The Role of Human Rights in Countering Violent Extremism A COMPILATION OF BLUEPRINTS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT

POLICY

SEPTEMBER 2015

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THE ROLE OF HUM AN RI GHTS IN COUNTERING V IOLENT EXTREMISM I

HUM AN RIGHTS FIRST

Introduction

On the sidelines of the annual United Nations

General Assembly meeting, the United States is

sponsoring briefings and meetings with allies to

develop strategies to counter the spread of

violent extremism. These activities will build on

the February 2015 White House Summit to

Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). The CVE

initiative is designed to advance a more

preventive and proactive approach to countering

violent extremism. It takes into account the

lesson of the past decade that addressing the

threat of violent extremism requires a truly

comprehensive strategy that goes beyond

military intelligence and law-enforcement tools.

The United States government has played a

leading role in moving forward a global

conversation on countering violent extremism

since convening the White House Summit. If

this process is to yield results, the United States

will have to continue to provide leadership in

close coordination with the efforts of the United

Nations and other multilateral organizations,

notably the U.N. Secretary General’s Plan of

Action on Preventing Violent Extremism to be

presented to the U.N. General Assembly later

this year.

While sustained U.S. engagement with this

multilateral process will be essential, just as

important will be a clear demonstration from the

United States that it is putting the principles of

its CVE approach into practice. The United

States must show its commitment to the

principles it has been championing through its

more comprehensive, preventive CVE strategy

in each of its bilateral relationships, particularly

those with states facing challenges from the

threat of terrorism, which also engage in

systematic violations of human rights. It is no

accident that these two conditions often

coincide.

This blueprint brings together examples of

existing bilateral relationships with some U.S.

allies that fit this category. The material

collected here illustrates the vital importance for

the United States to encourage its allies to

implement security policies rooted in the reality

that good governance, the rule of law, and

respect for human rights are essential tools in

countering violent extremism

This blueprint compiles and summarizes

previous Human Rights First blueprints. For

more information on a specific topic or country,

please refer to the following documents: How to

Conduct Effective Counterterrorism that

Reinforces Human Rights (December 2014);

How to Bring Stability to Bahrain (December

2014); How to Prevent Egypt Slipping into a

Deepening Crisis (December 2014); How to

Build a More Sustainable and Mutually

Beneficial Relationship with Saudi Arabia

(March 2015); How to Counter Terrorism by

Supporting Civil Society in the United Arab

Emirates (May 2015); How the United States

Can Help Counter Violent Extremism and

Support Civil Society in Kenya (July 2015).

Recommendations

Human rights violations and the denial of rights

and freedoms contribute to the problems of

regional instability and violent extremism.

Counterterrorism assistance should promote—

rather than undermine—the rule of law and

human rights. Human rights are not secondary

in any strategy to promote stability and counter

violent extremism; they are essential to its

success.

SECURITY FORCES

Human rights are key to achieving security and

stability. The effectiveness of security forces

will improve as relations with communities

improve, which will in turn foster longer-term

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security. Security efforts rife with human rights

violations undermine security and encourage

violent extremism.

Accordingly, the U.S. should upgrade its

extensive military and military contractor training

programs to instill as a priority respect for

human rights, transparency, pluralism, and the

rule of law. U.S. security agencies should

encourage the establishment of dedicated

entities within security services that are

responsible for investigating complaints of

abuses and for ensuring compliance with the

rule of law.

In situations where other states are involved in

armed conflicts with terrorist and/or insurgent

groups, governments should include well-

resourced training in international human rights

law and international humanitarian law as an

integral component of any form of military or

other security assistance provided to that

government.

COUNTERTERRORISM/CVE POLICIES AND

LEGISLATION

U.S. embassies’ should broaden dialogues with

civil society and human rights groups in partner

countries to include discussion of

counterterrorism cooperation, the effects of U.S.

assistance and to solicit recommendations for

how the United States can advance human

rights protections through its counterterrorism

assistance.

The U.S. should offer resources to local civil

society figures and other community-based

stakeholders to counter violent extremism and

develop programming designed and/or

implemented by those local groups

U.S. security agencies should persuade officials

to revise repressive and counterproductive

counterterrorism measures without delay and

convey that statutes criminalizing peaceful

dissent harm multilateral efforts against

terrorism and destabilize societies.

HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL

SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

A civil society that is free to operate without

intimidation or repression is a strong antidote to

extremism, and the United States should take

action on protecting civil society leaders as part

of its counterterrorism objectives.

A memo issued by President Obama in

September 2014 confirms that protecting and

promoting civil society is not just the job of the

State Department, but includes the Department

of Treasury, Defense, and Justice, the Office of

the United States Trade Representative, and

other U.S. agencies engaged abroad. It directs

senior U.S. officials of agencies, when travelling

abroad, to “seek opportunities to meet with

representatives of civil society, especially those

who face restrictions on their work and who may

benefit from international support and solidarity,”

and that “each agency engaged abroad shall

incorporate inclusive outreach to civil society

into their international engagement.”

This effort should also be present in U.S.

counterterrorism and countering violent

extremism initiatives. As President Obama

noted in September 2014, “by giving people

peaceful avenues to advance their interests and

express their convictions, a free and flourishing

civil society contributes to stability and helps to

counter violent extremism.”

The U.S. should call public attention to incidents

when international media, international human

rights organizations and representatives of

multilateral organizations that are denied access

and call for them to be admitted.

The U.S. should broaden the U.S. Embassies’

dialogue with civil society and human rights

figures to include discussion of counterterrorism

cooperation and the effects of U.S. assistance.

Senior U.S. officials should publicly urge the

immediate release of all jailed human rights

defenders and call for the lifting of restrictions

on legitimate, non-violent human rights

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advocacy. Objections to restrictions on

independent non-violent civil society activists

should be on the agenda of every bilateral

meeting until the country’s crackdown on human

rights defenders is ended.

Local civil society groups and other community-

based stakeholders should be free to access

resources from domestic and international

sources to counter violent extremism and

develop programming designed and

implemented by those local groups.

U.S. EXPORT CONTROL OF ARMS AND

OTHER EQUIPMENT

U.S. government officials should conduct a

comprehensive assessment of American sales

of military and law enforcement equipment in

order to ensure U.S. technology is not enabling

the repression of civilians and thereby fueling

the grievances on which violent extremism

feeds.

The Defense Department should insist that all

future training of security force personnel in

ethnically and religiously diverse countries

should include proportionate representation of

minority service men and women.

U.S. government officials should enhance the

export control process by strengthening existing

restrictions and providing more funding for

monitoring of the use of weapons and other

equipment after sale.

LEAHY LAW

The U.S. government should enhance the

implementation of the Leahy Law so that it can

be more effective ensuring that U.S.

counterterrorism assistance does not support

security forces engaged systematic violations of

human rights.

U.S. government officials should invest in

remediation procedures to retrain, re-evaluate,

and eventually restore access to units denied

assistance under the Leahy Law vetting

process.

COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE

The U.S. government should modernize

counter-threat finance to increase pressure on

state supporters of violent extremist groups and

promote inter-state cooperation to halt support

for those groups from private individuals and

institutions.

Where disclosure would not jeopardize efforts to

prevent terrorism or cut off funds to terrorist

groups, the U.S. government should confront

partner nations with information on their role in

enabling or actively financing violent extremists,

through U.S. diplomatic channels, and hold

partner governments accountable.

The U.S. government should urge reform of

counterterrorism finance tools such as the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to ensure

governments do not use these tools as a

justification for actions that crack down on

legitimate civil society organizations and political

expression.

The State Department should support the fight

against corruption by vigorously implementing

Presidential Proclamation 7750.

Country Examples

The following countries are examples of states

that silence opposition voices, attack

independent NGOs and human rights

defenders, and commit other human rights

violations in the name of countering violent

extremism.

Bahrain

Bahrain is among Washington’s most repressive

allies. The King’s family controls the

government and judiciary in Bahrain. The King’s

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uncle has been the country’s unelected prime

minister since 1971 and through him the King

makes all cabinet appointments. The King has

the authority to amend the constitution and

appoints all judges by royal decree. The al-

Khalifa family members generally fill about half

of all ministerial slots, including those related to

defense, internal security, and foreign policy.

The country’s majority Shi’a sect is

underrepresented in the cabinet and other

government posts, notably in the security

services where they serve mainly in

administrative functions, if at all.

SECURITY FORCES’ REFORM

The security forces are almost exclusively

drawn from the Sunni sect, either from the local

Bahraini community or, in the case of police,

increasingly from recent arrivals from Yemen,

Syria, Pakistan, or a number of other countries.

Many locals view the police not as protectors of

their security or their rights but as agents of

repression who often do not understand their

culture or context.

While there has been some recruitment to

diversify the police service, a failure to embark

on a genuine overhaul of the Bahrain police and

military to better reflect the communities they

serve leaves many Shi’a distrustful of those

charged with their protection.

The lopsided sectarian makeup of security

forces hampers stability in Bahrain, thus

undermining U.S. national interests in the

country and the region. More than 100 men

from Bahrain are reported to have volunteered

for ISIL, including a former police lieutenant who

appeared in a video urging Bahraini security

personnel to join him. But, leading human rights

activist Nabeel Rajab was sentenced to six

months in jail in January 2015 for tweeting that

“many #Bahrain men who joined #terrorism &

#ISIS came from security institutions and those

institutions were the first ideological incubator.”

CIVIL SOCIETY

The release of political leaders from prison—as

President Obama urged in May 2011, but has

not mentioned since—would help restore

international confidence in the reform process.

So would an end to the targeting of civil society

figures.

In 2011, several prominent political leaders

were jailed and still remain in prison. In jail now

is Ali Salman, leader of the main opposition

group Al Wefaq who was sentenced to four

years on political charges. The leader of the

Bahrain Teachers Association, Mahdi Abu

Deeb, is also serving five years and was

sentenced after being tortured and subjected to

an unfair trial. Prominent human rights defender

Abdulhadi Al Khawaja was subjected to an

unfair trial and is serving a life sentence for his

part in the 2011 protests. The release of these

and other leaders of political and civil society

groups is an important path to political stability

in Bahrain.

The U.S. embassy sent trial observers to these

men’s trials and often sends trial observers to

attend the higher-profile, politically-connected

trials in Bahrain. Unfortunately the U.S.

government never publicly states afterwards

whether, in its view, the trials met international

standards. Several human rights defenders

have raised their concern to Human Rights First

about this silence, and others have read it as an

endorsement of the unfair criminal process.

Egypt

Egypt remains important to U.S. national

security interests—it’s part of the alliance

fighting against ISIL and is battling an

insurgency in the Sinai that worries several

countries in the region, including U.S. ally Israel,

to name just the current front burner issues—

but the increasingly authoritarian Sisi regime is

destroying the political opposition, consolidating

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control over the institutions of government, and

driving Egypt into an uncertain future of

festering internal conflict and polarization. The

Muslim Brotherhood leadership is largely in

exile or in prison. Liberal opposition voices,

independent NGOs, and human rights

defenders are attacked.

RESTRICTED CIVIL SOCIETY

Egypt’s civil society has faced a deepening

crisis. The case against former President

Mubarak’s part in the killing of hundreds of

protestors in early 2011 was dropped on

November 29, 2014, which was seen as a

symbolic exoneration of the regime against

which tens of millions of Egyptians rose up in

January and February 2011. The ruling added

to the impression that the judiciary is swayed by

political preferences, further undermining the

rule of law and strengthening a culture of

impunity for those who attack government

critics, including human rights activists and

other dissidents.

On November 26, 2014, civilian courts

sentenced 78 children to between two and five

years in prisons for taking part in pro-Muslim

Brotherhood protests, adding to the thousands

of people already jailed in mass trials which the

United Nations describes as “unprecedented in

recent history”.

President Sisi approved an anti-terrorism law

that grants the government blanket power to

ban groups on sweeping, loosely defined

charges including disrupting public order.

On November 16, 2014, five student protestors

were referred to a military court because their

alleged damage to university property

constituted an attack on a “vital state institution”.

Theirs was the first case referred under a new

decree (Law 136 of 2014) issued at the end of

October, putting all “public and vital facilities”

under military jurisdiction for two years. This

means that any crimes alleged to have taken

place at such places (including universities and

factories) can be prosecuted by military courts,

expanding the growing jurisdictional scope of

the military court system even further.

Egypt’s 2002 Law on Associations, or Law 84,

prohibits NGO engagement in “unauthorized

activities.” It enables the government to shut

down any group, freeze its assets, confiscate its

property, decide who is on its governing board,

block its funding, and deny it permission to

affiliate with international organizations. The law

expressly authorizes the government to interfere

in the internal affairs of associations.

The law includes vague grounds for dissolution,

which include, “Threatening the national unity or

public order or public attitude.”

Following the November 10, 2014 deadline for

NGOs to register under this repressive law

governing their operations or face closure

passed without raids on their offices or the

further detention of human rights defenders, civil

society figures and their work remain vulnerable

and many expect their organizations to be

forced to close, and fear arrest. Some human

rights defenders are already in jail, while other

activists have left the country after receiving

death threats or hearing that they are on a list of

people targeted for arrest. More repressive

measures are threatened.

New penalties for breaking the law, passed in

September 2014, allow for crippling fines, life in

prison, and in certain cases the death penalty.

Kenya

Kenya has yet to fully recover from large-scale

violence following the 2008 election, when

around 1,300 people were killed—including

hundreds by the police—and half a million were

displaced during a six-week period. Kenya also

hosts around half a million refugees fleeing war

in Somalia.

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The United States should strengthen and

sharpen its efforts to support Kenya. A

reinvigorated approach would both improve the

lives of Kenyans and serve U.S. interests by

combating violent extremism. The U.S.

government should take steps to promote

greater stability in Kenya and the region.

Kenya’s high unemployment and poverty

rates—fueled by corruption—threaten the

country’s stability and help drive disillusioned

youth to join al-Shabab and other extremist

groups.

CRACKDOWN ON CIVIL SOCIETY

The 2013 Public Benefit Organizations (PBO)

Act, a law designed to regulate and protect civil

society, has yet to be implemented. On the

positive side, parts of the Kenyan judiciary

remain defiantly independent of government

interference.

Some organizations have already been

targeted. Within days of the April 2015 terrorist

attacks on Garissa University that left 148

people dead, Kenyan authorities listed 85

entities “suspected to be associated with” al-

Shabab, a terrorist group with origins in

Somalia.

The list included the internationally respected

human rights NGOs Muslims for Human Rights

(Muhuri) and Haki Africa. Both are known for

their outspoken criticism of Kenya’s police

forces, particularly of abuses police have

committed in the name of countering terrorism.

The government froze the bank accounts of

each. Hussein Khalid, chief executive officer of

Haki Africa, was among the activists in

attendance at February’s White House Summit

on Countering Violent Extremism. In June, the

two groups won a court injunction in Kenya

rejecting the terrorist designation, but their bank

accounts remain frozen.

Mwangi told Human Rights First that he has

received death threats, and he was arrested

again on July 1. Human rights defenders

complain of mistreatment by the police and the

courts. For example, the courts have been

increasing bail fees of those arrested for

peaceful protests, activists say.

The 2014 State Department country reports also

noted that in Kenya, “Less-established NGOs,

particularly in rural areas, reported harassment

and threats by county-level officials and security

forces. Human rights activists claimed security

forces conducted surveillance of their activities,

and some reported threats and intimidation.”

Kenya’s efforts at countering extremism are

failing partly because of a lack of cooperation

with civil society. Muhuri Executive Director

Hassan Abdi Abdille said, “This government will

never win the war on terrorism because of a

lack of public participation. If the elite like us

isn't allowed to participate how will the common

people?”

CORRUPTION

In 2006 Senator Obama spoke at Nairobi

University and told his Kenyan audience that the

country was facing a corruption crisis, that

“corruption … erodes the state from the inside

out, sickening the justice system until there is no

justice to be found, poisoning the police forces

until their presence becomes a source of

insecurity rather than comfort.”

Local human rights defenders working in some

of Nairobi’s poorest areas told Human Rights

First about the everyday police bribery that

destroys trust in the rule of law. There’s a rough

price list for those arrested to pay their way out

of trouble, with a drunk and disorderly arrest

costing around Kenya Shillings 2,000 (US$20)

and Ksh10,000 for robbery with violence. These

sums—in a country where 46 percent of people

live on less than a dollar a day—are

astronomical.

The problem of bribery extends to policing in the

name of counterterrorism. An experienced

Mombasa photojournalist told Human Rights

First about a general lack of trust in the

professionalism of police charged with

counterterrorism work: “There are cases of the

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police targeting and shooting the wrong person

through mistaken identity, and reports of

[terrorist] suspects being able to bribe their way

out of custody.”

POLICING IRREGULARITIES

There is low public confidence across the

country in the Kenyan security forces’ ability to

prevent further attacks. Undermined by a lack of

professionalism, corruption, and impunity for

their own abuses, Kenya’s police needs urgent

reform. According to the 2014 State Department

Kenyan country report, “Police were largely

ineffective, and there was a public perception

that police often were complicit in criminal

activity. Police incompetence and complicity in

criminal activity contributed to an increase in

crime, especially in Nairobi. Poor casework,

police incompetence, and corruption

undermined successful prosecutions; the

conviction rate was between 13 and 16

percent….Police officials resisted investigations

and jailed some human rights activists for going

to a police station to make a complaint.” It noted

too that, “Police frequently used excessive force

when making arrests,” and “frequently arrested

and detained persons arbitrarily.

Overwhelmingly, victims of arbitrary arrest were

poor young men.”

Policing problems are deep and widespread

across the country, ranging from petty

corruption to poor standards of recruitment and

training. Kenya’s 2012 Prevention of Terrorism

Act is vaguely worded and criminalizes

individuals for being members of designated

terrorist entities regardless of their specific

actions. There is no domestic legal definition of

terrorism in Kenyan law, and counterproductive

policing methods aimed at Muslim communities

are fueling the sort of extremism they are

intended to prevent.

Muslim leaders complain of widespread

harassment and say the police are too ready to

link the whole community to al-Shabab. “Every

time people see one of these massacres—no

sane person celebrates that,” said Khelef

Khalifa, Chair of the Mombasa-based NGO

Muhuri. “But the government can't succeed in

fighting terrorists if it alienates Muslims.”

He says the police harass Muslims, that they

are “90 percent more likely” to arrest Muslim

men, who they then exploit for bribes. “The last

two years have been hell for the Muslim

community,” said Khalifa.

The Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) has received

$50 million from the U.S. government and is

accused by Muhuri of torture and a string of

extra-judicial executions. “Sometimes they want

to arrest someone—why not go to where he

works or pick him up during the daytime if he’s

not in hiding? They come at night, raiding

houses, shooting up the place, hurting people. It

breeds bad blood with the Muslim community,”

said Khalifa.

Kenyan authorities accept there is a problem,

and the Kenyan Independent Policing Oversight

Authority (IPOA) regularly condemns police

abuses, reminding the authorities that, “unfair

policing shapes the view of police as biased and

untrustworthy. It generates reluctance to

cooperate with police officers, which in turn

undermines efficiency in profound ways. IPOA

is confident that that is not the image that an

increasingly professionalized and accountable

National Police Service would wish to foster in

the minds of the public.”

Saudi Arabia

The kingdom is now experiencing an

authoritarian winter at home and encouraging

one abroad while enabling radical clerics to

promote sectarian violence throughout the

region. These are serious challenges which

impede the United States from achieving the

objectives of its military campaign against ISIL

and which work against American interests in

many parts of the region.

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Riyadh has taken advantage of this new

security environment to implement draconian

regulations on countering terrorism that

criminalize and deter peaceful dissent. These

new laws seem tailored to obstruct the

legitimate activities of independent human rights

activists and have been used accordingly.

Meanwhile, hardline clerics are granted impunity

by the state to propagate the sorts of hatred

against other sects and religions that encourage

Sunni sectarian extremism and legitimize

terrorism by ISIL, al Qaeda, and other such

groups.

Riyadh is continuing to promote extremist

ideologies that underpin recruitment for terrorist

organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIL on

regional and global levels.

Saudi authorities are promoting a renewed

wave of authoritarianism and intolerance in

numerous parts of the Middle East. Saudi

Arabia has been in the lead of a group of

“counter-revolutionary powers” who have “rolled

back the electoral and participatory gains of the

Arab Spring in Egypt just as they clamped down

on protest movements within the Gulf itself.”

Although it stands opposed to Bashar al-

Assad’s dictatorship in Syria, it has engaged in

the Syrian conflict as part of its rivalry with Iran

in a manner that has contributed to the elevation

of sectarianism between Sunni and Shi’ite

Islam. The ruinous influence of heightened

sectarianism has been a major contributor to

mounting instability in the Gulf, the Levant, and

South Asia.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Sunni and Shi’ite advocates of equal rights for

Shi’ite citizens of Saudi Arabia, such as Mikhlif

al-Shammari and Fadhel al-Manasif, have been

convicted and jailed. In the last year, at least

four prominent lawyers who called for greater

accountability by the Ministry of Justice have

been convicted on questionable charges for

their activism.

Many non-violent activists, like women’s rights

activists Looujain Hathloul and Maysa al-

Amoudi, have had their trials sent to Saudi

Arabia’s terrorism-focused Specialized Criminal

Court, where they receive even harsher

sentences for nonviolent activities than they

would have before ordinary criminal courts. New

laws are having a chilling effect upon peaceful

dissent and stifling much-needed civil society

mobilization.

DOUBLE STANDARDS

Shi’ite citizens of Saudi Arabia regularly report

pervasive discrimination and have a long history

of exclusion from administrative or political

posts of authority. Saudi authorities continue to

indoctrinate the country’s youth with hateful

ideas that dehumanize and encourage violence

against other religious groups as well as against

Sunni Muslims who deviate from orthodox

religious teaching.

While Riyadh has aggressively pursued non-

violent human rights defenders for what they

post online, comparable scrutiny has not been

applied to Saudi religious leaders who

encourage intolerance or violence using the

same media. The Saudi government reserves

the right to dismiss radical clerics from the pulpit

but typically does not use it with preachers who

stop short of endorsing al Qaeda or targeting

the state. In fact, it often grants them special

privileges, such as senior government posts,

officially-endorsed speaking opportunities, or

state-sanctioned access to the airwaves.

Saudi-owned outlets notorious for promoting

sectarian intolerance, such as the television

station al-Majd and the news website Lojainiat,

which have been permitted by the state to keep

operating.

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United Arab Emirates

The country’s positive image is pushed by an

impressively lavish lobbying and PR machine in

Washington D.C.—more expensive than that of

any other Middle Eastern country.

But dissent is not tolerated and human rights

activists are targeted, threatening the country’s

progress and stability. The 2013 U.S. State

Department human rights report on the UAE

notes “The three most significant human rights

problems were citizens’ inability to change their

government; limitations on citizens’ civil liberties

(including the freedoms of speech, press,

assembly, association, and internet use); and

arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions,

and lengthy pretrial detentions”.

The authorities have tried to suffocate the

country’s civil society in recent years, jailing

dozens of dissidents after unfair trials, throwing

out international think tanks, and disbanding

local organizations.

Much of this fear appears to have been rooted

in the perceived challenge from political Islam

and the possibility of contagion from protests

during the 2011 uprisings elsewhere in the

region. The well-organized UAE Islamic group

Islah—which claimed up to 20,000 supporters—

was feared by many in the government as

representing the sort of challenge that the

Muslim Brotherhood posed in Egypt.

PARTNERS IN MIDDLE EASTERN STABILTIY

While U.S. officials admit there are human rights

problems in the UAE they are often reluctant to

raise the most difficult ones—such as those

which protect freedom to criticize the

government. Apart from the annual State

Department country reports, the U.S. is rarely

openly critical of the UAE’s human rights record.

A veteran analyst in the UAE told Human Rights

First that “Many of those who left to fight with

ISIS or other groups in Syria or Iraq are men

from Salafist groups that were arrested,

tortured, and harassed, even after they were

released from jail. They were living under

continual pressure in all aspects of their lives

and so chose another route to change things”.

Repressive cybercrime legislation and a poor

record on internet freedom—not to mention the

closing down of several U.S. organizations and

research institutes in the country—make the

UAE government a questionable partner for the

U.S. government to choose for establishing a

digital communications hub “to counter terrorist

propaganda.” The Sawab Center – New Digital

Communications Hub to Counter Extremist

Propaganda, was launched in Abu Dhabi in

July.

CRACKDOWN ON CIVIL SOCIETY

The authorities began their crackdown on civil

society in March 2011, a few weeks after the

removal from office of President ben Ali in

Tunisia and President Mubarak in Egypt and at

a time when mass protests had erupted in

Bahrain and in the Eastern Province of Saudi

Arabia. The crackdown came in response to a

petition signed by 133 people asking for the

authorities to begin a process of democratic

reform. The signatories included leading

members of civil society—academics, lawyers

and former judges, journalists, and others. The

government reaction was swift, and the

following month five activists were arrested.

The targeting of civil society has intensified

since then, say local activists, often in the name

of counterterrorism, and typically at the hands of

Sheikh Mohammed’s State Security. Local

human rights activists estimate the number of

those in jails in the UAE for political reasons at

over 200. Few civil society representatives

remain in the country and out of jail.

Last year Law 7-2014, On Combating Terrorism

and Terrorist Activities, included new offenses

centering on the definition of “terrorist outcome.”

Article 1 defines a terrorist outcome expansively

as: “Stirring panic among a group of people,

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killing or causing grave physical harm, or

material damage to property or environment,

disrupting/undermining the social domestic or

international security, antagonizing the state,

impacting the public authorities in the State or

other states or international organizations as

they go about exercising their duties or

receiving from the State or other states or

organizations a benefit or privilege of any kind.”

Article 15 allows for the criminalization of

“whoever publicly declares his animosity or lack

of allegiance to the State or regime”.

Although no cases have yet been brought under

this new law, it is extremely broad in its potential

application. On November 15, 2014, the Cabinet

approved a “terrorist” list of 83 groups ranging

from armed terrorist groups like ISIL and Boko

Haram to American and European Muslim

humanitarian and rights groups, including the

Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR)

headquartered in Washington, D.C. and the

Muslim American Society (MAS) based in

Virginia, groups not designated as terrorist

organizations in the United States. In May 2015

interior ministers of the GCC, meeting in Saudi

Arabia, agreed to harmonize a blacklist of

“terrorist organizations and individuals”.

Activists labeled as associated with political

Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, are

especially vulnerable. The UAE continues to

send large donations to President Sisi in Egypt

in part to help his efforts to crush the

Brotherhood.

Previously tolerated local civil society

organizations have been disbanded, including

the Association of Teachers and the Association

of Jurists. Former heads of the Jurists

Association are now political prisoners,

including renowned constitutional scholar Dr.

Mohammed al Roken. He's one of dozens

serving long prison sentences after being

convicted in the mass unfair “94 Trial” of 2013.

This trial of 94 defendants took place in the

State Security courts from March to July 2013.

The court convicted 69 defendants who were

sentenced to between seven and 15 years in

prison. Prosecution evidence relied on

confessions defendants claimed were forced out

of them by torture in custody. International

observers were not allowed into the court.

Abdullah al-Hadidi, the son of one of the

defendants, was sentenced to 10 months in jail

for tweeting details of the case “in bad faith”.

There is no appeal recourse on verdicts from

this court.

Only a tiny handful of dissidents currently

remain in the country and out of jail.

Furthermore, activists blame the State Security

Apparatus for tampering with official

government files holding their ID and other

information. They said that dates of birth have

been changed so that adults are officially

registered as children, or other details modified,

making it impossible for them to get drivers

licenses and other essential documents. This

administrative harassment has sent people into

an endless bureaucratic loop, preventing them

from getting or renewing passports, applying for

school, opening bank accounts, and generally

operating normal lives. The denial of a security

clearance amounts to a denial of a job—the

denial of a normal life. Many activists are unable

to support themselves financially. Others say

they have been intimidated by State Security

vehicles with tinted windows running them off

the road.

STIFILING ONLINE DISSENT

A prominent tool the government has used is a

“cybercrimes decree” issued by President

Khalifa on November 13, 2012 (Federal Legal

Decree No. 5/2012), which established a legal

basis to prosecute and jail people who use

information technology to promote dissent.

Article 28 of the decree provides for

imprisonment and large fines for anyone who

uses information technology to “incite actions

that endanger state security or infringe on the

public order.” Article 30 provides for life

imprisonment for anyone using such technology

to advocate the overthrow or change of the

system of governance.

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HUM AN RIGHTS FIRST

Conclusions

A coherent, consistent, interagency U.S.

government approach to support freedoms of

expression, association, and assembly and to

end repression of civil society will make a

meaningful impact against violent extremism

and better serve U.S. interests.

National counterterrorism measures that are not

rooted in respect for human rights risk being

counterproductive. When governments stifle

peaceful dissent, muzzle the media, and

prevent the legitimate activities of non-violent

civil society organizations, they are not

countering extremism; they are fomenting it.

Respect for religious freedom is an essential

part of CVE strategy. The extremist discourse of

some governmental religious institutions is part

of the problem; independence and de-

politicization of those institutions is an essential

part of the solution. A comprehensive CVE

strategy must address the religious and

ideological narratives that lure the vulnerable

and disenfranchised segments of society to

violent extremism. To be effective as

counterweights to extremist discourse, religious

institutions must be—and be seen to be—

independent of political control, and

governments must ensure that diverse religious

views are tolerated.

WHERE TO FIND US

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Tel: 212.845.5200 Tel: 202.547.5692 Tel: 713.955.1360

Fax: 212.845.5299 Fax: 202.543.5999 Fax: 713.955.1359

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