tilly, charles, terror, terrorism, terrorists [2004]

7/26/2019 TILLY, Charles, Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists [2004]

1/10

Terror, Terrorism, TerroristsAuthor(s): Charles TillyReviewed work(s):Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium (Mar., 2004),pp. 5-13Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3648955.

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2/10

Terror,

errorism,

errorists*

CHARLES

TILLY

Columbia

University

The terms

error,

errorism,

nd terroristo

not

dentifyausally

oherentnd

distinct

social

phenomena

ut

trategies

hat ecur cross

wide

variety f

actors

nd

political

situations.

ocial scientists ho

eify

he

erms

onfuse

hemselves

nd render

disservice

to

public

discussion. he

U.S.

government's

wn

catalogsof

terrorist

vents

ctually

support

oth laims.

TERROR, TERRORISM,

TERRORISTS

Some vivid terms

erve

political

and normative nds

admirably

despite hindering

description nd explanationof the social phenomenaat whichtheypoint.Those

double-edged

erms

nclude

riot,

njustice,

nd

civil

society,

ll of them

politically

powerful

ut

analytically

lusive

Moore

1979;

Vermunt nd Steensma

1991;

Cohen

and

Arato

1992;

Brass

1996;

Herzog

1998;

Plotz

2000;

Schweingruber

000; Edwards,

Foley,

and

Diani

2001;

Ferree

et

al.

2002).

They

also include

terror, errorism,

nd

terrorists.

his brief

urvey

hows

how and

why.

In

his address o

Congress

nine

days

after he

devastating

ttacks

f

September

1,

2001,

U.S.

President

George

W.

Bush

declaredthat our war

on

terror

egins

with

al-Qaida,

but

t does not end

there. t willnot end

until

very

errorist

roup

of

global

reach has been

found,

topped,

nd defeated

State Department

002a:i).

Echoed

Secretary f State Colin L. Powell in May 2002: In thisglobal campaignagainst

terrorism,

o

country

as the

uxury

f

remaining

n the idelines. here re no sidelines.

Terrorists

espect

o

limits,

eographic

r moral.

The

frontlinesre

everywhere

nd the

stakes re

high.

Terrorism ot

only

kills

eople.

t also threatens emocratic

nstitutions,

undermines

conomies,

nd destabilizes

egions

State Department

002a:iii).

n the

words f

the

president

nd

the

ecretary

f

state,

error,errorism,

nd terroristsecome

inseparable oncepts,

oherent

ntities,

fficacious

ctors,

nd enemies o

be

eradicated.

Students f

politicalprocesses

nd

collective

iolence

certainly

hould

pay

atten-

tion

to such

reification;

t exerts

significant

nfluence n world

politics.

But

they

should not

incorporate

he

categories

wholesale into their own

descriptions

nd

explanations f thepoliticalprocessesat hand. In particular, ocial scientistswho

attempt

o

explain

udden

attacks

on

civilian

argets

hould doubt the existence f a

distinct,

oherent lass of

actors

(terrorists)

ho

specialize

n a

unitary

form of

political

ction

terror)

nd

thus hould

establish

separate

variety

f

politics terror-

ism).

This

essay

argues

the

following oints

nstead:

*

Theword error

oints

o a

widely

ecurrentut

mprecisely

ounded

olitical

trategy.

*

We

can

reasonably

define hat

strategy

s

asymmetrical

eploymentf

threats

and

violence

gainst

nemies

sing

means that

all

outside

he

orms

fpolitical

struggleoutinelyperating

within

ome current

egime.

*Address

orrespondence

o: 514

Fayerweather

all,

MC

2552,

Columbia

University,

ew

York,

NY

10027;

email:

[email protected].

SociologicalTheory

2:1

March

2004

?

American

ociological

Association.

307

New

York

Avenue

NW,

Washington,

C

20005-4701

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3/10

6

SOCIOLOGICAL

THEORY

*

A

great

variety

f

individuals

nd

groups ngage

n

terror,

hus

defined,

rom

time o

time,

most

often

lternating

error ith

ther

olitical

trategies

r

with

political

naction.

*

Groups

and

networks

pecializing

n terror nd no otherforms

f

political

action

do sometimes

orm,

ut

they ypically

emain nstable

nd

ephemeral.

*

Most

groups

and networks hat

engage

in terror

verlap

extensively

with

government-employed

nd

government-backed

pecialists

n

coercion-armies,

police,

militias,

aramilitaries,

nd the

ike.

*

Even

when

they rganize

n

opposition

o

existing overnments,

pecialists

n

coercion

typically

dopt

forms

of

organization,

xternal

connections,

nd

sources

of

supply

esembling

hose

of

government-employed

pecialists.

*

Most

uses ofterror

ctually

ccur s

complements

r as

byproducts

f

truggles

n

which

articipants-often

ncluding

he

o-called

errorists-are

ngaging

imul-

taneously

r

successively

n othermore outine

arieties

f

political

laim

making.

*

Terror

s a

strategy

herefore

anges

from

1)

intermittentctions

by

members

of

groups

that are

engaged

n

wider

political

struggles

o

(2)

one

segment

n

the modus

operandi

of

durably organized specialists

n

coercion,

ncluding

government-employed

nd

government-backed

pecialists

n

coercion

to

(3)

thedominant

ationale or

distinct,

ommitted

roups

nd networks

f activists.

*

Despite

the

publicity

t has received

ecently,

ariety 3)

accounts

for

highly

variable

but

usually

very

small share of all

the terror hat occurs

in the

contemporary

orld.

In fact, he StateDepartment's wnreportingnworld ffairs enerallyonfirmshis

argument.

he

State

Department

racks

the

world's

vindictive iolence

from

two

distinct

erspectives.

Mandated

by Congress,

t

issues

separate

annual

reports

n

human

rights

nd

on

global

terrorism. nderthe dministration

f John

.

Kennedy,

as

Congress ppropriated

unds

or

foreign

id it also

required

he

xecutive ranch

o

report

n

human

rights

iolations.

n its current

ersion,

he annual

human

rights

report

draws information

rom

American

embassies across the world

on

local

instances f

government-backed

orture,

ruel

punishment,

rregular

etention,

ras-

tic civil iberties

estrictions,

ompulsory

abor,

child

abor,

and related buses.

Issued

n

May

2002,

the State

Department's

tatement

n human

rights

uring

001

made an obligatoryeferenceo fightingerrorism,oughly quating overnmentshat

violatehuman

ights

ith

overnments

hat

romote

nternationalerror.

t

declared

hat

its

ountry

eports

apture

a world till

eeling

nd

reacting

o the

vents

f ast

Septem-

ber.Yet the

reports'

entralmission emains

he

ame

to

give

voiceto thosewho

have

beendenied

he

freedomsnd

rights rovided

or n theUniversal eclaration

n Human

Rights.

he

reports

onfirmhat

he

battle

f deas

between

hosewho

uppress

emocracy

and human

rights

nd thosewho would

see

them lourish emains ar

from

ver.

Only

through

he

promotion

nd

protection

f

human

ights

nd fundamentalreedomsan

the

international

ommunity

e securefrom he

scourge

f

terrorism

State Department

2002b:1).

Nevertheless,

he

2001

report

n human

rights,

ike ts

predecessors,

ocused

onways hatgovernmentsistreatortolerate hemistreatmentf)their wn citizens.

The State

Department's

nnual human

rights eport omplements

he

workofsuch

organizations

s

Human

Rights

Watch and FreedomHouse

by cataloguing pecific

abuses one

country

t

a

time

see

Human

Rights

Watch

2000;

Karatnycky

000).

Each

one ofthese

gencies

ssues an annual

nventory

f

grim overnmental

ctions nd of



4/10

TERROR, TERRORISM,

TERRORISTS

7

governmentalomplicity

ith

ther

eople's

ssaults n citizens.

y

no means

ll

of

the

abuses

they

eport

ualify

s

violence

n

the

brute

orce

ense

of

mmediatenfliction

f

physical

amage.

Only

a

minority

f

the

violent

vents,

urthermore,

ualifies

s

terror

defined s

asymmetrical

eployment

f

threatsnd violence

gainst

nemies

sing

means

that all

utside he

orms f

political

truggleoutinelyperating

ithin

he urrent

egime.

Butall ofthem onstituteignificanthreatso the uality f ifen the ffendingountries.

Since he

1980s,

he

State

Department

lso sends

Congress

n

annual

document alled

Patterns

f

Global

Terrorism

Johnson

001).

The

State

Department

efines errorisms

politically

otivated iolence

erpetrated

gainst

oncombatant

argets y

subnational

groups

r

clandestine

gents, sually

ntended

o

nfluencen audience

Ruby

2002:10).

Any

such definition as the

disadvantage

f

requiring

nformation

n

motivations

nd

intentions;

n

fact,

olid vidence

n motivations

nd

ntentions

arely

ecomes vailable

for

ollective iolence.

till,

he

report'smplicit

election

rinciplesingle

ut attacks

n

noncombatant

argets y

other-than-regularly-constituted

ational

military

orces,

spe-

cially

when

omeonebroadcasts

olitical

laimson

behalf f

the

ttackers. he

annual

reports ctuallydescribe wo differentinds of events: 1) whatthey all significant

terrorist

ncidents,

ttacks

heir

pecialists egard

s

crossing

nternationalines-because

the

attackers ame

from he

outside the

country,

ecause

they

received

ubstantial

backing

from

utside,

r

because

they

ssaulted

foreigners;

nd

(2)

other ttacks

by

domestic

roups

n

domestic

argets.

On

a

fairly

mall

scale,

the State

Department's

ocally

knowledgeable

bservers

probably eport

he bulk of

qualifying

ctions

n

the first

ategory

or he

world

s a

whole.

Those are

the vents or

which

hey upply

ynopses

ne

by

one and

make

nnual

counts.

They urely

miss he

vast

majority

fthe

world'sviolent vents

n

category

(cf.

Bonneuil nd Auriat

2000;

Davenport

2000;

Martinez

001;

Tilly2003).

Figure

1

dis-

plays he rend feventsn thefirstategoryrom 980through001 StateDepartment

2000,

2001,

2002a). Clearly,

he

overall rend an

downward.

he State

Department's

count

of international

erroristncidents

eached

highpoint

n

1988

and

generally

declined hereafter.he number

fdeaths n

attacks

ose

from 33 to 405 to

an estimated

3,547

including

,000

deaths

ssigned

o

September

1)

from

999

o

2001.

Nevertheless,

700

600

500

.

400

.E

300

E

200

100

0

1980 1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

Years

Figure

1.

Total international

errorist

ttacks,

1980-2001.



5/10

8 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the346

attacks

f2001

ay

far

elow he

frequencies

f

he

1980s,

nd theoverall

evels

f

casualties

eclined

s wellfrom

he 1980s

nward.

The similarly

efined

nders-Sandler

(2002:161)

eries

or

eath-dealing

vents

lone

from 970

to 1999

hows

second

ethal

peak

during

he

arly

990s,

nd a

steep

ecline

hereafter.)

rom he ater

990s,

round

half f all

tallied

ttacks onsisted ot

of

njuries

o

persons

ut of bombsdirected

t

oil

pipelines, speciallypipelines arrying il northward o the United Statesthrough

Colombia. That fact

n

tself emonstrateshat

tate

Department

pecialistsnterpreted

the

political

motivation

equired

y

their

efinition

f

terror

ather

roadly.

When

hey

id voice

demands,

ttackers escribed

n the

reports

most

ften

alled

for

autonomy

r

independence

or

ome

subnational

opulation

r

region,

eplacement

f

existing overnments,

r redress f

wrongs

one

to

some

organization.

n the

whole,

internationalerroristncidentsdentified

y

State

Department

bservers ose and

fell

with

the

activity

f

independence

movements.

Whether

he

minorrise that occurred

during

he

ater

990s

epresents

new ort

f

political ampaign

emains o be seen.

The

overall

rend

till uns

downward.

Unsurprisingly,heStateDepartment's ummaries f international erroristnci-

dents

give

special

attention o attacks on

American nterests-American

itizens,

American

ervice

personnel

ttacked outside of

their

normal

military

ctivity,

ro-

perty

wned

by

Americans

r

by

theU.S.

government,

nd U.S.

territory

tself.

hus,

the

airborne attacks of

September

11 received

xceptional

ttention

n

the

year's

report

but still

counted as

just

4

of the

year's

346

significant

erroristncidents

(State

Department

002a).

The

previous

year's

report

had

singled

out

South

Asia

explicitly

s

a

base

for

terrorism

irected

oward

U.S.

interests;

ad

called

special

attention

o

the

Afghan

Taliban's

provision

f

safe

haven for

Osama

bin

Ladin

and

his

network;

ad linked

he ethal

ombing

f the

U.S.S.

Cole

in

Yemen

October

000)

tobinLadin; and had added, ThegovernmentfPakistan ncreased tssupport o the

Taliban

and continuedts

upport

o militant

roups

ctive

n

ndian-held

ashmir,

uch

as the

Harakat

ul-Mujahadin

HUM),

some

of which

engaged

n

terrorism

State

Department

001:Asia

Overview

).

As mirroredn its annual

reports

n the

subject,

then,

he

State

Department's

orking

efinitionf

terror

ingles

ut violence

ommitted

by

relatively

ell-connected

roups

nd directed

gainst olitically

ignificantargets

f

other

nationalities,

specially

f

American

nationality.

errorists

re

the

people

who

perform

uch

cts,

nd terrorism

s thefact f their

erforming

t.

TO DEFINE TERROR

Although

efinitionss such

cannot

be true r

false,

n social science

seful efinitions

should

point

o detectable

henomena

hat xhibit

ome

degree

f causal

coherence-in

principle

ll instances hould

display

ommon

properties

hat

embody

or result

rom

similar

ause-effectelations.

y

that

criterion,

hat

violent vents

ctually ught

to

qualify

s

terrorism?

eginning

ith

itations rom

he

1790s,

he

Oxford

nglish

ic-

tionary ives

wodefinitionsor

errorism:

1) governmenty

ntimidations directed

and

carried ut

by

the

party

n

power

n

France

during

heRevolution f

1789-94

..

and

(2) policy

ntended o

strikewith

error hose

gainst

whom t

s

adopted.

Both

definitionsoint o the symmetricaleploymentfthreats nd violence gainst nemies

outside

heforms

f

political

truggle outinely

perating

ithinhe urrent

egime.

Theword terrortself

ntered he

West's

politicalvocabulary

s

a

name forFrench

revolutionaries'ctions

gainst

heir omestic

nemies

n

1793 and 1794. treferredo

governmental

epression,

most

directly

n theform

f executions.About

17,000

egal



6/10

TERROR, TERRORISM,

TERRORISTS

9

executionsoccurred

under

the

Reign

of

Terror,

nd

something

ike

23,000

more

occurred

llegally Greer

1935).

Some

scholarsalso

argue

that

deaths n

the fierce

Vendee

civil

wars of 1793-1795 houldcountas

consequences

f the

Reign

of

Terror;

their nclusionwould

bring

he total

up

to

the

vicinity

f

200,000

dead

on all sides

including

egular roops

Gerard

1999;

Guenniffey000:234-35).

At either

xtreme

f

theestimates, istorians f the French Revolution ontinue o think f theoriginal

Reign

of

Terror

s

state-organized

r

state-backed

isitation f violenceon France's

dissident

itizenry uring

he

two central

years

of

radical

revolutionary

ower.

Since

the French

Revolution,

he

word terror

as

expanded

n

scope.

Writers

n

terror

ontinue o use it for

governmental

ntimidation

f

citizens,

s

in

Joseph

talin's

use of executions o

still

dissentwithin

he Soviet

Union

(Mayer

2000).

But

they

lso

use the

term

frequently

o

designate

landestine ttackson

governmental

argets y

domestic

pponents

uch as

Basque separatists,

he Irish

RepublicanArmy,

nd

Sri

Lanka's Liberation

igers

f

Tamil

Eelam

(Schmid

001).

At

times,

urthermore,

uch

civilwar

practices

s ethnic

leansing

nd

genocide

eceive he

designation

error

e.g.,

Taylor 1999).Thus,theterm prawls crossa widerangeof human ruelties.

Amid

the

sprawl,

s

a

coherent

phenomenon

t work?No useful

generalization

covers ll thedifferentorts f

political

nteraction

or

which

bservers,

nalysts,

nd

participants

ometimes se

theterm

error,

uch ess

for

erroristsnd

terrorism.

ut

we

can

identify

ome order n

the

phenomenon

y

means of four

teps:

1) noticing

that a recurrent

trategy

f

intimidation

ccurs

widely

n contentious

olitics

and

corresponds

pproximately

o what

many

people

mean

by

terror;

2) recognizing

hat

a

wide

variety

f

ndividuals,

roups,

nd networks ometimes

mploy

hat

trategy;

(3) relating

he

trategyystematically

o other

orms

f

political truggle

roceeding

in

the same

settings

nd

populations;

and

(4) seeing

that

specialists

n

coercion

rangingfromgovernment mployeesto bandits sometimesdeploy terrorunder

certain

political

circumstances,

sually

with far more

devastating

ffects

han

the

terror

perations

f

nonspecialists.

Terror s

a

Strategy

Asymmetricaleployment

f

threats

nd

violence

gainst

enemies

utside the forms

of

political truggle outinely

perating

within he current

egime

oes have a crude

logic

of its

own.

In

addition

to

whatever

arm

t inflicts

irectly,

t

sends

signals-

signals

that

the

target

s

vulnerable,

hat the

perpetrators

xist,

nd

that

the

per-

petrators ave thecapacity o strike gain.The signals ypicallyeach three ifferent

audiences: he

targets

hemselves,

otential

llies of the

perpetrators,

nd

third

arties

that

might

cooperate

with one

or

the

other.

Although

some users of

terror

for

example, minority

f

19th-century

narchists)

perate

n the

heory

hatdestruction

of

evil

objects

is a

good

in

itself,

most terror

upports

demands for

recognition,

redress,

utonomy,

r

transfers

f

power.

Considered as

a

strategy,

errorworks

best when

it

alters or

inhibitsthe

target's disapproved

behavior,

fortifies he

perpetrators' tanding

with

potential

llies,

and movesthird

arties

toward

greater

cooperation

with he

perpetrators'rganization

nd announced

program.

MultipleUsesofTerror

FromMafiosi to

ruthless

overnments,

eople

who

operate

protection

ackets

nter-

mittently

eploy

error

gainst

nemies nd uncertain

lients

Gambetta

1993;

Stanley

1996;

Varese

2001;

Volkov

2000,

2002).

Whether r

not

they operate

large-scale



7/10

10 SOCIOLOGICAL

THEORY

protection

ackets,

repressive overnments

requently pply

terror

o

threatening

minorities.

Weak,

beleaguered

overnmentsommonly dopt

the

strategy

f

exemp-

lary punishment:

nflicting

errible

ublic

retaliationon those few enemies

they

manage

to

seize

with he

announced hreat f

visiting

imilar

unishments

n

others

who dare

to

challenge

hem.But

dissidents

eeking

utonomy,

triking

t their

ivals,

or trying o bringdown governmentsikewise ometimes ngage in asymmetrical

deployment

f

threats nd violence

against

enemies

by

means that

fall outsidethe

forms f

political

truggle outinely

perating

within he current

egime.

During

he

ast

few

decades,

religious

nd

ethnic ctivists ave

been

by

far hemost

frequent

ongovernmentaltrategists

f terror

see, e.g.,

Kakar

1996;

Gurr

2000;

Beissinger

001;

Horowitz

2001).

Sometimes

hey

have

demanded

utonomy,

ome-

times

hey

have

sought

ontrol f

existing

overnments,

ut often

nough

they

have

struck

irectly

t their

eligious

nd ethnic

ivals.The terrible wandan

genocide

of

1994

pivoted ultimately

n

ethnic

control of the

Rwandan

state,

and

despite

the

slaughter

f

hundreds

f

thousands

of

Tutsi,

ended

with

seizureof

state

power

by

Tutsi-dominated ilitaryorces.The genocide tself ctivated ll thesedifferentses

of terror

Prunier

1995, 2001;

Des

Forges

et

al.

1999;

Taylor

1999;

Mamdani

2001;

Pillay

2001;

Uvin

2001).

Terror

nd Other

orms

of

Struggle

As these

varied

examples

uggest,

he

trategy

f terror

ppears

across a

wide

variety

of

political

ircumstances,

n the

company

f

very

ifferentorts

f

political

truggle.

Attacks

f

rish

Protestant nd Catholic

activists n each other

nd

on

governmental

targets,

or

instance,

frequently

ollow the

strategy

f

terror,

ut

they

generally

intersect ithotherforms fnegotiation t international, ational, nd local levels

(Jarman

997;

Keogh

2001).

In

many

parts

of

the

world,

pecializedmilitary

orces-

governmental, ongovernmental,

nd

antigovernmental-frequently

ngage

n

kid-

napping,

murder,

nd

mutilation

n

addition

to their ccasional

pitched

battles

with

other

rmed

forces.

To

take

just

one

case,

during

the

late

1990s

the

self-styled

llied

Democratic

Forces

(ADF)

ravaged

the Rwenzori

mountain

region

of

western

Uganda,

brutal-

izing

and

killing

ivilians and

looting.

Hundreds of civilianswere

killed

n ADF

raids and

ambushes on

unprotected

ivilian

homes

throughout

he

year.

Some of

those

killed

by

the ADF

were

mutilated,

ometimes

y

beheading.

Civilians,

both

adults and children,were abductedduringADF raids to serve as portersor for

forcedrecruitmentnto

the rebel

army Human

Rights

Watch

2000:84).

Because

armed forces

depend

on

arms,

quipment,

ood,

and

pay

even when

they

re

living

off the

land,

such

terror-wielding

rmies

thrive

especially

where

they

can

seize

control of

income-generating

esources such

as

drugs,

timber,

diamonds,

and

other

minerals.

They

then

often

adopt

terror o

maintain

control of the crucial

resources

rather

han

concentrating

n the

seizure

of

state

power.

Extensive

on-

nections with

emigrant

diasporas

magnify

hose

effects,

most

likely

because

the

exiles both

provide

external

upport

for

rebels and offer

onduits for

contraband

into and out of

rebel

territoryCollier

and

Hoeffler

001).

Terror

nd

Specialists

n

Coercion

The

prominence

f

organized

rmed forces n

certain

ypes

of terror

ends tself o

analytic

onfusion. t is

all too

easy

toconflate

error-deploying

overnments,

rmies,



8/10

TERROR, TERRORISM,

TERRORISTS

11

militias,

aramilitaries,

nd

rebels

with

onspiratorial

ealots.

The

State

Department's

general

statements

bout human

rights

nd

terror

n 2001 featured

ust

such

a

conflation.

We

actually

need a twofolddistinction:

irst etween

violent

pecialists

and

others,

nd

then

between ctors who

deploy

terrorwithin heir wn

operating

territoriesnd

thosewho direct t elsewhere.

Figure2 schematizes he two distinctions,ssigning haracteristicames to the

four

corners f

a

two-dimensional

pace.

Autonomiststand for all those

politically

active

groups

whose

members ometimes

aunch

terror ttackson

authorities,

ym-

bolic

objects,

rivals,

or

stigmatized opulations

on their

own

territories

ithout

becoming

urably

rganized pecialists

n

coercion.

Zealots

maintain

imilar

onnec-

tions witheach other

but

commit heirviolent cts

outside of their

own

base

terri-

tories;

they

include

long-term

xiles who returnhome

to attack their

enemies.

Governmental,

ongovernmental,

nd

antigovernmental

ilitiasmaintain

nduring

organizations

f

coercive

pecialists

nd

exercise

error

within

heirbase territories.

Finally,

conspirators

rganize

specialized striking

orces

for

operations

way

from

base. (Terror-inflictingrmiesoperating broad also fit nto this corner f thedia-

gram,

ut

they

trike venmore

rarely

hando mobile

organizations

f

conspirators.)

The

diagram

s

a whole summarizes

his

paper's

main

point:

A

remarkable

rray

of

actors

sometimes

dopt

terror s

a

strategy,

nd therefore

o

coherent et

of cause-

effect

ropositions

an

explain

terrorism

s

a

whole.

The

crude

typology istinguishes

ourrather ifferent

orts of relationsbetween

the authors

and

victims

f

terror,

ence

four differentarieties f

politics.

t

also

emphasizes

crucial

fact bout

actually

xisting

error:

ery

ittle f

t

actually

ccurs

in

the

diagram's

upper-right-hand

orner-where

we

find

pecialists

n

coercion

who

operate

outsidetheir

ome bases. Most

terror ccurs

on

the

perpetrators'

wn home

territory,nd nonspecialists-zealots-inflict a significanthare of the terror hat

does occur

outside

of

home

territory.

he fact does not diminish

he

horror

of

September

1. But t

does warn

against

nalyzing

ll

terror

s if

t consisted f

closer

or

moredistant

pproximations

o that

errible eries

f attacks

n

theUnited

States.

Properly

nderstood,

error

s

a

strategy,

ot

a

creed.

Terrorists

ange

across

a wide

Specialists

MILITIAS

CONSPIRATORS

Degree

f

Specialization

n

Coercion

Nonspecialists

AUTONOMISTS ZEALOTS

Home

Territory

OutsideHome

Territory

Major

ocusof

Violent

ttacks

Figure

2.

A

crude

typology

f

terror-wielding

roups

nd networks.



9/10

12 SOCIOLOGICAL

THEORY

spectrum

f

organizations,

ircumstances,

nd

beliefs.

Terrorism s not a

single

causally

coherent

henomenon.

No

social scientist

an

speak responsibly

s

though

it were.

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