encompass public policy concerns articulated inCaparo Industries plc v Dickman. The three-stageCaparotest for establishing a duty of care requires (i) foreseeability of damage, (ii) a relationship characterised by the law as one of proximity or neighbourhood and (iii) that the situation should be one in which the court considers it would be fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of given scope on one party for the benefit of the other. In other jurisdictions, such asNew Zealand, there is now a two-part test for novel fact situations, where the establishment of a duty must be balanced against applicable policy matters.The real significance of the case undoubtedly lies in Lord Atkins neighbour principle. What he was (probably) seeking to do was to move away from the situation-by-situation approach to duty of care and establish a more general approach that would apply across all situations. Such an approach could, if successful, unify the cases that had gone before and, perhaps more importantly, offer some element of predictivity in relation to cases yet to come. The terms of the neighbour principle are too familiar to restate, but it does contain within it the two key concepts which would come to dominate 20th century negligence law. These are foreseeability (which Lord Atkin mentions expressly) and proximity (a term he does not use but which is implicit in his definition of who in law is my neighbour).

View of Different Judges About the Case:

Lord AtkinLord Atkin commented that he did "not think a more important problem has occupied your Lordships in your judicial capacity, important both because of its bearing on public health and because of the practical test which it applies to the system under which it arises".He agreed with counsel, based on his own research, that Scots and English law were identical in requiring a duty of care for negligence to be found and explained his general neighbour principle on when that duty of care arises. At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of "culpa," is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot, in a practical world, be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.[12]:44He supported this broad test by citingHeaven v Pender and rejected the cases in favour a narrower interpretation of a duty of care with the example of negligently poisoned food, for which they had been no claim against the manufacturer. "If this were the result of the authorities, I should consider the result a grave defect in the law, and so contrary to principle that I should hesitate long before following any decision to that effect which had not the authority of this House".He went on to suggest that there should be a duty of care owed by all manufacturers of "articles of common household use", listingmedicine,soapandcleaning productsas examples. "I do not think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its principles are so remote from the ordinary needs of civilized society and the ordinary claims it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy where there is so obviously a social wrong." Lord Atkin then rejected cases that did not support his approach and citedBenjamin N. CardozoinMacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. in favour of his view. He concluded:If your Lordships accept the view that this pleading discloses a relevant cause of action, you will be affirming the proposition that by Scots and English law alike a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.It is a proposition which I venture to say no one in Scotland or England who was not a lawyer would for one moment doubt. It will be an advantage to make it clear that the law in this matter, as in most others, is in accordance with sound common sense. I think that this appeal should be allowed. Lord ThankertonLord Thankerton ruled that Donoghue had no contract with Stevenson, nor that her case was covered by one of the scenarios in which a duty of care had previously been found. However, he held that where goods could not be examined or interfered with, the manufacturer had "of his own own accord, brought himself into direct relationship with the consumer, with the result that the consumer [was] entitled to rely upon the exercise of diligence by the manufacturer to secure that the article shall not be harmful to the consumer", an exception to the general nonexistence of a duty of care that applied to Donoghue. Lord Thankerton further argued that it was impossible "to catalogue finally, amid the ever-varying types of human relationships, those relationships in which a duty to exercise care arises apart from contract" and commented that he "should be sorry to think that the meticulous care of the manufacturer to exclude interference or inspection by the seller should relieve the seller of any responsibility to the consumer without any corresponding assumption of duty by the manufacturer".Lord MacmillanLord Macmillan examined previous cases and held that "the law takes no cognizance of carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness only where there is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has caused damage".Whether there was a duty and breach would be examined by the standard of thereasonable person. These circumstances "must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life. The categories of negligence are never closed".Lord Macmillan held that, according to this standard, Stevenson had demonstrated carelessness by leaving bottles where snails could access them; that he owed Donoghue a duty of care as commercial manufacturer of food and drink; and that Donoghue's injury was reasonably foreseeable. He therefore found that Donoghue had a cause of action and commented that he was "happy to think that in ... relation to the practical problem of everyday life which this appeal presents ... the principles of English and Scots law are sufficiently consonant with justice and common sense to admit of the claim which the appellant seeks to establish."MinorityThe minority consisted of Lord Buckmaster and Lord Tomlin.Lord Buckmaster Lord Buckmaster focused on precedent, and commenced by warning that "although [common law] principles are capable of application to meet new conditions not contemplated when the law was laid down, these principles cannot be changed nor can additions be made to them because any particular meritorious case seems outside their ambit".He held that there were only the two recognised exceptions to the finding of a duty of care and supportedBaron Alderson'sjudgment inWinterbottom v Wrightthat "the only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty".Lord Buckmaster dismissedGeorge v Skivington, opining that "few cases can have lived so dangerously and lived so long", and rejectedHeavenas atabula in naufragio(Latin: literally "plank in a shipwreck") that was unrelated to Donoghue's case; both "should be buried so securely that their perturbed spirits shall no longer vex the law".He concluded that there was nocommon lawsupport for Donoghue's claim and supported Lord Anderson's judgment inMullen. In a case like the present, where the goods of the defenders are widely distributed throughout Scotland, it would seem little short of outrageous to make them responsible to members of the public for the condition of the contents of every bottle which issues from their works. It is obvious that, if such responsibility attached to the defenders, they might be called on to meet claims of damages which they could not possibly investigate or answer.

Lord TomlinLord Tomlin concurred with Lord Buckmaster. While he agreed with Lord Atkin that the duty of care a manufacturer owed to its consumers was the same regardless of the product they produced, he held that no general duty of care existed and that the fact the product was in a sealed container made no difference to the finding of a such duty.He further endorsed concerns that Lord Atkin's broader test of liability would have allowed everyone injured in theVersailles rail accidentto be able to claim compensation from the manufacturer of theaxlethat broke and caused the crash.

ConclusionIf there is one case that every law student has read, it would surely be the case of Donoghue v Stevenson. This case set the very foundation of the tort of negligence and contains Lord Atkins famous neighbour principle which forms the basis of the common law duty of care:\The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyers question, Who is my neighbour receives a restricted reply. The answer seems to be persons, who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.Before Donoghue v Stevenson , it was held that a duty of care only existed in specific circumstances such as between two contractually obliged parties, or where a manufacturer was producing inherently dangerous products. The judgement of this case broadened the scope of a duty of care to include anyone who could reasonably be affected by ones acts or omissions.Donoghuemay not have invented the tort of negligence, but it freed the cause of action from the shackles that had inhibited its growth. It did this by opening up the field for duty of care to spread into new situations. While the neighbour principle is the most famous element of the case, it is the quotation from Lord MacMillan, another of the majority, that the categories of negligence are never closed which perhaps better caught the mood of the new departure thatDonoghuemarked. But, as has been recognised in more recent years, the simplicity of its approach to duty is, in reality, too simple. It fails to capture all the complicated variations of fact that negligence law has had to encounter. In many ways the modern approach is to deny the existence of any single approach to duty that works in all circumstances. There are different approaches for different contexts, something Lord Steyn has called a mosaic (MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board[2000] 2 AC 59, [1999] 4 All ER 961). In cases involving physical injury caused by a positive act, the neighbour principle still works pretty well, because those are cases where foreseeability and proximity will (in most cases) get you home. Once we stray outside these spheres into liability for non-physical injuries, or for omissions, or for the conduct of third parties, other considerations beyond foreseeability and proximity begin to acquire greater significance. In those cases,Donoghuestands as a foundation stone upon which much more has been built.At the risk of extending the metaphor too far, the builders of negligence law have not all been working to the same plans over the years. In the years of expansion (exemplified byAnns), judges seemed to view negligence as an instrument of social progress, and themselves as crusaders for justice. It seemed that there were few wrongs which negligence could not be used to put right. This corresponded with a time when the state (in its widest sense) tended to be viewed positively as a device for advancement. Whether for good or for ill, that collectivist approach has clearly fallen significantly out of fashion, and it is no surprise that the law of negligence has come to reflect that change. The consequence was that the tendency to reach for negligence as the primary instrument of loss distribution has diminished. Indeed, the whole project that would suggest that it is a positive thing to distribute losses to those most able to bear them has been cast into doubt. The idea that losses should be left to lie where they fall has become much more prevalent.Negligence did not become less expansionist because of the decision inCaparo. Rather, the decision inCaparocame about because of changes in social attitudes which led the judges to consider that the expansion had gone too far. Law is, therefore, a reflection of change more than it is a driver. From our current vantage point, it is hard to see a return to those expansionist times of the 60s and 70s, but attitudes that change can change back.It is fruitless to ask what Lord Atkin would have made of how negligence has turned out. He was, in many ways, an Edwardian gentleman for whom much of the 21st century would make little sense. He may even have been surprised that this generation felt that the 80th anniversary of his judgment was worthy of note at all. But the enduring legacy ofDonoghue v Stevensondoes not rest only on the fact that it is a good story. It may be true that, had the same developments occurred in a more prosaic case, its fame may be less, but its impact as a foundational basis for modern negligence law would still have remained. History has not given us all that many influential snails. But Mrs Donoghues snail can proudly claim that title. Real or not, it has slithered its way to worldwide fame.Donoghue v Stevensonmade it clear that, even without a contract between the parties, a duty of care is owed by A to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which could reasonably be foreseen as likely to cause injury to his neighbour: B. This concept, developed by the great jurist Lord Atkin, has become known by the universal shorthand, the neighbor principle. Who, Lord Atkin asked rhetorically, is in law my neighbor Donoghue v Stevenson provides the answer.The Snail and the Ginger Beertells the full story of this remarkable case. It provides vivid biographical sketches of the protagonists and of the great lawyers who were involved in the case. It sets Donoghue v Stevenson in its historical context and re-evaluates the evidence. The roots of the neighbour principle are excavated in the parable of the Good Samaritan and the case law of the United States.

BibliographyWebsites Referred To: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com http://www.sclqld.org.au http://www.brightknowledge.org http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk http://www.scottishlawreports.org.uk http://www.unitedessays.com http://www.wildy.com http://www.leoisaac.com http://www.scottishlawreports.org.uk http://www.peterjepson.com http://casebrief.wikia.com http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Donoghue-v-Stevenson.php

Books Referred

Law of Torts by R.K Bangia (Allahabad Law Agency)