The World Bank Institute Governance Team
Governance, Corruption and Poverty: Analytical and Empirical approaches * The World Bank Institute Governance Team What is Governance?: A working definition for governance
Governance is the process and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised: (1) the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (2) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently, and to formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and, (3) the respect for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them Operationalizing Governance:Unbundling its Definition into Components thatcan be measured, analyzed, and worked on Each of the 3 main components of Governance Definition is unbundled into 2 subcomponents: Voice and Accountability Political Stability and lack of Violence Quality Regulatory Framework Government Effectiveness Control of Corruption Rule of Law Governance and Poverty Nexus, I
Unsound economic/institutional policies due to vested interests Distorted allocation of public expenditures/investments Low human capital accumulation Elite corporate interests capture laws and distort policymaking Absence of rule of law and property rights Governance obstacles to private sector development Lower Investment and Growth Lack of Health and Education Low human capital accumulation Lower quality of education and health care Cont Governance and Poverty Nexus, cont.
State capture by elite of government policies and resource allocation Regressiveness of bribery tax on small firms and the poor Regressiveness in public expenditures and investments Unequal income distribution Briber imposes regressive tax and impairs access and quality of basic services for health, education, and justice Political capture by elites of access to particular services Poor have smaller share in growth Impaired access to public services Control of Corruption: Aggregate Indicator (selected countries from 155 worldwide, for illustration, based on 1998 research data*) Good Corruption Control Margin of Error Corruption Level POOR GOOD Source:Governance Matters, PRWP 2196 by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido. Application of Rule of Law Varies by Region
(based on aggregation of surveys/polls *) High Index of Rule of Law Appli- cation Low Index OECD East Middle South Eastern Latin Sub- Former Asia East Asia Europe America Saharan Soviet Africa Union Note:Regional Averages shown for discussion purposes, and hide large intra-regional variation in each case.Thin vertical line reflects estimated margin of error.Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999)."Aggregating Governance Indicators" and "Governance Matters" PWRP 2195 and The Dividend of Good Governance
Infant Mortality and Corruption 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Weak Average Good Control of Corruption x Development Dividend 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 Weak Average Good Regulatory Burden x Development Dividend Per Capita Income and Literacy and Rule of Law 25 50 75 100 Weak Average Good Rule of Law x Development Dividend Per Capita Income and Voice and Accountability 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 Weak Average Strong x Development Dividend Note : The bars depict the simple correlation between good governance and development outcomes.The line depicts the predicted value when taking into account the causality effects (Development Dividend) from improved governance to better development outcomes. For data and methodological details visit Incomes vs. Government Effectiveness Incomes vs. Control of Corruption Voice, Accountability and Civil Liberties Matter for Development
Source: KKZ 1999 Corruption is associated with absence of Civil Liberties
High Corruption Low Not Free Partly Free Free Based on averages of data from 160 countries. Civil Liberties Control of Graft and Freedom of the Press
High Control of Graft [kkz] r =.68 Low Low High Freedom of the Press (Freedom House) Salient Features of New Governance Diagnostic Tools
Multi-pronged surveys of:households, firms and public officials[triangulation] Experiencial questions (vs. opinions/generic) Specially designed and tested closed questions Conceptual framework: Incentive Structure behind Governance; focus on development Rigorous technical requirements in implementation Local Institution Implements, with WB Collaboration Recognizing Multidimensionality of Governance Focus on Service Delivery:Input for Action and Change Romania: Disproportionally Negative Impact on the Poor
Key point:the surveys not only reveal the incidence and extent of corruption, but allow us to examine the direct costs to different groups in society.This research demonstrates the highly unequal impact of so-called "gratuity payments" in Romania.Though they are often seen as a quasi-market pricing mechanism, they have an impact on the poor's access tohealth services. Corruption as a regressive tax on the household (% of income paid in bribes, as reported by all users that requested public services) Corruption as a regressive tax: small firms pay disproportionally in bribes (% of gross monthly revenue paid in bribes) Citizen Voice Improves Accessibility of Public Services to the Poor (Bolivia diagnostic results, 2000) Based on Bolivia Public Officials Survey. The sample of institutions includes 44 national, departmental, and municipal agencies whichare a prior anticipated to be accessible to the poor Citizen Voice Helps Control Bribery (Bolivia diagnostic results, 2000)
Based on 90 national, departmental, and municipal agencies covered in the Bolivia Public Officials Survey. Transparency within Government Agencies Increases Their Poverty Reduction Impact in Bolivia
Based on Bolivia Public Officials Survey. The sample of institutions includes 50 national, departmental, and municipal agencies whichare a prior anticipated to have a major impact on poverty reduction. Public Officials evaluation of effectiveness and access to the Poor by their public sector agencies [Preliminary results on Governance-Poverty nexus, Bolivia] Public officials themselves report that only one-half of public services they provide are accessible to the poor Performance of re-distributive public agencies: Mixed Results; they do not perform better than others in terms of providing access to the poor Limited public service accessibility to the poor at local level is associated with high bribery in local administration Bribery in provision of public services reduces accessibility to the poor Bribery does not increase public service quality Bribery increases cost of public services Pro-Poor Public Officials: Who are they?
[Illustrative results from one country diagnostic] Determinants of pro-poverty reduction reporting by public officials (Initial results from multivariate econometric analysis, Bolivia data): Municipality/Locality plays key role: significant differences across localities College-educated officials report higher pro-poverty alleviation impact Public officials in pro-poor institutions do not report higher poverty alleviation impact Public officials in better run, transparent, less corrupt agencies do report enhanced pro-poor impact Lower Public Sector Salaries do not Increase Bribery in Ecuador
15.5% 15% Bribe* = 3MS 12% 8.4% 9% 7.7% Bribe* Bribe* = 6% = 0. 2MS 0. 5MS 3% 0% Monthly Salary Monthly Salary Monthly Salary Less than 3MS Between 3 & 13 MS More than 13 MS * Average bribe to public officials Indonesia (preliminary): Public Sector Corruption in Indonesia Is Not Caused by Low Government Pay(Indonesian Public Official Survey Very Preliminary Draft) Based on 36 public agencies covered in the Indonesia Public Officials Survey. Indonesia (preliminary):Agencies Providing for Citizen Voice Exhibit Less Bribery(Indonesian Public Official Survey Very Preliminary Draft) Based on 36 public agencies covered in the Indonesia Public Officials Survey. Indonesia (preliminary): Bribery is More Prevalent in Resource-Rich Public Agencies(Indonesian Public Official Survey Very Preliminary Draft) Based on 36 public agencies covered in the Indonesia Public Officials Survey. Parliamentary legislation Central Bank Influence
Understanding the Politics is key to Assess Misgovernace, grand corruption, and its incidence on socio-economic variables:State Capture Prevails in many countries 50 % 45 % 40 % 35 % 30 % %of Firms affected by state capture 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 % % 5 Hungary Estonia Russia Azerbaijan Adverse Impact of Purchases of: Parliamentary legislation Decrees Central Bank Influence Prioritization: Strategy will differ (illustrative)
A.Little Political Will Civil Society and Data Power/Diagnostics: Voice/ Accountable Leadership Donor Public Procurement ADRs in the Judiciary Delicensing Process NGO/participatory drive (to improve public service delivery) B.With Political Will Public Procurement and Budgetary Reforms pro-poor Judicial reforms Civil Service Reform Police -- Accountability Collective Action with Civil Society & Private Who Should take the lead in a National Governance/Anticorruption Program?
Percentage of Respondents A-C: Anti-Corruption A simple Formula synthesizing Governance/Anticorruption:
National Governance:Challenges in Integrating Anti-Corruption Into Institutional Change A simple Formula synthesizing Governance/Anticorruption: IG and AC = KI + LE + CA Improving Governance and Anti-Corruption= = Knowledge/Info.Data ...+Leadership (incl. Political) Collective Action (change) Overall Corruption Over Time
(Selected Countries; ICRG index, rescaled 0-10) 10 High corruption Indonesia El Salvador 8 Russia Indonesia 6 Russia 4 Firms Senior Management Time Spent with Officials Do the bribes paid by firms make life easier for them?Not necessarily; as it turns out, firms that pay more bribes end up spending more (not less) time with bureaucrats. In Russia, various estimates suggest that senior managers/owners of SMEs end up spending between percent of their time negotiating with officials. Excessive control by officials over enterprise translates into excessive regulations, inordinate amounts of time spent by the enterprises owner with bureaucrats, and bribery. Our evidence suggests a very close association throughout the world between the extent of bribery and (higher) senior management time wasted with officials on licenses, as well as a close association between bribery and higher cost of investing and cost of capital for firms. Thus, we find no empirical support for the traditional grease argument, which suggested that petty bribery can help oil the squeaky wheels of commerce in developing countries.To the contrary, the business community ends up losing by bribing. El Salvador Poland 2 Poland Low corruption Finland Finland 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 7 Governance and Poverty: Summing Up
Governance broader concept than corruption Misgovernance results in poverty through various channels reduced growth being a key one Interplay between voice, accountability, rule of law and anti-corruption for attacking poverty is key Power of Data for analysis, reform formulation, and collective action: i) Cross-Country Indicators & analysis; ii) Regional Surveys, and iii) in-depth country diagnostics. Focus on varying quality of institutions within each country enormous variation (e.g. Parliaments) Misgovernance in extremis:Failed States Resolute collective action can make a difference, and in 5-10 years IG = K.I + LE + CA Visit: Data Presented for Analysis and informing Policy Advise, not for Precise Rankings
The data contained in this presentation originates from a large variety of external sources as well as World Bank surveys and research.Governance data is typically subject to a significant margin of error. The purpose is therefore not to present precise comparative rankings across countries, but instead to illustrate characteristics of governmental and corporate performance in order to assist in drawing implications for action.No ranking of countries is intended in presenting these research-oriented empirical results from these external sources. Further details and data, visit: