the presidency of religious affairs’ relationship with religious groups (sects/sufi orders) in...

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The Presidency of Religious Affairs’ Relationship with Religious Groups (Sects/Sufi Orders) in Turkey

Sönmez Kutlu

Ankara University Ankara, Turkey

T

he PRA is an institution that was established in order to provide religious services under the purview of general Turkish administrative state services. It is neither a sacred nor sanctified institution. Its aim is

to teach religious truth to the public, protect secularism, keep religion outside the realm of politics, control religious duties without giving monopoly to any religious groups, strengthen the nation state and protect religion from being exploited. Some scholars studying this subject have argued that the main goal in the establishment of the PRA was to secure state control of religion (Islam) and religious officials rather than protect them, on the one hand, and to ensure the protection of secularism on the other.

1

Until the 1960s, the PRA’s objectivity and unbiased approach were undisputed. We know that studies carried out under the control of the PRA on hadith and Qur

’a

nic commentary were based on the principles of a specific Islamic sect, the Sunni tradition, and especially Hanafite principles.

2

Even this did not result in accusations of bias towards Sunnism. The famous Qur

’a

nic commentary

Hak Dini Kur

”

a

n Dili

by Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır and

Tecrid-i Sarih

(a hadith commentary) have been accepted as important works and never regarded as biased Sunni works. In the legislation after the

coup d’état

in 1960, the neutrality of the PRA, for the first time in its history, was put into question.

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In addition, some argued that “religious and sectarian services could be regarded as a public service”

3

and, accordingly, sectarian and religious units in the PRA representing different religious denominations needed to be established. The reason for this discussion was primarily the idea that the PRA could not keep its neutrality. This neutrality was based on the Islamic principles of belief, worship and moral principles — which were held long before the emergence of various Islamic sects in Turkish society. Yet, in the report prepared by the committee, the statement “Turkish-Shiite religious needs also must be considered as public service” may be understood to mean that the demands of non-Sunni groups were considered to be properly part of public service as well. Nevertheless, whether this statement includes Alawi-Baktashis and whether their demands were seen as under the purview of public service is not clear, because, until that time, Alawi-Baktashis had been observing their religous duties by following Hanafi rites. In fact, after the transition to democracy, the PRA did not properly meet the needs of either Alawis or Sunnites or any other religious groups.

4

The first serious demand for religious representation, in fact, pertained to Alawism and Baktashism, which are Sufi orders and not related to Sunni groups. In 1963, a proposal for the establishment of “the Directory of Relgious Sects” within the PRA was suggested but not accepted on the grounds that this could be understood as “officially paving the way of secterianism.”

5

Many political scientists and scholars of law draw attention to the possible negative results of giving priority to a certain group. In a symposium held by Cem Vakfı (Cem Faoundation), Orhan Aldıkaçtı, the chief architect of 1982 Constitution, announced that this proposal was rejected on the grounds of “national integrity.”

6

These proposals, which would have made the PRA an institution representing various religious groups and sects, were rejected. Therefore, they have no effect on the regulations of the PRA. To protect the PRA from becoming an institution over which various religious groups and Sufi orders tried to take control, Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution lays out the principles that the PRA needs to follow: “The PRA, which is considered under the general administration, in line with secular principles, is an institution not belonging to any political affiliations, aims social solidarity and integrations and follows the regulations prescribed in the law.”

With this law, the PRA was given a new role, that is, to contribute to national security. With the influence of liberalism at the end of the 1980s, demands on the state in general and the PRA in particular increased and discussion of the problems of representation intensified. Sunni sects, religious groups and Sufi orders did not criticize the neutrality of the PRA but rather the PRA’s opposition to religious groups. In fact, some religious groups, by

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accusing the PRA of preventing the activities of their members, actually tried to widen their sphere of activities.

Alawi political and religious demands increased after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. There were other reasons for this intensification, including increasing Shi

‘

ite activities in Alawi circles, the activities of missionaries, the decrease of Marxist influence on Alawi circles, the re-discovery of Alawi identity, etc. So, following the article “to contribute national securty and integrity,” the PRA tried to find ways of meeting the demands of the Alawis. During the Turkish Republic, the number of mosques increased in regions where Alawis lived, as was the case in Sunni circles. After the 1980 military coup, the building of Alawi mosques was encouraged and financially supported. The PRA, whose religious services are mosque-oriented, did not seriously attempt to recognize the Alawis. It appointed imams with scant knowledge about the Alawis to the villages where there were no imams. People of these villages, in which there had been no mosque before, felt the PRA did not try to find alternative ways to serve their particular needs.

There was no mention of Alawism or Baktashism in Friday sermons and religious publications until the end of the 1980’s. On the other hand, there was almost no serious publication on these subjects at all. The first serious dialogue between the PRA and the Alawis was in the 1990’s, when M. Sait Yazıcıoglu was the president of the PRA. The subject of Alawism headlined the official periodical of the PRA,

Diyanet Dergisi

, XIII, January 1992. In this issue, the Alawi Dede (an Alawi religious functionary), and Alawite and non-Alawite academicians put forward their ideas. But the impetus for this special issue was not issues of freedom of speech and belief, but rather the concept of security and the integrity of society. After the publication of this special issue, the PRA published a few books related directly or indirectly to Alawism. Some Alawis welcomed these attempts but the majority considered them a “Sunniization attempt.” Meanwhile, in the 1990’s in Turkey and abroad, the Alawis established foundations, associations and federations. They reorganized under the name Cemevi. The establishment of Cemevis (whose religious and legal status was controversial) was the first major point of conflict between the PRA and the Alawis. The PRA’s regulation that Cemevi was not a general place of worship became the grounds for the decision of some municipalities not to give the building sites arranged for the places of worship to Cemevi. With the new regulations and the process of accession talks with the European Union, there has been heated ongoing debate.

Discussions about PRA-Alawis relations, which have been influenced by the political atmosphere in Turkey, were linked to discussions of secularism. The issues were the legitimacy of the PRA in a secular system; PRA’s relation to sects and Sufi orders (and its seeming indifference to some of them); the

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representation of the Alawi-Baktashis in the ranks of the PRA; the allocation of funds to the Alawis from the PRA budget; the position of the Cemevis, etc. Several books, reports and surveys were published and symposiums held. So, the question of how the PRA was to become a democratic and civilian organization, whether religious services would be transferred to religious movements and groups, and whether these demands were even realistic were discussed.

The Higher Committee of Religious Affairs, the highest decision and consultation authority in Turkey (established in 1965), continued its activities after the 1980s. This clearly contradicts with the “neutrality” requirement of the PRA. Religious publications from the official periodical of the PRA

Diyanet Dergisi

, scientific and non-scientific, were subject to the control of this committee. Only after examining “whether these works are in accordance with the traditional Sunnite understanding” has the publication has been allowed. The PRA is considered an organization that strictly follows a traditional Sunni understanding of Islam, for the verditcs and opinions of the Higher Committee were based on contingent and historical experiences and not on the principles prescribed in the Qur

’a

n and in accord with the spirit of the modern age.

7

The committee’s answers to the question asked by an Alawi Dede in accordance with the traditional Sunni-Shi

’

i binary opposition is a good example of this point. When asked why temporary marriage (

mut

”

a nikahı

) is not allowed, the committee answered using the following historical Sunni reasoning, disregarding the fact that this question was asked by an Alawi and that for him, there are totally different political and sociological reasons behind his defense of the legitimacy of temporal marriage.

8

Beginning with the Safawids and continuing through the modern period, the translations of Shi

‘

ite works into Turkish meant the continuation of the growing influence of Shi

‘

ism on Alawism. Questions from people following diffferent religious affiliations can only be properly answered by those who specialize in the history of the various sects and Sufi orders. Unfortunately, there are few specialists on these issues on the committee. Surveys indicate that the imams appointed to the Alawi villages still do not have adequate knowledge about Alawism and Baktashism because of inadequate education in religious high schools and divinity schools. (The subject of Alawism was finally included in the curriculum of the religious high schools in 2007.) Until very recently, graduates of these schools were not educated about Alawism either before their appointment or after. The result has been a loss of confidence in these appointed imams in Alawi villages. Therefore, to meet their demands, the Alawis tried to find alternative ways to meet their needs. This led to the establishment of new institutions claiming to be alternatives to the mosque and the PRA.

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“The PRA’s relationship with religious groups” in general and “PRA-Alawis relations” and “PRA-Jafaris relations” in particular are the major issues being discussed recently. Regardless of which sect, group or Sufi order they belong to, everybody’s expectation, including Alawi-Baktashis from the PRA, is that religious services of good quality be provided to meet their demands. The services the PRA provides today are still insufficent in this regard. Although there are some legal reasons for this, the main reason is that the PRA was organized years ago and it is impossible to expect such an organization to provide services to 70 million people. Today, religious services are diverse and different ways of communcations have emerged. So, it is a mistake to reduce PRA-Alawis relations to the issue of the latter’s representation in the ranks of the PRA. The main problem is not “the issue of the representation of the Laws in the PRA but rather the fact that the PRA, due to its inadequate units and services and the lack of well-educated religious officials to be appointed in Alawi circles, cannot find proper ways of communicating with the Alawis.

Turkey needs radical new legislation to redefine the units under its authority and create new ones as new demands emerge. But priority must be given to the continuing neutrality, autonomy and the freedom of the PRA from any political pressures.

9

This will ensure that Turkey is a properly secular state. There have been attempts, for the sake of secularism, to confine religion to the conscience and private lives of individuals, on the one hand, and to certain designated places on the other. This has so much been the case that secularism, let alone becoming a guarantee of freedom of religion and speech, has turned out instead to be something that limits religious freedom and an ideology leading to the emergence of the clergy. As long as religion and secularism are not free of conflict, as long as the legal system continues to bypass politics and as long as mutual undesrtanding in society is not realized, it is impossible to find solutions to the problems in the relations of the state with religion. Radical legislative changes are crucial to free the PRA from political pressure and help it provide different sectors of society with the services that they need. If this fails to happen, we can only expect the emergence of rival PRAs.

Interestingly, the idea that the Alawis must be represented in the PRA is not shared by all Alawis. In fact, all Alawi associations, foundations, and

tekke

(dervish lodges) consider this issue from a different angle. However, every group tries to present their ideas as if they are shared by the majority of Alawis. Their demands are essentially different from the ones we have seen earlier in the establishment of the Republic.

The objective of Alawi criticism of the PRA are attempts to recover “authentic” Alawism, receive religious and other services from the PRA, obtain promises from some political parties for their endeavors, such as supporting

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the building of Cemevi and the allocation to them of a share of the PRA’s national budget, the attempt in some circles to present the Alawis as a counter group against political Islam, and the Alawis desire to be free of the influences of illegal organizations. The fact that basic human rights has recently become an international issue rather than an interior problem is another reason why the Alawis level criticism against the PRA. The PRA in response has made some serious attempts to try to find ways of building mosques and providing services in the regions where the Alawis live. These attempts have been portrayed by the media as evidence that Alawis do have representation in the PRA; this dominates debate around this issue. Alawi demands for formal status recognition from the PRA can be categorized into four groupings:

a. Reorganization of the PRA and Representation of the Alawis therein

This new model has been proposed by Director Izzettin Dogan of the Cem Vakfı (Cem Foundation) along with some others. They claim that the PRA has some fundamental problems with Alawite tradition, thought and even the concept of the secular state, and that it has not fulfilled its state mandate of providing religious services to all the Muslims of Turkey in an equal way. Therefore, they demand that the PRA be a free, autonomous organization not controlled by anyone. They also demand that the PRA needs to be reorganized under the name of the Organization of Religious Services, which would be an umbrella organization encompassing different religious groups in the country. For them, in this new organization, there must be separate units enabling different religious affiliations to be represented. Of course, they want the Alawis to be represented in this new organization.10 However, over the course of time, their discourse has changed. They no longer want to abolish the PRA, which they now recognize as a given reality in the country, but rather demand a reassessment of the situation and the reorganization of the PRA.11

The Cem Vakfı held an international symposium entitled “Din Devlet 3lißkileri ve Türkiye”de Din Hizmetlerinin Yeniden Yapılanması (Religion-State Relations in Turkey and the Reorganization of Religious Services in Turkey) on 26–27 March 1996 to draw attention to the issue of Alawi representation. In this symposium, Dogan proposed that “Not only Alawis, our Sunni brothers, but also our Jewish and Christian brothers, in short everybody in Turkey, must be represented in the ranks of the PRA. Furthermore, these groups must democratically be represented in accordance with their population totally without taking any concept of hierarchy into account, since it is known that there is no hierarchy in religious issuues.”12 When their demand for representation was denied on 27 December 2003, Chairman Dogan established an organization called the “Directory of Alawite-Islamic Religious Services.”13

The Presidency of Religious Affairs’ Relationship with Religious Groups

© 2008 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2008 Hartford Seminary. 255

However, Alawi organizations in general and The Confederation of Alawi Unions in Europe in particular rejected such an initiative.14

b. The Abolition of the PRAThe majority of Alawi organizations both in Turkey and in Europe support

this idea. These include: Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri (Pir Sultan Abdal Associations), Hacı Bektaß Veli Dernekleri (The Associations of Hacı Baktaß Veli), The circle of The Foundation of Samah Culture, The Dervish Lodge of Karaca Ahmet and Kurdish Alawi Cultures.15 For these groups, “the PRA is an institution against the concept of secularism adopted by the state. As long as this sitution continues, the claim that the Turkish state is secular is baseless. What needs to be done is to abolish the PRA.”16 Veliyyiddin Ulusoy of the Dedegan Branch (also called Celebi or Ulusoys — subgroups of Haci Bektash Wali Lodge) says that “Alawis have nothing to do with the PRA. It is an institution founded by the state and follows the Sunnite approach. For me, every religious group must be given the right to establish their own institution and finance them. The state has to stop supporting the PRA. We do not need the PRA. Every group can solve its problems. The state can only be the arbitrator.”17

c. Keep the PRA and let the Alawis be representedThis segment supports the idea of Alawi representation by suggesting the

appointment of an elderly Dede in the PRA and also the appointment of a Dede in the Office of the Mufti in the cities and towns.18

d. The Demand for the Establishment of an Alawite Directory of Religious Affairs

According to supporters of this idea, the Alawite Directory of Religious Affairs must be autonomous and, as far as financial issues are concerned, must be under the control of the state. Furthermore, the funds for this Directory must come from the national budget.19

The last two positions are only ideas of some specific individuals.In the 1990’s, the Alawi-Baktashis in rural areas were confused about the

issue of PRA representation. There were even different opinions among male and female residents in the same villages.20 With the welcoming of the Cemevis in the cities and villages, the situation seems to be changing. In a 2005 sociological survey analyzing “The Problem of the Representation of the Alawis in the PRA,” 74% of Alawis want to be represented and provided with religious services while 26% of them reject representation and religious services.”21 Although most Alawi-Baktashis want to be represented in the PRA, national and international laws do not allow the representation of the Sufi orders and sects (especially the Alawi) in the PRA.22

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Three crucial issues for the Alawis arise in their discussions: First, what is Alawism? Secondly, what kind of status should the Alawis have within in the ranks of the PRA? Thirdly, who will represent the Alawis?

The first and second questions are related to the essence of Alawism and Baktashism. For some researchers, Alawism-Baktashism is a religion while for others it is only a sect within Islam. Some claim that it is a secular democratic and national belief system or a Sufi order. There are also some scholars who claim that it is the Turkish way of understanding Islam or life. Sociological research shows that even those who define themselves as Alawi have difficulty defining what Alawism is.

The question of who will represent the Alawis is also problematic. Today, there are various Alawi-Baktashi groups, such as the Ocakzade Dedeler branch, the Dedegan (Celebiler) branch, the Babagan (Babalar) branch and then there are those who do not follow any religious authority. The main problem regarding who will represent the Alawis is the role Alawi foundations and associations organized in Europe will be treated, because some of these groups define Alawism as Alawism without Ali or as non-Islamic religion. For others, Alawism is equal to Marxism, or is the religion of the Kurds. There are also some groups who claim that real Alawism is the Alawism of Ahl al-Bayt (the House of the Prophet), namely Shi‘ism. They see themselves as the sole representatives of Alawism. It seems that there are totally different, sometimes conflicting, perceptions of Alawism. Given these different and opponent Alawi subgroups, Alawi representation in the PRA by one single group or person seems to be impossible.

The uncertainty about the religious, social and legal status of the Cemevis, the newly emergent places of worship, is another obstacle to solving the problem of Alawi representation in the PRA. From a religious point of view, some Alawi-Baktashis point out that they are not alternatives to mosques but are rather cultural centers23 while others claim, by distorting historical facts, that Cemevis are alternative places of worship. On the other hand, there are some who say that Alawism is a separate religion that has nothing to do with Islam and Cemevis are the places of worship for this religion. Given all this, the question of their status is significant. Giving them the status of Dervish Lodges means opposing the Laws of the Revolution. Before doing this, all other Dervish Lodges need to be legalized, because for the time being, Cemevis are opened under the Laws of Foundations and Associations. According these present laws, the PRA cannot endorse or assist the Cemevis and appoint Dedes, since it has no authority to do that. Even if the PRA is granted such an authority, the extent to which the PRA can actually control them is questionable. To see Alawism as a separate religion and Cemevis as a place of worship of this religion, different issues need to be discussed out of the context of PRA-Alawis relations.



As was the case in 1960, Alawis today are not in agreement on their demand for representation. In the 1990’s, they demanded everthing from the PRA without knowing whether the PRA could legally act. New research indicates that Alawis in rural areas are more concerned with religious issues, that their demands are realistic and that what they mainly demand from the PRA are more religious services. These services would include educating religious functionaries to lead religious ceremonies, building Cemevi, exempting them from paying electricity and water bills, sharing from the budget allocated for religious services, the establishment of 30% permanent staff positions, organizing Ahl Bayt celebrations for 10–15 days in Muharram and the teaching of Alawism in religious sermons.24

To be clear, Alawis currently benefit from the services of mosque functionaries, such as for funeral services, marriage ceremonies, and reciatation of the Qur’an. Yet, with the institutionalizing of the Cemevis, it seems that funeral services will be carried out in the Cemevi rather than in the mosque. As for the building of the Cemevi, it is well known that the PRA has no duty to build either mosque or Cemevi. It is the people who build mosques. Following the law, PRA has the responsibility for appointing imams and controlling these mosques. The demand for 30% of the budget is not realistic. For appointments to religious posts, the certificate of religious high schools and divinity schools is required. Anybody with these certificates can apply for a job in the PRA subject to passing the exam. PRA officials have stated on various occasions that several Alawis are serving in the different units of the PRA.

Sociological studies carried out in the past and today clearly indicate that the Alawi-Baktashis benefit from the services of the PRA, though not as much as the Sunnis do.25 In public opinion polls about to what extent Alawis benefit from the services of the PRA, it is pointed out that mosque oriented religiosity both in Sunni and Alawi circles has decreased. Therefore limited numbers of people benefit from the services of the PRA.

The conclusion has been that Alawi villages with mosques benefit from the services of the PRA and the imams that are appointed there. It is also found that Alawis, though not as much as Sunnis, also attend daily prayers, Friday prayers and congregational (ıyd) prayers. It has also been indicated that the number of the Alawis attending Cemevi has recently decreased.

The fact that the PRA, by carrying out scientific research, failed to come up with any scientific ways to meet the religious demands of the Alawis and to publish religious works to illuminate them in accordance with their needs is the most serious mistake the PRA has made. In a public survey, it is indicated that in spite of all these ideological distortions, 10.72% of sincere and devoted Alawi-Baktashis wish that their children could recite and understand the



Qur’an.26 As stated before, the PRA is under obligation to meet this need and must find a new way of dealing with these demands.

In the era of President Ali Bardakoglu, PRA relations with Islamic groups are considered on the basis of the principles of secularism and freedom. In his speeches in the country and abroad, Bardakoglu emphasizes the legitimacy of the PRA in a secular country by using different reasoning not seen before. For him, the PRA has three major characteristics:

There are three basic characteristics for the Presidency as a public institution. First, it is a public institution; it provides its services within the framework of the Constitution and the laws. Second, it is a free institution; it puts a special emphasis on producing religious knowledge in a free atmosphere. Third, it is a civil organization; that is to say, it takes seriously the accumulated religious experiences of the people and their requests, and it provides the most suitable services for them. Due to these three characteristics, as a constitutional, free, and civil organization, the Presidency is able to function and serve in harmony with the secular principles and implications of the freedom of religion.27

The first characteristic, though in line with the stated mission of the PRA, still has some problems in practice with regard to secularism. The verdict of the High Court regarding the PRA put its legitimacy into question. The President rejected PRA regulations on Qur’anic schools.28 The other two characteristics of the PRA are only the heartfelt wishes of Bardakoglu.29

The second characteristic, producing religious knowledge in a free atmosphere, is not included in the responsibilities and authorities of the PRA. In a sense, Bardakoglu’s statements can be seen as a new definition of the duties and responsibilities of the PRA. It is notable that its administrators, including the president himself, are appointed by the ruling parties and, therefore, can be changed by other parties. As long as the director and mufti are appointed by political authorities and not elected in a free election, and as long as knowledge is controlled by the Higher Religious Affairs Committee, it is difficult to claim that the PRA “produces free knowledge.” Furthermore, it is impossible to produce knowledge by committee, for only unbiased scholars and institutes can produce free and reliable knowledge. Therefore, the production of free knowledge is the responsibility of Divinity Faculties. The PRA must enlighten the public by using this knowledge. Given the PRA’s proposal for establishing an Academy of Religious Affairs, Haseki Education Centers, Qur’anic schools and courses and similar services, it seems that the PRA seeks to claim the responsibilities formerly held by the Sheikh al-Islamlik (the office of the chief religious official in the Ottoman Empire).

The civil character of the PRA is most problematic. Bardakoglu’s third characteristic, which is “(the PRA) is a civil organization; that is to say, it takes



seriously the accumulated religious experiences of the people and their requests, and provides the most suitable services for them,” contradicts with the requirement of neutrality and its principle that “the PRA follows in its services the issue of belief, worship and moral principles without depending on a specific sect or group.” The contradiction exists because if the PRA takes into consideration the living experience of believers, it will have to provide services, say, to Alawis and Jafaris in accordance with their experience, on the one hand, and to the Shafiites according to their experience, on the other. This entails recognizing the Cemevi as places of worship. The civil character of the PRA must be based on the religiosity that Islam proposes rather than the experiences of certain groups, Sufi orders or clergy. Bardakoglu’s vision is only possible by transforming the PRA into a civil, democratic and autonomous organization. For this, there must be radical legal change.

Recently, Muharram fasting, the Ashura, the martyrdom of Husain in Karbala, Ahl al-Bayt (The House of the Prophet), and the life of Ali and his services to Islam have begun to be mentioned in Friday sermons, the PRA’s official periodical and on its official calendar. In the last two years, the subject of the Prophet and “The love of the House of the Prophet”30 were included in the ceremonies of the Week of the Blessed Birth, which is an annual celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad and is organized under the control of the PRA. The PRA Press later published the special edition of Diyanet Dergisi devoted to the subject of “the Love of the House of the Prophet.”

The PRA also began publishing “the Alawi-Baktashi Classics.” According to unofficial statements, the publications of 17 Alawi manuscripts were planned. At first these works were to be published by the PRA Press, but some academicians and members of the Higher Committee of Religious affairs objected. Therefore, they were published by Diyanet Vakfı Press (Diyanet Foundation Press). Of these manuscripts, four have been published so far. In a special course organized by the PRA, muftis from big cities and towns, preachers, teachers of Qur’anic schools, and imams were educated on the subject of Alawism and Bektashism. In the Celebration of the Blessed Birth, the office of mufti in some big cities and towns coordinated some activities with Alawite foundations and associations. Some activities during the week of the Celebration of the Blessed Birth and Muharram Celebrations were even co-organized with the Alawis and some Alawi leaders (Dede) were even sent abroad to join the Week of Blessed Birth of 2007.

Another group with concerns regarding the PRA are the Jafaris. They do not want to be represented in the ranks of the PRA because they do not accept the PRA definition of Jafaris as a political non-Sunnite sect that follows Shi‘ite-3mami rites in law.31 They claim that the PRA tries to make them



Sunnites and accuses them of being pro-Iranian. In an interview published in Caferiyol Yol (Caferi Way), Bardakoglu encourages the Jafaris by saying that “Jafarism is a rite based on the ideas of the followers of the great scholar of Islam and man of letters Imam Jafar al-Sadık and the opinions of his followers. The duty of our presidency is to provide religious services to the people and meet their demands. It is a neutral institution and does not discriminate in favour of a special religious group, sect or Sufi order.”32 This has not changed Jafari perception that the PRA is not an institution representing all the Muslims in Turkey.33

PRA-Jafari relations in recent years has begun to deteriorate. The reason for this is that it is stated that “the openings of big and small mosques are subjected to the permission of the PRA and these mosques are controlled by the PRA.” In other words, mosques built by individuals and open to worship will be taken over by the PRA; they have actually been so taken over.34 As Bardakoglu states, the officials serving in these mosques are “voluntary imams.” The PRA is planning to appoint them permanently or temporarily depending on their age, education and other qualifications, but for the time being,35 the PRA does not appoint imams for these mosques.36 Jafaris still choose their own imams and pay their salaries.

The relations of the Alawi-Baktashis, Jafaris and the other groups with the PRA is a function of the expectations of these groups. Accordingly, one can expect the PRA to establish new units and services to meet these needs. According to recent surveys, not only are the demands of the Alawis and Jafaris considered but also those of the Sunnis. Young Sunnis criticize the PRA for not providing adequate religious education.

The reorganization of the PRA is demanded by all groups in Turkey. Before attempting reorganization, however, various religious groups must put forward their realistic demands, though they also need to face traditional understandings of religion. Both Alawis and Sunnis hold that keeping the traditional way makes them better believers or more religious. But modern societies living in an era that witnesses rapid and radical changes have begun to lose their belief in the validity of traditional understandings. Both religious groups and the PRA, following the experience of the Prophet, need to reinterpret religion without following the understanding of any particular sect. This means going back to common values.

Some proposals for reorganizing the PRA still remain as propasals in the sub-commissions waiting to be sent to the Genaral Assembly.37 Those proposals have been rejected by one of the members of the coalition government. New clear proposals await public discussion. It is essential that this organization be reorganized as a civilian and autonomous institution of religious services.



Endnotes

1. For the analysis of Istar Gozaydın about the aims of the political authorities who founded the Republic when they established the PRA, see,.: “Türkiye’de Laiklik Uygulaması: Diyanet Modeli (The application of Secularism in Turkey: The Model of PRA”, http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/conf_25feb_igozaydin.php adlı Web sayfasından (dated 05.06.2007).

2. “Tefsir ve izah kısmında bervechi ati nıkat nazarı dikkate alınacaktır.” Bunlardan 5.si ßöyledir: “3tikadca Ehli sünnet mezhebine ve amelce hanefî mezhebine riayet . . .” “As far as the interpretation and explanation are concerned, the following points are to be taken into account.” Of these points, the fifth is as follows: “Following the Sunnitte approach and the Hanafite rite” (Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, Hak Dini Kur ”an Dili, Eser Kitabevi, 3stanbul 1971, I/19).

3. 3l Han Özay, “Bir ‘Dinayet’ Hikayesi”, 3slamiyat, IV (2001), issue 1, 53 (quoted from the report prepared as a PRAft proposal by 3stanbul Science Commission, in 1961, chaired by Sami Onar) In this report, they defend the idea that the PRA must be organized in accordance with the demands of the sects. It is stated that “..thus the demands of Turkish-Shiis or the followers of other religions, which became public service, will be met . . .”

4. Cf. Hasan Onat, “Alevîlik-Bektaßîlik, Din Kültürü Ahlâk Bilgisi Dersleri ve Diyânet,” Türk Yurdu, v. 25, issue: 210 (Íubat 2005), 17.

5. Vehbi Bilimler, Diyanet 3ßleri Baßkanlıgı Kuruluß ve Görevleri Kanun Tasarısı Hakkında Mütalaa, Sönmez Neßriyat ve Matbaacılık A.Í. Matbaası, 3stanbul 1963, 5; 3ßtar B. Tarhanlı, Müslüman Toplum Laik Devlet (Afa Yayıncılık, 3stanbul 1993), 179.

6. See. “Din Hizmetlerinin Yeniden Yapılandırılması,” Din-Devlet 3lißkileri ve Türkiye”de Din Hizmetlerinin Yeniden Yapılandırılması Sempozyumu Kitapçıgı, 193.

7. Hayrettin Karaman is of the view that the following of the Hanafi rite is related to the demands. “As for the application, it is to be noted that although there is an opportunity to become more tolerant, both the Higher Committe of Religious Affairs and other units of the PRA in charge of publications of religious books follow Sunni approach not the Hanafite one. It may be due to the demands or the attitude towards non-Sunni groups was not as tolerant as today or other reasons. See, http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/conf_25feb_hkaraman.php, (dated 06.06.2007).

8. See, dated 11.07.1996 and reference number: B.02.1. D3B.0.10/214-838 (the verdict of the Higher Committee of Religious Affairs).

9. In a survey carried out in 2001, to the question “whether the PRA is under the influence of the political authority,” the 80% questioned said “Yes” and 20% said “No.” (See, Kemallettin Taß, Türk Toplumunun Diyanet 3ßleri Baßkanlıgına Bakßı (3stabul Örnegi) (The Turkish Society’s Approach to the PRA: The Case of 3stanbul), 2001, 158.

10. They declared in their official magazine CEM Dergisi their ideas on this issue. See, “Cem’in Diyanet Bildirisi,” Cem Dergisi 1 (1992), issue: 8, 10.

11. Cemal Íener, Yaßayan Alevilik, Ant Yayınları, 3stanbul 1996 (4. baskı), 189.12. Din-Devlet 3lißkileri Uluslararası Sempozyumu, (The Symposium on

Religion-State Relations), 211.13. http://www.cemvakfi.org/blddetay.asp?ID=101, (dated 27.05.2007).14. http://www.radikal.com.tr, (newspaper dated 15.12.2003).15. For the idea of this group about this issue, see. 3lyas Üzüm, Günümüz Aleviligi

(3SAM Yayınları, 3stanbul 1997), 130–132.16. Üzüm, 130.17. Íener, Yaßayan Alevilik, 51. For a similiar idea, see. Íener, Yaßayan Alevilik, 89;

Cem Dergisi 1 (1992), issue 8, 12.

http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/conf_25feb_igozaydin.php

http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/conf_25feb_hkaraman.php

http://www.cemvakfi.org/blddetay.asp?ID101

http://www.radikal.com.tr



18. Ibid., 111. 19. Muharrem Naci Orhan, “Politikacıların Alevi-Sünni Kıßkırtmasının Önüne

Geçebilmek 3çin Agır Müyyideler Getirilmelidir,” Türk Yurdu (Alevilik Özel Sayısı) 14 (1994), the issue: 88, 67.

20. For the findings of a survey carried out in the Baladız, with its name Gümüßgün, a village of Keciborlu, Isparta and also for the findings of a survey about the villge of Niyazlar, yesilova, Burdur, see: Hüseyin Bal, Alevi Bektaßi Köylerinde Toplumsal Kurumlar, (Ant Yayınları, 3stanbul 1997), 175.

21. Alevî-Bektâßîlerin Diyanet 3ßleri Baßkanlıgı’nda Temsil Problemi (Alan Araßtırması),” Uluslar arası Bektaßilik ve Alevilik Sempozyumu –I-, Bildiriler-Müzâkereler, 28–30 Ekim 2005, 459.

22. The main legal obstacle is the Lozan Treaty in 24 Temmuz 1923, secular regulations in Turkey, The legistlation about the Closure of Derwish Lodges in 2 September 1925, Legistlations regulating the duties and responsibilities of the PRA in 3 Mart 1924. For detail see, Sönmez Kutlu, “Alevilik-Bektaßiligin Diyanette Temsil Sorunu,” 3slamiyât, IV (2001), issue 1, 26–29.

23. Süleyman Sarıtaß, “Cemevi Camiye Karßılık Düßünülemez,” Türk Yurdu (Alevilik Özel Sayısı) 14 (1994), sayı: 88, 20; Bedri Noyan, “Bektaßi ve Alevi Konusunda Bir Gezinti,” Türk Yurdu (Alevilik Özel Sayısı) 14 (1994), sayı: 88, s. 38; Cemal Íahin, “Ben de Aleviyim Ama Alevileri Bir Avuç Marksist’in Tekelinden Kurtarmak Lazım,” Türk Yurdu (Special Issue on Alawism) 14 (1994), issue: 88, 54.

24. Battal Pehlivan, Aleviler ve Diyanet (Pencere Yayınları, 3stanbul 1995), 25–26; 29–30.

25. According to the survey undertaken by Ali Aktas on Alawi-Baktashi groups in Sah Kulu Dervish Lodge, 12.5% of those surveyed fast regularly while 22.43% sometimes; 5.79% kill animal as a sacrifice regularly while 36.35% do this sometimes; 5.11% pray regularly while 7.02 observe daily prayers sometimes; 5.11% gives alms-giving while 7.26 do this sometimes. See. Bkz. “Kent Ortamında Alevilerin Kendilerini Tanımlama Biçimleri ve 3nanç Ritüellerini Uygulama Sıklıklarının Sosyolojik Açıdan degerlendirilmesi,” I. Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaß Veli Sempozyumu Bildirileri (22–24 Ekim 1998) (A paper submitted to the I. Symposium on Turkish Culture and Hacı Bektashi Wali), 467. In a survey conducted on the issue of youngsters regardless of their sectarian affiliations, it is found out that 55.7% of them attend mosque regularly while 52.5% of them attend rarely. This survey also shows that 14.6% of them pray regularly, but 57.5% observe prayer sometimes. See, Türk Gençligi 98 Suskun Kitle Büyüteç Altında, Konrad Adenauer Vakfı Yayını, 98 (Figure: 118).

26. Aktaß, idem, 474 (Figure: 33).27. Ali Bardakoglu, “Freedom with Religion: the Turkish Experience,” Religion and

Society New Perspectives from Turkey, (Presidency of Religious Affairs, Ankara 2006, ss. 9–20), 52.

28. Radikal Gazetesi, 10.12.2003.29. In an article, Minister of State Mehmet Aydin, before becoming minister, was

stating that the PRA was not a civilian organization and it had to be so.” Bkz.: Mehmet S. Aydın, “Avrupa Birligi, Din ve Diyanet,” 3slâmiyât, IV (2001), the issue 1, 17 onwords).

30. The issue 171 of the official periodical of the PRA, Diyanet Dergisi, was devoted to the issue of Ahl al-Bayt.

31. In a catechism published among the publications of Religious Affairs Pres, Jafaris are presented as a political Shi‘i sect. Jafaris reject such presentation and consider this a biased idea. For the presentation of the Shi‘a in this book see, 3mihal, 3man ve 3badetler, (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara 2006), I/29.



32. Ali Bardakoglu, “Caferileri Kazanmalıyız,” Caferiyol, the issue:1, (3stanbul Mayıs 2006), 14–15.

33. For the criticisms of Selahattin Özgündüz, the head of Turkish Jafaris, about the PRA and its attitude towards to the Jafaris, see.: “Diyanet Ne Yapmaya Çalıßıyor (What is the PRA tıying to do),” Caferiyol, sayı:1, (3stanbul May 2006), 18–20. Also the ideas of the Jafari religious authorities on this issue, see The Declaration of the Federation of the Jafaris, 1 March 2004 (Sümeyra Teymur, Türkiye Caferileri, Ankara Üniversitesi 3lahiyat Unpublished M:A: thesis, Ankara 2007), 58–81.

34. Ali Bardakoglu, “Caferileri Kazanmalıyız,” Caferiyol, issue: 1, (3stanbul Mayıs 2006), 14.

35. Bardakoglu, “Caferileri Kazanmalıyız,” Caferiyol, issue: 1, (3stanbul Mayıs 2006), 15.36. The Jafaris strongly rejected the appointment by the PRA of an imam in their

village in 2004. See, http://www.habervitrini.com/haber.asp?id=144189. (dated 03.06.2007.)37. For example, the minister of state in charge of the PRA, Mehmet Aydin, has some

new ideas and proposals about the reorganizations of the PRA, but has not made any serious attempt. About his proposals, see.: (Mehmet S. Aydın, “Avrupa Birligi, Din ve Diyanet”, 3slâmiyât, IV (2001), the issue: 1, 17.

http://www.habervitrini.com/haber.asp?id144189

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