the vietnam war - ghent university...those of vietnam, the war indeed had wounded the nation in many...

Faculty of Arts and Philosophy

Academic period 2013-2014

THE VIETNAM WAR

WAS THE PRICE TOO HIGH FOR THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA?

VY THI BICH NGUYEN

Promoter: Prof. Dr. Ken Kennard

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the academic degree of

Master Program in American Studies

2

EXPRESION OF THANKS

First of all, my thesis would not have taken its shape without the great encouragement and

support of Professor Ken Kennard, my supervisor. Thus, my great appreciation is extended to

him, who spends a lot of time and care counseling and revising my work and gives me many

previous comments so that I could complete it on time.

Then, I would like to express my sincere gratitude towards all of the professors of the Master

Program of American Studies, who have brought me this invaluable opportunity to acquire

deeper knowledge of the fields in which I have long been interested. Their detailed and careful

guidance and responsibility provide me a warm and professional learning environment where I

could gain plenty of first-hand experience throughout the courses offered.

Last but not least, my thanks would also go to my family and my friends for their care and

assistance during the year. Without them, I could not have finished my master program in

Belgium and built up this intimate international friendship.

In brief, all of you are due for my deep gratitude.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPRESION OF THANKS ................................................................................... 2

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 4

2. INTERNAL PRICE .......................................................................................... 8

2.1 Money Cannot Buy Victory: An American War-Torn Economy ..................................... 8

2.2 The Invisible 17th

Parallel Within American Society ...................................................... 13

2.3 The Other War in Washington ......................................................................................... 22

2.4 A Traumatized Nation – Impacts On American Psyche .................................................. 30

3. EXTERNAL PRICE ....................................................................................... 39

3.1 The Illusory Victory – The Illusory Prestige ................................................................... 39

3.2 American power: An End or a Change? .......................................................................... 44

4. CONCLUSION................................................................................................ 48

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 52

4

1. INTRODUCTION

In the memory of most Americans who were involved directly or indirectly in the Vietnam

War, Vietnam became much more than a country or a conflict;1 it became a metaphor for a

very unhappy chapter in American history. It reminded people of the very moment when the

United States lost its own values and beliefs. Moreover, Americans have not forgotten the

image of the last helicopter’s departure from Saigon on 30 April 1975, a glaring symbol of

American failure.2 Subsequently, the blame for the Vietnam disaster has been laid firmly at the

government’s door; yet, the costs for this defeat were not always understood. However, the

impacts of this war have remained all-pervasive. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter objected to

normalizing the relations with Vietnam, saying that the destruction had been mutual. His view

was later echoed by William S. Cohen, the incumbent Secretary of Defense, who paid a visit to

Vietnam to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the conflict. Cohen pointedly

refused to apologize for the U.S. military action in Vietnam, explaining: “Both nations were

scarred by this. They, the Vietnamese, have their own scars from the war. We certainly have

ours.”3 Their common perception presents us with the unpalatable truth that the war was

equally destructive for the United States as it was for Vietnam. In other words, for Americans,

the effects of the war have reverberated throughout the nation over time and are now

considered as the price that the United States clearly continues to pay for its gross misconduct

in Vietnam decades ago.

More often, the war’s damage has only been associated with a ravaged Vietnam, which

was known to the world as having paid an enormous price for their eventual victory.4

Frightening scenes during the conflict were televised prominently and later depicted in various

American movies, books and photographs. Yet, that was only one side of the sad story about

the Vietnam War. The other painful part stayed within the U.S. Although the images of

America as an exhausted nation, badly devastated by the war were blurred and outnumbered by

those of Vietnam, the war indeed had wounded the nation in many ways, visibly and

1 David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.

(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 342. 2 Ibid., 343.

3 Bob Buzzanco, 25 Years After End Of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With

Vietnam. Common Dreams, 17 Apr. 2000. Accessed June 11, 2014.

http://www.commondreams.org/views/041700-106.htm 4 David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.

(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 340.

http://www.commondreams.org/views/041700-106.htm

5

intangibly, internally and externally, immediately and lingeringly. Recollections of those

gloomy days in Vietnam could hardly lie dormant in the minds of whoever was involved and

inevitably scarred by the war. Nonetheless, not everyone has thoroughly understood what came

out of the war as the immediate and long-term consequences for the U.S.

Much has been debated on the reasons and legacies of this disaster. Accordingly, the

results of this fiasco have also been extensively written down in American historical record as a

very hard lesson. The Vietnam War was also a defining psychological moment as it exposed

U.S. vulnerability for the very first time. Americans became aware that power alone was not

enough to win the war. Money, manpower and even technology could not bring back victory

for the Americans. For this reason, the Vietnam failure assumed great importance in American

story. The question of how this war could turn the U.S. into a domestically war-wrecked nation

that was vulnerable to international affairs has continued to interest many historians, politicians

and observers. Internally, it shook the domestic stability and pushed the nation into a serious

economic and political downturn. Externally, the failure not only lowered American global

prestige, but it also marked the decline of American power as a leading nation, the end of the

American era. Though the United States still held on to its peak position of power after

Vietnam, it had been seriously wounded by Vietnam. The United States then became identified

with weakness. Consequently, this once most powerful nation began showing numerous signs

of war-weariness, exhaustion, divisiveness and insecurity. Therefore, it is worth considering

whether both internal and external repercussions were too heavy a price for the United States to

pay.

Hence, in this paper, the focus will be on both this internal and external price that the

United States has paid and continues to pay for their conduct in Vietnam. These effects not

only emerged immediately after the end of the war but had appeared as soon as the Vietnam

commitment commenced. In the first section, we will discuss the internal problems the U.S.

encountered because of the conflict. Economically, the changing policies that five successive

presidents pursued in Vietnam were mainly at the expense of the federal budget. Having

suffered a huge budget deficit owing to the excess of money wasted on the war, the domestic

economy became destabilized. In return, this financial policy was hurting profits, creating labor

unrest, and fueling inflation in the U.S.5 Ironically, the United States was pumping billions of

U.S. dollars into a country whose existence was merely in name, only to bring back home

economic chaos, drain its financial power, and cripple its own economy for many decades

5 Ibid., 261.

6

afterwards.6 Thus, in terms of the economy, American policy culminated in an exorbitant loss.

Besides, socially, the Vietnam War was probably the prime cause for American domestic

disorder. As the war escalated, shifts of perspective among people appeared and social disunity

ensued. Many backlashes and anti-war movements were initiated among students who mainly

opposed to the excessive conscriptions. These waves of protest somehow stimulated thoughtful

people to reconsider the “righteousness” of American involvement in this conflict.7 People

started to question the morality of the war.8 Additionally, for the first time the media presented

to the people the harsh and real truths behind the war.9 The public became better informed as to

a larger degree about what was going on at the war front, which often challenged the narrative

that was being released by the U.S. government. As a result, doubts were cast on the

justifiability and urgency of American military action in the name of national security.

Hence, this became the most divisive war in American history.10

Society imploded,

public confidence eroded, and the price of humanity exceeded the limit of tolerance.

Politically, fighting two wars simultaneously, one in Vietnam and the other inside Washington,

American leaders were unavoidably undergoing extreme tensions and frustration. Public

outrage and dissatisfaction with what their government was doing considerably added to the

already unbearable pressure among the Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials who

were responsible for the decision-making to steer the nation to victory. When news was

released about successive increases in troop number, yet without signs of progress, the

presumed light of victory at the end of the tunnel became ever dimmer and illusory. Towards

the end of the 1960s, as the United Stated fell deeper into the war, patience was lost and

mistrust widespread. Particularly, as U.S. Presidents were held responsible for the

disinformation of the war and later scornfully exposed as liars, this was a profound shock to

many Americans. This resulted ultimately in the unprecedented transfer of power from the

executive branch to the legislative branch. The imperial presidency was over. It signaled

change in the White House and henceforth foreign policy became intertwined with the Vietnam

6 Ibid., 339.

7 Ibid., 263.

8 What Effects Did the Vietnam War Have on American Society? StudyMode.com. April 2004. Accessed

June 06, 2014.

http://www.studymode.com/essays/What-Effects-Did-The-Vietnam-War-45611.html 9 Kroes, Rob. "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've seen

the mall: Europeans and American mass culture. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996.),113. 10

David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.


http://www.studymode.com/essays/What-Effects-Did-The-Vietnam-War-45611.html

7

syndrome.11

Psychologically, scars of the war kept haunting and traumatizing Americans for

decades. For those who directly fought in Vietnam, the experiences and its obsession continued

to haunt them in their daily lives.12

For the young generations, this war was a valuable lesson

about American values and characteristics. Notably, the failure was so serious an attack on the

notion of power and exceptionalism that had underpinned American life throughout history.

In large part, the impacts of this war were on domestic affairs. However, since foreign

policy is an extension of domestic policy, whatever happened in domestic area inevitably

affected the U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Therefore, the second section will concentrate

on how the war affected the United States in connection to its international front. After

Vietnam, it became clear that the U.S. failed to fulfill its mission of bringing peace to the

world, which shook its worldwide position and prestige. As depicted in the words of Defense

Secretary McNamara, the continuation of Vietnam policy was “the continuation of American

slide down the slippery slope”.13

Coincidentally, this statement also foreshadowed the slope of

international power that the United States had always been top-ranked. This miscalculation

drove the nation into a new postwar era in which the American global role became restricted as

U.S. power declined.

11

Max Boot, The Incurable Vietnam Syndrome. The Weekly Standard 15, No 5. October 19, 2009.

Accessed June 20, 2014.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/059wcvib.asp?pg=1 12

Clyde Haberman, Agent Orange’s Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans. The New York Times. May

11, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/agent-oranges-long-legacy-

for-vietnam-and-veterans.html 13

Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.

(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 125.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/059wcvib.asp?pg=1

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/agent-oranges-long-legacy-for-vietnam-and-veterans.html


8

2. INTERNAL PRICE

2.1 Money Cannot Buy Victory: An American War-Torn Economy

As for the exorbitant price the U.S. had to pay for its involvement in Vietnam, it did not have

to wait until the final stage of the war to see all the damaging repercussions of this war. In this

way, the destruction of the U.S. economy had already taken place even before the war came to

an official end. The entire war cost an estimated $140 billion,14

creating an exhausted and

vulnerable economy in the end. Yet, no matter how much money the U.S. spent on the war, it

was never able to buy victory at home as planned. One of the reasons was because funds were

allocated not only for the sustainability of the contemporary huge standing army at home but

also for the maintenance of the puppet government in South Vietnam. The large financial

resource was mobilized to mainly invest in a fictitious South Vietnam whose existence and

longevity was not based on nationhood but on American money. Interestingly, in 1960s,

American victory almost depended on the capacity of this ‘invented nation’ to fight against

North Vietnam. This explained why up to 78 percent of the Vietnam budget was set aside for

the military-building while only 2 percent went for welfares, health and education.15

Yet, this

was obviously a hopeless fight. In the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. had already spent a great

amount of budget subsidizing the French in their Indochina War, for example $785 million in

1953 alone.16

Then in the 1960s, having mistakenly put money into the incompetent hands of

the South Vietnamese government, the United States could not escape the financial loss in the

end. This triggered serious economic woes to the U.S. during the conflict, including an

unbalanced economic production, the dwindling consumer’s confidence, and the huge budget

deficit. These factors partly accounted for the economic crisis and energy vulnerability in the

1970s.17

Contextually, considered as one of the prosperous decades in American history, the

early 1960s was passing through the phase of affluence and high growth that preceded another

14

Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed 9 June 2014.

http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm 15


(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 198. 16

Ibid., 198. 17

Rexy. How much did the Vietnam War cost? The Vietnam War.Info. January 22, 2014. Accessed June

16, 2014. http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/

http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm

http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/

9

economic boom. Yet, the late 1960s witnessed a surprisingly rapid downturn in the economy,

coinciding with the years the Vietnam War escalation began in earnest.18

This suggested that

among many unavoidable factors causing a slowdown as the very nature of the economy cycle,

the Vietnam War did give a significant contribution to the decline of American economy. This

decline continued and finally culminated with the economic crisis in the 1970s and as a result

weakened American economic power in the world.19

This unsettled most Americans as it

contradicted to their post-war consensus that economic boom would return as in the 1950s and

early 1960s. Triumphant experiences in fighting many wars in history, especially in the two

world wars against more powerful enemies, had boosted Americans’ confidence that victory

was well within grasp and another boom was around the corner. Owing to this post-war

consensus, the majority of Americans probably did not view the U.S. involvement in another

war as a matter of major concern. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War turned out to be a complete

difference. The longer the United States spent time in Vietnam, the more severely its economy

was hurt by the war. Unlike Vietnam, whose economy almost inescapably collapsed because

the whole country turned into the battlefield shattered by American constant bombings, the

United States ironically hurt itself in the pursuit of global security. While being the first to

blame for paralyzing the Vietnamese economy, the U.S. was to blame again for its ailing

economy till many subsequent decades. There were many ways the economy was driven for the

benefit of the war.

Firstly, the military overproduction, which was regulated for the purpose of sustaining

the war, played a major part in causing an unbalanced economy.20

Since the United States was

sinking deeper into the mire of Vietnam, the escalation policy led to both an increase in the

manpower, further requirements in the number of military weapons, and more demands for the

mass production of weaponry. A full-scale war economy would also mean a transition in the

industrial sectors. As Williams concluded, “a growing portion of the industrial capacity and

labor power of the economy had to be devoted to meeting the growing needs of the war.”21

The

18

Sam Williams, The U.S Economy in the Wake of the Economic Crisis of 1957-61, A Critique of Crisis

Theory. Wordpress. January 5, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2014

http://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/the-five-industrial-cycles-since-1945/the-u-s-economy-in-the-

wake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/ 19

Vietnam War and American Economy. Historycentral.com. Accessed June 27, 2014.

http://www.historycentral.com/sixty/Economics/Vietnam.html 20

Ibid. 21




wake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/

http://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/the-five-industrial-cycles-since-1945/the-u-s-economy-in-the-wake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/


http://www.historycentral.com/sixty/Economics/Vietnam.html



10

economy was thus occupied with producing weapons instead of basic necessities for the

domestic market. Factories that used to produce consumer goods were now converted to

manufacturing war-related materials.22

A balance on both military and consumer’s domestic

demands at the same time would provide an uphill task that the economy could hardly sustain.

Since military power was a demonstration of American might in both wartime and peace time,

and was vital for the U.S to sustain the war, cutting down the military expenditure at the war’s

peak seemed defeatist. In this case, the United States seemed to have no better option than

running an economy that centered on war production. The increasing requirement of the war

efforts especially when the ground war was waged after 1964 added higher tension and burden

to the manufactures.23

Certainly, a focus on the urgent military demands would simultaneously

entail a sacrifice of domestic demand at the time. The quantity of consumer goods produced

annually had to be shortened to make room for the war-related production. Also, fighting in a

backward and impoverished country, American troops and military personnel had to live on

American goods for their basic necessities including food and medicines. These products were

prioritized to send for American men on the battlefield. In return, the outcome was a shortage

of goods to meet domestic demands that spurred a price rise in the market and the flow of

imported goods. People frustrated and consumer confidence shrank. In the long-run, a

reduction in the consumer-capacity was well within sight.

Secondly, the policy of increasing military and economic support that Kennedy and

Johnson adopted undoubtedly added to the already “high level of Cold War military

expenditures.”24

Military spending had very often occupied a significant part in the national

budget under many Presidents. During Eisenhower years, nuclear weapon became the focus of

American national security policy. His emphasis on this massive destruction weapon, though

actually did not lead to the drastic reduction in military spending, still cost cheaper than the

standing army. Thus, defense budget was cut by 27 percent during his tenure.25

As every raw

material and manpower serving in the military field was at the expense of the domestic

22

Rexy. How much did the Vietnam War cost? The Vietnam War.Info, January 22, 2014. Accessed June

16, 2014. http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/ 23

McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.

(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 127. 24




wake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/ 25

Lawrence J.Korb, Laura Conley, and Alex Rothlan, A Historical Perspective on Defense Budgets.

Center For American Progress. July 6, 2011. Accessed June 28, 2014.

http://americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/07/06/10041/a-historical-perspective-on-defense-

budgets/




http://americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/07/06/10041/a-historical-perspective-on-defense-budgets/


11

economy, Eisenhower reassured the nation that he would not spend even one penny less or

more than necessary to maintain national security. But still, American military spending

remained high. Under Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, the postwar economic success in the

previous decades could not afford the period of war escalation, particularly when the two

Presidents devoted themselves to constructing a better American society. Both men spent great

time and effort on their cherished domestic programs of the New Frontier and the Great

Society, which required a considerable amount of federal budget.26

As John Whiteclay argued,

“Johnson’s decision to finance the major war and the Great Society simultaneously ravaged the

economy.”27

Meanwhile, the President’s reluctance to ask Congress for a tax increase in the

course of pursuing a balanced budget further worsened the federal debt.28

While basic expenses

on social and welfare must be maintained, a substantial amount of money spent on weaponry

made the large budget deficit apparent. Therefore, American economy underwent a steady

downturn until reaching crisis in the following decade.

However, as explained, the United States seemed to have ‘no choice’ but continue to

shoulder the financial burden that it had taken up in the beginning. In the late 1960s up to the

early 1970s, consecutive requests for more troops certainly involved increases in the federal

budget. By 1967, expenditures were already in excess of $2 billion per month.29

An additional

200,000 troops in that year certainly required further mobilization of reserves. This also meant

spending another $10 billion annually on the war.30

Upon the near collapse of the South

Vietnamese government in 1965, more U.S. troops were sent there to fill the vacuum.31

For this

reason, by January 1973, there were more than 540,000 troops in Vietnam compared to 81,000

in 1965.32

This accounted for a constant sharp rise in funding to keep the large standing army

in a remote country. Eventually, it was estimated that $111 billion military cost for war-related

26

The Great Society. Encyclopedia.com. Accessed June 28, 2014.

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/The_Great_Society.aspx 27

John Whiteclay Chambers. The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University

Press, 2000), 766.

http://books.google.be/books/about/The_Oxford_Companion_to_American_Militar.html 28

Melvin Small, The Domestic Course of the War, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.

http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/domestic.htm 29



Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.




Ibid., 321.

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/The_Great_Society.aspx

http://books.google.be/books/about/The_Oxford_Companion_to_American_Militar.html

http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/domestic.htm

12

operations and another $25 billion economic and military aid to Saigon regime.33

Where was

that additional amount taken from if not partly from the reduction of domestic expenses?

Actually, in dealing with the overheating of the economy, in 1965, Johnson’s economic

advisers had proposed an increase in taxation to help pay for the increasingly expensive war

abroad and the possibility of a double-digit inflation in the economy. Yet, fearing that this

taxation would politically affect his ambitious Great Society, the President delayed taking up

that advice until late 1968, which turned out too late.34

Until then, he could neither save the

prevailing unbalanced economy from a downturn that loomed ahead, nor realize his domestic

ambition. As Martin Luther King bitterly concluded, “The Great Society has been shot down

on the battlefields of Vietnam.”35

Owing to the massive spending on war, President Nixon

inherited from Johnson an economy surrounded by troubles and difficulties. Surprisingly,

during his tenure, although Congress refused an increase in financial aid to South Vietnam,

Nixon still committed another $13 billion budget to the Vietnam policy.36

Besides those direct and immediate impacts on the domestic economy, the United

States also went through the currency crisis and Oil Crisis in the early 1970s. The OPEC

nations unanimously increased oil price and imposed oil embargo against the United States

right at the time the American economy was getting more fragile.37

The oil shortage was soon

followed by a sharp rise in the food price. Domestic inflation was sparked off. Moreover, after

the Second World War, the Bretton Woods system established a relationship between dollar

and gold. When the U.S. had to pour billions of money into the system to feed their ‘invented

nation’ in Vietnam, huge money needed printing. This growing expansion on money supply led

to the devaluation of the dollar and consequently shook the previously established relationship.

In the early 1970s, changes in the international market suggested that the system would no

longer be sustainable.38

Under international pressure, the United States unilaterally abandoned

33

Rexy. How much did the Vietnam War cost? The Vietnam War.Info. January 22, 2014. Accessed June

16, 2014.

http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/ 34

Melvin Small, The Domestic Course of the War, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.

http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/domestic.htm 35



W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 6. 37

Terry Macalister, Background: What caused the 1970s Oil Price Shock?, The Guardian. March 3,

2011. Accessed June 29, 2014.

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/mar/03/1970s-oil-price-shock 38

Ibid.



http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/mar/03/1970s-oil-price-shock

13

this system in 1971.39

The loss of the U.S. Dollar’s value, together with the effect of the Yom

Kippur war in 1974 that resulted in the oil embargo, had indeed threatened American economic

security.40

These setbacks originated from the United States’ policies of war escalation and

Americanization. Without having to finance the war, there might have been no urgent need for

large money supply, no dollar crisis and probably no quick collapse of the system. Instead, that

war expenditure could be spared for domestic investment to secure the economy from

international pressure. Economic vulnerability somehow diminished American strength in the

international market.

Generally, devoting to a war economy turned out to be an unwise investment. It clearly

produced more losses than gains. Unfortunately, the American government and its economy

seemed stuck in the evidently complicated situation. The excessive capital wasted overseas

annually did not generate any real profit to the American economy. Instead, it widened the

already sizable budget deficit. The duration of the war was the key factor. The United States

heavily subsidized its infant regime in South Vietnam while being ironically incapable of

stabilizing its own domestic economy. Fighting a far-off war that inflicted huge economic

instability at home turned out a serious miscalculation which the United States might not have

fully anticipated and thus, could not avoid. How could the U.S. bring stability to other nations

while still struggling with its own affairs? How could the U.S. strengthen South Vietnam to

make it able to stand on its own feet while failing to stay firm domestically? Eventually, what it

got in return was not an economically independent government but an exhausted domestic

economy burdened with another financial dependency in South Vietnam.

2.2 The Invisible 17th

Parallel Within American Society

Socially, the Vietnam War also had an immeasurable effect on the United States, which

apparently shattered American unity as never before.41

During the war, there was a creeping

conversion of American perception upon American role in Vietnam. Public support for the war

39

Nick Beams, When The Bretton Woods System Collapsed World Socialist Website. August 16, 2001.


https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/08/bw-a16.html 40

Ron Hera, The War at the end of the Dollar, Financial Sense, 4 Dec. 2012. Accessed June 9, 2014.

http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/ron-hera/the-war-at-the-end-of-the-dollar 41

SparkNotes Editors. SparkNote on The Vietnam War (1945–1975). SparkNotes.com. SparkNotes LLC.

2005. Accessed 29 May 2014.

http://www.sparknotes.com/history/american/vietnamwar/context.html

https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/08/bw-a16.html

http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/ron-hera/the-war-at-the-end-of-the-dollar


14

was under the sway of political leaders, remaining strong in the beginning, gradually declining

and later transforming into frustration, distrust and oppositions. Also, the huge price of

humanity in this war challenged the moral aspect and justifiability of American action,

especially when disinformation was exposed at the peak of the war, largely thanks to the

media.

During Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, under the dire threat of Communism, the

United States adopted the containment policy for the national security. The Korean War was

one of the first showdowns of this policy. In the 1950s and early 1960s, American people were

almost unanimously behind their Presidents over the Southeast Asian issue. American opinion

showed a particular unity with respect to the need to contain Communism.42

This resulted from

the fact that Americans were living through the communist fear for decades. Especially in the

1950s, McCarthyism left Americans so fearful that they soon decided to encourage their

government to put all effort to contain Communism and therefore, believed that defending

South Vietnam was in the national interest.43

They were convinced by their government that

the Vietnam War was to block the communist flow into South Vietnam from the North,44

and

that protecting South Vietnam from being conquered by the Communist forces equaled to

protecting the United States and the West from communist aggression. A breakaway from

government stance would be deemed as either disloyalty or pro-Communism.45

Moreover,

events of the Tonkin Resolution in 1964 was another perfect catalyst that bolstered support

from both the public and Congress. Johnson was granted full authority to do whatever he

assumed appropriate in the ensuing years to sustain and win the war. Americans gave their

government absolute confidence and responsibility to release people from their communist

fear.46

A Harris survey reported that 70% of American people approved the ground war,

assuming that the United States should take its stand against communist expansion in Asia.

Yet, containment was the only goal of the war that these interviewees knew. Indeed, in 1965,

most Americans had little knowledge of the war and how to win it.47

Thus, results of the survey

were not solid enough to justify American action but only showed a fact that their fear of

42

David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge,

Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 1. 43

UShistory.org. The Antiwar Movement. U.S. History Online Textbook .2014. Accessed June 13, 2014.

http://www.ushistory.org/us/55d.asp 44

David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,


Ibid., 245. 46

Ibid., 249. 47

Ibid., 249.

http://www.ushistory.org/us/55d.asp

15

Communism in the 1950s was so pervasive. This fear explained why “public support for the

war appeared firmer than ever, although they knew that the fighting would go on for several

years.”48

Another reason why Americans maintained strong approval for the war was because of

the disinformation intentionally released to them. People were ill-informed, uninformed or

even misinformed during the conflict. The political turmoil in South Vietnam did not augur

well for the American future in Vietnam. Social unrest provoked boiling resentment of the

populace on the American-controlled government. This concurrently illustrated that the

American military advisers and troops had failed to maintain order and stability for that

newborn government. Hence, the fundamental purpose for sending huge political and financial

support came to nothing. When news about the protests, the political social backlashes in South

Vietnam and its incompetent government reached home in details, American people were left

with the feelings that their men were not achieving the success or progress that had previously

been sold to the public. The image of the self-immolation of a Buddhist monk in 1963 to

protest Diem government foreshadowed a political mess that could hardly be tidied up by

military alone as American officials had wrongly assumed.49

Images of other following self-

immolations had profound effects on both Vietnamese and Americans. Indeed, this event of

1960 cleared the way for series of subsequent waves of movement within the U.S. At least

eight Americans set themselves ablaze to protest the war within five years from 1965-1970.50

Notably, people were once again stunned in 1965 when Norman Morrison set himself on fire to

“express his concern over the great loss of life and human suffering in Vietnam.”51

He died in

the hope that his cries would not go unheard.52

Actually, their deaths sounded urgent alarm

about the horrors of the war. Together with news released about U.S. political failure in South

Vietnam, Americans were sharply divided among themselves and started to stage protests.53

As

48

McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.


Ibid., 209. 50

Michelle Murray Yang, Still Burning: Self-Immolation as Photographic Protest. (Quaterly Journal of

Speech 1: 1-25. Accessed June 12, 2014), 4.

http://advocacyethicsanddesign.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/murray-yang-still-burning.pdf 51

Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.


Michelle Murray Yang, Still Burning: Self-Immolation as Photographic Protest. (Quaterly Journal of

Speech 1: 1-25. Accessed June 12, 2014), 4.

http://advocacyethicsanddesign.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/murray-yang-still-burning.pdf 53

Rob Kroes, "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've seen

the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 113.

http://advocacyethicsanddesign.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/murray-yang-still-burning.pdf


16

a result, while trying to deal with increasingly violent and political backlashes in South

Vietnam, the federal government concurrently faced many protests mounting across the nation.

Particularly, in the aftermath of the 1965 bombing policy Operation Rolling Thunder to

blast Hanoi to the point of national disaster, signs of protests rapidly emerged, mainly on

university campuses. Peace movements arrived in Washington in 1965, calling on officials to

end, not to extend the war.54

Forms of protest were not limited to marching. Alongside the Free

Speech Movement, broad revolts were led by college and university students across the land to

voice their moral objection to the other part of society which supported the war, Johnson’s

escalation policy and the rising draft calls.55

The “Vietnam Day” held at Berkeley in October

1965 drew thousands of students who gathered to freely voice their opinion. There, they

sparked off debates on the moral basis of the war. These intellectual gatherings played as a

ground where information and intelligence of the war were spread and drew nationwide

attention.56

Unfortunately, they practically made no impact on the administration, while in

return being considered as rebels or pro-Communists.57

With public support remaining strong, Johnson quietly changed his policy to

Americanize the war, to clear the way for an easy and certain victory, without having to ask for

further Congressional approval.58

As the American role in South Vietnam enlarged, so did the

number of American troops. It entailed constant increases in conscriptions at home, which were

clearly unfair to the minorities who were ineligible for deferments.59

In the course of the civil

right movement, these drafts intensified the frustration of the minority group over the

government. Much to the African American disappointment, the unfair conscription was just

another racial discrimination that fueled the antiwar movement that was spreading around the

nation. The seed of this movement began to sprout rapidly into an unstoppable force,

pressuring American leaders about the Vietnam commitment.60

The scope of the movement

seemingly corresponded with escalation of U.S. troops in Vietnam. The first march to

54

David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.


John Hellmann, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,

1986), 71. 56

Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States, Modern American Poetry. 1998.

Accessed June 13, 2014

http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html 57



Ibid., 249. 59

Ibid., 251. 60

UShistory.org. The Antiwar Movement. U.S. History Online Textbook .2014. Accessed June 13, 2014.


http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html


17

Washington in March 1965 came as a shock to the officials. It comprised up to 25,000 people,

mainly students, gathering at the White House to resist the bombing.61

This marked the

beginning of many upcoming backlashes against the government’s military actions.62

The

movement blossomed in 1967 with the march on the Pentagon, the largest protest in decades,

drawing up to 50,000 protestors coming from different groups. The event astounded the

public.63

In the middle of social chaos and disorder because of the war opposition, American

people were suddenly going into an awful shock at the Tet Offensive in 1968, which dispelled

the illusion of progress in Vietnam. For them, this event was no different from a psychological

defeat as they figured out that their U.S. forces were hopelessly no closer to victory than they

had claimed in the beginning. People were also getting a clearer vision of the dangerous and

complicated situation in Vietnam, where U.S. troops were stuck. Antiwar feelings quickly

invaded into American psyche.64

In November 1969, in the middle of domestic economic

downturn, another group of estimated 500,000 participants marched on Washington the second

time, mainly to oppose the escalating U.S. role and troops in Vietnam because the economic

cost was too high.65

Ironically, the government was forced to employ military to quell its own

youth.66

By the end of 1969, up to 80% of those asked admitted that they were tired of the

conflict.67

Dissatisfaction with government officials and opposition to the administration’s

policy in Vietnam became the focus of dissenters’ attention. At times, Robert McNamara,

Secretary of Defense, was targeted by the protestors as a “war machine”.68

While constantly

receiving cables reporting the worsening political and social situations in South Vietnam,

Washington was tense with excessive domestic pressures and chaos. Those movements

demonstrated the clash of ideas between the government and its people, especially the draftees

and the youth, which ultimately tore society apart. People’s dissatisfaction on the federal

government marked the fracture in the relation between the public and politicians, and shook

61

Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States. Modern American Poetry. 1998.



W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), iii. 63



Ibid., 255. 65






Ibid., 259. 68





18

public confidence in their government. The Vietnam involvement had been sold to public as a

‘crusade’ for American and Western security against the communist threat. In fact, that

external threat was not as clear as the domestic threat of increasing financial and human losses

for the United States. The aim of stopping Communism appeared more vague and dubious. The

war had been sold to them as where the U.S. as a superpower would need little effort to defeat

a third world nation that was economically and politically feeble. The nation’s physical ability

including huge amounts of time, finance and numbers of lives were continuously spent on the

war without recording success. The war had been sold to them as an easily-won fight and thus,

victory was guaranteed. However, more than two decades passed by, victory remained beyond

reach. Meanwhile, the war was taking so many young lives, and American social unity was

teetering on the edge of collapse. Opinion shifts were recorded as most profound in history.69

Demands for withdrawal regardless of consequences started to mount up.70

With growing

dissents among the public, signs of uncertainty and concerns appeared within the Pentagon.

Though failing to halt or slow down American intervention in Vietnam, these antiwar

movements finally did contribute to drawing national and worldwide attention to American

escalation in Vietnam. They also disseminated more degree of truth about the Vietnam War

and expressed doubts about American possibility of a victory attained via military superiority.

Together with other social movements, these protests not only typified the racial division as the

nature of the country in the 1960s, but also deepened the domestic fracture in society. In sum,

when the U.S. approached the political conflict in Vietnam, it was simultaneously handling

another social conflict at home.71

Obviously, public opinion was largely affected by the amount and accuracy of the

information released. In the Vietnam War, the media, particularly the press, was partly held

responsible for the changing perspective of Americans towards many war-related issues.72

Initially, when Americans were unanimous about the war, Life Magazine proclaimed that the

Vietnam policy was wise and moral. And Time concluded that the conflict was The Right War

at The Right Time.73

The growing power of journalism at the time opened doors for many war

journalists to go directly to the faraway warfront and brought home more degree of truth. With

69



Protests against the Vietnam War. HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2008. Accessed June 11, 2014

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/protests_vietnam_war.htm 71



Ibid., 267. 73

Ibid., 247.

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/protests_vietnam_war.htm

19

numerous articles and photographs about the conflict, the public had a clearer and more exact

view of what their boys were doing there and how their government was handling the war.

Besides, when several truths were gradually made known to the public by the media,

Americans realized a “mismatch” between the reality and the government’s announcement.

This was the first American war to be televised. People everywhere in the world could follow

every American action from home. Thus, they had been bombarded with images from the

war.74

In particular, exploding napalm, firefights, body bags, coffins, and other frightening

scenes streamed into American living rooms.75

Notably, people were shocked and haunted by

the two images televised in Vietnam. One was the film of villagers from young to old being

burned by napalm when American troops mistakenly attacked the village. The other was the

traumatic My Lai massacre in 1968 where five hundreds unarmed villagers were killed, mainly

women and children.76

While such facts demonstrated American strong military power, the

American government could not help facing criticism for its inhumane actions. The public and

international observers were thus left with outrage and the impression that Americans had

misplaced Vietnam and misused their power. Media brought clearer the American state of

uncertainty and confusion.77

Since an added truth was disclosed, public faith in their officials’

claim of a promising victory started to wane. Domestic consensus rapidly ruptured. Another

wave of shock swept over the whole nation on 13 June 1971 when The New York Times

published the first installment of the Pentagon Papers.78

People were once again ignited when

confidential details were released, which inevitably challenged the accountability of the U.S.

government.79

It was doubted whether their trustworthy government was telling the truth. This

shocking news brought dissent and frustration around the country and intensified pressure on

the administration to quickly get out of the Vietnam political dilemma. Public outcry sparked

by the media helped bring the war to a quick end80

. The Wall Street Journal warned that

74


the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996),113. 75



Ibid., 344. 77


the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 136. 78




History.com Staff. Vietnam War Protests. A+E Networks. 2010. Accessed June 13, 2014.

http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests 80




http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests

20

everyone had better be prepared for a bitter taste of a defeat.81

By and large, since the Vietnam

War, another historical dimension of the media event has been added.82

The role of the media

was largely recognized and became growingly influential, particularly in the area of public

opinion. Its enormous power played a key role in swaying people’s perspective. The media did

give the American public a different vision of the war, the tragedy and its effects. It raised

social awareness as to what the war really meant by the U.S. and clearly marked an influence

on the American population as a whole.

Additionally, the war raised another concern about the price of humanity in terms of

people’s lives being destroyed. It revealed the immoral aspect of American policy that

demanded condemnation by the society. “The ultimate human cost of the Vietnam War was

staggering for both sides.”83

About three millions of Vietnamese died. At least that many were

wounded, while more than 58,000 American troops gave up their lives on the battlefield.84

About 1,400 Americans died in 1965 alone, and the number mounted up to 5,000 in 1966 and

over 9,000 in 1967.85

That many more casualties inflicted was easily predictable. Although this

number compared to that of the two World Wars was relatively small, the image of American

boys returning home in body bags alarmed the critical condition of the remote war and

questioned the ethical and the practical aspects of the war. The public was upset at the fact that

young Americans were constantly and increasingly being killed on foreign soil by an enemy

who was exposed as not posing any direct threat to the U.S. The sacrifice of American boys

was seemingly above people’s limit of tolerance. The cost for this victory, if gained, was

simply too high to pay.86

Demands for winning the Communist transformed into demands for

ending the war as soon as possible.

The immorality of this war was additionally illustrated in the body count measurement

adopted by American officials as a proof of their progress in Vietnam. American success was

81

Ibid., 256. 82


the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 134. 83

SparkNotes Editors. SparkNote on The Vietnam War (1945–1975). SparkNotes.com. SparkNotes LLC.

2005. Accessed May 29, 2014.

http://www.sparknotes.com/history/american/vietnamwar/context.html 84

Bob Buzzanco, 25 Years After End Of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With

Vietnam, Common Dreams, 17 Apr. 2000. Accessed June 11, 2014.

http://www.commondreams.org/views/041700-106.htm 85









21

evaluated via the number of Vietcong being killed. The military advisers believed that they

could weaken the Vietnamese force and destroy Hanoi’s will to fight by killing as many

Vietnamese as possible via constant bombings and ground wars. This immoral strategy of

inflicting more casualties on Vietcong than they could replace or sustain became an American

military strategy for many following years. The purpose was to transfer only one message, that

there was little chance and space for North Vietnam to win. Sadly, counting the number of

dead Vietnamese as a measure of American progress was so inhuman that it was actually

showing a bitter truth. American policy-makers was being stuck in their hopelessness and lost

in their miscalculation of the war.87

“Using body counts as a measurement to help figure out

what should be done in Vietnam to win”88

was a seriously misleading and immoral strategy

they were following. Clearly, those statistics could not show any progress in the American

strategy. Likewise, they should not be treated as signs of progress in the war. How could they

count the enemy’s loss of life as American triumph? How could the increasing number of

enemy’s death be transferred into the increasing percent of hope for the U.S.? Where did

morality lie when viewing casualties as trophies? In essence, the only significance these

numbers conveyed was probably how fierce the war was, how mistaken the leaders were, and

how much the price of humanity the U.S. paid for its misconduct.

In short, the antiwar movement was the opportunity for those politically, racially,

culturally frustrated with the government and the society to make their voices heard. In a sense,

the movement may just be the tip of the iceberg that implied a much more serious schism of the

domestic U.S. in the 1960s. This movement might have reinforced the civil right movement,

which was launched for racial justices, and the hippy movement that looked to restructure the

whole society at the time.89

The collapse of social stability split the country’s unity over

Vietnam and weakened American strength at the home front. Conversely, that internal erosion

perfectly nurtured the will and obduracy of North Vietnam.90

Without strong public support,

whether the U.S. could sustain this protracted war was now open to doubt. People expressed

concerns about whether the war was legal and that young American giving up their lives for a

87

John Hellmann, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam. (New York: Columbia University Press,

1986), 67. 88


New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 238. 89

Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States, Modern American Poetry. 1998. Web.

June 13, 2014


W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 6.


22

dubious threat was justifiable.91

In the end, the U.S. went to a far-off war, only to let its internal

ideological conflict unfold onto the world. Was the war really worth that degree of social

divisiveness and dramatic loss of life?

2.3 The Other War in Washington

Politically, the fierce war of words in Washington, the erosion of faith when presidents were

exposed as liars, and the political fear of another Vietnam that led to the unprecedented

transferring of domestic political power, were among the huge costs for the Vietnam War.

Unfortunately, they continued to weigh down the U.S. for decades.

Firstly, it might not be an overstatement to say that ever since the war plunged deeper

into a political crisis, especially from 1965, when the escalation began, until the humiliating

withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1973, Washington was entering another invisible war. Indeed, it

was constantly suffering a heavy atmosphere whenever the issue of Vietnam was picked up.

Political strategy was regularly being contested and caused bitter division among the Cabinet

members as to which way to best proceed the war and steer the country towards victory. The

situation in the White House was also fraught with difficulties, worries and high expectations.

Yet, no absolute consensus was ever reached. There were always at least two contrasting

perspectives to approach any issue over Vietnam. The seemingly only common ground in their

presumption was probably the haunting falling-domino theory that the U.S. was already

obsessed with long before the Vietnam War.92

This obsession seemed to confuse and make

them unable to work out the problem in Vietnam. President Eisenhower himself, though

viewing the Southeast Asia problem as of great importance to American security, yet without

any clear feasible solution to it. He had already felt stumped and thus, together with his

Secretary of State, Herter, expressed a sense of satisfaction when dumping the potentially

intractable problem of Vietnam into Kennedy’s lap.93

As Secretary of Defense McNamara

admitted, during his seven years in service, both Kennedy and Johnson were under increasing

strain due to Vietnam issue. The confusing advice Kennedy had already received from

91



Theodore H. Drapper, McNamara’s Peace, The New York Review of Books. May 11, 1995. Accessed

June 18, 2014.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1995/may/11/mcnamaras-peace/ 93

, Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. Ed,


http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1995/may/11/mcnamaras-peace/

23

Eisenhower about the complicated situation in Vietnam was underpinned by the notion that

maintaining the Indochina region as a priority in American foreign policy was crucial. Indeed,

without any thoughtful or reliable analysis of the issue, most of Kennedy and his group’s

debates failed to come to terms with the pros and cons of withdrawal.94

Did any of the five

Presidents from Truman to Nixon actually know how to tackle this perplexing and dangerous

problem? All had to listen to and count on their military advisers who ironically had little idea

of how to deal with the conflict except by trial and error. The lack of experts or specialists who

had knowledge and understanding about Communism and the issues surrounding Southeast

Asia was ironically a result of the McCarthyism in the 1950s, which had uprooted anyone

suspected for fear that Communism would infiltrate into American political arena.95

Thus, the

advisers seemed to be inexperienced in Vietnam and therefore, their shallow analysis was

explicable.

In mid-1963, President Kennedy had to face a dilemma of whether to carry out a coup

against Diem government or not.96

This resulted from a continuing dispute among the military

advisers in both Washington and Saigon, who were still disagreeing over what to do due to the

lack of precise information and investigation. His reluctance finally deprived him of the choice

of supporting either Diem or the coup. Ultimately, Diem had been suddenly assassinated before

Kennedy could come up with a solution. As a result, his team “was forced to make tough

decisions,” to put the future of South Vietnam into “the hands of someone whose identity and

intentions remained unknown.”97

Had Kennedy made the decision earlier on the coup, he could

have avoided such a “somber and shaken”98

reaction over Diem’s assassination. Had he had

more options and trustworthy advice to change the situation in time, he could not have plunged

into the political chaos in South Vietnam afterwards, and forcefully worked with Diem’s

incompetent successor and his unfit provisional government.

Under Johnson presidency, the atmosphere in the White House was going from bad to

worse. When the “slide down the tragic and slippery slope” continued, the U.S. was stuck in

limbo.99

Especially, after the big shock of the Tet Offensive, most of the discussions were

about how to pull out of Vietnam.100

On one hand, withdrawal was equal to unconditional

surrender, which was like a stab in the back of Johnson’s predecessors, who had put all effort

94

Ibid., 63. 95

Ibid., 64. 96

Ibid., 81. 97

Ibid., 81, 188. 98

Ibid., 84. 99

Ibid., 125. 100

Ibid., 126.

24

to demonstrate American power to the world by making Vietnam their absolute commitment.

On the other hand, continuation, while would be dangerous, costly in lives and unsatisfactory

to the American people,101

would lead to nowhere near victory, particularly at the time signs of

certainty of success were fading.102

Unfortunately, while the war in Vietnam was increasingly

hot, the internal war of contradictory ideas among the military adviser team was equally

searing. Even worse, “the Secretary of Defense seemed almost at war with himself”, Vandiver

commented.103

The war in Vietnam was without a front. Similarly, the battle lines in the war of

ideas inside Washington were rarely clearly drawn. When the two wars began, both Johnson,

his Secretary of Defense, and perhaps any of his advisers, were like stifling in the airless White

House. The accumulating stresses took a heavy toll on any policymakers. The President’s

stream of unanswerable questions and McNamara’s constant sleepless nights with the aid of

tranquillizers clearly evidenced the depths of despair and pressure they were tied with.104

Frustration, anxiety, and desperation poured into Washington when the situation in Vietnam

proved clearly intractable. Victory became negotiable and illusory. Particularly, tensions

mounted even to breaking point when the American government had to press the panic button

in response to the Tet Offensive in 1968. Clearly, once the nation got involved in the conflict,

those who had to steer the political boat had no choice but fully engaged in and devoted

themselves to it. Meetings were held, memos exchanged one after another, and thousands of

cables transmitted between Washington and Saigon; yet none could ease the tensions they were

facing and lead to any solution. As the Secretary of Defense admitted, “we remained in

constant turmoil over Vietnam.”105

The American government claimed its purpose of the

intervention was to help bring peace and political stability to South Vietnam. Ironically, while

peace for Vietnam was still far beyond reach, these two elements were already unattainable in

Washington. Political atmosphere among the Cabinet remained highly strained when political

advisers were far from “at peace with themselves”.106

Secondly, when documents related to the war were brought to light, American people

were deeply shocked as American Presidents were exposed as liars. “For Johnson and his

101

Ibid., 307. 102

Vandiver, Frank Everson, Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson's wars, (College Station: Texas A &

M University Press. 1997), 213. 103

Ibid., 223. 104

Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. Ed,


Ibid., 188. 106

Ibid., 335.

25

advisers, the war would have to be fought without arousing public passion.”107

This premise

was perhaps the basis of most of his later decisions to provide only half-truth to the public.

Even in 1965, when Johnson had already made “the fateful choices that locked the United

States onto a path of massive military intervention”108

and when requests for additional troops

in Vietnam continuously arrived, he still decided to tell the country: “our policy in Vietnam is

the same as it was one year ago, and it is the same as it was ten years ago.”109

He then invoked

the Tonkin Resolution in 1964 and Congress’s approval to take any necessary action to justify

all subsequent steps he took without asking for Congress’ further support. And he firmly said:

“I do not think any more congressional involvement would be necessary.”110

At the time when

antiwar movement was on the rise and signs of a divided society demanding a withdrawal from

Vietnam became clearer, Johnson either had to change the Vietnam policy to end the war or to

change public opinion.111

The problem was he could not back away and admit defeat for he had

once declared: “I am not going to be the first president to lose a war.”112

For him, the war “had

become a matter of pride.”113

Thus, he had no choice but to rally the nation. Officials became

salesmen as Johnson secretly told his advisers: “Sell our product to the American people. Tell

them we are winning the war”.114

Alterman even pointed out that McNamara, Secretary of

Defense, was also a compulsive liar sometimes. He kept in mind the perspective that he had the

right to choose which information to give to the public and nothing more.115

Why did Johnson

decide to exclude Congress and American public from his policy? Was there a lack of trust or

self-confidence? Was it because he did not think that Congress would accept such an escalation

which would obviously cost huge money and human power? He did not believe that Congress

and American people would go along with the war. Congress would have been inundated with

constant requests to afford the escalation. Or was it because he did not feel confident of the

current policy? He himself was even not certain if the escalation would guarantee a victory for

107

John Whiteclay Chambers, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University

Press, 2000), 763.




Eric ALterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences, New

York: The Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2004

http://books.google.be/books/about/When_Presidents_Lie.html?id=ndpYYUsv2u4C&redir_esc=y 110

Ibid., 111



Ibid., 246. 113

Ibid., 255. 114

Ibid., 256. 115

Ibid., 256.


http://books.google.be/books/about/When_Presidents_Lie.html?id=ndpYYUsv2u4C&redir_esc=y

26

the United States. Possibly, American people would react to the truth about the current

situation of the battlefront with an urge for a full-scale war. This would threaten the

involvement of China as in the case of Korean War, and then lead to the U.S.’s open-ended

commitment, which Johnson and his administration were attempting to avoid. Without

Congressional consultation and public support for a larger war effort, Johnson continued to

lead the country deeper into the war. After the Tet Offensive in 1968, “the widespread public

disaffection”116

started to grow rapidly since Americans realized that what they knew of the

war was nowhere close to the truth, and that they had been deceived by their government.117

While the situation was getting worse and public pressure calling for a withdrawal from

Vietnam were growing at home, Johnson’s struggle to seek feasible advice continued to bring

back no satisfactory results. However, the United States was not yet ready to give up in

Vietnam. Much to people’s surprise, in such a quagmire, Johnson decided to give up the home

front by deciding to withdraw from the coming Presidential election. The President painfully

confessed, “We have too many difficult problems and we need leadership that won’t be

attacked at every turn. We probably need a fresh face.”118

This decision marked the end of his

presidency and buried his cherished Great Society. His presidency was ruined by the Vietnam

War and eventually defined as more a failure than a success. His personal withdrawal from

politics ended in public condemnation. This was vaguely replicated by world condemnation

when the U.S. finally withdrew from Vietnam seven years later.

Disillusioned by Johnson’s administration, Americans transferred their faith to his

successor, Richard Nixon, who had promised a “secret plan” to end the war with honor.

Although at the time Nixon had no idea and even no intent to keep his words, those assuring

words, which were largely expected, helped him complete his journey to the White House.

Like many of his predecessors, Nixon had no knowledge of Vietnam and shared the same

feeling that victory depended on “the will to win and the courage to use power.”119

Surprisingly, despite running on the platform of opposing the war, Nixon was believed to have

prolonged the war for his presidential purpose. In particular, released tapes showed that Nixon

played a part in pulling the South Vietnamese government back from the Paris Peace Talks by

116


Press, 2000), 763.


Ibid., 763. 118

Frank Everson Vandiver, Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson's wars, (College Station: Texas A &

M University Press. 1997), 221. 119




27

promising that they would get a better deal when Nixon got elected.120

Certainly, no President

wanted to be the first to lose a war. And Nixon fully understood that his Vietnamization could

hardly guarantee victory. Thus, his de-escalation policy remained on paper while he quietly

escalated the bombing campaign. Public patiently granted the President more time to wind

down the war.121

Unquestionably, the release of Pentagon Papers in 1971122

about the

government fighting the war in secret, and the subsequent Watergate Scandal, revealing the

misconduct of the Nixon administration,123

only further fueled public outrage. This event was

the last straw taking Nixon down from power. When it turned out that the war had been

dragged out for another five years with additional loss of another 22,000 lives and huge money,

public reaction was filled with anger and bewilderment. Among the public now sat the

shocking feeling that the people had once again been betrayed by their own President. No

matter what the administration did or said, once public confidence had been lost, it could never

be fully regained. Never before had the President’s credibility been questioned as it was since

Vietnam.

Thirdly, the whole nation had been living through different types of political fear for

decades; the Vietnam War had truly instilled another terrible persistent fear into American

psyche. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, “the only thing to fear is fear itself”,124

the American people now might fully understand the fearful nature of the fear. Undoubtedly,

the Red Scare and the McCarthyism in the 1950s alarmed the nation about the fear of

Communism.125

This communist fear invaded into the public and especially into all

government agencies. It was this fear, which Americans could not afford to live with, that

120

Colin Schultz, Nixon Prolonged Vietnam War for Political Gain – And Johnson knew about it, Newly

Unclassified Tapes Suggest, Smithsonian.com, March 18, 2013. Accessed June 19, 2014

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-gainand-

johnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/ 121



Marc Fisher, As years go by, Watergate drifts toward myth, The Washington Post. June 14, 2012,


http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html 123

Naylor, Bryan, Best Known for Water Gate Committee, Longtime Sen. Howard Bakers Dies, NPR.org.

June 26, 2014. Accessed June 27, 2014.

http://www.npr.org/2014/06/26/325909260/best-known-for-watergate-committee-longtime-sen-howard-

baker-dies 124

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933, as published in Samuel Rosenman, ed, The

Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume Two: The Year of Crisis, 1933 (New York: Random

House, 1938), 11–16.

http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5057/ 125

McCathyism/The “Red Scare”. Dwight D. Eishenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood

Home. Accessed June 26, 2014.

http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/mccarthyism.html

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-gainand-johnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-gainand-johnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest%20headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html

http://www.npr.org/2014/06/26/325909260/best-known-for-watergate-committee-longtime-sen-howard-baker-dies


http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5057/


28

largely affected and urged the country into Cold War, whose climax was on Vietnam

battlefront. Indeed, the decision to fight in South Vietnam certainly reflected contemporary

conventional wisdom.126

Interestingly, since the war dragged on and the nation fell deeper into

the conflict, the fear of Communism and the falling domino principle turned into the fear of

failure and of being trapped further into that political mess in Vietnam. This fear rapidly

overwhelmed Washington. The President and his Cabinet were now struggling with the fear of

losing the war and of losing face as international eyes were watching over the American

performance. This fear was among the basic premises leading to escalation. Probably, it was

this strong fear of failure that somehow drove the Presidents to take whatever risk they

assumed necessary to win the war, even by lying to the American public. In this regard, fear

turned out to be the United States’ Achilles heel in war. Had it not been for this fear,

Americans could have accepted withdrawal more easily when there was still chance even as

early as in 1963 as argued by McNamara.127

Had it not been for this fear, Americans might

have escaped the Vietnam nightmare. Had it not been for this seemingly well-founded fear,

American leaders would not have been blindly and hastily taken on such a remote war, only to

discover later that it was so wrong. This fear prevented Americans from breaking out of the

mindset that had been filled with the communist threat. Ultimately, when the war culminated in

success for North Vietnam, the fear of being defeated was transformed into American

tremendous shock. In a war, the winner was always right. And Americans were shocked

because for the first time they realized their powerful country was wrong. The U.S. was not as

infallible as they supposed. They were also shocked for being defeated by a “forth-rate”

power128

was too unpalatable a truth to believe. Wryly enough, after this fiasco, Americans

were once again going through another fear named “Vietnam syndrome”, a new political

phrase coined by President Richard Nixon.129

It was actually the fear of another Vietnam; the

fear of getting bogged down in a similar quagmire that made the United States reluctant and

cautious to demonstrate its power to the world.130

More importantly, this fear carried a long-

126

David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War.

(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 1. 127

Robert S.McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.


David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,


George C.Herring, The “Vietnam Syndrome” and American Foreign Policy, VQR- A National Journal

of Literature and Discussion, Vol 57, No 4. December 12, 2003. Accessed June 20, 2014.

http://www.vqronline.org/essay/vietnam-syndrome-and-american-foreign-policy 130

Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed. June 9, 2014.


http://www.vqronline.org/essay/vietnam-syndrome-and-american-foreign-policy


29

term effect to any future President. His role as a U.S. Commander in Chief was partly

restricted. Indeed, a U.S. President was almost handicapped whenever it came to using military

power in the international front. The authority was automatically transferred to and

concentrated on the hands of Congress. The War Powers Resolution was one obvious example,

which required the President to consult with Congress for every single international

intervention.131

Curbs on presidential power were then unavoidable. The power of the White

House would never be regained to the fullest again. Since Congress and American public were

repeatedly misled into the conflict when Presidents were granted with wide discretion,132

mutual trust was broken and virtually absent within the United States henceforth. Put simply,

every time the United States was about to set foot on an international arena, the President had

to gain Congressional approval, sway public opinion, and set their minds at rest with the

promise that there would be “no more Vietnams.”133

A great effort was surely needed to restore

American trust after Vietnam.

In brief, the Vietnam War became an irretrievable disaster after five Presidents

successively made the same commitment to deal with it and failed. The government was

unconsciously engaged in the invisible war of words within Washington when conducting a

far-off war. These two parallel conflicts, which the administrators were fighting simultaneously

throughout years of excessive pressure and fear of failure, actually exhausted their heart, mind

and patience. Predictably, they lost all three. A national consensus, which was truly

fundamental when a country went to war, was seriously lacking within the U.S. How can the

U.S. win the war when the society was disunited, the government divided and ideas split

amongst the architects of the war? Failing to reach any feasible political solution to the

conflict, administrators were lost amongst themselves. They lost the war inside Washington.

Subsequently, Americans lost faith in their government and Presidents. With the morass of lies

and deceit, particularly of the Johnson and Nixon, American faith was almost broken. Their

distrust, as emphasized by Gary Hart, helped create the legacy of skepticism between the

governors and the governed in the United States that endures today.134

In the aftermath of the

131

Stephen Griffin, War Powers Resolution: America’s Most Misunderstood Law, Huff Post Politics.

November 13, 2013. Accessed June 27, 2014.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-griffin/war-powers-resolution-ame_b_4268839.html 132

Ibid. 133

The Vietnam War and its Impacts - Political Lessons. Encyclopedia of the New American Nation.


http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/The-Vietnam-War-and-Its-Impact-Political-lessons.html 134

Gary Hart, ‘When Presidents Lie’: The Post-Truth Presidency, The New York Times, October 10,


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-griffin/war-powers-resolution-ame_b_4268839.html

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/The-Vietnam-War-and-Its-Impact-Political-lessons.html

30

war sat a huge incredibility gap, which explained why President Gerald Ford had to assure the

nation in his address: “Our long national nightmare is over. Our great Republic is a government

of laws, not of men. Here the people rule.”135

These words, Alterman argued, were only to

mark the beginning of the nation’s slide into the age of “the post-truth presidency”, the post-

truth era.136

Moreover, ever since the U.S. took on this conflict, every single President seemed

to glue himself to as their major concerns in foreign policy. Consequently, while presented to

us as a misstep in American foreign policy, the Vietnam War also signified the historic change

in the United States presidency. Henceforth, presidential reliability was seriously called into

question. The previous discretion was then transferred to Congressional hands. As history is

full of surprises, the Vietnam failure evidently adds another to that series of the unexpected,

clearly in the American political life.

2.4 A Traumatized Nation – Impacts On American Psyche

Besides all the visible and measureable costs of the Vietnam War, the intangible damage on the

nation’s psyche, and on Vietnam veterans in particular, is probably too difficult and too huge to

quantify.

Initially, American failure came as a rude shock and probably the first and most

stinging attack on the United States. It caused the whole country to confront the values and

beliefs on which American character was formed.137

It challenged the notions of American

exceptionalism and invincibility that were well-entrenched in American history and built up

American nature.138

American history was seemingly associated with wars. Initiated from the

war of independence that marked the birth of the nation, along history, the United States often

found itself involved in wars of all kinds, from domestic to international ones, regardless of

whether it was for the national security or the world’s safety. Before Vietnam, it had been true

that any U.S. involvement in any war always brought home resounding victories and added one

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/10/books/review/10HARTL.html?_r=0 135

Marc Fisher, As years go by, Watergate drifts toward myth, The Washington Post. June 14, 2012,


http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html 136

Eric ALterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences, New

York: The Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2004

http://books.google.be/books/about/When_Presidents_Lie.html?id=ndpYYUsv2u4C&redir_esc=y 137



Ibid., 344.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/10/books/review/10HARTL.html?_r=0

http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest%20headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html


31

after another to its “spectacular and unparalleled record of success.”139

Indeed, the United

States’ successive victories from its birth were among the solid evidences to tout Americans

about the country’s exceptionalism belief.

Throughout more than two centuries, that victorious feeling had seated deeply in

American mindset, reinforced American self-confidence and constructed American ego. In

return, this exceptional understanding was also the underlying power that accounted for

American natural inclination to reach out toward others and intervene into international affairs.

The notion of exceptionalism denoted and implied a hidden comparison in the American

relationship with other nations. Viewing itself exceptional meant others were not. Being

exceptional meant the United States placed itself at an exalted position and devalued the rest.

Being exceptional meant the United States was too wise to be wrong. And, being exceptional

somehow meant the United States allowed itself to make exceptions. Invading Vietnam

without having to declare war140

was one exception. Being defeated but withdrawing from

Vietnam without having to take any responsibility for the political mess it had left behind and

the rapid collapse of South Vietnam,141

an infant regime conceived and born by the United

States, was the other. Exceptions had certain benefits. If the United States had declared war on

Vietnam, it might not have saved face by the “peace with honor” as claimed by President

Nixon,142

even though in the language of a war, there seemed no place for honor on the loser’s

side. Simply, how could one lose the war in honor? And sometimes, the price for that

exception was even heavier. If the war had been officially declared, strong Congressional

approval and public support were obviously not absent or short-lived in the U.S. If the whole

country had been in accord on Vietnam, the gap between the government and the public would

not have been considerably unbridgeable, a certain amount of consensus could have been

reached, the return of U.S. troops probably sympathized, and the Vietnam defeat viewed and

accepted as the failure of the nation as a whole. Thus, the government and the soldiers would

not have been the ones to blame. In this sense, being exceptional equally meant the country had

to pay a higher price for its every misstep. After all, exceptionalism is a double-edged sword

that while represented American strength to the world, internally it could hurt the U.S. if

139

Ibid., 344. 140

Ibid., 249. 141


Press, 2000), 763.


Ibid., 763


32

success was not ensured. With the Vietnam miscalculation, the United States began to

understand this truth.

Supposedly, the North Vietnamese with their historic remarkable victory might have

taught Americans to reconsider the exceptionalism concept. Actually, perhaps it was not the

Vietnamese but Americans themselves, via their own failure in Vietnam, started to question

this belief. It was not and could hardly ever be the intent of the Vietnamese to attack American

exceptionalism, a notion that never seemed to bother them in any way. Why not the

Vietnamese? It was simply because most Vietnamese did not truly understand how much the

notion of exceptionalism really mattered in this war. They were not fully aware of or really

cared about the difference between the French, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Americans,

an exceptional people coming from an exceptional nation, except for the only common purpose

of occupying and colonizing Vietnam in one way or another. Thus, in the Vietnamese eyes,

American act was merely just another external invasion, regardless of American allegations

that they were helping to construct a stronger South Vietnam. How could they trust the United

States’ words that the huge American military and financial support for South Vietnam was for

free? In the Vietnamese interpretation, the imperial invader, like the French, was no different

from a war-hunger. Obviously, the xenophobic feelings inherited and cultivated throughout a

history of constant wars largely fueled their nationalism, patriotism and made them hostile to

the U.S. presence.143

All they knew was the firmness that they would fight against whoever

invaded their country, no matter how powerful the enemy was. Losing Vietnam to American

hands was similar to losing Vietnamese identity and nationality, for which they were fighting.

Likewise, they would rather fight, even till the last Vietnamese, for the country’s freedom and

self-determination than concede the Americans. That was their strong will and the only

message the Vietnamese wanted to deliver. Then why did Americans feel that their

exceptionalism was being attacked? Was it because after subsequent unsuccessful military

objectives, they eventually realized that invoking the exceptional nature to justify the direct

confrontation with North Vietnam after 1965 was no longer convincing? The language of

exceptionalism was once used by President Johnson to justify this conflict.144

Conversely,

many protestors meanwhile invoked this notion to oppose the act of intervention, stating that it

143

L. Anderson, David and Ernst, John, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam

War, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 194. 144

Exceptionalism – Vietnam and the end of American Exceptionalism. Encyclopedia of the New

American Nation. Accessed June 17, 2014

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-Vietnam-and-the-end-of-american-

exceptionalism.html

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-Vietnam-and-the-end-of-american-exceptionalism.html


33

was “inconsistent with the values and principles upon which the nation was founded.”

Opposition was thus to reaffirm and preserve this understanding. Years after the war was over,

the reason why they were in Vietnam still left in confusion. That was why this defeat brought

about so many disputes over Americans’ attitudes to their exceptionalism. The Vietnam

experience in return raised doubts about this deeply-held belief. It also disclosed the truth that

the U.S. actually was just as other nations, having its own strength and weakness. More

importantly, the U.S. was definitely not infallible.145

In the end, thanks to this debacle,

Americans came to realize that exceptionalism, which they had been long proud of, was

bitterly identical to a myth. Psychologically, the more the U.S. believed in itself and its

capacity, the more vulnerable and responsive it was to the wound named Vietnam. Assuming

itself as an exceptional nation, the U.S. concurrently did not allow itself to make mistakes. And

thus, the mistake like Vietnam was something unimaginable, if not intolerable. The ideas of

American benevolence and infallibility had been guiding the country’s use of force throughout

history. It was in pursuit of noble goals that the United States got involved in Vietnam, pouring

immense military and financial support merely to foster the feeble puppet government or South

Vietnam.146

Yet, the use of force in this case only brought home disgrace and questioned the

great national dignity.

Besides the attack on the national psychology in general, there was another similarly

damaging attack on human psychology in particular. Irrefutably, a majority of Vietnam

veterans, whose souls were once distorted by horrors in the war, now continued to be

traumatized by its unpleasant memories and suffered much emotional disturbance in their lives.

This group was probably among the most severely injured, both physically and psychologically

by this war, not only in the wartime but also in peacetime. For them, the war even went beyond

the common perspective of a fight between the United States and North Vietnam. It became

their personal war in the fierce confrontation with the elusive and hostile enemy during the

fighting. The war then turned into their daily struggle with that disturbing past when they

returned. That chapter of national history perhaps became a part or the rest of their personal

history.147

In the war, the alien environment of the battlefield was the soldiers’ primary root of

fear. The huge rice paddies, deep swamps, and impenetrable jungles that were all well-travelled

to the North Vietnamese, were among the major disadvantages to American troops fighting on

145

Ibid., 146



Hellmann, John, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,

1986), 102.

34

a ground war. They were enduring a miserable condition while not many were familiar with the

harsh tropical climate.148

The harsh living condition in an agrarian and wild country was

another source of suffering. “It was as if the sun and the land itself were in league with the

Vietcong, wearing us down, driving us mad, killing us”, a lieutenant bitterly shared.149

Emotionally, the troops were also troubled by their own bewilderment due to the cultural gap

that made them fail to understand their enemy. Sometimes, they even questioned among

themselves about their purpose of being there. As one veteran recalled the emotionless

response of the peasants witnessing their homes being destroyed, “their apparent indifference

made me feel indifferent. They did nothing and I hated them for that.”150

Particularly, the

guerilla war often filled them with dread of being attacked all of a sudden. Worse still, it was

difficult to tell friend from foe, to precisely identify their South Vietnamese associates from

North Vietnamese enemies.151

The fierceness of the war left them with the feeling that they

were surrounded by a deadly force for the whole time.152

Unfortunately, the end of the war did

not signal the end of their affliction. Thus, it could not guarantee these troops a truly escape

from the war and a brighter prospect back home. The twenty-five-year war was over, and its

lasting impact remained heavy. Physically, besides all the serious amputations or permanent

disability, appalling damage caused by the Orange Agent stayed equally irreparable for later

generations. It was the American program of defoliation, in which U.S. aircrafts were deployed

to spray more than 19 million gallons of powerful mixtures of herbicides over 4.5 million acres

of land,153

in order to fight an invisible enemy who immediately vanished into the dense

jungles after carrying out sudden attacks. Sadly, effects of that human catastrophe on both

Vietnamese and U.S. troops persisted for decades, causing cancers, disorders, and congenital

maladies on younger generations.154

Therefore, for these soldiers and their families, the wound

148





Ibid., 338. 151



Bill Hunt, interview by Michelle Marberry, How Vietnam Vets Were Treated Upon Arriving Back In

The United States, The Vietnam Conflict: An Academic Information Portal for Education and Research.


http://www.deanza.edu/faculty/swensson/interview_hunt_cominghome.html 153

History.com Staff. Orange Agent. A+E Networks. 2011. Accessed June 18, 2014.

http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/agent-orange 154

Clyde Haberman, Agent Orange’s Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans, The New York Times.

May 11, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2014.


http://www.deanza.edu/faculty/swensson/interview_hunt_cominghome.html

http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/agent-orange


35

might never be healed. It more or less reshaped, if not distorted their future. After several years

fighting in Vietnam, these veterans did not simply return home carrying scars on their bodies

but turning back to their normal lives with abnormalities.

Apart from about 300,000 physically wounded, another 58,000 died, and more than

2,000 missed in actions, the number of whom bore psychological scars were probably

uncountable.155

Psychologically, they once again endured years of mental torment by the

traumatic memories and seemed not ever able to forget that sad part of life. For those who had

given up lives in Vietnam or at home because of Vietnam, their deaths were possibly paid more

attention to by American public and aroused big waves of protest in return. Their mounting

sacrifices were like catalysts causing additional tensions and undue pressure within the United

States and around the world. For those who survived the war, in a sense, getting through the

conflict and returning home was not a fortune compared to dying for the country on the

battlefields. Had they died in the war and carried home in body bags, there could have been a

different story. Had they died in the war, their names might have been respectfully written

down as war heroes on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall years later. Had they died in the

war, their sacrifice and valor might have rested in American memories and recorded in history

forever. And had they died in the war, at least, their Vietnam wound would not have been that

lingeringly haunting.

Furthermore, there was another equally deep wound inflicted on these veterans, not by

the war itself but by their beloved country; the wound caused by American negligence. Unlike

veterans of the two World Wars who came home to well-deserved victory celebrations with

national self-congratulations, and were greeted as heroes in great honor,156

the Vietnam

veterans returned to the fraught silence and intense humiliation of the whole nation as if they

were bringing back a crying shame on the nation. If the United States considers its commitment

in Vietnam as to protect the country from the Communist threat, naturally, should U.S. troops

sent to Vietnam be viewed as heroes fighting for the U.S. national security? And if so, should

the U.S. pay tribute to their time, energy and even lives spent for the country’s security?

Strikingly, their return soon went unnoticed and sank. They were likely to be shunned, if not

denigrated by Americans when coming back home, alive.157

Even worse, some were alienated

155

Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed 9 June 2014.




Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.




36

by their own family members who reacted to their return apathetically. Everyone chose not to

ever mention the war. Little assistance was provided and no new public policy adopted for

these veterans as well as their relatives158

as if there were, the Vietnam ache would be once

again touched, reopened and started to throb. They wanted to stay quiet to the past as though

they were attempting to let everything fall into oblivion.

By treating the soldiers with such indifference, the United States might be seeking a

sense of relief or a try to ease the sense of guilt for the failure. As the American public was

sharply split over the ‘righteousness’ of the war,159

how to treat these veterans remained a

confusing and disputable issue. Consequently, people tended to respond to these soldiers with

alienation and some condemnation. Why did Americans seem to blame these soldiers for the

wrong action in Vietnam? Clearly, though it might not be entirely accurate, this was the first

war the United States had ever lost, a totally new experience for the whole nation, a somewhat

embarrassment that the whole nation was attempting to forget.160

Previous strong public

opposition seemed to pave the way for their current disappointment. The entire country now

threw their anger and frustration at those who had been forcefully drawn to the war. As a result,

the veterans were largely ignored, if not condemned, and “treated badly as an act of national

bad faith” and awful shock.161

As shared by Bill Hunt, a former U.S. military advisor,

Americans were raised to believe that winning wars was something within reach and

inevitable. They were so accustomed to success that they had come to take it for granted. And

failure came hard.162

When the United States lost the war, it was assumed that their soldiers

had not fought bravely enough to save the country. Later, when it turned out that the soldiers

were not to blame, public perspective was shifted to the government. As Isaacs argued,

American public only turned against the war when the military failed to win it in the end and

when the government failed to achieve what they kept promising, though having been given

plenty of time to justify the human and economic sacrifices with a victory.163

Consequently,

158

Ku Bia, Vietnam War Veterans, The Vietnam War. Accessed June 16, 2014.

http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-veterans/ 159

Ibid. 160



Adam Garfinkle, Wartime Lies, Arnold Isaacs challenges many of the myths surrounding Vietnam,

The New York Times. November 2, 1997. Accessed June 17, 2014.

http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/02/reviews/971102.02garfint.html 162



Adam Garfinkle, Wartime Lies, Arnold Isaacs challenges many of the myths surrounding Vietnam,

The New York Times. November 2, 1997. Accessed June 17, 2014.

http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/02/reviews/971102.02garfint.html

http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-veterans/



37

having lost patience with their government, people now assumed that soldiers were not

victimizers but rather victims of a bad government that performed poorly in the war.164

Yet, calling these soldiers victims, who previously “allowed themselves to fall under

the charms and spells of political witch doctors,” as John Hellmann mockingly described,165

in

a sense was still inappropriate. If they were victims of this war, then who were the three

millions Vietnamese families and soldiers who had no choice but fighting and dying for their

country’s independence? Were they not victims of American aggression and misassumption

about the conflict? In this context, it might be more appropriate to consider the Vietnam

veterans as both victims and victimizers. For the Vietnamese people and any observer who

looked at the U.S. intervention as an act of invasion, these troops would obviously be viewed

as victimizers, who had inflicted on Vietnam massive destruction and death. On the contrary,

through the lens of Americans who opposed their government action and therefore,

sympathized with these soldiers, veterans were also victims. They were deprived of freedom by

their democratic country, forced into conscription and then made to suffer these lasting damage

in lives. In sum, no matter how they were called and perceived, afflictions were hardly

relieved. The fact that more Vietnam veterans committed suicide after the war than had died in

it suggested this truth.166

Post traumatic stress disorders, such as felony conviction, incidence

of nightmares, and inability to be emotionally close to other people, etc. had become common

problems for Vietnam veterans.167

Thus, American refusal to recognize and share their

invisible and unspeakable burden was another sharp cut into their already tormented soul. Even

if the Vietnam War was condemned as a bad and immoral war,168

it should not be these war

heroes to blame. The war was wrong, but not the soldiers who had responded to the nation’s

call and fought bravely and loyally under the instruction of their generals. To abandon the

veterans immediately after their return could not help Americans more quickly forget the war

but only sharpened the wounds that were still sore. Instead, there should have been great efforts

164

Bill Hunt, interview by Michelle Marberry, How Vietnam Vets Were Treated Upon Arriving Back In

The United States, The Vietnam Conflict: An Academic Information Portal for Education and Research.


http://www.deanza.edu/faculty/swensson/interview_hunt_cominghome.html 165


1986), 115. 166

Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam. Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed 9 June 2014.


Curry G. David, and Josefina J.Card. Lives after Vietnam: The Personal Impact of Military Service.

American Journal of Sociology 90, No 4 (1985): 949-951. Accessed June 16, 2014.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779544?seq=2 168





http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779544?seq=2

38

of the government and American public in trying to heal these tangible and intangible wounds.

Injuries may be healed, and pain may alleviate. Yet, scars would be left forever.

As history cannot be changed, memories can hardly fade away no matter how much

time went by. People all want to leave the war behind, but the fact remains that time and space

could not guarantee to release their minds from such an unnerving experience. Even till the day

these present veterans have all rested in peace, the infliction of the Vietnam pain will remain

pervasive. Put simply, while turning Vietnam into a physically war-crippled nation,

psychologically, the whole United States was living through the shadow of the war. The notion

of exceptionalism continued to be shaken as it provoked numerous debates. Though more than

four decades has gone and Americans have woken up from the nightmare of Vietnam, its

memories continue to loom large in American minds, leaving them a vague sense of unease

whenever people touched the issue.169

169

Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.



39

3. EXTERNAL PRICE

3.1 The Illusory Victory – The Illusory Prestige

History of the United States as a world leader was often associated with stories of its powerful

influence over other nation states. Understandably, the country’s outstanding historical record

has been dominated by American foreign affairs. And since domestic and foreign policies were

closely intertwined, whatever happened to the former would inevitably trigger the reframe of

the later. This explained why the Vietnam War, regarded as a dark spot of American history of

intervention, was also believed to have inflicted indirect but far-reaching consequences on the

U.S. international front. The tenacious persistence of this external price made it continuing

intolerable.

Arguably, the first external impact of the Vietnam failure was the shaking of American

worldwide prestige. As soon as news of the Vietnam involvement was widely disseminated,

the American worldwide image was accordingly at stake. How could such an unofficial war in

a remote area be a major cause for concern and damage to the U.S.? Why did the United States

continue to stay in a fight that was clearly by mid-1968 unwinnable? To answer this, it is

necessary to understand the American perspective on Vietnam, recognizing how vital victory

was to the U.S. and its reputation.

Naturally, war often breaks out when the two-sided conversation stops working, when

the ‘collision’ could not be solved by diplomacy, or when the gap of misunderstanding is too

large to be bridged by mutual reconciliation. Strangely enough, none of these reasons were

applicable to the outbreak of the Vietnam War. In fact, there was no official declaration of

war.170

Originally, the U.S. did not go to war with Vietnam because of any direct conflict

between the two. An impoverished faraway Vietnam certainly could not and would not pose

any danger to the United States at any time, let alone at the moment the U.S. was at the height

of its power. Some revisionist historians such as Gabriel Kolko, contended that if it had not

been for the American drive for hegemony and world order, the United States might have

eluded an overestimation of the communist threat and the containment policy.171

When this

drive was obstructed and challenged by the communist aggression, and the U.S. came under

170



Ibid., 18

40

attack from communist advances, military response was adopted virtually anywhere on the

globe, specifically in Southeast Asia.172

Following the lines of this policy, most Joint Chiefs of

Staff agreed the military intervention in this area.173

Vietnam unavoidably became the focus of

American concern at the climax of the ideological conflict. Without the communist threat, the

U.S. had little legitimate excuse to fight in Vietnam. In this context, the Vietnam War was

actually an extension of Cold War and accordingly, victory bore great significance to the U.S.

Winning this war carried immense prestige and helped the U.S. deliver three vital messages

correspondingly to the world, Communism and the French.

Firstly, “Americans have perceived themselves as having a world destiny that

intertwined with the fate of Asia”.174

In this connection, the future of Asia was the key to the

world’s security. And it was only the United States that allegedly had enough power and

capacity to ensure this security. Thus, acting as a world protector, the U.S. decided to reach out

to Asia, to make it “safer for democracy”175

for the benefit of the world. The purpose of the

Vietnam War was to protect the western world and the U.S. itself from the communist

expansion, which was represented by the Soviet Union’s increasing domination over the Third

World. Victory would act not only as an illustration of American power but also a confirmation

of its international role and prestige. Moreover, the United States would use this victory as a

warning to any third-world nation that was about to fall into Communism; there would be a

price to pay if against the United States. Hence, in the eyes of the world, this conflict was

somehow a display of power and a test of U.S. firmness and capacity to achieve its objective.

Since the U.S. volunteered to carry this world mission on its shoulder when coming to

Vietnam, the success or failure of this intervention was equal to that of the mission. American

reputation as a world saviour would either be reinforced or redefined. This just added pressure

on the U.S. to be victorious.

Secondly, in the larger scene of Cold War between the Communist and the Capitalist,

whose representatives were the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, the conflict

reflected an indirect confrontation between the two world powers. If Asia fell into communist

hands, it would certainly be led by the Soviet Union, who would extend influence over the

whole region and predictably organize these newborn communist countries against the United

172

David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War.


Ibid., 3. 174


1986), 4. 175

Ibid., 6.

41

States and the western world. Winning in Vietnam in a sense meant the U.S. was well able to

contain Soviet Union domination. American victory would partially thwart the Communist

ambition of expansion and reaffirm American determination to afford Cold War anywhere.

Thirdly, there was also an implicit message sent to the French, an American close ally,

who represented the highly civilized Europe. Despite American huge support in the name of

containment policy, which was up to 80 percent of French warfare from 1950 to 1954, the

French fate in Vietnam still culminated with failure.176

Succeeding where the French colonial

had been defeated in humiliation, not once but twice, would be a third-time embarrassment for

the French. The United States intervened in Vietnam with high hopes of easily achieving this

purpose, with the feeling that victory was within grasp. Victory would be the solid evidence to

show the French how exceptional the Americans were and that they far exceeded their

European ancestry. Success would strengthen American belief that with their messianic

mission, Americans were far more remarkable and civilized than their European allies.177

All above sublime objectives implied the truth that it was first for the United States’

own benefit that the country went to war. The U.S. would not and could not guarantee the

world’s security unless being able to ensure its own at home first. If the United States failed to

contain Communism, it might be true that the democratic world’s future would be more prone

to harm. Yet it was even more certain that the American future would first be threatened. This

danger appeared to weigh heavier. The question was: Why did the Communist expansion

become so threatening in the eyes of Americans that they had no other choice but contain?

American ego probably played one part in this perspective. For so long the United States was

shaped by the ambition to top the world in all aspects.178

This ambition and its realization built

up an American arrogance that largely sat in the mindset of almost every American. So

arrogant was the U.S. that it could not allow itself to be outranked by anyone, as well as be

threatened. Regarding itself as “a shining city upon the hill”179

, the United States seemed to rest

assured with the presumption that it was a model for other countries to follow. If the Soviet

Union became so influential, it would someday play down American international role. The

opponent’s advance meant the U.S.’s recession. With the communist domination, the United

176




1986), 52. 178



The Puritan vision for America that continues to this day. Finley, Gavin. John Winthrop and “A City

Upon A Hill. Accessed June 24, 2014. http://endtimepilgrim.org/puritans02.htm

http://endtimepilgrim.org/puritans02.htm

42

States would forcibly dwarf itself to make room for the newly emerged powers. In this respect,

it was not yet certain that the security of the world or of the United States was in jeopardy; yet,

the American world image and role were now under direct attack. It was for the preservation of

its global credibility that the United States found this intervention justifiable.180

History might play the other part. The triumph of Mao Tse-tung in 1949 had caused a

trauma to the United States. China had appeared as an important part of American thinking, a

next frontier of the U.S. in Asia. Notably, since the day the U.S. lost China to communist

hands, Chinese expansion became a clear-cut demonstration of the regional threat to American

influence over Asia. Actually, Washington remained convinced that its principal enemy in

Southeast Asia was not North Vietnam but the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, the

defense of South Vietnam was rather to stem Chinese ambition across the region. This was

American interpretation, which underpinned its wider policy in Asia.181

The fact that China

went communist added to the existing apprehension that the communist expansion had reached

a point that must be contained. Indeed, in the Chinese long-term ambition, American influence

in Asia would be greatly diminished, if not eliminated altogether.182

Moreover, the fact that the

United States had to concede the Soviet Union and draw up an artificial border in the Korean

War183

did not bode well for American future in this region. This concession conveyed the

impression of American impotence in Asia against the communist force.184

The international

threat of Communism, joined by the regional one, turned into a doubled worry for Americans

and their imperial control of Southeast Asia. The United States probably had a clearer sense of

how formidable its rival was and thus, it no longer felt secure with its position at the time. In

this regard, it was apparently not a perfect coincidence of the three historic events: the Chinese

expansion, Korean War and the Vietnam involvement. Without China and Korea going

communist, the United States would not go to war with Vietnam at once. Since Asia possessed

a strategic position in American foreign policy, the United States could not let its political

arena in Asia be swayed by the communist. In the larger picture, Americans were being forced

to take drastic action to avoid defeat in South Vietnam for the sake of American security and

180



R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St Martin’s Press. 1991), 186. 182

Ibid., 187 183

Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: An Encyclopedia, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2013

Accessed June 24, 2014). 351.

http://books.google.be/books?Korean+war+-+An+Encyclopedia&hl 184

C.Herring, George, America and Vietnam: The Unending War, Foreign Affairs. December 1, 1991.

Accessed June 20, 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47440/george-c-herring/america-and-

vietnam-the-unending-war.

http://books.google.be/books?Korean+war+-+An+Encyclopedia&hl

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47440/george-c-herring/america-and-vietnam-the-unending-war


43

position.185

Understandably, the conclusion that Communism was so threatening appeared

logical. Accordingly, the containment policy sounded more justifiable than ever. At this

juncture, it was not so important whether Communism was truly as dangerous as the United

States had assumed. The more important issue was that the United States had to contain

Communism by using the Vietnam conflict to defeat the Soviet Union, its Cold-War enemy,

and the Chinese, its regional enemy. In other words, the fight against North Vietnam was

American aim to kill two birds with one stone. The United States was concurrently well aware

that this remote war could not be won in the conventional sense. It was fearful that “winning

might provoke a larger war”, a head-on confrontation with either the Soviet or the aggressive

Chinese, and even a nuclear war, which should and must be avoided. In sum, a traditional

victory seemed inappropriate, “unnecessary and possibly counterproductive”.186

As a result, for the Americans, winning the war did not simply mean having defeated

North Vietnam but having successfully achieved its three-layer-objective. It was immediately

obvious that being a winner would powerfully reinforce American self-confidence and ego.

Conveying such significance, victory became so crucial that the United States could not bear

losing. Sadly, big declarations often fall short. As the war dragged on, victory remained

strangely elusive while American patience was pushing towards a breaking point. It always

seemed true that the higher the expectation was, the deeper the disappointment would be.

Likewise, the Vietnam failure greatly stunned the world and weighed even more heavily

against the U.S. and its sphere of influence. The defeat in Vietnam did not simply mean the

United States lost the war to North Vietnam, whose sustainability was largely thanks to the

considerable financial and military support from both China and Russia.187

It also meant the

U.S. lost the war to the Communist. Inevitably, it lost its own worldwide image, its

international prestige and influence. In the American conception and even through the lens of

other smaller powers, it was incredible that this powerful nation could be beaten in any war and

by anyone. And the Vietnam experience surprisingly challenged the popular narratives about

the powerful and the powerless. Winning the war, Vietnam also concurrently delivered a vital

message to the world. The power of nationalism could defeat even the most powerful enemy.

The American ignorance of this element, together with its arrogance, was largely accountable

185

R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St Martin’s Press. 1991), 186. 186



Bob Seals, Chinese Support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War: The Decisive Edge,

MilitaryHistoryOnline.com, 2008. Accessed July 7, 2014

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/chinesesupport.aspx


44

for its failure.188

The astounding victory of the Vietnamese played as a catalyst for other civil

strife elsewhere around the world to spark off. After that failure, the domino theory, which had

been haunting Americans for so long, did not come into practice on the spot. Nor was it

obvious yet that the Communist were about to organize all Asian nations against the United

States as judged and feared by American political leaders.189

It was quite clear that the loss of

South Vietnam to North Vietnam and the reunion of the this country did not threaten American

security immediately as Americans had scared themselves. Instead, with that loss, the United

States had to endure a much more devastating consequence, the attack on its international

reputation. Wryly enough, this had nothing to do with Communism. It was not the communist

power that lowered American prestige. Rather, it was American misinterpretation of the

communist threat that the nation suffered this self-inflicted damage. Perhaps, the United States

now better understood that it had mistakenly overestimated the communist threat in Vietnam.

In the Cold War scene, this Vietnam defeat was like a severe attack on American pride. The

silent retreat after suffering heavy losses of lives indeed brought home shame and dishonor on

American international prestige. The latter price was even higher and unendurable in

connection with American ego.

3.2 American power: an End or a Change?

There was little doubt that the United States was playing a leading role in the world affairs.

Every American international performance was the demonstration of American power, which

was often thought of as seemingly unlimited and unique. In the wake of Vietnam, the notion of

American power started to be questioned. That ignominious defeat gradually sapped the United

States from its domestic and international credibility. When people’s trust was shifted away,

the role was restricted, and the power would accordingly dwindle. That was why the Vietnam

War was believed to have marked the end of American era and signaled change of its

international role. This was deemed as the second external price for the United States.190

It was necessary first to understand what the American era was? Stephen emphasized

that it was the period when the world was largely driven by American power, when the United

188



Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.


W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), vi.

45

States could create and lead almost every part of the world, and establish a worldwide political,

economic and security order.191

With that definition, the American era was characterized by the

international recognition of American power and role as a world police. In return, the latter

evidenced the former. If the United States was able to perform its international role to the full,

the American era would be in its greatest. As the two notions were closely intertwined, if

demonstrations of the one were no longer solid and convincing, the other similarly became

shaky. More importantly, did the war really cause an end or merely a change to what the

United States had self-proclaimed, its American era? The answer probably lied on the current

judgment of the American power.

Admittedly, having defeated a world leader did not necessarily mean Vietnam was

stronger than the United States. Likewise, that the United States was defeated did not obviously

mean its position as a leading power had to be transferred to the new winner. As Anderson

argued, Vietnam did not defeat the United States as a nation. Thus, the United States remained

a world power that was predictably able to apply its full strength and authority over other

international conflicts.192

Certainly, the U.S. was still leading the world, and that position was

merely challenged but surely not to be shifted to any nation right after the defeat. Even the

Soviet Union was doubtfully qualified for that top, let alone Vietnam. However, whether the

maintenance of that position would secure the nation’s great era was called into question.

Apparently, North Vietnamese astounding victory partly shook American position, and

consequently endangered American power. That power had previously been displayed through

the U.S. military performance in Vietnam. Yet, power was not merely about how much

American military capacity was, but also about to what extent the U.S. could utilize this

strength to decide and define its own sphere of influence, its own interests, as well as its

control over others. American power was illustrated by the capacity to both handle its internal

affairs and dominate the world. Stepping into international affairs was a typical American

action and reaction, which had long been regarded as the expression of the Manifest Destiny,

an ideology on which the nation premised.193

This was also among the nation’s motivations to

get involved in Vietnam. Unfortunately, owing to the Vietnam defeat, the U.S. henceforth took

one step back from international front. It was also no longer allowed to take risks proving its

191

Stephen M.Watt, The End of The American Era, The National Interest, Nov-Dec 2011, Accessed June

23, 2014.

http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037 192



Hellmann, John, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,

1986), 6.

http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037

46

power to the world at the country’s expense. Congress disapproved a massive and prolonged

military intervention, arguing that it did not want to make the same mistake in Vietnam,

wasting more lives and money for any unclear threat. Was it truly because the U.S. did not

want to get into more troubles; or rather because it would be unable to stay out of troubles and

solve them if once again intervene? Was that act of recession for the benefit of American future

security; or rather because of the present insecurity of the country? Congressional explanation

appeared to be only half-truth. The other half was that any similar loss was unaffordable for an

already exhausted nation, and that with its current power, the U.S. might be incapable of

guaranteeing victory. Taking back the power once given to the Executives’ hands, Congress

probably better understood where American position was after Vietnam. This new step

meanwhile disclosed a sense of anxiety and a lack of confidence that primarily affected and

steered the American world of politics into many unprecedented changes. This largely

reframed American foreign policy.194

And since foreign policy was to perform American

international role, a change in the former would inevitably require an adaptation of the latter to

fit in with new conditions. Congressional reaction to the Vietnam failure seemed to present

another unpleasant truth: the U.S. was now losing the power it once gained. Also, the power of

the White House would never be the same again. In other words, in the changing times, though

still able to preserve its top position, the world savior could hardly remain the most powerful,

let alone save the world as it declared. Restriction on its sphere of influence entailed the limit

on its role. How could the United States show its power to the world if unable to exercise it?

This was another cost for this conflict that the United States was still paying.

In short, when American worldwide cachet was lost and the once most influential

country was now carrying little clout in its voice, the United States could no longer deserve the

prominence it had ever risen to. Similarly, when American authority was in decline, its

international role consequently needed redefining. These interconnected elements, which

constructed American power, probably accounted for changes in American international

relations and diplomacy. In the new “so-called” American century, “might it remain the

strongest global power but be unable to exercise the same influence it once had”?195

Might the

United States preserve its era but be unable to drive the world towards American attraction? If

194

George C.Herring, The “Vietnam Syndrome” and American Foreign Policy, VQR- A National Journal

of Literature and Discussion. Vol 57, No 4. December 12, 2003. Accessed June 20, 2014.

htp://www.vqronline.org/essay/vietnam-syndrome-and-american-foreign-policy 195

Stephen M.Watt, The End of The American Era, The National Interest, Nov-Dec 2011, Accessed June

23, 2014.




47

not, its heydays were probably over. Its era might be drawing nearer to a close. And Vietnam

was not the prime cause but rather a catalyst for that change in American power. Without the

“strategic surrender”196

in Vietnam, the United States would have still triumphantly enjoyed its

lasting empire. In this regard, the external price for this miscalculation was way too heavy.

196

Thompson, W. Scott, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), v.

48

4. CONCLUSION

Generally, a war ends when either of the belligerents can no longer afford to sustain it.

Similarly, the Vietnam War ended with victory for North Vietnam because the powerful United

States became exhausted and therefore, had to give up this military political conflict first. This

exhaustion was not simply encapsulated physically but spiritually. The final victory of a war

often tells us who is right and who is wrong; who is strong and who is not. Likewise, the

victory of North Vietnam proved that the tough-minded Vietnamese were right and were

fighting for the right, for the reunion and self-determination of their country. Yet, in this case,

the winner was definitely not the stronger. It was true that American failure was partly

attributed to the country’s limited strength when it was not allowed to conduct an all-out war.

Thus, American military and financial resources were never mobilized to the fullest extent.197

However, it was largely the lack of fighting spirit and national unity that caused the United

States to walk away from the war. When signs of a promising victory became elusive, the

whole nation ran out of patience and as a result, the confidence that victory was well within

reach seriously shrank. As pretext for a war seemed always necessary, the price for a war was

inevitable. The Vietnam War was no exception. The horrors of the war were for everyone. The

twenty-five-year war ended with a humiliating failure for the U.S. while exposing an harsh

truth that many American politicians had misunderstood. In the fight between the power and

patriotism, the hi-tech weaponry and will, victory was scarcely on the former side. Vietnam

was a prime example of the importance of will power in warfare. Indeed, no matter how strong

the United States appeared, military superiority could not be the solution to the conflict but

only produce the reversed effects on Vietnam instead. Vietnamese were not discouraged but

keener and more determined to fight. Undoubtedly, the United States was militarily and

financially powerful; yet that power was definitely not the privilege for it to control everything

given that it was able to. Whenever that power became problematic, the resulting price was

exorbitantly high and clearly unbearable.

After twenty five years of involvement, the United States came out of this conflict,

carrying so many visible and invisible wounds. Some were left scars; some remained unhealed.

And the nation is still bearing the burden for its countrymen’s mistakes decades ago.198

This

burden is deemed as the price the U.S. has to pay for being involved in such a tragedy.

197

R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 2. 198

David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,

(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 497.

49

Actually, in the beginning, the United States had been fully aware of most of the possible and

dire consequences that might happen once failed to handle this fighting. As time elapsed and

the U.S. fell deeper into the Vietnam commitment, their anticipation proved excruciatingly

true. The Vietnam War remained a pivotal event in American history as its profound effects on

domestic America still persist today.199

Having poured huge money to feed a fictitious nation

in South Vietnam, which was at the brink of social collapse, the United States in return

suffered a serious drain on the economy that threatened its economic security in the coming

decades.200

This economic exhaustion forced the U.S. to change its approach to Cold War ever

since.201

Furthermore, society was split over the Vietnam dispute. The anti-war movement

gradually took shape. These domestic troubles became so clear that the feeling of war-

weariness started to pervade the whole nation.202

As the media intervened, news of atrocities,

notably the enormous price of humanity that both belligerents were suffering, was rapidly

broadcast. People started to question the U.S.’s claim of the justifiability of its action, the

progress of the war, as well as the moral purpose of this intervention that Washington had been

selling. Clearly, blood and money were not the only price that the United States was paying

during the war. The widespread public distrust of the government for having misled people into

an illegitimate war finally transformed into the lack of public confidence in the federal

government in the contemporary U.S.203

The gradual disintegration of social values and order

that the war had resulted in still continues today.204

Due to the Vietnam experience, there was

also a loss of confidence in the capacity of American politicians for leadership. Moreover, the

protest and disharmony in the society also weighed heavily on policy-makers.205

When the

United States entered the war, Washington simultaneously entered a period of constant tensions

and disagreement. Its members including the Presidents were likely to be caught between a

199

Ibid., 1. 200



Rexy, What was the impacts of the Vietnam War, The Vietnam War.Info, June 8, 2013. Accessed

June 16, 2014.

http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-impact/ 202



Rexy, What was the impacts of the Vietnam War, The Vietnam War.Info, June 8, 2013. Accessed

June 16, 2014.






http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-impact/


50

rock and a hard place. Sign of consensus and peace in Washington quickly disappeared. When

it became clear that American military was not in control of the situation in Vietnam, military

officers became doubters and critics.206

All were experiencing an exceedingly difficult

atmosphere, sinking deeper into the mire of Vietnam. Additionally, memories of the war kept

traumatizing the veterans for the rest of their lives. Meanwhile, the scars of this defeat scoured

into the national psyche. This conflict also challenged the notion of exceptionalism that had

become a deep-rooted belief of the American lives. In a sense, the United States was seemingly

not engaged in a fight against a small nation for fear of Communism but in a fight to redefine

American values and beliefs. Besides, although the external impacts of the war on American

international front seemed to be outweighed by the domestic upheaval, their persistence also

contributed chiefly to the severity of the devastation. Ironically, the world saviour cannot save

himself. Once Washington’s self-image was shattered, American worldwide prestige was

accordingly damaged. Eventually, losing the war, the United States was forced to reframe the

goals of its political life ever since.207

As for foreign policy, the war thoroughly changed the

way the United States approached its military action.208

International engagement was limited

as the American power was in decline. In this regard, coming out of Vietnam, the United States

was correspondingly entering a period of political downfall.

The American dream of victory could hardly be realized because the country was

fighting in a losing battle. The U.S. initially lost among the politicians, in the path to win the

hearts and minds of the American people. It also miscalculated in the premature birth of South

Vietnam. American defeat was clearly a tragedy that caused incalculable damage to the

nation’s standing in the world, while leaving a tender scar to the domestic U.S. The post-war

consensus was brought to an inevitable end.209

It took the U.S. many decades to recover

domestically, and even now, the whole country is still dealing with some of the fallout from

that period.210

Unfortunately, the United States eventually lost its overwhelming predominance

206

Ibid., 198. 207



Rexy, What was the impacts of the Vietnam War, The Vietnam War.Info, June 8, 2013. Accessed June

16, 2014.




Max Boot, The Incurable Vietnam Syndrome, The Weekly Standard 15, No 5. October 19, 2009.





51

in world affairs.211

Worse still, it might take a longer time for the Americans to successfully

push the traumatic images of the Vietnam War to the back of their minds. It was mainly

because echoes of the war are likely to grow even louder every time the United States is about

to demonstrate its military power to the world. Many historians regarded the Vietnam

experience as a war that never seemed to go away, and so did its impacts.212

In this context, the

price for this war was too high for the United States.

211

R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 2. 212



52

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alterman, Eric. When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences.

New York: The Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2004

http://books.google.be/books/about/When_Presidents_Lie.html?id=ndpYYUsv2u4C&redir

_esc=y

American Presidents: A Reference Resource: Dwight David Eisenhower, Millercenter.org.


http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/9

Barringer, Mark. The Anti-War Movement in the United States. Modern American Poetry. 1998.



Bates, Milton J. The wars we took to Vietnam cultural conflict and storytelling. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1996.

Beams, Nick. When The Bretton Woods System Collapsed. World Socialist Web Site. August 16,



Bia, Ku. Vietnam War Veterans. The Vietnam War. Accessed June 16, 2014.


Bill Hunt, interview by Michelle Marberry, How Vietnam Vets Were Treated Upon Arriving

Back In The United States. The Vietnam Conflict: An Academic Information Portal for

Education and Research. Accessed June 16, 2014.


Boot, Max. The Incurable Vietnam Syndrome. The Weekly Standard 15, No 5. October 19,



Buzzanco, Bob. 25 Years After End Of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms

With Vietnam. Common Dreams, 17 Apr. 2000. Accessed June 11, 2014.


C.Herring, George. America and Vietnam: The Unending War. Foreign Affairs. December 1,


http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47440/george-c-herring/america-and-vietnam-the-

unending-war.













53

C.Herring, George. The “Vietnam Syndrome” and American Foreign Policy. VQR- A National

Journal of Literature and Discussion. Vol 57, No 4. December 12, 2003. Accessed June 20,

2014.


Chambers, John Whiteclay. The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Oxford

University Press, 2000. Accessed June 17, 2014


Curry, G. David, and Josefina J.Card. Lives After Vietnam: The Personal Impact of Military

Service. American Journal of Sociology 90, No 4 (1985): 949-951. Accessed June 16,

2014).


Dolan, Edward F. America after Vietnam: Legacies of A Hated War. New York: Franklin Watts.

1989

Emerson, Gloria. Winner and Loser, Battles, Retreats, Gains, Losses and Ruins from a Long

War. New York: Random House. 1975.

Exceptionalism - The Vietnam syndrome and American Exceptionalism. Encyclopedia of the

New American Nation. Accessed June 17, 2014.

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-The-vietnam-syndrome-

and-american-exceptionalism.html

Exceptionalism – Vietnam and the end of American Exceptionalism. Encyclopedia of the New

American Nation. Accessed June 17, 2014

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-Vietnam-and-the-end-of-

american-exceptionalism.html

Finley, Gavin. John Winthrop and “A City Upon A Hill. Accessed June 24, 2014.


Fisher, Marc. As years go by, Watergate drifts toward myth. The Washington Post. June 14,

2012, Accessed June 19, 2014.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest-

headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933, as published in Rosenman, Samuel.

The Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume Two: The Year of Crisis, 1933. ed.

New York: Random House, 1938, 11–16. Accessed June 26, 2014.





http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-The-vietnam-syndrome-and-american-exceptionalism.html

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-The-vietnam-syndrome-and-american-exceptionalism.html




http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest-headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest-headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html


54

Garfinkle, Adam. Wartime Lies, Arnold Isaacs challenges many of the myths surrounding

Vietnam. The New York Times. November 2, 1997. Accessed June 17, 2014.


Griffin, Stephen. War Powers Resolution: America’s Most Misunderstood Law. Huff Post

Politics. November 13, 2013. Accessed June 27, 2014.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-griffin/war-powers-resolution

ame_b_4268839.html

H. Drapper, Theodore. McNamara’s Peace. The New York Review of Books. May 11, 1995.



Harberman, Clyde. Agent Orange’s Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans. The New York

Times. May 11, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2014.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/agent-oranges-long-legacy-for-vietnam-and-

veterans.html

Hart, Gary. ‘When Presidents Lie’: The Post-Truth Presidency. The New York Times. October

10, 2004. Accessed June 19, 2014.


Hellmann, John. American myth and the legacy of Vietnam. New York: Columbia University

Press, 1986.

Hera, Ron. The War at the end of the Dollar. Financial Sense, 4 Dec. 2012. Accessed June 9,

2014.


Hickman, Kennedy. Vietnam War: Nixon and Vietnamization 1969-1972. Military History.

About.com. Accessed June 19, 2014.

http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/vietnamwar/a/VietnamViet.htm

History.com Staff. Orange Agent. A+E Networks. 2011. Accessed June 18, 2014.


History.com Staff. Vietnam War Protests. A+E Networks. 2010. Accessed June 13, 2014.


J.Korb, Lawrence; Conley, Laura and Rothlan, Alex. A Historical Perspective on Defense

Budgets. Center For American Progress. July 6, 2011. Accessed June 28, 2014.

http://americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/07/06/10041/a-historical-

perspective-on-defense-budgets/


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-griffin/war-powers-resolution%20ame_b_4268839.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-griffin/war-powers-resolution%20ame_b_4268839.html






http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/vietnamwar/a/VietnamViet.htm





55

Kaiser, David. American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War.

Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000

Kalb, Marvin. It’s Called The Vietnam Syndrome, and It’s Back. Brookings. January 22, 2013.


http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/01/22-obama-foreign-policy-kalb

Kroes, Rob. "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've

seen the mall: Europeans and American mass culture. Urbana: University of Illinois Press,

1996.

L. Anderson, David and Ernst, John. The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the

Vietnam War. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007

Landerman, Scott and Martini, Edwin A. Four Decades On: Vietnam, The US, and The Legacies

of the Second Indochina War. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 2013

Leo, Rus. American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam

(Review). MFS Modern Fiction Studies 55, No 2 (2009): 376-379 Accessed June 17, 2014.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mfs/summary/v055/55.2.leo.html

LIFE Covers: The Vietnam War. My Vietnam Experience, 5 Sept. 2011. Accessed June 12, 2014.

http://usastruck.com/2011/09/05/life-covers-the-vietnam-war/

M.Watt, Stephen. The End of The American Era. The National Interest. Nov-Dec 2011,



Macalister, Terry. Background: What caused the 1970s Oil Price Shock? The Guardian. March

3, 2011. Accessed June 29, 2014.


Manuto, Ron and O’Rourke, Sean Patrick. Eisenhower Warned About Military Spending. The

Wichita Eagle Kansas.com. January 18, 2011. Accessed June 28, 2014.

http://www.kansas.com/2011/01/18/1678809/eisenhower-warned-about-military.html

McCathyism/The “Red Scare”. Dwight D. Eishenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and

Boyhood Home. Accessed June 26, 2014.


McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of

Vietnam. ed. New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995.

Murray Yang, Michelle. Still Burning: Self-Immolation as Photographic Protest. Quaterly

Journal of Speech 1: 1-25. Accessed June 12, 2014.

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/01/22-obama-foreign-policy-kalb

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mfs/summary/v055/55.2.leo.html

http://usastruck.com/2011/09/05/life-covers-the-vietnam-war/



http://www.kansas.com/2011/01/18/1678809/eisenhower-warned-about-military.html


56

http://advocacyethicsanddesign.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/murray-yang-still-

burning.pdf

Naylor, Bryan. Best Known for WaterGate Committee, Longtime Sen. Howard Bakers Dies.

NPR.org. June 26, 2014. Accessed June 27, 2014.

http://www.npr.org/2014/06/26/325909260/best-known-for-watergate-committee-

longtime-sen-howard-baker-dies

Protests against the Vietnam War". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2008. Accessed June 11, 2014


R.B. Smith. An International History of the Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

R. Issacs, Arnold. Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy. Balimore: John

Hopkins University Press, 2001

http://books.google.be/books/about/Vietnam_Shadows.html

Rexy. How much did the Vietnam War cost? The Vietnam War.Info . January 22, 2014.



Rexy. What was the impacts of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War.Info . June 8, 2013.



Sandler, Stanley. The Korean War: An Encyclopedia. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2013

Accessed June 24, 2014. 351.


Schultz, Colin. Nixon Prolonged Vietnam War for Political Gain – And Johnson knew about it,

Newly Unclassified Tapes Suggest. Smithsonian.com. March 18, 2013. Accessed June 19,

2014

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-

gainand-johnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/?no-ist

Seals, Bob. Chinese Support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War: The Decisive Edge.

MilitaryHistoryOnline.com, 2008. Accessed July 7, 2014


Sitkoff, Harvard. Post War Impact of Vietnam. Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9,

2014.







http://books.google.be/books/about/Vietnam_Shadows.html




http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-gainand-johnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/?no-ist

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-gainand-johnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/?no-ist



57

Small, Melvin. The Domestic Course of the War. Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June

9, 2014.


SparkNotes Editors. SparkNote on The Vietnam War (1945–1975). SparkNotes.com. SparkNotes

LLC. 2005. Accessed May 29, 2014.


Staff Writer, From the War of Independence to Operation Enduring Freedom - blood spilled

from sea to shining sea. American War Deaths Through History, 24 May 2014. Accessed

June 10, 2014.

http://www.militaryfactory.com/american_war_deaths.asp

Starks, James. Armies of the Night by Norman Mailer. The Hip Forums, 17 Jan. 2005. Accessed

June 11, 2014.

www.hippy.com/modules.php?name=Reviews&rop=showcontent&id=423

The Great Society. Encyclopedia.com. Accessed June 28, 2014.


The Vietnam War and its Impacts - Political Lessons. Encyclopedia of the New American

Nation Accessed June 14, 2014.

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/The-Vietnam-War-and-Its-Impact-

Political-lessons.html

Thompson, W. Scott. The Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977.

UShistory.org. The Antiwar Movement. U.S. History Online Textbook .2014. Accessed June 13,

2014.


Vandiver, Frank Everson. Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson's wars. College Station: Texas

A & M University Press. 1997

Vietnam War and American Economy. Historycentral.com. Accessed June 27, 2014.


What Effects Did the Vietnam War Have on American Society? StudyMode.com. April 2004.



Williams, Sam. The U.S Economy in the Wake of the Economic Crisis of 1957-61. A Critique of

Crisis Theory. Wordpress. January 5. 2009. Accessed June 9, 2014

http://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/the-five-industrial-cycles-since-1945/the-u-s-

economy-in-the-wake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/



http://www.militaryfactory.com/american_war_deaths.asp

http://www.hippy.com/modules.php?name=Reviews&rop=showcontent&id=423









the vietnam war - ghent university...those of vietnam, the war indeed had wounded the nation in many...

Documents