the new russian jewish diaspora and ‘russian’ party politics in israel

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The new Russian JewishDiaspora and ‘Russian’party politics in IsraelVladimir (Ze'ev) Khanin aa Bar‐Ilan University ,Published online: 24 Dec 2007.

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The New Russian Jewish Diaspora and'Russian' Party Politics in Israel

VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) KHANIN

The second half of the twentieth century was the period of intensive ethnic migrationsworldwide, which became an important resource for the political developments in thehost countries. Such an example is Israel, which during last three decades receivedabout a million Russian Jewish immigrants. This immigrant community reflects itsideological, class, and sub-ethnic diversity and political aspirations through thenetwork of 'sectarian' parties, which in their turn show the different models ofleadership, political activities and organizational infrastructure. Whether thesemovements will disappear within the generation, will become a long-run phenomenon,or will be transformed into a mainstream political movement, may become evident inthe near future.

The second half of the twentieth century was a period of active migrationfor many ethnic groups. The formation of new, organized ethnic and sub-ethnic communities in the 'host' countries that began to play a more notablerole in local government and politics was the outcome of this process, withJewish emigration from the USSR and the successor states being one of themost impressive examples. The two latest waves of emigration, from 1969until 1979 and from 1988 to the present, substantially changed thegeographic distribution of Eastern European Jewry. Russian Jewishcommunities now exist in 52 countries around the world.1

The largest concentration of Russian-speaking Jews outside the FormerSoviet Union (FSU) is in Israel. According to the Jewish Agency for Israeldata, some 1,200,000 people (about 40 per cent of former Soviet Jewry)have made aliya since 1970, including 938,000 between 1989 andNovember 2002.2 Like Russian Jews still residing in the diaspora,immigrants in Israel must also make decisions regarding their cultural,language and national identities. These decisions then impact on theirelectoral and general political behaviour. Finally, in Israel, as in othercountries with a substantial Russian-speaking Jewish population, the newimmigrants must look for the best models for their communal organizationand its political institutionalization on a national level.3

Vladimir (Ze'ev) Khanin, Bar-Ilan University

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.8, No.4, Winter 2002, pp.37-60PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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38 NATIONALISM and ETHNIC POLITICS

At the same time, there are also several differences between the politicalstatus of Russian Jewish immigrants in Israel and in other Jewishcommunities of the world. Thus, in countries of the former Soviet Union,one can easily observe a strong disproportion between intensive intra-communal politics, on the one hand, and poor representation of the Jewishpopulation as an institutionalized ethnic group in national politics, on theother. In addition, the politicization trends of Jewry in the USSR/CIS oftentend toward emigration.4 The political institutionalization of Russian Jewishimmigrant groups in Western countries such as the U.S., Canada andGermany is usually an internal issue of the local Jewish communities, whichuse an established and formalized mechanism for lobbying on behalf ofJewish interests on a national basis.

The Israeli situation is a unique one, where new immigrants from theCIS comprise about 15 per cent of the population, and a strong 'Russian'community institutional infrastructure has been created which has becomea major factor in local and national politics. The most important amongthese institutions are the Russian immigrant parties, founded in the late1990s, which have substantially changed the picture of Israeli party politics.

Origins of 'Russian' Party Politics

Israeli party politics can hardly be regarded as ethnic-oriented; however,'ethnic' parties are not unusual for Israel either. In the pre-state Yishuv therewere movements and lists that represented specific Jewish communalminorities, such as the Federation of Sephardi Jews in Eretz Israel, theYemenite Union, and Aliya Hadasha (The New Immigration - a list ofAshkenazi Jewish immigrants from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia).

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Israeli politicalsystem has witnessed dozens of communal and ethnic lists, although veryfew of them passed the electoral vote threshold. Among them were suchparties as the All-Israeli Sephardi list in 1951, Tami (the movement forJewish tradition, a party of Jewish immigrants from Asia and Africa andtheir descendants) in 1981-88, ethnic religious parties such as Shas(Orthodox Sephardi, since 1984) and the Banner of Torah (OrthodoxAshkenazi, since 1988), as well as Arab lists.5

The ethnic factor became evident again at the end of the 1990s. AsIsraeli historian Saul Friedlander commented, 'Tribal structures arebecoming more rigid; they are regressing instead of progressing. Eachgroup, every tribe, has become militant and aggressive, and is governed byits own internal principles.'6 The 1999 elections showed a further increasein the ethnic component of Israeli politics. Among the 31 party lists offeredto the voters on 17 May, 12 - more than a third - represented ethnic

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THE NEW RUSSIAN JEWISH DIASPORA IN ISRAEL 39

communal, ethnic national or ethnic religious entities, including seven inthe Jewish sector (five were immigrant lists) and five in the Arab sector. Inaddition, there were unsuccessful attempts to create two more ethnicmovements - a list of Caucasian Jews, and the North African movement -Yehudei Morocco B'aliya.

The Russian immigrant parties, however, are quite a recentphenomenon. One of the reasons that they did not exist previously is that themajority of historical Israeli parties have Russian roots. They were foundedby different streams of the Zionist movement at the start of the twentiethcentury in the Pale of Jewish Settlement of the Russian Empire (whichincluded contemporary Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and someRussian areas). However, due to suppression of Zionist organizations andorganized Jewish life in the USSR by the Soviet authorities beginning in the1920s Russian Jews, who were the initial founders of the Zionist movement,were separated from Zionist activities for 50 years, as well as beingseparated from Israel and the Jewish world.7

Thus, those Soviet Jews who, after a long separation, began to come enmasse to Israel in the 1970s, and then again in the 1990s, were different notonly from Israelis whose roots were in Asia, Africa or Western Europe, butin terms of language, identity and culture, they were also very different fromthe descendants of those who had come from Russia in the first decades ofthe twentieth century to establish the Jewish home in Palestine.

Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union were also differentamong themselves. The majority of politically prominent figures of theSoviet Jewish immigration of the 1970s demonstrated strong Zionistaspirations, and thus came to Israel to be an undivided part of local Jewishsociety. Hence, for the majority of them, the idea of an ethnic party wasunacceptable. Thus, until the early 1990s immigrants from the USSRpreferred to support mainstream Israeli parties. Russian immigrant lists, suchas the List for Russian Olim created in 1981, were unable to pass the electoralthreshold.8 The same trend seemed to prevail after the large ally a of the 1990shad begun. Thus, according to a representative sample of new immigrantsfrom the USSR, taken in April 1992, only 11 per cent of respondents wereready to support a new immigrant party, if such would have been created.9

That is why two 'Russian' both immigrant lists, Da and Tali, created on theeve of the 1992 elections, did not pass the 1.5 electoral threshold.

The situation had changed by the mid-1990s. By that time Israelalready had more than half a million 'Russian' new immigrants,accounting for more than 10 per cent of the Jewish population. Asopposed to previous waves of Russian Jewish immigration, many of theseimmigrants had come to Israel with little ideology. They also came topossess a rapidly growing network of educational, welfare and cultural

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institutions and interest groups, as well as numerous mass media assetsand strong 'Russian' business interests. For many FSU immigrants (olim)]it was quite logical that the final stage of this process should be thecreation of their own political movement.

In addition, a new generation of leaders appeared in the Russianimmigrant community with a philosophy similar to that of the new olim,even though Zionism was still an important value for many of theseactivists. In the Soviet Union these people had witnessed an explosion ofpolitical ethnicity which had become a factor in splitting society not onlyalong cultural boundaries but also along social, political and class lines.Thus, the idea of an ethnic structure was not something totally illegitimatefor these new leaders. Many of these leaders were participants in therevival process of the Eastern European Jewish movement, whichinvolved the establishment of schools, associations and communities, aswell as involvement in party politics in the USSR and the post-Sovietstates. These politicians did not see any ideological problem in applyingtheir experience to organizational and political activity to Israel, includingparty building.

For instance, this new group of immigrants had an impact on thestructure of the Zionist Forum of Soviet Jewry, which was originallyfounded by the group of former Zionist and human rights activists headedby Natan Sharansky in 1988 to support their veteran colleagues in Israel.Under the new conditions of mass Russian Jewish immigration, the Forumwas transformed into an umbrella organization for numerous newimmigrant associations,10 apparently using the USSR Jewish Va'ad as theorganizational model. The core of a future 'Russian' immigrant party beganhere as a political wing of this organization.

Yisrael B 'aliya

A period of intense consultations between the Zionist Forum leaders andrepresentatives of the new immigrant community in 1993-94 concludedwith a seminar in Jerusalem on 10-11 November 1994, which broughttogether leaders, journalists, Russian-speaking activists in Israeli parties,intellectuals and individuals who shortly thereafter became prominentfigures in the Israeli political establishment. The major aim of the seminarwas to discuss the 'strategy to create a "Russian lobby" in Israeli politics'.11

According to the protocols of this meeting, some participants favouredcreating stronger Russian sections in mainstream Israeli parties. However,the majority argued that the 'political potential of aliya cannot be realizedwithin the framework of existing Israeli parties'. It was concluded that onlya Russian immigrant party could attain its political goals and could preventthe dispersion of forces and a confrontation within the community.12

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In early 1995, the political movement called Yisrael B'aliya (meaningboth 'Israel on the Rise' and 'Israel for Aliya') was established. Themovement was transformed into a political party at its founding conferencein Jerusalem on 17 March 1996. The conference adopted basic documents- the Statute and Mission Statement of Yisrael B'aliya, elected NatanSharansky the party leader and formed a list of candidates for the 1996Knesset elections.13

The success of Yisrael B'aliya was promoted by a favourable politicalsituation in Israel on the eve of the 1996 elections, including the impact ofa new system of separate voting for prime minister and a party list. Thus,the electoral debut of Yisrael B'aliya in 1996 was very successful, gainingsome 175,000 votes and winning 7 Knesset seats. Natan Sharansky becameMinister of Trade and Industry, and Yuli Edelstein was Minister ofImmigrant Absorption in Binyamin Netanyahu's 1996 government. The1998 municipal elections also brought Yisrael B'aliya representatives intothe governments of many important local municipalities.14 In 1999 the partywon 172,000 votes and 6 Knesset seats. In Ehud Barak's 1999 government,Sharansky was Minister of Interior and another party's MK (Member ofKnesset), Marina Solodkin was Deputy Minister of Absorption. On movingto opposition in summer 2001 due to the strong disagreement with EhudBarak's policy of concessions to Palestinians, Yisrael B'aliya returned to theruling coalition after Ariel Sharon's victory at the February 2001 elections.In the new government Sharansky became Deputy Prime Minister andMinister of Construction, and Yuli Edelstein again headed the Ministry ofImmigrant Absorption.

Similar to Popular Front movements in the USSR during perestroika,which were more united against the common communist enemy than bycommon ideological and social principles, the Yisrael B'aliya party tried tospeak on behalf of all Israelis of 'Russian' origin. Thus, in the spirit of theparty's official centrist ideology, it sought to keep a balance in its approach(or even abstain where possible) on certain issues such as the Israel-Arabconflict and secular-religious relations. This was especially obvious duringthe party's first term in the Knesset and in the government. Yet, the partywas unable to avoid internal ideological and personal conflicts whichresulted in the secession of various factions and the formation of newpolitical parties.

Yisrael Beiteinu

In winter 1999, a large group of right-wing members, headed by Yurii Sternand Michael Nudelman, left the Yisrael B'aliya party. The reason wasdissatisfaction with Israeli government concessions to the Palestinian Arabsduring the Wye Plantation summit. This split also had a personal dimension.

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The conflict between the camp of Natan Sharansky, Yisrael B'aliya'scharismatic leader, and Yuli Edelstein, the party's central committeechairman, on the one hand, and Yurii Stern and Michael Nudelman'sfaction, on the other, had started even before the 1996 elections. While thefirst group, through control over appointments both within the party and inYisrael B'aliya-controlled government institutions, enjoyed the support ofthe party's bureaucratic apparatus, the second group became the populistleaders of all those who were pushed into the margins of the party'sinfrastructure.15

After leaving the Yisrael B'aliya party, Stern and Nudelman's factionjoined another 'Russian' party, Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home), foundedshortly before these events by former Director General of the PrimeMinister's Office Avigdor Lieberman, himself a veteran immigrant from theUSSR. The core of his new organization was created by a large group ofRussian-speaking former members of Likud who were disappointed in theWye agreement, and the ignoring of their demands and ambitions by theLikud leadership.

In addition, a number of independent 'Russian' municipal lists appearedin the November 1998 municipal elections, much to the disapproval of theYisrael B'aliya leaders. One such case was the successful Russianmunicipal bloc in Ashdod (Our Home - Ashdod) which received nine seatsin the city council - a nationwide record that year. According to observers,'the immigrants' huge success in Ashdod was an inspiration to AvigdorLieberman, who hastened to copy the successful model to the nationallevel.'16 Another group of this sort was headed by Larisa Gershtein, DeputyMayor of Jerusalem, leader of the 'Community for Jerusalem' bloc, and along-time critic of Sharansky and Edelstein.

Lieberman was also supported by a group of former Zionist activists inthe Soviet Union who were disappointed with their marginalization inIsraeli Russian politics and with what they saw as Soviet-style democraticcentralism in Yisrael B'aliya. The feelings of this group were vocalized byYosef Begun, a former refusnik and prisoner of Zion.17

Another important factor was that Avigdor Lieberman started hispolitical campaign with an unprecedented attack on the Israeliestablishment whom he called 'oligarchs', including the State Prosecutor'sOffice and the Investigations Division of the Israel Police. This triggered ahuge wave of pro-Lieberman solidarity among many Israelis of non-FSUorigin. Furthermore, according to Ze'ev Geyzel, Yisrael Beiteinu wasattractive to many 'Russian' immigrants of both waves who did not want tovote for a clearly ethnic party such as Yisrael B'aliya.18

Thus, in the 1999 elections, Yisrael Beiteinu bloc received more than82,000 votes and 4 Knesset seats. After the elections, Yisrael Beiteinu

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formed a joint parliamentary faction with the right-wing National Unionbloc and thus became one of the leading forces in opposition to EhudBarak's centre-left government. After the February 2001 prime ministerialelections, which were won by the candidate of the 'national' camp, ArielSharon, Yisrael Beiteinu received key portfolios in the new ruling coalition.Avigdor Lieberman became Minister of National Infrastructure, and YuriStern became a deputy minister in the Prime Minister's Office. However, insummer 2002 both ministers left the national unity government in protestagainst what they had defined as the 'moderate' approach of Ariel Sharonto struggle with the Palestinian terror.

Habehira Hademocratit

Another secessionist group, mainly representing the left-wing and anti-clerical faction, left Yisrael B'aliya shortly after the 1999 elections. In July1999, Knesset members Roman Bronfman, a veteran immigrant, and AlexTsinker, a new immigrant, left the party to form the Mahar (Tomorrow)parliamentary faction. The official reason for that step was a disagreementwith their party's decision to join the government coalition together withultra-Orthodox religious parties, and strong ideological disputes with NatanSharansky and Yuli Edelstein.19 Yisrael B'aliya, however, said thatBronfman's and Tsinker's reasons had more to do with their personalpolitical ambitions than with ideological principles.20 (According to internalsources, Roman Bronfman, who, despite Yisrael B'aliya's declared'neutrality' in the Prime-Minister's elections, as head of its electionheadquarters in 1999 played a key role in 'instructing' the local partybranches to support Ehud Barak, had expected to get a position in the Barakgovernment. Barak, however, agreed with Sharansky's decision to give thisposition to Yuli Edelstein.)

Two weeks after these events, the new parliamentary faction wasrecognized by the Israeli Knesset.21 Consequently, in August 1999,Bronfman and Tsinker announced the establishment of their own party,Habehira Hademocratit (Democratic Choice).

Other Parties

In addition to these three parties, there were other political organizationsfounded by different waves of immigrants from the USSR/CIS in the 1990s.In 1996, one such party was Efraim Fainblum's Aliya party. Another was ZaEdinstvo i Dostoinstvo Aliyi (For Unity and Dignity of Aliya) led by EfraimGur, representing Jewish immigrants from Georgia.22 In 1996, both partiescreated a common electoral bloc, Yedinstvo and Aliya (Unity and Aliya),which received 22,000 votes but was unable to pass the 1.5 per centelectoral threshold.

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Among the parties that challenged Yisrael B'aliya and Yisrael Beiteinuin 1999 was Tikva ('Hope', or 'Nadezhda', in Russian), founded by AlexTentser, a noted 'critic of the establishment', who from 1992 to 1996 waschairman of the Public Committee for Control over Electoral Promises.Another founder of Nadezhda was Slava Premysler, owner of a network ofnon-kosher food stores in Jerusalem. The party included among its goals thestruggle for the 'rights of [ethnically] mixed families' and for the'legalization of civil marriage',23 and was widely identified as a 'Russiansatellite' of the Yisrael Ehad (One Israel) bloc.

Another party, Lev Olim Lemaan Yisrael (Heart of Immigrants for Israel- Lomi), created in February-March 1999, identified itself as a movementof 'Russian-speaking Sephardi Jews', and tried to speak on behalf ofimmigrants from Central Asia and Caucasus. Despite considerableorganizational efforts, Lomi had very limited electoral success. Manyprominent communal figures and the majority of voters preferred the Likud,other olim parties, and especially the Sephardi Shas party. Lomi, with 6,000votes, and Nadezhda, with 7,000 votes, were unable to pass the 1.5 per centelectoral barrier and had to put off their political ambitions until the nextelections.24

Today, 'Russian' party politics includes Yisrael B'aliya, Yisrael Beiteinuand Habehira Hademocratit, together with Russian sections of Israelimainstream parties.

The Ideological and Organizational Infrastructure

Each of the existing new immigrant parties in Israel can be characterized byboth common and specific features in their ideology, patterns of leadershipand organizational development, as well as relations with the electorate, themedia, and other new immigrant and mainstream associations. Despite thefact that the Russian immigrant parties in Israel are still new, someconclusions can already be drawn in terms of their classification.

Party Ideologies

Each of the new immigrant parties represents various political trends withinthe community: left-wing and anti-clerical (Habehira Hademocratit), right-wing and neo-traditional (Yisrael Beiteinu), and centrist or centre-right(Yisrael B'aliya). In social and economic terms, Yisrael Beiteinu, accordingto its mission statement, identifies with more conservative ideas,25 whileHabehira Hademocratit regards itself more as a social democratic party.26

Yisrael B'aliya tries to combine elements of both ideological traditions,aspiring to simultaneously represent the interests of underprivilegedcategories of the population and the middle class.27 All parties combine

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ethnic communal, ethnic national and class interests as they see fit. Thus,the new immigrant community is split over the same issues as Israeli societyin general, attesting to their degree of political integration.

Like most ethnic communal parties worldwide, the majority of Israeli'Russian' parties seek to appeal to the widest range of people, which leadsthem to moderate their ideological inclinations whenever possible. Forexample, the unsuccessful Democracy and Aliya (Da) party, founded in1992, declared the priority of communal issues and abstained from foreignpolicy problems.28 The Lomi mission statement of 1999, also in the spirit of'communal compromise', tried to avoid left-right policy issues andconcentrated on a 'combination of the traditional religiousness of BukharanJews with more active participation of the community in technological andcultural progress'.29

Yisrael B'aliya ideology was probably the most impressive attempt atimplementing the centrist idea. The party's message was initially directed atthe widest range of groups of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Infact, it was thought to satisfy everybody: doves and hawks; new olim andveterans; youth, middle-aged and pensioners; secular and religious; rich andpoor; Ashkenazi and Sephardi; and Jews and their non-Jewish relatives.

Yisrael B'aliya centrism, in fact, is not just a self-sufficient ideology, butmuch more a result of the balance of different intra-party factions, based oncompromised ideological and political attitudes, reached against a commonethnic and/or communal background. This can be illustrated by the situationin Yisrael B'aliya on the eve of the 1999 elections. The top four MKs ofYisrael B'aliya were divided in their support for prime minister: YuliEdelstein supported right-wing Benny Begin, Natan Sharansky supportedright-of-centre Binyamin Netanyahu, Roman Bronfman supported left-wingEhud Barak, and Marina Solodkin supported centrist Yitzhak Mordechai.30

Consequently, the party's platform during 1996, 1999 and 2002-03electoral campaigns was very eclectic. It contained demands for privatizationof state and trade union-controlled monopolies and the creation of freeeconomic zones, on the one hand, and massive state intervention in the areasof job creation, housing, infrastructure, the education system, state support ofenterprises and various categories of the population, development of asystem of government-subsidized mortgages and other social welfare issues,on the other. The Yisrael B'aliya programme challenged religious coercion,demanding civil marriage and divorce, while proclaiming respect for Jewishtradition and the status of the religious community in Israel. In 1999 and2002, too, Natan Sharansky emphasized the development of a religiousconsensus, not only for new immigrants but for Israeli society in general.

From this point of view, the party espouses a 'new Zionist' ideologydeveloped by some activists of the USSR underground Zionist movement,

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which stressed the role of Jewish religion and the secular diaspora Jewishculture as parts of the ethnic national identity.31 Thus, Yisrael B'aliyaideology included both the demand 'to deal seriously with the issue ofhelping the people of Israel to return to the basics of Zionism andingathering of exiles', and a need to preserve Russian Jewish identity.32Thisconcept was summarized by Sharansky before the 1996 elections when hedeclared that 'Zionism does not mean that Jews have to forget their diasporatradition and culture. Neither do they have to come to Israel because theysuffer in the place of their origin, but rather are attracted by better conditionsin this country.'33

In foreign policy, until the start of the current Intifada in September 2000Yisrael B'aliya's centrist position resulted in support for theIsraeli-Palestinian peace settlement as well as a declaration of the Jewishpeople's historical rights to the Land of Israel. As a result, the party declaredneutrality regarding the prime ministerial candidates, both in the 1996 and1999 elections.

Even the more ideologically-oriented Yisrael Beiteinu and HabehiraHademocratit parties, in order to appeal to the new immigrants, could notescape a 'social centrist' orientation. It was clear, for instance, that YisraelBeiteinu policy-makers, even from the beginning, recognized an ideologicalcontradiction between their orientation favouring liberal economicprinciples and increasing the government's role in meeting the social,professional, cultural and welfare needs of the new immigrants. As a result,the Yisrael Beiteinu mission statement, besides having a clearly definedright-wing orientation in foreign policy and a 'classical' Revisionist Zionistapproach to the Jewish character of Israel, is an eclectic combination ofliberal economic principles as well as statements aimed at satisfying thesocial and welfare needs of various groups of the Israeli population.34

The 'communal centrism' message was also seen in the HabehiraHademocratit ideology. According to party press secretary Mark Gorin,'Already today it is possible to tell that our priorities reflect the interests ofthose who adhere to social centrism and new immigrants represent themajority of them.'35

Together with this, the party's mission statement included a change ofthe state/religion status quo and separation of religion from politics,legalization of civil marriage, erasure of ethnic/religious status fromidentification documents, considerable secularization and unification of theIsraeli education system, modernization of the Israeli electoral system, andreform of recruitment to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).36 The programmecontained a definite leaning toward the non-Jewish and ethnically mixedelements in the current immigration from the CIS. Thus, HabehiraHademocratit ideology contains a substantial deviation from the concept of

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a Jewish state, as it supports a state of all its citizens - one of the ideologicalsignposts of the post-Zionist approach of Israeli left-wing movements.37

Finally, the olim parties, like many other communal or sectarianorganizations, try to look like mainstream parties, which further complicatestheir ideology and structure. For instance, the Yisrael B'aliya statutereserves the right of its chairman to appoint people who are not olim fromthe CIS to party organs.38 One of the Knesset members elected in 1996 onthe Yisrael B'aliya ticket was Zvi Weinberg, an immigrant from Canada. Acurious feature of Yisrael B'aliya's national aspirations was the creation ofa party branch in one of the Druze villages in the Upper Galilee.

Yisrael Beiteinu leaders also insisted that their message be addressed toall Israelis and not just to new immigrants from the CIS. Thus, the party listfor the 1999 elections included Colonel Eliezer Cohen (ret.) in fourthposition as a representative of native Israelis, and there was a representativeof the Ethiopian community further down the list. Party leader AvigdorLieberman defines the party as a 'mainstream Israeli right-wing party,whose electoral support mainly comes from the Russian-speakingpopulation due to certain historical and political conditions'.39 Liebermanbecame the leading figure in the joint Yisrael Beiteinu-National Unionfaction after the assassination in October 2001 of Tourism MinisterRehavam Ze'evi, leader of the National Union bloc and founder of itsMoledet (Homeland) party component.

Thus, Yisrael Beiteinu and Habehira Hademocratit, more than YisraelB'aliya, identified with a specific ideology (right and left, respectively),while Yisrael B'aliya is more identified with the overall community.Together, the different approaches of these parties to various issues ofIsraeli foreign and domestic policy contribute to the specific position ofeach party on the Israeli political map (see Table 1).

TABLE 1IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF MAJOR NEW ISRAELI IMMIGRANT PARTIES

Habehira Hademocratit Yisrael B'aliya Yisrael Beiteinu

Ideology Post-Zionist Neo-Zionist Classical Zionist

Approach to the Not to change To correct, but to To change

Law of Return preserve the essence

Foreign Policy Left Centrist Right

Approach to State Anti-clerical, to Moderate, careful Moderate, not toand Religion separate religion change the change the

from the state status quo status quo

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Leadership and Institutional Infrastructure

Every political organization that has appeared in the Israeli 'Russian'community has been based on two principles. The first is the personalcharismatic authority of the party leaders. Natan Sharansky, AvigdorLieberman and Roman Bronfman are the chairmen and chief ideologists oftheir parties. The party leaders officially, or de facto, enjoy a crucial role inthe formation of the candidate lists for the Knesset elections.

Second is the 'mass participation' issue. As acknowledged by YuriiStern, one of the leaders of Yisrael Beiteinu, 'no one in the "Russian street"would understand a party without branches, departments and committees.And since we are largely working there, we have to have all theseinstitutions, which are expected to act not only before, but also between, theelections.'40 The Director General of Yisrael B'aliya, Eli Kazhdan, alsostressed this point by saying that the party's electorate 'is a very specificone. While it would be very strange if Likud or Shinui (Israeli mainstreamparties) supporters would come to their parties' branches between theelections, our voters are used to approaching Yisrael B'aliya activists andleaders with all their problems.""

Thus, Yisrael B'aliya, shortly after the 1996 elections, organized arecruitment campaign that raised the party membership from an initial 2,500to about 15,000 in early 1997 and to about 20,000 on the eve of the 1998municipal elections. Another task was to 'create an active organizationaland political structure'.42 After the 2001 prime ministerial elections, YisraelB'aliya planned to utilize the relative intra-political peace due to thecreation of Ariel Sharon's unity government to open new party branches andstrengthen existing ones, thus again bringing the party membership to morethen 20.000.43

After the 1999 elections, leaders of Yisrael Beiteinu also initiated arecruitment campaign by which party organizers hoped to bringmembership up to 25,000 or SO.OOO.44 Habehira Hademocratit, whosemembership by April 2000 had reached 2,000, hoped to raise it to 10,000 bythe year's end.45

Israeli Russian parties adopted various patterns for their institutionalinfrastructure. According to Yisrael B'aliya's statute, adopted formally in1997 and substantially revised in 1998, the basic Yisrael B'aliya unitbecame the branch. Branches were to be organized in every city or town,with no less then 25 party members who, in their turn, were eligible toelect the local Yisrael B'aliya committee (Articles 3.1.1-3.1.3 of YisraelB'aliya Statute). At the peak of Yisrael B'aliya organizational activitiesin late 1998, the party had about 70 branches. The largest among themwere party chapters in Jerusalem, Beersheva, Haifa, Rishon Lezion andAshkelon, as well as in small towns in northern Israel like Kiryat Bialik,

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Nazareth Illit and Afula, and in the south, Dimona and Ofakim.46 Theparty also had regional coordination organs for Jerusalem, Netanya andthe northern, central, southern and Negev areas of the country, whichelected a chairman and included members of the party's towncommittees.

The party branches, according to the first version of Yisrael B'aliya'sStatute, also elected representatives to the party congress (1,500 delegates)as well as the majority of candidates on the 500-member party centralcommittee. The rest of the central committee was named by the partychairman (Art.3.1.5, 4.1, 4.2). The executive council and the party bureauare the central decision-making organs. They consist of the chairman ofYisrael B'aliya and of its central committee (both elected by the partycongress), as well as the party's Knesset members, ministers, regionalrepresentatives, local party committee chairmen and other party officials. Inaddition, Yisrael B'aliya established a party apparatus, as well as variousparty committees, including a control committee, the party court and theelectoral body.

The institutional infrastructure of Yisrael Beiteinu started with 69electoral headquarters in various cities of the country. In summer andautumn 1999 it was based on 36 local and seven regional brunches (inJerusalem, Ashdod, Tel Aviv, Beersheva, the Galilee and other areas). Eachregional branch is headed by one of the Yisrael Beiteinu founders (LarisaGerstein, Shimon Katsenelson, Efim Dayan, Alex Grinberg, Alex Kluchand others) and the national administration. This body includes sectionsdealing with specific issues (professional employment, youth, science,culture and others). Each section has a forum of experts to work outrecommendations for the party factions in the Knesset.47

The Habehira Hademocratit party tried to find a middle way between thesemi-democratic centralism pattern of Yisrael B'aliya and the corporatecentralist structure of Yisrael Beiteinu. The party is governed by a 200-strong central committee, while the real power belongs to the party leaderand a group of his close associates and advisors.48 At the local and regionallevels, Habehira Hademocratit branches are being established as umbrellabodies for various functional structures and initiatives - for women, youth,students and professionals.49

Financing Party Activities

Huge and sophisticated Russian party structures for electoral campaigns andother projects naturally demand considerable funding. These funds comefrom different sources. New parties such as Yisrael B'aliya, before the 1996elections, and Yisrael Beiteinu, before the 1999 elections, did not getgovernment funding, as did parties already represented in the Knesset.

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Membership fees added little to the funds and, hence, they had to rely onbank loans and especially the fundraising abilities of their leaders. It isbelieved that a considerable part of Yisrael Beiteinu's expenses wereinitially covered by party leader Avigdor Lieberman himself, who is knownto have had successful business dealings both in Israel and in EasternEurope, and worked as a consultant for some Western firms in the new post-Soviet markets. Similarly, the Russian Sephardi Lomi party is believed to befinancially backed by Lev Levayev, its unofficial leader and a successfulIsraeli businessman of Central Asian origin.

Yisrael B'aliya, in its turn, benefited from the fundraising efforts inIsrael and abroad by party leader Natan Sharansky. These efforts were verysuccessful due to his extensive personal contacts and reputation as a formerleading Soviet human rights activist and prisoner of Zion. In January 2001it took Sharansky only a day and a half to raise three million shekels (about$750,000) in the U.S. for a large demonstration in Jerusalem againstgovernment plans to give up Israeli sovereignty on the Temple Mount andother sections of the city.50 Another source of Yisrael B'aliya's financialresources may have been certain business circles. For instance, on the eveof the 1996 elections, there were rumours that Yisrael B'aliya had receivedmoney from the Israel Association of Building Contractors, whose memberswere interested in Sharansky's plans to construct affordable housing for newimmigrants and young married couples.

Israeli electoral law, however, imposes strict limitations on both local andforeign donations to political activities. Thus, leaders of new immigrantparties, as well as mainstream parties, refrained from conducting (at leastopenly) fundraising campaigns among Russian Jewish businessmen in Israeland in the diaspora. Israeli politicians also had to take into considerationIsraeli public sensitivity to overdramatized media speculation about theinfiltration of the Russian Mafia into the Israeli establishment. (According toNatan Sharansky, 'discussions of the "Russian Mafia" surface during periodswhich surprisingly coincide with elections in Israel.'51

Many Israeli parties often circumvent the limitations through amutot -non-profit associations which, alongside their declared welfare,educational, cultural or other social-related activities, are used to channelmoney into the electoral funds of 'fraternal' political movements. The levelof use of these associations for such purposes in Israel became clear duringthe scandal and police investigation around Barak's amutot, which helpedhim and his One Israel bloc to win the 1999 elections.52

Some of the Russian parties also used this method to finance theiractivities. One such example was the support which Yisrael B'aliyareceived from the Olami Association, which was founded in 1994 for publicactivities on behalf of new immigrants and, in its turn, received money from

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various sources, including the American-based Israeli LeadershipAssociation.53 Between the 1996 and the 1999 elections, the Israeli mediadiscussed relations between Yisrael B'aliya and the Shamir Association forPublications. (The former director general of this association, Betsalel Shif,was appointed chief treasurer of the party, and then served as Sharansky'spolitical advisor.)

On the eve of the 2001 prime ministerial elections it became clear thatthe radical left-wing Peace Now movement had helped finance HabehiraHademocratit, as well as other left-wing parties, using funds provided by theEuropean Union. According to the Israeli media, this money was used forthe political education of immigrants from the former Soviet Union,'according to party principles', and other propaganda activities such as thepublishing of posters, bumper stickers and advertisements in the Russianpress, together with organizing meetings.54 Habehira Hademocratit alsoreceived European money directly through the non-profit association, TheInstitute of Democracy and Leadership for Immigrants from the USSR. Thisassociation was founded by Roman Bronfman in 1998, and in 1999 itreceived 400,000 from the European Council. According to the Israelimedia, this 'coincidentally coincided with Roman Bronfman and AlexTsinker leaving Yisrael B'aliya to form a new party'.55

For the parties already represented in the Knesset, however, the publictreasury is the main source of funding. Yisrael B'aliya, Yisrael Beiteinu andHabehira Hademocratit receive the equivalent of about US$18,000 a monthfor each Knesset member. Parliamentary parties are also eligible to fundtheir electoral campaign from the treasury - about 1.4 million shekels(about $350,000) per Knesset member),56 a right that was fully used byYisrael B'aliya in the 1999 elections. During the 2001 campaign for primeminister, Yisrael B'aliya, Yisrael Beiteinu and Habehira Hademocratit, likeother parties, supported one of the candidates that ran on behalf of the twolarge parties instead of selecting their own candidate, received 330,000shekels per each Knesset member. According to Israeli media, most of thismoney the parties spent on meeting their immediate internal needs.57

Despite these and other sources, Israeli new immigrant politicalmovements, like their counterparts, have expenses which often exceed theirbudgets. As a result, many of them have substantial financial overdrafts,which have forced the parties to cut down on political activities, close smallparty branches and recommend using resources from local governmentorgans whenever possible.58

Party Factions in the Knesset and in Local Government Organs

In light of the above, achieving representation in the Knesset and in localgovernment organs is not only the most important way to implement party

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policies, but also an important measure of a movement's organizationalsurvival. The new immigrant parties that did not win a Knesset seat havemore or less disappeared.

The Knesset faction of each of the parliamentary Russian parties enjoysa central place in their infrastructure. For instance, in September 1997,Yisrael B'aliya initiated an institute of liaisons of its parliamentary faction.Currently represented in 67 cities and directed by the head of the party'sKnesset faction, its aim is to build a bridge between the electorate, centraland local party branches, and government organs.59 In addition, after the1998 local elections, Yisrael B'aliya was represented in more than 60 localgovernments with about 100 deputies, including 17 deputy mayors, electedon the party platform.60 Despite the fact that some of these people leftYisrael B'aliya for other political organizations, the party's factions in localgovernment are still an important stronghold within the party'sinfrastructure. It is noteworthy that 9 of the 15 seats in the highest partyorgan - the executive committee, elected in February 2001 - were taken byYisrael B'aliya's deputy mayors, and three others by council members.61

This is also true for Yisrael Beiteinu, where Russian municipal blocs andmovements were the initial background to its origin. Thus, already in May1999, the party (according to its press office) was represented by 40deputies in 23 municipal councils, most of whom came to Yisrael Beiteinufrom other parties.62 Leaders of Yisrael Beiteinu municipal factions alsohead the local party branches, and the most prominent among them (LarisaGershtein, Semeon Katsenelson, Mark Basin and others) also head regionalYisrael Beiteinu chapters. Thus, the party's integrated infrastructurefunctions in symbioses with its local government factions, which are themain centres of the party's organizational activities.

The Knesset faction of Yisrael Beiteinu is responsible for strategicplanning, ideological development, and information and propagandaactivities.63

Habehira Hademocratit can be regarded as the most 'parliamentarian'among the Russian parties. Most of the political activities of this party,initially a secessionist faction from Yisrael B'aliya after 1999 elections, areconcentrated in its Knesset caucus and in related initiatives. However, theparty is largely underrepresented in local governments. To date, the onlyprominent figure from local government is businessman and Jerusalem citycouncil member Slava Premisler who had been chairman of the unsuccessfulTikva party before joining Habehira Hademocratit in May 2001.

Habehira Hademocratit's lack of representation in local governmentorgans distances it from very important political resources including controlover socially important projects, as well as opportunities to reward activistswith administrative appointments. This limits the party's organizational

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efforts and may substantially damage its political prospects.64 According toa study by the Tel Aviv University Institute for Social and Political Research(ISPR) in early 2001, the number of those who would be ready to supportthe party at the polls is five times smaller than the number of respondentsthat in principle identified with the party ideology.65

The Parties and their Allied New Immigrants Associations

Israeli Russian parties also developed different models of relations withvarious new immigrant associations which make up the parties' 'external'infrastructure. For instance, unsuccessful early Russian immigrant partiessuch as Da and Tali were begun in 1992 by leading activists of competingnew immigrant 'umbrella' organizations - the Zionist Forum and the Labor-affiliated Association of New Immigrants from the USSR. Both partiesserved as 'political wings' of these associations, and used their human,organizational and financial resources.66 Similarly, in 1995, the NewImmigrants' Sociological Association, according to its chairman, DavidAptekman, together with some other immigrant organizations, played acritical role in the establishment of Efraim Fainblum's Aliya party,67 whilethe Zionist Forum became the base for the Yisrael B'aliya movement.

In contrast, Russian parliamentary parties of the late 1990s often took onthe role of patron with respect to various satellite new immigrantorganizations. Yisrael B'aliya, which absorbed a number of fellowcountrymen, cultural and other olim organizations, was a champion in thisfield.68 In some cases such organizations are connected to Yisrael B'aliyathrough the 'double functions' of their leaders. For example, MikhailFrenkel is both one of the top party functionaries and the chairman of theAssociation of New Immigrant Teachers. In 1996-2000, the party alsosponsored the establishment of a number of functional and 'task' structures.One of them was a new settlement movement, Hityashvut B'aliya(Settlement on the Rise), inaugurated on 11 April 1999 at the settlement ofMa'aleh Shomron.69

After the 1999 elections, Yisrael Beiteinu also began to developorganizations connected or related to the party structures. Thus, in autumn1999, Yisrael Beiteinu announced the creation of the Women's Forum anda youth movement. The party also enjoys a growing network of relationswith independent and non-political immigrant organizations. For example,Krysha dlia Nuzhdaiushchikhsia (The Roof for Those in Need) is avoluntary organization established by a group of former undergroundZionist activists in the former Soviet Union to initiate extensiveconstruction projects to solve new immigrants' housing problems.70

The party is also active in informal social, demographic and interestgroups of the new immigrant population and sponsors their various

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professional, cultural and social activities." Yisrael Beiteinu was especiallysuccessful in attracting different youth and student groups. (An informalstudent organization, sponsored by the party in 2000, became the secondlargest faction on the student council at Bar-Ilan University, one of theleading academic institutions in Israel.)72

Yisrael Beiteinu has also been successful in gaining the allegiance ofthose working in the infrastructure of competing-parties and associations.For example, in the struggle for leadership in the Zionist Forum, the originaldomain of Yisrael B'aliya, in summer and autumn 1999, Yisrael Beiteinucaptured positions in the Forum.73 The final success came at the ZionistForum convention on 29 April 2001. Professor Michael Nudelman, aYisrael Beiteinu MK, was elected president of the Forum over YisraelB'aliya candidate MK Genadi Rigger.

An attempt to revive the united front nature of the Forum byconverting it into a non-political coordination body of the three IsraeliRussian parties was not successful. While Habehira Hademocratit readilysupported this concept, promoting its activist Boris Elkon to one of thetwo Forum vice presidential positions, Israel B'aliya's reaction wasdifferent. It rejected the idea of rotating the position of president betweenIsrael B'aliya and Yisrael Beiteinu, and similarly refused to take anothervice presidential position, which was offered to MK Marina Solodkin ofYisrael B'aliya. This position was subsequently filled by JerusalemDeputy Mayor Larisa Gershtein (Yisrael Beiteinu).74 In addition, a numberof Yisrael B'aliya-related and independent immigrant associations andactivists left the Forum. Some of them, like Netanya Deputy Mayor LenaKim, announced their wish 'to create a new umbrella organization, whichwould unite the organizations that disagreed to what happened at the April2001 Forum convention.'75

Some Israeli Russian parties are also trying to establish themselves inthe diaspora. These activities are especially important because40,000-50,000 new immigrants (mostly from the CIS countries) arrive inIsrael every year and, according to the Israeli Law of Return, they areimmediately granted Israeli citizenship. Thus, Yisrael Beiteinuacknowledged their intention to create an international Yisrael Beiteinustructure with branches in Moscow, Tashkent, New York, Paris and otherJewish diaspora centres.76 In addition, Yisrael Beiteinu, as well as YisraelB'aliya and some of the Israeli mainstream parties, may exert additionalinfluence in the Russian Jewish diaspora through their recently createdbranches in the newly-established Zionist Federations of Russia andUkraine which, according to the decisions of the Thirtieth Assembly of theJewish Agency for Israel, now get full representation in the JAFI executiveorgans.77

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The revival of a political movement in the Bukharan community, aftera short pause following Lomi's fall in the 1999 elections, was alsoconcurrent with attempts to establish the World Union of Bukharan Jews.Besides Israel, another centre of this movement is in North America. InMay 1999, about 200 representatives from 12 cities gathered for the firstcongress of Bukharan Jews of North America. The next step was theestablishment of the World Union of Bukharan Jews at a meeting inJerusalem in November 2000, where Lev Levayev was elected presidentof the organization.78

Although Habehira Hademocratit lacks a formal network of branchesabroad, Roman Bronfman uses his position as chairman of theparliamentary lobby for Israel-Ukrainian relations to raise the image of hisparty among the Ukrainian Jewish population. Bronfman also served in late2000 and early 2001 as a special prime-ministerial envoy to Russia and theCIS, a mission that ended after the electoral loss of Ehud Barak in February2001.

The Parties and the Press

The Russian-language media is another very important part of Russianimmigrant politics. Some political parties, both Russian and national,publish their own newspapers in Russian. Among the few such newspapersare Moledet (Motherland) and Shinui (Change), published by parties of thesame name, and Dialog, a publication of Habehira Hademocratit. Often onecan see some correlation between the Russian parties and the variousindependent Israeli (and foreign) Russian media. Such cooperation usuallygives the party leaders more political exposure. Independent newspapers,according to observers, 'provide a permanent platform for the immigrants'organizations and their leaderships.'79

Understanding the role of the Russian media has caused some politicalgroups to attempt to impose direct control over these assets. One such caseinvolved Vesti (News), the most popular newspaper among olim, withstrong right-wing leanings and a member of the Yediot Ahronot mediagroup. According to some sources, before the municipal elections of 1998,Rolando Aizen, a co-owner of Yediot Ahronot and a former member of theYisrael B'aliya financial committee, put pressure on the board to dismissVesti's editor-in-chief, Eduard Kuznetsov. The reason for his attack on thisinfluential journalist and well-known hero of the underground Zionistmovement in the USSR was the newspaper's open support for anti-YisraelB'aliya Russian municipal lists, which later became the foundation forLieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party.80

In the 1999 elections, the confrontation between the political camps inthe olim community was reflected in the major Israeli Russian-language

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newspapers. Thus, Vesti almost openly supported Yisrael Beiteinu (as wellas other national camp parties) and Binyamin Netanyahu.81 On the otherhand, Novosti Nedeli (News of the Week), another leading Russian-language daily, supported Yisrael B'aliya and Ehud Barak. After theelections, other Russian language newspapers such as 24 Chasa (24 Hours)and Russkyi Izrail'tyanin (Russian Israeli) seemed to favour HabehiraHademocratit.

The conflict between these parties extended to Israeli electronic media,including radio, TV, and especially dozens of Israeli Russian-languageInternet sites. It is also expected that the newly launched Israeli Russian-language Israel Plus TV channel will also be a target of struggle betweendifferent Russian and Israeli political camps, despite its designatedindependence from direct political influences.82

Conclusion

The Russian immigrant parties in Israel, which represent both the sectarianinterests of this community and the ideological, social and culturalcleavages within it, have succeeded in establishing themselves as animportant part of the Israeli political system. This success can be attributedto many factors - the political situation in Israel of the 1990s, demographicand ethnic cultural trends in Israeli society, and the social experience andpolitical culture imported by the new immigrants. On the other hand, it isnot yet clear whether this success marks a long-lasting phenomenon, orwhether it depends on political circumstances and the dated social andcultural trends in the Russian immigrant community.

In any case, it is clear that the political future of Israeli Russian politicalorganizations depends on the degree of integration of new immigrants, theparties' natural electorate, into Israeli society. There are at least three trendsthat currently affect the Russian immigrant community in this sphere. First,there is the trend (more popular among immigrants with a strong Jewishidentity) to almost completely integrate and acculturate into the nativeJewish Israeli environment. The opposite trend is characterized by thenegativism of some immigrants toward Jewishness and Israel, and a lack ofreadiness to integrate into local society. The third, middle trend tendstoward integration without acculturation, that is, becoming an integratedpart of Israeli Jewish society while preserving Russian Jewish ethnicidentity and communal integrity.

In different proportions these three trends are combined in the ideologyand activities of the Israeli Russian parties, both those represented in theKnesset and political movements with no representation. The futuredevelopment of specific parties may follow any of these scenarios:

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(a) The gradual transformation of sectarian Russian movements intomainstream political parties, which represent a specific ideological and/orsocial cluster of politics;(b) The preservation of Russian political parties, either independent or partof wider political blocs, as communal options to present the interests of acultural faction which is also integrated into Israeli society;(c) The establishment of a ghettoized political movement on the periphery

of the Israeli political sphere;(d) The total disappearance of Russian parties as sectarian organizationswith the integration of new immigrants into mainstream Israeli politics.

Although each of these scenarios has its analogy in the country's politicalhistory, their realization will depend on concrete demographic, social,cultural, political and other developments that Israel faces in the newcentury.

NOTES

1. Shlomo Groman, 'Karta novogo russko-evreiskogo iskhoda' [The Map of the New Russian-Jewish Exodus], ICPA-2 (Information Bulletin of the Second International Conference onPersonal Absorption of Jewish Immigrants [Repatriates] from the Former USSR), No.1 (2November 1999), pp.3-4.

2. Reports of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem, December 2002, pp.2-4.3. See Vladimir Khanin, 'Political Institutionalization of Russian Jewish Ethnicity in the

Modern World: the Experience of Israel and the Diaspora', in Eliezer Ben-Rafael, YosefGorni, and Ya'acov Ro'i (eds.), Contemporary Identities Throughout the Jewish World(Laden and Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003).

4. Zvi Gitelman, 'Yehid, Kehila Vamedina: Hitna'agut Politit Shel' Yehudei Russia VaukrainaKayom.' [Personality, Community, and State: the Political Behavior of Jews of Russia andUkraine Today]. Lecture given at Tel Aviv University, 10 June 1999; and Vladimir Khanin,'Institutionalization of Post-Communist Jewish Movement: Organizational Structures,Ruling Elites, and Political Conflicts', Jewish Political Studies Review, Vol.14, Nos.1-2(Spring 2002), pp.5-28

5. On Israeli ethnic parties, see Hanna Herzog, Kehilot Bapolitika: Dimyoni Ureali[Communities in Politics: Imagined and Real] (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1986) (in Hebrew);Hanna Herzog, 'The Ethnic Lists in the 1981 Elections,' in Asher Arian (ed.), The Electionsin Israel, 1981 (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 1983), pp.61-87; U. Schemer, Sergio DellaPergola, U.Avner, Ethnic Differences Among Israeli Jews: A New Look (Jerusalem: Institute ofContemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and American Jewish Yearbook,1991), pp.84-6, 91-103; Benyamin Neuberger, 'The Arab Minority in Israeli Politics: FromMarginality to Influence,' Asian and African Studies, Vol.27 (1993), pp.149-69; Daniel BenSimon, Kesem al'shivtei melekh: Israel erev bhirot'99 [Disenchanted Tribes: Israel Goes toElections] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 1999)

6. Ma'ariv, 9 October 1998.7. The last Zionist organizations were dissolved in the USSR in 1936. See Zvi Gitelman, A

Century of Ambivalence (New York: Shocken Books, 1988); Benjamin Pinkus, The Jews ofthe Soviet Union. The History of a National Minority (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1988); and Yaacov Ro'i, The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1967(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

8. Bernard Reich, Meyrav Wurmser and Noach Dropkin, 'Playing Politics in Moscow and

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Jerusalem: Soviet Jewish Immigrants and the 1992 Knesset Elections', in Daniel Elazar andShmuel Sandier (eds.), Israel at the Polls, 1992 (Lanham: University Press of America andJerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1995), p.145.

9. Eliezer Leshem and Moshe Lissak, 'Development and Consolidation of the RussianCommunity in Israel', in Shalva Well (ed.), Roots and Routes: Ethnicity and Migration inGlobal Perspective, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1998), p.160.

10. See Matvei Geiger, 'Agony of the Public Structures', http://ispr.org/politinl.html, andArkady Zubov, 'Sionistskii Forum: istoriya l'ubvi' (The Zionist Forum: A Love Story),Izrail' segodnya: sobytia, kommentarii, analitika [Israel Today: Events, Comments, andAnalyses], 1 May 2001.

11. Author's interview with one of the seminar organizers and, later, chairman of the Jerusalembranch of Yisrael B'aliya, Natan Patlas, lecturer, Hebrew University of Jerusalem(Jerusalem, June 2000).

12. 'Ways and Possibilities of the Realization of the Social and Political Potential of Aliya fromthe USSR/CIS in Israel.' Protocol of section 1 meeting, 10 November 1994 (in Russian). Theauthor is grateful to Natan Patlas for a copy of this protocol.

13. Yediot Ahronot, 18 March 1996; Vesti, 18 March 1996.14. See Vladimir Khanin, 'Israeli 'Russian' Parties and the New Immigrant Vote', Israel Affairs,

Vol.7, No.2/3 (Fall 2000), pp.101-3415. For details, see Vladimir Khanin, 'Israeli "Russian" Parties', pp.123-9.16. Daniel Ben Simon, 'Christmas Presents', Ha'aretz, 29 December 2000.17. Author's interview with Yosef Begun, Kiev, August 2000.18. Author's interview with Ze'ev Geyzel, December 1999. See also Ze'ev Geyzel,

Politicheski'e struktury Gosudarstva Izrail' [Political Structures of the State of Israel](Moscow: Institute of Israel and Middle Eastern Studies, 2001), p.128.

19. Ha'aretz, 8 July 1999.20. This official reaction by Yisrael B'aliya was first broadcast by Reka — Voice of Israel in

Russian, 8 July 1999.21. Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), 21 July 1999.22. Dina Seigel, The Great Immigration: Russian Jews in Israel (New York and Oxford:

Berghahn Books, 1998), pp. 163-7. On the eve of the January 2003 elections Alex Tsinker,the second Habehira Hademocratit Knesset member, who remained outside after the joiningof Roman Bronfman and his party to electoral bloc with Meretz, announced the recreation ofthe Za Edinstvo i Dostoinstvo Aliyi party, seeking the vote of 'non-Jewish immigrants fromthe FSU' and former citizens of Armenia, Tsinker's home country (See: Tribuna, 18November 2002)

23. Vesti, 30 March 1999.24. Khanin, 'Israeli "Russian" Parties', pp.13-14.25. Israel 2000: Ideologia Umetsiut [Israel 2000: Ideology and Reality]. The Mission Statement

of Yisrael Beiteinu (Jerusalem 2000), pp.2-3.26. See Dialog (publication of Habehira Hademocratit), No.1 (July 2000), pp. 1-3.27. Guidelines of new mission statement of Yisrael B'aliya were announced by Director General

of the party Eli Kazhdan in his interview in Vesti, 29 March and 5 April 2001.28. Michael Rivkin, 'Da?', New Outlook, Vol.35, No.3 (1992), p.41.29. Novosti Nedeli, 14 April 1999.30. Nadav Shragai, 'Yisrael B'aliyah Won't Settle for Less', Ha'aretz, 8 June 1999.31. Raphaell Nudelman, 'Hanisayon Lehadesh Hazionut: Bein Aliya Shnot Hashivim Lealiya

Shnot Hatishim' [Attempts to Renew Zionism: Between the Aliya of the 1970s and the1990s], Yehudei Brit Hamoetzot Bama'avar, Vol.4(9) (2000), pp.67-84.

32. Jerrold Kessel, 'Russian Immigrants May Be Major Influence on Israeli Elections,' CAWWorld News, 16 February 1996.

33. Natan Sharansky expressed this view on the Israel TV Channel 2 talk-show 'Dan ShilonWelcomes', 12 July 1995. Similar views were expressed by leading activists of his party. SeeSeigel, p.171.

34. See Programma partii 'Nash dom Izrail" [Program of the Yisrael Beiteinu Party], Jerusalem,February 1999 and December 2002, accessed at www.beytenu.org.il: 8101/r-part-prog.htm.

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See also interview of Michael Nudelman, 'Economika dolzhna byt' sotsial'no orientirovana'[Economics Must be Socially Oriented], Vesti-Kaznatchei, 18 January 2001, p.8.

35. Quoted in Dan Ogen, 'Habehira Hademocratit Under the "Dressing" of 'Social Centrism",accessed at www.ispr.org/demokr.html.

36. Igor Moldavsky, interview with Roman Bronfman, Vesti, 19 August 1999.37. Author's interview with Roman Bronfman, Moscow, September 2000.38. 'Israel B'aliya, The Statute, 1998', Part II, Art.46.39. Avigdor Lieberman's presentation to a meeting of Yisrael Beiteinu activists in Kedumim,

October 2001.40. Interview with MK Yurii Stern, Jerusalem, August 1999.41. Quoted in Baruch Kliain, 'Gendirector Tisrael B'aliya' [Yisrael B'aliya's Director-General],

Vesti, 5 April 2001.42. Author's interview with Michael Brodsky, press secretary of Yisrael B'aliya Knesset faction,

Tel Aviv, 27 June 1999.43. Vesti, 5 April 2001 and the author's interview with Shimon Eisenberg, Israel B'aliya

Executive Council, December 200244. Vesti, 30 August 1999.45. David Zev Harris, 'New Party: Separate Rabbinate, State', Jerusalem Post, 8 May 2000.46. Israel B'aliya: Dva goda na politicheskoi karte [Yisrael B'aliya: Two Years on the Political

Map] (Jerusalem: Tisrael B'aliya Press Service, September 1999), pp.41-2, 44.47. See the official site of Yisrael Beiteinu: www.beytenu.org.il.48. Harris, 'New Party.'49. Author's interview with MK Roman Bronfman, Moscow, September 2000.50. Vesti-2, 11 January 2001, p.1.51. Natan Sharansky's statement was quoted in Vesti, 25 March 1999, p.5.52. On the amutot scandal, see Barry Rubin, 'External Factors in Israel's 1999 Elections', Middle

East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol.3, No.4 (December 1999), accessed atwww.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria.html.

53. Yoav Yitzhak, 'Delo o tovarishchestvakh Sharanskogo' [The Case of Sharansky'sAssociations], MIGnews, 2 August 2000, p. 11.

54. Ha'aretz, 28 January 2001; and Vesti, 29 January 2001.55. See Yoav Titzhak, 'Kakh Bokhash Haihud Haeiropi Bainyanim Politim Bamedinat Yisrael'

[The way the European Union Intervened into the Affairs of the State of Israel], Maariv, June22, 2001; Dov Kontorer, 'Skupleny na kornu' [Totally Bought], Vesti-2, 28 June 2001,pp. 1-2.

56. Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House,1998), p. 155.

57. Gai Leshem and Uzi Daian, 'Lo Rak Sharon Zakha Baphirot' [It Was Not Only Sharon WhoWon the Elections] Yediot Ahronot - Musaf Shabbat, 9 February 2001, pp.15, 25.

58. A solution suggested by Yisrael B'aliya's executive committee to its local factions when theparty entered into difficulties in paying back electoral bank loans after the 1999 elections.Author's interview with Yisrael B'aliya spokesman David Schechter, Tel Aviv, 8 July 1999.

59. Khanin, 'Israeli "Russian" Parties', p.111.60. The author was provided with this data at Yisrael B'aliya central headquarters in Jerusalem.61. See official site of Yisrael B'aliya, www.aliya.org.il.62. Press release of Yisrael Beiteinu, 19 May 1999.63. Author's interview with Yurii Stern, Jerusalem, August 1999.64. Authors interview with the press secretary of the party, Mark Gorin, Tel Aviv, January 2001.65. The poll results are published at www.ispr/all.html.66. Leshem and Lissak, 'Development and Consolidation,' p. 156. See also Zvi Gitelman,

Immigration and Identity: Resettlement and Impact of Soviet Immigrants on Israeli Politicsand Society (Los Angeles: Wilstein Institute of Jewish Policy Studies, 1995).

67. Interview with Professor David Aptekman, Ashkelon, February 2001. See also Seigel,pp.148-50, 164-6.

68. Vremya, 24 March 1999.69. Ha'aretz, 8 June 1999.

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6 0 NATIONALISM and ETHNIC POLITICS

70. The association, according to its chairman, Bella Gul'ko, finds more understanding withYisrael Beiteinu leader and former National Infrastructure Minister Avigdor Lieberman,rather than in the Yisrael B'aliya-controlled Ministry of Construction and Ministry ofImmigrant Absorption, which run a competing mikbazei di'ur housing project. The latter islobbied by powerful associations of building contractors. Interview with Bella Gul'ko,Jerusalem, February 2001.

71. The information was provided by a top Yisrael Beiteinu official.72. Author's interview with then Bar-Ilan University student leader Hatuna Amshikoshvilli,

October, 2000.73. Matvei Geiger, 'Agony of the Public Structures', accessed at www.ispr.org/politinl.html.74. Arkady Zubov, 'Boi za Sionizm' [A Battle for Zionism] Izrail' segodnya, 1 May 2001.75. See Viktoria Martynova, 'Posle boya' [After the Beatings], Vesti, 3 May 2001, p.6.76. Lev Avenais, '"Our Home" Builds its Home', accessed at www.ispr.org/ndi.html.77. The author is grateful to Yosef Zissels, chairman, Zionist Federation of Ukraine, and

Professor Michael Chlenov, chairman, Zionist Federation of Russia, for copies of theprotocols of the CIS delegation meetings in Jerusalem, June 2001.

78. Vesti, 19 November 2000.79. Yosef Shagal, 'Po slukham i po sushchestvy' [According to Gossips and According to the

Essence], 24 Chasa, 20 December 1999, p.6. Some observers also see a political dimensionto the fact that Eduard Kuznetsov is married to Larisa Gershtein, a Deputy Mayor ofJerusalem and a founder of Israel Beiteinu party.

81. In January 2000, Eduard Kuznetsov was finally forced to leave the newspaper and togetherwith a group of Vesti journalists founded MIGnews weekly, which became the most right-wing among the major Israeli Russian printed media. Afterward Vesti moved to the centre ofthe political spectrum.

82. One was able to get this impression from the opening presentation of the Israel Plus TVchannel 9 November 2002.

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the new russian jewish diaspora and ‘russian’ party politics in israel

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