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TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 1. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000 The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and Its Consequences Pippa Norris Harvard University Abstract The UK political system has long exemplified ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government, a type subsequently exported to many Commonwealth countries. The primary advantage of this system, proponents since Bagehot have argued, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance. Yet under the Blair administration, this system has undergone a series of major constitutional reforms, perhaps producing the twilight of the pure Westminster model. After conceptualizing the process of constitutional reform, this paper discusses two important claims made by those who favor retaining the current electoral system for Westminster, namely that single-member districts promote strong voter-member linkages and generate greater satisfaction with the political system. Evidence testing these claims is examined from comparative data covering 19 nations, drawing on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study finds that member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure multimember districts, but that combined districts such as MMP preserve these virtues. Concerning claims of greater public satisfaction under majoritarian systems, the study establishes some support for this contention, although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for debates about electoral reform and for the future of the Westminster political system. ________________________________________________________________ “An ancient and ever-altering constitution is like an old man who still wears with attached fondness clothes of the fashion of his youth: what you see of him is the same; what you do not see is wholly altered.” Walter Bagehot (1867). The UK political system exemplifies ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government (Lijphart 1999), a type subsequently exported with some important variations to Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand, Canada, India, and Australia, as well as to many post-colonial nations in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia where these institutions commonly failed to take root. At the apex of British colonial power in the late 19 th Century, President Woodrow Wilson (1884) observed that Westminster parliamentary government had become ‘the world’s fashion.’ The primary advantages of this system, proponents have argued ever since Bagehot, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance. Yet voices criticizing the Westminster system have strengthened in periodic waves during recent decades. Under the Blair administration, the British constitution has undergone a series of major reforms. Some components, like the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, and the introduction of party lists for elections to the European parliament, are already locked in place. Others like the future role and powers of the

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Page 1: The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and Its … · 2016-06-28 · Electoral Reform and Its Consequences Pippa Norris Harvard University Abstract The UK political system

TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 1. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000

The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and Its Consequences Pippa Norris

Harvard University Abstract The UK political system has long exemplified ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government, a type subsequently exported to many Commonwealth countries. The primary advantage of this system, proponents since Bagehot have argued, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance. Yet under the Blair administration, this system has undergone a series of major constitutional reforms, perhaps producing the twilight of the pure Westminster model. After conceptualizing the process of constitutional reform, this paper discusses two important claims made by those who favor retaining the current electoral system for Westminster, namely that single-member districts promote strong voter-member linkages and generate greater satisfaction with the political system. Evidence testing these claims is examined from comparative data covering 19 nations, drawing on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study finds that member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure multimember districts, but that combined districts such as MMP preserve these virtues. Concerning claims of greater public satisfaction under majoritarian systems, the study establishes some support for this contention, although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for debates about electoral reform and for the future of the Westminster political system. ________________________________________________________________

“An ancient and ever-altering constitution is like an old man who still wears with attached

fondness clothes of the fashion of his youth: what you see of him is the same; what you

do not see is wholly altered.” Walter Bagehot (1867).

The UK political system exemplifies ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government

(Lijphart 1999), a type subsequently exported with some important variations to

Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand, Canada, India, and Australia, as well as

to many post-colonial nations in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia where these

institutions commonly failed to take root. At the apex of British colonial power in the late

19th Century, President Woodrow Wilson (1884) observed that Westminster

parliamentary government had become ‘the world’s fashion.’ The primary advantages of

this system, proponents have argued ever since Bagehot, lie in its ability to combine

accountability with effective governance.

Yet voices criticizing the Westminster system have strengthened in periodic

waves during recent decades. Under the Blair administration, the British constitution has

undergone a series of major reforms. Some components, like the Scottish Parliament and

Welsh Assembly, and the introduction of party lists for elections to the European

parliament, are already locked in place. Others like the future role and powers of the

Page 2: The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and Its … · 2016-06-28 · Electoral Reform and Its Consequences Pippa Norris Harvard University Abstract The UK political system

TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 2. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000

House of Lords remain under debate after publication of the Wakeham report. The

prospects for still others, like the Jenkins proposals on electoral reform for Westminster,

remains uncertain1. As with recent changes in New Zealand, we are perhaps witnessing

the twilight of the pure Westminster model, with only a few states like Barbados

continuing to cling to this ideal, as nostalgically as John Major’s images of cricket whites,

British bobbies, and warm beer.

This study focuses upon perhaps the most important and yet contentious matter

that remains to be resolved - the question of electoral reform for the British House of

Commons. Debate about reform raises difficult and complex issues about the normative

goals that any electoral system should serve, the trade-offs among these values, as well

as the best mechanisms to achieve these goals. An extensive literature has discussed

these issues (Rae 1971; Lakeman 1974; Bogdanor and Butler 1983; Groffman and

Lijphart 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Reeve and Ware 1992; Nohlen 1996; Norris

1997; Farrell 1997; Cox 1997; Katz 1997; Reynolds and Reilly 1997). In this study we

focus upon examining the evidence for two central claims about the virtues of preserving

the current system. Proponents of the status quo at Westminster have commonly

stressed the importance of keeping single member districts because, it is argued, these

maintain the accountability of elected representatives to local constituents. If individual

MPs misbehave in any regard - if they prove lackadaisical, miscreants, sinners or fools -

then, the theory goes, voters can kick them out. This claim is important since it lies at the

heart of the reform debate in British politics, framing the options considered by the

Jenkins Commission. Moreover advocates argue that first-past-the post provides a

decisive electoral outcome that is perceived as fairer and more transparent than the

process of post-hoc coalition formation, and one that therefore increases overall

satisfaction with the democratic process.

To explore these claims, Part I of this study first sketches a broad interpretation

about how we can best conceptualize the process of constitutional reform in Britain,

drawing upon Lijphart’s theoretical framework. Part II then outlines the arguments

favoring preserving the status quo of first-past-the-post elections for Westminster and the

claims that the use of single member districts strengthens voter-member linkages and

promotes public satisfaction with the political system. Part III examines comparative

evidence about the consequences of single, combined and multi member districts

drawing on data from the 19-nation Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study

finds that member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure

multimember districts, but that combined districts such as those used by Mixed Member

Proportional systems (MMP) preserve these virtues. On the claims of greater public

satisfaction with the political process under majoritarian systems, the study establishes

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TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 3. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000

some support for this contention although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion

considers the implications of the findings for the debate about electoral reform and for the

future of the Westminster system.

Understanding Constitutional Reform

The conceptual framework for this study starts from Arend Lijphart’s classification

of political institutions into majoritarian or consensus democracies (Lijphart 1999). In this

well-known theory, majoritarian systems are characterized by the concentration of power

in the hands of the largest party, on the grounds that this promotes accountability with

effective governance: the party in government is empowered to take and implement

difficult and tough decisions during its tenure in office, assured of the ability to pass its

legislative program without many checks and balances so long as they can carry their

backbenchers with them. At the end of their term of office the government can be held

clearly accountable for the results of their actions and kicked out, if unpopular. In

contrast the consensus model prioritizes generating broad participation in government

and widespread agreement with the policies that the government should pursue,

emphasizing inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise. The major institutions

underpinning these forms of democracy cluster along two principal dimensions: the

executive-party and the federal-unitary (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

[Figure 1 and Table 1 about here]

How can Lijphart’s framework help us to understand the changing British political

system? The Blair Government’s program of constitutional change covers a raft of major

developments, either currently under debate or in the process of being implemented. Like

billiard balls ricocheting into each other around a table, the full impact of these reforms

currently remains unpredictable. For all the commissions and committees, the reviews

and reports, employing the great and the good, there is no over-arching master plan but

rather a perfect exemplification of British muddling through. This remains a work in

progress, although perhaps the Blair government’s defining achievement during their first

term in office, characterized schizophrenically by courage and timidity, radicalism and

conservatism, devolution and centralization, often with two steps unexpectedly forwards

and one back. If Blair’s progress during the 1997 election was best depicted, in Roy

Jenkins memorable phrase, as gingerly carrying a Ming vase across a crowded room, the

process of constitutional reform can be seen as analogous to gingerly carrying a Ming

vase across a crowded room when blindfolded.

The UK political system has been or is being transformed through multiple

reforms: devolution in Scotland and Wales; the introduction of multiple types of electoral

systems for different bodies including PR for European elections; the regulation of party

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funding; central bank independence; reforms to the composition and role of the House of

Lords; the peace settlement in Northern Ireland; legislation on freedom of information;

and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law

(Blackburn and Plant 1999; Hazell 1999). The main change can be understood as the

erosion of the pure ‘Westminster’ model of government, representing a highly centralized

and unitary political system where executive power was concentrated in the Cabinet and

House of Commons, with multilayered governance diffusing the process of decision-

making to multiple bodies. Government powers are being transferred simultaneously

downwards towards elected bodies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London,

and upwards towards multilateral agencies of global governance, notably the European

Union as well as organizations like the World Trade Organization. Power has also

simultaneously drained away outwards, from Whitehall towards both the corporate and

non-profit sectors. The UK is hardly alone in this process - globalization has been eroding

the autonomy of nation-states around the world (Held et al. 1999) - but the change is

perhaps more dramatic and striking in the home of the Westminster system (Kreiger

1999). As a result, the UK seems likely to remain a majoritarian democracy in the core

executive but one which has moved closer towards Lijphart’s ‘consensus’ model on the

federal-unitary dimension, with a more decentralized government, stronger bicameralism,

a more rigid constitution, stronger judicial review, and central bank independence. The

UK is becoming more like the political systems in Australia and Canada. Comparative

studies suggest that the rise of multilayered governance may well have major

consequences: for the transparency, accountability, effectiveness and complexity of the

decision-making process in the UK; for spending and fiscal flow in economic and social

policy; for local, national and cosmopolitan identities; for the role and functions of elected

representatives; and ultimately for diffuse levels of public support for the political system

(Sartori 1994; Lijphart and Waisman 1996).

For all these developments, the Westminster system has arguably still not

changed fundamentally on the executive-party dimension. Britain retains single-party

majority cabinet government in Whitehall not coalitions, a dominant cabinet rather than

executive-legislative balance, two-party predominance of government and opposition in

Westminster, despite the rise of popular support for other parties, pluralist rather than

corporatist interest groups, and above all a majoritarian electoral system for Westminster,

buttressing and reinforcing all of the above. If Westminster moved towards a more

proportional electoral system – as in New Zealand - then this would undermine the

foundations of the majoritarian structure. Moreover alternative electoral systems have

been adopted at almost every level except for Westminster with the introduction of the

Additional Member system for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the

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London Assembly; the Supplementary Vote for the London Mayor; the Regional List

system for European elections; and the Single Transferable Vote for the new Northern

Ireland Assembly. The federal-unitary dimension of British government has been

transformed far more than the executive-party dimension. Like Harold Lloyd dangling in

midair on a skyscraper ledge, one hand has slipped but the other retains its grip.

Claims for the Virtues of First-Past-the-Post

Therefore the argument about electoral reform for the House of Commons is

central to the future of the British political system, as well as dividing the major parties,

and the central claims in favor of retaining the status quo deserve close and careful

scrutiny. The lessons from the flourishing literature in new and old democracies is that we

can identify some of the probable mechanical results of electoral systems with a fair

degree of confidence - such as their impact on the structure of party competition, the

proportionality of votes to seats, the representation of women, and patterns of turnout

(Lijphart 1994; Katz 1997). In contrast, far less is known about what Blais and Massicotte

(2001) term the psychological effects of electoral systems on the attitudes and behavior

of voters, representatives, and parties. Reforms in Israel, Italy, Japan and New Zealand

during the early 1990s illustrate that this process remains fraught with uncertainty and

often produces multiple unintended consequences (Norris 1995; Vowles 1998).

The debate about electoral reform at Westminster arouses strong passions

among advocates, although the rest of the country seems less moved by the minutiae of

the Alternative Vote (AV)+ versus Supplementary Vote, or the Additional Member System

(AMS) versus First-Past-The-Post. Defenders favoring keeping the current system of

first-past-the-post for Westminster commonly make a series of claims for its virtues. This

study examines the evidence for two core propositions about the psychological effects of

electoral systems upon the public, namely that:

(i) Single member districts promote accountability via strong links between voters and

elected members, so that electors living under these systems know more about

parliamentary candidates and have greater contact with elected representatives, than

those living under multimember or combined systems;

(ii) Majoritarian systems promote greater public satisfaction with the political system, so

that electors experiencing these systems are more likely to feel that the electoral system

is fair, to have a strong sense of political efficacy, to turnout to vote, and to express

greater overall satisfaction with democracy, compared with those under multimember or

combined systems.

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Claims for strong voter-member linkages

What is the reasoning behind these claims? One of the primary virtues of the

Westminster system is meant to lie in the chain of collective and individual accountability

(Strom 2000). The core claim is that representatives are accountable via elections if

citizens can sanction those in office, retaining those that perform well and ousting those

who do not (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). Like a series of inter-locking fail-safe

mechanisms protecting the nuclear button, four primary channels can be identified in the

Westminster system protecting citizens from the government. The first principle of

parliamentary government is that the executive emerges from and is responsible to the

legislature, so that the cabinet is collectively accountable on a day-to-day basis to

parliament. The ultimate penalty of a legislative vote of no confidence is that the cabinet

can be removed from office. Moreover at general elections, the party in government can

be held collectively accountable for their actions and punished or rewarded accordingly

by the electorate. Thirdly, given single member districts, strong party discipline, and

mass-branch party organizations, members of parliament are seen as accountable for

their actions on a regular basis to party members in their local constituency, as well as to

party leaders and whips in the House. Members who fail to support party policies, or who

are seen to fail in their personal conduct, may not be re-nominated for their local seat.

_______________________________________________________________

Government

Members of Parliament

Local Party Local Electorate

_______________________________________________________________

All these forms of accountability may or may not operate, but the specific claim

examined here is the argument that even if all these mechanisms simultaneously fail, in

the final stage, general elections in single member territorial districts allow constituents to

hold individual MPs to account for their actions (or inactions). Voters in Britain cannot

directly select the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, nor even (directly) the overall balance of

parties in the Commons, but they are empowered to pick their local member of

parliament. The territorial basis of the British House of Commons reflects the traditional

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conception of representation ever since its origins in the 13th Century, and it is believed to

be an important mechanism providing an incentive for constituency service, as a way to

maintain members’ independence from parties, and as a means to ensure that members

remain concerned about the needs and concerns of all their constituents, not just party

stalwarts.

The essential aspect of the electoral system promoting accountability is the

district magnitude – the number of representatives elected to a constituency – in the case

of Westminster based on single member geographically based seats. Average district

magnitude is calculated very simply by dividing the total number of seats in the legislature

by the number of districts. Other classic dimensions of electoral systems are less relevant

to voter-member linkages, such as the electoral formulas, threshold, and ballot structure.

The use of all single member districts produces a district magnitude of one in Britain and

the United States, whereas at the other extreme the use of the whole country as one

constituency, as in Israel and the Netherlands, produces district magnitudes of 120 and

150 respectively. In multimember districts with closed party lists electors are powerless

to reward or punish individual candidates, they can only signify their displeasure with

particular politicians by casting a ballot against the whole party. PR systems with open

party lists allow electors to prioritize candidates within a list, but it is more difficult for

voters to evaluate all the candidates on such a list than to become familiar with a local

representative in a single seat. The choice of district magnitude has many significant

consequences, as Reynolds and Reilly (1997, P.92) observe: “To sum up, when

designing an electoral system, the district magnitude is in many ways the key factor in

determining how the system will operate in practice, the extent of the link between voters

and elected members, and the overall proportionality of the results.”

This claim of electoral accountability represents an important issue that has

framed and limited much of the debate about alternative systems in Britain, for example

the Jenkins report (1998) was given a wide-ranging brief but the terms specified that ‘a

link between MPs and geographic constituencies’ should be maintained (my italics).

While systems with a small district magnitude, like the Single Transferable Vote (STV),

and mixed systems like the Additional Member System (AMS), could be and were

considered for the Commons, this effectively ruled out any consideration of the system

which is most common throughout the rest of Europe: regional party lists with large

multimember districts. The report concluded that the vast majority of MPs (80-85%)

should continue to be elected on an individual constituency basis by the Alternative Vote,

with the remainder elected on a corrective top-up basis based on open party lists in small

multimember constituencies formed from county or city boundaries.

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TWILIGHT OF WESTMINSTER? PAGE 8. REVISED FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 21 DECEMBER 2000

But is there good evidence supporting the core claim that electors living in single

member districts generally know more about local parliamentary candidates and have

more contact with elected representatives - and can therefore hold them to account more

effectively - than those living in multimember constituencies? The evidence remains

inconclusive.

Some of the most plausible cross-national evidence in favor of the claim for

strong voter-member linkages is provided by Bernhard Wessels (1999) who compared

the role orientations of national MPs in Europe and Members of the European Parliament

in the 15 EU member states. He found that district magnitude was significantly related to

role orientations: the smaller the district magnitude - and therefore the more personalized

the electoral competition - the more members chose to represent their constituency.

Another important indicator in favor of this proposition is a study where Curtice and

Shively (2000) examined the evidence that voters were contacted more often and had

better knowledge of candidates under single member district systems rather than under

PR multimember districts, and concluded that in both cases there was a positive and

significant effect.

In addition, evidence within particular countries confirms that legislators in

majoritarian systems like the US, Britain and Australia dedicate a large proportion of their

time to constituency service (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; McAllister 1997). British

Members of Parliament face a series of conflicting demands on their time and energies

but in recent years they are devoting an increasing amount of time to ‘service

responsiveness’: dealing with government departments on behalf of individual

constituents and local groups. MPs help shortcut the bureaucratic maze of housing

regulations, police complaint procedures, or social security claims for individuals, or local

groups, mediating on behalf of constituents to ensure government officials uphold their

rights. The growth of such activities in the post-war period has been documented (Norris

and Lovenduski 1995). What is less clear is whether elected members elsewhere also

provide similar services. Studies in Ireland and Italy, for example, have shown that

deputies work hard for their constituents, and they may actually undertake more

constituency business than their British equivalents (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995).

Small multimember districts may actually promote greater incentives for constituency

service than single member districts, since members need to distinguish themselves from

other contestants within their own party (Carey and Shugart 1992). In Britain it has also

commonly been found that the ‘personal vote’ for MPs is normally limited in scope, and

there is little evidence that the amount of constituency service is tied to the electoral

incentive of seat marginality (Norris 1997; Norris, Vallance and Lovenduski 1992).

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Moreover previous studies suggest a complex relationship between the type of

electoral system, the degree of constituency casework, and knowledge of candidates,

mediated by political culture, the traditional role of legislators, and the structure of

government services. For example few members of the German Bundestag engage in

constituency service, irrespective of whether members are elected via the party lists or

single member districts, in large part because services like housing, education and

welfare are the responsibility of the Lander level. (Wessels 1997) Voter-legislator

linkages may be determined by the size of the constituency combined with the provision

of legislative staff more than by the use of single member districts. Consider, for example,

the amount of mail that can be generated in a populous Senate seat like California

compared with a small UK constituency like the Western Isles. Based on a comparison of

twelve west European democracies, Vernon Bogdanor (1985) was skeptical about any

simple and direct relationships among the type of electoral system, voters’ awareness of

candidates, and levels of constituency service, and the study concluded that cultural and

historical traditions play a far more important role in determining parliamentarian-

constituent relationships than the electoral system per se.

Claims about Public Satisfaction with the Political System

The second claim examined here concerns the broader consequences of the

choice of electoral system upon political support. Claims about the perceived fairness of

different electoral systems are commonly invoked on all sides of the reform debate. One

of the commonest arguments by those favoring electoral reform is that the British public

has become dissatisfied with the fairness of the outcome, a claim that has become

increasingly popular with the rise of electoral support for minor parties since the early

1970s and the continued barriers they face in entry to the House of Commons. In turn, it

is argued, this has fuelled wider public disaffection with the political system, undermining

faith and confidence in British representative democracy. Yet proponents favoring the

status quo have made counter claims. It can be argued that first-past-the-post represents

a simple and transparent method of translating votes into seats, and the decisiveness of

the outcome means that voters may regard the results as fairer, more satisfactory, and

more democratic than a coalition government produced by post-hoc behind-the-scenes

negotiations between unexpected political bedfellows (such as in New Zealand or the

Netherlands). Previous comparative studies suggest that greater institutional confidence

and system support is associated with majoritarian rather than proportional electoral

systems (Norris 1998; Listhaug et al. 2000).

Yet again evidence for and against these claims remains inconclusive and mixed.

Curtice and Jowell (1997) examined trends in public support for the British political

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system and reported a decline in trust in government and political institutions from 1987

to 1996. Yet at the same time they detected no apparent trend towards increased support

for electoral reform in Britain from 1983-1996; during this period in a steady pattern over

one half of the public say they favor keeping the current system and one third support

reform. Yet there are many reasons why it is difficult to interpret declining institutional

confidence as a direct response towards the workings of the British electoral system per

se since the demand for constitutional change is only weakly tied in voters’ minds to

levels of trust in the political system; moreover similar patterns of declining institutional

trust are evident in many post-industrial societies, including those like Sweden with PR

electoral systems (Dalton 1998). Studies have also looked directly at a broader range of

attitudes towards constitutional and electoral reform but public opinion on these issues

tends to be soft and incoherent. The best demonstration of this tendency is the way

public opinion is open to framing effects: even in the same survey, the same people offer

responses both supportive and critical of the current electoral system and potential

alternatives, depending upon the way the questions are worded and ordered (Curtice and

Jowell 1998; Dunleavy and Margetts 1997). These results suggest that on these issues

public attitudes monitored in surveys are similar to Zaller’s (1992) ‘top of the head’

responses, akin to asking the public about, say, the truth or falsity of Fermat’s theorem or

Einstein’s theories of relativity. Surveys may generate an answer but it may not

necessarily be meaningful. Electoral reform is a technical and abstract issue, involving

considerable uncertainty about hypothetical choices, so not surprisingly qualitative

studies conclude that the public typically displays little understanding of how alternative

electoral system would work, and indeed a fairly muddled view even of how the current

system operates (Hedges and White 1999).

Research Design, Comparative Framework and Data

These considerations suggest that we need to reexamine whether voter- member

linkages, and general satisfaction with the political system, are actually higher in single

member than multimember districts, as claimed by proponents of maintaining the

Westminster status quo.

The psychological effects of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems on

public opinion and the evidence for these claims can be investigated in many ways. One

approach is through the comparison of the workings of different electoral systems within

the UK, with appropriate controls, which allow ideal ‘natural experiments’ for testing these

propositions. Hence voter’s awareness of candidates can now be compared under

different electoral systems within one country, including elections to the Scottish

Parliament, European Parliament, and House of Commons. To compare like with like,

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however, this strategy can only attribute any differences to the type of electoral system

per se after the new regional bodies have been in existence for at least one term, and

even then any differences in the public’s awareness of candidates, in the provision of

constituency service or even levels of turnout could be due to the functions and visibility

of members of these bodies rather than to the electoral systems as such2. Moreover this

approach is only appropriate for post-hoc evaluations of public reactions, after the

reforms are introduced, when it may be too late to serve the policy process well.

Alternatively these claims can be examined from a cross-national perspective, as

they are here based on the 3rd release of survey data from the Comparative Study of

Electoral Systems covering 19 nations (CSES)3. The CSES uses a common module

incorporated into cross-sectional post-election national surveys within each country, (total

N.32022), including the BES. Full details of the CSES dataset and questionnaire are

available online (www.umich.edu/~nes/cses). The electoral studies in this dataset were

for contests from 1996-1999.

The 19 countries under comparison vary significantly along multiple dimensions,

including levels of democratic and socioeconomic development, as well as cultural and

geographic regions of the world. The comparison includes four Anglo-American

democracies (Australia, the United States, Britain and New Zealand), five West European

nations ranging from the Scandinavian north to the southern Mediterranean (Spain,

Germany, the Netherlands, Norway), six post-communist nations in Central and Eastern

Europe (Ukraine, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Hungary), two Latin

American societies (Mexico and Argentina), one in the Middle East (Israel), and two

Asian countries (Japan and Taiwan). In comparing the pattern of constituent-

representative linkages in different nations we need to control for intervening factors that

can be expected to influence this process, including at aggregate level the length of time

which a country has been a continuous democracy and levels of democratization, as well

as standard social background factors at individual-level including age, education, gender

and income that previous studies have found to be commonly associated with levels of

political knowledge and voter-initiated contact activity (Verba et al. 1995).

Classifying Electoral Systems

Most importantly, the comparison includes a wide variety of electoral systems

exemplifying most of the major types around the globe, ranging from single member

districts in the US, Australia and Britain, through to the Netherlands and Israel where the

whole country represents one geographic constituency. The proportionality of the system

and its electoral formulae are less important for this study than the district magnitude.

Three nations under comparison used single member districts including first-past-the-

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post systems (the United States and the UK) and the Alternative Vote (Australia). Eight

nations used multimember districts with proportional representation party lists including

Spain, Israel, Poland, Romania, Argentina, the Netherlands, Norway and the Czech

Republic. Eight used combined districts that mixed both single member and multi

member seats, including New Zealand4, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Ukraine,

Lithuania, and Taiwan. There are many other important differences in electoral systems

within each category, summarized in Table 2, for example in the ballot structure of first-

past-the-post in the UK and the Alternative Vote in Australia, in the proportion of single

member districts and party list members elected in mixed systems, as well as in levels of

electoral thresholds facing minor parties. In this study we can start by describing the

differences in knowledge, contact and political support among citizens living in single

member, combined and multi member district systems, then use multivariate analysis

with controls to explore this further.

[Table 2 about here]

The Impact of Electoral Systems

Voter Knowledge of Parliamentary Candidates

To examine the claims that single member districts increase voters’ awareness

about parliamentary candidates, we need to establish what citizens knew about those

seeking their vote. The CSES asked respondents whether they recalled any candidates

in their district in the last parliamentary election and, if so, they were asked to identify

their name. Up to three candidate names were recorded and these were verified as

correct against constituency data. It can be argued that voters may still know much about

the elected member or members from their district and they may be familiar with

opposing candidates standing for election, even if they remain unable to recall their

names. Voters may also be able to use heuristic shortcuts if they support ‘the Labour

man’ or ‘the Liberal Democrat woman’. Nevertheless name-recognition is a significant

indirect indicator of broader awareness of electoral choices, it has long been used in

surveys to test political knowledge, and it is important in order to be able to evaluate the

general record of elected members, to hold individual politicians accountable for their

actions.

[Table 3 about here]

The descriptive results in Table 3 list how far people could correctly identify

candidates and the pattern shows considerable variation among countries. The

Japanese electorate emerges with the highest awareness of those standing for the Diet:

only 6% failed correctly to identify any candidate. In contrast at the other extreme, one

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fifth of all Mexicans could not correctly name a single candidate, and the same was true

of one quarter of all Spaniards. But the other important pattern shown in the comparison

is that the three single member electoral systems – Britain, Australia and the United

States – emerged as about average, above some of the newer democracies, it is true,

but also all below Norway, Hungary, Germany and New Zealand. In Britain, 40% failed to

name a single parliamentary candidate, while one third could recall the name of one

candidate, and one third could correctly identify at least two. There is little persuasive

evidence from the rank order or the mean averages, without any controls, that electors

necessarily know more about the contestants seeking their support in pure single

member district systems than under combined systems, although both these systems

tend to show stronger member-voter linkages than under pure multimember PR districts

Voter Contact with MPs

Voter contact with elected representatives was measured by asking people

whether they had had any contact with an MP during the previous twelve months. It

should be noted that this need not necessarily have involved constituency service per se,

since this could have been generated by the form of election campaign like telephone or

household canvassing, or party rallies, as well as by constituency surgeries. Nor does

this specify the direction of who originated the contact activity, whether voters or

members. Nevertheless proponents of single member districts suggest that in general

voters should have more contact with members through all these channels.

[Table 4 about here]

The results show that on average about 12% of the public reported contact with

an MP during the previous year, with the highest levels in New Zealand and minimal

contact activity in Poland, Netherlands and Spain. Britain proved close to the average,

with 13% of citizens contacting an MP during this period. Without any controls, the initial

pattern shows that compared with pure multimember PR systems, the overall amount of

contact is marginally greater in both single member and in combined systems. This

provides some support to the claims that retaining the links between an individual

member and a particular constituency maintains member-voter linkages, although at the

same time there are no significant virtues in this regard for first-past-the-post over mixed

systems like MMP. The pattern by nation shows that Australia is ranked second in this

list, and the United States and Britain are just slightly above average. A closer look at the

rankings, however, shows that some multimember districts like Israel and Norway are

also above average in contact activity, as are some combined systems like New Zealand

and Lithuania. Multiple factors may also be contributing towards variations in the overall

pattern – such as the size of the country, the average voting age population per district,

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or even the type of pre-modern or post-modern electoral campaign – as much as district

magnitude per se. Despite the current debate that the Israeli nation-wide constituency

needs to introduce local districting to promote constituency service and individual

accountability, it turns out that members of the Knesset are about as active in maintaining

contact with the electorate as Westminster representatives.

Multivariate analysis is required to examine all these relationships in more depth.

As a first step in this direction, logistic regression models can be used to examine the

impact of single member, combined and multimember districts upon the two core

measures of contact activity and knowledge of candidates. The models first entered

controls for the level of democratization in each country (measured by the Freedom

House Gastil Index), that might be expected to shape political traditions and democratic

cultures, and individual-level background factors which are commonly found to influence

contact activity and political knowledge, namely age, sex, education and income (the

latter as a proxy for socioeconomic status). The second step then entered the electoral

system variables, using dummies for whether the system had single member or

combined districts, with the multimember PR system as the default. Details of the coding

used for all items are listed below Table 5.

[Tables 5 and 6 about here]

The results predicting contact activity in Table 5 show that the Gastil index and

the demographic variables behaved in the expected way: there was more contact

between voters and elected members in more democratic countries. Education and male

gender also proved significant predictors of the amount of contact activity (although,

interestingly, age and income proved weak predictors). After controlling for these factors,

compared with multimember districts, single member districts proved to be significantly

associated with the amount of contact activity but at the same time, as already observed,

combined districts (such as those with first-past-the-post plus party lists) actually

displayed the highest level of contact activity. Table 6 repeats this exercise for knowledge

of candidates, and finds a similar pattern for the level of democratization and the role of

education and gender. After introducing these controls, in this case the use of single

member districts proves an insignificant predictor of knowledge of candidates, whereas

the use of combined districts proves strongly related.

Extrapolating from these results, this suggests, as observed earlier, that although

proponents of maintaining the status quo for Westminster commonly claim that retaining

the geographic link between individual MPs and a particular local constituency under

FPTP is essential for strong voter-member linkages, in fact combined systems display

similar levels of contact activity and stronger levels of awareness of candidates. It

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remains to be seen whether many other characteristics of the electoral and political

system are affecting the results, and plausibly many other factors may be important such

as the average voter population in each district, the size of the assembly, the length of

the campaign, the regulations of campaign advertising, and the role and functions of

national parliaments. Once more nations are eventually added to the CSES dataset,

providing a wider variety of political systems, then these would all be fruitful avenues for

further research and more sophisticated modeling.

Political Support and Electoral Systems

Beyond these indicators of specific knowledge and contact, do voters display

more general satisfaction with the political system under different systems? In this regard

we need to consider the best way to measure the concept of ‘support for the political

system.’ Elsewhere, building on the Eastonian framework, I have argued that this is

essentially a multidimensional concept and so cannot be tapped reliably using single

measures, for example of political trust (Norris 1998). Instead we can distinguish between

five levels of support ranging from the most abstract and diffuse level, measured by

support for the political community like the nation-state, down through support for

democratic values, for the political regime, for political institutions, and for political actors.

In this view, citizens can logically distinguish between levels, for example trusting their

local representative and yet having little confidence in parliament as an institution, or

approving of democratic ideals but still criticizing the performance of their government,

and so on. Following this logic, four alternative indicators of political support were used

for the analysis in this study, with the specific items listed under Table 5.

Specific support was measured by perceptions of the fairness of the electoral

system; the most direct evaluation of how well the system was seen to work. Yet

responses to this item could easily be colored by the outcome of the specific campaign

under analysis, for example by the party that won office. Diffuse support, understood to

indicate more general approval of the political system as a whole, was measured by

general satisfaction with the democratic process. It would be consistent to approve of

how the last election worked and yet to remain dissatisfied with how democracy

performed in general, or vice versa. The diffuse sense that citizens could influence the

political process was tapped by measures of political efficacy. Lastly, voting turnout was

compared as a critical indicator of involvement in the specific election. Factor analysis

(not reported here) revealed that these items fell into two principal dimensions: the

‘approval’ dimension meant that perceptions of the fairness of the electoral system were

closely related to general satisfaction with democracy, while the ‘participation’ dimension

meant that political efficacy was closely related to electoral turnout (Norris 2000).

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[Table 7 about here]

The results of the comparison in Table 7 show that on average the public living

under the majoritarian systems was slightly more likely to display positive attitudes in

terms of the fairness of elections, levels of efficacy and overall satisfaction with

democracy than the average response for those living under PR or combined systems.

This lends further confirmation to my earlier models comparing the impact of electoral

systems on institutional confidence using the World Values survey data, as well as other

recent work by Listhaug, Aardal and Ellis (2000).

Nevertheless a closer examination of the distribution in the CSES data shows

considerable variations within each category. For example evaluations of the fairness of

the election was among the strongest in the Netherlands, where 92% thought that the

election was fair. Yet in contrast in Israel, using a similar PR system with a low threshold

and a nation-wide constituency, only one fifth of the public felt that the election was fair.

The variations among the combined systems ranged from 91% believing that the election

was fair in Germany down to 37% in the Ukraine. These substantial contrasts can

plausibly be attributable to the many factors commonly used to explain levels of political

support, including the role of political culture, the performance of the regime, and the

broader workings of political institutions beyond the electoral system (Norris 1998). The

fact that the three majoritarian systems (the US, Australia and Britain) are all long-

established democracies and affluent post-industrial societies hinders any direct

comparison across nations, in contrast to consolidating regimes such as in the Ukraine,

Mexico and Taiwan. The final release of the CSES dataset is planned to expand the

number and range of nations under comparison and this would allow these propositions

to be tested more systematically, along with comparison of the relative differences among

sub-groups of the population within each country (Norris 2000). Defenders of majoritarian

systems commonly argue that the electoral rules of the game generate greater public

trust and satisfaction, producing a more decisive outcome that more accurately reflects

the choice of the plurality of voters, rather than back-room wheelings and dealings to

produce coalitional partners, and the limited evidence reviewed here lends some support

to these claims.

Conclusions: The Implications for Westminster Government

The process of constitutional reform in Britain is a complex process with multiple

developments at different levels of government. With constitutional reform, like

Johnston’s dog singing in a bar, the amazement is not due to the grace of the voice but to

the fact that it is happening at all. Nevertheless despite the sweeping nature of the

reforms in the federal-unitary dimension, so far the status quo in elections to the House of

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Commons means that less has altered in the executive-parties dimension. Westminster

remains still, recognizably, Westminster despite all the multiple reforms implemented or

in the process of being introduced under the Blair administration. Yet, like Bagehot’s old

man wearing the clothes of his youth, underneath profound shifts are altering the

centralized nature of British government. We are just starting to evaluate the full

consequences of the rise of multilayered governance for matters like the complexity and

transparency of the policymaking process, as well as for how the public has responded to

these developments in terms of their national identities, trust in the political system, and

levels of civic engagement.

The keystone to further substantial change in the political system lies in electoral

reform for the House of Commons. Are the arguments favoring preserving first-past-the-

post for Westminster justified? We remain open to persuasion, but the evidence reviewed

here suggests considerable grounds for skepticism about many claims about its virtuous.

Theoretically rational choice models offer many plausible reasons why single member

districts should strengthen the linkage between electors and elected members, promoting

interactive contact, constituency service, and voter awareness of the electoral choices of

candidates (Carey and Shugart 1992). In practice, however, the evidence examined here

suggests that messy reality gets in the way of simple relationships. The study arrives at

two major conclusions:

First, compared with pure multimember PR systems, single member districts

were found to generate more voter-member contact, but combined districts showed equal

or stronger levels of voter-member contact activity as well as far greater knowledge of the

candidates. We can conclude that the evidence supports the claim that having some

members of parliament elected from single member districts promotes voter-member

linkages, but this argument does not preclude the introduction of mixed or combined

systems with some multimember districts, as in Germany or New Zealand, which are

widely believed to have other virtues for matters like proportionality and social diversity.

Second, the study lends further confirmation to the claims that the public displays

greater satisfaction with the political system in countries employing majoritarian electoral

systems, as indicated by evaluations of the fairness of elections, feelings of political

efficacy and overall satisfaction with democracy. This supports the argument that

majoritarian systems produce a clear and decisive outcome, expressing the wishes of the

plurality of voters, whereas proportional systems are more likely to lead to a process of

bargaining and compromises in government coalition building that may produce less

overall satisfaction with the system. Nevertheless the evidence examined here remains

limited, mainly by the fact that the three majoritarian systems are all among the most

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affluent and long-established democracies, and this finding needs testing more widely

with more sophisticated models once the range of countries included in the current

release of the CSES dataset is extended.

Moreover as soon as we look at particular countries, it is clear that the

relationship between the type of electoral system and the type of voter-member linkages

is contingent upon many other factors, and the deviations from the overall pattern

become clear. For example, electors in multimember Israel reported as much contact

with members of the Knesset as did British voters with MPs in the House of Commons. It

can be argued that this is not surprising since, after all, Israel is a small, compact and

above-all intensely political society, where everyone seems to know everyone in public

life. In the same way, knowledge of the candidates may be particularly strong in New

Zealand because of the intense battle that had been waged for the MMP system, while

Germans or Norwegians may score highly on this indicator because these are affluent,

well-educated societies sharing certain North European democratic traditions. Along

similar lines, people in the Ukraine probably feel pessimistic about the way that

democracy is working in their country for the very good reason that democracy isn’t

working particularly well there. Yet as soon as particular cultural or historical factors are

taken into account then this erodes claims for a direct relationship between the simple

mechanics of the electoral rules and the complex relationship between elected members

and citizens. Clearly more work is needed to plumb the full psychological effects of

electoral systems, and the expansion of the CSES dataset once more countries become

available can facilitate this process. Comparisons across all the different electoral

systems in Britain also promise all sorts of delights for the psephologically inclined. But

the initial picture that emerges from this evidence suggests that while defenders of first-

past-the-post for Westminster want to cloak themselves in the assumed virtuous of this

system, in practice the reality is more complex and the introduction of mixed systems

could preserve the old benefits while adding multiple advantages.

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Table 1: Lijphart’s Classification of Political Institutions

Westminster Model Consensus Model

EXECUTIVE-PARTIES DIMENSION

Executive Single party cabinet government Multiparty coalitional cabinet government

Balance of Powers Executive dominance Executive-legislative balance

Party system Two-party system Multi-party system

Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional representation

Interest group system Pluralist Corporatist

FEDERAL-UNITARY DIMENSION

Dispersion of power Unitary and centralized government Federal and decentralized

Legislature Unicameral legislative power Balanced bicameralism

Constitutions Flexible constitution amended by simple majority

Rigid constitutions changed by extraordinary majorities

Judicial review Parliamentary sovereignty Legislation subject to judicial review

Central banks Bank dependent on the executive Independent bank

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Table 2: Electoral Systems for the Lower House in the Selected Countries Under Comparison TYPE OF

DISTRICTS Year

of Electi

on

Electoral System

Party List

Formula Thresh-hold

%

Total N. of

Members

N. Of SMD MPs

N. Of List MPs

Total number

of Districts for Lists

Voting Age Population

(VAP)

Average VAP per member

Mean District Mag.

Prop. ENPP Max. Years

between Election

s SINGLE MEMBER

USA 1996 FPTP Plurality None 435 435 196 511 000 436,691 1.0 .94 1.99 2

UK 1997 FPTP Plurality None 659 659 45 093 510 68,426 1.0 .80 2.11 5

Australia 1996 AV Majority None 148 148 13 547 920 91,540 1.0 .84 2.57 3

COMBINED

Taiwan 1996 SNTV+PR Closed 5 334 234/58 100 2 14 340 580 42,935 50.0 .95 2.46 4

Ukraine 1998 FPTP+PR LR-Hare 4 450 225 225 1 38 939 136 86,531 225.0 .86 5.98 5

Japan 1996 Parallel-FPTP 500 200 300 11 96 672 730 193,345 27.3 4

Lithuania 1998 2nd Ballot +PR LR-Hare 5 141 71 70 1 2 751 320 19,512 70 .76 3.32 4

New Zealand 1996 FPTP+PR St Laguë 5 120 65 55 1 2 571 840 21,432 55 .96 3.78

Germany 1998 FPTP+PR Closed 656 328 328 65 942 100 100,049 4

Hungary 1998 FPTP+PR Closed 386 176 110 1 7 742 951 20,059 110 4

Mexico 1997 FPTP+PR Closed 500 300 200 1 55 406 943 110,813 200 3

MULTIMEMBER

Spain 1996 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 3 350 350 50 31 013 030 88,608 7.0 .93 2.73 4

Romania 1996 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 3 343 343 42 16 737 320 48,796 8.2 .82 3.37 4

Norway 1997 PR Lists Closed St Laguë 165 165 19 3 360 083 20,036 8.7 .95 2.35 4

Poland 1997 PR Lists Open D’ Hondt 7 460 460 52 27 901 720 60,656 8.8 .82 2.95 4

Argentina 1999 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 3 257 257 24 23 230 160 90,389 10.7 2

Czech Rep 1996 PR Lists Closed LR-Droop 5 200 200 8 7 859 160 39,296 25.0 .89 4.15 4

Israel 1996 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 1.5 120 120 1 3 684 850 30,707 120.0 .96 5.63 5

Netherlands 1998 PR Lists Closed D’ Hondt 0.67 150 150 1 11 996 400 79,976 150.0 .95 4.81 4

Notes: PR Proportional Representation; FPTP First Past the Post; AV Alternative Vote; SMD Single Member Districts; List Party List; SMD Single Member Districts; List Party List. For the measures of proportionality and ENPP see Table A1. Note this classification distinguishes between NZ MMP where the outcome depends upon the proportion of votes cast in the party lists and mixed systems used in Taiwan, Ukraine and Lithuania where the single member districts and party lists operate independently and in parallel. Voting Age Population: IDEA Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997. www.idea.int Source: Successive volumes of Electoral Studies; Richard Rose, Neil Munro and Tom Mackie. 1998. Elections in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1990. Strathclyde: Center for the Study of Public Policy. http://www.aceproject.org/ ; Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. Eds. 1996. Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage. Table 1.2.

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Table 3: Knowledge of Candidates

% None

Correct

% One

Correct

% Two

Correct

Type of District

Japan 6 14 80 Combined

New Zealand 17 20 63 Combined

Germany 24 43 33 Combined

Norway 31 18 51 Multimember

Hungary 37 24 40 Combined

Britain 40 32 29 Single Member

Czech Republic 42 21 37 Multimember

Australia 43 58 Single Member

USA 48 24 28 Single Member

Ukraine 61 18 21 Combined

Poland 62 22 16 Multimember

Taiwan 63 13 24 Combined

Romania 71 19 10 Multimember

Spain 74 16 11 Multimember

Mexico 82 11 7 Combined

All 48 22 30

Single Member 43 37 20

Combined 43 18 39

Multimember 60 17 24

Note: Q: “Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who ran/stood in you

[lower house primary electoral district] in the last [parliamentary/congressional] election?

[If YES] What were their names?”

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-99.

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Table 4: Contact with elected representatives

% With contact Type of Districts

New Zealand 26 Combined

Australia 16 Single Member

Israel 16 Multimember

Lithuania 15 Combined

Norway 15 Multimember

USA 14 Single Member

Britain 13 Single Member

Germany 11 Combined

Mexico 10 Combined

Argentina 10 Multimember

Japan 8 Combined

Taiwan 8 Combined

Ukraine 8 Combined

Hungary 7 Combined

Czech Republic 7 Multimember

Romania 7 Multimember

Poland 6 Multimember

Netherlands 5 Multimember

Spain 3 Multimember

ALL 12

Single Member 14

Combined 14

Multimember 8

Note: Q12 “During the last twelve months, have you had any contact with a [Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?”

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-99.

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Table 5: Models predicting contact with elected members

Model I Model II

B SE Sig B SE Sig

Level of Democratization .220 .024 .000 .290 .025 .000

SOCIAL CONTROLS

Age .006 .001 .000 .004 .001 .000

Gender (male) .284 .036 .000 .291 .036 .000

Education .251 .011 .000 .237 .011 .000

Income .002 .011 .000 .035 .011 .000

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

Single Member .274 .053 .000

Combined .691 .044 .000

Constant 4.54 5.29

% Correctly predicted 87.8 87.8

Negelkerke R2 .053 .069

Notes: Model I: Binary logistic regression models without the electoral variables. Model II: Complete model where electoral systems with only multimember party list districts are the default. Level of democratization is measured by the Freedom House Gastil Index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (reversed scale). Age: Years Education: 8-point scale from none (1) to completed university graduate (8) Income: Household income on a standardized 5 point scale. Type of district: Multimember (1) Combined (2) Single member (3). Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-8

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Table 6: Models predicting knowledge of candidates

Model I Model II

B SE Sig B SE Sig

Level of Democratization .631 .016 .000 .650 .018 .000

SOCIAL CONTROLS

Age .016 .001 .000 .015 .001 .000

Gender (male) .171 .026 .000 .177 .026 .000

Education .180 .008 .000 .165 .008 .000

Income .059 .119 .000 .110 .037 .000

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

Single Member .017 .032 N/s

Combined .470 .134 .000

Constant -5.36 -6.93

% Correctly predicted 64.5 68.3

Negelkerke R2 15.5 20.4

Notes: Model I: Binary logistic regression models without the electoral variables. Model II: Complete model where electoral systems with only multimember party list districts are the default. See Table 5 for details of all data and coding.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-8

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Table 7: Indicators of public satisfaction with the electoral and political systems % Fairness

of Election % High Efficacy

% Turnout

Satisfaction with

democracy

Type of Districts

USA 75 78 77 81 Single Member Australia 69 95 78 Single Member Britain 81 76 83 75 Single Member Mean 78 74 85 78 New Zealand 77 76 95 68 Combined Japan 42 65 84 64 Combined Germany 91 69 93 63 Combined Taiwan 62 53 92 47 Combined Hungary 82 73 73 42 Combined Mexico 56 10 76 42 Combined Lithuania 55 66 35 Combined Ukraine 37 71 77 9 Combined Mean 63 60 84 46 Czech Rep 80 86 90 61 Multimember Argentina 59 56 42 Multimember Norway 93 86 86 90 Multi Member Netherlands 92 30 78 88 Multi Member Poland 72 74 57 63 Multi Member Spain 80 70 90 63 Multi Member Israel 20 17 83 53 Multi Member Romania 82 71 88 44 Multi Member Mean 72 61 82 63 All 73 64 80 63

Fairness of Election: Q2. “(PLEASE SEE CARD 1) In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly?” Percentage who believed election was fair (defined as categories 1 and 2). Satisfaction with Democracy: Q1. “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?” The figures represent the percentage ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied. Political Efficacy: The 15-point political efficacy scale was constructed from the following items that were highly inter-correlated. ‘High’ efficacy was categorized as a total score of 8 or above.

Q11. (PLEASE SEE CARD 5) “ Some people say that members of [Congress / Parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [Congress / Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] know what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?”

Q13. (PLEASE SEE CARD 6) “Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn’t make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?”

Q14. (PLEASE SEE CARD 7) “Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?” Turnout: The question measured whether the respondent cast a ballot in the election. Functionally equivalent but not identical items were used in each national election survey. Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-8

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Figure 1

Typology of DemocraciesRef: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999

Executive-Parties

2.01.00.0-1.0-2.0

Uni

tary

-Fed

eral

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

VEN

US

UK

TRI

SWI

SWE

SPA

POR

PNG

NOR

NZ

NET

MAU

MAL

JPN

JAM ITA

ISR

IRE

ICE

GRE

GER

FRA

FIN

DENCR

CAN

BOT

BEL

BARBAH

AUT

AUL

Majoritarian

Consensual

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About the Author

Pippa Norris, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge

MA 02138; e-mail: [email protected]; http: www.pippanorris.com.

Acknowledgement

I am most grateful to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), based at the

Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI for release of this

dataset, particularly Phil Shively, and all the national collaborators who made this

possible. More details of the research design are available at www.umich.edu/~nes/cses.

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1 At the time of writing (April 2001) the Jenkins Commission has recommended the

Alternative Vote Plus system for the House of Commons. The Labour government

remains committed to holding a referendum on electoral reform, promised in the 1997

manifesto, but the timing for this remains undecided. The Liberal Democrat

spokesperson, Simon Hughes, has indicated that the party will not back the non-

proportional Alternative Vote Plus system proposed by the Jenkins report to replace first-

past-the-post. In addition, the Kerley Working Party has recommended the use of STV for

local elections in Scotland. Details of recent developments are regularly monitored by the

Electoral Reform Society. www.electoral-reform.org.uk. The full text of the Jenkins report

is available at: www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4090/4090.htm

2 The wrong lessons can easily be drawn, as shown by conclusions about the European

elections where low turnout was commonly blamed on the introduction of the regional

party list systems rather than the nature of the campaign and levels of public interest in

the outcome.

3 More details of the research design and collaborators are available at

www.umich.edu/~nes/cses.

4 It should be noted that Curtice and Shively classify New Zealand according to their old

electoral system, as single member majoritarian, which may account for differences

between this study and their results since it turns out that New Zealand is on the high end

for both candidate knowledge and contact activity.