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Published as “Theravada Buddhism and Buddhist Nationalism: Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia,

and Thailand,” The Review of Faith and International Affairs, 14.4: 42-52, 2016.

THERAVADA BUDDHISM AND BUDDHIST NATIONALISM:

SRI LANKA, MYANMAR, CAMBODIA, AND THAILAND

By Charles Keyes

Professor Emeritus of Anthropology and International Studies

University of Washington

Abstract:

Fundamental to the teaching of the Buddha is the recognition that although it should be

the goal of his followers to seek ultimate transcendence of the world, following the path

to Nirvana (Pali, Nibbana) has to take place within the world. This has meant that

Buddhists from the very beginning of the religion have had to engage rather than shun

politics, and these politics are shaped by the societies Buddhists live in. This paper

examines how Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand

has shaped relations with Muslim minorities in these countries.

In a piece first presented on the Australian Broadcasting System’s “Religion and Ethics”

section Jarni Blakkarly (2015) observed that “It does not take much knowledge of Buddhism to

realize just how irreconcilable the thinking of Buddhist extremists groups is with what the

Buddha Gotama taught and the way Buddhism is practiced throughout most of the world.”

Indeed, of all the world religions, Buddhism is almost always characterized as being a religion

of peace, tolerance, and compassion. Blakkarly’s conclusion – here prompted by calls by senior

Buddhist monks not only in Sri Lanka, but also in Myanmar and Thailand to purge their

societies of Muslims – makes it seem that violence has not been a characteristic of Buddhist

societies. But, in fact, violence justified by religion has probably existed since Buddhism first

became a religion supported by state authorities.

Fundamental to the teaching of the Buddha is the recognition that although it should be

the goal of his followers to seek ultimate transcendence of the world, following the path to

Nirvana (Pali, Nibbana) has to take place within the world. This has meant that Buddhists from

the very beginning of the religion have had to engage rather than shun politics, and these

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politics are shaped by the societies Buddhists live in. There is no concept in Buddhism

comparable to the Islamic ummah, or community of all believers, or to the Christian catholic in

its basic sense of a universal church. Buddhists have lived and still live within very different

types of societies.1

Today those states in which the majority of their populations adhere to Buddhism are

mainly found in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos) and South Asia (Sri

Lanka and Bhutan).2 Other than Bhutan, the majority of these Buddhists follow the tradition of

Buddhism usually labeled Theravada, that is, the tradition of Buddhism whose scriptures are

written in Pali rather than Sanskrit and whose primary exemplars are members of the sangha –

the bhikkhu or Buddhist monks who have subjected themselves to the ancient ‘discipline’

(vinaya) first laid down by the Buddha and who are led by senior monks (thera).

Buddhism began with the life of the Buddha. Most followers of Buddhism accept that

Prince Siddhartha, the future Buddha, was born in 623/624 BCE and after achieving

enlightenment in his early thirties died at the age of 80 in 543/544 BCE, the later date being

taken as the beginning of the Buddhist era.3 Although the Buddha taught a way, the dhamma4

that was to make it possible for human beings to gain transcendence of the suffering (dukkha)

inherent in being in the world (samsara), and to realize the ‘otherworld’ of Nibbana, he also

taught that while traversing the path humans must still remain in the world. Thus, the question

of what stance the Buddha and his followers should take toward the world is fundamental to the

religion.

Theravada Buddhism has its origins in Sri Lanka well before the thirteenth century, but

it was not until the period from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries that it became the

fundamental basis for political orders in both Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. It was during this

period that Buddhist monks led a ‘revolution’ that transformed the religion of a small elite into a

popular religion. This was accomplished in two fundamental ways: first, the sangha, the order

of monks, was established in villages as well as existing in centers of power; second, the

dhamma was represented in vernacular literatures and embodied in rituals practiced in villages

as well as in monasteries.

The followers of Theravada Buddhism credit King Aśoka, who ruled much of India in

the third century B.C.E., not only with the spread of Buddhism to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia,

where this tradition of Buddhism became dominant, but also with the establishment of a model

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of a Buddhist sociopolitical order. This model, known as the “Two Wheels of Dhamma,” makes

the laity, and especially a lay ruler, as responsible as the sangha for the perpetuation and

dissemination of the teachings of the Buddha (see Reynolds 1972).

The Aśokan model was emulated in all Theravadin societies, although it only became

fully institutionalized in the period between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries (see

Gombrich 1976; Tambiah 1976). During this period, rulers of Buddhist kingdoms provided an

example for all laypersons by offering wealth to support the sangha. The monarch also

intervened from time to time to ensure that the sangha adhered properly to Buddhist discipline

and to prevent schisms. In return, the sangha participated in royally sponsored rites that

conferred legitimacy on the monarch.

The kingdoms ruled by Buddhist monarchs between the thirteenth and nineteenth

centuries were hardly without conflict. The island of Sri Lanka was beset by almost perpetual

wars throughout this period, and on at least two occasions the political turmoil led to the nearly

total disappearance of the sangha (Gombrich 1976; Malalgoda 1976). In mainland Southeast

Asia, following the collapse of the empires centered on Pagan and Angkor in the thirteenth

century, there was almost constant warfare between the Burman and Siamese empires and

between these empires and the smaller principalities that surrounded them (see Prince Damrong

Rajanubhab 2001; Sunait Chutintharanond 1997). The conflicts in South and Southeast Asia

only came to an end (at least temporarily) in the nineteenth century with the British conquest of

Sri Lanka and Burma and the incorporation of Laos and Cambodia into French Indochina. The

colonial era proved to be the crucible for forging new relationships between Buddhism and

power.

Beginning in Sri Lanka in the eighteenth century, lower Burma in the early nineteenth

century, and throughout the nineteenth century in South and Southeast Asia, Theravada

Buddhist traditions were challenged by new political and economic influences associated with

the expansion of Western colonialism and capitalism, and by new cultural influences associated

with Christianity and Western science. Taken together, these influences created a crisis of

authority for both the rulers and the populace in the countries of this region. Responses to that

crisis resituated Theravada Buddhism within a modern world.

The colonial polities were all what J.S. Furnivall termed ‘plural societies,’ that is,

societies “comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without

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mingling, in one political unit” (Furnivall 1939, 443).5 The ‘without mingling’ characteristic led

the post-colonial states that succeeded the colonial ones to all adopt policies that sought to

transform colonial ‘subjects’ into ‘citizens’ of the nation without legally-recognized distinctions

based on ethnicity, race, or religion. In fact, however, such distinctions were not erased. In each

of the countries where Buddhism is the religion of the majority, ethnic and religious minorities

have struggled, sometimes violently, to assert their right to maintain their own customs and

culture.

Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka

The origins of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism can be traced to Angarika Dharmapala

(1864-1933), a lay devotee of Buddhism. He used the story of a Sri Lankan king Dutugemunu

(Duthagamani) – who reigned in the 2nd century BCE – as the justification for a religious war

with the Tamils. King Dutugemunu, the story goes, led his forces against non-Buddhists,

brandishing a spear with a relic of the Buddha embedded in it. He was accompanied by

Buddhist monks and after the battle was consoled by Buddhist saints who told him that since

those who were killed “were unbelievers and men of evil life ..., not more to be esteemed than

beasts, he had committed no sin in taking their lives” (Obeyesekere 1975, 236).6 This myth, in

Dharmapala’s retelling of it in many forms, has continued to provide a justification for a holy

war against non-Buddhists in Sri Lanka.7

When Ceylon (renamed Sri Lanka in 1972) became independent in 1948, it was a plural

society with marked diversity. While nearly 70 percent of the populace were speakers of Sinhala

and most of these were followers of Buddhism, the other 30 percent consisted of Tamil Hindus

and Tamil Muslims, other Muslims, and a small but politically significant Eurasian Christian

segment. In the first years of independence, the government, led by an English-educated elite of

diverse backgrounds, promoted a civil order in which diversity was recognized. However, after

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), became prime

minister in 1956, the situation changed dramatically. Bandaranaike, who had been educated at

Oxford, was a convert to Buddhism and, like Angarika Dharmapala, became zealous in his

linking of religion and politics. He introduced a number of new policies designed to accord a

privileged position to the Buddhist Sinhalese: first, Sinhala was recognized as the only national

language to the exclusion of English and Tamil; secondly, the national history as taught in

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government schools accentuated the history of Buddhism in the country; and lastly, the state

undertook to support Buddhism beginning with the celebration of 2,500 years of Buddhism in

1955/56. Bandaranaike had the strong support of many Buddhist monks for these policies (see

Bechert 1978).

Bandaranaike’s connection to Buddhism proved, however, to be a double-edged sword.

In 1959 he was assassinated by a monk. Although the monk was found to be insane, the

assassination was, nonetheless, the beginning of an increased association between Buddhism

and political violence in Sri Lanka.

Although Sri Lanka had long been an ethnically complex society, the primary conflict

that has its roots in the linking of Sinhalese nationalism and Buddhism has been that between

Tamils and the Sri Lankan state. The relegation of non-Buddhists to second-class citizenship in

Sri Lanka led to growing tensions within the country and finally to open conflict beginning in

the 1980s. In 1983, the Sri Lankan government either backed or tolerated a pogrom-like attack

by security forces and joined by many ordinary Sinhalese on Tamils living in the capital of

Colombo as well as in the highlands. Tamils subsequently turned in increasing numbers to a

movement led by the radical and militant Tamil Tigers (“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”).

Because the Tigers were pioneers in the use of suicide bombings and killed many more non-

combatants than Sri Lankan soldiers, they were branded a terrorist organization by India, the

U.S., and other countries as well as by the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan

government’s twenty-year war with the Tamil Tigers resulted in the death of over 65,000 people

on both sides.

In 2002 the Tigers declared a ceasefire and entered into negotiations with the Sri Lankan

government headed by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the granddaughter of

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. However, the negotiations collapsed, in part because of controversy

over the distribution of aid in Tamil areas following the Tsunami in late 2004 and then the

assassination of the country's foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar by a sniper in August

2005. President Kumaratunga was pressed by the National Buddhist Front, an organization of

many monks, to continue the war and even ban non-Buddhist NGOs from working in the

country.8

The end of the Tamil conflict would take another four years. Before this Mahinda

Rajapaksa had been elected president and vowed to use any means to defeat the Tamil rebels.

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Victory for the government came in May 2009. In the aftermath, Buddhist nationalism became

even more significant, having been the ideology that guided government forces. With the

replacement of Rajapaksa by Maithripala Sirisena in an election in 2014 the main threat to

Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism was now posited as stemming from Muslims. The tragedy of Sri

Lanka stemming from the dominance of Buddhist nationalism continued.

Buddhist Dominance in Myanmar/Burma

In Burma (today officially known as Myanmar), as in Sri Lanka, the establishment of a

colonial order by the British created a crisis of order that has yet to be fully resolved. As in Sri

Lanka, those who came to power in postcolonial Burma in 1948 sought to rule over a very

diverse population. About two-thirds of the populace, living mostly in the central “divisions” of

the country, are ethnically Burman (today officially called Bamar). Those living in the

peripheral “states” belong to such different ethnic groups as the Shan, Mon, Rakhine

(Arakanese), Karen, Karenni, Wa, Kachin, Chin, Naga, and Rohingyas.

The Burmans are overwhelmingly Buddhists, as are most of the Shan, Mon, Rakhine,

and some Karen. Buddhists constitute approximately 89-90 percent of the total population.9 The

term “Buddhist,” however, subsumes significant differences in the religious orders (gaing) to

which Buddhist monks belong as well as differences in practices among the laity. By contrast,

the majority of the Kachin, Chin, Naga, and a substantial majority of the Karen are Protestant or

Catholic Christians. The Rohingyas, living in the Rakhine (Arakan) state in an area bordering

Bangladesh, are Muslims. Other Muslims are also found in Burma among the descendants of

Indian migrants and Malays living in the Tenasserim Peninsula and from southern China. In

Burma today Muslims and Christians each constitute at least four percent of the total population

of the country.10

In addition to the indigenous peoples of Burma, hundreds of thousands of South Asians

migrated to Burma during the colonial period. They settled primarily in urban areas where new

job opportunities arose in the export economy promoted by the British. During World War II

hundreds of thousands of Indians fled, never to return. In the post-independence period the new

government instituted what could only be termed “ethnic cleansing” by compelling a large

percentage of the Indian population to leave the country. Nonetheless, many Indians remained

and today about two percent of the population of Burma are of Indian descent. A limited

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number of Chinese also settled in Burma during the colonial period, although a much larger

influx of Chinese into Burma has taken place quite recently.

The leaders of successive governments in Burma since it became independent in 1948

have based their legitimacy on demonstrating public relationships with Buddhist sacred rites

and sites – most notably with stupas thought to contain relics of the Buddha – as well as with

the sangha. From 1962, when General Ne Win seized control of the government, until 2015

Burmese governments were headed by the military. There was strong resistance to military rule

by ethnic Burmans who looked for leadership and inspiration to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the

daughter of the assassinated leader who had guided Burma to independence from Britain.

Although the National League for Democracy that coalesced around Aung San Suu Kyi won a

convincing election in 1990, it was not allowed by the Burmese military to assume power. Suu

Kyi would then be under house arrest for more than a dozen years, finally being released in

2010. Her popularity soon thereafter culminated with her election to parliament in 2012 and

then her leading the National League for Democracy in a decisive election in 2015 when the

party achieved dominance in the parliament. However, she was not allowed to become president

or prime minister owing to a law originally enacted when the military controlled the

government that prohibited her from doing so because she had been married to a foreigner and

her sons were not citizens of Myanmar.

Even though the military regime long maintained total control of power through the use

of force, its legitimacy had been rendered deeply problematic by the involvement of Buddhist

monks in protest movements, first in 1990 following the suppression of the 1988 student-led

uprising and then much more dramatically and in much greater numbers in the so-called

“saffron revolution” of 2007 when Buddhist monks took leadership in protests against the

military government. Lacking the support of monks, the junta turned to a magical Buddhism

centered on the worship of stupas and Buddha images to shore up its legitimacy.11

In efforts to cloak itself with a Buddhist aura, the junta also moved in a number of ways

to marginalize those residents of Burma who are not Buddhist, especially those who are

ethnically and/or religiously distinct from the dominant Burmans. As Monique Skidmore (2003)

has observed, the junta sought to establish a “Buddhist totalitarian utopia” in which non-

Buddhist minorities are not accorded equal rights. Although most religious adherents who

registered with the authorities generally were free to worship as they chose, the government

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imposed restrictions on certain religious activities and promoted Buddhism over other religions.

Military governments also restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and

political freedom.12

While some Christian ethnic minorities, such as the Kachin in northern Burma, have

maintained spaces in which they can practice their religion without too much interference by the

state, other Christians have fared less well. One report has documented how the government has

undertaken sponsorship of new Buddhist shrines and images, “including on ethnic minority

sacred sites. Some monuments sacred to ethnic minorities were destroyed and replaced with

new structures, such as hotels, against local objections” (Human Rights Watch 2003). Karen

Christians in particular have been targeted, as they constitute the primary support for the long-

running Karen insurrection against the Burmese state. Even with the restoration of democracy in

Myanmar beginning in 2010, minorities – ethnic and/or religious (especially Muslim) – have

continued to be marginalized because of the pervasive influence of Burman Buddhist

nationalism.

Cambodia

On the surface it would seem as though Cambodia’s ordeal was the product not of

Buddhist nationalism but of the radical secularist ideology of the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot.

However, the ideology of the Khmer Rouge has unequivocal roots in a version of reformist

Buddhism (see Keyes 1994).

The first imagining of a Khmer Buddhist nation was spurred by the founding of the

Buddhist Institute in 1930. The French had founded the Institute “to lessen the influence of Thai

Buddhism (and Thai politics) on the Cambodian sangha and to substitute more Indo-Chinese

loyalties between the Lao sangha and their Cambodian counterparts” (Chandler 1991, 18).

Suzanne Karpelès, a French Buddhist scholar who was placed in charge of the institute,

recruited as her chief associates a number of ex-monks. Several of these subsequently founded

the Khmer Communist Party. Pol Pot, the nomme de guerre of Saloth Sar, who had also been a

novice for a period of time, was one of the recruits to the Party.

Pol Pot and his close associates conceived of the Party, which they called Angkar, ‘the

organization,’ in ways that were very similar to the sangha. Those who became members

subjected themselves to a discipline to subordinate themselves to the organization. Hinton has

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shown how the Khmer Rouge concept of “revolutionary consciousness” is linked to the

Buddhist conception of ‘mindfulness’ (Hinton 2005). Even more perversely the Khmer Rouge

took the conception of ‘cutting off one’s heart’ (dach chett), which in Buddhist practice meant

cultivating detachment from worldly desires, and utilized it to promote among cadres a

detachment from emotion when taking the lives of those deemed to be ‘enemies’ (Hinton 2005,

262-63). But while Angkar promised a future to Khmer that was an earthly Nibbana, its actions

in fact led to a marked increase in suffering.

One of the first actions of Angkar after the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia in

April 1975 was a move to eliminate the Buddhist sangha. Monks and novices, even those in the

base areas that the Khmer Rouge had controlled before April 1975, were compelled to disrobe.

Being sent for “re-education” often meant being sent to be killed. In 1980 it was estimated that

five out of every eight monks had been executed during the Pol Pot regime. Major temple-

monasteries were destroyed and lesser ones were converted into storage centers, prisons, or

extermination camps. The only monks who survived while remaining monks were those who

fled to southern Vietnam.

In 1978 the Vietnamese government invaded Cambodia to rid it of a regime that, while

communist, was seen as threatening to Vietnam. A new regime was installed led by Hun Sen, a

former Khmer Rouge leader who had defected to Vietnam. This regime based its legitimacy on

not being the Khmer Rouge and erected monuments at sites of some of the worst killing – Tuol

Sleng in Phnom Penh and Choeng Ek on the outskirts of the city.

The government under Hun Sen supported the restoration of Buddhism, and since the

early 1990s Buddhism has once again reemerged as the religion of the Khmer although

members of religious minorities are also recognized as being Cambodian citizens. The

memories of the Khmer Rouge raise for many Khmer fundamental questions about how a

Buddhist society could have spawned such violence. Because these questions have been very

difficult to answer, some have turned away from Buddhism and embraced Christianity. Even

more Khmer have been attracted to millenarian and magical Buddhist sects that have sprung up

in the late 20th and early 21st centuries (see Marston and Guthrie 2004). Maha Ghosananda

(1929-2007), the most respected senior monk who had escaped Cambodia before Pol Pot, and

many of his followers, some belonging to Buddhist non-governmental organizations, promoted

active efforts to ensure that a Buddhist message of peace be clearly articulated. This message

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has been widely adhered to and although there have been religious tensions in post-Pol Pot

Cambodia, no Khmer monks have embraced the position taken in other Buddhist societies that

advocate the purging of the society of non-Buddhists.

Thailand

Thailand escaped the tragedies that beset both Cambodia and Sri Lanka, but there was a

period when a militant Buddhist nationalism contributed to the justification of violence that

threatened the unity of Thai society. In the early-1970s student-led protests succeeded in

persuading King Bhumipol Adulyadej that he should encourage Field Marshals Thanom

Kittikachorn and Prapas Charusathien, the then military dictators, to go into exile. The king then

oversaw the establishment of a new constitution and parliament. This democratic system proved

to be short-lived. Right-wing forces supported by elements of the military and police began to

use intimidation and death squads to regain control of power. Many in the student movement,

on the other hand, began to see the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) as the best vehicle for

ensuring a more just distribution of power and wealth in the society. The divisions were

exacerbated by Thai reactions to the take-over in 1975 of the governments of South Vietnam,

Cambodia, and Laos by communist parties.

In this context, a very prominent Buddhist monk, Kittivuddho Bhikkhu, began to preach

that communists were less than human and, thus, to kill them would not be a ‘sin’ – that is,

would not lead to ‘demerit’ – in Buddhist terms.13 Although many Buddhist monks and

laypersons strongly denounced Kittivuddho for this position, the Ecclesiastical Council made up

of the most senior monks in the Thai sangha refused to reprimand him. When the patriarch of

the Buddhist Sangha agreed to preside at the ordination of Thanom Kittikachorn, the former

military dictator, thereby enabling him to return to the country, it seemed clear that the

established sangha had sided with the right-wing.

On October 6, 1976, right-wing paramilitary groups backed by units of the police staged

a vicious attack on student protestors at Thammasat, one of the main universities in Bangkok.

Many students were brutally killed and their bodies mutilated. In the wake of this event, the

military once again took control of the government, while hundreds of students who escaped

went to the forests upcountry to join a communist-led insurgency.

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For nearly three years, Thailand faced a virtual civil war. The CPT did not, however,

come to power. In part this was a consequence of the disenchantment of many of the students

who had joined the insurgency with the rigidity of the Maoist Party leadership. It was even

more the consequence of a decision taken by senior members of the Thai army who had taken

control of the government to offer unconditional amnesty to those who had joined the CPT. This

decision implied a rejection by these men of both militancy and militant Buddhism in the

pursuit of their political objectives. In the wake of this decision, the CPT collapsed and Thai

society became for nearly three decades one of the most open in Asia.

In the 1980s and 1990s there was strong popular support for moves by elected

governments and King Bhumipol to expand Thailand’s civil society to be inclusive of

minorities, including religious ones. This inclusiveness was legitimated in a new constitution

promulgated in 1997. This constitution redefined the term satsana, previously used only to

designate Buddhism, to mean ‘religion’ in a broader sense so that those following Islam and

Christianity could also be considered to be full citizens of a nation based on the three pillars of

monarchy, satsana and Thai-ness defined primarily as having competence in the national

language. The promotion of inclusivist policies led to greater integration of Muslims, including

many in the large Malay-speaking Muslim population of southern Thailand, into Thai society.

Although Buddhist nationalism declined in significance during this period, it did not disappear.

The 1997 constitution was the most liberal in Thailand’s history. There was a small

group of monks and laity who pushed to have the constitution recognize Buddhism as the

official religion of the state, but these efforts were rebuffed. Following the turmoil of the 1970s

a number of competing and quite distinctive Buddhist movements in Thailand emerged (see

Keyes 1999). Notable among these is the evangelical Dhammakaya (Thai, Thammakai) that has

attracted many in the expanding middle class with a message that support for this sect and

Dhammajayo, its controversial leader, leads to greater worldly rewards. This sect has been in

conflict with established Buddhism, in part because of its success in attracting millions of

supporters and even more for its advocacy of heterodox beliefs and practices. While other Thai

have turned to fundamentalist Buddhist movements such as Santi Asoke or to monks renowned

for their meditation retreats, many more have become what I have termed ‘post-Buddhist.’ That

is, there are many – mainly in the urban middle class – who still think of themselves as in some

way connected to Buddhism, but who participate in rituals only rarely and who have limited

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contact with monks. Such people live very secular lives. With many becoming post-Buddhist

and the fragmentation of the sangha, as well as the presence of significant non-Buddhist

minorities, Buddhism no longer serves to unite the Thai citizenry in the same way as in the past.

A particularly pertinent example is evident in the ongoing (as of mid-2016) controversy

over the succession to the supreme patriarch (sangharat) of the Thai sangha. It has long been

the practice that the most senior monk among the Supreme Sangha Council should succeed to

the leadership of the Thai sangha. When the last patriarch died in 2015 at the age of 100, the

most senior monk was 90 year old Somdet Phra Maha Ratchamangalacharn, also known as

Somdet Chuang. The Sangha Council forwarded his name to the king for royal approval, but the

military-led government has held up the nomination and asked the Department of Special

Investigation to determine whether Somdet Chuang had undermined his moral authority by

purchasing an expensive Mercedes Benz car. Behind this charge is the assertion by some

leading monks that Somdet Chuang is sympathetic to the Dhammakaya sect and is linked to the

political party overthrown in the coup.14

The 1997 constitution opened the way for a new political order. The Thai Rak Thai

Party led by Thaksin Shinawatra, a successful entrepreneur, won an impressive mandate in

parliamentary elections held in early 2001 and again in 2005. These electoral victories were a

consequence of overwhelming support from the people of northeastern and northern Thailand.

Although their forebears had been peasants, the current population could best be characterized

as post-peasants. Many have traveled to Bangkok or abroad for work and even those who

remained in rural communities now understand themselves because of universal primary

education and the rapid expansion of radio and TV to belong to a much larger world.15 Despite

(or, more likely, because of) Thaksin’s electoral victories that were unparalleled in modern Thai

history, he was considered anathema by the elite, especially those close to the monarchy. This

elite also found significant, support from the mainly Sino-Thai Bangkok urban middle class.

Thaksin’s record as prime minister was marred by his own self-centered activities and he clearly

failed to deal successfully with the growing insurgency in the Malay-speaking Muslim

population in the far south of the country.

In 2006 Thaksin was overthrown in a military coup and has lived in exile almost ever

since. Nonetheless, the party he founded – renamed the Pheu Thai (‘for Thai’) Party –

succeeded in elections in both 2007 and 2013, despite significant legal and juridical constraints,

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in gaining parliamentary majorities. Those opposed to Thaksin and his followers gave reason to

the military to stage another coup in 2014. A military dictatorship was again instituted and, as of

2016, is still in power. The underlying divisions of Thai society have not however been

eliminated; instead they have deepened. Furthermore religious divisions in the country have

exacerbated political divisions.

Buddhists Confront Muslims

In September 2014 “a Burmese monk stepped off a plane in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and

was warmly greeted by a taller, similarly dressed Sri Lankan monk. This seemingly innocuous

scene was in fact a meeting between representatives of two radically extremist Theravada

monastic groups: Ashin Wirathu Thero of the 969 Movement, now called the Ma Ba Tha monk

group, in Burma (Myanmar) and Dilantha Withanag of the Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) group in Sri

Lanka” (Blakkarly).16 Both monks and their followers have sought and are still continuing to

seek to purge their societies of Muslims whom they accuse of intending to eliminate all

religions save their own.

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001,

Islamophobia has spread like a cancer, and despite Buddhism’s reputation as a peaceful religion

is also significant in societies with majority Buddhist populations. Although there is little

question that the emergence of radical Islamists has contributed significantly to the emergence

of monk-led anti-Islam Buddhist groups such as those in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, the roots of

such groups can be traced back to the development of Buddhist nationalism in the postcolonial

period. As Alan Strathern reported for the BBC in May 2013, “The global climate is crucial.

People believe radical Islam to be at the centre of many of the most violent conflicts around the

world” (Strathern 2013). Violence instigated by those who claim to speak in the name of Islam

in Paris, Brussels, as well as in the Middle East has given substance to this view, including in

Buddhist societies.

The most significant target of violent discrimination in Burma has been the Muslim

Rohingyas living in the northwest of the country on the border between Burma and Bangladesh.

Because of their religion and because of their location, the Rohingyas are considered by the

Burmese government to be illegal migrants to the country, even though a majority claim to be

descendants of the indigenous people of northern Rakhine. In fact, while there is no question

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there has been migration from Bengal into the Rakhine state beginning in the colonial era, there

is also none that there have been Muslims who identify as Muslim Rohingya living in Rakhine

since at least the 17th century.17 Burmese governments have rejected this history and have made

and continue to make efforts to force Rohingyas to “return” to Bangladesh. An Amnesty

International report issued in 2004 stated that it “is concerned that the Burma Citizenship Law

of 1982 and the manner in which this law is implemented effectively denies the right to a

nationality for members of the Rohingya population” (Amnesty International 2004).

It might have been thought when the National League for Democracy headed by Aung

San Suu Kyi won the election decisively in 2015 the situation of the Rohingya might change for

the better. Instead, she “does not want to call them Rohingya, the name they use, because

nationalist Buddhists want to perpetuate the myth that they are ‘Bengalis’ who don’t belong in

Myanmar.”18 Thus, the status of Rohingya in Burma continues to be parlous and Burmese

Buddhist nationalists have used their presence to stir up anti-Muslim sentiments. The Rohingyas

have become international pariahs with Rohingya refugees being forcibly sent out to sea or

imprisoned in Thailand.

In Thailand, anti-Muslim violence developed after then Prime Minister Thaksin

Shinawatra reacted to the events of 9/11 by sending a small contingent of troops to join the

international coalition sent to Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein. This move was strongly

protested by Thai Muslims and in early 2004 violent confrontations erupted in the Malay-

speaking provinces of Thailand’s far south. Also in 2004 Thai government troops killed a large

number of Muslim youth at Krue Se mosque in Pattani and subsequently caused the deaths of

many more who suffocated after having being piled on trucks by security forces. Since then,

violence has escalated; insurgents have assassinated many local officials, teachers, and even

Buddhist monks and novices. Religious violence has become a painful reality in Thailand.

Many had hoped that the military government that staged a coup in September 2006 might

change the situation, since the coup was led by General Sonthi Bunyaratklin, a Thai-speaking

Muslim. However, even he was unable to resolve the situation in the South. Instead, the

insurrection intensified.

Successive Thai governments, including the one installed by the military junta in 2006

and the weak elected ones that came to power through elections from 2007 to 2014, each

allowed military authorities to take charge of suppressing the insurrection in the south. The

15

militarization of the conflict was raised to a new level with the creation of armed militias

operating in the south under the patronage of the Queen (International Crisis Group 2007). In a

move that would have surprised even Kittivuddho Bhikkhu, the outspoken advocate of militant

Buddhism in the 1970s, soldiers have been recruited to become monks, some even carrying

arms under their yellow robes (Jerryson 2009; McCargo 2009a, 2009b).

Conclusion

Although anti-Muslim Buddhist monks have figured prominently in stories in recent

years about Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand, they are not representative of most monks in their

countries. There are some outstanding examples of Buddhist leaders denouncing anti-Muslim

individuals and groups. At the forefront of these are those affiliated with the International

Network of Engaged Buddhists (INEB), an organization based in Thailand. In marked contrast

with the ‘enraged’ Buddhists who would purge their societies of all Muslims, engaged

Buddhists seek to pursue dialogues with them. Socially-engaged Buddhism traces its roots to

the renowned Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh, but is today most identified with INEB, an

organization founded by the well-known Thai Buddhist layman, Sulak Sivaraksa. There is,

arguably, no more significant a spokesman for Buddhist-Muslim dialogue than the Thai

Buddhist monk, Phra Paisal Visalo.

It is worth concluding by quoting from a long op-ed piece he published over two days in

the Bangkok Post in July 2006:

Both Buddhism and Islam recognize the unity of humanity, seeing every human being as

a friend or a fellow sharing the earth. … However, quite a number of Buddhist and

Muslim devotees divide and classify other human beings in terms of religion, race,

nationality, language, etc. This has not only led to division between ''us'' and ''them'' but

also to indifference or callous disregard for others – even to the point of seeing the other

as the enemy. …

The religious devotees who worship violence are willing to die in order to take the lives

of others. At present, a question that is worth pondering is: To what extent is Buddhism

or Islam able to serve as a powerful inspiration for its followers to sacrifice their lives to

16

save the lives of others? Or at least to convince followers to struggle for global justice

and peace through non-violence without being anxious for their own personal safety?

This will be possible when there is no 'us'’ versus ‘them’. ….

Through open and continuous dialogue, I believe there will be improved understanding

between Buddhists and Muslims. We will find that a lot of the differences between us

have been exaggerated by a great magnitude, and that the differences between us serve

as no legitimate reason to divide us into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Paisan Vislalo 2006).

Phra Paisan is calling for Buddhists to return to their roots as humans who recognize that while

they must live in the world, they must also seek to be moral actors in that world. One can only

hope that his voice and similar ones will be heard above those of angry or fearful Buddhists

espousing violence.

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1 I draw here on several previously published papers: Keyes (1978, 1989, 2007, 2008/09, 2011, 2013). 2 I have not considered Tibet in this paper because, although it has a majority Buddhist population, it is

officially part of China. There are significant Buddhist populations in China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, but

none can be considered to be “Buddhist states.” Although Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion

in Laos, I have not included discussion of Laos in this paper because the country has not figured

significantly in discussions of Buddhist nationalism. 3 The consensus of Buddhist scholars today, however, is that he was born and died in the fourth century

BCE. See Bechert (1991–97). 4 Because I will be primarily concerned with the Theravadin tradition, I will hereafter employ Pali rather

than Sanskrit renditions of Buddhist terms. 5 Furnivall developed this idea through comparisons between the Netherlands Indies and British Burma,

the latter country being one in which he served as a colonial official (Furnivall 1948). 6 Obeyesekere updated and revised this article in 1995 (Obeyesekere 1995), but my citation is from the

original published version.

19

7 On Dharmapala’s vision of an exclusivist Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, also see Roberts (1997). 8 On the direct involvement of monks in the election of 2004 as well as the advocacy of some monks for

the violent suppression of Tamil ethnonationalism, see the article “Powerful Buddhist Monks Enter Sri

Lanka's Election Race” issued by Dow Jones news service on March 2, 2004

(http://framehosting.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?StoryID=2004030207260015&Take=1

). 9 It is difficult to obtain precise figures for any demographic aspect of Burma. The 89-90 percent figure

reported to be Buddhist is found in most reputable sources. See, for example, the United States

Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2002). 10 These statistics are based on the CIA “World Fact Book” --

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html. 11 For the best analysis to date of the sangha’s challenge to the legitimacy of the Burmese military junta

see Schober 2010. 12 See “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004,” released by the United States Bureau of

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 28, 2005

(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41637.htm). 13 I have discussed Kittivuddho’s advocacy of militant Buddhism at some length in my “Political Crisis

and Militant Buddhism in Contemporary Thailand” (Keyes 1978). 14 See Panu Wongcha-um (2016), and “New Conflicts Erupt over Patriarch Bid,” Bangkok Post, March

27, 2016 (http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/911584/new-conflicts-erupt-over-patriarch-bid). 15 For examinations of the post-peasant characteristic of the Northeast see Keyes (2012, 2014). For the

North see Walker (2012). 16 Bodhu Bala Sena means “Buddhist Power Force.” The 969 movement uses these numbers to refer to

the attributes of the Buddha, the dhamma, his teachings, and the sangha, the order of Buddhist monks

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/969_Movement). 17 The Wikipedia article on Rohingya (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohingya_people) contains

excellent documentation on the history of the Rohingya. 18 See the NY Times editorial (May 9, 2015), “Aung San Suu Kyi’s Cowardly Stance on the Rohingya.”

The US ambassador to Rangoon rejected Aung San Suu Kyi’s demand that the US stop using the term

“Rohingya” (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/us-defies-myanmar-government-

rohingya-muslims).