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Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Land Use Policy

journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / landusepol

he living commons of West Tyrol, Austria: Lessons for land policynd land administration

ein van Gilsa, Gerhard Sieglb, Rohan Mark Bennetta,∗

UNU School for Land Administration Studies, ITC Faculty, University of Twente, Enschede 7500 AE, NetherlandsDepartment of History and European Ethnology, University of Innsbruck, Austria

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 18 June 2013eceived in revised form 7 October 2013ccepted 11 October 2013

eywords:lpine pastoral commonsand administrationand tenureand policystrom’s design principles

a b s t r a c t

A right of commoners to pastures existed since the Early Middle Ages in Anglo-Saxon England and theEuropean mainland, including Tyrol in Austria. Lowland commons institutions were largely dissolved bythe 19th century; however, in the European Alps contiguous commons remain alive. Some two thousandalpine commons institutions are registered in the Tyrolean parcel cadaster and land registry. A specificstudy of West-Tyrolean commons (known as Agrargemeinschaft or AGMs), framed by Ostrom’s designprinciples is presented. General lessons for land policy and land administration are extracted. An inter-view period was split between the Inn valley and the Ötztal. Roughly half are considered independent:others are regulated by the Tyrolean Agricultural Authority. Some AGMs hold the full bundle of land rights:others only hold pastoral and forestry rights. AGMs consisted either of a single cadastral parcel or severalcontiguous parcels. In the Inn valley villages the pastoral commons were owned by the municipalities,while in the researched Ötztal, AGMs are frequently the full owners of the commons. AGM membershipranges between 5 and 60 farm households. The number of livestock units pastured was in most casesstipulated in approved regulations. Alpine commons larger than 200 ha are also hunting-zones: revenueis collected from the lease of hunting rights. Most of the alpine commons are designated and used as ski-zones. Upper portions of two alpine commons in the Ötztal are state protected natural areas. The numberof farms with pastoral rights is declining at District and State level. Key lessons for land policy and landadministration include: Ostrom’s design principles being a precondition rather than a panacea; com-

mons institutions requiring one clear ownership party; both public and collective ownership producingsuccess; publically owned commons requiring a local representative; small membership numbers beingpreferable; small shareholdings not being preferable; decentralized governance being beneficial; internaldemocratic elections being beneficial; internal boundary records being superfluous; explicit sanctionsbeing superfluous; mixed economies being acceptable; and geography being a significant influence on

comm

the longevity of pastoral

ntroduction

‘The tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) has informed mul-ilateral land policy for decades (e.g. World Bank, 1975; Feder,985; Perrings, 1993; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; Rohdet al., 2006; MCC, 2012). Hardin opens with an allegory, a pasture

open to all’ used by pastoralists who maximize individual profitsesulting in a Malthusian catastrophe. Hardin recommends enclo-ure as a means of preventing such tragedies. However, empiricalvidence of pastoral commons open-to-all and the efficacy of enclo-

ure are not provided (Handy, 2013). In reality, pastoral villageommons are often collectively held lands with restricted andndividual use rights (De Vries, 1976; Dahlman, 1980; Dickel and

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 053 4874 339; fax: +31 053 4874 575.E-mail address: r.m.bennett@utwente.nl (R. Mark Bennett).

264-8377/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.10.011

ons.© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Mietzne, 1999; Weckl, 1968). Pastoral village commons withouttragedy are also recorded side-by-side with enclosed, individu-ally held degraded pastures in the same environment (Ward et al.,1998; Rohde et al., 2006). The apparent scarcity of degraded pas-toral village commons suggests mechanisms other than enclosureare preventing a tragedy. Socio-political control mechanisms, nowrecognized as Ostrom’s design principles, have been identified byOstrom (1990). Further, longevity of commons institutions is asso-ciated with a modest number of commoners (Wade, 1987). Inspiredby Ostrom’s design principles, new pastoral commons suchas ‘community-based natural resource management’ (CBNRM)including wildlife commons on pastoral commons (Nature Conser-vancies) have been instituted, notably in the pastoral regions of

southern Africa (Blaiki, 2006; Dressler et al., 2010; NACSO, 2013;Suich, 2010, 2013).

‘Commons’ is a familiar concept in English and American sci-entific literature. However, a right of commoners to pastures has

Use P

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H. van Gils et al. / Land

een practiced since the Early Middle Ages in Anglo-Saxon Englandnd the European mainland (Oosterhuizen, 2011) including TyrolGrimm, 1910; Wopfner, 1995). Therefore the use of the Anglo-axon term for pastoral commons to represent the numerousocal names (Annex) seems conceptually appropriate and practical.hese commons consist of three elements, a relatively large parcel,collective of commoners holding rights to the parcel, and tenure

ules outlining the relationship between parcel and commoners.n the northwest European lowland and the Alps, the commonersre often the owners of ancestral farms (Annex). The acreage ofhe farm parcels defines the use-share in the pastoral commonspro rata parte) and is expressed in animal units (De Vries, 1976;ahlman, 1980; Dickel and Mietzne, 1999; Vivier, 1998; Holzner,007). During the Middle Ages, ownership of all lands includingommons was progressively claimed by feudal landlords. Towardhe end of medieval feudalism in the 15th century many lowlandnd alpine commons had obtained written rules and regulationsSlicher van Bath, 1960; Kos, 2009; Casari, 2007; Tagliapietra, 2011;

eckl, 1968). The lowland commons institutions in Europe wereargely dissolved in the 18th and 19th century. This dissolutionntailed partition of the commons parcel and allocation of a piece ofhe parcel to each of the commoners. In other cases entire commonsre sold as hunting grounds, country estates, conifer plantations,r were nationalized and subsequently transferred to municipali-ies (Visser, 1975; Whited, 2000). In contrast, in the European Alpsontiguous commons are alive. However, tenure information onontemporary pastoral commons appears to be absent, with thexception of the iconic Swiss village (Netting, 1976; Ostrom, 1990).eyond Europe, alpine pastoral village commons are widespread

n the Himalayas (Mohammad, 1989; Jodha, 2008; Bhasin, 2011)nd the Andes (Westreicher et al., 2006). In contemporary Africaowland village commons prevail in savanna and grassland biomesKalabamu, 2000). However, the land rights of African, Himalayannd Andean commoners are transferred privately, locally and orallycross generations until recently. Demarcation and registrationf pastoral commons in Africa commenced in Botswana duringhe late 1960s and subsequently in neighboring countries (e.g.apitango and Meijs, 2010; Malatsi and Finnström, 2011; cf. Kenya,007).

About two thousand commons have been registered in theyrolean parcel cadaster since the mid-19th century and in the landegistry (Grundbuch) since the early 20th century by collectives ofarmers (e.g. Alminteressentschaften), currently known as Agrarge-einschaft - hereafter AGM. Half of these AGMs are independenthile the other half is regulated by the Tyrolean Agriculturaluthority (TAA; Agrarbehörde). Regulated AGMs have no access toivil law courts, but instead to state (Landesagrarsenat; LAS) andederal (Oberster Agrarsenat; OAS) agrarian tribunals and to theonstitutional court (Verfassungsgerichtshof; VfGH). Recently, reg-lated AGMs have been categorized as either AGMs with their own

and (typical AGM) or AGMs on public land (Gemeindegutsagrarge-einschaft; VfGH, 2008; TFLG-Novelle, 2010). These categories will

e referred to as independent versus municipality AGM. The inde-endent AGM holds the full bundle of land rights, whilst theunicipality AGM holds only pastoral and forestry rights: otherithdrawal rights (‘Substanz’) and their revenues are appropriated

y the municipality. The withdrawal rights may include hunting,verpass for ski-slopes, ski-lifts, land lease and sale for build-ngs, telecom towers, access roads and quarries. Estimates on theroportion of AGMs on public land vary from a quarter to 60%Landtag Tirol, 2011; Tiroler Gemeindezeitung, 2012). The distinc-ion between independent AGM versus AGM on public land and

he financial consequences are currently contested in the agrarianribunals and constitutional court.

In the second half of the 20th century three pan-European trendsffect alpine commons, namely the transformation of subsistence

olicy 38 (2014) 16–25 17

farming, the growth of outdoor-tourism especially in winter, andthe expansion of protected areas for nature conservation. As aresult, land in the commons is in demand for ski-infrastructureand nature conservation. Farming has been surpassed by tourism assource of income in Alpine valleys. Most commoners are part-timefarmers specializing in dairy farming but otherwise directly or indi-rectly employed in tourism (Agrarstrukturbehebung, 1999). In themeantime, alpine pastures are identified as hotspots of botanicaldiversity (WWF, 2004; Holzner, 2007) and considerable expansesare designated as Natura2000 areas (cf. EU, 1992).

The lack of empirical information on the contemporary tenure ofthe European alpine commons invites further research. Empiricalinformation on the commons is scarce and largely deals with ‘dead’commons or commons in pre-modern societies and economies.The remarkable longevity of the European alpine commons pro-vides us with an opportunity to extract generalized land policyand land administration lessons for other contexts. Specifically, thecommons enable testing of the design principles for sustainablepastoral commons, postulated by Ostrom, for the first time in thecontext of a dual use of the commons for pastoralism and outdoor-tourism. From a more practical perspective, the Austrian Alpsappears a promising research area for commons as their presence,extent, number and boundaries appear extractable from the onlinecadaster (DKM, 2012). Finally, policy lessons learnt from Tyroleancommons may contribute to the discourse on the new commons,the CBNRM programs worldwide especially the well-publishedCommunal Area Conservancy Program in Namibia (NACSO, 2013),that seem unaware of their parallels in the Alps and vice versa(Dressler et al., 2010; Lapeyere, 2010; Siegl and Schermer, 2008;Suich, 2010, 2013). The remainder of the article is structured as fol-lows: the research design including an outline of Ostrom’s designprinciples is provided; the study areas are described and justified;results are presented under themes relating to the Ostrom designprinciples; key discussion points are covered; and finally a synthe-sis of key lessons is presented in accompaniment with suggestionsfor future research.

Research design

The overarching methodology was qualitative in nature, withsome additional quantitative data captured as a result of interviewdata compilation. Ostrom’s design principles aided both data col-lection activities and subsequent analysis. A case study approachwas utilized: documents, interviews, and gray literature were gath-ered over specific locations maintaining AGMs. The data acquiredwas synthesized, tabulated where appropriate, and used to under-take the analysis against Ostrom’s design principles. The procedurequalitatively revealed levels of adherence to Ostrom’s design prin-ciples, and also enabled the extraction of generalized land policyand land administration lessons regarding the management ofcommons.

Among the Austrian states, Tyrol was selected as a researchsite because about half of its surface, that is three quarters of thefarmland is commons and a third of these commons contains win-ter sports’ grounds. West Tyrol shows the highest proportion ofalpine pastures held by AGMs (Holzner, 2007). The interview period(08–15 October 2012) was split between the two major valleysin West-Tyrol, the Inn valley and the Ötztal, to allow detection ofspatial diversity of commons tenure. Historically (Graf, 1880), theupper Inn valley is known to contain both commons on public land

(Gemeindealmen) and independent commons (Interessentschaften).Within the Inn valley, the Serfaus-Fiss-Ladis area was selected forits extensive alpine commons. The upper-end of the Ötztal waschosen because the Alpine Research Station of the University of

1 Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25

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Fig. 1. Location map covering the southern portion of West-Tyrol, Austria. Shownare the municipalities of Ladis, Fiss, Serfaus and Sölden, the river Inn and its tributary

8 H. van Gils et al. / Land

nnsbruck in Obergurgl could provide expertise and contacts witheighboring landlords.

Ten interviews were planned. Although this number may seemow, the authoritative literature on commons is often without evi-ence of any concrete case (e.g. Hardin, 1968; Dahlman, 1980) andistorical research (e.g. Netting, 1976; Whited, 2000; Kos, 2009)nd court cases often deal with one or a few commons. Con-equently, ten cases are suggested to provide a contribution tohe knowledge about commons. The interviews themselves wereemi-structured and used Ostrom (1990) design principles as the-atic areas for inquiry. In no specific order these were: (P-1) the

roup boundary definition; (P-2) the alignment of rules governingollective use of goods and local conditions; (P-3) the rule mod-fication processes and the role of those impacted by the rules;P-4) the recognition of self-management by external authorities;P-5) group behavior monitoring processes; (P-6) graduated sys-ems of sanctions; (P-7) low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms;nd (P-8) the existence of nested governance enterprises wherehe commons form part of larger systems. Justification for utiliza-ion of Ostom’s paradigm lies in its widespread recognition in theeld of common pool resource management, and its considerationf issues central to both land policy and land administration – theentral focus of the research.

The Inn valley municipalities (n = 3) received questionnaires inerman in advance. Simultaneously, questionnaires were mailed

o AGMs (n = 2) traceable on the web (Serfaus; Ladis). Shortemi-structured interviews were granted by the Serfaus and Fissunicipalities (n = 2) and the AGM in Ladis (n = 1): the outline of

he questionnaire was followed as much as practical. Remaininguestions were answered by both municipalities from March toay 2013. In the Ötztal, the Alpine Research Station contacted the

eighboring AGMs (n = 8) and the municipality (n = 1) for an inter-iew. As a result seven (n = 7) questionnaires were mailed to AGMs.pon our arrival in the valley the potential interviewees (n = 10)ere telephoned to arrange a date, time and venue for an interview.

our AGMs (n = 4) in the Ötztal completed the questionnaire andould be interviewed each for an hour; the information on a fifthas provided through the neighboring AGM. Between interviewstime-slot was reserved for spontaneous provision of informationeyond the questionnaire. All interviews were conducted in Ger-an by the first author. The metadata of the interviews (n = 8) are

rovided in Table 1.DKM (2012) was used to extract cadastral and municipal

oundaries, parcel numbers, point locations of pastoral commonsAlmen), forest types, ski-zones, hunting zones and nature con-ervation areas. Our questionnaire survey was complementednd cross-checked by analysis of census and spatial data of theommons. The census-based land use statistics per municipal-ty (Statistik Austria, 2012) provide the number and extent ofull-time and part-time individual farm and forest enterprises asell as the number of juridical persons running a farm or for-

st enterprise. The Alm-cadaster (Almkataster, 1986) contains theumber of alpine pastures per municipality. The shareholders of theki-infrastructure companies are provided by FirmenABC (2013).urther, laws, case law, statutes and pertinent publications of localnd regional government were consulted.

esearch area

Research was undertaken at two sites in West-Tyrol, firstly athree contiguous municipalities in the upper Inn valley (Serfaus,

iss and Ladis) and secondly in the string of villages and hamletst the apex of the Ötztal, from Zwieselstein to Obergurgl in theölden municipality (Fig. 1). Serfaus and Fiss each have around onehousand inhabitants, Ladis, Zwieselstein and Obergurgl about half

the Ötztaler Ache.

Administrative boundaries and rivers generalized from DKM (2012).

that number. Over 4000 people live in the thirty or so villages andhamlets of the municipality of Sölden. The population of Serfaus,Fiss and Ladis declined from 1869 onwards but has grown sincethe 1960s. Sölden’s population was stagnant from 1869 onwardsbut growth started earlier in the 1930s (Statistik Austria, 2012).Currently cattle are grazed on the commons at both sites in short-distance summer pastoralism (<15 km). In addition, long-distancesheep pastoralism is practiced at the Ötztal site, also across the Ital-ian border. Our commons in the Ötztal are partly situated within the‘Ötztaler Alpen’ Nature2000 protected area. A small (20 ha) naturereserve (Zirbenwald) is included. Further, the alpine commons areseamlessly zoned as hunting grounds (Jagdkataster (DKM, 2012)).Chamois (Gams) occurs in all, while Ibex is limited to the Masnerand Lader Heuberg commons in Serfaus.

The montane forest in the Inn valley and Ötztal are conifer-ous and consist largely of spruce (P. abies) mixed with larch (L.decidua), both commercial timbers. Scots pine (P. sylvestris) dom-inates at lower elevations in the Inn valley. Sandwiched betweenthe alpine pastures and the spruce belt are Swiss pine (P. cembra)forests. Forest is typically zoned as ‘protection forest (Schutzwald)’for control of avalanches, landslides and rock falls, implying prohi-bition of clear-cutting, but permitting sustainable logging and fuelwood harvesting. None of the forests in the research sites is stateor federal property, but summits and glaciers are.

Results

As per the research design, key results are presented usingthemes that closely relate to Ostrom’s design principles. In order,these include: group boundaries; rules governing land uses; mem-

bership and rule modification; interconnectedness with outsideauthorities; and monitoring behaviors, sanctioning, and disputeresolution.

H. van Gils et al. / Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25 19

Table 1The alpine pastoral commons (Almen) in the apex of the Ötztal from Zwieselstein to Obergurgl (1–5) and in the upper Inn valley: Serfaus-Fiss-Ladis (6–8). Listed are thefunction of the interviewee (first column); the name of the commons as in Almkataster (1986) and the topographic map (second column); the municipality of the ancestralfarms and the municipality of the pastoral commons (third column); and the cadastral parcels within the commons (last column).

Function Commons parcel MUNIa/b Parcel ID

1 CEO AGMc Rotmoos-Kippele Sölden/Sölden 5325/1;5323;5324;5326; 53272 CEO AGM Angerer Alm Sölden/Sölden 4929/1; 4928/13 Secr. AGM Gaislachalpe Sölden/Sölden 1501/1; 1501/2; 1501/4;6400/1; 16794 CEO AGM Timmeltalalpe Sölden/Sölden 4905/1; 4910/1; 49065 CEO AGM Verwallalpe Sölden/Sölden 5133; 5220/16 CEO AGM Lawens/Lader Ladis/Serfaus 2323/1; 2115/2; 2115/4; 2115/5

Lader Urg Ladis/Fiss 21667 Dep. Mayor Wanne/Kuhalm Fiss/Fiss 2158/1; 2143/1;2166

Platzör Fiss/Fiss 2160/1; 2160/2Frommes Fiss/Fiss 2146/3; 2149Schöngamp Fiss/Fiss 2159; 2160/1

8 Office Head Komperdell Serfaus/Serfaus 2369; 2114/1 and othersMunicipality Kerb Serfaus/Serfaus 2114/1

Masner Serfaus/Serfaus 2326Heuberg Ladis/Serfaus 2321

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municipality to a hunting cooperative (Genossenschaftsjagd) of res-ident parcel owners (Serfaus: surface area minus Masner, Heubergand Urg; Fiss: entire municipality; Timmelstalalpe). All our inter-viewees report revenue from the lease of hunting rights (Table 2).

UNIa/b, (a) municipality of the wintering farms/(b) municipality of the pastoral coEO AGMc, Chief Executive Officer (Obmann) of the commons cooperative (Agrargem

roup boundaries

Commons consisted either of a single cadastral parcel or severalontiguous parcels (Tables 1 and 2) in a spatially nested hierarchyith the municipality (Figs. 2 and 3). The commons are gener-

lly situated in the municipality of the ancestral farms exceptor Ladis (Tables 1 and 2) with commons in Fiss and Serfaus.he ancestral farms are grouped in compact villages and hamletsurrounded by hay-meadows. Upslope of the villages stretches aoniferous forest belt and alpine pastures unfold upwards from800 m (Figs. 4 and 5). The parcel boundaries of the pastoral com-ons were known by all interviewees from the online cadaster

DKM, 2012) as well as on the ground. Although incompletelyemarcated on the ground, boundaries of commons are respectedy the neighbors as testified by all informants.

ules governing land uses

The number of livestock units pastured on the commons dur-ng summer was in most cases stipulated in the AGM regulationspproved by the TAA. For example on the Timmelstalalpe, 87 cat-le units were statutorily allowed (I-4). In all except one case (I-3)nused livestock shares of members were taken up for a fee byarmers from neighboring villages (Table 2). Consequently contem-orary livestock numbers on the alpine pasture corresponded to the

evel stipulated in the AGM regulations of decades ago (I-4; I-6). Inddition to cattle, two commons in the Ötztal accommodated sheepnd goat herds of non-members for a fee (I-4 and I-5). Members doot pay grazing fees (Table 2). The Ladis AGM (I-6) reported thathe maximum allowed stocking density in a dry summer resultedn untimely depletion of the pasture and subsequent prematureescent of the cattle to their winter quarters. Further, the high costf bush control, was spontaneously mentioned by the same inter-iewee. Regulators of livestock numbers at the alpine commonsere reported at three levels. Two interviewees (I-1; I-2) empha-

ized self-regulation by the AGM, while others (I-3; I-5) mentionedtate regulation (TAA). A third, more indirect control was foundo be a maximum stocking density stipulated in the context of anU subsidy (I-3). One AGM, the smallest, appears unregulated forivestock numbers (Table 2: I-5).

The alpine commons larger than 200 ha (Table 2) are also

unting-zones (Eigenjagd: Masner, Lader Heuberg, Lader Urg, Gais-

ach, Rotmoos-Kippele, Verwall, Angerer). The hunting right maye leased to third parties. Parcels smaller than 200 ha are consoli-ated in contiguous hunting grounds and mandatorily leased by the

s.haft).

Fig. 2. The location of the studied pastoral commons in the southern portion ofthe municipality Sölden in the Ötztal: Gaislachalpe, Timmeltalalm, Angerer Alm,Verwallalpe oder Verwall (alpe) and Rotmoos-Kippele Alpe.

Cadastral boundaries, rivers, village and hamlet locations generalized fromTirisMaps (2012).

20 H. van Gils et al. / Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25

Table 2Summary of interview responses and document analysis.

Interview 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Valley Ötztal Ötztal Ötztal Ötztal Ötztal Inn Inn InnMunicipality Sölden Sölden Sölden Sölden Sölden Ladis Fiss SerfausCommonsparcel(Alm/Alpe)

Rotmoos-Kippele Angerer Gaislach Timmeltal Verwall Lader Urg Wanne- KomperdellLawens Kuhalm KerbHeuberg Platzör Masner

SchöngampFrommes

Alm/Alpe ha 1100 630 900 1100 660 720 420 450370 400 250720 400 860

170Village/Hamlet Obergurgl Angerer Z-steina Z-stein Pirchhütt Ladis Fiss SerfausOwner AGM AGM AGM AGM AGM MUNI MUNI MUNIHunting lease AGM AGM AGM AGM AGM AGM MUNI AGMSki-Infra lease AGM AGM AGM AGM AGM MUNI MUNI MUNILand lease/sale AGM AGM AGM None AGM MUNI MUNI MUNINo. of membersb,c 7 (6) 15 43 (41) 13 5 67 (27) 40 60Transfer use shares Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No info YesAnnual assembly Yes Yes Yes Yes No na No info YesAGM/external fee No/yes No No No No No/yes No info No infoHerders None None Yes Yes None No info 4 7-8Stock density limit Yes Yes Yes Yes No No info No info NoRegulator AGM AGM EU/TAA None TAA No info MUNI No infoGrazing rules Yes Yes Yes Yes No No info No info No infoSanctions No No Yes No No No info No info No

rms).

za(iT(si

Fm

B

a Z-stein, Zwieselstein.b In round brackets (00): number of farm owners (some natural persons own 2 fac In square brackets [00]: farming members.

Most of the alpine commons are designated and used as ski-ones for part of their surface. The exceptions are the Lader Urgnd Heuberg commons (DKM, 2012) in the Serfaus municipalityTable 2 and Fig. 3). The ski-infrastructure (ski-lifts, restaurants)s built and owned by local shareholder companies (Ltd; GmbH).

he companies have a few large shareholders in the ÖtztalHochgurgler Lift GmbH; Ötztaler Gletscherbahn GmbH), manymall shareholders in Fiss (Fisser-Bergbahnen GmbH) or the munic-pality as majority shareholder in Serfaus (Seilbahn Komperdell

ig. 3. The location of the studied pastoral commons in the Serfaus, Fiss and Ladisunicipalities in the Inn valley.

oundaries and rivers generalized from DKM (2012).

GmbH). All our informants report lease revenues received from ski-infrastructure companies (Table 2). In the Inn valley revenue flowsto the municipality, in the Ötztal to the AGM. In the same way landlease and land sale of the commons is autonomously managed bythe AGMs in the Ötztal and directly (Fiss) or indirectly (Serfaus;Ladis) via the AGM by the municipalities in the Inn valley.

The upper portions of two alpine commons in the Ötztal(Table 1: Rotmoos-Kippele and Verwall; Fig. 2) are included inthe Ötztaler Alpen Natura2000 protected area. At the lower endof the Rotmoos-Kippele commons the Nature Monument Zirben-wald is situated. The lower portions of all commons are ski-zones(Schigebiet) supporting ski-infrastructure. Evidently, ski-zones andprotected areas are mutually exclusive. The two AGMs of pastoralcommons including Natura2000 areas did not report any constraintcaused by the protection status of their lands (I-1; I-5). As the pro-tected patch of Swiss pine forest was considered unsuitable for fuelwood or timber production by the AGM (I-1), its conservation sta-tus was accepted. In this regard, some of the commons appear toexhibit characteristics of a public private partnership (PPP). Thatis, a government activity is being financed and operated through apartnership of government agencies and the AGMs.

Membership and rule modification

Membership of the AGMs ranged between 5 and 60 farm house-holds. Only farmers held pastoral entitlements. The number offarms (full- plus part-time) with pastoral rights to the commons inthe Inn valley villages (Serfaus, Fiss and Ladis) were stable between1995 and 1999, while numbers are declining at District and Statelevel (Statistik Austria, 2012). A similar trend analysis cannot bemade for the researched Ötztal villages and hamlets, because thestatistics are aggregated at the wider municipality level (Sölden).Some AGMs reported institutional members including the munici-

pality (I-8) or a school and church (I-6) without pastoral rights. Notall farming members participate in summer pasturing (I-1: 4 outof 6; I-4: 2 out of 13) as cattle farming is only for a small minor-ity of members the principal source of income. Nearly all farming

H. van Gils et al. / Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25 21

Fig. 4. Elevation profile of the land use and cover in the upper Inn valley. From left (west) to right (east), Furgler summit, Komperdell Alm, forested slope, plateau withS n Ried

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erfaus village surrounded by fields, steep forested slope and the river Inn (betwee

repared with the profile tool and data of Tirol Atlas (2012).

embers are part-time farmers with full-time off-farm employ-ent. Further, the survey showed that the elected chief executive

fficer (Obmann) of AGMs serves a renewable five-year term offfice. The smallest AGM (5 members) informally selected a chiefxecutive (Table 2). Half of the AGMs hired herders (Table 2).

elationship with outside authorities

The two research sites each represent an alternative form ofenure for pastoral commons (Table 2). In the Inn valley munic-

pality AGMs are found. In the Serfaus AGM, the municipality isn AGM member and is represented on the executive committee.he municipal representative ratified land transactions. Further,

ig. 5. Elevation profile of the land use and cover in the upper Ötztal. From left (west)o right (east), the river (Gurgler Ache), Untergurgl/Angern hamlet surrounded byelds, forested slope, Angerer Alm, glacier, water divide = Austrians-Italian bordernd glacier at the Italian side. Horizontal scale factor: 0.5.

repared with the profile tool and data of Tirol Atlas (2012).

and Tösens). Horizontal scale factor: 0.5.

the AGM reportedly relinquished land for public use on requestto the municipality at compensation costs for lost pasture ratherthan at market rates. In addition to the full bundle of withdrawal(substance) rights, the Serfaus municipality owns the dairy on theKomperdell Alm. In Fiss, the AGM transferred ownership and man-agement of the alpine commons to the municipality in the 1970sand retained only the pastoral and forest use rights. The Fiss AGMwas converted to a user cooperative (Interessentschaft). The twoInn valley AGMs (Serfaus and Ladis) transferred revenues resultingfrom the withdrawal (substance) rights to municipalities. In con-trast to the Inn valley, four among five alpine commons in the Ötztalwere found to be independent AGMs holding the full bundle of landrights. Consequently, these four AGMs in the Ötztal did have not totransfer revenues to the municipality (Sölden).

Our sample included an AGM (I-3) that disagrees with themunicipality’s (Sölden) claim on the ownership of the substancerights in their pastoral commons. However, money had not beentransferred by the AGM to the Sölden municipality at the time ofthe interview. The contested tenure of this AGM (Gaislachalpe) asidentified in the survey is reflected in official publications. It is listedas municipality AGM (Tiroler Gemeindezeitung, 2012), but absentas such from another inventory (Landtag Tirol, 2011).

Regarding cross-border interactions (e.g. Italy), no specificissues were reported by the interviewed AGMs. However, inter-views were not undertaken with the sheep owning AGMs ofSouth-Tirol, Italy.

Monitoring behaviors, sanctioning, and dispute resolution

The AGM pasture manager (Alpmeister) and hired herders mon-itored adherence to AGM and external regulations every second tothird day during the summer pasturing season. In addition, cattleowners (I-6) visit their cattle during weekends. Occasionally, tres-passing of a (unfenced) pasture boundary by cattle was observed,the neighboring AGM notified and strayed cattle driven back (I-

8). Sanctions for trespassing were considered superfluous by allinformants. A case of diseased livestock delivered for summer pas-turing was reported to the Veterinary Inspectorate for sanctioning(I-3) (Table 2). Otherwise, the interviewees did not recount any

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iolation by commoners or sanctions against commoners. The twovailable AGM statutes (I-4; I-6) do not foresee fining by the AGMf its members. Instead, the AGM may petition the regulator (TAA)o collect receivables when a member negates on contributions inind (labor) or cash and fine members for violations of AGM statute,GM regulations or management plan.

iscussion

Discussion points are synthesized using a number of themes:dherence to Ostrom’s design principles; the numbers game; theole of geography; tenure reclassification and insecurity; mixedconomies and commons; and the last of the Marken? Thesehemes summarize the findings with respect to the original aimsf the paper, but, also highlight revealed points of interest or unex-ected findings.

dherence to Ostrom’s design principles

The commoners in Tyrol do not report a Malthusian tragedyor people, pasture or stock. The AGMs generally conform to therst three of Ostrom’s eight (8) design principles, while internalehavior monitoring (P-5) and graduated sanctions by the AGMgainst members (P-6) seems currently redundant. Informal, socialanctions seem sufficient within the small villages and hamlets.owever, self-determination within the AGM (P-4) beyond pas-

oralism and forestry has been weakened since the 1990s for annknown and contested number of AGMs on public land: subse-uently the cost of external conflict resolution (P-7) increases. The

ncreasing number of contested AGMs on public land suggested thenterconnected system of nested governance tiers (P-8) is expe-iencing change or is fragmenting. Consequently, following thestrom design principles, the sustainability of the Tyrolean com-ons is at risk. On the other hand, the commons in northwestern

uropean lowland were governed following the same principless currently in Tyrol and have been abolished nonetheless. Con-equently, Ostrom’s design principles may be a precondition forongevity of alpine commons, but is not in itself a sufficiently robustxplanation.

he numbers game

From within the sampled AGMs (Table 2), those on public land,ound in the Inn valley (42.3; SD 13.6; n = 3), appear to have more

ember farms than the independent AGMs found in the Öetztal17.6; SD 4.1; n = 4)1 (Table 2).The number of members of the livingommons in Tyrol (5–60 member farms) found in this research isithin the range (9–77) reported for historical commons (marken)

n the Netherlands (De Moor and Weeren, 2012) and Italy (Stoeckle,009). The membership of the Tyrolean commons is low comparedo the several hundred or even thousands of members per Natureonservancy (NACSO, 2013). Further, the European commons haveset number of member farms. Currently, farmers represent ainority (<5%) among the employed in the Tyrolean municipalities.

n addition most Tyrolean commons include regulated livestockumbers. In the Namibian Conservancies all residents are mem-er (Republic of Namibia, 1996; NACSO, 2013) and stock numbersppear unregulated.

Whilst relatively small membership numbers appear to have

enefits, they also pose a potential threat – particularly if a declin-

ng trend is evident. It remains to be seen whether the low numberf commoners bringing cattle to the pastures is stabilizing or in

1 Whilst Table 2 lists 5 independent AGMs, the ownership of one is currentlyontested (Gaislach) and not included in the calculations.

olicy 38 (2014) 16–25

decline. A continued growth in tourism could ultimately result in avery small number of commoners with an interest in the pastoralcommons. Four scenarios may be envisaged. AGMs may volun-tarily dissolve following the example of Fiss, transfer their land tothe municipality and continue as user cooperative of dairy farm-ers holding pastoral and/or forestry rights on public land. A secondoption seems that a few members acquire neighboring ancestralfarms with pastoral rights on their commons (I-4), thus achiev-ing economies of scale. As a third alternative, commons may beoffered for sale to local ski-lift companies as these have a substan-tial economic interest in the alpine commons. Finally, enclosureof the commons into paddocks suitable for sheep grazing may beviable from a farming perspective, although the resulting fragmen-tation and fencing may be considered unfortunate for their use aswinter sport ground.

The role of geography

The continuity of contiguous medieval highland commons tilltoday in the Alpine countries (Austria, Switzerland, Italia andFrance) suggests the triumph of geography over governance asa guarantee for longevity. In the highlands, the extent of hay-meadows and crop fields providing feed in winter is limited bymountainous conditions (cold climate, relief and shallow soils),year-round livestock numbers are constrained by winter feedand consequently premature depletion of summer pastures isprevented. In addition, the Alps have been peripheral to urbanagricultural commodity markets up to the mid-20th century ham-pering development of market-oriented farming. Instead of a‘tragedy’, the commons in Tyrol are the resource base for a mix ofmarket-oriented livestock farming and outdoor-tourism. Employ-ment and investment opportunities in tourism allowed populationgrowth in villages and hamlets thus counteracting the rural depop-ulation and poverty found in many mountain ranges. Arguably,the commons have facilitated the corporate investment in ski-infrastructure: local investors could lease land for the infrastructurefrom a single institution rather from a large number of farm parcelowners.

Tenure reclassification and insecurity

AGMs with land holdings recently reclassified as public land (in2010) face insecurity of tenure and income. The reclassificationappears not always clear-cut from the cadaster or land registry.Ambiguity prevails on whether hunting and commercial forestryis a component of the pasture and forest use rights or count aswithdrawal rights. In the latter case, the municipality could appro-priate additional revenues. The consequences of revenue transferfrom the AGM to municipality for management of the commonsfor the dual purpose of pastoralism and tourism (e.g. access roadsand bush control) add to the uncertainty. Will municipalities takeup the estate management responsibility of AGMs cost-effectively?Will AGMs be allowed to withhold realistic management fees fromtheir revenues? Additionally, the number of AGMs affected by thesechanges is not known.

The ramifications of this issue have yet to be translated into pol-icy or legislation for limitation of collateral damage to the commonsand the wider economy (TFLG-Novelle, 2010). As an urgent matterof policy, the cadastral and land registry entries of all regulatedAGMs may need to be systematically compiled, compared and re-assessed. The alternative is a clarification by judicial proceedingsfor individual commons over a considerable time period. The cur-

rent dispute also suggests a policy of registering the full bundle ofland rights of commons explicitly at first opportunity. This mightprevent ambiguities as novel land uses emerge, such as ski-tourism.The same issue applies with regards to safari tourism in Africa in the

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0th century, or wind turbine placement for electricity generationn other contexts.

he mixed economy of contemporary commons

In both the Tyrolean commons and the southern African pas-oral and wildlife commons, a contemporary trend is observedrom subsistence pastoralism to a dual economy of market-orientedivestock production and outdoor-tourism. Tyrolean commons are

anaged as multi-sector estates of pastures, forests, hunting andport grounds including access roads. The wildlife (Namibian Con-ervancies) and pastoral commons (Traditional Authority), forxample, co-exist as two independent cooperatives on the sameand. Further, pastoral commons and protected areas (Natura2000)verlap in Tyrol (and exhibit the characteristics of a PPP asiscussed), while the Namibian wildlife commons and State Pro-ected Areas are mutually exclusive (NACSO, 2013). The hypothesisegarding PPPs is suggested as an area for further investigation:essons from the extensive literature body on PPPs may be trans-errable to the realm of pastoral commons management.

he last remnants of the Marken?

The contemporary Tyrolean pastoral commons display strikingnstitutional similarities to historical commons in northwesternurope reinforcing the unifying commons terminology of thisaper. In both cases, pastures are held collectively while grazingights are held individually by the owners of a set of ancestral farms.hese grazing shares are proportional to farm size and expressedn animal units. Further, the commons parcels occur in a spatiallyested hierarchy with the territories of municipalities in both areas.hese institutional similarities of the Tyrolean and northwest Euro-ean pastoral commons appear too fundamental and particular toe coincidental. Therefore, we suggest that the Germanic tribesolonizing the Alps, and England, after the collapse of the Romanmpire imported their tenure template for pastoral commons fromhe northwestern European lowlands. Indeed, the Tyrolean pastoralommons are historically known as ‘Marken’ (Grimm, 1910) as areheir equivalents in northwestern Europe till today (e.g. Dickel and

ietzne, 1999). Further research could investigate this hypothesis.

onclusions

This paper aimed to assess whether a living commons exhibit-ng multi-purpose land uses adhered to Ostrom’s design principles.urther, it aimed to extract new land policy and land administra-ion lessons for the management of commons. In this regard, theollowing twelve (12) summarizing remarks are presented:

1. Ostrom a precondition not a panacea (see section “Adherence toOstrom’s design principles”).

2. One commons. One owner. It appears pertinent to allocate over-arching ownership rights of commons with a single party, be itthe municipality or the collective of the commoners, and legallyallow for both options.

3. Both public and collective ownership can work. Both pub-lic (municipality) and collective private ownership (AGM) ofshared pastures land can be sustainable in terms of allowingfor economic development, and dual pastoral and out-doortourism use.

4. Public ownership? Local presence needed. The owner needs alocal presence, be it the municipality or the collective of thecommoners. This is the case in West-Tyrol where public landownership implies municipal ownership. However, in Africa

olicy 38 (2014) 16–25 23

public usually means national or state ownership: too far awayto interact meaningfully with commoners.

5. Small membership is beautiful. Membership numbers up to amaximum of one hundred, or so, appear to work better.

6. Small shareholdings are not beautiful. The membership boundaryof the group should be clearly defined and limited to those whohave a share in a given, limited amount of land (ancestral farm).This avoids individual shares becoming too small (e.g. half acow) as land is split over generations.

7. Decentralized governance helps. Land policy, legislation, or reg-ulation decisions appear to work better when decentralized tothe subnational (state) level (Tyrol) and implemented at themunicipal level. Such subnational approaches are not present inthe published African examples mentioned in the Introduction(e.g. Namibia, Botswana). Arguably, in these contexts, govern-ments are concerned about regions breaking away from thepatchwork nation: decentralization is not allowed.

8. Internal democratic elections help. Use internal democracy forthe election of the CEO of the AGM. As the membership basegrows this will tend to lead toward municipal land ownership.Smaller membership bases tend to collective private owner-ship. Such internal democracy is not distinguishable in theAfrica examples.

9. Internal boundary records are superfluous. The external spatialboundaries of the group are more important to define thanthe internal. Only external spatial boundaries of the commonsneed be registered in a state or national cadastre/land registry:on-ground demarcation and high precision surveying seemunnecessary and are of low priority for sustainability.

10. Explicit sanctions are superfluous. Explicit, financial sanctions bythe commons institution seem largely superfluous.

11. Mixed economies can grow organically. Formal or informalpartnerships between public institutions and commoners candevelop organically. Public-private partnerhsips are active andsuccessful in West-Tyrol at the local level between municipal-ities and the commons institutions. State legislation neitheractively promoted nor prevented the partnerhsips.

12. The triumph of geography. It appears the geographic location ofan AGM largely actively determines the longevity of a pastoralcommons.

Finally, regarding future research, the hypotheses regarding (1)the transferability of lessons from PPPs literature, and (2) the histor-ical importation by Germanic tribes of their own tenure templatesfrom the European lowlands, could inspire further research activi-ties.

Acknowledgements

The Alpine Forschungsstelle Obergurgl (University of Innsbruck)in the person of Dr. Klaus Schallhart facilitated the interviewsand subsequently the composition of the co-author team. Theinterviewed municipal officials and AGM executives are kindlyremembered for their friendly willingness to answer questions andcomplete questionnaires. However, any misinterpretation of thequoted information is solely the responsibility of the authors. Fred-erick Yirilabuo (Elected District Council member, Ghana) selectedand shaped the ‘Tyrolean Alpine Commons’ as MSc thesis themeat the University of Twente to identify parallels and contrast withAfrican pastoral commons. This paper hopefully helps to designa policy for sustainable commons. Prof. Tine de Moor (Univer-

sity of Utrecht) is acknowledged for stimulating questions anddiscussions in particularly on the issue of sanctions and for infor-mation on the number of members of eight commons in the EasternNetherlands.

2 Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25

A

TH

TN(m

Table A.2 (Continued)

Municipality Juridicalpersona

AGMb AGMc AlpinePastured

Alpine pasturee

No No No No

FrommesSchöngampPlatzörLader Urg (Ladis)

Ladis 3 1 1 0 None

a Number of Farm & Forest enterprises owned by a juridical person(Agrarstrukturbehebung, 1999); the juridical person may be an AGM or munici-pality.

b AGM on public land; Landtag Tirol; Anfrage 385/11 (2011).c AGM on public land; Tiroler Gemeindezeitung (2012); includes AGMs of neigh-

boring municipalities with forest/access rights.d

4 H. van Gils et al. / Land

ppendix A.

See Tables A.1 and A.2.

able A.1istorical indigenous names for pastoral commons on the European continent.

Commons; land parcel Location; current country

Allmende Austria, Germany, SwitzerlandAlpe or Alm Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Italy (Südtirol)Dorfmarken AustriaFeld GermanyGemeinsgrund GermanyGemein/Gemain AustriaGemeindeweide Netherlands; GermanyGemene gronden Belgium, NetherlandsMark(e) Germany, NetherlandsMarkegronden NetherlandsMeent(gronden) Netherlands, BelgiumMontagne FranceMonte (Vecinal en Man Comun) Spain

Commoners; natural personsAlpgenossen SwitzerlandEigengeërfden NetherlandsErfgooiers NetherlandsGeerfden NetherlandsMarkgenossen GermanyMarkgenoten NetherlandsTeiler Switzerland

Commons institution; juridical personAgrargemeinschaft AustriaAlpgenossenschaft Switzerland; GermanyAlpgeteilschaft Switzerland(Alp) Interessentschaft Italy (Südtirol), AustriaBoermarke NetherlandsCommunes FranceGemeinheit GermanyMarke(genootschap) NiederlandeMarkgenossenschaft Germany, AustriaNachbarschaft AustriaRiordinamento delle

associazioni agrarieItaly

Commons statuteAlpbrief AustriaCarte di regola ItalyEinung SwitzerlandMarkeboek NetherlandsRegulierungsbescheid AustriaSchaarbrief NetherlandsWilkeuren Netherlands

Ancestral farms with pastoral rights to commonsErf NetherlandsStammsitzliegenschaft Austria

Volle hoeve Netherlands

able A.2umber of juridical persons owning a farm or forest enterprise, AGMs on public land

municipalities) and alpine pastures per municipality in the researched Inn valleyunicipalities according to various sources.

Municipality Juridicalpersona

AGMb AGMc AlpinePastured

Alpine pasturee

No No No No

Serfaus 2 1 3 7 KomperdellKälbermaisKerbMasner high & lowHeuberg (Ladis)Lawens (Ladis)

Fiss 1 0 1 4 WanneKuhalm

Number of ‘alpine pastures’ (Almen; Almkataster, 1986).e Alpine pastures (Almen); point locations in TirisMaps (2012).

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