TO KILL OR NOT TO KILL:

THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT AND THE DOCTRINE OF TAKFIR

By

ROBERT ALAN WILLIAMS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

M.LITT, MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

2009

‗I hereby certify that this dissertation, which is approximately 14,978 words

in length, has been composed by me, that it is the record of work carried out

by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a

higher degree. This project was conducted by me at the United States Library

of Congress from June 2009 to August 2009 towards fulfillment of the

requirements of the University of St Andrews for the degree of M.Litt, under

the supervision of Dr. Michael Boyle.

Date : _____________________________________________________

Signature : ___________________________________________________

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: The Importance of Ideology .................................................................. 3

0.1 What is Takfir?.................................................................................... ............. 4

0.2 Goal of the Study ................................................................................................ 5

0.3 Plan of the Study ……………………………………………………............ 5

Chapter 1: Global Jihad as a Social Movement.......................................................... 7

1.1 Al-Qaeda: From Afghanistan to a Global Movement ..................................... 7

1.2 Unifying a Decentralized Movement ................................................................ 9 1.2a Ideology .......................................................................................................... 10

1.2b Mobilization of Followers .............................................................................. 11

1.2c Regional Inflammation ................................................................................... 12

1.3 The Global Jihadist Movement and Netwar Theory ...................................... 13

1.4 Analytical Framework ...................................................................................... 14 1.4a Narrative Level ............................................................................................... 14

1.4b Organizational Level ...................................................................................... 14

1.4c Doctrinal Level ............................................................................................... 15

Chapter 2: The Narrative of Takfir in the Global Jihadist Movement ................. 16

2.1 Global Jihad and Takfir Before the GJM ........................................................ 16 2.1a Ibn Taymiyyah ................................................................................................ 17

2.1b Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab ................................................................... 18

2.1c Sayyid Qutb .................................................................................................... 19

2.1d Abdullah Azzam ............................................................................................. 22

2.2 The Global Jihadist Movement and Takfir ..................................................... 23 2.2a Pragmatic Narrative of Takfir .......................................................................... 23

2.2b Fundamentalist Narrative of Takfir .................................................................. 26

2.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 28

Chapter 3: GJM Organizational Strategies and Takfir ......................................... 29

3.1 Organizational Structure and the GJM ............................................................ 29

3.2 Global Insurgency ............................................................................................ 30 3.2a Organizational Structure...................................................................................... 31

3.2b Takfir and a Global Insurgency Strategy ........................................................... 32

3.3 Decentralized Resistance ................................................................................. 33 3.2a Organizational Structure...................................................................................... 35

3.2b Takfir and a Strategy of Decentralized Resistance ............................................ 36

3.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 38

Chapter 4: Takfir in Practice: AQI’s Implementation of Takfir ........................... 39

4.1 Al-Qaeda in Iraq Chronology: 2003-2007 ...................................................... 39

4.2 Al-Qaeda in Iraq‘s Doctrine of Takfir ............................................................. 42

4.3 The Causes of AQI‘s Complex Doctrine of Takfir ........................................ 43 4.3a Strategy vs. Ideology ............................................................................................ 43

4.3b Global vs. Local ................................................................................................... 45

4.4 Implications for the Global Jihadist Movement ............................................. 46

Conclusion: A Movement Divided ............................................................................ 48

Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 53

Appendix 1: Glossary .................................................................................................. 58

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UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

ABSTRACT

To Kill or Not to Kill:

The Global Jihadist Movement and the Doctrine of Takfir

By Robert Alan Williams

Since 9/11, many within Western defense and counterterrorism communities

have approached al-Qaeda simply as an operational problem with only scant

attention paid to the ideology behind their operations. This study intends to

partially remedy this deficiency by analyzing how a portion of jihadist

ideology—the doctrine of takfir—has been interpreted and implemented

organizationally and strategically by the post 9/11 Global Jihadist Movement

(GJM). Drawing on the theory of Netwar, this study examines the historical and

contemporary jihadist narratives of takfir, the place of takfir in the

organizational strategies laid out by the GJM strategists, and the implementation

of takfir by a GJM-affiliated group, al-Qaeda in Iraq. From this analysis it is

concluded that disagreements within the GJM over the definition and

implementation of takfir are emblematic of greater fissures within the movement

at large.

.

3

Introduction

The Importance of Ideology

With the recent change in presidential administrations in the United States, there have been

numerous calls for the United States to reevaluate its counterterrorism strategy and the Bush

administration‘s ―war on terror.‖ On August 6, 2009, John Brennan, President Barak Obama‘s chief

counterterrorism advisor, issued a statement outlining the new administration‘s approach to

counterterrorism. Mr. Brennan noted that the United States is not at war with ―jihadists‖ but rather,

―…the President has made clear, we are at war with al-Qaeda, which attacked us on

9/11 and killed 3,000 people. We are at war with its violent extremist allies who seek

to carry on al-Qaeda‘s murderous agenda. These are the terrorists we will destroy.

These are the extremists we will defeat (Brennan 2009).‖

Mr. Brennan‘s desire to not use the term ―jihadists‖ stems from the fact that the more widely

accepted definition of jihad—which literally means ―to struggle‖ in Arabic—is an inwardly directed

struggle for holiness, and not the act of physically waging war in defense of Islam (Cook 2005, pp. 1-

40). As members of al-Qaeda call themselves ―jihadists‖ Brennan nobly desires to not give ―these

murderers‖ any form of religious legitimacy (Brennan 2009). However, the term ―jihadism” is a

modern neologism with little religious significance for contemporary Muslims (McCants 2005, p. 5).

Counterterrorism expert Jarret Brachman notes that while ―jihadism‖ and ―jihadist‖ are ―clumsy‖

terms, they do communicate two vital points:

1. Al-Qaeda and groups like it are distinguished from other Muslims by their singular focus

on the violent side of the jihad concept.

2. That focus on the violent side of jihad is part of a robust ideology which underlies and

drives Al-Qaeda (2008, p. 5).

This second point is what drives the purpose of this study. Too often in the US defense and

counterterrorism communities al-Qaeda is approached simply as an operational problem with only

scant attention paid to the ideology behind their operations. This study attempts to fill that hole in

4

the scholarship by assessing how a component of al-Qaeda‘s ideology—the doctrine of takfir—is

understood, conceptualized, and put into practice by those within the successor movement to al-

Qaeda, the Global Jihadist Movement (GJM).1 Through this in-depth study of the GJM‘s doctrine of

takfir, divisions within the GJM become apparent, and potential strategies for combating the GJM

emerge.

0.1 What is Takfir?

Takfir is the practice of declaring an individual a religious apostate or kuffar—an

unbeliever—and excommunicating them from Islam‘s community of believers. The doctrine of

takfir has always been a part of jihadist ideology as a way to legitimize violence because the

jihadist‘s literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith dictates that for apostates their ―blood is

forfeit‖ and they are condemned to death (Kepel 2002, p. 31). Because jihadists claim to never target

―true‖ Muslims, a jihadist‘s understanding of takfir has major implications for how they choose

legitimate targets of jihad. However, the doctrine is highly disputed among jihadists and mainstream

Muslims alike, as no tradition exists within Islam of judging another Muslim‘s ―Muslim-ness‖

(Brachman, 2008, p. 45). Due to this controversy, there have been numerous disagreements

throughout history over how those involved in jihad should practice the doctrine of takfir, thereby

making takfir a point of doctrinal weakness for today‘s GJM.2 By evaluating the disagreements

surrounding the doctrine of takfir within the GJM, this study illuminates various fissures within the

movement as a whole.

Some analysts have claimed that central members of al-Qaeda Central—such as Ayman al-

Zawahiri—are actually leaders of Takfir wa’l Hijra, an Egyptian terrorist group which adheres to a

1 See Chapter 1

2 See Chapter 2.

3 This framework does not impart a hierarchical significance of one dimension over another, nor does it imply that

2 See Chapter 2.

5

radical takfiri interpretation of legitimizing violence against all individuals outside their group

(Guarantana 2007, p. 115). Other scholars have claimed that individuals within al-Qaeda and the

GJM should be considered takfiris rather than jihadists due to their targeting of other Muslims

(Kilcullen 2009; Kagan 2007). In reality, the place of the doctrine of takfir within the GJM is far

more complex, with various understandings and interpretations of how the doctrine should be

practiced by those affiliated with the GJM. This study intends to unpack that complexity, and

understand how takfir is narrated by the GJM to its followers, placed within the global strategy of the

GJM, and practiced by GJM cells and affiliate groups.

0.2 Goal of the Study

The overall goal of this study is to provide a granular analysis of the GJM‘s understanding

and implementation of the doctrine of takfir. This study asks the primary question: What are the

historical and contemporary interpretations of takfir by jihadists, and how have those interpretations

been applied organizationally and strategically by the modern GJM? From this primary question,

two secondary lines of inquiry emerge. From an in-depth analysis of the place of the doctrine of

takfir in the GJM‘s ideology, what divisions or fissures within the movement become apparent?

Finally, if any divisions do exist, what insights can be drawn for possible ―counter-jihadist‖

strategies?

0.3 Organization of the Study

Chapter One is a background chapter, explaining the evolution of al-Qaeda from a group of

like-minded jihadists in Afghanistan to a decentralized global social movement. Many current

studies of terrorism and political violence reference ―al-Qaeda,‖ but fail to examine how the threat

from ―al-Qaeda‖ has changed over time. Also, this chapter provides an explicit discussion of the

6

methodology used to analyze the GJM and its doctrine of takfir, while also outlining the logic behind

the study‘s structure. Drawing from social movement theory and the theory of Netwar, this chapter

contends that the GJM is best analyzed across three levels: narrative, organizational, and operational.

Chapter Two analyzes the historical evolution of the narrative of takfir in jihadist literature,

and how that narrative is framed today.

Chapter Three leverages the ―jihadist strategic studies‖ literature to examine how the doctrine

of takfir fits into the ideal organizational structures laid out by GJM strategists.

Chapter Four investigates how the doctrine of takfir is actually practiced by global jihadists.

The chosen case study is al-Qaeda in Iraq, a dimension of the GJM with organizational structures

similar to the ones outlined in the Chapter Three.

This study‘s concluding chapter outlines the actual complex relationship between the GJM

and takfir, the divisions and fissures within the GJM which that relationship illuminates, and the

implications of these divisions for Western counterterrorism policy.

7

Chapter 1

Global Jihad as a Social Movement

All too often in government, academic, and media discourses, the term ―al-Qaeda‖ is used to

describe what today is better described as a global social movement of jihadists. This mistake is not

trivial, because it extends from a widespread misunderstanding of the contemporary Global Jihadist

Movement‘s (GJM) current structure and capabilities. Before one can examine the relationship

between the doctrine of takfir and the GJM, it is first required to understand the movement itself.

This chapter describes al-Qaeda‘s evolution to its current state as a global movement, while

explaining that although the GJM is highly decentralized, there is utility in examining the movement

as a whole. This chapter concludes with an analytical framework for the rest of the study, which

draws from the theory of Netwar and social movement theory more broadly.

1.1 Al Qaeda: From Afghanistan to a Global Movement

There is controversy over when al-Qaeda came into existence as an organization. Jason

Burke criticizes the Western conception of al-Qaeda as a powerful and hierarchical global network

created in the late 1980‘s with Osama bin Laden as the leader holding each jihadist‘s marching

orders (Burke 2004, p. 1-21). As Marc Sageman notes, the main question asked today is whether al-

Qaeda should be examined as an organization or a social movement (2007, 29). To understand what

al-Qaeda has become, it is necessary to go back to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

In response to the 1979 Soviet invasion, Palestinian cleric Abdullah Azzam, with the help of

Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden, set up the Maktab al-Khidmat organization to receive and

finance the influx of foreign fighters—predominantly Arabs—who came to fight against the Soviets

(Kepel, 2002, pp. 144-145). Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988,

8

Azzam, bin Laden, and the MAK‘s new Egyptian contingent clashed over the correct role for the

facilitation network they had developed (Gerges 2005, 24-29; Felter 2007). While Azzam believed

the MAK still had unfinished business in consolidating the Islamist‘s control of Afghanistan, bin

Laden and the MAK‘s Egyptian members desired to take up new conflicts. In the wake of Azzam‘s

assassination in 1989—likely by the hands of Egyptian jihadists—bin Laden and his close associates,

including Ayman al-Zawahiri, pushed for a globalization of their struggle. While Burke argues that

no full-scale organization called ―al-Qaeda‖ existed at this time, it is clear that bin Laden presided

over a sophisticated organization, even if the moniker ―al-Qaeda‖ was not accepted internally (2004,

pp. 1-21; Hegghammer 2006, pp. 13-14).

After a fallout with the Saudi regime over the invasion of Iraq in 1990, bin Laden moved

himself and his inner-circle to Sudan. From Sudan al-Qaeda began to build a global network of

militant contacts, and bin Laden repeatedly denounced the Saudi regime and any Western presence

on the Arabian Peninsula (Springer 2009, p. 15; 9/11 Commission Report 2004, pp. 86-90). In 1996,

financial troubles and pressure from Saudi Arabia forced the Sudanese government to expel bin

Laden and around 150 of his followers, who then took refuge in Afghanistan with the support of the

Taliban and Mullah Omar. In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda began to shift to a global movement, as it

created training camps for worldwide recruits, and bin Laden started to gain more influence with al-

Zawahiri‘s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Al-Qaeda‘s organizational concept became more unique,

extensive, complex, and hierarchical after the move to Afghanistan. Thomas Hegghammer refers to

al-Qaeda in this time period as an educational institution for global terrorism, consisting of only 300-

500 people, but also training and indoctrinating around 10,000 to 20,000 individuals from around the

world in camps (2006, p. 14). In addition to the organizational changes, bin Laden‘s rhetoric

changed, as he stated it was ―an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country‖ to

focus on ―kill[ing] the Americans and their allies—civilian and military‖ (See Lawrence 2005, p. 61).

The emphasis was no longer on the ―near enemy‖ of the local regimes, but rather the ―far enemy‖ of

9

the United States (Gerges 2005, pp. 12-15; Hegghammer 2006, p. 13). This new direction was met

with attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as AQ-related attacks on the USS

Sullivan and the USS Cole. During this time period planning for the attacks of September 11th was

well underway, and al-Zawahiri formerly merged the EIJ with al-Qaeda.

After September 11th, AQ made its largest move from a decentralized organization to a

decentralized social movement not out of choice, but out of necessity. The closing of al-Qaeda

training camps in Afghanistan, the global crackdown on terrorist financing, and the killing of many

of al-Qaeda‘s personnel have forced al-Qaeda to adapt in order to survive (Sageman 2007, p. 31).

Despite the global onslaught against al-Qaeda, it has survived as a movement because of its core

ideology, shared identity among members, the mobilization of movement followers and regional

inflammation—which is elaborated upon below. According to Jarret Brachman and Thomas

Hegghammer, today ―there is no single al-Qaeda‖ but rather a global jihadist movement (GJM) with

six separate dimensions:

1. Al-Qaeda Central (bin Laden, Zawahiri)

2. Religious Scholars and Ideologues

3. Strategic Thinkers (al-Suri, Akbar Naji)

4. Al-Qaeda affiliate groups (al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, AQIM)

5. Individuals supported by AQ (7/7 Bombers)

6. Individuals inspired by AQ‘s ideology, but not directly supported (Brachman 2008, p.

15; Hegghammer 2006, pp.15-17)3

1.2 Unifying a Decentralized Movement

The GJM is undoubtedly divided over various issues—such as the use of takfir—but certain

overarching characteristics exist which bind the movement together, and make the term ―global

jihadist movement‖ analytically useful. According to Rita Katz, the GJM ―is at once hierarchical

and decentralized‖ due to the importance of the strategic and ideological influence of al-Qaeda

Central, strategists, and ideologues on local affiliate groups and individuals who also maintain a high

3 This framework does not impart a hierarchical significance of one dimension over another, nor does it imply that

these dimensions are unrelated to one another.

10

level of autonomy (2007). In other words, the GJM is at once unified under broad common themes,

but divided over the specific ―ends and means‖ of the movement. Despite these fractures, it is

necessary to examine how the different components of the GJM are linked. While diverse

dimensions and factions within the GJM may disagree on their relative importance, it is the following

elements that create the narrative which unifies the movement.

1.2a Ideology

The current ideology of the global jihadist movement—developed over the past few decades

and rooted in puritanical interpretations of Islam such as Salafism and Wahhabism—is a unifying

element for the movement because it is ―emotionally compelling‖ and ―globally accessible‖

(Brachman 2008, p. 10). Like all modern ideologies, the ideology of global jihad resonates with

some members of its core audience—the ummah—because it appeals to grievances of oppression and

victimization, while simultaneously framing those grievances as a Manichean struggle between good

and evil which demands immediate action. The ability of jihadist ideology to be spread on web

forums, books, compact discs, and DVDs has the dual effect of unifying the movement under the

ideology, while increasing the diversity of the ideology itself. Therefore, no single ideology exists

for the GJM, but the following core tenets are widely agreed upon within the movement:

Beliefs

1. Common Enemies: A global conspiracy exists to destroy Islam, with the main contributors

being the crusading US-led Western world, and the Jewish Zionists, and in conjunction with

illegitimate Muslim regimes (Bin Laden 1996). Due to this conspiracy, Western influence

and foreign presence must be removed from Muslim territory.

2. Founding Myth: The GJM cause originates with Muhammad and his ―rightly guided

followers‖ who were forced out of Mecca due to their beliefs. After fleeing to Medina,

Muhammad and his people consolidated their strength, expanded their group, and returned to

Mecca spreading their views by the sword, and ultimately creating a government aligned with

the Quran (Brachman 2008, p. 41). The GJM propagates this myth to add legitimacy to their

cause.

3. Puritanical Islam: There exists only one true form of Islam, that which was practiced by

Muhammad and the first four generations of Muslims, the salaf al-salihin. Due to this

11

essentialist view of the religion, the GJM contends that all Muslims must return to the

―golden age‖ of the seventh century, and practice a conservative form of the religion that is

free from modern degradations (Wiktorowicz 2006, pp. 207-209; Stout 2007, pp. 1-23).

4. Jahiliyah: This concept—coined by Abul A‘la Maududi and popularized by Sayyid Qutb—

translates to ―ignorance‖ in English, and was first used to describe the ignorance

characterized by paganism during pre-Islamic times. The term is now used by the GJM to

classify the modern world as a jahili society, due to the repressive effects of democracy,

globalization, and all non Islamic influences (Qutb 2007; Sageman 2004, p. 13).

Actions

1. Caliphate: The ultimate goal of the movement is the removal of jahili regimes across the

world and the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate, uniting the Islamic world under an Islamic

state governed by Sharia law.

2. Lesser Jihad: As previously argued4, Jihad is a controversial term, but the doctrine of lesser

Jihad is a key component of the GJM‘s ideology. Armed violent resistance is framed as a

defensive measure against the West, and is legitimated by their claims that the West is

pitilessly hostile to Islam (Cook 2005, pp. 32-37). By making jihad a defensive rather than

offensive action, global jihadists evoke religious sanction and appeal to a wider audience

since the Qu‘ran states, ―There is no compulsion in religion‖ (Qur‘an 2:256).

2.2b Common Identity

Beyond the common feelings of victimization stressed in GJM ideology, various shared

characteristics give the disparate elements of the GJM a common identity. The GJM is a Sunni

Islamic movement, unified through the Arabic language.5 Also, the personal histories of many

jihadists are linked, with members of affiliate groups tied to other groups and members through

common training camps, areas of operation, educational institutions and familial ties (Kilcullen 2005,

pp. 7-8).

1.2b Mobilization of Followers

The GJM is also unified because of the nature of social movements themselves. Utilizing the

tools of globalization, the GJM allows for consumers of its ideology and message to also become

producers of that message. A vibrant online community exists where individuals who are intrigued

4 See Introduction.

5 The Qur‘an is studied in the original Arabic, and therefore unifies jihadist groups throughout the world.

12

by the GJM‘s message can go to read and post writings, swap anecdotes from their particular

location, and share technical tips for those engaging in violent jihad (Brachman 2008, p. 13). Attack

videos from different theatres, religious sermons justifying violence, and ideological and strategic

texts from respected jihadist scholars are easily accessible online, and therefore provide the GJM new

avenues for Muslims to engage with the ideology. Web forums allow for jihadists to openly debate

issues, and jihadist sponsored news services systematically spread the GJM message. These

examples display only a portion of the way the internet has affected and facilitated the expansion of

the GJM. However, it is without question that the ability of the movement‘s ideology and strategy to

be easily accessed online has allowed the movement itself to unify under a common narrative, which

has grown and evolved through public debate.

1.2c Regional Inflammation

The GJM thrives on regional instability and inflammation. While ungoverned areas provide

safe havens for al-Qaeda Central and regional affiliate groups, it is the areas of continued violent

conflict which allow for the GJM to latch on and co-op the local grievance as part of its global

narrative. By framing local violence in this fashion, the global jihadist movement unifies seemingly

unrelated local conflicts into a larger struggle against those who are not just attacking Iraqis or

Afghans, but the ummah as a whole. As many analysts have noted, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq

created a new proving-ground for the next generation of global jihadists. More importantly, military

campaigns by any member of the ―Crusader-Zionist alliance‖ in a predominantly Muslim country

serve as a ―proof-of-concept‖ for the ideology of the GJM (Brachman 2008, p. 14). The GJM

positions itself as the Islamic vanguard, defending all Muslims against outside encroachment and

further victimization. The GJM is also increasingly looking to areas such as Somalia and Yemen,

where local governments are weak and do not adhere to the GJM definition of proper Islamic

13

government (Schmitt E., Sanger D. 2009). By aligning itself with these local conflicts, the GJM

desires to show that its ideology unifies jihadists in various theatres under a common goal, and

therefore allows for the growth and sustainment of the movement itself.

1.3 The Global Jihadist Movement and Netwar Theory

The previous two sections show that al-Qaeda is best described as a broad social movement

called the Global Jihadist Movement (GJM). But, if al-Qaeda is now best described as a global

social movement with various dimensions acting with unique levels of autonomy, how can one best

analyze the strength and coherence of such a decentralized movement?

In order to understand the organizational dynamics of the GJM, this study will build off the

insights of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, and their theory of Netwar.6 Netwar theory has been

described as ―social movement theory for military and policy analysts, as it concerns why and how

protagonists facilitate collective action using nontraditional organized forms‖ (Cozzens 2009, p.

492). According to Ronfeldt, Netwar is ―an emerging mode of conflict in which the protagonists…

use networked forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology attuned to the information

age‖ (in Bunker 2002, p. 1). Furthermore, according to Netwar theory, social movements derive

their strength from their abilities and competencies across five levels of practice and theory:

Narrative level - the story they tell, to themselves and to others;

Organizational level – their organizational design;

Technological level - in particular, their information systems;

Social level - the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust;

Doctrinal level - collaborative strategies and methods (in Bunker 2002, xv).

While Brachman and Hegghammer breakup the GJM into six separate dimensions, Arquilla and

Ronfeldt make a more universal dichotomy of how social movements function. Therefore, what is of

6 The model in this study was also used by Jeffrey Cozzens (2009) in his paper on the Al-Takfir wa‘l Hijra movement.

See bibliography.

14

paramount importance is how each of the six dimensions of the GJM influence these five levels of

analysis.

1.4 Analytical Framework

The interest of this study is to examine how the concept of takfir is understood and practiced

within the complex global jihadist movement, and how that relationship explains the nature of the

GJM itself. Since the goal is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the fractures within the global

jihadist movement, this study will utilize a modified form of Arquilla and Ronfeldt‘s levels of

Netwar analysis. This study will be composed of three parts, keying in on the narrative,

organizational, and the doctrinal levels of the GJM, and the various dimensions of the movement—

i.e. strategists, religious scholars, affiliate groups—which affect each of these levels.

1.4a Narrative Level: Religious Scholars, Ideologues and al-Qaeda Central

First, this study will examine the narrative laid out by al-Qaeda Central and religious

ideologues regarding takfir and how the GJM as a whole should view the concept. This will give an

intellectual history of how the narrative regarding takfir has been framed over time by the central

leaders and religious ideologues that so greatly influence the entire movement. This section will also

examine various other questions. Has the narrative of the relationship between takfir and global

jihad changed over time? What has influenced any varying narratives regarding takfir within the

movement?

1.4b Organizational Level: Jihadist Strategists

In the next section, this study will look at the organizational level of the GJM. While it is

clear this study contends that al-Qaeda is now best understood as a social movement, what does that

15

mean in regard to how the GJM wants to accomplish their goals? What are the roles of each of the

dimensions of the movement in achieving the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate? In short, what is

the global strategy of the movement? These questions are tackled primarily by the strategists within

the movement. This section will analyze the two main competing currents in jihadist strategic

thought, and how the concept of takfir relates to the organizational structures of these strategies.

1.4c Doctrinal Level: Al-Qaeda Affiliate Groups

The last empirical chapter will include an examination of the doctrinal level of the GJM. The

focus of this section will be to examine how takfir is actually practiced by an al-Qaeda affiliate group

within the GJM which displays similar organizational structures outlined in the previous chapter.

What leads groups to choose their own interpretation of takfir? Does the actual practice of takfir

differ from the narrative prescriptions of al-Qaeda Central and GJM ideologues?

Due to the scope of this study, certain Netwar levels of analysis, and components of the global

jihadist movement have been omitted. Assessing the technological level of the GJM would be

beyond the scope of this study, and its relationship to the concept of takfir would not be particularly

illuminating. Also, the ―social level‖ is not given its own distinctive chapter, but is incorporated into

the other chapters due to its overlap with the narrative, organizational and doctrinal levels. Finally,

the two dimensions of the GJM which consist of individual jihadists have been omitted, due to a lack

of information to evaluate individual understandings of takfir within the GJM.

16

Chapter 2

The Narrative of Takfir in the Global Jihadist

Movement

Despite the various modern tools which allow individuals to contribute to the ideology of the

GJM in online jihadist web forums, it is still the religious ideologues, scholars, and members of al-

Qaeda Central that lead the narrative of the movement due to the respect they garner from the

movement at large. This is true for key components of jihadist ideology, such as the concept of

takfir. However, jihadists have historically failed to orchestrate a common narrative of how takfir

should be used in jihad. Various jihadist scholars and ideologues have defined the proper use of

takfir in jihad quite differently. This chapter displays those dissimilar narratives, and shows that due

to the lack of coherency surrounding the doctrine, jihadist scholars and ideologues have framed their

narratives of takfir to fit their own personal goals of their jihad. This chapter ends by showing the

two common narratives of takfir within the GJM, and how those narratives display a common fissure

within the movement itself.

2.1 Global Jihad and Takfir before the GJM

As Will McCants has shown in his Militant Ideology Atlas, the most quoted individuals by

jihadists today are religious scholars and ideologues which lived before al-Qaeda and the GJM ever

existed (2006). Therefore, any examination of global jihadist ideology must first study the narratives

laid out by these highly influential individuals. This section will begin by explaining how the

narrative of takfir was constructed by militant jihadist scholars even before the creation of the GJM.7

7 The scholars/ideologues chosen for this chapter were selected based on the amount of scholarship they had written

regarding takfir, as well as the level of respect they receive in today‘s GJM, as displayed in McCants (2006).

17

2.1a Ibn Taymiyyah

Ibn Taymiyyah is the most quoted Islamic scholar by individuals within the GJM (McCants

2006, p. 7). Born in 1269, Ibn-Taymiyyah was a Syrian professor of Islamic law, whose writings

focused on proper statecraft and governance (Springer 2009, p. 29). Ibn-Taymiyyah wrote during a

period when revolting against Muslim leaders was particularly prominent, as the Mongols had

conquered Mesopotamia, converted to Islam, and were expanding their dynasty westward. Siding

with the Mamluk rulers of Egypt, Ibn-Taymiyyah focused his writings on giving scholarly

justification for rebellion against Mongol rulers. Within the GJM, these writings of Ibn Taymiyyah

are widely treated like ―orthodoxy‖ and not ―opinion‖ (Aboul-Enein 2007, p. 3).

Taymiyyah’s Narrative of Takfir

Faced with the conversion by the Mongols to Islam, Sunni scholars at that time had difficulty

legitimizing a Mamluk jihad against their coreligionists. Never one to adhere to the mainstream

positions of his fellow scholars, Ibn-Taymiyyah was the first cleric to issue a fatwa against other

Muslims, labeling the Mongols apostates due to their failure to implement Sharia law (Esposito

2003, p. 46; Sivan 1985, pp. 94-98). While Ibn Taymiyyah claimed that the Mongols use of their

traditional ―Yassa code‖ instead of Sharia law was the reason for his fatwa, the lack of strict and

literal Sharia under the Mamluks points to the territorial invasion by the Mongols as a more

important factor (Harrmann U., Philipp, T. 1998, 55-62).

The legitimate targets of takfir for Ibn-Taymiyyah were not individuals, but the government

at large.

However, with respect to a specific individual, you must not make a judgment

against him until you investigate; he could be ignorant and not know, or he

could have made an interpretation [that is incorrect], or there could be a

situation in which he was made to utter words without actually intending them

(Quoted in Ibn Uthaimeen, 2007).‖

18

Ibn-Taymiyyah‘s government-individual dichotomy is troublesome, because he never makes the

distinction between where the ―government‖ ends and the ―individual‖ begins. Still, Ibn-

Taymiyyah‘s fatwa is cited widely today within the GJM, as scholars and jihadists seek to add

legitimacy to their condemnations of Western-supported Muslim regimes.

2.1b Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab

The 18th Century Islamic Revivalist—and self-proclaimed theologian—Muhammad Ibn-

Abd-al-Wahhab was deeply influenced by Ibn-Taymiyyah, and built on Ibn-Taymiyyah‘s scholarship

to create his own narrative of takfir. Al-Wahhab‘s radical doctrine came to be called Wahhabism, a

staunchly puritanical interpretation of Islam which has deeply influenced the GJM. While many

tribal leaders in Arabia viewed al-Wahhab and Wahhabism as a nuisance, tribal leader Muhammad

Ibn-Saud saw opportunity in al-Wahhab (al-Rasheed 2002, pp. 16-24). With a desire to expand his

tribe‘s control of Arabian land, Ibn-Saud aligned himself with al-Wahhab, using his religious

doctrine to legitimize his desire for territorial conquest. If it were not for Ibn-Saud, it is likely that al-

Wahhab‘s puritanical ideology would have slowly faded away.

Al-Wahhab’s Narrative of Takfir

Like Ibn-Taymiyyah, al-Wahhab saw violent jihad as the only way to combat an Islam which

had been corrupted over time. Al-Wahhab contended that, as a religion, Islam needed to ―return to

its revealed sources‖ and that a ―purified Islam‖ was free of modern innovations which were leading

the religion to polytheism (Esposito 2003, p.47). Despite their similarities, Al-Wahhab took the

narrative of takfir a step further than Ibn-Taymiyyah, interpreting takfir as a legitimate practice

against not only governments, but all Muslim individuals (Springer 2009, p. 30).

19

According to al-Wahhab, a Muslim may be deemed a kufafr—and eligible for execution—if

they commit an act which voids their Islamic identity. Those acts which make any Muslim an

unbeliever include:

1. Use of shrines or other acts related to polytheism

2. Using any and all mediators for God

3. Not performing takfir against non-Muslims

4. Using or believing in any form of law other than the Sharia

5. Mocking Islam or the Prophet through words or actions

6. Supporting or helping non-believers against Islam

7. Stop practicing Islam, or believe it is allowable to do so (Wiktorowicz 2005, p. 81)

Those groups deemed kuffar by al Wahhab include Shiites, Sufis, and literally all Muslims who do

not subscribe to Wahhabi doctrine. This broad interpretation of the doctrine of takfir has proven

useful both for the al-Saud tribe in the 18th century, as well as certain elements within today‘s GJM.

Essentially, al-Wahhab has made all individuals combatants, and therefore the al-Saud tribe and the

GJM use this religious interpretation to legitimize their violence against all Muslims, including

civilians. Most importantly, al-Wahhab was concerned with a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and

the Hadith above all else. This preference for fundamentalism and ideology over strategic concerns

is apparent within a section of today‘s GJM, and is a potentially divisive characteristic of the

movement.

2.1c Sayyid Qutb

It is difficult to overstate the importance to today‘s GJMof the Egyptian educator, poet, and

author Sayyid Qutb. According to a study by West Point‘s Combating Terrorism Center, Qutb is the

most cited modern individual by those within the GJM today (McCants 2006, p.8). Interestingly,

Qutb was radicalized not in his home state of Egypt, but in the United States. From 1948 to 1950,

Qutb attended university in the United States while also traveling in Europe. During this time, Qutb

grew to view Western society as superficial, decadent, primitive, sexually depraved, and empty

20

(Qutb, 1951). Qutb‘s experience in the West fueled his own religious reawakening, as he viewed

Islam as the only foil for a corrupt Western society.

Upon his arrival back in Egypt, Qutb was removed from his job within the Egyptian Ministry

of Public Instruction due to his writings which denounced the United States. Now viewing his own

government as corrupt as the Western society he loathed, Qutb was recruited by the Muslim

Brotherhood, an underground opposition group which had recently radicalized due to the

assassination of their leader, Hassan al-Banna (Springer et al, 34). As Nasser increasingly repressed

all opposition to his rule, Qutb quickly became the ideological leader of the Muslim Brotherhood,

calling for a movement to challenge the authority of Nasser‘s regime. Qutb‘s views on takfir were

based on contempt not only for the West and Muslim governments, but the whole world which had

turned away from Islam (Sivan 23-26). Qutb‘s narrative of takfir is best viewed as a middle point

between those of al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyyah. While he holds strong puritan convictions like al-

Wahhab, Qutb had similar political goals to Ibn Taymiyyah. As a member of an opposition group,

Qutb framed his narrative of takfir in a way which would not alienate the Muslim Brotherhood from

those whose support it needed, the Egyptian people.

Qutb’s Narrative of Takfir

Qutb‘s work can be seen as an extension of both Ibn Taymiyyah‘s writings and the work of

Abu al-A‘la Maududi, an Indian journalist who had published numerous pieces concerning jihad and

political Islam. Maududi‘s concept of ―the modern Jahiliyah‖ greatly influenced Qutb. As explained

above, Jahiliyah refers to the ―period of ignorance‖ in which the world lived before the revelation of

Islam to the Prophet Muhammad. For Maududi and Qutb, the entire world—even Muslim countries

such as Egypt—were living in a state of modern Jahiliyah, because rulers did not rule based on

Islamic law, and individuals did not live an Islamic way of life. According to Qutb:

Any society is a jahili society which does not dedicate itself to submission to

God alone, in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its

21

legal regulations… Lastly, all the existing so-called ‗Muslim‘ societies are also

jahili societies (Qutb 1964, pp. 80-82).

Qutb framed Jahiliyah as ―not just a specific historical period‖ but rather as a ―state of human affairs‖

encompassing the entire world (Quoted in Sivan 1985, p. 28). Qutb‘s views on the modern Jahiliyah

have profound implications for his narrative of takfir.

While Qutb died before he could clarify how his views on the doctrine of takfir (Kepel 2002,

pp. 23-25; Springer 2009, p. 37) he clearly believed all Muslims—except for his Islamic vanguard—

were considered kuffar. However, Qutb did not believe that violent jihad was the only answer to

such disbelief. Many scholars have failed to highlight the clear distinctions made by Qutb between

takfir of individuals and takfir of governments, which makes his views on takfir less ―open-ended‖

than some have claimed (Kepel 1984, p. 57). For Qutb, while all modern Muslims were apostates,

jahili governments must be countered by violent jihad, while individuals are not to be killed but

preached to and taught. This mixture of the ―sword and the word‖ can be seen throughout the

writings of those in today‘s GJM (Stout 2008, p. 13). While Qutb claimed that individuals are

undeniably disbelievers, he contends that this is due to the corrupt jahili regimes, which have made

the wider populace ignorant to Islam due to the lack of Sharia. Thus he argues:

[The movement] uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming

ideas and beliefs, and it uses physical power and jihad for abolishing the

organizations and authorities of the jahili system which prevents the people

from reforming their ideas… This movement does not confine itself to mere

preaching to confront physical power, as it also does not use compulsion for

changing the ideas of people. These two principles are equally important in

the method of this religion (Qutb 1964).‖

Ironically, Qutb committed an act he so often ridiculed by interpreting the Qur‘an in a

modern context, and shunning the literal interpretation which states that apostasy requires the death

penalty. Therefore, those within the GJM can combine Qutb‘s theory of modern Jahiliyah with a

literal interpretation of the Qur‘an to justify a doctrine of takfir where all individuals are legitimate

targets of violence.

22

2.1d Abdullah Azzam

The last ideologue to craft his own narrative of takfir before the evolution of al-Qaeda into the

GJM was a man who helped in the creation of al-Qaeda itself, Abdullah Azzam. Holding a

doctorate in fiqh—Islamic jurisprudence—Azzam provided the intellectual inspiration necessary to

turn his MAK organization in Afghanistan into al-Qaeda.8 Despite his assassination in 1989,

Azzam‘s involvement in the creation of al-Qaeda allowed him to be the last great contributor to the

present-day GJM‘s narrative of takfir without actually being alive to participate in the movement.

Azzam’s Narrative of Takfir

Azzam‘s legacy has been centered on his view that jihad is not a collective duty, but rather an

individual obligation. In his most famous work, In Defense of Muslim Lands, Azzam repeatedly

calls for individuals to take responsibility in the jihad, but he does not believe that those who do not

do so should be labeled apostates. Azzam was the first intellectual to not only view jihad as a

transnational movement, but to be an operational leader working to make this vision a reality.

Azzam understood that the labeling of other Muslims as kuffar and calling for their deaths would not

further his goal of an Afghanistan free of occupiers and ruled by Sharia, because the people of

Afghanistan would not tolerate this expansive violence (Drennan 2008, pp. 15-18). Azzam believed

that takfiri groups in Egypt suffered from a ―lack of knowledge‖ and were ―simply youth with much

zeal, and the hearts of these youth were made to follow their desires (Azzam 2007, p. 104).‖

Azzam‘s full-rejection of takfir as compatible with his vision jihad is due directly to how he

prioritized jihad to begin with. Azzam‘s paramount focus was on the removal of foreign occupiers

from Muslim lands, not the assimilation of all Muslims to al-Qaeda‘s interpretation of Islam. While

Azzam believed Sharia law was necessary in all Muslim countries, he laid out no strategy for how

8 See Chapter 2.

23

this was going to be achieved, largely because this was not his primary focus. His primary focus was

to target non-Muslims in Muslim territories, therefore the use of takfir would only increase division

amongst the ummah, subsequently hurting Azzam‘s goal of rallying individual Muslims to defend

their lands against invaders.

2.2 The Global Jihadist Movement and Takfir

The inconsistencies within the narrative of takfir crafted by scholars before the beginning of

the GJM forced those at the highest levels of today‘s movement to analyze the relationship between

the disputed doctrine and the entire enterprise of global jihad. Influential leaders and ideologues in

the GJM have attempted to find a workable understanding of takfir which best develops the goals of

the global movement. Just as those Islamic scholars before them, it has been the individual

ideologue‘s interests—not necessarily the interests of the movement—which have dictated their

stance on takfir. The GJM‘s views on takfir are divided between two camps: those focused on a

pragmatic strategy to further the global movement, and those religious fundamentalists primarily

focused on creating an Islamic society ruled by a literal interpretation of Sharia. This division has

made the doctrine of takfir the most debated ideological topic within the GJM (Brachman 2008, p.

45). The increased decentralization of the GJM will likely increase the division, creating a

progressively dissimilar narrative throughout the movement.

2.2a Zawahiri and Maqdisi: Importance of Strategy

The leading ideologue and strategist within the GJM today is Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda‘s

number-two. While Osama bin Laden is the face of the GJM, Zawahiri is far more prolific in his

global dissemination of ideological treatises and videos to all members of the movement (Profile

2006). However, since the demise of the former al-Qaeda organization and the emergence of the

24

broader GJM, Zawahiri has become partially sidelined due to the emergence of local operational

commanders, and his inability to control the movement while continually eluding the global military

and intelligence campaign to find him (Brachman 2008, p. 101). Feeling ―alienated and marginalized

like never before,‖ Zawahiri has changed the focus of his writings, attempting to ―reestablish his

position at the top of the movement‖ by addressing the entire ummah in his videos and written

material (Brachman 2008, p. 101).‖

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi is best known as the mentor to al-Qaeda in Iraq commander Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi. Maqdisi has become ―the key contemporary ideologue in the jihadist universe‖

because of his ability to be ―the primary broker between the Medieval Authorities, the Conservative

Scholars, and the Saudi Establishment Clerics on the one hand, and the Jihadi Theorists on the other

(McCants 2006, p. 8).‖ A Jordanian-Palestinian with a propensity for persuasive prose and his own

jihadist website, Maqdisi has been quite successful in spreading his own narrative of takfir

throughout the movement.

Pragmatic Views on Takfir

Often citing Ibn Taymiyyah and Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri explicitly labels the ruling

regimes in Muslim-dominated countries as apostates, who have turned their back on Islam (Zawahiri

2006). Zawahiri believes that modern regimes in Muslim countries are ―agent governments‖ of the

U.S. and Israel whose actions include ―fighting Islam, torture, illicit profiteering, bribes, and paying

no heed to lives and sanctities (Zawahiri 2006).

While his views on takfir regarding Muslim ruling regimes are not largely contested within

today‘s GJM, Zawahiri‘s description of takfir of individuals runs counter to those within the more

fundamentalist wing of the GJM. With the understanding that the widespread judging of individual

Muslims as kuffr is likely to turn the ummah against the GJM, Zawahiri took a nuanced stance on

how the GJM practices takfir. Zawahiri claims the only Muslims eligible for takfir are those who

25

collaborate with the local apostate regimes or Western governments. According to Zawahiri, ―He

who voluntarily joins the realm of disbelief and war and fights against the Muslims surrounding him

has actually become an apostate (Zawahiri 2006, p. 20).‖ Zawahiri does not overtly define what type

of cooperation will cause this ruling of apostasy, but in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2005

Zawahiri clearly states that rank-and-file members of Muslim societies should not be targeted

(Zawahiri 2005). It is clear that Zawahiri understands that the practice of takfir on individuals will

curtail public support for the GJM, and therefore it must be limited only to those who can

unequivocally be deemed as aiding the apostate regimes and their sponsors.

Maqdisi agrees with Zawahiri‘s views on the ruling Arab regimes as kuffar, and builds on

Zawahiri‘s narrative in regard to how the GJM should conduct takfir on individuals. According to

Maqdisi, individual Muslims who do not adhere to the ideology of the GJM are violating Islamic

law, but rather than practice takfir against these individuals, he instructs those within the GJM to

declare ―disavowal towards their disobedience, corruption and sins and [to] not interact with them in

the manner of Kuffr (Maqdisi 2009, p. 59).‖ Maqdisi shares Zawahiri‘s view that takfir should be

performed on those who collaborate with the apostate Muslim regimes and their Western

counterparts. He argues:

We only perform takfir upon the one who has in his work a type of kuffr or

shirk [polytheism] such as participating in the kuffr legislation, or the taaghuti

[idolatrous] rule, or allegiance to the mushrikun [polytheists] and kuffr, or

aiding them against the people of tawhid [believers in the unity of Islam]

(2009, p. 59).

The GJM is also struggling with how to deal with the Shia, whom even Zawahiri

himself calls ―a religious school based on excess and falsehood (Zawahiri, 2005, p. 8).‖

Despite the pervasive belief within the GJM that Shiism is a heretical school of thought,

pragmatists within the GJM do not believe the movement should perform takfir on the Shia.

As Maqdisi frames:

26

Despite the deviousness and false, deviant beliefs of al-Rawafid [the Shia],

there are certain rules for holding them to be infidels, just like any heretics

who also pray in the direction of Mecca. They cannot be held to be infidels

collectively. One should distinguish between average Shi'is who do not know

anything of their beliefs and who do not observe apostate practices, and the

elite Shi'is who believe in the well known apostate ideas of their

denomination (Maqdisi, quoted in Terrorism Monitor).

Much like Qutb, Zawahiri claims that the Shia are not apostates, but simply ignorant to the

one ―true Islam.‖ Therefore, it is the role of the GJM to educate the Shia and not ―throw the masses-

scant in knowledge-into the sea before we teach them to swim (Zawahiri 2005, p. 6).‖ Much like

Azzam, Zawahiri has this narrative of takfir because the killing of the Shia ―won't be acceptable to

the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it (2005, 8).‖ Since Zawahiri views

the ―strongest weapon‖ of the GJM and its local allies as being the ―popular support from the Muslim

masses,‖ he understands that the Shia cannot be labeled as apostates by the GJM, even though he

views a conflict between the GJM and the Shia as ―a matter that will happen sooner or later (2005,

9).‖

2.2b Al-Fahd: Importance of Ideology

While much of the leadership within the GJM understands that a strategic definition of takfir

is the only way for the GJM to survive in the long-term, there is another wing within the movement

which believes the GJM should not sacrifice its religious doctrine for strategic gains. More recently,

this wing have been termed the ―Neo-Zarqawist‖ faction of the GJM, due to their agreement with al-

Qaeda in Iraq commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that all individuals who do not subscribe to the

GJM‘s ideology are kuffar, and are legitimate targets of violence (al-Shishani 2009, p.1) .9 As

expressed above, a narrative of takfir that pits a legitimate Islamic vanguard against the entire world

began with Muhammad al-Wahhab. Sayyid Qutb‘s theory of worldwide Jahiliyah is also used to

9 This author would also use the term ―Neo-Shurki‖ due to the consistency between the beliefs of this faction within the

GJM and those of former Egyptian jihadist Shurki Mustafa.

27

legitimize the Neo-Zarqawists narrative of takfir because Qutb claimed the entire world—except the

Muslim Brotherhood—was ignorant to the ―true‖ Islam.

It is no surprise that this competing narrative of takfir has been adopted primarily by clerics

and religious scholars within the GJM, rather than the strategists and leadership who seek the

furtherance of the movement over allegiance to religious dogma. This narrative of takfir is also

appealing to individual jihadists in the movement who are drawn to the GJM because of its violent

characteristics, and not its political or strategic message (APS 2009, 2). This understanding of takfir

serves the interests of religious figures within the GJM who desire an ideology consistent with a

literal reading of the Qur‘an, while also serving the interests of violence-seeking individuals within

the movement who are drawn to the GJM because of the sadistic nature of violent jihad.

Fundamentalist Narrative of Takfir

In contrast to the pragmatic wing of the GJM, the fundamentalist faction does not have

ideological heavyweights such as Zawahiri and Maqdisi trumpeting its cause. However, there are

still many clerics—primarily in Saudi Arabia and Jordan—that have adopted this fundamentalist

narrative of takfir (APS 2009, 3). One of these religious figures is Saudi Sheikh Nasir bin Hamad al-

Fahd. While most popular for his fatwa encouraging al-Qaeda to pursue weapons of mass

destruction, al-Fahd directly addressed how the GJM should practice the doctrine of takfir in his

Whoever Does Not Do Takfir of the Disbelievers is a Disbeliever, a title which in effect presents his

principal position. In the book, al-Fahd echoes al-Wahhab‘s call for all Muslims to practice takfir

against not only those he terms ―the original disbelievers10‖ but all Muslims who do not adhere to a

Salafist interpretation of Islam (quoted in Brachman 2008, p. 46). Al-Fahd claims that no individual

can claim neutrality on the issue, and if one chooses to not practice takfir against ―the disbelievers‖

10

Here al-Fahd is referring to all individuals who are not Muslims.

28

they themselves are kuffar. This narrative of takfir legitimizes violence against any person who does

not support the goals and ideology of the GJM.

2.3 Conclusion

The varying historical narratives of takfir exemplify that while it is imperative to

understand jihadist ideology, it would also be imprudent to not acknowledge that jihadist

ideology is malleable. Jihadist scholars from Ibn Taymiyyah to Abdullah Azzam have provided

today‘s GJM with the parameters for how far the doctrine of takfir can be stretched to fit the

interests of those in the movement. The narratives of takfir in the GJM today have highlighted a

common division within the movement; one between strategy and ideology. Individuals who

preference ideological concerns over strategic issues will be drawn to the fundamentalist

narrative of takfir, while those who desire strategic gains over ideological adherence will find

more appeal in the pragmatic narrative of takfir. Today‘s global jihadists continue to use takfir

to legitimize their interests just as their historical counterparts have done since the 13th

century.

29

Chapter Three

GJM Organizational Strategies and Takfir

According to the theory of Netwar, an understanding of how a social movement organizes

itself is necessary in order to judge that movement‘s strength and coherence. Therefore, this chapter

intends to analyze how the doctrine of takfir fits in with the organizational strategy of the GJM. The

GJM provides for a unique and difficult case study for this aspect of Netwar theory do to the

ambiguous nature of its organizational structure. Since 9/11, and the evolution of al-Qaeda into the

GJM, scholars have debated the importance of each of the six dimensions of the GJM, and what role

they play in the movement (Schmitt E., Sciolino E. 2008). Addressing the question of the relative

importance of each of these dimensions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a body of

literature exists—written by individuals within the GJM—which provides suggestions and guidance

for the movement in achieving its strategic goals. This literature, first referred to as ―Jihadi Strategic

Studies‖ by Thomas Hegghammer and Brynjar Lia, explicitly deals with how the GJM should

organize itself, and how the movement‘s various dimensions must operate in order for the GJM to

restore the Islamic Caliphate (Hegghammer T., Lia B. 2004). Using this literature, this chapter will

examine the desired future organizational structure laid out by strategists within the GJM, and how

the two modern narratives of takfir are placed within these strategies.

3.1 Organizational Structure and the GJM

No matter how much the counter-terrorism community searches for a coherent global

strategy for the GJM, they will not find one. As Jarrett Brachman says, ―there is no single Jihadist

strategy‖ but ―there are, however, Jihadist strategists (2009, 81).‖ The decentralization of al-Qaeda

has created a situation where a coherent global strategy is impossible to implement, thereby forcing

30

the movement—and most specifically al-Qaeda Central—to be more opportunistic than strategic.

The content within the Jihadist Strategic Studies literature is best viewed as idealistic guidance by

individual strategists who desire a particular identity for the GJM itself. However, the utility of the

Jihadist Strategic Studies literature is not in ―stealing al-Qaeda‘s playbook‖ (Brachman, J., McCants

W. 2006) but rather in understanding that the GJM has two primary organizational paths which it

may follow:

Global Insurgency

Decentralized Resistance

While it is not certain the GJM will completely head down either of these strategic paths, the

Jihadist Strategic Studies literature shows that those within the movement understand a choice must

be made. Analyzing where takfir fits within these two strategic paths is vital if one hopes to

comprehend the future utility of the doctrine for the GJM.

3.2 Global Insurgency

The desire to move the GJM toward a Global Insurgency organizational structure is based on

a particular operational strategic vision held by a diverse group, including strategists Abu Bakr Naji

and Abu Ubayd al-Quarashi, as well as those within AQ-central such as Ayman al-Zawahiri.

According to this strategic vision, the paramount near-term goal of the GJM is to seize and govern

territory, which will allow jihadists to consolidate their strength, while simultaneously beginning the

restoration of Sharia and the Islamic Caliphate (Brachman 2008, p. 94). Due to the emphasis on

territory, those adhering to this strategic vision for the GJM view the support and co-option of local

insurgencies under the banner of the GJM as the primary task for the movement (Springer 2009, pp.

129-131). Ideally, these local insurgencies will work to delegitimize current governments, create

alternative or parallel governance structures, militarily exhaust or defeat the local government, and

finally recruit a critical mass of the population as supporters to the GJM (Schultz 2008, p. 43). In his

31

manuscript Management of Savagery, GJM strategist Abu Bakr Naji lays out the strategic guidelines

for the GJM to follow in these insurgencies. Naji advises these insurgencies to adopt a strategy of

―vexation and exhaustion‖ attacking repeatedly, unpredictably, and constantly changing targets (Naji

2005, pp. 7-9).11 These attacks will exhaust the counterinsurgent forces, compelling the

counterinsurgents to pull out of peripheral areas, leaving ―security vacuums‖ for the insurgents to fill.

The mission of the GJM and its local allies is to ―manage the chaos‖ in these security vacuums by

providing effective territorial governance. This governance includes:

The management of peoples‘ needs with regard to the provision of food and medical

treatment, preservation of security and justice among the people who live in the

regions of savagery, securing the boarders by means of groups that deter anyone who

tries to assault the regions of savagery, as well as setting up defensive fortifications

(Naji 2005, p. 11).

Those adhering to the Global Insurgency strategic vision understand—like classical

counterinsurgency theorists Robert Thompson and David Galula—that an insurgency is bound to fail

if it lacks the support of the local population (Galua 1965; Thompson 1966). Naji realizes that his

intensely violent strategy will polarize the population, and therefore a coordinated media and

information operations campaign explaining their attacks is necessary to win the population to the

GJM‘s side. The violence ―will be a powerful motive for the individual to choose to fight in the

ranks of the people of truth in order to die well‖ and it is ―better than dying for falsehood and losing

both this world and the next (Naji 2005, p. 43)

3.2a Organizational Structure

In order to accomplish the strategic goals of a Global Insurgency, the GJM must adopt a

specific organizational structure. With multiple insurgencies occurring around the globe, an effective

11

Naji also emphasizes the importance of ―spectacular‖ attacks of terrorism in Western countries. In his view, these attacks will create more security vacuums by forcing Western countries to focus resources on protecting their homeland, which will draw their forces out of insurgencies in Muslim-dominated countries.

32

organizational structure for the GJM would unite and connect these theatres of conflict beyond a

shared ideology. In a Global Insurgency strategy, the local affiliate groups fighting the insurgencies

appear to be the most important dimension within the movement, but it is al-Qaeda Central which

holds the most structural significance. According to David Kilcullen and Michael Scheuer, it is the

duty of al-Qaeda Central to co-opt and aggregate local actors into a Global Insurgency by:

1. Building ―mass consciousness‖ through the support of spectacular acts of ―resistance‖ such

as the 9/11 attack;

2. Acting as a ―propaganda hub‖ and a ―center of excellence‖ for local insurgent groups to

come for ideological, strategic, and operational guidance (Kilcullen 2009, pp. 28-29);

3. Provoking a global uprising against the ―world order‖ by acting as the ―inciter-in-chief‖ of

the GJM (Scheuer 2005).

Adhering to a decentralized structure, a Global Insurgency strategy relies on al-Qaeda Central to lead

this global coalition and give each dimension of the movement its broad purpose and direction.

Due to the separation—in both time and space—of the local insurgencies from al-Qaeda

Central, coordination is difficult, and an understood division of responsibilities is necessary between

the two groups. Naji addresses this issue by making the distinction between ―leaders‖ and

―managers‖ within the GJM (2005, p. 25). For Naji, the ―managers‖ within the GJM are the heads of

the local insurgent groups, while the ―leaders‖ are the members of al-Qaeda Central. In this

dichotomy, the ―leaders‖ are ―the object of complete reliance‖ and are in charge of ―the secrets of the

movement (2005, p. 25).‖ Therefore, the subordinated role of the ―manager‖ is to be a master in ―the

art of administration‖ and work to implement the visions of the ―leaders (Naji 2005, p. 25)‖

3.2b Takfir and a Global Insurgency Strategy

In both its strategic assumptions and its organizational structure, the strategy of Global

Insurgency is heavily focused on making the GJM appealing to the ummah. Therefore, it is the

strategic narrative of takfir which best coincides with the long-term goals of a Global Insurgency. If

the purpose of local insurgencies is to create parallel governance structures which attract the

33

allegiance of individuals away from the state, a doctrine of takfir which calls for the death of a large

portion of that population would be counterproductive.

Despite the compatibility between the strategic narrative of takfir and the strategy of Global

Insurgency, a uniform adherence to that narrative across the individual dimensions of the GJM is not

certain due to the organizational structure of a Global Insurgency. While Naji claims the ―leaders‖ of

al-Qaeda Central are charged with uniting the GJM‘s various worldwide insurgencies, he does not

consider the effect of the physical and temporal separation of these ―leaders‖ from the operational

―managers‖ of local insurgencies. This distance, along with a lack of any true mechanism to control

the ―managers‖ of local insurgencies by al-Qaeda Central, gives near complete autonomy to local

insurgent groups to adhere to their own strategic vision, and define the doctrine of takfir as they

choose. As a result, no continuity can be expected throughout the movement in regard to the chosen

narrative and definition of takfir.

While never explicitly referring to the doctrine of takfir, Naji acknowledges that the choice of

targets by local insurgencies would deeply affect the success of a Global Insurgency strategy (Naji

25-26). Naji contends that the choice of targets should be up to the ―High Command‖ of al-Qaeda

Central because local insurgent leaders will often not understand the political consequences of

targeting certain groups (Naji 2005, p. 25-26). Once again, there is no description for how al-Qaeda

Central can enforce these targeting requirements, thereby allowing any local insurgent commander

who follows a fundamentalist narrative of takfir to choose their own targets based on their individual

or group‘s chosen ideology. This makes the GJM-associated insurgencies the most important

dimension within the movement, because the following of a fundamentalist narrative of takfir by a

single GJM-affiliated insurgent group could alienate Muslims around the world.

3.3 Decentralized Resistance

34

The strategy of Decentralized Resistance stems principally from the assumption that Western

counterterrorism policies and practices have successfully deterred al-Qaeda and the GJM from

achieving their desired goals. Abu Musab al-Suri—veteran jihadist and mastermind behind the

theory of Decentralized Resistance—notes that since 9/11 the US-led initiative against al-Qaeda was

successful in limiting jihadist financing, targeting jihadist leaders and cadres, eliminating safe

havens, increasing international cooperation in counterterrorism, and expanding legislation to combat

the GJM (al-Suri 2005, pp. 665-668, 1408). While others view the United States and the West as

both politically and militarily weak, al-Suri views any type of overt confrontation by the GJM as a

futile endeavor. According to al-Suri:

Open confrontation with America or any of her military allies is impossible as long as

America can maintain complete hegemony with its overwhelming technological

capabilities, and particularly with the presence of the collaborating powers who

conduct her administration on the ground. (2004, p. 66).

Unlike the strategy of Global Insurgency, an underpinning assumption of Decentralized

Resistance is that local insurgencies and affiliate groups cannot be properly managed by al-Qaeda

Central, nor acquire the sufficient governing capabilities to make the strategy of Global Insurgency

effective. Jihadist writer and strategist Lewis Atiyatallah notes:

Establishing a nation in the real meaning (which includes being attached to a certain

piece of land with presence of establishments, departments on the land, and the

people who are on a certain piece of land…etc.) We are not in a hurry for that; it

consumes energy and will be an easy target for the enemy (the Americans and their

followers have long arms, which are the air weapons and the weapons of mass

destruction, we must be aware of that) (Atiyatallah 2006, p. 2).

Al-Suri was not completely against the supporting of local insurgencies and traditional

guerilla warfare by the GJM, he just believed that the movement was not ready for such actions. Al-

Suri outlined a three-stage theory of global jihad:

1. Stage of Attrition – Small cells around the globe involved in ―limited terrorist warfare‖ such

as raids and targeted explosions against both the ―near‖ and ―far‖ enemies. These groups will

strain economies cause ―political confusion‖ and ultimately force a ―security collapse.‖

35

2. Stage of Balancing – The cells attempt to draw regular armed forces into battles short of

―open confrontation.‖ Raids and subterfuge remain the key tactics, as cells begin to merge,

but without forming centralized hierarchical structures.

3. Stage of Termination and Liberation – Guerilla cells being to take control of more territory

and confront their enemies both clandestinely and in open insurgencies. The territory gained

will be used to launch other operations, as well as build the Caliphate (2004, p. 1422).

3.3a Organizational Structure

This three-part strategy of Decentralized resistance begins with the understanding of the

asymmetric nature of the conflict between the West and local regimes against the GJM. The first

step is therefore to further decentralize the movement into local clandestine guerilla cells—ideally of

up to 12 individuals—which are less susceptible to penetration and exploitation by outside security

forces. According to al-Suri, the GJM needs to:

Become a strategic phenomenon, following the model of the Palestinian Intifada

against occupation forces, the settlers, and all who aid them. However, it should be

broadened and embrace all corners of the Islamic world, reaching with its deterrent

arms the heart of the invading United States and its allies of infidels, from every race

and every place (2004, p. 1393).

Al-Suri called this decentralization an ―individual jihad‖ due to the lack of connections

between cells, and the elimination of allegiance to authoritative leaders such as Osama bin Laden

(2004, p. 1396). Instead, individuals within the GJM have allegiance only to themselves, and their

personal obligation to God to engage in jihad (Springer 2009, p. 114). Ideally, the clandestine cells

will form organically based on personal networks, bonds, and kinship.12 However, these cells are

advised to limit their size, and not to unite with other cells so that ―the arrest of one does not lead to

the arrest of all (al-Suri 2004, p. 54).‖ While not physically linked, the resistance is completely

global, because ―neither the United States nor ten armies of its like‖ has the capacity or capability ―to

fight in hundreds of Fallujah‘s throughout the Arab and Islamic world (al-Suri 2005, 5).

12

The research of Marc Sageman suggests that this type of personal network group formation occurred within al-Qaeda even before 9/11 (2004).

36

The individuals who populate the resistance cells are drawn together not only by their

personal bonds, but by a belief in resisting the ―enemy‖ and the propaganda and message of the GJM.

In a strategy of Decentralized Resistance, the promulgating of that propaganda and those messages is

the duty of al-Qaeda Central. Al-Qaeda Central and affiliated Islamic ideologues and scholars are

instructed to relinquish any command and control functions, and instead use their international

legitimacy to foster a ―common aim, a common doctrinal program, and a comprehensive educational

program‖ within the GJM (al-Suri 2004, p. 17). Individual cells will also find inspiration and broad

guidance through virtual training camps, where jihadists around the globe can go online to find

military training manuals, religious justifications for jihad, and other inspirational material

(Stenersen 2007). Also, while the parameters for the GJM‘s targeting will be set by al-Qaeda

Central, actual targets will be chosen by individual cells based on their local conditions and

opportunities.

The dimension of today‘s GJM which is left out in a Decentralized Resistance strategy are the

local insurgencies and affiliate groups. These groups are strategically important in al-Suri‘s third-

stage of warfare, but the GJM is not ready to support them at this time. The strategy of Decentralized

Resistance is a conservative and gradual approach, slowly progressing toward further centralization,

open guerilla warfare, and the eventual restoration of the Caliphate.

3.3b Takfir and Decentralized Resistance

Al-Suri himself sees no use for the doctrine of takfir within the movement beyond defining

the ruling regimes in Muslim-dominated countries as apostates. Just as in the strategy of Global

Insurgency, a Decentralized Resistance strategy is principally focused on winning over the ―hearts

and minds‖ of Muslims around the globe. Al-Suri claims that the chief impediment to that

informational campaign would be for the GJM to adopt a fundamentalist narrative of takfir. The

37

leadership of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria—a militant Islamist organization operating in

Algeria in the mid-1990‘s—is characterized by al-Suri as being ―a few deviant ignoramuses‖ due to

their widespread violent takfiri campaign which killed numerous civilians and turned the Algerian

population against the group (Al-Suri 2004, p. 56). Al-Suri warns that some currents of present-day

mainstream jihadiist ideology ―have merged with takfirism‖ because ―some ignorant jihadis‖ had

taken the definition of jihad to include ―the concept of expiating others (al-Suri 2004, p. 842).‖

While the strategic narrative of takfir best coincides with the organizational structure and

strategy of Decentralized Resistance, the takfir narrative of Sayyid Qutb is highly influential. Just as

Qutb prescribed, al-Suri claims that a Decentralized Resistance calls for both ―the sword‖ and ―the

word.‖ While the West and the local apostate regimes must be dealt with by the sword, all Muslims

who do not subscribe to the GJM‘s ideology need to be educated and instructed, not killed. Al-Suri

claims that even Shiites are ―part of the Islamic nation‖ and while they are ―misguided and deviant‖

they are not to be considered kuffar, nor should they be the targets of violence (Al-Suri 2004, p. 794).

In this view the Shiites are better dealt with through the GJM‘s global propaganda campaign, than

violent targeting which could damage the image of the GJM.

Beyond the problems inherent in popularizing a strict system of governance from the 8th

century, the organizational structure of Decentralized Resistance lacks any mechanisms to control

which narrative of takfir the clandestine cells choose to adopt. While al-Suri believes this further

decentralization of the GJM will increase unity within the movement, this is based on the assumption

that local cells will strictly adhere to the broad guidance of al-Qaeda Central and the GJM‘s

ideologues and scholars. Just as in the strategy of Global Insurgency, the temporal and geographical

separation of those guiding the GJM and those following eliminates all guarantees of tactical and

doctrinal unity throughout the movement. It is explicitly noted by al-Suri that he understands a

fundamentalist narrative of takfir exists within the GJM, but it is by faith alone that he believes the

movement will choose to follow the strategic narrative disseminated to the cells of his Decentralized

38

Resistance. Furthermore, there are no assurances that the guidance disseminated online to the GJM

will be aligned with a strategic narrative of takfir. The nature of ―virtual training camps‖ allows all

Islamic scholars and ideologues who may claim to be speaking for the GJM to espouse any definition

of takfir they choose, without significant obstructions to the dissemination of their messages. The

adoption of a fundamentalist understanding of takfir by a single cell jeopardizes the goals of the

entire movement.

3.4 Conclusion

While the two primary currents in jihadist strategic thought have far different prescriptions

for the GJM‘s future organizational structure, they do share some common assumptions. Both

theories are based on the strategic assumption that the ummah’s support is vital to the GJM, which

means no doctrine of takfir should be accepted which jeopardizes this support. Furthermore, both

theories accept that in order for the GJM to survive it must maintain a decentralized structure to

prohibit outside penetration by security forces, and it is only regarding the level of decentralization

which the two strategic currents disagree. This consensus among strategists that the GJM should not

revert back to a sophisticated command and control infrastructure raises serious vulnerabilities for

the movement. With the lack of mechanisms to control the targeting of local insurgencies and cells,

the GJM opens itself up for those who follow a fundamentalist understanding of takfir to severely

damage the movement through overly-violent operations. Therefore, the GJM is stuck in a dilemma,

where both centralization and decentralization threaten the movement‘s future existence.

39

Chapter 4

Takfir in Practice: AQI‘s Implementation of Takfir

As John Locke said, it is ―the actions of men‖ which are ―the best interpreters of their

thoughts.‖ While the GJM‘s narrative of takfir is far from cohesive, and strategists in the movement

may have deemed a fundamentalist understanding of takfir as detrimental to the GJM as a whole, this

chapter asks the question, how is takfir actually practiced within the movement? While this study

cannot inspect the practice of takfir by all the dimensions within the GJM, this study will examine

the practice of takfir by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an affiliate group with elements akin to the

organizational strategies outlined in the previous chapter.13 Like the strategy of Global Insurgency,

AQI is a GJM-affiliated group involved in a local insurgency that eventually attempted to control

territory and the local population. However, in similar fashion to Suri‘s Decentralized Resistance,

AQI began to decentralize into largely autonomous cells that acted based on their own individual

interests. While AQI did not explicitly adhere to the organizational structure of a Globalized

Insurgency or a Decentralized Resistance, the group provides an insight into how the key

components of those strategies—groups involved in local insurgencies and small decentralized

cells—actually practice takfir. The case of al-Qaeda in Iraq highlights how the decentralized

structure of the GJM is detrimental to the movement‘s long term prospects, as well as uncovering

numerous fissures within the GJM as a whole.

4.1 Al-Qaeda in Iraq Chronology: 2003-2007

13

This study will examine AQI from 2003-2007.

40

It is impossible to understand AQI without first examining the journey to Iraq by AQI‘s

founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi began his jihadist career in Afghanistan, where from 1989

to 1993 he fought with the mujahidin in the battles of Khost and Khardez, and met with al-Qaeda

leadership while training at a camp in Sada (Weaver 2006). After returning to his home country of

Jordan, Zarqawi and his ideological mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, were arrested and

imprisoned. During this time Zarqawi became further radicalized, taking an even harder line

interpretation of Salafism than his mentor (Weaver 2006). Upon his release in 1999 Zarqawi traveled

to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he met with Osama bin Laden, who approved Zarqawi to setup

his own training camp in Heart, void of AQ affiliation (Napoleoni 2005,p. 98). Zarqawi‘s group, the

Jund al-Sham fought with al-Qaeda and the Taliban against the US in 2001 in Heart and Kandahar,

but were forced to retreat to Iran, and found sanctuary with Kurdish separatist-Islamist group Ansar

al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan (Napoleoni 2005, pp. 99-100).

Zarqawi quickly built his own group of global jihadists, Jamia’at Tawhid wal Jihad (JTJ),

and three months after the US-led invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi began to move his group into the Sunni

tribal areas of Anbar province. Zarqawi‘s JTJ was only a portion of the much larger and multi-

faceted Sunni insurgency which encompassed both globally-minded jihadists—like JTJ—and local

Iraq-oriented Sunni insurgent groups.14 In the summer of 2003, Zarqawi and his JTJ became

infamous in the region after a string of suicide bombings, car-bombs, and hostage beheadings of both

Coalition forces and Iraqi Shiites who Zarqawi deemed ―collaborators‖ with the United States

(Fishman 2006, p. 20). Al-Qaeda Central saw an opportunity to gain presence in the world‘s largest

jihadist battlefield, and in 2004 offered Zarqawi to join the al-Qaeda network. Understanding he

would have to sacrifice little to no control over his group, Zarqawi accepted the offer in order to

profit ―from the al-Qaeda brand‖ in the form of notoriety and resources (Phillips 2008, p. 71).

14 Most official estimates put the size of the group at 8-15% of the Sunni insurgency (Boyle 2009).

41

Throughout 2005, AQI began to lose its local support from the Sunni tribes in al-Anbar due

to its privileging of its own ideology over local customs and identity. AQI ignored tribal taboos

against exogamous marriage, attempted to usurp tribal control of local black markets, and brutally

imposed its own puritanical version of Islam on their Sunni counterparts (Phillips 2008, p. 79;

Kilcullen 2009, pp. 132-133; Fishman 2009, p. 6). Instead of unifying Iraqi‘s Sunnis, AQI became a

―malignant foreign entity‖ who had lost their status as a protective force due to their intra-sectarian

violence (Phillips 2008, p. 15). Even the ramping up of attacks against the Shia in 2006 did not unify

the disparate elements of the Sunni insurgency, and AQI further lost credibility as it failed to protect

local populations from Shia reprisal attacks (Fishman 2009, p. 2).

Zarqawi‘s death in 2006 brought about numerous changes for AQI. First, AQI lost its more

centralized structure, as Zarqawi‘s replacement Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was unable to cohesively

lead the group, thereby giving local cells autonomy in their operations (Fishman 2009, p. 15). Also,

AQI attempted to mend its broken relationship with local tribes through its umbrella organization, the

Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The ISI was intended to bring together numerous Iraqi insurgent groups

under a single entity, which would fill the political vacuum left after a Coalition withdrawal

(Fishman 2009, p. 4). However, AQI‘s damage had already been done, and leaders from other Sunni

insurgent groups like the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) and the 1920 Revolution Brigade, claimed the

ISI was an attempt by AQI to unjustifiably claim political leadership of the insurgency (Fishman

2009, p. 6).

Tønnessen notes that at this time, ―the conflict in Iraq increasingly evolved from being a

struggle against the Coalition forces toward a struggle for the future outlook of Iraq (2009, p. 5).‖

However, the ISI and its Sunni counterparts had very different outlooks for Iraq, and in 2007 intra-

Sunni violence hit record numbers. All these factors—along with a new US-led counterinsurgency

42

strategy in 2007 of allying with those Sunni tribal leaders disenchanted with AQI—led to the

reversion of al-Qaeda in Iraq back to its original state, a terrorist group only capable of sporadic

spectacular attacks.

4.2 AQI’s Doctrine of Takfir

Beyond the GJM-wide belief that local regimes are kuffr themselves, AQI most prominently

utilized takfir against the Shiites of Iraq. While the largest offensive against the Shiites was in 2006,

al Zarqawi‘s group targeted Shiites since it began operations in Iraq in 2003—despite calls for the

cessation of such targeting by al-Qaeda Central (Napoleoni 2005, pp. 149-151). According to

Zarqawi, the Shiites misguided beliefs ―have always been a thorn in the heart of Islam‖ and ―their

perfidy is engraved in the forehead of history‖ (Zarqawi 2005). For AQI, the Shiites of Iraq were

apostates not only for their beliefs which were deemed un-Islamic, but also because ―they work with

the United States against a purely Sunni state‖ by controlling and supporting the post-Saddam Iraqi

government (Zarqawi 2005).

As AQI evolved into the ISI, and the group lost the more centralized structure it held under

Zarqawi, AQI‘s doctrine of takfir was further radicalized. In 2006, AQI began to view not only

Shiites, but members of other Sunni insurgent groups as apostates (Fishman 2009, p. 14). Despite

disdain for such actions by ISI leadership, local AQI cell commander Abu Safir al-Hasan legitimized

his violence against the IAI through takfir, claiming the IAI ―didn‘t conform to religious law‖ and

―didn‘t confess of their crimes‖ but only ―sat in their houses after their despicable actions and

atrocities (al-Hasan 2007).‖

4.3 The Causes of AQI’s Complex Doctrine of Takfir

43

This section intends to answer the question: Why did AQI choose this narrative of

takfir? The evidence from AQI demonstrates that while members of al-Qaeda Central and GJM

ideologues may draft two concrete competing narratives of takfir, the actual practice of the doctrine

is far more complex. AQI‘s evolving doctrine of takfir reiterates the previous chapter‘s contention of

the importance of a social movement‘s organizational structure. As AQI‘s structure changed, and

targeting decisions became more decentralized, the doctrine of takfir within the movement was also

altered. When targeting decisions were in the hands of Zarqawi, AQI practiced takfir through his

own interpretation of the doctrine. When AQI lost this top-down control, those cells directly in

charge of selecting attack targets chose a doctrine of takfir which best suited their interests. Those

individual interests were framed based on how AQI‘s members prioritized the following:

Strategic Pragmatism vs. Adherence to Ideology

Global vs. Local Concerns.

While history has shown the doctrine of takfir to be a malleable aspect of jihadist ideology, how the

above interests were prioritized determined the parameters of that malleability for AQI.

4.3a Strategy vs. Ideology

AQI‘s use of takfir against Iraqi Shiites is an ideal portrait of how an affiliated group within

the GJM prioritizes ideology and strategy to create its own understanding of takfir. Due to AQI‘s

original organizational structure, decisions on targeting were almost entirely in the hands of Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi (Springer 2009, p. 176). Due to his central role, Zarqawi‘s own views on the

malleability of the GJM‘s ideology dictated how the group understood takfir. Zarqawi had

historically viewed the Shia as always an impediment to the realization of a Sunni caliphate.

Zarqawi even expressed the need for greater targeting of Shiites to Osama bin Laden during a

meeting in 1999 (Weaver 2006, p. 8). The targeting of Shiites was a non-negotiable aspect of the

GJM‘s ideology for Zarqawi. While AQ-Central leaders viewed the targeting of civilian Shiites as

44

detrimental to the GJM‘s reputation with mainstream Muslims, Zarqawi believed that this was a part

of the GJM‘s ideology that could not be sacrificed for any strategic interests.

After Zarqawi‘s death and AQI lost its central control of targeting, a debate commenced

between the leaders of AQI-ISI and the commanders of local cells in regard to the targeting of other

Sunni insurgent groups. As AQI began to lose its appeal in the tribal areas, Sunni insurgent groups

and local tribes began to open up to the idea of participating in the political process. This, however,

was not an option for AQI, as they viewed all those who participated and aided the apostate

government as apostates themselves. For Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the ISI‘s Minister of War, the violent

targeting of these Sunni groups would only turn people away from the ISI, and the group would lose

any chance of uniting the Sunni insurgency under the banner of the GJM (Fishman 2009, pp. 9-10).

However, local commanders lacked this strategic interest, and were more concerned with upholding a

strict interpretation of the GJM‘s ideology. Void of concern for the GJM at-large, local commanders

began to target Sunnis, with one commander saying, ―We discussed our situation with each other and

took matters into our own hands (al-Hasan 2007).‖

The case of AQI also shows how the GJM‘s ideology inherently encourages local groups to

adopt a more fundamentalist understanding of takfir. In similar fashion to Bosnia, Chechnya and

Kashmir, when elements of the GJM move into a local area and attempt to implement their own

puritanical version of Islam, they are often met with resistance from the local host population. In

Anbar, local tribal leaders ―ultimately sought to preserve rather than overturn‖ the hierarchy and

social order of the province, and conflict was hastened by AQI‘s attempt to ―to strip Islam of the very

practices and rites that rendered it such a powerful source of identity and ontological security for

Anbar‘s Muslims (Phillips 2008, p. 79).‖ This incompatibility, coupled with the GJM‘s already

Manichean outlook on the world, encouraged AQI to resort to indiscriminate violence to graft their

global agenda on a localized conflict. AQI was able to use takfir to describe those not adhering to

their ―deculturalized‖ version of Islam as apostates, and therefore legitimate targets of violence (Roy

45

2004, pp. 263-5). Al-Qaeda‘s violence against local populations for such seemingly trivial acts such

as smoking cigarettes and watching satellite television highlight how much the GJM‘s ideology

encourages a fundamentalist interpretation of takfir (ICG Report 2008, p. 3)

4.3b Global vs. Local

The strategic aspect can be further broken down into whether dimensions of the GJM—such

as AQI—preference globally strategic decisions or locally strategic decisions. The case of AQI‘s

doctrine of takfir against the Shia is a prime example of such a dichotomy.

While it has been argued that the targeting of Iraqi Shiites was an ideological aspect of AQI

since its founding, it can also be viewed as a strategic decision. In 2005, AQI‘s targeting of Iraqi

Shiites rapidly increased despite reservations toward such acts by those within al-Qaeda Central

(Kilcullen 2009, pp. 119-120). What explains this alteration of AQI strategy? In short, AQI viewed

the targeting of Shiites as locally strategic and prioritized this belief over global concerns of how

Muslims around the world would view such attacks. After beginning to feel some push-back from

local Sunni tribes, Zarqawi was searching for a way for AQI to appeal to local groups while

maintaining his ideological viewpoint (Fishman 2006, p. 23). Zarqawi believed that by attacking

Shiites he could incite a sectarian war within Iraq which was large enough to compel other Sunni

tribes and insurgent groups that ―only jihadist extremism and brutality could keep Sunnis safe

(Fishman 2009, p. 2).‖ According to Zarqawi, ―If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of

sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger

and annihilating death at the hands of the Sabeans (Zarqawi 2004).‖ This example shows a tendency

for local elements of the GJM to choose local interests over global interests. As the previous chapter

explained, with no organizational mechanism to control local cells and affiliate groups, local

46

dimensions of the GJM can draft their own visions of ideology and strategy which are oftentimes

locally focused.

4.4 Implications for the GJM

The examination of AQI‘s doctrine of takfir illuminates various divisions within the GJM.

Paradoxically, the GJM is a global movement at once unified and divided by its ideology and

strategic goals. AQI exemplifies that ideological and strategic continuity even within local affiliate

groups cannot be expected, much less the GJM as a whole. The inherent difficulty of an

ideologically-based movement that lacks centralized control is that local mutations of that ideology

cannot be controlled. Also, it is virtually certain that as al-Qaeda Central attempts to latch on to

various conflicts around the globe, its desire to spread a puritanical version of Islam will be viewed

as incompatible with local concerns.15 As many GJM strategists and al-Qaeda Central members

already understand, if the GJM desires to actually achieve the strategic goals of controlling land,

populations and re-building the Islamic Caliphate, it will be forced to moderate its ideological

positions (Lia 2008, p.2).

While the moderation of a strict adherence to ideology can be viewed at the level of

strategists and members of al-Qaeda Central, Jeffrey Cozzens notes that this cannot be guaranteed for

the entire movement because ―al-Qaeda and its warfare are dualistic (in Ranstorp 2007, p. 128).‖

What Cozzens means here is that violent acts by the GJM have an ―expressive‖ side which serves to

express a jihadist‘s identity, and an ―instrumental‖ side which works as a tool to achieve strategic

objectives (Cozzens 2009b, p. 88). The moderation of the GJM‘s ideology is therefore virtually

impossible across the entire movement because for some members of the GJM, it is the adherence to

15

Al-Qaeda has had a history of trouble with affiliate groups going back to the days of the group‘s conception (See Felter 2007).

47

jihadist ideology and the involvement in violence which affirms their way of life (Cozzens 2009b, p.

88).

48

Conclusion

A Movement Divided

To conclude, this chapter will provide its analytical conclusions to the primary and secondary

research questions outlined in the introductory chapter. The final section provides suggestions for

further research.

5.1 Primary Question: How have the historical and contemporary

interpretations of takfir been applied organizationally and operationally

by today’s GJM?

Historically, global jihadists have interpreted the doctrine of takfir to fit their primary

interests and how they viewed a legitimate jihad. Intellectually drawing from their ideological

predecessors, ideologues and Islamic scholars aligned with today‘s GJM have defined takfir in two

separate ways. The first definition—drawing from Ibn Taymiyyah, Qutb, and Azzam—have framed

takfir pragmatically, by not allotting for large-scale declarations of apostasy on other Muslims. This

belief is based on the assumption that the ummah is the ―center of gravity‖ for the GJM, and

therefore those within the movement should not overtly partake in actions which alienate other

Muslims. The second definition of takfir within today‘s GJM is based on al-Wahhab and Qutb‘s

claims that all those who do not follow jihadist ideology are kuffr. Those following this narrative of

takfir believe that do to the disbelief of all those not aligned with the GJM, all non-GJM individuals

are apostates and legitimate targets for jihad.

While GJM strategists and members of al-Qaeda Central unanimously support of the pragmatic

narrative of takfir, the GJM‘s decentralized organizational structure does not guarantee the movement

49

will follow this interpretation. GJM strategists have outlined two global operational strategies for the

GJM—Global Insurgency and Decentralized Resistance—which both maintain a largely decentralized

organizational structure. The general consensus among GJM strategists is that the movement must

maintain a certain level of decentralization in order to avoid penetration by outside security forces.

However, the lack of mechanisms for al-Qaeda Central to control target selection by disparate elements

of the movement means that each dimension of the GJM may adopt whichever narrative of takfir fits

their individual interests.

The case of al-Qaeda in Iraq is a superb example of a group with organizational structures

similar to that of both a Global Insurgency and a Decentralized Resistance, choosing its own definition

of takfir to fit the group‘s provincial interests. Initially, and regardless of al-Qaeda Central‘s interests,

AQI followed a doctrine of takfir which deemed Iraqi Shiites kuffr because the group‘s leader, Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi, viewed the disdain for the Shia a non-negotiable aspect of jihadist ideology. After

the death of Zarqawi and the decentralization of AQI into autonomous cells, local cell commanders

began to practice takfir on other Sunni insurgents. This doctrinal change stemmed both from the

ideological beliefs of local commanders, as well as the encouraging affect to do so of GJM ideology as

a whole. As elements of the GJM find local resistance to the implementation of Sharia and their

puritanical interpretation of Islam, insurgent groups and cells are encouraged to deem the resistors as

kuffar and begin to target them.

5.2 Secondary Question: What divisions or fissures within the GJM

become apparent through the study of the GJM’s doctrine of takfir?

This study has identified two primary lines of division within today‘s GJM. The first of these

divisions is based on how individuals within the GJM view the purpose of their jihad and their

violence. The first group views jihad as a tool for the larger strategic objective of rebuilding the

Islamic Caliphate and ridding the word of kuffr. This focus on strategic goals allows for a partial

50

moderation of jihadist ideology, as this group understands that a literal adherence to Salafism,

Wahhabism, or jihadist ideology more broadly will lead to the loss of support from the mainstream

Muslims whom the GJM needs to appeal to. Baldly, this group prioritizes achieving strategic goals

over strict adherence to jihadist ideology. The second group within the GJM consists of individuals

who view the strict adherence to jihadist ideology as the primary purpose of their jihad. While not

nihilistic—they too hope to achieve the movement‘s strategic goals—this second group finds their

purpose not in the achievement of the GJM‘s objectives, but rather in simply following the ideology

which gives them their jihadist identity.

The second fissure within the GJM which emerged in this study was whether individuals in the

GJM preference global or local concerns. In both of the examined currents of jihadist strategic thought,

strategists claim that the GJM must maintain global reach by either supporting local GJM-linked

insurgencies, or through the broad support of decentralized cells around the globe. An inherent

problem with such a globalized and decentralized movement is that while some individuals will base

their strategies around achieving the GJM‘s broad global objectives, some GJM-affiliated groups and

cells will be enticed to formulate their strategies based on local concerns. AQI‘s increased targeting of

Shiites in 2005 is a prime example of such a division. While the broad targeting of civilian Muslims in

Iraq was detrimental to the GJM as a whole, it was perceived as a strategically useful tactic for AQI

locally.

5.3 Secondary Question: What insights can be drawn for possible

“counter-jihadist” strategies?

It is clear from this study that the GJM‘s ideology is self-destructive. As Fareed Zakaria notes,

today‘s GJM ―lack[s] answers to the problems of the modern world‖ and does not hold ―a worldview

that can satisfy the aspirations of modern men and women (2009).‖ The inability to control the

narrative of takfir and violent targeting in the movement has proven devastating for the GJM, as local

51

populations turn against GJM-related elements due to the irreconcilable differences between the

worldviews of mainstream Muslims and even the most moderate of jihadists. Therefore the goal of any

―counter-jihadist‖ strategy should be to exacerbate these self-destructive tendencies while exploiting

the aforementioned fissures within the movement itself.

Based on this study, a concentrated public diplomacy and strategic communications campaign

against the GJM‘s ideology should be the cornerstone of any counter-jihadist strategy. The goal of

such a strategy should be the isolation of jihadists from the wider community of Muslims, primarily

targeting young Salafi youth who are prone to sympathizing with the movement. The campaign should

focus on the fundamentalist narrative of takfir within the GJM, and how it has resulted in the deaths of

Muslims around the globe. This campaign should explain the detrimental affect elements of the GJM

have had on local populations by highlighting the savagery of AQI in Anbar as well as historical cases

such as the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria. Even non GJM-aligned Islamic insurgent groups should

be targeted in this campaign, through the display of the incompatible interests of global jihadists and

local movements. Non-Muslims should tread carefully in implementing this strategy due to a deficit of

legitimacy for non-Muslims commenting on Islam. Western countries should therefore not lecture

Muslims on their religion, but rather communicate the failings of jihadist ideology, and advertise

condemnations of the GJM by other Muslims, particularly Salafist scholars and clerics.

5.4 Future Research

The field of terrorism and political violence research would benefit from further inquiries

into the nexus of jihadist ideology, strategy, and operations. Subsequent studies would be wise to

focus on various other case studies, examining the doctrine of takfir as practiced by other GJM

elements such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and jihadists

at the cellular level. Furthermore, studies may examine other aspects of jihadist ideology—such as

52

al-wala' wa-l-bara’—and how these doctrines affect jihadist strategy and operations. There is also a

gap in the literature regarding the doctrine of takfir as practiced by irredentist jihadists such as the

Taliban. A comparative study of jihadist ideology‘s affects on different types of jihadist groups—i.e.

irredentist versus global—would also be analytically useful.

53

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Appendix 1

Glossary

Al-Qaeda Central: Remaining senior leadership of al-Qaeda likely based in Waziristan. While their

ability to coordinate, command, and call off attacks is questioned, they are highly influential ideologues

and propagandists.

Fatwa: Formal legal opinion or decision made by an Islamic scholar

Hadith: The specific narrative reports of what the Prophet Muhammad said or did, or of his taci

approval of something said or done in his presence.

Jahiliyah- The era preceding Islam, referred to by Muslims as a period of ―ignorance‖ about

monotheism and divine law.

Jihad: Literally means ―to struggle‖ or ―to strive‖ in Arabic; has two separate connotations. ―Greater

Jihad‖ refers to the inward struggle to be a better Muslim. The ―lesser jihad‖ is an external struggle to

defend Islam.

Kuffar: Disbeliever (Kuffr-disbelief)

Salafi A Muslim who follows the ―pious ancestors‖ and calls for a return to the Koran and Sunna as

the authentic basis for Muslim life. While most jihadists are Salafis, not all Salafis are jihadists.

Sharia: Ideal Islamic law

Takfir: The act of charging someone of unbelief (kuffr) and deeming them an apostate and therefore a

legitimate target of violence for jihadists.

Ummah: Refers to the worldwide Islamic community often reffred to by Islamists and jihadists