the price of propaganda in sino-soviet relations

THE PRICE OF PROPAGANDA IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

William deB. Mills

A period of flux in China's relations with the superpowers marked by failed initiatives and sudden displays of resentment on all sides developed after the end of China's anti-Soviet, united front policy. Basking then in the glow of Sino-American recognition and Beijing's strident calls for world unity against hegemony--which in 1979 pretty clearly meant the Soviet Union--it was possible for Western observers to conclude that Moscow was the odd man out. But presidential candidate Reagan's pro-Taiwan rhetoric, cumulative Chinese dissatisfaction over a range of minor bilateral issues, no doubt a growing realization that leaning too far toward the West diminished China's flexibility, and domestic fears as well of cultural and ideological contamination all propelled China back toward a less one-sided posture.

With Moscow of course content to promote this development, renewed efforts to normalize Sino-Soviet relations became timely once again. Semian- nual political consultations began in late 1982, the fifth session having occurred in October 1984. In September 1983 Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Kapitsa launched a "new channel, ''1 reused in July 1984 with the visit to Moscow of Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. The Soviet Union toned down its anti-China rhetoric, and both sides publicly stressed the dramatic rise in bilateral trade 2 and broadening of contacts. 3

However, as progress in Sino-Soviet relations finally seemed to be occur- ring, the exchange of a series of highly visible visits between China and the United States 4 reinvigorated the other side of the triangle. Then, in April, severe border clashes between China and Vietnam occurred, with China going out of its way to publicize its successes. Apparently in reaction to these media events, the Kremlin postponed a landmark visit by First Deputy Chairman Ar- khipov to Beijing for economic discussions in May? A bitter public exchange of accusations in ensuing weeks thereupon slowed the momentum of Sino- Soviet relations. In well-publicized meetings with Vietnamese and Laotian officials, Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko denounced China by name for its military moves on the Sino-Vietnamese border, his first such attacks since becoming the Soviet leader in February. The Chinese responded by attacking Chernenko for those speeches and by publishing a series of press reviews depicting the Kremlin's overall foreign policy line since Yuri An- dropov's death in markedly more negative terms than the cautious, polite ap- praisals with which China had greeted Chernenko's appointment. In the midst

William Mills is analyst of Chinese foreign policy at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. He has contributed articles to Problems of Communism and Asian Survey.

44 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / WINTER 1984

of this resurgence of polemics, Qian visited Moscow, a trip that failed to re- store the momentum in Sino-Soviet relations so visible before the postponement of Arkhipov's trip.

In a word, the seemingly rigid lines of the strategic triangle of 1979 had crumbled, leaving trilateral relations in a state of uncertainty. With the Soviet leadership still in transition from the Brezhnev era and with 80-year-old Deng Xiaoping and his comrades of the revolutionary generation in the process of bringing a new generation into power in China, this instability is likely to increase.

The erratic nature of triangular ties cautions us against too easily assuming the permanence of any short-term trend, yet the mistake is all too often made. So in this period of triangular instability, it is well worth remembering past vacillations in Sino-Soviet relations. In the aftermath of the May-June 1984 downturn in China's ties with the new Chemenko regime, it is instructive to recall the failure of an earlier initiative--the Soviet rhetorical restraint following the September 1976 death of Chairman Mao Zedong, designed as a signal of Soviet willingness to come to an understanding with China's new leadership. The failure to overcome the tensions in Sino-Soviet relations after Mao's death disproved the optimistic Soviet hypothesis that they were simply due to Mao personally, suggesting the possibility that the key was some innate contradiction between the two societies, which would constitute a much more durable obstacle to normal relations. Thus, the story of the failure to reach a compromise following Mao's death and the return in 1977 to open polemics on both sides is the story of the maturing of the Sino-Soviet conflict and for this reason is of continuing relevance.

The relevance of the 1976-77 period of transition in triangular relations is particularly pointed in view of the mid-1984 period, in which once again initiatives designed to improve Sino-Soviet relations during a time of leadership transition have been undermined by a rising tide of polemics. Since the emotionalism of individual human interactions seems inevitably to infect intergovernmental relations as well, the damage to reconciliation efforts re- suiting from public recriminations can come as no surprise. The question is: why do Moscow and Beijing repeatedly engage in such costly rhetorical bat- tles? A major portion of the explanation lies at the systemic level: bilateral goals are repeatedly sacrificed for the sake of other foreign policy considerations, as the events of early 1977 will show.

SOVIET VERBAL RESTRAINT

"Soviet-Chinese co-operation," Mikhail Suslov informs us, "reached its peak after 1953. '8 Barely three years later came Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), a speech that destroyed the CPSU's claim to infallibility and was later identified by the Chinese as "the origin of the split in the international

MILLS 45

communist movement. ' ,7 Subordination had never set well with the Chinese. Even before winning the revolution, they were claiming to have developed an Asiatic form of Marxism that the Russians were not qualified to discuss. 8 Now, in 1956, reacting with Marshallian skill, the Chinese supported Khrushchev's "courageous self-criticism" by claiming the right of judicial review over the bloc leader, pointing out the need to "destroy blind faith in dogma," since "there has never been a man in the world completely free from mistakes. ' '9 For the next 20 years accusations and protestations swirled around each other in the murky atmosphere of Sino-Soviet dialogue, causes and consequences becoming ever more intertwined. Hypothesized causes ranged from the petty bourgeois class composition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese resentment over the unequal treaties to Soviet fears of nuclear war clashing with China's desire for national reunification. The simplest hypothesis of all, that Sino-Soviet hostility was motivated by Mao's personal antipathy for the Soviet Union, could not be tested, however, for through all the maneuvers--the criticism of proxies, the Nine Comments, the offers of military cooperation to aid Vietnam, the border talks; despite the overthrow of Khrushchev and the Cultural Revolution, detente and the Shan- ghai Communiqur--Mao remained in power. When the "Great Helmsman" died in September 1976, the Soviet Union held its breath.

For seven months, the Soviet propaganda machine idled, 1~ as the Kremlin waited for the new Chinese leadership irrevocably to commit itself. Evidence of continued anti-Sovietism was hardly scarce, 1~ but the Russians muted their response, giving Chairman Hua Guofeng's regime time to consolidate itself and perhaps understanding the slow pace of change in highly bureaucratized states.

An example of the hesitation on the part of the Soviet Union after Mao's death is provided by the Opasnyi kurs (Dangerous Course) series, a decade- old annual compilation of the major Soviet journal and press statements on China. Volume 6 came out in late 1975 with articles from 1974, volume 7 in late 1976 with articles from 1975. Volume 8 was presumably being compiled in the fall of 1976 when Mao suddenly died, offering the possibility of a major shift in Chinese policy toward the U.S.S.R. No volume appeared that year. Volume 8 was finally published in 1978. Entitled Kitai posle Mao Tsze-duna (China After Mao), had the admitted purpose of demonstrating that "the greatpower, chauvinist, anti-Soviet course of the Chinese leadership, at root contradicting the interests of the Chinese people themselves, remain[ed] un- changed. ,,~2 Mao having died and his political allies, the Gang of Four, having been overthrown, his era was apparently no longer of interest. The single exception to this editorial policy was an article on the historical tradition of Sino-Soviet friendship, la That, it was implied, was the only message the editors wished to have carried over into the post-Mao era. Not only was 1976 skipped, not a single article from 1977 appeared until spring. Even then there were only two: aNovoye vremya article from April and Aleksandrov's May 14


Pravda statement. 14 The other 15 articles in volume 8 were all signaling the resumption of anti-Chinese commentary in the Soviet press. This resumption of full-scale public Soviet attacks on China represents the start of a new period in Sino-Soviet relations. The hypothesis that the Sino-Soviet dispute was due to idiosyncratic factors--a personality clash between Mao and Khrushchev or some deep-seated personal prejudice against the Soviet Union on Mao's part--was exposed as too simplistic. Whatever the cause of Sino-Soviet hostility, the reality in 1977 was that it had been inherited on both sides.

The single article in volume 8 dating from 1976 had originally appeared in the last issue of Far Eastern Affairs for that year. ~5 This piece, by O.B. Rakhmanin, appears to have been a Soviet offer to post-Mao China. " I t is well known," Rakhmanin began, "that there were times when the two sides [the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C.] went in one formation in the struggle against imperialism, for the triumph of social ism."6 Rakhmanin reviewed the "great friendship ''~7 of the two peoples, going back to the seventeenth century, pointed out how Soviet military aid had destroyed American-KMT plans to "transform China into an American colony, ''~s and concluded with a reference to Soviet good will. Such unbelievable "forgetfulness" and total lack of critical comment suggests that at the very least Rakhmanin himself was advocating that the two sides start their relations over. It may well have been intended as a government-to-government signal for which the Soviet side would not have to take responsibility if it were rebuffed. What expectations the Rus- sians had or how sincere this apparent offer was remains unclear, since the Chinese did not respond. Nevertheless, Soviet verbal moderation, which in itself suggests that Rakhmanin's article reflected more than the opinion of one man or institution, lasted until April 1977.

CHINA" S CHALLENGE

Judging from Soviet commentary, the last straw was apparently the publication of volume 5 of The Selected Works o fMao Tsetung on April 15. The fact that Chairman Hua chaired the editorial committee, with all Politburo members participating, illustrates the political significance of this volume. 2~ Hua made its significance even plainer in his May 1 article on the subject, in which he called volume 5 " a scientific summing-up of the great struggles carried out in all fields by our Party."21 The meaning of "scientific" was crucial. Volume 5 was admitted to be not just a compilation of Mao's works but a selection of his correct works. "Chairman Mao," Hua wrote, "a t all times took a very serious and prudent attitude toward ideological and theoretical questions, and never allowed his Selected Works to be compiled until his writings had been tested in practice for a period of time."zz Hence, the contents of volume 5 may be read as the fundamental statement of Chinese policy as of April 1977.

MILLS 47

The publication of volume 5 and Hua's May 1 analysis of it seem to have been central to the Soviet decision to abandon its policy of verbal restraint at that time. According to Hua, "Chairman Mao fought against modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at its centre and dealt it a smashing blow theoretically . . . . We must carry out Chairman Mao's behests and carry the struggle against Soviet social-imperialism through to the end."za

Anti-Soviet comments had frequently been made since Mao's death, but few if any were as definitive as having the Chairman himself uncompromis- ingly call in a major speech for carrying the anti-Soviet struggle "through to the end." Even more serious was the context. Hua was defining which of Mao's innumerable comments were to be adopted as official parts of Chinese policy for the future.

Volume 5 contains 1949-56 materials, thus barely touching on the period of Sino-Soviet hostility. Pro-Soviet references to the Soviet Union could hardly be expunged from famous speeches during a period when Mao was still above criticism and when his posthumous aura was being used to prop up a shaky regime. Nor could such major speeches credibly be omitted. Hence, references to alliance with the Soviet Union from such speeches as "The Chinese People Have Stood Up" (September 21, 1949) can probably be discounted despite their inclusion in volume 5. 24 Such references seem to have little contemporary significance as well because they are not singled out in Chinese commentary on volume 5. The introductory analysis published by the editorial committee when volume 5 appeared summarized "The Chinese People Have Stood Up" as defining China's new system, which was designed to protect China by means of a powerful military. No references to foreign friends was made. z5 In fact, these favorable references to the Soviet Union were ignored in Soviet analysis of volume 5 as well.

It is the reference to the Soviet Union from 1956 and 1957 that made the publication of Volume 5 a significant foreign policy event. Both anti-Ameri- can and anti-Soviet statements were included, but their treatment by the editorial committee was instructive. The committee's article listed the 70 articles included in volume 5 and analyzed 27. The two major anti-American pieces, "Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks" and "U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger" were omitted from the analytical section of the committee's article. A third piece, "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Committees," commented extensively on the United States. The editorial committee summarized these comments as indi- cating that "China 's policy towards the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S. [was that] we were in no hurry to do it ." Mao was quoted by the committee as observing, "One day the United States will have to establish diplomatic relations with us."26 Mao continued by observing, "Between socialist states and imperialist states, of which the U.S. is the most important,


imperialists fear China more than China fears the imperialists."27 The edito- rim committee ignored this negative statement. Treatment of the United States by the committee, which it must be remembered was composed of the entire Politburo, could have been much more severe.

Such was not the case with treatment of the Soviet Union. In the analysis of "Talks at a Conference," the editorial committee quoted a long critique of the U.S.S.R., including the prophetic statement " I f they (the Russians) insist on having their own way, sooner or later we will have to bring everything into the open.'28 Mao's January 1957 comments, which now read like a justification for the Sino-Soviet split, were introduced by the committee as a critique of Khrushchev revisionism and great-power chauvinism." 2a

In addition to "Talks at a Conference," two other pieces in volume 5 con- tain discussions of the U.S.S.R. 3~ Each was analyzed in detail by the editorial committee, which portrayed the U.S.S.R. under Khrushchev as damaging the world communist movement, slandering Stalin, and abandoning Leninist and Stalinist orthodoxy, in contrast to the Chinese, who were described as being simultaneously theoretically pure ("we protect Stalin") and creative ("the great theory of continuing the revolution").31

Two reasons why the Soviet leadership might have taken publication of volume 5 as a major anti-Soviet move have been analyzed. First, volume 5 contained a number of anti-Soviet statements, despite the lack of any materials dating later than 1957. Second, the accompanying editorial committee statement, representing the Chinese government's official view as of April 1977, played down the anti-American content and stressed the anti-Soviet content of volume 5.

A third reason seems equally important: comments by Mao favorable to the Soviet Union from this period were omitted from volume 5. In November 1957, Mao made a series of speeches in Moscow, while participating in international communist meetings, a2 Volume 5 included five pages of excerpts from these speeches aa but totally ignored two pro-Soviet speeches: Mao's "Speech at the Moscow Celebration Meeting" (November 6) and his November 17 speech at Moscow State University. a4 On November 6, Mao had called the U.S.S.R. " a country which truly practices proletarian interna- tionalism, genuinely opposes national oppression and helps oppressed nations to emancipate themselves. ''aS Mao added that "any government that refuses to be on friendly terms with the Soviet Union only harms its own people."36 On November 17, Mao had said, "The socialist camp must have a head, and this head is the U.S.S.R. ''37

The publication by China between April 14 and May 1 of volume 5 of Mao's Selected Works, the analysis by the editorial committee, and Hua's discussion of volume 5 appear to have been accepted by the Kremlim as dispro- ving the hypothesis that Mao personally was the motive force behind Chinese hostility toward the U.S.S.R. and that Chinese policy would be moderated once Mao was gone. This argument was made more compelling by two other

MILLS 49

domestic Chinese events of late April and early May: the National Conference on Learning from Daqing in Industry, which began on April 20, and Hua 's tour of the Northeast. The message sent to the U.S.S.R. was one of total hostility.

Ye Jianying set the tone in his April 22 speech at the conference, in which he stated:

The wild ambition of Soviet revisionism to subjugate China will not die. We must race against time and quicken the pace of industrial development, build the national economy and strengthen our socialist state of the proletarian dictatorship, as

On the same day Hua pointedly toured a Harbin air defense unit, where he left little to the imagination:

The northeastern provinces hold an extremely important strategic position. Soviet revisionism's wild ambition to subjugate China will not die . . . . We must do a good job in preparing for war. 39

Hua reiterated the message in his speech to the Daqing Conference on May 13:

The question of the speed of construction is a political rather than a purely economic question. When viewed in the light of the international class struggle, the political nature of this question stands out still more sharply. By their very nature imperialism and social-imperialism mean war. We cannot afford to let time slip through our fingers, as it waits for no one. Every communist, every revolutionary and every patriot should be clear about the situation, seize the present opportune moment, strive to work well and make our country strong and prosperous as soon as possible. 4~

The publication of volume 5, with its anti-Soviet bias, the even more anti- Soviet tone of the accompanying commentary, the rash of anti-Soviet speeches by top Chinese leaders, and the new emphasis on economic development (suggesting that China's power would increase) constituted a powerful set of stimuli. The global context only heightened their likely impact. The three major contextual factors were probably the broadening Chinese ties with Japan and the West, disarmament, and Soviet relations with Africa.

Chinese ties with capitalist states were expanding rapidly. Between March 15 and April 15 alone, at least 17 delegations from these states, excluding delegations from Western communist parties, went to China. These delegations included economic delegations from West Germany, the United States, and Japan; a West German political delegation; a U.S. congressional delegation; and, on April 7, a visit by the British prime minister, " I ron Lady" Margaret Thatcher. In addition, economic agreements were signed with France and Au- stria during this period.

As for the second factor, a wide range of disarmament talks---especially Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and mutual force reduction talks--were


either in process or imminent. To portray China as a warmonger threatening the West and the socialist camp alike would provide a nice impetus to the West to take a conciliatory stance.

In Africa, the U.S.S.R. was deeply involved in an effort to expand its in- tluence. The Angolan civil war continued; Rhodesia appeared headed toward a race war and possible involvement of Cuban troops; a palace coup had occurred in the Soviet ally Ethiopia in February; much of Eritrea was in anti- Soviet rebel hands; the border war with Somalia was heating up; and on March 8 Zaire's Shaba province had been invaded from Angola. In Soviet propaganda aimed at Africa, portrayal of the People's Republic of China as an imperialist threat to Third World states was convenient.

Whether internal factors played a role in the Soviet decision cannot be determined from the sources analyzed here, but, given the above contextual ar- guments in favor of more prominent criticism of the PRC, the reasons described earlier seem a more-than-sufficient explanation for the precise timing of the Soviet policy shift.

RUSSIA'S RIPOSTE

Soviet reaction to the publication of volume 5 was rapid. Only a few days after it appeared, M. Galin published an article on China in New Times

(Novoye vremya, published in both English and Russian) discussing volume 5 as follows:

hi order to strengthen the ideological foundations of the regime, the new Beijing udministration published the fifth volume of Mao's Selected Works in the middle of April . . . . Many of the works communicated an anti-Soviet tenor. It is significant, tot example, that the compilers and editors did not include Mao's speech at the opening of the 8th CCP Congress tSeptember 1956), which contained positive views on the world socialist system and on the experience of the CPSU. 41

More significant than Galin's article was the return to Pravda of I. Alek- sandrov for the first time that year. The most authoritative and detailed critiques of China in the Soviet press at this time were essays, generally between one-third and one-half a page long and appearing on page four of Pravda under the pseudonym I. Aleksandrov. Such articles appeared only a few times a year and were generally reprinted in Opasnyi kurs. 42 The contextual stimulus for Aleksandrov's article appears to have been the continuing Chinese propaganda campaign against the U.S.S.R, The reasons for the timing of the article, which signaled the resumption of the full-scale anti-Chinese propaganda in the Soviet media, were apparently the publication of volume 5 and Hua's May 1 analysis of it. In Aleksandrov's words:

The fifth volume of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works was published recently in Peking. On I May the present CCP chairman Hua Guofeng published an article

MILLS 51

devoted to this volume. In the article, Hua proclaims the new Chinese leadership's loyalty to Mao's domestic and foreign policy and to the national, great-power, m i l i t a r i s t c o u r s e . 4a

Aleksandrov argued that China was the only state favoring war over detente, that China was utterly anti-Soviet, and that certain Western groups fa- vored arming China. China, in short, was portrayed as presenting a great, long-range danger to the whole world.

Although Aleksandrov saw "the relaxation of tension" as the dominant global trend, he warned ominously that "the present Chinese leadership has joined the most reactionary forces of imperialism in their attacks on the socialist countries.' ,44 One could, it seemed, talk to some imperialists but not to others, and the danger was that the latter would team up with the Chinese, who were conducting an "increasingly unbridled anti-Soviet campaign . . . using the flag of anti-Sovietism.. , to undermine international detente. ''45 After presenting evidence to show that "the new PRC leaders are parading their loyalty to Mao's thoughts and deeds and are proclaiming anti-Sovietism and militarism as their long-term, programmatic aim,"46 Aleksandrov made his main point:

One cannot help marveling at the astonishing myopia of certain Western figures who are so blinded by anticommunist prejudice that they fail to notice how im- mensely dangerous the Maoist policy is to their own peoples.

The claptrap about "Soviet hegemonism" is meant to justify China's enormous military expenditures and distract the attention of the international public from the preparations for Peking's implementation of its expansionist plans. 47

China's new leadership was beyond redemption, it seemed, but the issue of concern was whether the West would join China. It was the forces of imperialism whose nature and goals were in doubt!

China was accused of "making every effort to prevent the normal development of relations among the nuclear powers, ' ,48 provoking territorial dis- putes, slandering the U.S.S.R., and opposing disarmament. Aleksandrov warned that " i f the world thermonuclear holocaust which the Maoists are provoking were to break out, it would cause incalculable disasters for all the earth's peoples without sparing the Chinese people. ''49 Aleksandrov half- heartedly bid the Chinese people stop and think: "Peking's expansionist policy primarily damages the Chinese people," for economic development could be obtained only through peace "primarily with the socialist countries."5~ But Aleksandrov's conclusion gave no hint of any hope for change:

It would be an unforgivable error to adopt a passive position with respect to Pek- ing's reckless policy and to wait until the danger has increased to disastrous dimensions. All those who hold peace d e a r . . , must aim their efforts together at exposing and suppressing the extremely dangerous schemes and actions of Maoist and other provokers o f war. (Emphasis added) 51


As long as the Maoist concepts of self-reliance, stress on ideology at the expense of economic development, and people's war as a substitute for mod- em armaments were in vogue, regardless of how irritating to the U.S.S.R. China might be, China could not pose a credible military threat. By mid-May, self-reliance was being supplemented by an increasing interest in Western technology, and the Daqing Conference had made clear that the government was now stressing economic development to improve Chinese military capabilities, implying the end to the passive people's war doctrine. Moreover, China was openly wooing Western Europe and Japan. Hence, the long-term prospects for the U.S.S.R. were actually more threatening than while Mao was still alive.

In a month that saw Pravda print just one major article on China (aside from the diplomatic note)--an appeal to Westerners "who hold peace dear," Renmin ribao (RMRB) was issuing a steady stream of appeals to European and developing states with one basic message: the U.S.S.R. was the world's most dangerous expansionist power, a power that intended to conquer the world but could be defeated, as Sudan's expulsion of Soviet troops (on May 17) demonstrated. Waving the socialist flag as a cover, the U.S.S.R., as portrayed by China, was exploiting the decline of the West in Africa to increase its influence in order to gain the ability to cut the West 's resource lifeline. 52 Every Soviet policy from refusal to return the four southernmost Kuril Islands (the "Northern Territories") to Japan to the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province was part of a Soviet drive for world hegemony, according to the Chinese. 53

On May 19, just five days after Aleksandrov's article was published, the U.S.S.R. sent China a formal note protesting the "campaign, hostile to the Soviet Un ion . . . mounted by the propaganda bodies and officials at all levels. ''54 Between May 14 and 19 no authoritative article had appeared in RMRB criticizing the U.S.S.R., nor did the Soviet note refer to any specific Chinese statement or act. Timing suggests the note and Aleksandrov's article should be seen together, as a double-barrelled blast against the Chinese. Moreover, the note's contents closely paralleled those of Aleksandrov's article. Each began by noting the anti-Soviet campaign but stressed that the real problem was the danger to "all mankind" of exacerbating tensions. Each stressed that it was Chinese cooperation with reactionary forces in the West that was of concern:

[Aleksandrov]: Certain Western figures.., blinded by anti-communist prejudice.55

[Note]: Reactionary circles of the imperialist states. 56

[Aleksandrov]: Western circles [that] cheer themselves with the illusion that they will be able to divert Peking's expansion away from themselves and in somebody else's direction.., are forgetting the bitter lessons of recent history. 57

[Note]: Those who call for the organization of a crusade against the Soviet Union should not forget how similar marches against our country ended in the past. 58

MILLS 53

Read together, the two pieces had a very serious tone. Aleksandrov, it will be recalled, concluded that taking a "passive position" toward China "until the danger has increased to disastrous dimensions" would be "unforgivable ." The note's conclusion spelled out Aleksandrov's implications that a

policy geared to aggravate international tensions that endangers all mankind.., is exactly where reactionary circles of the imperialist states are heading. The organiz- ers of the campaign in China, which is hostile to the Soviet Union and dangerous to world peace, are actually in concert with them. The Government of the USSR... warned in all seriousness that the Chinese leaders are assuming a great responsibility to their people for the consequences of continuing this campaign39

CHINA'S RESPONSE

On May 30, the RMRB commentator "responded" with the most prominent attack on the U.S.S.R. of the month, a front-page article in which Afri- cans were called upon to unite to resist Soviet aggression. But "commentator" was only giving the preface. The real verbal response ~~ came during June 6 and 7, with the visit of President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri of the Sudan. Numayri, who had expelled Soviet military advisers on May 17, was treated as a hero, for he demonstrated the feasibility of precisely what the Chinese were advocating: the defeating by Third World states of Soviet efforts to increase their influence.

RMRB's welcoming editorial ~1 extolled the Sudan for having "smashed the Soviet subversive plot" and "exposed Soviet expansionist ambitions and ag- gressive arrogance in Africa." Not only was the editorial larger and more prominently located than most RMRB editorials welcoming foreign guests (covering the whole top of page l), but the text referred to the U.S.S.R. by name repeatedly instead of merely making the pro forma references to "opposing imperialism, colonialism, and hegemony." Moreover, at times Sudan seemed almost forgotten as the editorial reviewed the recent series of events in Zaire, Djibouti, and Egypt to illustrate the development of a "united front against Soviet hegemony."

Any suspicions that China was using Numayri 's visit for its own purposes were confirmed the next day by Vice-Premier Li Xiannian's welcoming speech. Li began with the standard attacks on imperialism and hegemony but ended his speech with an extra statement not usually found in speeches welcoming foreign guests. The lack of relevance of Li's comments to Sudan was matched only by the pointedness of their relevance to Sino-Soviet polemics:

When our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao passed away, social-imperialism employed both soft and tough tactics against us. On the one hand, by deliberate gestures, it feigned willingness to improve relations with us; on the other hand, it slandered that our foreign policy had been "greatly discredited" in the vain hope that we would change the revolutionary line and policies which Chairman Mao laid down for us. Exasperated at being rebuffed and disillusioned, it has not thrown


away its mask and revealed its true colours by hurling vicious slanders and curses at China. Delivering a diplomatic note, making public speeches and publishing articles, it rabidly abuses China as so-called dangerous adventurism, and extends to state relations the differences on matters of principle between the two sides. But whatever tactics social-imperialism uses will prove futile. Who does it think will be cowed by such tactics?! 6z

The Soviet challenge, issued through an Aleksandrov statement and a diplomatic note, was publicly accepted in a speech purportedly made to welcome a Third World guest. But the language of the Soviet challenge and the fact that it was made publicly (as opposed to the common Soviet procedure of sending a private communication to the Chinese) suggest that the Russians expected no less. The Kremlin appears primarily to have been talking to the West, and China's vociferous response just played into their hands.

R M R B made it clear that China would in fact not "be cowed" with authoritative attacks on the U.S.S.R. averaging an extraordinary one every two days for the rest of the month, na The old themes remained. China called on the Third World to resist the superpowers, saying self-reliance was the only road to victory for the Arabs and extolling Egypt and Sudan for setting back the U.S.S.R. n4 Europe was warned against detente, which was described as a cover for military threat, political subversion, and economic infiltration, n5 In a show of Maoist bravado, nuclear weapons were once against termed "paper tigers.' ,n6

New themes, weaving daily events into the broad fabric of anti-Sovietism, were also taken up. The U.S.S.R. was attacked for practicing maritime hegemony in a commentary on the UN maritime law debate, ~7 for example. But the main new issue was the Soviet draft constitution, which seemed to provoke a reintroduction of old ideological issues into a debate that had been focusing on realpolitik. Power, however, remained the bottom line. Accord- ing to a Xinhua commentary, the Soviet draft constitution of June 4 "codifie[d] into fundamental law the fascist dictatorship of the bureaucratic- monopoly capitalists and their social-imperialist policies." Since "every state is the dictatorship of a definite class," the Soviet "state of the whole people" was by definition a fraud. 68 The U.S.S.R. was described as characterized by class oppression and sharpening class antagonisms under a government whose economic reforms had "the sole purpose of production to seek maximum profits for the bureaucratic-monopoly capitalist class, strengthen its fascist rule and serve its drive for world hegemony. ''69 Ideological errors mattered because of their foreign policy consequences, in this case "aggression, expansion, intervention and subversion."7~

A major article appeared on June 16. 71 Lengthy, (a third of a page), it ran on page 1, under the largest headline of any foreign policy article that month, and was by Commentator--roughly the Chinese equivalent of I. Aleksan- drov. 72 Textual distinctions from other June articles on the U.S.S.R. were as marked as format distinctions.

MILLS 55

The commentary was designed to provide a more formal and prominent response to Aleksandrov and the Soviet note than the single paragraph in Li Xiannian's June 6 speech. The relatively unemotional and general calls for Third World unity versus outside interference and the focusing on distant events such as those in Zaire and Djibouti, elements that characterized many of the articles in June, were replaced by vitriolic and pointed criticisms of So- viet acts described as directly anti-Chinese. When China did not respond to the Soviet "pretense of willingness to improve relations" after Mao's death, "with their illusions shattered and their intrigues frustrated, the Soviet re- visionists' disgusting smile faded and they viciously slandered, cursed and attacked China with redoubled venom." But the U.S.S.R., Commentator concluded, could not "shake the Chinese people's resolve to carry through firmly to the end the struggle against Soviet modern revisionism. ,,7a Aleksan- drov had his answer.

The two articles show considerable similarity. Aleksandrov complained of the "increasingly unbridled anti-Soviet campaign" and accused Hua and Ye of having "maliciously slandered the U.S.S.R." Commentator referred to Soviet speeches "unscrupulously slandering, maligning, and abusing China." Aleksandrov accused China of expansionism, subversion, and exacerbating tensions. Commentator accused the U. S.S.R. of"global expansionism." Aleksandrov accused China of "pushing the world toward war;" Commentator said the U.S.S.R. was "preparing in every way to unleash a new world war." Yet a difference existed. Whereas Aleksandrov seemed primarily to be addressing the West, Commentator, writing before Deng Xiaoping had regained power and before real progress had begun to occur in Sino-American relations, made no implication that China was looking any- where for support. China did not have the stength to threaten, as Aleksandrov did in demanding suppression of Maoist schemes, but it nevertheless prom- ised to struggle "to the end" without alluding to the possibility of cooperation with "less reactionary forces" in the West. That possibility was of course ob- vious to all, given the recent string of Western delegations that had visited China, but the verbal distinction nevertheless remained.

In sum, the first two months after resumption of full-scale public Sino- Soviet debate saw a large number of major attacks published in RMRB and

Pravda. Most of these articles spoke either to specific events or were blanket attacks on the opponent's overall policy. But concealed within them was a genuine debate--beginning with Aleksandrov's implicit invitation to "the least reactionary imperialists," to coin a phrase, to join in suppression of Chinese "warmongering"---coupled with criticism of Chinese propaganda. This was followed almost immediately by the Soviet note to China, officially protesting her propaganda campaign. China responded with simultaneous editorial welcoming Numayri and comments by Li Xiannian refuting the So- viet opener two weeks after the note was delivered. Ten days later, Li's message was more formally repeated. These five items are the crucial initial com-


ponents of the Sino-Soviet debate in Pravda and RMRB following the resumption of full-scale Soviet attacks on China. Despite the fact that responses to specific comments by the other side can be distinguished from other verbal attacks, all the articles on both sides during this period seem to have shared one crucial point in common: for both the Chinese and the Russians, the pri- mary audience seems to have been some third party. For the Chinese, it was probably the Third World; for the Russians, it was the West.

The resumption of full-scale Soviet attacks--signaled by Aleksandrov's May piece--and China's vociferous June response coincided with a number of contextual events that combined with the verbal thrusts across the Amur to mark out the May-June 1977 period as a new stage in Sino-Soviet relations: active Soviet wooing of Vietnam and Laos, full-scale Vietnamese involvement in Laos, the U.S. decision to send Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to China, Deng Xiaoping's return to power, and the new Soviet constitution. After the Ussuri clashes, the Soviet Union had relied on superior military force versus China. The Chinese, unable to respond in kind, had used words to balance the Red Army. When Mao died, the Soviet Union tried a new tack--verbal restraint. China demanded substantive concessions as the pre- condition to negotiations, increased its own verbal attacks, and began making serious overtures to Japan and the West. By May the U.S.S.R. had lost hope of rapprochement with China in the near future and had rejoined the propaganda war, making a full-scale effort, like the Chinese, to persuade third parties to join it against its opponent across the Amur. As far as Sino-Soviet relations were concerned, the post-Mao era may be said to have begun in May 1977.

CONCLUSION: THE PRICE OF PROPAGANDA

Although the substance of 1977 events differs greatly from that of mid- 1984, a similar lesson emerges from each period bilateral policy can all too easily fall victim to other foreign policy priorities. Mutually contradictory foreign policy goals prejudiced efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations in both periods. In 1977 the Soviet Union could not easily practice rhetorical restraint toward China and simultaneously warn the West against providing military aid. Ultimately, the latter goal won out, as shown by Aleksandrov's May 1977 reference to Western myopia in the face of a perceived "Maoist" threat to world peace. Similarly, Soviet efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations in 1984 were set back by postponement of Arkhipov's trip and Cher- nenko's "resolute condemnation ''74 of Chinese military moves against Viet- nam. And Radio Moscow recently warned that U.S. nuclear aid to China might "heighten Beijing's implacability. ''75

Two Chinese foreign policy goals apparent in 1977 continue to hinder the normalization of Sino-Soviet ties: the need for economic and technical aid from the West and the desire for world status as leader of the Third World.

MILLS 57

Public criticism of the U.S.S.R. served both these goals by enabling Beijing to pose as a stalwart prospective Western ally and as defender of the Third World without expending limited economic or military power. Li Xiannian's bravado in proclaiming that China could not be cowed by the U.S.S.R. and the hero's welcome Beijing gave Numayri after he expelled Soviet troops come to mind from 1977. Contemporary Chinese commentary is filled with similar references, such as RMRB's August statement that "the Chinese people fully support" Pakistan against Soviet hegemony."76 Chinese publicity of its fighting with Vietnam this spring no doubt sent a signal of support to Thailand, which had clashed with Vietnam shortly before, but also embarras- sed the Kremlin, which was planning the highest-level delegation to China in many years.

The resulting bitterness is clearly apparent in propaganda on both sides. Aleksandrov's 1977 complaint of an "increasingly unbridled anti-Soviet campaign" is echoed in Beijing Review's July 1984 charge of an "escalating anti-Chinese propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union ''77 and Pravda's charge of a rise in the "hostile nature" of Chinese commentary on the U.S.S.R. the same month. 78

Chinese tactics vis-h-vis the superpowers have repeatedly shifted since Mao's death. Initial coolness toward each gave way in 1979 to a Sino-Ameri- can honeymoon combined with an anti-Soviet united front encompassing the West. This, in turn, was soon replaced by a more-balanced appraisal recog- nizing both the limits on Sino-American cooperation and the utility of lessen- ing Sino-Soviet tensions.

Yet certain strands of continuity that hold the period together conceptually are beginning to appear. One is the repeated undermining by broader issues of Sino-Soviet initiatives to improve bilateral ties. Soviet rhetorical restraint in 1977 contradicted Soviet desires to persuade the West and Third World countries not to improve ties with China; Chinese willingness to talk to the Soviets in 1979 foundered on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Moscow postponed high-level economic talks after the Reagan visit and border fighting between China and Moscow's Vietnamese ally in the spring of 1984. The question is not so much whether Beijing and Moscow want improved ties. Logic and, from the U.S. perspective, caution would suggest that we assume this desire always exists alongside other priorities. In both 1977 and 1984 such desires existed, and a period of leadership transition seemed to facilitate the fielding of new initiatives, yet the initiatives foundered.

The question is whether Sino-Soviet normalization can be achieved in spite of the enduring obstacles erected by broader foreign policy considerations. In part the problem is one of higher priorities, as with Beijing's sacrificing of its ties with Moscow in order to gain favor elsewhere by means of its propaganda. At other times, unforeseen issues arise in the international system from which bilateral ties cannot be isolated, as with the collapse of government control in Afghanistan, which led to the Soviet invasion. Whether be-


cause o f s imple failure to insulate S ino-Sovie t relat ions f rom events e lsewhere

or because o f a calculated use o f public cr i t ic ism to further other goals , out-

breaks o f public po lemics concern ing internat ional issues have repeatedly un-

de rmined efforts to improve bilateral ties. This pattern, most recently seen in

May and June 1984, suggests that as long as Bei j ing and M o s c o w rely on

propaganda to further fore ign pol icy goals , their bilateral relat ions will remain

unstable.

N O T E S

1. Xinhua (September 16, 1983), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report- China (FBIS-CH1), (Washington, D.C. :Dept. of Commerce), (September 16, 1983), p. C1.

2. Xinhua (February 10, 1984), inFBIS-CHI (February 13, 1984), p. C5; Pravda (February 11, 1984) in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-USSR (FBIS-SOV), (February 13, 1984), p. B1; Radio Moscow in Mandarin (March 3, 1984) in FBIS-SOV (March 5, 1984), p. B1.

3. Xinhua (March 2, 1984), in FBIS-CHI (March 2, 1984), p. C1. 4. Premier Zhao visited the United States in January, 1984; President Reagan visited China in

April; Minister of Defense Zhang Aiping visited the U.S. in June; Navy Secretary Lehman visited China in August.

5. Sino-Vietnamese border fighting was reported by both sides throughout April. Xinhua and TASS both announced postponement of Arkhipov's visit on May 9. See FBIS-SOV (May 9, 1984), p. B1.

6. Mikhail Suslov, "The Struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Unity of the International Communist Movement," in his report to the February 14, 1964, Com- munist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] Central Committee [CC] plenum, as quoted in John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 57.

7. Publisher's preface to Statements by Khrushchev, vol. 5 (Beijing: World Culture Press, 1965), as quoted in Gittings, p. 63.

8. Anna Louise Strong, "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung," Amerasia 6 (June 1947), p. 161. 9. "On the Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily,

hereafterRMRB] (April 5, 1956), as quoted in Robert Bowie and John Fairbank, eds., Com- munist China 1965-1959. Policy Documents with Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 150-151.

10. "Idled" is a relative term. The FBIS-SOV Index for January-March 1977 listed over half a column of "commentaries and polemics" in Soviet media on China--20 articles. But for July-September 1977, 2.5 columns were listed. Pravda output on China is also illustrative. From August through October 1976 the output was 14-19 articles a month; from November 1976 through March 1977 the output was 4-8 articles a month; from April through June 1977 output was back at the former level, at 16-21 articles a month. Data from Index to Pravda (Columbus, Ohio: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1976, 1977). For data on the extent of coverage of China in the Soviet military paper Krasnaia zvezda [Red Star], see my "Comparing Soviet Civilian and Military Views of China," The Korean Journal of lnternational Studies (summer 1984), p. 291.

11. E.g., see the three harsh Chinese attacks on the U.S.S.R. in FBIS-CH1 (December 28, 1976), pp. A7-A10; (February 23, 1977), pp. A3-A6; (February 9, 1977), pp. A5-A6.

12. Opasnyi kurs (Dangerous Course), vol. 8 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), p. 2. 13. O.B. Rakhmanin, "Druzhba sovetskogo i kitaiskogo narodov imeet svoyu istoriyu i tradit-

sii" (Friendship of the Soviet and Chinese People Has Its History and Tradition), Opasnyi kurs, pp. 26-46.

14. M. Galin, "Chto proiskhodit v Kitaye" (What Is Happening in China), pp. 132-144, and I. Aleksandrov, "Pekin: kurs na sryv mezhdunarodnoi razryadki pod prikrytiyem an- tisovetizma" (Peking: A Course Toward Wrecking International Detente Under the Guise of Anti-Sovietism), pp. 189-198 in Opasny_i kurs, vol. 8.

MILLS 59

15. O.B. Rakhmanin, "Druzhba sovetskogo i kitaiskogo narodov imeet svoyu istoriyu i tradit- sii" (Friendship of the Soviet and Chinese People Has Its History and Tradition), Opasnyi kurs, vol. 8, pp. 26-46.

16. Ibid., p. 26. 17. Ibid., p. 26. 18. Ibid., p. 39. 19. Ibid., p. 46. 20. Peking Review (PR) (April 22, 1977), p. 5. 21. Hua Guofeng, "Continue the Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the

End," PR 19 (May 6, 1977), p. 15. 22. Ibid., p. 15. 23. Ibid., p. 26. 24. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong xuanji (The Selected Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 5 (Beijing: Re-

nmin Dabanshi, 1977), p. 5. 25. Committee for Editing and Publishing Chairman Mao Tsetung's Works, the CC of the CCP,

"Introducing Volume 5 of the Selected Works ofMao Tsetung," PR 17 (April 22, 1977), p. 16.

26. Ibid., p. 27. 27. Ibid., p. 27. 28. Editorial committee, p. 28; volume 5, p. 345. 29. Editorial committee, p. 27. 30. "Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward the Party's Tradition" and "Speech at the Sec-

ond Plenary Session of the 8th CC of the Communist Party of China," vol. 5, p. 293-304 and 323-319.

31. Editorial committee, p. 23. 32. On the issues involved in these meetings, see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict,

1956-61 (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 145-151. 33. Mao, p. 496-500. The Moscow Celebration speech is in Bowie, pp. 389-393; the Moscow

speech is in RMRB (November 20, 1957). Both are discussed in Zagoria, pp. 146-7. 34. Bowie, p. 390. 35. Ibid., p. 391. 36. Quoted from Zagoria, p. 146. 37. Quoted from Zagoria, p. 146. 38. Xinhua (April 22, 1977) in FBIS-CH1 (April 22, 1977), p. E3. 39. Heilongjiang radio (May 11, 1977), inFBIS-CHI (May 13, 1977), p. LI. Such extreme at-

tacks on the U.S.S.R. in a domestic conference whose proceedings hardly can be seen as targeted primarily at the West or the Third World indicate that internal politics also constitute a partial explanation for China's anti-Soviet stance. That this essay focuses on the effect of broad foreign policy considerations on bilateral ties should therefore not be taken as a denial of the significance of the domestic factor as an additional explanatory variable.

40. Xinhua (May 12, 1977), inFBIS-CHI (May 13, 1977), p. E l l . 41. M. Galin, "Chto proiskhodit v Kitaye" (What Is Happening in China) in Opasnyi kurs, vol.

8, p. 141, reprinted fromNovoye vremya (New Times) (April 17, 1977, pp. 12-15. 42. Three articles by Aleksandrov are listed in Index to Pravda for 1976, for example. These

were not published in Opasnyi kurs, apparently because the series omitted 1976 from its coverage. Both of Aleksandrov's 1977 articles were included in volume 8.

43. Pravda (May 14, 1977), pp. 4-5, inFBIS-SOV (May 16, 1977), pp. C1-6. 44. Pravda (May 14, 1977), inFBIS.SOV (May 16, 1977), p. C1. 45. Ibid., p. C1. 46. Ibid., p. C1. 47. Ibid., p. C2. 48. Ibid., p. C5. 49. Ibid., p. C6 50. Ibid., p. C6. 51. Ibid., p. C6. 52. RMRB (May 5, 1977), p. 6. 53. RMRB commentaries [pinglun] (May 8, 1977), p. 6; (May 23, 1977), p. 5. Xinhua com-

mentaries [shuping] (May 20, 1977), p. 6; (May 24, 1977), p. 6.


65. RMRB (June 19, 66. RMRB (June 21, 67. RMRB (June 15, 68. RMRB (June 13,

PR 25 (June 17, 69. Ibid., p. 14. 70. Ibid., p. 15.

54. TASS (May 26, 1977), inFBIS-SOV (May 26, 1977), p. C1. 55. Pravda (May 14, 1977), in FBIS-SOV (May 16, 1977), p. C2. 56. TASS (May 26, 1977), in FBIS-SOV (May 26, 1977), p. C2. 57. Pravda (May 14, 1977), in FBIS-SOV (May 16, 1977), p. C2. 58. TASS (May 26, 1977), in FBIS-SOV (May 26, 1977), p. C2. 59. Ibid., p. C2. 60. Recall that behavior is not being tested here, so the extent to which press commentary can be

considered equivalent to the real Chinese response to the Soviet resumption of full-scale attacks cannot be determined here. Although rhetoric in the open media may at times reveal the true state of bilateral ties, media criticism of an opponent may mask less negative interactions carried out through secret diplomatic means. For a discussion of the hypothesis that Chinese media criticism of the U.S.S.R. has been utilized to raise Beijing's status in the Third World and the West, see my "Sino-Soviet Interactions, May 1977-June 1980," Phd. diss., Univer- sity of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1981), esp. pp. 363-365. For a discussion of the hypothesis that differences between the views of China in Pravda and the military daily Krasnaia zvezda result from the differences in the audiences these papers are targeted at, see my "Comparing Soviet Civilian and Military Views of China," pp. 304-5.

61. RMRB (June 6, 1977), p. 1. 62. RMRB (June 7, 1977), p. 2; the quote is from "Li Hsien-nien Sternly Denounces Social-Im-

perialism," PR 24 (june 10, 1977), p. 5. 63. As opposed to one every five days during August-November 1977, for example. 64. RMRB (June 7, 1977), p. 6; (June 8, 1977), p. 6; (June 16, 1977), p. 1; (June 20, 1977), p. 1;

(June 24, 1977), p. 6; (June 26, 1977), p. 1. 1977), p. 6. 1977), p. 6. 1977). 1977); quoted from "Reactionary Essence of New Soviet Constitution," 1977), p. 13.

71. RMRB (June 16, 1977), p. 1, "Watch How They Are Going to Act," PR 26 (June 24, 1977), pp. 13-15.

72. "Commentator" may write about any issue, not just foreign relations, but appears to serve a similar role--as the unofficial voice of the Politburo.

73. PR 26 (June 24, 1977), p. 15. 74. Chernenko's comments provoked a heated Chinese response, beginning with Xinhua the next

day (inFBIS-CHI, p. C1). Chernenko's comments were reported by Moscow radio (June 11, 1984, in FBIS-SOV [June 12, 1984], p. El-2).

75. Moscow radio (june 25, 1984), inFBIS-SOV (june 26, 1984), p. B1. 76. RMRB (August 18, 1984), p. 6. 77. PR (now renamed Beijing Review) 28 (july 1984), p. 12. 78. Pravda (July 19, 1984), p. 5, inFBIS-SOV (July 19, 1984), p. BI.