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TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 1. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and Its Consequences Pippa Norris
Harvard University Abstract The UK political system has long exemplified ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government, a type subsequently exported to many Commonwealth countries. The primary advantage of this system, proponents since Bagehot have argued, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance. Yet under the Blair administration, this system has undergone a series of major constitutional reforms, perhaps producing the twilight of the pure Westminster model. After conceptualizing the process of constitutional reform, this paper discusses two important claims made by those who favor retaining the current electoral system for Westminster, namely that single-member districts promote strong voter-member linkages and generate greater satisfaction with the political system. Evidence testing these claims is examined from comparative data covering 19 nations, drawing on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study finds that member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure multimember districts, but that combined districts such as MMP preserve these virtues. Concerning claims of greater public satisfaction under majoritarian systems, the study establishes some support for this contention, although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for debates about electoral reform and for the future of the Westminster political system. ________________________________________________________________
“An ancient and ever-altering constitution is like an old man who still wears with attached
fondness clothes of the fashion of his youth: what you see of him is the same; what you
do not see is wholly altered.” Walter Bagehot (1867).
The UK political system exemplifies ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government
(Lijphart 1999), a type subsequently exported with some important variations to
Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand, Canada, India, and Australia, as well as
to many post-colonial nations in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia where these
institutions commonly failed to take root. At the apex of British colonial power in the late
19th Century, President Woodrow Wilson (1884) observed that Westminster
parliamentary government had become ‘the world’s fashion.’ The primary advantages of
this system, proponents have argued ever since Bagehot, lie in its ability to combine
accountability with effective governance.
Yet voices criticizing the Westminster system have strengthened in periodic
waves during recent decades. Under the Blair administration, the British constitution has
undergone a series of major reforms. Some components, like the Scottish Parliament and
Welsh Assembly, and the introduction of party lists for elections to the European
parliament, are already locked in place. Others like the future role and powers of the
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 2. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
House of Lords remain under debate after publication of the Wakeham report. The
prospects for still others, like the Jenkins proposals on electoral reform for Westminster,
remains uncertain1. As with recent changes in New Zealand, we are perhaps witnessing
the twilight of the pure Westminster model, with only a few states like Barbados
continuing to cling to this ideal, as nostalgically as John Major’s images of cricket whites,
British bobbies, and warm beer.
This study focuses upon perhaps the most important and yet contentious matter
that remains to be resolved - the question of electoral reform for the British House of
Commons. Debate about reform raises difficult and complex issues about the normative
goals that any electoral system should serve, the trade-offs among these values, as well
as the best mechanisms to achieve these goals. An extensive literature has discussed
these issues (Rae 1971; Lakeman 1974; Bogdanor and Butler 1983; Groffman and
Lijphart 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Reeve and Ware 1992; Nohlen 1996; Norris
1997; Farrell 1997; Cox 1997; Katz 1997; Reynolds and Reilly 1997). In this study we
focus upon examining the evidence for two central claims about the virtues of preserving
the current system. Proponents of the status quo at Westminster have commonly
stressed the importance of keeping single member districts because, it is argued, these
maintain the accountability of elected representatives to local constituents. If individual
MPs misbehave in any regard - if they prove lackadaisical, miscreants, sinners or fools -
then, the theory goes, voters can kick them out. This claim is important since it lies at the
heart of the reform debate in British politics, framing the options considered by the
Jenkins Commission. Moreover advocates argue that first-past-the post provides a
decisive electoral outcome that is perceived as fairer and more transparent than the
process of post-hoc coalition formation, and one that therefore increases overall
satisfaction with the democratic process.
To explore these claims, Part I of this study first sketches a broad interpretation
about how we can best conceptualize the process of constitutional reform in Britain,
drawing upon Lijphart’s theoretical framework. Part II then outlines the arguments
favoring preserving the status quo of first-past-the-post elections for Westminster and the
claims that the use of single member districts strengthens voter-member linkages and
promotes public satisfaction with the political system. Part III examines comparative
evidence about the consequences of single, combined and multi member districts
drawing on data from the 19-nation Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study
finds that member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure
multimember districts, but that combined districts such as those used by Mixed Member
Proportional systems (MMP) preserve these virtues. On the claims of greater public
satisfaction with the political process under majoritarian systems, the study establishes
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some support for this contention although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion
considers the implications of the findings for the debate about electoral reform and for the
future of the Westminster system.
Understanding Constitutional Reform
The conceptual framework for this study starts from Arend Lijphart’s classification
of political institutions into majoritarian or consensus democracies (Lijphart 1999). In this
well-known theory, majoritarian systems are characterized by the concentration of power
in the hands of the largest party, on the grounds that this promotes accountability with
effective governance: the party in government is empowered to take and implement
difficult and tough decisions during its tenure in office, assured of the ability to pass its
legislative program without many checks and balances so long as they can carry their
backbenchers with them. At the end of their term of office the government can be held
clearly accountable for the results of their actions and kicked out, if unpopular. In
contrast the consensus model prioritizes generating broad participation in government
and widespread agreement with the policies that the government should pursue,
emphasizing inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise. The major institutions
underpinning these forms of democracy cluster along two principal dimensions: the
executive-party and the federal-unitary (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
[Figure 1 and Table 1 about here]
How can Lijphart’s framework help us to understand the changing British political
system? The Blair Government’s program of constitutional change covers a raft of major
developments, either currently under debate or in the process of being implemented. Like
billiard balls ricocheting into each other around a table, the full impact of these reforms
currently remains unpredictable. For all the commissions and committees, the reviews
and reports, employing the great and the good, there is no over-arching master plan but
rather a perfect exemplification of British muddling through. This remains a work in
progress, although perhaps the Blair government’s defining achievement during their first
term in office, characterized schizophrenically by courage and timidity, radicalism and
conservatism, devolution and centralization, often with two steps unexpectedly forwards
and one back. If Blair’s progress during the 1997 election was best depicted, in Roy
Jenkins memorable phrase, as gingerly carrying a Ming vase across a crowded room, the
process of constitutional reform can be seen as analogous to gingerly carrying a Ming
vase across a crowded room when blindfolded.
The UK political system has been or is being transformed through multiple
reforms: devolution in Scotland and Wales; the introduction of multiple types of electoral
systems for different bodies including PR for European elections; the regulation of party
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funding; central bank independence; reforms to the composition and role of the House of
Lords; the peace settlement in Northern Ireland; legislation on freedom of information;
and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law
(Blackburn and Plant 1999; Hazell 1999). The main change can be understood as the
erosion of the pure ‘Westminster’ model of government, representing a highly centralized
and unitary political system where executive power was concentrated in the Cabinet and
House of Commons, with multilayered governance diffusing the process of decision-
making to multiple bodies. Government powers are being transferred simultaneously
downwards towards elected bodies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London,
and upwards towards multilateral agencies of global governance, notably the European
Union as well as organizations like the World Trade Organization. Power has also
simultaneously drained away outwards, from Whitehall towards both the corporate and
non-profit sectors. The UK is hardly alone in this process - globalization has been eroding
the autonomy of nation-states around the world (Held et al. 1999) - but the change is
perhaps more dramatic and striking in the home of the Westminster system (Kreiger
1999). As a result, the UK seems likely to remain a majoritarian democracy in the core
executive but one which has moved closer towards Lijphart’s ‘consensus’ model on the
federal-unitary dimension, with a more decentralized government, stronger bicameralism,
a more rigid constitution, stronger judicial review, and central bank independence. The
UK is becoming more like the political systems in Australia and Canada. Comparative
studies suggest that the rise of multilayered governance may well have major
consequences: for the transparency, accountability, effectiveness and complexity of the
decision-making process in the UK; for spending and fiscal flow in economic and social
policy; for local, national and cosmopolitan identities; for the role and functions of elected
representatives; and ultimately for diffuse levels of public support for the political system
(Sartori 1994; Lijphart and Waisman 1996).
For all these developments, the Westminster system has arguably still not
changed fundamentally on the executive-party dimension. Britain retains single-party
majority cabinet government in Whitehall not coalitions, a dominant cabinet rather than
executive-legislative balance, two-party predominance of government and opposition in
Westminster, despite the rise of popular support for other parties, pluralist rather than
corporatist interest groups, and above all a majoritarian electoral system for Westminster,
buttressing and reinforcing all of the above. If Westminster moved towards a more
proportional electoral system – as in New Zealand - then this would undermine the
foundations of the majoritarian structure. Moreover alternative electoral systems have
been adopted at almost every level except for Westminster with the introduction of the
Additional Member system for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the
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London Assembly; the Supplementary Vote for the London Mayor; the Regional List
system for European elections; and the Single Transferable Vote for the new Northern
Ireland Assembly. The federal-unitary dimension of British government has been
transformed far more than the executive-party dimension. Like Harold Lloyd dangling in
midair on a skyscraper ledge, one hand has slipped but the other retains its grip.
Claims for the Virtues of First-Past-the-Post
Therefore the argument about electoral reform for the House of Commons is
central to the future of the British political system, as well as dividing the major parties,
and the central claims in favor of retaining the status quo deserve close and careful
scrutiny. The lessons from the flourishing literature in new and old democracies is that we
can identify some of the probable mechanical results of electoral systems with a fair
degree of confidence - such as their impact on the structure of party competition, the
proportionality of votes to seats, the representation of women, and patterns of turnout
(Lijphart 1994; Katz 1997). In contrast, far less is known about what Blais and Massicotte
(2001) term the psychological effects of electoral systems on the attitudes and behavior
of voters, representatives, and parties. Reforms in Israel, Italy, Japan and New Zealand
during the early 1990s illustrate that this process remains fraught with uncertainty and
often produces multiple unintended consequences (Norris 1995; Vowles 1998).
The debate about electoral reform at Westminster arouses strong passions
among advocates, although the rest of the country seems less moved by the minutiae of
the Alternative Vote (AV)+ versus Supplementary Vote, or the Additional Member System
(AMS) versus First-Past-The-Post. Defenders favoring keeping the current system of
first-past-the-post for Westminster commonly make a series of claims for its virtues. This
study examines the evidence for two core propositions about the psychological effects of
electoral systems upon the public, namely that:
(i) Single member districts promote accountability via strong links between voters and
elected members, so that electors living under these systems know more about
parliamentary candidates and have greater contact with elected representatives, than
those living under multimember or combined systems;
(ii) Majoritarian systems promote greater public satisfaction with the political system, so
that electors experiencing these systems are more likely to feel that the electoral system
is fair, to have a strong sense of political efficacy, to turnout to vote, and to express
greater overall satisfaction with democracy, compared with those under multimember or
combined systems.
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Claims for strong voter-member linkages
What is the reasoning behind these claims? One of the primary virtues of the
Westminster system is meant to lie in the chain of collective and individual accountability
(Strom 2000). The core claim is that representatives are accountable via elections if
citizens can sanction those in office, retaining those that perform well and ousting those
who do not (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). Like a series of inter-locking fail-safe
mechanisms protecting the nuclear button, four primary channels can be identified in the
Westminster system protecting citizens from the government. The first principle of
parliamentary government is that the executive emerges from and is responsible to the
legislature, so that the cabinet is collectively accountable on a day-to-day basis to
parliament. The ultimate penalty of a legislative vote of no confidence is that the cabinet
can be removed from office. Moreover at general elections, the party in government can
be held collectively accountable for their actions and punished or rewarded accordingly
by the electorate. Thirdly, given single member districts, strong party discipline, and
mass-branch party organizations, members of parliament are seen as accountable for
their actions on a regular basis to party members in their local constituency, as well as to
party leaders and whips in the House. Members who fail to support party policies, or who
are seen to fail in their personal conduct, may not be re-nominated for their local seat.
_______________________________________________________________
Government
Members of Parliament
Local Party Local Electorate
_______________________________________________________________
All these forms of accountability may or may not operate, but the specific claim
examined here is the argument that even if all these mechanisms simultaneously fail, in
the final stage, general elections in single member territorial districts allow constituents to
hold individual MPs to account for their actions (or inactions). Voters in Britain cannot
directly select the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, nor even (directly) the overall balance of
parties in the Commons, but they are empowered to pick their local member of
parliament. The territorial basis of the British House of Commons reflects the traditional
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 7. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
conception of representation ever since its origins in the 13th Century, and it is believed to
be an important mechanism providing an incentive for constituency service, as a way to
maintain members’ independence from parties, and as a means to ensure that members
remain concerned about the needs and concerns of all their constituents, not just party
stalwarts.
The essential aspect of the electoral system promoting accountability is the
district magnitude – the number of representatives elected to a constituency – in the case
of Westminster based on single member geographically based seats. Average district
magnitude is calculated very simply by dividing the total number of seats in the legislature
by the number of districts. Other classic dimensions of electoral systems are less relevant
to voter-member linkages, such as the electoral formulas, threshold, and ballot structure.
The use of all single member districts produces a district magnitude of one in Britain and
the United States, whereas at the other extreme the use of the whole country as one
constituency, as in Israel and the Netherlands, produces district magnitudes of 120 and
150 respectively. In multimember districts with closed party lists electors are powerless
to reward or punish individual candidates, they can only signify their displeasure with
particular politicians by casting a ballot against the whole party. PR systems with open
party lists allow electors to prioritize candidates within a list, but it is more difficult for
voters to evaluate all the candidates on such a list than to become familiar with a local
representative in a single seat. The choice of district magnitude has many significant
consequences, as Reynolds and Reilly (1997, P.92) observe: “To sum up, when
designing an electoral system, the district magnitude is in many ways the key factor in
determining how the system will operate in practice, the extent of the link between voters
and elected members, and the overall proportionality of the results.”
This claim of electoral accountability represents an important issue that has
framed and limited much of the debate about alternative systems in Britain, for example
the Jenkins report (1998) was given a wide-ranging brief but the terms specified that ‘a
link between MPs and geographic constituencies’ should be maintained (my italics).
While systems with a small district magnitude, like the Single Transferable Vote (STV),
and mixed systems like the Additional Member System (AMS), could be and were
considered for the Commons, this effectively ruled out any consideration of the system
which is most common throughout the rest of Europe: regional party lists with large
multimember districts. The report concluded that the vast majority of MPs (80-85%)
should continue to be elected on an individual constituency basis by the Alternative Vote,
with the remainder elected on a corrective top-up basis based on open party lists in small
multimember constituencies formed from county or city boundaries.
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But is there good evidence supporting the core claim that electors living in single
member districts generally know more about local parliamentary candidates and have
more contact with elected representatives - and can therefore hold them to account more
effectively - than those living in multimember constituencies? The evidence remains
inconclusive.
Some of the most plausible cross-national evidence in favor of the claim for
strong voter-member linkages is provided by Bernhard Wessels (1999) who compared
the role orientations of national MPs in Europe and Members of the European Parliament
in the 15 EU member states. He found that district magnitude was significantly related to
role orientations: the smaller the district magnitude - and therefore the more personalized
the electoral competition - the more members chose to represent their constituency.
Another important indicator in favor of this proposition is a study where Curtice and
Shively (2000) examined the evidence that voters were contacted more often and had
better knowledge of candidates under single member district systems rather than under
PR multimember districts, and concluded that in both cases there was a positive and
significant effect.
In addition, evidence within particular countries confirms that legislators in
majoritarian systems like the US, Britain and Australia dedicate a large proportion of their
time to constituency service (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; McAllister 1997). British
Members of Parliament face a series of conflicting demands on their time and energies
but in recent years they are devoting an increasing amount of time to ‘service
responsiveness’: dealing with government departments on behalf of individual
constituents and local groups. MPs help shortcut the bureaucratic maze of housing
regulations, police complaint procedures, or social security claims for individuals, or local
groups, mediating on behalf of constituents to ensure government officials uphold their
rights. The growth of such activities in the post-war period has been documented (Norris
and Lovenduski 1995). What is less clear is whether elected members elsewhere also
provide similar services. Studies in Ireland and Italy, for example, have shown that
deputies work hard for their constituents, and they may actually undertake more
constituency business than their British equivalents (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995).
Small multimember districts may actually promote greater incentives for constituency
service than single member districts, since members need to distinguish themselves from
other contestants within their own party (Carey and Shugart 1992). In Britain it has also
commonly been found that the ‘personal vote’ for MPs is normally limited in scope, and
there is little evidence that the amount of constituency service is tied to the electoral
incentive of seat marginality (Norris 1997; Norris, Vallance and Lovenduski 1992).
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Moreover previous studies suggest a complex relationship between the type of
electoral system, the degree of constituency casework, and knowledge of candidates,
mediated by political culture, the traditional role of legislators, and the structure of
government services. For example few members of the German Bundestag engage in
constituency service, irrespective of whether members are elected via the party lists or
single member districts, in large part because services like housing, education and
welfare are the responsibility of the Lander level. (Wessels 1997) Voter-legislator
linkages may be determined by the size of the constituency combined with the provision
of legislative staff more than by the use of single member districts. Consider, for example,
the amount of mail that can be generated in a populous Senate seat like California
compared with a small UK constituency like the Western Isles. Based on a comparison of
twelve west European democracies, Vernon Bogdanor (1985) was skeptical about any
simple and direct relationships among the type of electoral system, voters’ awareness of
candidates, and levels of constituency service, and the study concluded that cultural and
historical traditions play a far more important role in determining parliamentarian-
constituent relationships than the electoral system per se.
Claims about Public Satisfaction with the Political System
The second claim examined here concerns the broader consequences of the
choice of electoral system upon political support. Claims about the perceived fairness of
different electoral systems are commonly invoked on all sides of the reform debate. One
of the commonest arguments by those favoring electoral reform is that the British public
has become dissatisfied with the fairness of the outcome, a claim that has become
increasingly popular with the rise of electoral support for minor parties since the early
1970s and the continued barriers they face in entry to the House of Commons. In turn, it
is argued, this has fuelled wider public disaffection with the political system, undermining
faith and confidence in British representative democracy. Yet proponents favoring the
status quo have made counter claims. It can be argued that first-past-the-post represents
a simple and transparent method of translating votes into seats, and the decisiveness of
the outcome means that voters may regard the results as fairer, more satisfactory, and
more democratic than a coalition government produced by post-hoc behind-the-scenes
negotiations between unexpected political bedfellows (such as in New Zealand or the
Netherlands). Previous comparative studies suggest that greater institutional confidence
and system support is associated with majoritarian rather than proportional electoral
systems (Norris 1998; Listhaug et al. 2000).
Yet again evidence for and against these claims remains inconclusive and mixed.
Curtice and Jowell (1997) examined trends in public support for the British political
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system and reported a decline in trust in government and political institutions from 1987
to 1996. Yet at the same time they detected no apparent trend towards increased support
for electoral reform in Britain from 1983-1996; during this period in a steady pattern over
one half of the public say they favor keeping the current system and one third support
reform. Yet there are many reasons why it is difficult to interpret declining institutional
confidence as a direct response towards the workings of the British electoral system per
se since the demand for constitutional change is only weakly tied in voters’ minds to
levels of trust in the political system; moreover similar patterns of declining institutional
trust are evident in many post-industrial societies, including those like Sweden with PR
electoral systems (Dalton 1998). Studies have also looked directly at a broader range of
attitudes towards constitutional and electoral reform but public opinion on these issues
tends to be soft and incoherent. The best demonstration of this tendency is the way
public opinion is open to framing effects: even in the same survey, the same people offer
responses both supportive and critical of the current electoral system and potential
alternatives, depending upon the way the questions are worded and ordered (Curtice and
Jowell 1998; Dunleavy and Margetts 1997). These results suggest that on these issues
public attitudes monitored in surveys are similar to Zaller’s (1992) ‘top of the head’
responses, akin to asking the public about, say, the truth or falsity of Fermat’s theorem or
Einstein’s theories of relativity. Surveys may generate an answer but it may not
necessarily be meaningful. Electoral reform is a technical and abstract issue, involving
considerable uncertainty about hypothetical choices, so not surprisingly qualitative
studies conclude that the public typically displays little understanding of how alternative
electoral system would work, and indeed a fairly muddled view even of how the current
system operates (Hedges and White 1999).
Research Design, Comparative Framework and Data
These considerations suggest that we need to reexamine whether voter- member
linkages, and general satisfaction with the political system, are actually higher in single
member than multimember districts, as claimed by proponents of maintaining the
Westminster status quo.
The psychological effects of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems on
public opinion and the evidence for these claims can be investigated in many ways. One
approach is through the comparison of the workings of different electoral systems within
the UK, with appropriate controls, which allow ideal ‘natural experiments’ for testing these
propositions. Hence voter’s awareness of candidates can now be compared under
different electoral systems within one country, including elections to the Scottish
Parliament, European Parliament, and House of Commons. To compare like with like,
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however, this strategy can only attribute any differences to the type of electoral system
per se after the new regional bodies have been in existence for at least one term, and
even then any differences in the public’s awareness of candidates, in the provision of
constituency service or even levels of turnout could be due to the functions and visibility
of members of these bodies rather than to the electoral systems as such2. Moreover this
approach is only appropriate for post-hoc evaluations of public reactions, after the
reforms are introduced, when it may be too late to serve the policy process well.
Alternatively these claims can be examined from a cross-national perspective, as
they are here based on the 3rd release of survey data from the Comparative Study of
Electoral Systems covering 19 nations (CSES)3. The CSES uses a common module
incorporated into cross-sectional post-election national surveys within each country, (total
N.32022), including the BES. Full details of the CSES dataset and questionnaire are
available online (www.umich.edu/~nes/cses). The electoral studies in this dataset were
for contests from 1996-1999.
The 19 countries under comparison vary significantly along multiple dimensions,
including levels of democratic and socioeconomic development, as well as cultural and
geographic regions of the world. The comparison includes four Anglo-American
democracies (Australia, the United States, Britain and New Zealand), five West European
nations ranging from the Scandinavian north to the southern Mediterranean (Spain,
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway), six post-communist nations in Central and Eastern
Europe (Ukraine, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Hungary), two Latin
American societies (Mexico and Argentina), one in the Middle East (Israel), and two
Asian countries (Japan and Taiwan). In comparing the pattern of constituent-
representative linkages in different nations we need to control for intervening factors that
can be expected to influence this process, including at aggregate level the length of time
which a country has been a continuous democracy and levels of democratization, as well
as standard social background factors at individual-level including age, education, gender
and income that previous studies have found to be commonly associated with levels of
political knowledge and voter-initiated contact activity (Verba et al. 1995).
Classifying Electoral Systems
Most importantly, the comparison includes a wide variety of electoral systems
exemplifying most of the major types around the globe, ranging from single member
districts in the US, Australia and Britain, through to the Netherlands and Israel where the
whole country represents one geographic constituency. The proportionality of the system
and its electoral formulae are less important for this study than the district magnitude.
Three nations under comparison used single member districts including first-past-the-
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post systems (the United States and the UK) and the Alternative Vote (Australia). Eight
nations used multimember districts with proportional representation party lists including
Spain, Israel, Poland, Romania, Argentina, the Netherlands, Norway and the Czech
Republic. Eight used combined districts that mixed both single member and multi
member seats, including New Zealand4, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Ukraine,
Lithuania, and Taiwan. There are many other important differences in electoral systems
within each category, summarized in Table 2, for example in the ballot structure of first-
past-the-post in the UK and the Alternative Vote in Australia, in the proportion of single
member districts and party list members elected in mixed systems, as well as in levels of
electoral thresholds facing minor parties. In this study we can start by describing the
differences in knowledge, contact and political support among citizens living in single
member, combined and multi member district systems, then use multivariate analysis
with controls to explore this further.
[Table 2 about here]
The Impact of Electoral Systems
Voter Knowledge of Parliamentary Candidates
To examine the claims that single member districts increase voters’ awareness
about parliamentary candidates, we need to establish what citizens knew about those
seeking their vote. The CSES asked respondents whether they recalled any candidates
in their district in the last parliamentary election and, if so, they were asked to identify
their name. Up to three candidate names were recorded and these were verified as
correct against constituency data. It can be argued that voters may still know much about
the elected member or members from their district and they may be familiar with
opposing candidates standing for election, even if they remain unable to recall their
names. Voters may also be able to use heuristic shortcuts if they support ‘the Labour
man’ or ‘the Liberal Democrat woman’. Nevertheless name-recognition is a significant
indirect indicator of broader awareness of electoral choices, it has long been used in
surveys to test political knowledge, and it is important in order to be able to evaluate the
general record of elected members, to hold individual politicians accountable for their
actions.
[Table 3 about here]
The descriptive results in Table 3 list how far people could correctly identify
candidates and the pattern shows considerable variation among countries. The
Japanese electorate emerges with the highest awareness of those standing for the Diet:
only 6% failed correctly to identify any candidate. In contrast at the other extreme, one
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fifth of all Mexicans could not correctly name a single candidate, and the same was true
of one quarter of all Spaniards. But the other important pattern shown in the comparison
is that the three single member electoral systems – Britain, Australia and the United
States – emerged as about average, above some of the newer democracies, it is true,
but also all below Norway, Hungary, Germany and New Zealand. In Britain, 40% failed to
name a single parliamentary candidate, while one third could recall the name of one
candidate, and one third could correctly identify at least two. There is little persuasive
evidence from the rank order or the mean averages, without any controls, that electors
necessarily know more about the contestants seeking their support in pure single
member district systems than under combined systems, although both these systems
tend to show stronger member-voter linkages than under pure multimember PR districts
Voter Contact with MPs
Voter contact with elected representatives was measured by asking people
whether they had had any contact with an MP during the previous twelve months. It
should be noted that this need not necessarily have involved constituency service per se,
since this could have been generated by the form of election campaign like telephone or
household canvassing, or party rallies, as well as by constituency surgeries. Nor does
this specify the direction of who originated the contact activity, whether voters or
members. Nevertheless proponents of single member districts suggest that in general
voters should have more contact with members through all these channels.
[Table 4 about here]
The results show that on average about 12% of the public reported contact with
an MP during the previous year, with the highest levels in New Zealand and minimal
contact activity in Poland, Netherlands and Spain. Britain proved close to the average,
with 13% of citizens contacting an MP during this period. Without any controls, the initial
pattern shows that compared with pure multimember PR systems, the overall amount of
contact is marginally greater in both single member and in combined systems. This
provides some support to the claims that retaining the links between an individual
member and a particular constituency maintains member-voter linkages, although at the
same time there are no significant virtues in this regard for first-past-the-post over mixed
systems like MMP. The pattern by nation shows that Australia is ranked second in this
list, and the United States and Britain are just slightly above average. A closer look at the
rankings, however, shows that some multimember districts like Israel and Norway are
also above average in contact activity, as are some combined systems like New Zealand
and Lithuania. Multiple factors may also be contributing towards variations in the overall
pattern – such as the size of the country, the average voting age population per district,
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 14. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
or even the type of pre-modern or post-modern electoral campaign – as much as district
magnitude per se. Despite the current debate that the Israeli nation-wide constituency
needs to introduce local districting to promote constituency service and individual
accountability, it turns out that members of the Knesset are about as active in maintaining
contact with the electorate as Westminster representatives.
Multivariate analysis is required to examine all these relationships in more depth.
As a first step in this direction, logistic regression models can be used to examine the
impact of single member, combined and multimember districts upon the two core
measures of contact activity and knowledge of candidates. The models first entered
controls for the level of democratization in each country (measured by the Freedom
House Gastil Index), that might be expected to shape political traditions and democratic
cultures, and individual-level background factors which are commonly found to influence
contact activity and political knowledge, namely age, sex, education and income (the
latter as a proxy for socioeconomic status). The second step then entered the electoral
system variables, using dummies for whether the system had single member or
combined districts, with the multimember PR system as the default. Details of the coding
used for all items are listed below Table 5.
[Tables 5 and 6 about here]
The results predicting contact activity in Table 5 show that the Gastil index and
the demographic variables behaved in the expected way: there was more contact
between voters and elected members in more democratic countries. Education and male
gender also proved significant predictors of the amount of contact activity (although,
interestingly, age and income proved weak predictors). After controlling for these factors,
compared with multimember districts, single member districts proved to be significantly
associated with the amount of contact activity but at the same time, as already observed,
combined districts (such as those with first-past-the-post plus party lists) actually
displayed the highest level of contact activity. Table 6 repeats this exercise for knowledge
of candidates, and finds a similar pattern for the level of democratization and the role of
education and gender. After introducing these controls, in this case the use of single
member districts proves an insignificant predictor of knowledge of candidates, whereas
the use of combined districts proves strongly related.
Extrapolating from these results, this suggests, as observed earlier, that although
proponents of maintaining the status quo for Westminster commonly claim that retaining
the geographic link between individual MPs and a particular local constituency under
FPTP is essential for strong voter-member linkages, in fact combined systems display
similar levels of contact activity and stronger levels of awareness of candidates. It
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 15. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
remains to be seen whether many other characteristics of the electoral and political
system are affecting the results, and plausibly many other factors may be important such
as the average voter population in each district, the size of the assembly, the length of
the campaign, the regulations of campaign advertising, and the role and functions of
national parliaments. Once more nations are eventually added to the CSES dataset,
providing a wider variety of political systems, then these would all be fruitful avenues for
further research and more sophisticated modeling.
Political Support and Electoral Systems
Beyond these indicators of specific knowledge and contact, do voters display
more general satisfaction with the political system under different systems? In this regard
we need to consider the best way to measure the concept of ‘support for the political
system.’ Elsewhere, building on the Eastonian framework, I have argued that this is
essentially a multidimensional concept and so cannot be tapped reliably using single
measures, for example of political trust (Norris 1998). Instead we can distinguish between
five levels of support ranging from the most abstract and diffuse level, measured by
support for the political community like the nation-state, down through support for
democratic values, for the political regime, for political institutions, and for political actors.
In this view, citizens can logically distinguish between levels, for example trusting their
local representative and yet having little confidence in parliament as an institution, or
approving of democratic ideals but still criticizing the performance of their government,
and so on. Following this logic, four alternative indicators of political support were used
for the analysis in this study, with the specific items listed under Table 5.
Specific support was measured by perceptions of the fairness of the electoral
system; the most direct evaluation of how well the system was seen to work. Yet
responses to this item could easily be colored by the outcome of the specific campaign
under analysis, for example by the party that won office. Diffuse support, understood to
indicate more general approval of the political system as a whole, was measured by
general satisfaction with the democratic process. It would be consistent to approve of
how the last election worked and yet to remain dissatisfied with how democracy
performed in general, or vice versa. The diffuse sense that citizens could influence the
political process was tapped by measures of political efficacy. Lastly, voting turnout was
compared as a critical indicator of involvement in the specific election. Factor analysis
(not reported here) revealed that these items fell into two principal dimensions: the
‘approval’ dimension meant that perceptions of the fairness of the electoral system were
closely related to general satisfaction with democracy, while the ‘participation’ dimension
meant that political efficacy was closely related to electoral turnout (Norris 2000).
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 16. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
[Table 7 about here]
The results of the comparison in Table 7 show that on average the public living
under the majoritarian systems was slightly more likely to display positive attitudes in
terms of the fairness of elections, levels of efficacy and overall satisfaction with
democracy than the average response for those living under PR or combined systems.
This lends further confirmation to my earlier models comparing the impact of electoral
systems on institutional confidence using the World Values survey data, as well as other
recent work by Listhaug, Aardal and Ellis (2000).
Nevertheless a closer examination of the distribution in the CSES data shows
considerable variations within each category. For example evaluations of the fairness of
the election was among the strongest in the Netherlands, where 92% thought that the
election was fair. Yet in contrast in Israel, using a similar PR system with a low threshold
and a nation-wide constituency, only one fifth of the public felt that the election was fair.
The variations among the combined systems ranged from 91% believing that the election
was fair in Germany down to 37% in the Ukraine. These substantial contrasts can
plausibly be attributable to the many factors commonly used to explain levels of political
support, including the role of political culture, the performance of the regime, and the
broader workings of political institutions beyond the electoral system (Norris 1998). The
fact that the three majoritarian systems (the US, Australia and Britain) are all long-
established democracies and affluent post-industrial societies hinders any direct
comparison across nations, in contrast to consolidating regimes such as in the Ukraine,
Mexico and Taiwan. The final release of the CSES dataset is planned to expand the
number and range of nations under comparison and this would allow these propositions
to be tested more systematically, along with comparison of the relative differences among
sub-groups of the population within each country (Norris 2000). Defenders of majoritarian
systems commonly argue that the electoral rules of the game generate greater public
trust and satisfaction, producing a more decisive outcome that more accurately reflects
the choice of the plurality of voters, rather than back-room wheelings and dealings to
produce coalitional partners, and the limited evidence reviewed here lends some support
to these claims.
Conclusions: The Implications for Westminster Government
The process of constitutional reform in Britain is a complex process with multiple
developments at different levels of government. With constitutional reform, like
Johnston’s dog singing in a bar, the amazement is not due to the grace of the voice but to
the fact that it is happening at all. Nevertheless despite the sweeping nature of the
reforms in the federal-unitary dimension, so far the status quo in elections to the House of
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 17. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Commons means that less has altered in the executive-parties dimension. Westminster
remains still, recognizably, Westminster despite all the multiple reforms implemented or
in the process of being introduced under the Blair administration. Yet, like Bagehot’s old
man wearing the clothes of his youth, underneath profound shifts are altering the
centralized nature of British government. We are just starting to evaluate the full
consequences of the rise of multilayered governance for matters like the complexity and
transparency of the policymaking process, as well as for how the public has responded to
these developments in terms of their national identities, trust in the political system, and
levels of civic engagement.
The keystone to further substantial change in the political system lies in electoral
reform for the House of Commons. Are the arguments favoring preserving first-past-the-
post for Westminster justified? We remain open to persuasion, but the evidence reviewed
here suggests considerable grounds for skepticism about many claims about its virtuous.
Theoretically rational choice models offer many plausible reasons why single member
districts should strengthen the linkage between electors and elected members, promoting
interactive contact, constituency service, and voter awareness of the electoral choices of
candidates (Carey and Shugart 1992). In practice, however, the evidence examined here
suggests that messy reality gets in the way of simple relationships. The study arrives at
two major conclusions:
First, compared with pure multimember PR systems, single member districts
were found to generate more voter-member contact, but combined districts showed equal
or stronger levels of voter-member contact activity as well as far greater knowledge of the
candidates. We can conclude that the evidence supports the claim that having some
members of parliament elected from single member districts promotes voter-member
linkages, but this argument does not preclude the introduction of mixed or combined
systems with some multimember districts, as in Germany or New Zealand, which are
widely believed to have other virtues for matters like proportionality and social diversity.
Second, the study lends further confirmation to the claims that the public displays
greater satisfaction with the political system in countries employing majoritarian electoral
systems, as indicated by evaluations of the fairness of elections, feelings of political
efficacy and overall satisfaction with democracy. This supports the argument that
majoritarian systems produce a clear and decisive outcome, expressing the wishes of the
plurality of voters, whereas proportional systems are more likely to lead to a process of
bargaining and compromises in government coalition building that may produce less
overall satisfaction with the system. Nevertheless the evidence examined here remains
limited, mainly by the fact that the three majoritarian systems are all among the most
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 18. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
affluent and long-established democracies, and this finding needs testing more widely
with more sophisticated models once the range of countries included in the current
release of the CSES dataset is extended.
Moreover as soon as we look at particular countries, it is clear that the
relationship between the type of electoral system and the type of voter-member linkages
is contingent upon many other factors, and the deviations from the overall pattern
become clear. For example, electors in multimember Israel reported as much contact
with members of the Knesset as did British voters with MPs in the House of Commons. It
can be argued that this is not surprising since, after all, Israel is a small, compact and
above-all intensely political society, where everyone seems to know everyone in public
life. In the same way, knowledge of the candidates may be particularly strong in New
Zealand because of the intense battle that had been waged for the MMP system, while
Germans or Norwegians may score highly on this indicator because these are affluent,
well-educated societies sharing certain North European democratic traditions. Along
similar lines, people in the Ukraine probably feel pessimistic about the way that
democracy is working in their country for the very good reason that democracy isn’t
working particularly well there. Yet as soon as particular cultural or historical factors are
taken into account then this erodes claims for a direct relationship between the simple
mechanics of the electoral rules and the complex relationship between elected members
and citizens. Clearly more work is needed to plumb the full psychological effects of
electoral systems, and the expansion of the CSES dataset once more countries become
available can facilitate this process. Comparisons across all the different electoral
systems in Britain also promise all sorts of delights for the psephologically inclined. But
the initial picture that emerges from this evidence suggests that while defenders of first-
past-the-post for Westminster want to cloak themselves in the assumed virtuous of this
system, in practice the reality is more complex and the introduction of mixed systems
could preserve the old benefits while adding multiple advantages.
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 19. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Table 1: Lijphart’s Classification of Political Institutions
Westminster Model Consensus Model
EXECUTIVE-PARTIES DIMENSION
Executive Single party cabinet government Multiparty coalitional cabinet government
Balance of Powers Executive dominance Executive-legislative balance
Party system Two-party system Multi-party system
Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional representation
Interest group system Pluralist Corporatist
FEDERAL-UNITARY DIMENSION
Dispersion of power Unitary and centralized government Federal and decentralized
Legislature Unicameral legislative power Balanced bicameralism
Constitutions Flexible constitution amended by simple majority
Rigid constitutions changed by extraordinary majorities
Judicial review Parliamentary sovereignty Legislation subject to judicial review
Central banks Bank dependent on the executive Independent bank
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 20. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Table 2: Electoral Systems for the Lower House in the Selected Countries Under Comparison TYPE OF
DISTRICTS Year
of Electi
on
Electoral System
Party List
Formula Thresh-hold
%
Total N. of
Members
N. Of SMD MPs
N. Of List MPs
Total number
of Districts for Lists
Voting Age Population
(VAP)
Average VAP per member
Mean District Mag.
Prop. ENPP Max. Years
between Election
s SINGLE MEMBER
USA 1996 FPTP Plurality None 435 435 196 511 000 436,691 1.0 .94 1.99 2
UK 1997 FPTP Plurality None 659 659 45 093 510 68,426 1.0 .80 2.11 5
Australia 1996 AV Majority None 148 148 13 547 920 91,540 1.0 .84 2.57 3
COMBINED
Taiwan 1996 SNTV+PR Closed 5 334 234/58 100 2 14 340 580 42,935 50.0 .95 2.46 4
Ukraine 1998 FPTP+PR LR-Hare 4 450 225 225 1 38 939 136 86,531 225.0 .86 5.98 5
Japan 1996 Parallel-FPTP 500 200 300 11 96 672 730 193,345 27.3 4
Lithuania 1998 2nd Ballot +PR LR-Hare 5 141 71 70 1 2 751 320 19,512 70 .76 3.32 4
New Zealand 1996 FPTP+PR St Laguë 5 120 65 55 1 2 571 840 21,432 55 .96 3.78
Germany 1998 FPTP+PR Closed 656 328 328 65 942 100 100,049 4
Hungary 1998 FPTP+PR Closed 386 176 110 1 7 742 951 20,059 110 4
Mexico 1997 FPTP+PR Closed 500 300 200 1 55 406 943 110,813 200 3
MULTIMEMBER
Spain 1996 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 3 350 350 50 31 013 030 88,608 7.0 .93 2.73 4
Romania 1996 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 3 343 343 42 16 737 320 48,796 8.2 .82 3.37 4
Norway 1997 PR Lists Closed St Laguë 165 165 19 3 360 083 20,036 8.7 .95 2.35 4
Poland 1997 PR Lists Open D’ Hondt 7 460 460 52 27 901 720 60,656 8.8 .82 2.95 4
Argentina 1999 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 3 257 257 24 23 230 160 90,389 10.7 2
Czech Rep 1996 PR Lists Closed LR-Droop 5 200 200 8 7 859 160 39,296 25.0 .89 4.15 4
Israel 1996 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 1.5 120 120 1 3 684 850 30,707 120.0 .96 5.63 5
Netherlands 1998 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 0.67 150 150 1 11 996 400 79,976 150.0 .95 4.81 4
Notes: PR Proportional Representation; FPTP First Past the Post; AV Alternative Vote; SMD Single Member Districts; List Party List; SMD Single Member Districts; List Party List. For the measures of proportionality and ENPP see Table A1. Note this classification distinguishes between NZ MMP where the outcome depends upon the proportion of votes cast in the party lists and mixed systems used in Taiwan, Ukraine and Lithuania where the single member districts and party lists operate independently and in parallel. Voting Age Population: IDEA Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997. www.idea.int Source: Successive volumes of Electoral Studies; Richard Rose, Neil Munro and Tom Mackie. 1998. Elections in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1990. Strathclyde: Center for the Study of Public Policy. http://www.aceproject.org/ ; Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. Eds. 1996. Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage. Table 1.2.
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 21. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Table 3: Knowledge of Candidates
% None
Correct
% One
Correct
% Two
Correct
Type of District
Japan 6 14 80 Combined
New Zealand 17 20 63 Combined
Germany 24 43 33 Combined
Norway 31 18 51 Multimember
Hungary 37 24 40 Combined
Britain 40 32 29 Single Member
Czech Republic 42 21 37 Multimember
Australia 43 58 Single Member
USA 48 24 28 Single Member
Ukraine 61 18 21 Combined
Poland 62 22 16 Multimember
Taiwan 63 13 24 Combined
Romania 71 19 10 Multimember
Spain 74 16 11 Multimember
Mexico 82 11 7 Combined
All 48 22 30
Single Member 43 37 20
Combined 43 18 39
Multimember 60 17 24
Note: Q: “Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who ran/stood in you
[lower house primary electoral district] in the last [parliamentary/congressional] election?
[If YES] What were their names?”
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-99.
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 22. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Table 4: Contact with elected representatives
% With contact Type of Districts
New Zealand 26 Combined
Australia 16 Single Member
Israel 16 Multimember
Lithuania 15 Combined
Norway 15 Multimember
USA 14 Single Member
Britain 13 Single Member
Germany 11 Combined
Mexico 10 Combined
Argentina 10 Multimember
Japan 8 Combined
Taiwan 8 Combined
Ukraine 8 Combined
Hungary 7 Combined
Czech Republic 7 Multimember
Romania 7 Multimember
Poland 6 Multimember
Netherlands 5 Multimember
Spain 3 Multimember
ALL 12
Single Member 14
Combined 14
Multimember 8
Note: Q12 “During the last twelve months, have you had any contact with a [Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?”
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-99.
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 23. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Table 5: Models predicting contact with elected members
Model I Model II
B SE Sig B SE Sig
Level of Democratization .220 .024 .000 .290 .025 .000
SOCIAL CONTROLS
Age .006 .001 .000 .004 .001 .000
Gender (male) .284 .036 .000 .291 .036 .000
Education .251 .011 .000 .237 .011 .000
Income .002 .011 .000 .035 .011 .000
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS
Single Member .274 .053 .000
Combined .691 .044 .000
Constant 4.54 5.29
% Correctly predicted 87.8 87.8
Negelkerke R2 .053 .069
Notes: Model I: Binary logistic regression models without the electoral variables. Model II: Complete model where electoral systems with only multimember party list districts are the default. Level of democratization is measured by the Freedom House Gastil Index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (reversed scale). Age: Years Education: 8-point scale from none (1) to completed university graduate (8) Income: Household income on a standardized 5 point scale. Type of district: Multimember (1) Combined (2) Single member (3). Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-8
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 24. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Table 6: Models predicting knowledge of candidates
Model I Model II
B SE Sig B SE Sig
Level of Democratization .631 .016 .000 .650 .018 .000
SOCIAL CONTROLS
Age .016 .001 .000 .015 .001 .000
Gender (male) .171 .026 .000 .177 .026 .000
Education .180 .008 .000 .165 .008 .000
Income .059 .119 .000 .110 .037 .000
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS
Single Member .017 .032 N/s
Combined .470 .134 .000
Constant -5.36 -6.93
% Correctly predicted 64.5 68.3
Negelkerke R2 15.5 20.4
Notes: Model I: Binary logistic regression models without the electoral variables. Model II: Complete model where electoral systems with only multimember party list districts are the default. See Table 5 for details of all data and coding.
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-8
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 25. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Table 7: Indicators of public satisfaction with the electoral and political systems % Fairness
of Election % High Efficacy
% Turnout
Satisfaction with
democracy
Type of Districts
USA 75 78 77 81 Single Member Australia 69 95 78 Single Member Britain 81 76 83 75 Single Member Mean 78 74 85 78 New Zealand 77 76 95 68 Combined Japan 42 65 84 64 Combined Germany 91 69 93 63 Combined Taiwan 62 53 92 47 Combined Hungary 82 73 73 42 Combined Mexico 56 10 76 42 Combined Lithuania 55 66 35 Combined Ukraine 37 71 77 9 Combined Mean 63 60 84 46 Czech Rep 80 86 90 61 Multimember Argentina 59 56 42 Multimember Norway 93 86 86 90 Multi Member Netherlands 92 30 78 88 Multi Member Poland 72 74 57 63 Multi Member Spain 80 70 90 63 Multi Member Israel 20 17 83 53 Multi Member Romania 82 71 88 44 Multi Member Mean 72 61 82 63 All 73 64 80 63
Fairness of Election: Q2. “(PLEASE SEE CARD 1) In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly?” Percentage who believed election was fair (defined as categories 1 and 2). Satisfaction with Democracy: Q1. “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?” The figures represent the percentage ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied. Political Efficacy: The 15-point political efficacy scale was constructed from the following items that were highly inter-correlated. ‘High’ efficacy was categorized as a total score of 8 or above.
Q11. (PLEASE SEE CARD 5) “ Some people say that members of [Congress / Parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [Congress / Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] know what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?”
Q13. (PLEASE SEE CARD 6) “Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn’t make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?”
Q14. (PLEASE SEE CARD 7) “Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?” Turnout: The question measured whether the respondent cast a ballot in the election. Functionally equivalent but not identical items were used in each national election survey. Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-8
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 26. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
Figure 1
Typology of DemocraciesRef: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999
Executive-Parties
2.01.00.0-1.0-2.0
Uni
tary
-Fed
eral
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
VEN
US
UK
TRI
SWI
SWE
SPA
POR
PNG
NOR
NZ
NET
MAU
MAL
JPN
JAM ITA
ISR
IRE
ICE
GRE
GER
FRA
FIN
DENCR
CAN
BOT
BEL
BARBAH
AUT
AUL
Majoritarian
Consensual
TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 27. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000
About the Author
Pippa Norris, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge
MA 02138; e-mail: [email protected]; http: www.pippanorris.com.
Acknowledgement
I am most grateful to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), based at the
Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI for release of this
dataset, particularly Phil Shively, and all the national collaborators who made this
possible. More details of the research design are available at www.umich.edu/~nes/cses.
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1 At the time of writing (April 2001) the Jenkins Commission has recommended the
Alternative Vote Plus system for the House of Commons. The Labour government
remains committed to holding a referendum on electoral reform, promised in the 1997
manifesto, but the timing for this remains undecided. The Liberal Democrat
spokesperson, Simon Hughes, has indicated that the party will not back the non-
proportional Alternative Vote Plus system proposed by the Jenkins report to replace first-
past-the-post. In addition, the Kerley Working Party has recommended the use of STV for
local elections in Scotland. Details of recent developments are regularly monitored by the
Electoral Reform Society. www.electoral-reform.org.uk. The full text of the Jenkins report
is available at: www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4090/4090.htm
2 The wrong lessons can easily be drawn, as shown by conclusions about the European
elections where low turnout was commonly blamed on the introduction of the regional
party list systems rather than the nature of the campaign and levels of public interest in
the outcome.
3 More details of the research design and collaborators are available at
www.umich.edu/~nes/cses.
4 It should be noted that Curtice and Shively classify New Zealand according to their old
electoral system, as single member majoritarian, which may account for differences
between this study and their results since it turns out that New Zealand is on the high end
for both candidate knowledge and contact activity.