the world jewish congress: influence without power

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The World JewishCongress: InfluenceWithout PowerYITZHAK MUALEMPublished online: 31 May 2012.

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The World Jewish Congress: Influence Without Power

YITZHAK MUALEM

As a non-governmental entity, the World Jewish Congress is active in the global politics of the Jewish people, maintaining a broad network of relations with bodies and governments in all parts of the world. This network assists the Congress in its activities of providing material, political and cultural aid to Jewish communities throughout the world. The present article focuses on this entity in an attempt to answer the question: What is the degree of influence of non-national organisations in the global political arena, in an era in which the governmental unit, namely the sovereign state, is the chief actor? This examination of the World Jewish Congress' ability to act in the global Jewish political arena concentrates on three issues which represent three areas of activity on the organisation's agenda: reparations, endangered Jewry and the W aldheim affair.

The international scene is characterised by a multifaceted set of relations based on a system of ties between governmental and non-governmental units. This phenomenon has implications for the nature of institutions and processes in the global political arena. The non-governmental units enjoy autonomy in their activities in that arena, and sometimes act and exert influence in areas common both to them and to governmental units.

The World Jewish Congress, as a non-governmental unit, is active in the broad area of the global politics of the Jewish people. 1 This organisation has a wide network of relations with bodies and governments in all parts of the world: in the West (the United States and the countries of Western Europe), in the East (Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union), in the Third World and in the Arab countries.2 This network is useful to the Congress in its activities on behalf of Jewish communities throughout the world, in providing material, political and cultural aid.

The organisation began to operate as a global Jewish body in the 1930s.3 When it was first being organised, it was already providing help and aid to Jews everywhere, to those in Europe in particular, especially to German Jews living under the Nazi regime.< Its activity continued

Jewish Culture and History, Vol.S, No.2 (Winter 2002) pp.95-113 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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96 JEWISH CULTURE AND HISTORY

throughout the Second World War, and was intensified after the war, when the issue of saving and rehabilitating Jewish refugees was on its agenda. After the establishment of the State of Israel, the work of the Congress focused on providing aid to Jewish communities in Arab countries, in North Africa, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

Nahum Goldmann, as President of the World Jewish Congress from 1949 to 1977, defined the nature of its activity and aims:

First, to give real content to the abstract term 'the unity of the people everywhere,' and to serve as a lever to ensure that this aim is properly realized. And second, to secure cooperation between the people in all parts of the diaspora on all the issues common to them.5

The activity of the World Jewish Congress is based on the premise that it has no influence on the course of events on the high politics level (HP), namely military and security matters; however, it is able to exert its influence on the low politics level (LP) namely matters of society and economics in general, and in regard to safeguarding the rights of Jews and providing humanitarian aid to distressed Jewish communities, in particular.6

The research question that forms the subject of this article is, then: What is the degree of influence of non-national organisations in the global political arena, in an era in which the governmental unit, namely the sovereign state, is the chief actor? The issue at the centre of this article is: Is the ability of the World Jewish Congress to act limited only to the low politics level, in contrast to the ability of the sovereign state, i.e. the State of Israel, which considers itself the representative of the whole Jewish world? Another issue that needs to be addressed is: Is the activity of the World Jewish Congress, as a non-governmental unit defined as a transnational non-governmental organisation, characterised by its ability to arouse world public opinion and to create coalitions and a system of communication between elites?'

Politics of States and Non-governmental Organisations

From a theoretical standpoint, eclectic use will be made of all the explanatory tools available in the two major theories in the field of international relations. Theoretical explanations of the first approach -classic political realism - focus on the aims, power and functioning of the governmental actor.8 The second, complementary, approach is the institutionalised neo-liberal theory, which deals with the study of the comprehensive, complex relations of world politics.9 This approach places an emphasis on the activity, influence and contribution of the non-

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WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS: INFLUENCE WITHOUT POWER 97

governmental factors operating in this arena and their influence in areas that are not military-existential.

The political realism approach is based on the principle of the statecentric view. The government state is the key actor in the international arena, that acts to achieve its national interest, defined in terms of power. 10 Political realism is premised on three basic assumptions: (1) states act as rational units and are the dominant actors in world politics; (2) force is the effective tool in the world political arena; and (3) interrelationships between states are based on constant struggle. 11

In the 1970s, criticism was first levelled against the basic assumption of political realism, in relation to the status, aims, power and behaviour of the sovereign state in the international arena. Robert Keohan and Joseph Nye argued that it is impossible to sketch a perfect picture of classic political realism, and hence the point of view has to be expanded, making it possible to overcome the problems posed by the boundaries of the sovereign state. 12 In their opinion, the interrelationships are not exclusive to government states; rather world politics is a fabric of interentity relations - governmental and non-governmental political actors -within a political framework that transcends the boundaries of the government state. Accordingly, this framework forms the theoretical basis for a study of the World Jewish Congress's ability to function as a actor in global politics, in relation to the governmental actor's power and ability to exert influence.

The Global Politics of the World Jewish Congress

In this framework, we draw a distinction between areas of act1v1ty dealing with military and security matters (HP) and those dealing with economic and social matters (LP). This distinction enables us to analyse the World Jewish Congress' ability to act in general and to provide assistance to Jewish communities in particular, on the level of Low Politics. The contribution of this approach to a study of the activity of international organisations in the global political arena lies in the analysis of the way non-governmental actors act, focusing on specific areas of activity defined in their agendas. 13 In other words, the politics of these bodies is institutional and inter-institutional politics, whose goal is to promote the aims on the agenda of those organisations, within the context of the subject matter they are dealing with. 14

In this article, we will therefore examine the degree to which the World Jewish Congress can exert influence on the low politics level, where the government state does not enjoy dominance or exclusive influence on moves taken in the global political arena, according to the

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context of the matters on their joint agenda. The World Jewish Congress' ability to act in the international arena will therefore be examined by analysing the influence of the interdependence between this organisation and the State of Israel, which is a dominant and significant actor in shaping processes in the world Jewish political arena. These interrelationships will be examined on a continuum of relations, at one end of which is cooperation and complementarity and at the other opposition and conflict.15 This relationship constitutes the basis on which the degree of this organisation's influence on the global arena can be examined.

The examination of the World Jewish Congress' ability to act in the world Jewish political arena will focus on three subjects, which represent three areas of activity on that organisation's agenda:

• Reparations: a focused area of activity, both from the viewpoint of the subject and the viewpoint of time and space, that is, the early 1950s. During these years, the government of Israel and the Jewish world pursued a policy of receiving reparations from Germany for the injustice, thievery and harm caused to the Jewish people under the Nazi reg1me.

• Endangered Jewry: 16 a permanent area of activity on the organisation's agenda, although the topics and the activity vary. It is not limited in time and space. The test case presented in this section is the activity on behalf of Algerian Jewry at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.

• The Waldheim Affair: focuses on the struggle against Nazism, and is one of a set of topics in this area of activity. It is focused in space -Austria, and in time- the mid-1980s. The major activity in this regard revolved around the campaign against Kurt Waldheim's election as president of Austria, conducted by exposing his past as a Nazi officer.

Reparations

Restoration Activities of the jewish People

The activity in this area lasted for about 12 years, from the time the demand for payment of compensation from Germany was officially submitted, at the Pan-American Jewish Biltmore Conference in 1941, in which leaders of the World Jewish Congress in the United States played an active part. 17 The Congress first presented this demand in the name of the Jewish people, at the Emergency Conference held in November 1944 in Atlantic City. 18

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Over the years, the Congress became the main spokesman in regard to this activity, until the State of Israel decided to open negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. The State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, as sovereign states, had dominant influence on the course of events, that finally led to the signing of an agreement, under which about $820 million would be transferred by West Germany to the State of Israel and diaspora Jewry. 19

Activity to regain the Jewish property stolen by the Germans during the Second World War became the major subject on the agenda of the World Jewish Congress during the 1940s and 1950s. The demand that Jewish property stolen by a sovereign state- Germany under Hitler- be returned to a governmental entity, devoid of the legal-sovereign status of a state according to international law, was not legitimate from both a legal and a political standpoint. Nahum Goldmann was aware of the limited influence of the World Jewish Congress and its inability to impose its policy in this regard on the global arena in general and on the inter-state arena in particular. At the emergency conference in Atlantic City, he saw fit to clarify, at this early stage, that the aim of receiving the stolen Jewish property would be achieved by the sovereign states. In his words: 'Whatever can be recovered from the goods that were plundered and stolen should be taken, but the major responsibility for restoring Jewish property falls on the democratic governments.'20

The Noah Barou Initiative

During the Second World War and thereafter, many efforts were made to recover the property stolen in the areas under Nazi Germany's control. However, after all the means for recovering Jewish property in the countries of Europe were exhausted, including the enactment of laws for its return, and after the foundation set up by the UN for this purpose had done all it could, the idea of demanding compensation from Germany was put forward. The World Jewish Congress prepared a plan of action for the rehabilitation of European Jewry.21 For this purpose, it began to establish relations with various bodies and persons in the German federal government. 22

The man who made the initial contacts with the German government in an endeavour to obtain compensation was Noah Barou, one of the leaders of the World Jewish Congress in Western Europe.23 His activity included establishing relations with various officials in the German government, such as his personal ties with Herbert Blakenhorn, advisor to the then Chancellor of Germany. The global political system, underpinned by the concept of transnational relations, enables various

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actors to overcome national obstacles in their activities and to create channels of communication for the conduct of negotiations, as well as to establish coalitions to promote common areas of activity. This activity is not limited to any national boundaries, as presented by traditional scholars, proponents of the classic political realism approach. 24 Noah Barou skilfully exploited this interpersonal relationship between representatives of the World Jewish Congress and members of the new government of West Germany, to promote his aims in this regard. The contribution of this relationship lay in the fact that it formed the basis of a negotiation that developed later between Israel and West Germany. In other words, the Jewish Congress provided an infrastructure for the actions of the nation state, based on agreement and complementary relations between it and the State of Israel.

But this activity was not sufficient to promote this endeavour. Without the participation of the sovereign states, the World Jewish Congress could make no progress in its attempts to achieve its aims. And when there is a shift on the national level, this leads to a change in the nature of the activity in this area. Such a shift occurred in November 1948, when the German president Theodor Heuss and Chancellor Adenauer declared their desire to give the Jews a symbolic gift, in the amount of DM10 million. That same month, the German president stated that the entire German people ought to feel ashamed.25 However, these declarations were not enough. The World Jewish Congress refused to accept this, and in an open letter published in November 1949 demanded that 'the German state and the German people ... acknowledge their solemn obligation to correct the wrongs they did to the Jewish people, and to pay compensation in an amount that will enable those who survived to rehabilitate their lives in Israel and in other countries, with freedom and security'.26

Israeli-Gennan Negotiations

The activity centring on the payment of reparations gradually shifted from a subject being discussed in the global political framework and in transnational relations, to one that was addressed on the inter-state level, between actors who clearly had the ability to exert influence in the global and international political arena. Chancellor Adenauer regarded reparations as a means of promoting German national interests in the international arena, between the German Federal Republic and the world at large, and between Bonn and Washington in particular.27 The Israeli government also regarded reparations as a means of solving Israel's economic distress in the early 1950s and of helping it to absorb the mass immigration from Europe and the Arab countries.28

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After the German side had indicated its readiness to pay reparations, another shift began when Israel applied to the UN in January 1950, in a memorandum concerning Israel's right to be included in the various agreements to receive compensation from Germany. Later, this step was taken in the form of a letter sent to the four occupation powers.29

Michael Brecher claims that the Knesset's decision to adopt the government's recommendation and to enter into negotiations for the receipt of reparations from West Germany was a strategic decision that influenced the nature and mode of the Congress' activity in this area.30

Had it not been for this decision, no change would have occurred on the ground and the activity would have been shelved, and it is difficult to know when this issue would have again been put on the world Jewish agenda or whether it would have been addressed at the same pace and with the same intensity as it was in 1952. This is because the World Jewish Congress, which lacks any sovereign political power, had been active in this regard for more than decade without achieving any real results. It was only after the Israeli government decided to thoroughly deal with the matter that more practical aspects were introduced into this area, namely, a growing involvement in the course of the negotiations, culminating finally in the reparations agreement.31

The World Jewish Congress was in the forefront of this activity and played a pioneering role. It assisted and mediated between the two sovereign national actors - the State of Israel and West Germany - in the post-Second World War period. It was able to create channels of communication between the dominant actors, who determined the nature and essence of the policy in this sphere, on the low politics level.

In this activity, the relationship was an unequal one, based on interdependence, namely asymmetrical relations, between the State of Israel and the World Jewish Congress. This dependence was the result of the fabric of relations between a non-governmental organisation and a sovereign state. During this period, the State of Israel lacked the diplomatic tools to open negotiations with West Germany. Israel's dependence on the World Jewish Congress was not absolute, but the Congress had great significance insofar as it obtained economic resources to strengthen the Israeli economy and society. In contrast, the World Jewish Congress' dependence on the State of Israel, in its activity in this sphere, was absolute.

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Endangered Jewish Communities

Activities on Behalf of Algerian Jewry

In regard to the activity to help endangered Jewry, we will exap1ine and analyse the nature of the Congress' work as a non-governmental transnational actor, and its relationship with the other actors, governmental and non-governmental, who are involved in and influence the course of events in this sphere. By 'endangered Jewry', we refer to a community, a Jewish minority, on the one hand limited in its freedom of movement, and on the other, living under social, economic, and religious restrictions, facing a physical-existential threat as a Jewish community in the country of their residence. In order to fully describe this sphere of activity, we will focus as a test case on the work of the World Jewish Congress on behalf of the Jewish community in Algeria.

The passage of the Cremieux Decree in 1870 led to a significant change in the status of Algeria's Jews.32 Under this law, Algerian Jews became French citizens in the area under the Francophone colonial regime. However, from November 1954, on All Saints Night when the FLN (the National Liberation Front) launched the revolt against France, the situation of the Jews worsened. None of the previous commitments towards them, such as the Cremieux Decree, were honoured, and consequently, they rapidly left Algeria.

The World Jewish Congress began its activity in the Magreb countries at the beginning of the 1950s. The events and changes that occurred at the time induced the Congress members to act in order to safeguard the rights of Jews in these states, in keeping with the demand put forward by Nahum Goldmann and his staff.'' Joe Golan, Goldmann's secretary, took steps to set up a channel of communication with members of the FLN and succeeded in reaching an understanding with Muhammad Y azid, Minister of Information in the temporary government of the Algerian revolution (the GPRA) that sat in Tunis. They agreed that the rights of the Jews would be protected, according to three points: (1) the Jews would have the right to choose whether to become Algerians or to remain French citizens; (2) those who chose to become Algerians would receive equal rights; and (3) those who chose to remain French could stay in Algeria and enjoy the same rights as they did before.34

The major diplomatic effort was made by the Congress in 1962, prior to the signing of the agreement to end the acts of violence between the two sides fighting on Algerian soil (the French and the Algerians). Representatives of the Congress, led by Nahum Goldmann and Joe Golan, were privy to the diplomatic contacts between the sides and acted to obtain promises from them both, in regard to the preservation of the

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rights of minorities in Algeria under the Evian accord, signed on 2 March 1962. Golan claims that this was largely achieved owing to the creation of direct and indirect channels of communication with leaders of the FLN:

My work in regard to the future of the Jewish minority in Algeria was conducted through mediators, like Jean Daniel, a writer for L 'Express, and Rober Bare, the well-known French Catholic liberal, the Algerian author Jean Amrosh ... and many others like them, because my personal contacts would not have been sufficient to bring such pressure on the Algerian leaders.35

Between jewish and Israeli Interests

The circumstances of uncertainty and persecution by the FLN underground and the OAS (Organisation Armee Secrete, an underground organisation established in Algeria by French residents of Algeria opposed to an independent Algerian state) created an emergency situation in Algeria as far as the continued existence of Jews in that country was concerned. 36 Joe Golan tried to act to change the situation, but he encountered a staunch opponent to his activities in the form of the Israeli government, led by its then Foreign Minister, Golda Meir. Golan asserts that 'Golda didn't care that for the sake of five Mirages, all of Algerian Jewry might be lost. And when I explained to her: "Golda, the Jews are in danger," she replied, 'Mirages are more important. That is the movement's decision.'37

In the shadow of this controversy, enormously important interests in the Jewish world were involved in a sharp confrontation between representatives of the Congress - a non-governmental actor - and the State of Israel. The Jewish-ethnic national interest was represented in the name of the Congress by Joe Golan, and the national-state interest was represented by Golda Meir, in the name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israeli government. The national-state interest was aimed primarily at maintaining a continued relationship and alliance with France, one that was formed during the 1950s. In contrast, as a citizen of the State of Israel, Golan's contacts with the FLN leaders amounted in a sense to a violation of this alliance. The activity of the Congress was, then, a factor that interfered with the promotion of state and all-Jewish interests, as the State of Israel defined them. Therefore, Golda Meir pressured Goldmann and his people to stop meeting with members of the FLN to persuade them that their actions were impairing the interests of the Jewish community in Algeria. A letter dated 1.1.1960 sent by the Israeli Embassy in Paris to the Head of the Office of the Foreign Minister, J ochanan Meroz, reads: an employee of the Israeli embassy in

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Paris, wrote: 'I don't know if they have managed to make Goldmann realize that any attempt on his part to intervene in the internal affairs of Algerian Jewry can be catastrophic.'38

These conflicting interests and the activity that took place in their wake created a great deal of confusion. Foreign Minister Golda Meir revoked the passport of Joe Golan, who was an Israeli citizen. She prevented him from leaving the country and from acting under the directives of the World Jewish Congress in relation to providing aid to the Jews of Algeria. 'According to Golda Meir, Golan was engaging in certain activity abroad which made it imperative, in the view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that he remain at home. '39 In her opinion, his activity constituted a security risk to Israel's political interests, because his links with members of the FLN met with disapproval in Paris and in Jerusalem.40 Therefore, 'when the Israeli government restricted the validity of Joe Golan's passport, it believed that by doing so it had removed an impediment to Franco-Israeli relations, which were about to enter [1962] their most delicate phase' ,41 namely the critical phases of building the nuclear reactor in Dimona!2

Nahum Goldmann was opposed to the Israeli government's decision and defended the actions of his political advisor, claiming that they were taken with the knowledge of the French government. According to him, 'I personally reported to the Paris government, and it encouraged us to hold these contacts, only requesting that we keep them secret and report on them to the competent French authorities'!3 The Israeli government objected to Joe Golan's contacts because he was an Israeli and could be considered to be representing an official view. In a closed meeting with French officers and statesmen, he criticised Israel's policy on Algeria!• When the Israeli government learned that Golan was acting in arenas and spheres that were not solely related to saving Jews, such as his political links with leaders of the FLN, it immediately took steps to halt his political activity.

However, although the members of the World Jewish Congress had great hopes and expectations, they were disillusioned and disappointed by the response of the Algerians. The leaders of the FLN did not keep their promises in relation to the Jewish minority there. In fact, the Jewish exodus from Algeria was swift. As a result of the mass emigration, the Jewish community in Algeria was reduced from 130,000 in 1962 to 2,000 Jews in 1966!5

Joe Golan's activity did not prevent the exodus of Algeria's Jews to France. It was not an 'exodus from Egypt' that the Jews of Algeria wanted; rather it was an exodus of more than 100,000 residents to France, within a short period. The World Jewish Congress, as a voluntary umbrella

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organisation, devoid of political and sovereign power, found it difficult to provide aid to the Jews of Algeria. On the other hand, the Congress utilised every political means, and the various connections it had, to promote its goals in this regard. It raised the issue of the rights of Jews in the countries of their habitation to the agenda of world Jewry and took action on their behalf within the countries themselves. S.Z. Abramov, a leader of the World Jewish Congress in Israel, defined the mode of this activity as follows: 'This is the only Jewish organization in the world that penetrates places where the arm of the State of Israel and the arm of the World Zionist Federation cannot reach. '46

The W aldheim Affair

In the early 1940s, in the midst of the Second World War, the Congress laid the foundation for another area of activity that it added to its agenda, along with reparations. At the emergency conference in Atlantic City in November 1944, the Congress raised the issue of bringing Nazi war criminals to trial. One expression of this activity was the W aldheim affair, which occurred many years later.

The objective in taking action to bring Nazi criminals to trial was not merely a legal one; there was also a moral aim, which the Congress undertook as the representative of the Jewish people. The exposure of Kurt Waldheim's past did not take place in a vacuum; it was one more stage in a series of actions in this regard. In the W aldheim affair, as A vi Becker, Director-General of the Congress, said, 'the timing was absolutely coincidental' .'7 The affair was, therefore, not a 'foreign import' to the Congress's agenda, nor did it erupt like 'thunder on a clear day'; rather, it was a continuation of the line adopted by the leaders and legal advisors of the World Jewish Congress as far back as the early 1940s.

The Waldheim affair did not erupt suddenly. Kurt Waldheim's past as an Austrian officer in the Nazi army, 1942-44, was obscure. Suspicions about his blameless behaviour during this period gradually emerged over the years. When W aldheim was elected to the post of the UN SecretaryGeneral, there were people who raised questions about his involvement in war crimes. These suspicions about his past did not disappear, but rather grew stronger. In an interview about his past with a journalist from the GermanDer Spiegel, Waldheim offered a laconic reply, merely stating: 'I, like all the Austrians, was forced to enlist in the W ehrmacht. In 1941, I was wounded and was no longer fit for battle.'48

Waldheim's past as a Nazi officer was first exposed by the Israeli TV reporter, Haim Y avin, while Waldheim was serving as Secretary-General of the UN.'' Yavin claims that prior to his interview with Waldheim, a

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member of the Austrian delegation to the UN voiced his suspicions of Waldheim. During the interview, Yavin asked Waldheim about this fact. This query evoked negative reverberations and the matter was taken off the public agenda, but the silence on the issue did not last long.

From early March 1986, the Congress began publishing, in the written and electronic press, documents casting suspicion on Waldheim and alleging that he was involved in the murder of Jews and partisans in Greece and Yugoslavia during the Second World War.50 These revelations were aimed at exposing Waldheim's dubious past and bringing him to trial as a war criminal. Through this action, the World Jewish Congress became a vanguard in the campaign. 51 According to Y oel All on, head of the European desk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this campaign was conducted by the Congress, which initiated it and influenced the entire course of events in this regard. As Allon put it, 'the Congress launched its campaign against W aldheim without consulting the Israel government. Afterwards, the Congress held talks with us and kept us informed.'52

In this affair, unlike the other two spheres of activity described above, the Congress took the initiative throughout the entire campaign. In this test case, it was not merely reacting to events, acting as an agent transmitting information, nor as an organisation helping to promote the interests of the Jewish people. It was the initiator and the body influencing the way the affair developed and the nature of the activity.

The Israeli Dilemma in the Waldheim Affair

During this period, the Israeli government was confronted by a politicaldiplomatic dilemma - should it react to the suspicions raised about Kurt Waldheim's past and endanger its diplomatic relations with Austria, or should it avoid any reaction? The dilemma the Congress faced the Israeli government with was a hard one to resolve. The issue of whether to prefer the all-Jewish interest (the memory of the Holocaust) or the national interest 0iberal relations with Austria) was being put to the test.

In its activity in this sphere, the World Jewish Congress succeeded in 'dragging' the Israeli government into involvement in the affair. The Israeli government did concede to the requests of leaders of the Congress, but it fixed the boundaries of its involvement, based on the Israeli-Jewish moral concept that Nazi war criminals should be put on trial. The Israeli government was pulled into its reaction to the affair as a result of the activity of a non-governmental actor. According to Y oel All on, 'the government of Israel was not dragged into the affair because of the Congress' actions, but because of a situation in which action was taken in the name of the Jewish people ... necessitated by the activity of the Knesset

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members' .53 Michael Elitzur, Israeli ambassador to Austria until Waldheim's election as president, argued, on the other hand, that the State of Israel was dragged into this situation, one that was apt to harm the interests of the State of Israel: 'It was up to Israel to decide what was more important for the state, its relations with Austria or its relations with Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress. The Congress was the one who initiated this campaign without consulting us and without taking our interests into account.' 54 In other words, the State of Israel was forced to react both from an ideological point of view, as Y oel Allon pointed out, and from a political standpoint, as Michael Elitzur noted.

Israeli Government Support

The reaction of the Israeli government to the challenge posed by the World Jewish Congress had a far-reaching influence on the nature of the action taken regarding this matter. Avi Becker, Director-General of the Israeli section of the World Jewish Congress, claims that the involvement of the Israeli government carried a great deal of weight and influence. According to him,

As a Jewish organization, the Congress needed the backing of the State of Israel, after it had exposed various pieces of evidence regarding Waldheim's past, and Israel had failed to take a position, and this had evoked dissatisfaction. At a certain stage, an announcement was issued to the press, in which we demanded that the Israeli government react officially to the Waldheim affair. The Israeli government was unable to wrest itself free of the Foreign Ministry's perception that Austria was the gate to the East. However, the change in its policy changed the nature of the campaign.55

The Congress exploited the confusion and the absence of a uniform official line on the part of the Israeli government to create its own channels of communication within the Israeli political system, and utilised them to promote its aims.56 The then Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, publicly expressed a moderate line based on a realistic policy, while the Acting Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, expressed an extreme position opposing the attempt to elect Waldheim as Austria's president.57

However, later in the continuing campaign against Waldheim, the World Jewish Congress, by exploiting coalitions created within the political system, succeeded in bringing about a change even among those who had not supported its policy. This was reflected in Shimon Peres' support for the anti-Waldheim campaign. He stated:

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The campaign against Waldheim is not one conducted by a single private organization against one man. It is a moral struggle of the world's attitude to the intent to legitimize anti-Semitism and Nazism. It is a struggle for a free world, and its goal is to protect the international standards of morality and human rights. The government of Israel stands behind the World Jewish Congress in this struggle and will cooperate for the purpose of exposing documents and proofs that exist in relation to Nazi criminals.58

In this matter, the World Jewish Congress was successful in placing the subject of Waldheim on the worldwide Jewish agenda. Although it was not a subject of political significance, it had an impact on the political relations between the sovereign states· of Israel and Austria. This actor, like any organisation or political entity, acted in the global political system according to the guidelines it set for itself. Indeed, in the Waldheim affair, the Congress influenced the course of events as a nongovernmental, transnational organisation within the limits of the game allowed it by the national states, namely, up to the stage when national and state interests were likely to be impaired. In this affair, the price of the injury to state interests was the failure to appoint a new ambassador to Vienna, a move that constituted Israeli political 'lip service'. Therefore, at the end of Ambassador Elitzur's tenure, no new Israeli ambassador was posted to Vienna until Waldheim completed his term in office as president of Austria.

Summary: The Power of Non-governmental Organisations vis-a-vis the Power of the State

This article has examined and weighed the extent of the influence wielded by the World Jewish Congress, an organisation lacking in power and political sovereignty in the global political arena, as well as examining its contribution to world Jewry. The aim of every non-governmental organisation is to continue existing as a political entity aspiring to achieve its goals in the political arena, while influencing other entities. Based on the above analysis, one could say that the World Jewish Congress, as a non-governmental organisation, has influence on the global Jewish political arena, but this influence is limited in comparison to the ability and influence of the national state, even at the level of 'low politics'. However, since it is a transnational organisation, it can transcend the problems facing the sovereign state. This is reflected in its ability to conduct an autonomous foreign policy based on its own political agenda, and to form diverse coalitions and channels of communication with other actors in the world political arena.

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The purpose of the World Jewish Congress' activity in relation to reparations was to create a political and interpersonal relationship with the leadership and bureaucracy of West Germany, in order to promote the goals placed on its agenda at the 1944 Emergency Conference in Atlantic City. This relationship, first headed by Noah Barou, was the major foundation on which the negotiations conducted later, on the state level, were built. In other words, thanks to the preliminary activity of the Congress as a non-governmental transnational organisation, the activity in relation to reparations succeeded, to the extent of common interests shared by the Congress and the State of Israel, as well as the involvement of the sovereign actors - West Germany and the State of Israel.

The Congress' main activity on behalf of Algerian Jewry was carried out by Joe Golan. The relations he formed with FLN leaders opened doors for him. In the Evian accord, signed between the French government and the FLN leaders, the Algerian nationalists undertook to ascertain that the rights of minorities would be safeguarded. The minority clause was inserted into the agreement, after a concerted effort by the World Jewish Congress to persuade the FLN. However, in practice, this commitment was not honoured and the Jews soon left Algeria. This outcome clearly brought to light the difficulties confronting this organisation when its aims are contrary to those of states, in this case both France and Israel, and even the FLN. Consequently, this case illustrates the fact that the low level of influence of this organisation stems from the opposition between it and the State of Israel.

In the Waldheim affair, the Congress undertook an independent initiative, in contrast to what had occurred in the first two cases, in which the action was a cooperative endeavour and even to some extent based on asymmetrical interdependence, resulting from the power of these actors. In this case, the World Jewish Congress began, independently, to publish documents and papers in the world press suggesting that the Austrian lieutenant, Kurt Waldheim, had been implicated in war crimes committed between 1942 and 1944. In taking this action, the Congress was placing the issue of the struggle against Nazis and the endeavour to bring them to trial onto the agenda of world Jewry. Since the Congress wanted to give this issue a great deal of political weight, it enlisted the help of the government of Israel. This cooperation produced the political results that the Congress leaders were trying to achieve.

The Congress exploited the political situation then prevailing in Israel. Since a unity government was in power, the Congress was able to conduct a transgovernmental policy, thus creating transgovernmental channels of communication and coalitions. At first, it was active among

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leaders of the Likud party, and at a later stage succeeded in convincing the leaders of the Labour Party to take part in this activity. In this way, the affair became one of the key issues on the interstate agenda between Israel and Austria.

The above analysis of the degree to which a non-governmental organisation can affect the global Jewish political system, the influence of the World.Jewish Congress on the 'low politics' level is weak compared to the power and influence of the nation state, the State of Israel. However, it would be wrong to disregard or underestimate its influence on the course of events and activity in the global Jewish political scene.

NOTES

1. For the liberal policies of the World Jewish Congress in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, see Nahum Goldmann, Memoirs [Hebrew], Qerusalem: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1969), p.212; Mordecai Gazit, 'Dr. Goldmann and Nasser- The Meeting that Never Took Place' [Hebrew], Ma'ariv, 1 Sept. 1982, p.21; Yeshiyahu Weinberg, 'The Jewish Historiosophy of Nahum Goldmann' [Hebrew], Gesher, 109.2 (Autumn 1984), 7-10; Arthur Herzberg, 'The Political Legacy of Nahum Goldmann' [Hebrew], Gesher, 113.2 (Winter 1986), 16-23; 'High School Students- War and Peace' [Hebrew], For and Against 7.40 (Sept 1970), p.15; Nathan Lerner, 'Goldmann as a Jewish Leader' [Hebrew], Gesher 109.2 (Autumn 1984), 11-15.

2. A vi Becker, 'Sixty Years of Diplomacy of the World Jewish Congress' [Hebrew], Gesher, 132 (1995-96), 11-25.

3. On the establishment of the organisation see Protocol Du Premiere Congress ]uif Mondial (Geneva: Le Comite Executive, 1936); Congress 50th jubilee 1936-1986 Qerusalem, 1986); Leon A. Kubovitzki, Unity in Desperation (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1948).

4. Elizabeth A. Epler, 'Rescue and Aid Activities by the World Jewish Congress 1933-1945' [Hebrew], Gesher, 16.2-3, 173-207; A. Becker, 'Diplomacy without Sovereignty: Rescue Attempts by the World Jewish Congress', in New National Jewish Solidarity ed. by Benjamin Pincus and Ilan Truan [Hebrew] (Sdeh Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1988), pp.304-18. For the broad political and historical background of the growth of the World Jewish Congress in the 1920s and 1930s, see Nathan Feinberg, 'The Jewish Delegations Committee - 1919-1939' [Hebrew], Gesher 16.2-3 (Sept. 1979), pp.13-29; Yitzhak Mualem, 'The Global Politics of the World Jewish Congress' (unpublished masters dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 1988), pp.58-68.

5. Nahum Goldmann, Memoirs (see note 1), p.114. 6. On the various levels of politics, see Robert 0. Keohan and JosephS. Nye, Power and

Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p.25; Samuel Huntington, 'Transnational Organizations in World Politics', in Perspectives on World Politics, ed. by Richard Little and Michal Smith, 2nd edn, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp.212-28.

7. See the pioneering article on this subject, by Joseph S. Nye and Robert 0. Keohan, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction', in Transnational Relations and World Politics, ed. by JosephS. Nye and Robert 0. Keohan (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.ix-xxix. See also Charles Pentland, 'International Organizations and their Roles', in Little and Smith (note 6), pp.242-9.

8. See the six principles of classic political realism in Hans Morgenthau, Politics between Nations, I, trans. into Hebrew by Joseph Nadvah (Tel-Aviv: Yachdav, 1968), pp.1-16. See also Charles A. Maclelland, Theory and the International System (London: Macmillan, 1968), p.68, and the work of H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1970); George F. Kennan,

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American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); Raymond Aron, Peace and War (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1962).

9. See the following on neo-liberalism: Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, 'International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis', International Organization, 36.2 (Spring 1982), 245-75; Oran R. Young, 'Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes', pp.277-97; Joseph S. Nye, 'The Changing Nature of World Power'; Stephan D. Kresner, 'Global Communication and National Power: Life on Pareto Frontier', World Politics, 43 (April1998), pp.336-66.

10. Morgenthau (see note 8). 11. Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez, In Search of Theory: A Paradigm For Global Politics

(New York: Colombia University Press, 1981), p.5. 12. Keohan and Nye, Power and Interdependence (see note 6). 13. On the 'agenda' of an organisation, see ibid., p.65. 14. Richard Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson and Donald Lampart, The Web of World Politics

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p.37-9. 15. On the definition of interests in the international arena, see Thomas Robinson, 'National

Interests', in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. by J.N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp.182-90. And see more extensive reference to this subject in Yitzhak Mualem, 'The Jewish Dimension in Israel's Foreign Policy' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, 1999).

16. The case of Algeria demonstrates the policies and type of activities undertaken by the World Jewish Congress in respect to the aid and rescue of world Jewry, activities which also included operations on behalf of the Jews of the Soviet Union in the 1970s. For details of this sphere of activity, see Mualem, 'Global Politics' (note 4), pp.199-223; Mualem, 'Jewish Dimension' (note 15), pp.129-89.

17. See note 4; Goldmann (note 1), p.299. 18. See Nahum Goldmann, Generation of Destruction and Redemption [Hebrew] (Terusalem:

Zionist Library, 1967), p.121; Yitzhak Schwartzbart, Twenty-five Years in the Service of the Jewish People [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: World Jewish Congress, Israeli Executive, 1956), pp.15-16. See also 'Final Report and Conclusions' of War Emergency Conference of the World jewish Congress (Atlantic City, November 1944).

19. See report of Bank of Israel on contribution of reparations to Israel's economy: The Reparations and their Influence on the Israeli Economy (Tel-Aviv: Bank of Israel, 1967).

20. War Emergency Conference of the World jewish Congress (see note 18), p.11. 21. Stephen Roth, 'Problems related to Reparations and the Recovery of Jewish Property'

[Hebrew], Gesher 16.2-3 (1970), p.208; see also report on the Congress' activity in this regard: The World jewish Congress Survey of Policy and Activities 1948-1953 (Geneva: World Jewish Congress, 1953), pp.26-31.

22. Roth, ibid., pp.217-18. 23. Roth, ibid., p.218. See also Noach Barou, 'Origin of the Germany agreement', Congress

Weekly, 13 October, 1952, pp.6-8; S.J. Goldsmith, 'The Price of Involvement', in Essays in Jewish Sociology Labour and Co-operation ed. by Henrik F. Infield (London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1972), p.42; Joseph Frankel, 'Noach Barou, the Man from Poltova', in Infield, p.7; Nahum Goldmann, 'A Noble Son of Jewry', in Infield, p.ll.

24. Robert 0. Keohan and JosephS. Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations', World Politics, 27.1 (October 1974), 39-62.

25. Roth (see note 21) p.217. See also Chancellor Adenauer's address to the German Bundestag on this matter, in the papers of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 'With the German Declaration, Information to Israeli legations abroad' [Hebrew], No.372, 27.9.51, State Archives, file no.3063/18. See also Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.98.

26. Roth, ibid. 27. Nicolas Balbkins, 'West Germany and Jews: Bonn's Moral Comeback', Orbis, 11.3 (Fall

1967), p.97. 28. Eliezer P. Shinnar, The Burden of Necessity and Emotion [Hebrew] (Terusalem: Schoken,

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1967), p.21; Michael Bar-Zohar, David Ben-Gurion, Part II [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1976), p.918; David Horowitz, Life at the Centre [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Masada, 1975), pp.80-81; Yehudith Auerbach, Political Decisions and Changes in Positions: Israel· Germany 1950-1965, [Hebrew] (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Hebrew University, 1981); Yehiam Weitz, 'The Road to a "Different Germany"- David Ben Gurion and his Attitude towards Germany 1950-1952', in The First Fifty Years of Independence ed. by Anita Shapira [Hebrew] Qerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1998), pp.245-66; Benjamin Neuberger, 'Morality, Emotion and Realism in Israeli-German Relations', in Benjamin Neuberger, Wars and Settlements [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: The Open University, 1993), pp.279-90; Naima Barzel, 'Israeli-German Relations- From a Policy of Boycott to Complex Relations', in The First Decade 1948-1958 ed. by Zvi Zameret and Hannah Yablonka [Hebrew] Qerusalem: Yad ltzhak Ben-Zvi, 1997), pp.197-214; Inge Deustschkron, Bonn and Jerusalem (Philadelphia: Clinton, 1970), p.74; George Levy, Germany and Israel: Moral Debate and National Interest (London and Portland OR: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.l-15.

29. Shinnar, ibid., pp.15-17. See also the wording of the declaration on pp.180-86. In this connection, see the World Jewish Congress' failed attempt to persuade West Germany to give compensation to the Jewish people via Lord Anderson of Britain, in Alex Easterman's letter to Lord Anderson, dated 12 April1951, State Archives, file No.2417/2.

30. Brecher (see note 25), p.98. 31. See wording and details of agreement in Foreign Ministry's documents, 'Weekly Survey',

No.29, upon signature, State Archives, file No.3028/3. 32. Daniel Triger, 'The Fate of the Cremieux Decree' [Hebrew], Tefutzot Yisrael, 12.1

Qan.-Feb. 1974), 76-84; N.M. Gelber, 'The Cremieux Decree' [Hebrew], Gesher, 1.4-5 (1955), 43-4.

33. See letter by A. Kaplan, representative of the World Jewish Congress in Paris, to Nahum Goldmann, 24 January 1961, Central Zionist Archive, file No.1558/6z.

34. See Joe Golan's letter to Nahum Goldmann about his meetings with Muhammad Yazid, 21 January 1961, Central Zionist Archives, file No.2174/6z. See also memorandum from Mr Perltzweig to Mr A. Kaplan, 21 March 1961, Central Zionist Archives, file No.1554/6z, in which he argues that caution should be exercised in any action taken regarding the future of Algerian Jewry.

35. Ada Luciano, 'I am not satisfied with the Goldmann-Shapira agreement' [Hebrew], Ma'ariv, 4 April1962, p.7.

36. See extensive reference to the worsening state of Algerian Jewry owing to the struggle between the two underground movements, in Michael M. Laskier, North African jewry in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1994), pp.331-3; on this issue, see also memorandum by Jack Lazarus, a World Jewish Congress representative in Algeria, 30 January 1962, Central Zionist Archives, file N o.1658/6z, and the memorandum by A. Kaplan, the Congress' representative in Paris, to the political department, following his visit to Algeria on 6 December 1961, Central Zionist Archives, file No.1558/6z.

37. Igal Sarna, 'The Transfer from Africa,' Yedioth Aharonoth, (Hebrew) 'Seven Days' supplement (21 Aug. 1987), p.28.

38. See State Archives, file No.3296- Jews in Algeria, vol. I, 1.1.60. 39. Shlomo Eyal, 'After Joe and his Specific Activities' [Hebrew], Herut, 27 Feb. 1962, p.2. 40. See the position taken by S.K., a member of the Embassy staff in Paris, the very opposite

of Foreign Minister Golda Meir's position, which was that the attitude towards the FLN should be changed. In the State Archives, file No.3296- Jews in Algeria, Vol. I, 1.1.60.

41. 'The Interior Ministry in Paris has refused to grant a visa to Joseph Golan' [Hebrew], Haboker, 25 Feb. 1962, p.l.

42. Shlomo Aaronson, Nuclear Arms in the Middle East, Part I [Hebrew], Qerusalem: Akademon, 1994), p.270.

43. Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, Conversatiom [Hebrew] Qerusalem: Idanim-Yedioth Aharonoth, 1981), p.52.

44. Ibid

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45. On the exodus of Algerian Jewry see Laskier (note 36), pp.334-44. 46. Inon Shenkar, 'We are carrier pigeons between Jerusalem and Moscow' [Hebrew],

Ma'ariv, 27 Jan. 1986, p.13. 47. Shula Mustik, 'The Waldheim affair- part of the struggle to keep the Holocaust from

being forgotten' (Talk of the Day) [Hebrew], Hatzofeh, 7 April1986, p.3. 48. 'I won't bury my head in the sand', Ha'aretz weekly supplement, 21 Jan. 1972, p.S. 49. Joana Yahil, 'TV's Haim Yavin: First to question Waldhiem on Nazi links in 1972

interview', Jerusalem Post, 25 May 1986, p.3. See also statement by Edgar Bronfman, President of theW orld Jewish Congress, on this matter: Edgar Bronfman, 'The Waldheim Affair- After the elections, the shame of Austria', Tefutzot -A newsletter on Jewish life in thediaspora, 107:11 (May-June 1986), 4, 8. On this subject, see also the article by Yaacov Rabi, 'Waldheim's election: The dogs and the trap' [Hebrew] Gesher, 114 (1986), 35-40.

50. 'Waldheim: As a Nazi, I engaged in cavalry shows, not in deporting Jews' [Hebrew], Yedioth Aharonoth, 6 March 1986, p.S. See another reference to this subject in pamphlet published by the Executive of the World Jewish Congress: Waldheim's Nazi Past (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1987).

51. The leadership of the World Jewish Congress in the 1980s was representative of the new generation of Jewish leaders in the Diaspora. They were younger, more independent, and more critical than their predecessors 20 years earlier. See Gabi Shefer, 'Israeli Foreign Policy for the Diaspora' [Hebrew], in Israeli Foreign Relations: Proceedings of the Congress Marking 50 Years of Israeli Foreign Policy, ed. by Haim Opaz Oerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999); Yitzhak Mualam, 'Global Politics' (see note 4), pp.99-100.

52. Interview with Y oel Allon, head of the European desk 1 in the Foreign Ministry, 18 Aug 1987.

53. Ibid 54. Hubertus Chernin, 'Austria buys a new face' [Hebrew], Koteret Reshit, 216 (1 Jan. 1987),

p.25; see also interview with the Ambassador on 13 Sept. 1987. 55. Interview with A vi Becker, Director-General of the World Jewish Congress in Israel, 24

Aug. 1987. 56. Keohan and Nye, Power and Interdependence (see note 6), p.34. 57. 'Waldheim: Peres expresses a realistic, moderate position' [Hebrew], Yedidoth Aharonoth,

11 May 1986, p.S; Gideon Allon, 'The exaggerated handling of the Waldheim affair' [Hebrew], Ha'aretz, 16 June 1986, p.2b.

58. European Jewish Congress Annual Meeting, Hilton, Geneva, 23-26 May 1986, pp.86-7.

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the world jewish congress: influence without power

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