the sanction philosophy of law – 11 november 2015

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The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

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Page 1: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

The Sanction

Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Page 2: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Sanction

• Political power guarantees the application of juridical norms by means of the sanction

• Different conceptions of sanction and their juridical function

• Different punishment theories

Page 3: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Legal positivism• Describes sanction descriptively/formally • “how” the sanction is

• Violation non-correspondance of the real action to the prescribed action.

• Illicit (non-conformity with norms)recurrs=

• - no respect of a prohibition• -no execution of an order

Page 4: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Sanction• action adressed towards non complying behaviour in order

to:

• - nullify or neutralize harmful consequences of action

• - or prevent an action different with respect to one prescribed by norms

• Sanction=effect/juridical consequence that the positive legal system links to juridically relevant human actions

Page 5: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

With or without sanctions?• Every normative system foresees sanctions (answer to

violations)

• legal system without sanctions?

• Hypothetically, only 2 cases (unreal situations)

1)rational society-norms perfectly adjusted to receivers’

propensities(individuals obey spontaneously)

2)automatised society- individuls mechanically faithful to prescriptions (robots)

Page 6: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Normative theory

• Purely formal theories• Kelsen • Theory identifies juridical norm with a

hypothetical judgement :if “A” then “B”

• A= illicit• B=sanction

Page 7: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Kelsen

• A(illicit)never evil in itself(no scientific way to demonstrate it)

• nor can an illicit be defined supposing legislator wishes behaviour different/opposed one carachterized as illicit

Page 8: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• legislator express intentions addressing the sanction towards the individual who’s behaviour is opposed to his desires

• Kelsen: B(sanction) that qualifies A as an illicit

Page 9: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• According to Kelsen• The existence of B(sanction) and no other

ethical,social,psychological or political reason can define A as an illicit

Page 10: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• From the hypothetic imperative “If A, then B”, one should logically conclude that A is an illicit act therefore every member of society is legally bound by performing the opposite behaviour (not-A)

Page 11: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

•This reasoning cannot be accepted.

•Think of the following sentence:

•“All those earning a wage, shall pay taxes”

Page 12: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• In this case “paying taxes” is not a sanction for “earning a wage”(which is not, in turn, an illicit act)

Page 13: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• Traditionally, jurists indicate as primary norms those norms which prescribe a behaviour (must fulfill z) and as secondary norms those that threaten the non-compliance with that behavior .

• Kelsen reverses this traditional distinction: • primary norm is the norm that imputes and prescribes

the sanction;

• secondary norm is the rule prescribes a behavior.

Page 14: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• Indeed, if we assume (as Kelsen does) that the norm that forbids theft is valid only if a second norm links stealing to a sanction, then that's how the first norm (do not steal) does exist, but is encapsulated and contained in the second norm (if theft, then sanction), that in this way becomes according to Kelsen the only genuine juridical norm (that is, the primary rule).

Page 15: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• Pre-kelsen

• The sanction criteria does not qualify the illicit but viceversa the illict qualifies the sanction

Page 16: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Sanction not absoulte condition of law

Individual complies to law not only out of fear of sanction but also because he agrees with its contents

Law not only sanctioning activity but alsoPromotional

Non-sanctioning norms (private law; internationallaw)

Page 17: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• Normative theory: artificial; no legal system constituted only by sanctioning norms

• If norm is legal only when sanctioned; likewise sanctioned norm is legal only if in turn sanctioned..continue ad infinitum..ended by non-sanctioned norm(denying intial premises)

Page 18: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Theory of general prevention

• Individualsitic-utlitarian conception theory• 2 assumptions• 1)individual guided by instincts researching

pleasure/joy/happiness and by avoiding/eliminating suffering

• 2)individual acts out of egoistic interests(costs/benefits calculation and min suffering/max pleasure)

Page 19: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• punishment legitimate to the extent to which protects social convenience

• Legal system is strenghtened by the system of punishment/threat of punishment

• Suffering --> stop offender by producing counter-motivation to individul's search of utility when this damages social utility

Page 20: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• Non compliance to law not evil in itself

• Punishment of violations/threat of punishment of possible future violations is guided by prevention of future offences to preserve general members of society utility

Page 21: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Theory of special prevention• Empirical psycho-sociological conception

• Law/punishment justified insofar as functional to preserve organization and social integration foreseeing and eliminating deviances

• Punishment-->intimidation or discouragement future offences

• Punishment entity measured according to ability to intimidate offender preventing him from committing it again in future

Page 22: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Theory of social defence

• Sociological-criminal theory• Punishment function= prevention of most frequent

offences• Preventionist theory refers to:• an empiricist-evolutive conception of society (society

changes for conservation and adaption of the species)• Determinist conception of man (man behaviour

conditoned by external factors; i.e. Search for utility)• Punishment aims to prevent and neutralize antisocial

inclinations and behaviours

Page 23: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Theory of amends• theory of re-education correction and reparation• Punishment--> re-education purpose

• 2 prerequisites• 1)obective – existence and knowledge of values and

disvalues in order to disitinguish between good and bad behaviours

• 2)subjective- correctabilityand re-educability of the offender

• Justification of law and punishment = interior regeneration

Page 24: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Critics to theories

• Commensuration of punishment to purposes extraneous/additional/secondary to law(i.e. Social usefulness, re-education)paves the way for arbitrary (and thus injust) use of law

• Sanctionsstrengthened/weakened/cruel considering the seriousness of act to fulfill preventive/intimidatory/pedagogical effect

Page 25: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

critics

• consequence:offendermeans not an end• i.e. serious “non-frequent offences” could be

decriminalised

• punishabilty of guilty individuals since not dangerous or re-educable

• unacceptable possibilities since contrary to justice

Page 26: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Theory of retribution• reference to justice

• punishment according to justice

• bad is intolerable - punishment anti co-existential action

• “duty to punish” & “right to be punished”

Page 27: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Theory of retribution

• punishment proportional to entity of offence and according to justice

• afflicitive: • anthropologic commensuration(not “law of

retaliation”)limitation of freedom• humiliation arrogant will did not recognize the

co-existential limit• sufference condition(not guarantee) of

atonement

Page 28: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• punishment allows juridical regeneration of offender

• Kant, Hegeloffender’s dignity must always be respected

Page 29: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

forgiveness

• meta-juridical answer to evil• “gratious act” by the victim• judge cannot forgive because he acts

juridically

Page 30: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

Vengeance

• direct reaction to wrongdoing• no social/institutional mediation• emotional• no proportionality• analogy with sanction • considers answer to wrondoing dutiful in name of

an objective iniquity

Page 31: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

positive sanctions

• possible answer from law to meritorious act to strengthen social cohesion

• no symmetry – and + sanctions• - sanctions = due• + sanctions = not due

Page 32: The Sanction Philosophy of law – 11 November 2015

• “factual” reason: legal system insufficient resources to reward all meritorious acts

• “principle” reason: if meritorious act carried out in view of prize= loose its internal moral meaning:

• gratuity has its reward in itself and not out of itself

• Law, in this case, would become an ethical maximum, wanting to legalize something that in principle cannot be legalized.

• ethical point of view: if all meritorious actions were rewarded, citizens would consider the legal system in view of the reward and not understanding objectively the value of their action.