the smelting of iron cannons and consumption of gunpowder ... · the smelting of iron cannons and...

Chapter 14

The Smelting of Iron Cannons andConsumption of Gunpowder in

Gipuzkoa in the Sixteenth CenturyIgnacio M. Carrión Arregui

The province of Gipuzkoa in the Basque country was a territory of the Crownof Castile, bordering the Bay of Biscay and the frontier with France. Itsstrategic importance for the security of Spain meant that from an early timestrongholds (presidios) were raised for its defence, of which San Sebastián(Donostia) and Fuenterrabía (Hondarribia) were the most important (Figure14.1). These fortresses housed a considerable number of guns, garrisons ofsoldiers of the royal army, and armaments depots.

It was crucial for the Spanish monarchy to have adequate supplies of artilleryand gunpowder for the maintenance of their power, their military hegemony, andthe control of the seas. It is therefore not surprising that the Spanish authoritieswere concerned about scientific questions and the technical advances that werebeing made elsewhere. The metallurgy of the iron industry had made importantprogress from the early sixteenth century because of the spread of the ‘indirectmethod’ of casting, so that from the middle of that century it was possible tomake acceptable cast-iron cannons with pig iron from blast furnaces. Thismethod, which had been developed in England around 1543 and had thenbecame known in Liége and Germany, permitted sufficiently good guns to beobtained much more cheaply than those manufactured in bronze. Theproduction of cast-iron ordnance acquired a strategic importance for the Spanishmonarchs, although it was not possible for a significant amount to be made until1630.1 However, there were some earlier attempts, among them the experimentalsmelting of iron in the Basque country during the reigns of Philip II (1556–98)and Philip III (1598–1621), the period with which this account is concerned.

From the mid-sixteenth century, ironworks were established for the castingof iron cannon balls for the royal artillery, at for example Ezcurra and Eugui

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First presented at the 25th Symposium of ICOHTEC, Lisbon 1998. This chapter is part of aresearch project of the University of the Basque Country (UPV 156.130-HA064/97) and theBasque Government (GV-EJ PI-1997-63), entitled ‘Gipuzkoa from the fourteenth to thesixteenth centuries’.

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in Navarra, but these were not it seems blast furnaces and the plants wereunable to supply the growing demands of the monarchy. However in 1578 D.Francés de Alava, the captain general of the artillery, assured Philip II that theironworks at Eugui would be capable of making all the cannonballs needed ifsufficient funds were assigned to permit continuous working; the sameconsiderations applied also to the saltpetre factories.2

There were also attempts to produce cast-iron cannons. The chosen placewas the province of Gipuzkoa, where at the end of the fifteenth century asignificant armament industry had already developed, with an important

Smelting and Gunpowder in Gipuzkoa 267

Figure 14.1 Map showing location of Gipuzkoa and significant placesmentioned in this chapter.

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production of portable firearms. Bronze ordnance casting was a well-knowntechnology in the region and there is some account of foundry pieces of brassartillery in Gipuzkoa in the first decades of the sixteenth century, althoughfrom the reign of Charles V (1516–56) this production was concentrated inMálaga. We know too that in 1517 a master from Genoa manufactured aculverin in a bloomery near Irun with the remains of the ‘Great Serpentine’,the biggest cannon in the unsuccessful English expedition led by the Marquisof Dorset for the recovery of Guienne, that had burst at Pasajes in 1512. In1522 the town of San Sebastián confiscated copper from some merchants ofBarcelona for the manufacture of artillery for its defence, and from the mid-sixteenth century the Crown made serious attempts to encourage the miningof copper and the smelting of bronze artillery, including some experimentalsmelting with Cuban copper. The first attempts to smelt iron for the castingof cannons took place about the mid-1570s, before the disaster of the Armadahad shown the superiority of the English naval tactics based on cast-ironordnance.3 There was then a great pressure to pursue technologicalinnovations, and their performance shows us that the traditional Basque ironindustry was able to assimilate the new technologies.

In addition to these armaments, gunpowder was needed in Gipuzkoa inthe sixteenth century for a range of purposes: for the garrisons in thestrongholds, especially in case of conflict with France in this border area; thearming of the fleet; the safeguarding of merchant shipping; the training of thelocal militia (alardes); and the testing of weapons produced there. Theproduction of gunpowder was concentrated in the royal mills, but if necessaryit could also be made in the fortresses. An inspection of the fortifications ofSan Sebastián and Fuenterrabía by Miguel de Ipinza in a period of relativetranquillity between 1561 and 1562 allows us to see what quantities ofammunition and gunpowder were stored in their warehouses.4 In the ‘Houseof Ammunition’ of San Sebastián there was by weight – measured in quintals(100 pounds or 46.01 kg) and including the tare or container – 571 quintals(qn) of cannon powder and 40 qn of arquebus powder; in that at Hondarribiathere was 500 qn of cannon powder and 70 qn of arquebus powder. From thiswe can see that there were two types of gunpowder but we cannot specify theircomposition or grain size. At San Sebastián there were also 73 qn of saltpetreand 35 qn of sulphur, showing that gunpowder could be manufactured here,with perhaps different proportions for cannons or arquebus. Given thelocation of the fortresses it seems unlikely that water power was used, and thepestles and mortars in which the mixture was incorporated would have beenmoved by hand. Their purpose would be to re-work the deterioratedgunpowder, and only in the event of emergency to manufacture new powder.This agrees with the information in the military manuals of the time.

It is known that at times the province had difficulty in securing thenecessary supplies of gunpowder. For this reason from 1588 at least, the

268 Gunpowder, Explosives and the State


provincial assembly periodically asked its agent at court to secure letters fromthe king, authorizing the purchase of gunpowder from the factories of Burgosand Pamplona. These procedures were lengthy because the amount requestedmust be justified, but they were usually successful. The main problem was thatproduction at these works was irregular and often insufficient, beingdedicated in the first place to the supply of the army, navy, and royal artillery.Output was limited by the lack of saltpetre. The factories of Pamplona andthat of Málaga in the south were supplied from deposits at San Juan’s Priory(Castile-La Mancha), whose exploitation may have been impeded by thefinancial difficulties of the Crown.5

The gunpowder purchased from the royal factories was expensive,though efforts were made to acquire it at ‘the same price as that for themunitions of Their Majesty’. Sometimes the high cost caused complaints asin 1593 when, according to the representative of the town of Tolosa, theprice rose from 14 to 16 ducats per quintal (or from 1.54 to 1.78 reals perpound weight). These difficulties led to attempts to trade with themerchants of San Sebastián, and in 1595 gunpowder was acquired fromFlemish merchants, but at the higher price of from 2 to 2.5 reals per pound.These circumstances led to efforts in the 1580s and early 1590s to developthe production of gunpowder: by negotiations with a powdermaker fromCascante (Navarra) who supplied the royal weapons factories at Placencia delas Armas, near Mondragón; by trying to bring in a powdermaker and anItalian gunfounder from Madrid; and by attempting to have the factory atPamplona moved to Gipuzkoa.6

There is little information on the overall consumption of gunpowder, butsome details may be found in relation to the testing of weapons. The royalinspector (veedor), who lived in Placencia de las Armas, had the responsibilityfor entering into contracts with the artisans who made the different parts ofthe firearms, which had to be examined and proved. The contracts indicatethe calibre of the weapons, and some documents also record the consumptionof gunpowder and lead in the tests. This allows us to estimate that at the royalfactory of Placencia, the customary consumption of gunpowder was about600 kg per year.7 At the moment we do not have the data to speculate furtheron the overall production and consumption of gunpowder, although evidenceof that used in the testing of individual guns will follow later.

To return to the iron foundries which were located in the interior of theprovince, unlike the workshops concerned with the smelting of pieces ofbronze that were in the coastal area. Near Mondragón, steel was obtainedfrom the iron ore of the Udala mountain. Cast iron – called raya or arraia –was reduced in the low furnaces of the water-powered bloomeries (ferreríasmazuqueras) and transformed into steel by the tenaceros, by decarburization inmanually operated blacksmiths’ workshops.8 There was thus an iron workingtradition that favoured the further efforts, which will now be explored.



The first references to cast-iron objects are to the production ofcannonballs, for which a special ‘oven’ or furnace was ‘lifted’ or raised in thebloomery (ferrería) of Arrasate (Mondragón).9 It is expressly stated that theytried to make cast-iron and not wrought-iron balls. The bloomery had beenleased since the autumn of 1557 by Francisco Ibáñez de Larrategui, ‘in thename of sir Pero González de Escalate, Criado of His Majesty’. An importantcharcoal allotment had been acquired in August 1556, so there may have beensome previous test.10 In October 1557 a master carpenter was sent to Ezcurra(Navarra), to survey the wooden building and furnace where balls (pelotería)were made, and a similar structure was put up at the bloomery of Arrasate.


Table 14.1 Expense account for the smelting of cannons inMondragón (1578)

Units Reals/unit RealsIron and coalWrought iron (quintals) 13 24 312Cast iron (quintals) 40 26 1040Charcoal (loads) 300 3 900

2252 63% 41%Varied materialsTimber, wood, stocks, firewood

and ash trees 161Iron, steel, nails and wires 94Stone, brick, plaster and lime 215Fat, candles, wax, rope, etc. 60The rent of the bellows

and the reparations 120650 18% 12%

Wages Days Wages/day RealsMasons and carpenters 48 2.5 120Journeymen 106 2.0 212Women 30 1.0 30Others (specific tasks) 314

676 19% 12%Total (reals) 3578 100%Wages of the founders 160 4.0 1920 35%Total with the founders’ wages 5498 100%

Source: AHPG, 1/3685 (1578-VI-01 and VII-10 ), s.f.


There is little accurate data about the new furnace, but some technicianswhose surnames suggest they came from foreign lands (Francisco deSalambert and Nicolas Briant), arrived to supervise the making of the bellowsabout which detailed evidence does survive, providing us with a clear idea oftheir dimensions. The pair of long and narrow bellows were made with youngbull leather and fixed on an elm tree or yew beam. They were 2.4 m long and75 cm wide in the bragas, and 30 cm at the head. Their capacity would be halfa cubic metre of air.11 It seems that the structure of the building, including theair feeders, was the key element in the project, while the furnace and themoulds would be made directly by the founders without having to appeal toother specialists, which indicates that this was a low furnace. The operationdid not have the success hoped for and cannonballs were not made there,although production was maintained at the ironworks of Eugui.

From the end of the fifteenth century, bombards and other small wrought-iron guns were made in Bizkaia and in other places in the Basque country andSantander. These supplied the needs of ships like those of Magellan who setsail on his expedition in 1519 with guns made in Bilbao. In developing themanufacture of iron cannons, the first trial consisted of making pieces ofwrought iron bigger than the conventional ones, in an experimental way.12

Father Camino in his History of San Sebastián tells us that in 1574 themayordomo of the artillery of San Sebastián, the Licenciate Juan Pérez deErcilla, ‘had invented a new iron cannon of 926 pounds, that was fired withthree pounds and a half of gunpowder’. At its test firing from St Catalina’sdoor the shot reached the point of Ulía, a distance of 1700 metres.13 It was ‘apiece of iron ordnance worked by hammer’, that is of wrought iron, but of acalibre bigger than the guns usually manufactured with this technique. D.Francés de Alava ordered it, and it worked well and was carried to Madrid thefollowing year to be proved in the king’s presence.14

Also, in 1575 negotiations were started to bring in founders tomanufacture iron ordnance. Philip II ordered the governor of Flanders to sendthese workmen to Spain, but it seems that there were problems because of ‘thefear to the Inquisition’. Later negotiations were successful, and according toAlcalá Zamora a new effort was made ‘in Biscay’ (meaning the Basque countryin general).15 This undertaking was the smelting of artillery during the firstmonths of 1578 in Mondragón, Gipuzkoa, promoted by D. Francés de Alavaand supervised by Captain Lope de Elio, veedor of the weapons factories ofGipuzkoa and Bizkaia. At least two guns were made, and the expenses weremet by the royal paymaster. The technicians were foreign, with two Germanfounders, Jacob de Naysich and Hanz Merque and an Englishman known asJorge de Aura. They arrived in Placencia de las Armas from Madrid at the endof 1577, and settled in Mondragón where they stayed until June 1578.16

We have located the expense account for this operation and it issummarized in Table 14.1. The salaries of the foreign founders are an



important part of the costs, 35% of the total. Of the rest, additional wagesclaimed 12%, rents and diverse materials another 12%, and the iron andcharcoal used in the smelting took 41% of the total. The difference of salaryis clear, and similar to other accounts of those times. The day wage for eachforeign founder, paid throughout their stay, was four reals. The day wage ofthe local craftsman was two and a half reals, and that of an adult male workerwith low or no qualifications, engaged ‘to demolish the house where thisfoundry had to be built, and to manufacture the furnaces and move in thebellows’ was two reals. Finally the day wage for each woman employed ‘inbringing water, mud and other necessary things’, that is to say, incomplementary but heavy labours related to the manufacture of the mouldsand transportation, was one real. As is usual there are references to masters andjourneyman, the latter being synonymous with worker and servant, for therewas here none of the rigid structure of a guild.17

The smelting did not take place in an ironworks with bellows operated bywater power, but in a ‘house’ or forge where the bellows of the furnace weredriven by hand by means of four long rods of ash tree, moved by workers. Itwas not then a blast furnace or ‘oven of reduction’, consuming of iron ore. Itwas a low furnace where the cast iron was recast with wrought iron, in a waypossibly similar to those that were used to make bronze cannon.18 The workershad to leave the first site selected because when digging the foundations of thefurnace the ground was found to be damp, suggesting that it was notsufficiently elevated to make the pit for the mould. The foundry wasestablished at a new site we have been unable to locate. At least two furnaceswere built, for four ash tree rods were used to move two pairs of bellows. Theaccounts also indicate that a bricklayer (yelsero) put ‘a broad carved stone’ onthe soil of the ‘last oven’. The materials used in building the furnaces andchimneys were stone, plaster and bricks (2500 were used in the construction),as well as the timber to seat the bellows. Nothing more can be specified aboutthe characteristics of the furnaces, or about the pit for the moulds.

The materials used to make the moulds were clay or mud, wool mixed withclay, wire, cords, wax and fat, as well as the wood and iron to reinforce them.Once the pieces were cast they were chiselled and drilled by hand. This isbecause the vertical drills used for muskets and arquebuses were not applicableto the larger pieces. The cost of boring and making drills, and of the steel usedin borers, chisels and other tools were noted. The accounts also record: therent paid to the master forger Pedro de Bergara, who helped in the smeltingand in whose forge the tools were made and repaired; the cost of some hempropes; and the candles consumed ‘because the journeymen worked manynights’.

Fifty-three male quintals of iron were used (the quintal macho weighing73.8 kg).19 A total of 75 % of the iron employed (40 quintals) was raya orarraia, the cast iron easy to smelt that was used to make steel. Thirteen



quintals were of wrought iron, ‘iron to melt and to make the mixture with theraya’, that had to be broken before being melted with the cast iron in thefurnace. The metal of the guns would thus have a carbon content smaller thanthe customary pieces of cast iron. The charcoal consumed would be sufficientto reduce the iron in a low furnace and to make 75 quintals of wrought iron.With this quantity of metal they were able to make a cast-iron piece ofordnance (de fierro colado) and ‘others smaller and some balls’, according tothe declaration of the founders. Other sources tell us that they made at leasttwo guns: one burst by the mouth when tested ‘because they had nottempered it adequately’, and was abandoned in Mondragón; the second‘proved very good’. It was taken to Madrid to be seen by the monarch, and in1597 it was ‘in the house of the Count of Chinchón’.20

The testing was carried out on the order of D. Francés de Alava, generalcaptain of the artillery, by Juan Pérez de Irazabal, ‘corporal of the artillerymen ofFuenterrabía’, and Hernando de Liçardi, gunner. They went from Hondarribia(in Spanish, Fuenterrabia) to Mondragón, and in the presence of the veedor Lopede Elio they proved and tested the cast-iron cannon, certifying ‘the quality, formand calibre’ of the piece of ordnance that worked well.21 The basic test for thecannon is the missile it throws, and in this case it was ‘a ball of barely fourpounds’, about 1.8 kg. At the end of the document a horizontal line and a circleindicate the size of the ball – its diameter of 78 mm coinciding approximatelywith a cast-iron sphere of four Castilian pounds in weight.22 To accommodate theball, the gauge of the gun would be about 82 mm.23 It was found that in ‘relationto the calibre’ the gun had a diameter of four balls ‘in the thick part of the vent’,three ‘before the trunnions’, two in the muzzle after the curb, and three and a half‘at the vent of the breech’. The bore had some 23 cannonballs of length. Thethickness of the metal at the mouth was about 39 mm, before the trunnions itwas 78 mm, and at the touchhole about 117 mm. The bore was about 180 cmand the total length of the piece without the bell was about two metres. Theseproportions when analysed were compared with those then customary in bronzeordnance, and it was observed that it had ‘in the solid part of the breech a ballmore’, and another half before the trunnions.24

The gun under review was small, like a small saker or demi-saker, with abore a little less than that of the cast-iron cannon found in the hooker theGreat Grifon, a ship of the Armada sunk near Fair Isle off the north-east coastof Scotland on 28 September 1588. The proportions of this cannonapproximate to the theoretical optimum, according to the study by Martinand Parker.25 Its dimensions are similar to those of the bronze artillery,although it is much shorter and reinforced. In his ‘Treaty of Artillery’ of themid-seventeenth century, Captain Gaspar González de San Millán writes thatthe sakers and falcons of bronze should have a diameter of 3.5 balls at thebreech, 2.5 before the trunnion, and 2 in the muzzle, and a length of 30bullets. However, he says that the cast-iron ordnance of this calibre must have



a diameter of 4 balls at the breech, 3.5 before the trunnion, and 3 in themuzzle.26 We consider that the relationship between the weight of the ball andthe piece that we are studying would not reach 1:350, therefore we estimateits weight at about 1400 lb, or 650 kg.

The gunners charged with testing the cannon would first carry out a visualreview, surveying both outside and inside (with the help of a candle on a pike),looking for any defects.27 Next they put the cannon on its carriage,28 to checknot only its resistance to the explosion, but also its range and possibleusefulness. Next the cannon would be fired. The gunpowder used would bethat suitable for the arquebus, the same that was employed by the veedor inthe testing of portable firearms. Its composition would probably be ‘Six: Ace:Ace’ (6:1:1), that is to say, ‘Saltpetre 75.0%: Sulphur, 12.5 %: Charcoal,12.5%’.29 The gunpowder for this purpose was usually brought from thefactories of Burgos or Pamplona, but sometimes it was bought directly fromindividual gunpowder makers.30 Three shots were fired with an iron bullet,the quantity of gunpowder being gradually increased each time:

The first shot was fired with two pounds and a half of gunpowder of arquebus, thesecond with three pounds and the third with the weight in gunpowder of the ballof this piece and somewhat more, and this ball weighs four pounds scarce. Thesethree shots were fired with that quantity of gunpowder and its bullet of iron , assoon as possible.

Low shots were fired against a rock at a distance of 500 steps, about 700 m,with the gun in the horizontal position and without letting it rest. It wasrecorded that at this distance the gun made a ‘good battery’, remainingundamaged from two of the balls while the third one ‘made a little crack butit was not broken’. The bullets had also been cast in Mondragón by order ofElio. It was estimated that the range of the piece was 600 steps, some 840 m.The final evaluation was that the gun was ‘very good, useful and profitable forthe service of His Majesty at any time and in particular for use at sea’.However, this endeavour was not continued, and the experiment was treatedin official correspondence as ‘a failure’.31

The high costs incurred were in part the cause of this reverse, because inSpain the iron cannons smuggled from England cost only a third or a fourthas much.32 The death of D. Francés de Alava and the lack of serious conflictsat that time also caused the initiative to be abandoned,33 although neither thepeople of Gipuzkoa nor the members of the war council forgot it.Dissatisfaction with the quality of the gun is suggested in the letters of the late1590s, written by Captain Jerónimo de Aybar, successor to Elio in the weaponsfactory of Placencia. It should also be noted that in 1597 in the Escorial, D.Juan de Acuña, general captain of the artillery, informed the agent of theprovince of Gipuzkoa that ‘the smelting of artillery in the time of Sir Francés



de Alava, was not well-finished and cost much more than the guns that werebought abroad’.34 For these reasons the attempt of 1578 was abandoned.

A few years later the Armada (1588) revealed the serious inferiority of theartillery of the Spanish ships, and the topic of the smelting of iron cannonsreturned to consideration in Madrid. Immediately the province of Gipuzkoabegan negotiations to attract not only ordnance foundries to its territory, butalso to revive industrial activity as a whole, especially the sectors linked withthe production of iron and armaments. For example, they made an effort tointroduce the new technologies developed in the Low Countries formanufacturing iron plates and bars, not only in Bizkaia but also inGipuzkoa.35 In these ways they tried to increase industrial production as itrelated to the demands of the state, to help meet the severe recession in thetraditional commercial and industrial activities which had entered a deepcrisis.36

In about 1592 the representatives of Gipuzkoa tried to bring fromMadrid the Italian founder called Giovanni Rodi or Juan Andrea Rodio,who had offered ‘to make cast-iron ordnance, bullets and gunpowder’,activities that appeared to be still united in the same trade at this time. Thewar council and the council of Indies were also interested in this matter, ascan be seen from the records of the assemblies of Gipuzkoa in 1592 and1593. The town of Tolosa supported the project. Captains Asencio de Alçolaand Juan Martínez de Amilibia were asked to present a report indicating thebest place to build a foundry, but the negotiations by the agent of theprovince were not successful.37 In 1596 it was proposed in the generalassembly by the town of Getaria that the king should install facilities inGipuzkoa for the smelting of iron for artillery and cannonballs, the makingof body armour, and the manufacture of gunpowder. This was an integratedplan for developing the armament industry, and it reflected a greatknowledge of the sector. It was pointed out that there was good metal forsmelting, which ‘had been examined by Sir Francés de Alava’. It was alsoclaimed that transferring the manufacture of armour from Eugui (Navarra)to Gipuzkoa would save important costs in the transportation of goods andmigration of apprentices and craftsmen, for many of them came from thelatter province.38 Finally there was an attempt, without much conviction, toreplace Pamplona or Burgos as centres of gunpowder production,mentioning particularly the abundant hazel forests for charcoal. It seemsthat the idea that gunpowder should be made at the point of consumption,that is, in the strongholds and ports, still prevailed. Captain Jerónimo deAybar, veedor of Placencia, seconded these initiatives, except in the case ofthe gunpowder, and reported favourably to the war council when he wasconsulted.39 Captain Bartolomé de Alçola, on an errand for the generalassembly, also wrote a report and sent letters to important people fromGipuzkoa who were resident at the court.40



The Memorial that was finally sent to the King suggested a site ‘in theValley of Alçola and Mendaro’ for the foundry: it was not far from thearmoury centre of Placencia; there was forest for charcoal and six bloomeriesthat produced iron; and different types of mineral and of iron ore wereavailable with low costs of transportation.41 It also suggested that instead ofgiving grants for naval construction, all loans to ship builders should bewithdrawn and the funds used instead for setting up of foundries for themanufacture of cannons, instead of their purchase abroad.42 The only thingneeded was a good founder who knew ‘well the metals of iron, to make themixture necessary’ for the guns. As in Mondragón some years before, theywere planning to smelt the iron previously obtained in the low furnaces ofbloomeries, not in high blast furnaces. Detailed negotiations took place,followed by a new attempt which met with partial success in 1603 when‘masters of Liège’ were brought in. But when it was seen ‘that it was moreexpensive than to make it of bronze ... they were sent back’.43

It was possible to make cast-iron cannons, but using a type of scarce andexpensive iron on which steel production was based. Furthermore, charcoalconsumption was high, as can be seen in Table 14.1, because it was necessaryto reduce the mineral in the traditional bloomeries before reheating it to smeltthe iron and mould the piece. The solution to this problem was to introducethe technological change of the blast furnace, whose fuel consumption waslower and whose product, pig iron, could be poured directly into the moulds.Furthermore, the blast furnace had a higher volume of production whichgenerated important economies of scale. Only in this way was it possible toproduce iron artillery at low cost. This use of the blast furnace to produce cast-iron cannons had spread from Belgium, arriving in Sweden thanks to theemigration of Protestant gunfounders. Catholic entrepreneurs tried to do thesame for the Spanish monarchy.44 The availability of mineral resources,forests, and water meant that in a further effort in the early seventeenthcentury, the chosen location would be in the Señorío of Bizkaia or secondly theprovince of Gipuzkoa, but in both territories there was a great opposition tothe project.45

The new project was supported by Juan Curcio, a powerful entrepreneur ofLiège, and Hurtuño de Ugarte, purveyor to the navy of Flanders, who obtainedfrom Philip III, in 1614, a grant of the monopoly of cast-iron manufacture for12 years. They were authorized to ‘lift’ or raise blast furnaces, devices (ingenios)‘to cut small iron’, some kind of rolling mills called fanderías, and granted apreference in the acquisition of the forests for charcoal making. As was to beexpected they tried first to set up their project in Bizkaia and later in Gipuzkoabut the local authorities were opposed to this, and the Señorío brought actionagainst them that caused Ugarte to abandon the company. Curcio, who hadarrived in Spain around the end of 1616, obtained a second privilege in 1622,for 15 years, and began to build up blast furnaces in Lierganes, near Santander.



Soon after his death the industrial complex that he had built up became able,from 1630, to meet the Spanish need for iron ordnance.

The opposition that was encountered to these developments requires ourattention, especially after the efforts previously made to promote the industry.The cause lay in the fact that although the blast furnaces produced cast ironwith low unitary costs, the large volume of production meant that high inputswere required, particularly of charcoal.46 The concessions associated with theroyal privilege granted to Curcio included preferential treatment in theacquisition of wood and charcoal. This threatened to diminish the income ofthe owners of the forest, breaking the precarious balance between forestresources and fuel consumption. In contrast the fuel necessary for thebloomeries, these traditional, small, and scattered ironworks that consumedthe charcoal of the local forest, had brought profit to the forest owners and ledthem to ‘cultivate’ the forest to produce wood for charcoal. All this suggeststhat the lag in the manufacture of iron ordnance in Spain in the sixteenth andseventeenth centuries was not a problem of scientific or technical difficulties,but was motivated by economic reasons. The Basque iron industry, against theinterests of the Crown, opted to maintain a mode of production that wasobsolete from the point of view of technological progress, but efficient fromthe economic point of view, which allowed it to subsist until the nineteenthcentury.47 We are at present unable to say more on the production andconsumption of gunpowder, but its manufacture remained secondary to theordnance industry, and it therefore failed at this stage to develop themomentum necessary to become important in Gipuzkoa in its own right.

Notes

1 C.M. Cipolla, Cañones y velas en la primera fase de la expansión europea (Barcelona, 1976),pp. 23 ss.; F. Braudel, Civilización material y capitalismo (Barcelona, 1974), pp. 300–308.See H. Schubert, ‘The first cast-iron cannon made in England’, Journal of the Iron andSteel Institute, 146 (1943), pp. 137–139; J. Alcalá-Zamora, Historia de una empresasiderúrgica española: los altos hornos de Lièrganes y la Cavada, 1622–1834 (Santander,1974), p. 21.

2 Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS), G y M, leg. 82, f. 138; and leg. 88, f. 147.See I.A.A. Thompson, Guerra y decadency. Gobierno y administración en la España de losAustrias, 1562–1620 (Barcelona, 1981), pp. 289–297.

3 J. Vigón, Historia de la artillería (Madrid, 1947), t.1, pp. 116–126, 152–154; J. SánchezGómez, De minería, metalurgia y comercio de metales (Salamanca, 1989), p.12; J.C.Santoya, De crónica tiempos británicos (San Sebastián, 1974), p.38; J.L. Banús, El archivoquemado (San Sebastián, 1986), p. 156; J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Velas y cañones en la políticaseptentrional de Felipe II’, Cuadernos de Historia Jerónimo Zurita, núm. 23–24 (1974),pp. 240–241; C. Martin and G. Parker, La Gran Armada, 1588 (Madrid, 1988),pp. 209–227.

4 AGS, CMC 2, leg 398. 5 L.M. Diez de Salazar and R.Ma. Ayerbe, Juntas y Diputaciones de Gipuzkoa (San Sebastián,

1991), (hereafter JD), t.10 (1588); t.11(1592), and t.12, p. 97 (1593). M. Ulloa, La



hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II (Madrid, 1986). According to G.deUztariz, Theórica y práctica de comercio y de marina [1742] (Madrid, 1968), p. 215, therewas in Spain an abundant production of saltpetre and gunpowder. See also IgnacioGonzález Tascón et al., ‘The manufacture of gunpowder in Spain and Latin America fromthe sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries’ in Brenda J. Buchanan, ed., Gunpowder: TheHistory of an International Technology (Bath, 1996).

6 JD, t.12, pp.183, .523. In 1599 gunpowder was obtained in Pamplona at 14 ducats andat 16 ducats (JD, t.14, p. 172). It is said that fine gunpowder was 3 reals per pound, whilstthe king gave it at 2 reals per pound. The mill at Pamplona was unable to work for fourmonths due to the lack of saltpetre. Archivo Histórico de Protocolos de Gipuzkoa(hereafter AHPG), 1/3704 (1582); JD, t.11, p. 48 (1590); JD, t.11, p. 669 (1592 ); JD,t.13, pp. 197–98 (1596).

7 AHPG, 1/3685 (1578), 1/3743 (1584), f.7. 8 See J.A. Azpiazu, El acero de Mondragón en la época de Garibay (Mondragón, 1999). The

author of this book uses some of the records on which the present text is based. 9 The ferrería mayor was an ironworks, a bloomery with water-powered wheels to move the

bellows and hammer, where the ore was converted in wrought-iron bars; afterwards theywere worked in the ferrería menor (also water-powered) and in the blacksmith’s forge. SeeI. Carrión, La siderurgia guipuzcoana en el siglo XVIII (Bilbao, 1991), pp. 117–120.

10 AHPG, 1/3661 (1556), f. 53v; 1/3663 (1558), f. 86. 11 AHPG, 1/3662 (1557), f. 76–80. 12 T. González, Colección de cédulas, [...] concernientes a las Provincias Vascongadas (Madrid,

1829), t. I, pp. 189–192; J. Vigón, Historia de la artillería, t. I, pp. 119, 223, 438. 13 J.A. Camino, Historia civil-diplomática-eclesiástica anciana y moderna de la ciudad de San

Sebastián (San Sebastián, 1963), p. 229. 14 AGS, G y M, lb 32, f. 90. 15 J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Velas’, p. 240.16 AHPG, 1/3685 (1578-06-01), s.f., Receipt of the founders.17 I. Carrión, ‘Precios y manufacturas en Gipuzkoa en el siglo XVI: la fabricación de armas

de fuego’ in J.R. Díaz de Durana, ed., La lucha de bandos en el País Vasco (Bilbao,1998).18 See C. Lechuga, Tratado de la artillería y de la fortificación [1611] (Madrid, 1990),

pp. 29–132.19 See I. Carrión, ‘Los antiguos pesos y medidas guipuzcoanos’, Vasconia, 24 (1996),

pp. 59–79.20 JD, t. 13, p. 260J. 21 AHPG, 1/3683 (1578), s.f. 22 González de San Millán in his ‘Tratado de artillería’, in C. Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones

náuticas, (Madrid, 1996), t. 6 , pp. 496–497, gives the method for making a rule to gauge.According to him, a ball of 4lb would have a diameter of 83 mm, certainly the diameterof the bore.

23 C. Martin and G. Parker, La Gran Armada, p. 218. On p. 210 the diameter of the ballsand the bore of some guns is reproduced according to the design by D. Juan de Acuña,1590. It is noted that a gun that fired a 3 lb ball, should have the diameter of one ironsphere of 3 lb 6 oz, and for a shot of 6 lb a mouth of barely 8 lb (From AGS, MP y D, V-20). Vigón (Historia de la artillería, t. 2, p. 376) says that this difference, the ‘wind’(viento), was of 2 lines (4 mm), and C. Lechuga, Tratado, p. 139, says that the mouth mustbe 1/40 wider that the ball.

24 D. de Alava, El perfecto capitán instruido en la disciplina militar y nueva tácnica de laartillería [1590] (Madrid, 1994), pp. 309–310, says that this class of ordnance should havea diameter of 2 balls at the muzzle and 3 at the vent. C. Lechuga, Tratado, pp. 85–92,proposes for the culverin 2 in the mouth and 3.5 in the vent.

25 C. Martin and G. Parker, La Gran Armada, pp.18, 21 and 224, consider that this guncomes from the north of Europe, probably from Sweden. It fired a shot of 4.5 lb (2 kg),its diameter is 87 mm, its length 221 cm, the relation length/calibre was 25.5 and the



relation between the weight of that gun and the ball was 346. Its weight is about 1560 lb(718 kg).

26 C. Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones náuticas, t. 6, pp. 484 and 497–198, says that the‘Tratado’ is from the mid-sixteenth century (p. 480), but it must be from the seventeenthbecause of the reference to the foundry of Liérganes.

27 D. de Alava, El perfecto capitán, p. 313; C. Lechuga, Tratado, p. 319.28 D. de Alava, El perfecto capitán, p. 316, advises the gun should be tested on smooth

ground.29 There are many recipes for gunpowder (D. de Alava, El perfecto, pp. 345–347), but it

seems that the usual ones were ‘Six, Ace, Ace’ (6:1:1) or ‘Five, Ace, Ace’ (5:1:1), as Lechuga(Tratado, pp. 256–25) says. He suggests the first, the finest, for both arquebus andordnance. Gaspar González San Millán, in his ‘Tratado de artillería’ proposes 5:1:1 and alarge grain for the ordnance powder, and 6:1:1 with a small grain for the arquebus (C.Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones náuticas, t. 6, pp. 494–495).

30 See the bill of receipt of Miguel Campos, a gunpowder maker from Cascante (Navarra),to the Royal Paymaster. From the end of 1580 to 1582, Campos sent 12.18 quintals ofpowder and 836 lb of match cord (AHPG, 1/3704 (1582), s.f ). See also Lope de Elío, whoin September 1578 (AHPG, 1/3685, s.f ), declared that from 4 /05/1576 to 22 /07/ 1578,he had approved 11.026 barrels of arquebus powder. Each arquebus had been examinedand proved twice, needing in each test 1.125 oz of gunpowder, more that four times theusual load, and a double weight of lead (1.5 oz). He also received 217 muskets, which weretested with 3 oz of gunpowder and 2 balls of 2 oz. Between 25% and 40% of the barrelsburst or were not accepted. The charge for the musket was later reduced to 2.5 oz (AHPG,1/3743 (1584), f.7).

31 J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Velas’, p. 240.32 J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Velas’, p. 241.33 Letter of 1597 from the captain Jerónimo de Aybar, veedor, to the Province (JD, t. 13,

p. 260).34 JD, t. 13, p. 424.35 L. Cervera, El ingenio creado por Juan de Herrera (Madrid, 1972); F. Sagarminaga, El

gobierno y régimen foral del Señorío de Vizcaya desde el reinado de Felipe II hasta la mayoredad de Isabel Segunda (Bilbao, 1892), t. I, p. 96, also talks about the device of thebloomery of Berna in 1590. On Gipuzkoa, see I. Carrión, La siderurgia, pp. 100–102.

36 L.M. Bilbao, ‘Crisis y reconstrucción de la economía vascongada en el siglo XVII’, Saioak,1 (1977), pp. 163–167; E. Fernández de Pinedo, Crecimiento económico y transformacionessociales en el País Vasco, 1100–1850 (Madrid, 1974), pp. 32–33.

37 JD, t. 11, p. 609, and t. 12, p. 54; D. Goodman, Poder y penuria. Gobierno, tecnología ysociedad en la España de Felipe II (Madrid, 1990), p. 135.

38 The corslets made in Eugui were sent by land to Alzola and then from Deba by sea(AHPG, 1/3745 (1596). It was said in the assemblies in 1597 that the craftsmen werefrom Milan and the journeymen and apprentices from Durango and Gipuzkoa (JD, t.13,pp. 259–260). See S. Piquero, ‘El siglo XVI, Época dorada de los movimientos migratoriosguipuzcoanos de media y larga distancia durante la Edad Moderna’, in Las migracionesinternas y medium-distance en Europa, 1500–1900 (Santiago de Compostela, 1993).

39 JD, t. 13, pp. 197–198, 259–260 and 439–440.40 Archivo General de Gipuzkoa, JD-IM, II-21-18 (1597). Letters were sent to D. Francisco

de Idiaquez, secretary of state, to Esteban de Garibay, royal chronicler, and to D. Martínde Idiaquez, member of the royal council.

41 These bloomeries used ore from Bizkaia, brought by sea, from which good wrought ironwas made for the barrels of arquebus. It was said that if necessary they could also get in bysea a coarse iron from Renteria.

42 JD, t. 13, p. 328; AGG, JD-IM, II-21-18 (1597). See C. Fernández Duro, Armadaespañola desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y Aragón [1895–1903] (Madrid, 1972–73),t. 3, p. 183; D. Goodman, Poder y penuria, pp. 127–132.



43 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, lib. 739, ff. 57–60; J. Alcalá-Zamora, Historia de unaempresa, pp. 81–82.

44 J. Yernaux, La métallurgie liégeoise et son expansion au XVIIe siecle (Liège, 1939), pp. 28–31.45 JD, t. 20, pp. 88–89; Alcalá-Zamora, Historia de una empresa, pp. 83–84; I. Carrión, La

siderurgia, pp. 100–102.46 J-F. Belhoste, ‘L’impact du haut fourneau sur la forêt normande (XVIéme–XVIIéme

siécles)’, Protoindustries et histoire des forets (Toulouse, 1992), pp. 63–71. See F. Braudel,Civilización, p. 286.

47 L.M. Bilbao, ‘La siderurgia vasca, 1700–1885. Atraso tecnológico, política arancelaria yeficiencia económica’, IX Congreso de Estudios Vascos (San Sebastian, 1984), p. 92.



the smelting of iron cannons and consumption of gunpowder ... · the smelting of iron cannons and...

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