the shadow of the open door

Institute of Pacific Relations

The Shadow of the Open DoorAuthor(s): Paul H. ClydeSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jan. 24, 1949), pp. 13-16Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3022828 .

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THE SHADOW OF THE OPEN DOOR

BY PAUL H. CLYDE

Many current discussions of our relations with

China are heavily weighted, as is quite natural, with judgments as to what we must do right now. There

are opinions on this question to suit any taste, ranging from those which would have us take over China with

an American army to those that would have us with-

draw completely so that the Chinese may lie in their

own or a Russian bed. Somewhere in this array of con-

flicting and confusing opinion there are undoubtedly

proposals of real valuc, and it would seem that our first

task is to discover those judgments which rest upon a

careful and balanced use of all the evidence upon which

sensible opinions can be based.

Thus far in the public debate we have given almost

exclusive attention to that portion of the evidence which

is concerned with immediate tensions between the

United States and Russia. This is understandable, and

in a measure it is proper, but it does not go far enough. For one thing it tends to blind us to whatever light our history may have to throw on the problem of find-

ing not merely an immediate but, more important, a

long-range view of our purposes in China. Fortunately the history of the United States contains a revealing

chapter of experience on the business of dealing with

China. If we are concerned about what we should and

can do in and toward China today, it would hardly seem reasonable to detach this concern from the experi? ence of our past. While the past will not provide a com-

plete prescription for the present, it does reveal the

foundations on which the present and the future of

American policy must be built.

From a September day back in 1899 when John Hay set forth on paper some ideas which he felt should con-

Mr. Clyde is Professor of History at Duke University and author of The Far East: A History of the Impact of the West on Eastern Asia.

trol all the major powers in their dealings with China, down to Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, no discus- sion of the position of the United States vis-a-vis China which laid any claim to historical relevancy failed to dwell at length upon two major and interrelated prin? ciples of American policy?first, the Open Door in

China, and second, the territorial integrity and the administrative entity of China. In round numbers, these Siamese twins of American policy are now half a cen?

tury old by any conservative calculation. In reality, they are far older than this. Indeed, their birth would appear to date from the middle years of the nineteenth century. At all events, disregarding precise dates of origin, the

point to be noted is that for at least half a century (actually much longer) official American thought on

the subject of China has derived whatever vitality it

possessed from these two basic principles.

JANUARY 24, 1949 VOL XVIII NO. 2

THE SHADOW OF THE OPEN DOOR

by Paul H. Clyde Our historic attitudes toward China and their bearing on United States China policy today.

DISPATCH FROM INDONESIA

by George McT. Kahin An eyewitness report of the recent Dutch attack on Jogjakarta.

JAPAN'S NEW POLICE LAW

by Ralph J. D. Braibanti Drastic reorganization is taking place within a system which once symbolized the power of the Japanese state.

? 13 ?



Do these principles still apply today? Are they still

to be counted as American objectives? Are they still

applicable as policies? How do the circumstances that

surround their application today compare with circum?

stances of the past?

The Trader and the Diplomat The fact that these principles have been so persistent

and hallowed by age involves no particular mystery. Translated into the language of practical politics, the two principles were neither academic and doctrinaire nor solely a product of idealism. The Open Door was a favorite child of the American business man and

trader. To him it meant that his merchandise would re- ceive non-discriminatory treatmcnt in a weak China where his own government exercised an exceedingly limited influence, if any at all. The second principle? China's integrity?was the child of the statesman rather than the trader. Its basic reason for being was that the China of 1898, and often thereafter, seemed on the,

verge of becoming a huddle of European colonies. Since colonialism and free markets did not go hand in hand, there was but one course for American statesmanship if the China market was not to be lost to American trade. That course was to nourish China's integrity and

thereby to preserve an open door for American com? merce. This principle of China's integrity was particu- larly popular with an American public which, it must be confessed, knew very little about China but was in- clined to regard itself as peculiarly well disposed toward the Chinese people.

It will be noted that the two inseparable and interde-

pendent principles of policy were expressions of two realistic American interests, the one commercial, the other political. These, to be sure, have not been the only real interests of Americans and their government in

China, as a glance at the history of Christian missions would indicate. Nevertheless it would appear that re?

ligious, cultural, and intellectual interests have not been the primary determinants in the shaping of policy, al?

though at times they have exerted a significant influence. In a word, historic American policy has been essentially commercial and political. Within these limited spheres it has usually enjoyed the general approval of the American people, although it may be doubted whether it was ever regarded by them as a first line of diplomatic, much less of military, defense. Certainly, in the

present crisis in China, Americans may well look to this

past record as one guide in their analysis of the demands of the present. Do the Siamese twins bear as understandable a relationship to American interests today as

they did in the time of John Hay? Have the Open Door and the integrity of China grown or shrunk in their stature or in their usefulness? Are they applicable now or are they to be regarded as outmoded instruments?

The business of providing answers to these large and

compelling questions is not within the scope of this article. The purpose here is rather to set forth briefly some observations on the manner in which our policies have been applied in the past, and upon the altered circumstances in which they must operate if they are to be applied in the present and the future.

Viewed in historical perspective, the application of our China policy has been remarkable in three respects. The first is that, in principle, the United States has been a staunch champion of the Open Door and the integrity of China. The second is that at no time since 1898 has a thorough-going Open Door been achieved in practice. The policy has always been nullified to whatever extent

sphere-holding powers claimed and exercised monopo- listic practices within their spheres. Moreover, the con- tinuous existence of foreign naval leaseholds within China has been an actual infringement (even if not so regarded in legal theory) of China's integrity. The third point is that there has sometimes been a willing- ness on the part of the United States to compromise with the two basic principles of policy?as when, in

1900-1902, Hay himself became an unsuccessful con- cession hunter. In addition, the same tendency to com?

promise is notable in numerous diplomatic exchanges exemplified by the Root-Takahira (1908) and the Lan-

sing-Ishii (1917) notes. Both exchanges were so worded as to leave room for diametrically opposed interpreta- tions, the one a confirmation of the Open Door, the other a negation of it. Moreover, it has often been said, and with some justification, that although the United

States might claim to have sponsored the doctrines of

the Open Door and China's integrity, their application often tended to be a matter of British rather than of American influence.

U. S. Support Limited These limitations upon policy in practice have not

always been recognized with the frankness characteristic of Theodore Roosevelt. It was in 1910 that he described the Open Door to his successor William Howard Taft as "an excellent thing." He hoped that it might be a

good thing for the future, but he warned Taft that the

Open Door would disappear in the future, as it had in the past, whenever a powerful nation, bent on dis-

regarding it, was prepared to risk war rather than

abandon its intention. What Roosevelt predicted in 1910 came to pass with astonishing fidelity in the ten years following Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The

Open Door and China's integrity vanished for the pre? cise reason which Roosevelt had mentioned, namely, that the United States in its support of the doctrines was

limited to achieving general diplomatic agreement. Nei?

ther the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 nor the so-called

Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition in 1932 preserved

14 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



the Open Door or China's integrity when Japan decided to disregard these principles. The point to be observed is that war came in 1941 not when Japan destroyed the basic principles of American policy toward China but when Japan attacked American territory. Theodore Roosevelt's reputation as a prophet thereby gained added luster.

It would be a mistake, however, to dispose of the two principles as wholly ineffective. It is clear that

during most of the twentieth century they acted as a restraint upon the powers and helped to keep alive the ideals of free enterprise and of China's nationhood at times when both were in danger even as they are

today.

New Circumstances

A realistic view of current policy, however, will con- sider not only these limitations from the past but also the changed circumstances of the present in which the doctrines must operate. Whatever the present value of the two doctrines may be, it is clear that their enforce-

ment, if desirable, is something which cannot be left, as was once the case, to British influence. The full import of this shift in the historical picture can hardly be said to have matured in the American mind.

Moreover, British retirement from Asia is not the

only shift in the historical picture. In the time of John Hay, the Open Door was a doctrine which the powers applied to China. Since 1922 it has become a doctrine to which China (the subject of the doctrine) has sub- scribed. The doctrine is no longer unilateral. It may still be American policy but it must likewise be Chinese

policy if it is to be applied in a sovereign and indepen- dent China.

There are other facts, too, which would seem to pre-

NEW IPR PUBLICATIONS

The following studies, issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat, will be available in Feb? ruary from the IPR Publications Office, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22:

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN. By T. A. Bisson. New York: Macmillan. 143 pp. $2.75. A brief appraisal of occupation policies and achieve- ments.

FRONTIER LAND SYSTEMS IN SOUTHERNMOST CHINA. By Chen Han-seng. 156 pp., mimeo. $2.00. A comparative study of agrarian problems and social organization in Yunnan and Sikang.

JAPAN'S TEXTILE INDUSTRY. By John R. Stewart. About 80 pp., mimeo. $1.25. Including the text of an ECAFE report on the textile industry in nine Far Eastern countries.

clude a unilateral approach to our traditional China doctrines. Until a comparatively few years ago the western world lost very little sleep worrying about the

political theory or the political structure of Chinese

society. Throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, political China could be summed up as a society that was authoritarian and bureaucratic

resting on a Confucian ethic. Government, whatever else it might be, was assuredly not by the people. In most political matters, the bulk of China's millions were not participants but spectators. While this may still be true in some major degree, the public consciousness of China's people has experienced a vast awakening. The

products of this awakening are an infant nationalism and patriotism which, if too young to be described in

detail, are sufficiently virile to make their presence un- mistakable. It may be suggested therefore that while the old principles of the Open Door and of China's

integrity could be and were often enimciated and applied without consulting China, present and future

applications of these doctrines must take greater account of China's nationhood and sovereignty. Doctrines which

proclaim China's integrity cannot be applied with good grace by returning her to a status of semi-colonialism.

The Balance of Power

Moreover, if American principles must be applied in a new nationalistic China, they are also faced with a new type of balance of power playing upon China. At the close of the nineteenth century, the balance of

power structure in the Far East was diverse in that it

represented the constantly shifting pressures of all the

great powers. Probably the most potent factor in pre- cluding the break-up of China at the turn of the cen?

tury was mutual jealousies of the great powers. In gen? eral the old equilibrium of power prevailed until the end of World War I and the emergence of Japan into a position of unrivaled advantage. The balance of power was thereby destroyed. In the years that followed, Japan could and did restrict or nullify the Open Door and China's integrity in so far as it served her interests to do so. This kind of thing could conceivably happen again if no balance of power is preserved. Now the balance of power structure has again changed. The

equilibrium rests not on a diverse balance, but on con- centrated pressures from two sources?the United States and the Soviet Union. Many elements in this new bal? ance are contemporary versions of an older historical

heritage, such as Russian influence or control in Outer

Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea. American

influence, which makes up the other arm of the balance, represents forces whose application is less predictable because they lack the historical precedent or tradition from which the Russian advance is in part derived. This is one of the reasons why our difficulties in applying

JANUARY 24, 1949 15



policy to China are more perplexing than those that face the Russians.

Finally, it is to be noted that China's contemporary revolution appears to be social as well as political. If this be true, then American policy cannot ignore so vital a change and yet hope to succeed. Here again the his? torical heritage is of interest. As already noted, our tra? ditional doctrines relative to China were essentially po? litical and commercial. In this form they may have been

adequate for the China of that day, but it is by no means so certain that the old doctrines can be serviceable in the same limited form today. The Open Door and the principle of integrity can make sense now only in so far as they can be fitted into a new social-revolu-

tionary and nationalistic China. This is the crux of our China problem. The ironic commcntary is that there should be any problem at all. The United States has

long regarded itself as the traditional friend of China. This country has been the champion of doctrines that assert China's commercial freedom and her political independence. During the twentieth century, China's

spokesmen have often been loud in their praise of our behavior. Yet in the year 1949 the gulf that separates the Chinese and the American people in terms of mu? tual understanding would seem to be growing wider. The old doctrines are failing not because they are nec?

essarily less valid than they were in the time of John Hay but because we as a people have not wrestled with the task of modernizing them to the end that they should be serviceable in a new China.

What has been said here by way of a brief excursion into the history of our relations with China bears di?

rectly upon our problem in and toward China today. History, of course, does not support the notion that the future can be blue-printed from the past, but it does

support the idea that the lessons of the past have posi- tive value and that they cannot be ignored with im-

punity. Our past experience in the Far East is the most

tangible and usable evidence at our disposal. We can look at it with a perspective that is not distorted by the crises and the fears of the moment. Indeed, the current crises and fears reflect a very real danger. For instance there is a danger that China will again become a mere battlefield for foreign powers as Manchuria was in the

days of the Russo-Japanese War. The evidence is clear that we need to be prepared to meet this eventuality because there is not now in Asia anyone to fight our battles for us. However, this matter of fighting is only one, and perhaps not the most important point revealed

by the evidence. It is instructive to recall, however, that back in 1904 there was a generation of Americans who believed that Japan was fighting our battle in Asia for

us. It was the battle for the Open Door, one of the Siamese twins of our policy, and, as if to prove that there is coincidence, the enemy in that battle was Russia.

The evidence goes on to relate that Japan won whatever military victory there was in the Russo-Japanese War. For a time she eliminated the influence of Russia in China, but in the more important business of getting along with China, Japan's failure was colossal. This

Japanese failure forms a part of the historical evidence which Americans might well examine with great care. The essential features of this record are quite clear and

they are not in dispute. Japan ignored China's aspira- tions to national independence; she fostered Confucian traditionalism at a time when the most vital elements in Chinese life were attempting to discard it; and, in her

plans for China's future, she apparently forgot that

eighty percent of China's millions were peasants?the vic- tims of a quarter century of civil war and warlordism. To put the matter in other words, Japan's rulers appear to have believed that their own favorite ideas, regard- less of what the Chinese might think of them, could be foisted upon China by force. That Japanese experiment did not turn out very well, at least not for Japan. Fur-

thermore, the record is clear that Japan failed to fright- en or to buy into her service any Chinese leadership which the Chinese as a people would accept or follow.

These are merely a few samplings of the historical evidence available to all who are concerned about the fabrication of our China policy. During the nineteenth

century, we could afford the luxury of being uninformed on the history of our record in Asia. That luxury is now

beyond our means.

DISPATCH FROM INDONESIA

Batavia December 27, 1948

On December 15, 1948, the United Nations Com?

mittee of Good Offices arrived in Jogjakarta and

immediately proceeded to its quarters at the hill resort of Kaliurang, some fifteen miles away. The Committee's arrival was greeted with deep relief by the people of

Jogjakarta. Its presence in Kaliurang was felt to be 100 percent insurance against another Dutch attack up? on the Republic during the three-week period that it was scheduled to stay there. President Sukarno felt that he could safely leave his country and accept Pandit Nehru's invitation to visit India in order to strengthen the relations between the latter country and Indonesia.1 For the same reason the T.N.I. (Indonesian National

Army) felt that this was the one time that it could hold

full-scale maneuvers without fear of being caught ofF

balance by a Dutch attack. Between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, December

19, Dutch paratroops landed in the neighborhood of

Jogjakarta and cut the city's telephone communications

1 This information was communicated to the writer in a talk with President Sukarno on December 12, 1948.

16 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



the shadow of the open door

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