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  • The Legacy of Fortress Europe

    Evidence on trade diversion from Nazi Germany's

    confidential wartime foreign trade statistics

    Tams Vony

    University of Groningen

    Groningen Growth and Development Centre

    The paper is work in progress. Please do not circulate and consult the author prior to

    making any reference in published material.

    ABSTRACT

    The paper investigates trade diversion caused by the political reorganisation of Europe

    under Nazi occupation during World War II and its impact on the development of West

    German foreign trade after 1950. The confidential trade statistics of the Third Reich report

    data on both the geographical and commodity structure of German exports and imports that

    can be directly compared with interwar and post-war patterns. I test simple models of trade

    diversion for both the interwar and war years and determine econometrically to what extent

    and for how long pre-existing patterns of trade shaped the regional distribution of West

    German exports and imports during the 1950s and 1960s. In the early 1940s, the German

    economy became more eastward oriented with the eastward expansion of the Third Reich

    and the eastbound thrust of the German war effort. However, the legacy of Fortress Europe

    was short lived, as interwar trade patterns were by and large restored until the mid-1950s.

    The establishment of the EEC marked a new structural break in West German trade

    expansion. In appendix, I report a new constant-price dataset on the commodity structure of

    German/West German exports and imports between 1928 and 1970.

    JEL code: N14, N44, F14, F15

  • 1

    1. Introduction

    World War II represents a watershed in the history of Germany and has long been regarded as an important episode by economic historians. There is a vast literature on the Nazi war economy: on the growth of armaments production, on the reorganisation of labour and resource allocation, and on the financing of Hitlers preposterous quest for world domination.1 Particular attention has been devoted to the exploitation of occupied lands for their natural resources, their labour and their produce, which was estimated at 210 billion Reichsmark. This sum is 50 percent larger than the average annual GNP of the Third Reich during the war.2 It is another long-established notion that Germany exploited smaller nations in its backwater in South-East Europe through bilateral trade agreements, and tied them increasingly to the German war economy.3 This view was questioned by Ritschl, who argued that the much emphasised eastward shift of Germanys external trade from the late 1930s onward has been a sheer myth. In spite of all ideological commitment to the contrary, and in spite of the eastbound thrust of the Nazi war effort, the German war economy was in fact westward oriented.4

    A common characteristic of these investigations is that they relied on scattered

    quantitative evidence. Until recently, Germanys external economic relations have been studied

    on the basis of the Third Reichs clearing balances, as the publication of the official foreign

    trade statistics was terminated after 1940. The clearing accounts give a good indication to the

    extent to which foreign lands were economically exploited by Nazi Germany. However, they do

    not provide an accurate picture on the structure and balance of German exports and imports,

    mainly due to the fact that the foreign balances incorporated a long list of items other than

    commodity trade. Fortunately, the confidential trade statistics of the Third Reich for the years

    1941-1944 survived in the archives. They had been compiled for internal use only; their

    publication and further distribution was strictly forbidden.5 The quantitative analysis of this

    material makes an important contribution to the historiography of the Nazi war economy and

    thus constitutes the main task of this paper.

    Measuring trade diversion during the war is important also because of its implications

    for the development of West German foreign trade after 1950. It is widely agreed that trade

    expansion was instrumental in the growth miracles of the post-war Golden Age, particularly in

    West Germany, where exports grew twice and three times as fast as industrial production and

    national income respectively.6 Thus, the German Wirtschaftswunder has been interpreted by many

    as the outcome of an even more extraordinary export miracle.7 The most popular explanations

    The following abbreviations are used in footnotes: StDR = Statistik des Deutschen Reichs; Auenhandel = Der Auenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. References with no speficied author are publications of the Statistisches Bundesamt or Statistisches Reichstamt. 1 See Milward (1965), Zilbert (1981) and Tooze (2006) among others. For an extensive bibliography of the

    earlier German literature, see Volkmann (1984). 2 Eichholtz (1978), pp. 150-151. Also see Buchheim (1986). 3 See Hirschman (1945), Rnki (1983), and Grenzebach (1988) among others. 4 Ritschl (2001), p. 340. 5 Der Auenhandel Deutschlands, Ergnzungshefte (1941, 1942, 1943); for 1944, see BArch R 3/1626a, pp.

    38-39. In the summer of 1944, aggregate trade statistics were made public at a government press conference and some extracts were later published in Statistisches Handbuch, p. 390 ff.

    6 L. von Delhaes-Guenther, (2003), p. 17, and Giersch et al. (1992), p. 164. 7 See Michalski (1970), Boltho (1982), pp. 479-485, and Wallich (1955), pp. 228-229, among others.

  • 2

    of the latter can be organised into three camps. The first argues that new international

    institutions promoting trade liberalisation and market integration in Europe made conditions

    conducive for export-led growth.8 The second assumes that favourable domestic production

    costs and monetary protectionism enhanced the competitiveness of West German firms.9 The

    third sees the development of Germanys external trade as path-dependent and, therefore, claims

    that both the commodity structure and the regional composition of West German exports

    reflected patterns, or followed trends, that had been established long before the post-war Golden

    Age.10 Ritschl went even further to argue that the continental division of labour was further

    intensified under the Nazi New Order during the war, which laid the foundations for the main

    pillars of European market integration in the 1950s.

    In this paper, I test simple models of trade diversion to explain both the reorientation of

    Germanys external trade in the course of World War II and to measure how large and persistent

    an impact it had on post-war developments. I argue that the German economy actually became

    more eastward oriented with the eastward expansion of the Third Reich and the eastbound drive

    of the Nazi war effort, contrary to the revisionist view. By contrast, the legacy of Fortress

    Europe was rather short lived as the expansion of West German trade in the 1950s by and large

    restored the trade patterns of the interwar period. The regional distribution and the commodity

    structure of German exports and imports began to deviate from long-established trends only

    after the launching of the European Economic Community (EEC). The forceful reorganisation

    of intra-European trade after 1940 was not the origin of trade integration in the post-war era.

    The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview on the geography of

    German foreign trade, including a discussion of the confidential wartime statistics. In Section 3,

    I test simple models of trade diversion, both for the interwar period and for the early 1940s,

    focussing on intra-European trade. In Section 4, I test for alternative causes of trade expansion

    in West Germany after 1950, particularly the presence and persistence of a reconstruction

    dynamic. I aim to determine econometrically to what extent and for how long the restoration of

    pre-existing trade patterns shaped the structure of West German exports and imports and how

    large an impact the new trade promoting institutions, especially the European Payments Union

    (EPU) and the EEC, generated. Section 5 shifts focus onto the commodity structure of

    Germanys external trade based on a constant-price dataset that I constructed, which is reported

    in the Appendix. Section 6 concludes.

    2. The geography of German foreign trade: an overview

    For the purpose of my analysis, I constructed a dataset on country-shares in total German

    exports and imports, based on values expressed in current prices, for several benchmark years

    during both the interwar and post-war periods and the actual war years. For 1950, 1955, 1960,

    1965 and 1970, data have been drawn from the annual foreign trade statistics.11 The 1950

    8 See Milward (1987), Buchheim (1990), and Eichengreen (1995). 9 Carlin (1989), pp. 60-5, and Giersch et al. (1992), pp. 108-16, 176-84. 10 Advocated most strongly in Abelshauser (2001), pp. 510-22, and in Delhaes/Guenther (2003), pp. 85-86. 11 Auenhandel, Teil 1 (1951), pp. 12-13; Ibid (1956), pp. 34-36; Ibid (1961), pp. 32-33; Fachserie G, Teil 1

    (1966), pp. 36-37; Ibid (1971), pp. 42-43.

  • 3

    volume also reports equivalent figures for 1936 (according to 1936 national borders), which

    represents a good benchmark for the post-depression years, but it is not yet too strongly

    influenced by war preparations. To demonstrate how much regional patterns of trade were

    distorted by the impact of the Great Depression, I also collected data for 1928.12

    Unfortunately, we cannot adjust for border changes invoked by the post-war settlement

    in Europe, and within that the partition of Germany. The impact of the more substantial

    redrawing of maps overseas as a consequence of decolonisation is neutralised by adhering to the

    territorial units reported in the interwar trade statistics, which reflect colonial boundaries. As a

    result, my dataset includes regions such as the Arab Middle East that covers modern-day

    Jordan, Iraq and the countries on the Arab Peninsula, or French, British, Portuguese and Spanish

    West Africa, the Union of Rhodesia and the Nyassaland, French Indochina or British Malaya.

    This approach is made appropriate by the fact that I aim to test for the impact of multilateral

    trade agreements on the structure of actual trade flows. The extent to which the former colonial

    possessions of European nations were incorporated into preferential trade zones or currency

    blocs was determined primarily by the relationship of their erstwhile masters to the particular

    institutional frameworks. Furthermore, it is useful to group several entities together that alone

    accounted for negligible shares of Germanys external trade. These adjustments yielded a

    dataset of 95 countries or regions, for which I was able to construct by and large territorially

    consistent figures over time.

    For the early 1940s, the confidential foreign trade statistics report detailed data on both

    the commodity structure and the geographic distribution of exports and imports. The nomenclature

    of commodity groups is perfectly compatible with the official peacetime statistics. Regional

    data is affected to a large but non-quantifiable extent by the border changes that took effect

    between 1938 and 1941. Until 1939, the statistics are based on 1937 national borders. The

    wartime data refer to the Greater German Empire that included Austria, the Sudetenland, the

    Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as well as the annexed territories of Luxembourg,

    Malmedy and Eupen, Alsace-Loraine, Posen, Upper Silesia, the city of Danzig, and most of

    modern-day Slovenia. Nonetheless, this material constitutes the only source on actual wartime

    trade flows that allows for a direct comparison with interwar and post-war patterns.

    Figures 1 and 2 report the share of continents and the major regions of Europe in

    German or West German exports and imports respectively. In order to begin my investigation

    from a long-term perspective, I also included figures for 1913.13 The literature has frequently

    advocated the view that the development of West German foreign trade during the post-war

    Golden Age followed a path established in the first era of globalisation.14 The data demonstrate

    that World War I invoked hardly any changes in the regional composition of Germanys

    external trade, particularly on the export side. The structure of imports shows one significant

    12 StDR, vol. 366.2 (1929), pp. 4-7. 13 Own calculations based on data from StDR, vol. 366.2 (1929), pp. 4-7. 14 I had to make two adjustments on the 1913 data to assure its comparability with aggregate figures in my

    dataset: (1) I assumed that Austria within her post-1919 borders accounted for 25 per cent of German trade with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which equals her approximate share in GDP, Maddison (2006), pages 426 and 476.; (2) Turkish possessions in the Middle East are assigned 30 per cent of German trade with the Ottoman Empire, based on the actual trade patterns in the interwar period.

  • 4

    shift: the sharp decline in agricultural imports from Russia, replaced mainly by imports from the

    Netherlands. The relative weight of intra-European trade remained exactly the same. There is

    clearly no need to incorporate pre-1914 data to demonstrate the influence of long-established

    patterns on Germanys external trade, since the former had survived World War I unwounded.

    The volume of export and imports declined considerably after 1914, but their regional

    composition remained remarkably stable.

    Figure 1: The geographical composition of German exports (%)

    Note: Figures for the EEC refer to member states only, excluding their overseas possessions. Asia

    includes New Guinea and Polynesia. The appellation Western Offshoots refers to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zeeland.

    On the export side, we can also observe a stable pattern for the interwar period, despite

    the Great Depression separating my two benchmarks. Between 1928 and 1936, the share of

    Western Europe in German exports remained practically the same. The minor shift away from

    future EEC member states reflects economic stagnation during the mid 1930s in the Gold Bloc

    countries and strong growth in Scandinavia. Outside of Europe, exports to the Western Offshoots

    contracted more rapidly than exports in total, but this resulted solely from diminished import

    demand in the United States. By contrast, Asia, Latin America and Africa became more important

    export markets. Primary producing economies achieved significant Terms-of-Trade gains and

    thus could import a larger volume of manufactures with the revenue earned from a given

    volume of exports. The composition of German imports was shaken up more significantly. The

    shares of the United States and France fell sharply because Germany lacked the necessary hard

    currency reserves. The shares of the major western powers in German imports were picked up

    by countries which had signed bilateral trade agreements with the Nazi regime during the 1930s.

    Overall, bilateralism and the building of preferential trade blocs made only a limited

    impact on the geography of Germanys external trade. This finding is shared by Ritschl and

    Wolf, who argued that the politically arranged currency areas of the 1930s were endogenous to

    24.1 24.4 23.2

    35.5 36.2

    28.0 29.635.3

    40.4

    32.9 32.2 32.8

    30.033.9

    35.9 33.0

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    0

    20

    40

    60

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    1913 1928 1936 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    EEC Other WE Eastern Europe Western Offshoots Latin America Africa Asia

  • 5

    pre-existing patterns of trade.15 A much more significant diversion of German export and

    imports can be observed during the war, when the Nazi state gradually lost access to its overseas

    markets. Trade with the British colonies and dominions was shut down in 1939. Albeit in small

    volumes, exports to and imports from the Americas and Asia, particularly Japan and her

    possessions, continued until 1941. After the United States had declared war on Germany, the

    African colonies of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal remained the only accessible trade partners

    outside of Europe. Even the latter were lost in 1943, with the exception of Spanish West Africa,

    when the Allies conquered North Africa.

    Figure 2: The geographical composition of German imports (%)

    Note: Figures for the EEC refer to member states only, excluding their overseas possessions. Asia

    includes New Guinea and Polynesia. The appellation Western Offshoots refers to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zeeland.

    Germanys external trade was also reoriented within continental Europe. The future

    member states of the EEC absorbed a larger proportion of German exports than they had done

    before the war. By contrast, the share of other Western European countries declined, due to the

    termination of trade with Britain and the annexation of Austria. However, contrary to the

    revisionist view advocated by Berger and Ritschl, the German export sector actually became

    increasingly eastward oriented with the eastbound drive of the war effort.16 So much so that by

    1942 Eastern Europe absorbed nearly as much, and from 1943 even slightly more, of German

    exports as the future EEC.

    The picture appears different on the import side, but the analysis of wartime statistics on

    imports is made difficult by several distortions and conceptual problems. Direct deliveries to

    German troops, the SS, or civilian organisations and their members abroad were not accounted

    as German imports even if they had passed through a German customs border. Foreign supplies

    15 Ritschl and Wolf (2011). 16 Berger and Ritschl (1992), pp. 19-22.

    14.7 17.4 14.4

    46.8

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    80

    100

    1913 1928 1936 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    EEC Other WE Eastern Europe Western Offshoots Latin America Africa Asia

  • 6

    of both civilian goods and war material transported into the Third Reich were to be included in

    the import statistics, if they were not labelled as Wehrmacht supplies, regardless whether they

    were final or intermediary products destined for further processing within Germany.17 In a

    recent study, Scherner has documented numerous flaws in the official statistics, which the

    authorities were increasingly aware of.18 There is plenty of evidence that a large proportion of

    foreign goods actually consumed by German firms and households were entered as Wehrmacht

    supplies, including black-market purchases by occupying forces, which were transported to

    Germany. Additionally, a vast share of foreign food and fuel transports to German troops on the

    Eastern Front never passed through German customs borders. The re-estimation of German

    imports on the basis of payments transactions, the foreign purchases of the armed forces and the

    accounts of the occupation authorities results in much larger numbers than the official statistics,

    especially from occupied lands.

    Scherners new estimates, however, are difficult to interpret in the present framework.

    The purpose of his study was not to provide import data according to a conventional definition

    of imports, but to reconstruct how Nazi Germany had used different financial means to extract

    resources from foreign lands. Imports were defined as goods produced in a given country and

    purchased by Germany for consumption anywhere outside the country of origin. The Third

    Reich had three means to finance its imports: (a) revenue earned from exports, (b) clearing

    credits received from foreign countries and (c) the occupation tributes. Wehrmacht supplies, in

    particular, were purchased through means (b) and (c) which, however, Germany never repaid to

    the countries it had occupied during the war. Therefore, these supplies are better classified as

    bounty, or war contributions, rather than conventional imports.

    Additionally, increased imports from occupied territories did not reflect the expansion of

    production capacities, but simply the diversion of local output from domestic to foreign military

    consumption. By contrast, it was difficult to secure imports from neutral states or nations allied

    with Germany, as their productive potential was focussed on equipping their own expanding

    armies and on maintaining domestic consumption. In particular, Germany had to grant its allies

    in the East substantial and increasing provisions of intermediate inputs and manufactures

    (mostly coal, metals and machine tools) to sustain their military effort and, at the same time, to

    secure the essential raw-material imports, which until 1939 had been purchased overseas. The

    redirection of German exports to East and South-East Europe clearly demonstrates that Nazi

    Germany had made real efforts to reorient its war economy eastwards.

    Table 1 reports wartime exports and imports according to country of destination and of

    origin, expressed in current prices and based on official statistics. I only list European states

    which continued to trade with the Third Reich in notable volumes at least until 1943.19 German

    trade expanded noticeably with all countries in continental Europe between 1936 and the early

    1940s. However, the trade balance shifted differently depending on the relation of the particular

    17 Der Auenhandel Deutschlands. Ergnzungsheft 1941, p. 3. 18 Scherner (2012). Forthcoming publication, referenced with the permission of the author. 19 Small quantities of German manufactures were exported to Iceland, the temporarily occupied British

    Channel Islands and North Africa, from where some raw-material imports had also been secured, but they were negligible from the perspective of the big picture.

  • 7

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  • 8

    country with Germany. The largest export market was Italy, heavily dependent on German coal

    and capital goods to maintain her own war production and on imported armaments to supply her

    ill-equipped troops. However, exports also increased at a similar rate with smaller allies in the

    East, who played a significant military role both during the invasions of Yugoslavia and the

    USSR. The fastest export growth occurred in relation with Romania and Croatia, the main

    suppliers of crude oil and bauxite respectively, essential raw materials that Germany had to keep

    importing at all cost. The data also demonstrate that the Third Reich became increasingly

    dependent on her satellites by 1943. In light of the subsequent military defeats, it became more

    and more important to keep them in the war and to maintain their economic contribution to the

    Nazi war effort. After Italy had become a warzone and its northern half had been occupied by

    Germany, German exports shifted towards the Balkans even stronger than before.

    On the contrary, Germany secured large net imports from occupied territories, even

    without accounting for Wehrmacht supplies, and their exploitation through trade intensified

    during the war. This also represented a clear break with interwar patterns, which showed

    substantial German net exports to this region. The largest import surpluses after 1940 were

    realised vis--vis France, Belgium and the Netherlands (and occupied Italy in 1944), but in

    percentage terms net imports from Serbia and the western regions of the USSR were just as

    significant. The capacity of Nazi Germany to exert pressure on neutral states clearly diminished

    after Stalingrad. Until 1942, trade with Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey was approximately in

    balance, but in 1943 a large export surplus was required to secure the economic cooperation of

    these countries with an evil regime that had less and less chance of winning the war.

    The General Government represents a special case and offers insight into the working of

    the Nazi Growirtschaftsraum. Its trade with Germany expanded rapidly and was vastly larger

    than interwar trade between the greater Polish state and the Third Reich. Even more strikingly,

    Germany maintained a very large export surplus vis--vis a country which was traditionally seen

    as the most brutally exploited area in wartime Europe. Two factors can solve this puzzle. First,

    as already mentioned, Wehrmacht supplies were not accounted for in official imports. After

    1939, the country turned into a hell for underpaid Polish and forced Jewish labour, but it was a

    heaven for manufacturers with military contracts. Secondly, the increasing eastward orientation

    of German exports was not only driven by the eastbound thrust of the Nazi war effort, but also

    by the eastward expansion of the German Empire itself. The annexation of Austria and the

    highly industrialised western part of Czechoslovakia implied that their exports to Hungary,

    Poland, Romania or Yugoslavia were now accounted for as German exports.

    Furthermore, the exchange of goods between regions that had formerly constituted a

    single entity was suddenly being reported as foreign trade. Transports of goods between

    Germany and Slovakia or between Germany and the General Government was in large part

    made up of trade between regions of the former Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively, which

    had complementary economic structures. Similarly, the wartime division of labour in Western

    Europe was not based on the traditional input-output web that tied the industries of the Ruhr,

    Luxembourg and Lorraine together, as argued by Berger and Ritschl.20 After 1940, these areas

    were annexed by the German Empire. Therefore, trade intensification with France, Belgium and

    20 Berger and Ritschl (1992), 19-22.

  • 9

    the Netherlands was partly due to the fact that their transactions with Luxembourg and Alsace-

    Loraine now contributed to German exports and imports.

    The increasing eastward orientation of German exports during the war marks a clear

    break with the geographic patterns prevailing both in the interwar and post-war periods. In

    1950, Eastern Europe absorbed 5 per cent of West German exports and its share in imports was

    even smaller. By contrast, the weight of Western Europe remained far larger than what it had

    been in the interwar period, especially for exports. Cold-war tensions are mainly to blame for this

    reorientation of West German trade. With the establishment of COCOM in November 1949, a

    large proportion of internationally traded goods, labelled as strategic products, was excluded

    from East-West trade. Although the embargoes were eased during the 1960s, by that time,

    structural differences made eastern trade unattractive for producers on the western side of the

    Iron Curtain.21 Additionally, the decline of trade with the Soviet bloc was just as much the

    consequence of the post-war territorial settlements that dismantled the eastern half of Hitlers

    empire as the growth of German trade with Eastern Europe during the war had resulted from the

    eastward expansion of the Third Reich between 1938 and 1941.

    Trade with the Americas and Africa recovered quickly after the war, but there was a

    marked shift between North and Latin America, where governments pursued a policy of import

    substitution. Exports to Asia remained below interwar standards, primarily due to the

    communist takeover in China and sluggish import demand in Japan, where reconstruction

    efforts were still in their infancy. The geographic distribution of West German trade that had

    evolved by the interwar period was, by and large, restored until 1955, except for the fact that the

    share of Eastern Europe hit an all-time low. On the export side, the latter was offset by the

    increased share of overseas markets. By contrast, agricultural imports from Eastern Europe were

    replaced once again mainly by rising Dutch food exports to Germany.

    Despite the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the

    relative importance of its member states for German exports compared with the rest of Western

    Europe was remarkably similar to what it had been during the interwar period. In the second

    half of the 1950s, the geographic distribution of exports and imports remained fairly stable. The

    share of the EEC and Eastern Europe increased marginally at the expense of the rest of the

    continent. Only after 1960 did the EEC begin to absorb significantly larger proportions of West

    German trade, at the expense of both overseas markets and state-trading economies, but also of

    other countries in Western Europe. The completion of the European customs union in the late

    1960s was a particularly important threshold on the export side.

    Overall, the data indicates that the strong westward orientation of Germanys external

    trade after 1950 corresponded to interwar rather than wartime patterns. In the second half of the

    1950s, this restored regional pattern of trade was conserved. It was only after the EEC had

    created a more discriminatory trading bloc that the share of Western Europe in German exports

    and imports was propelled to unprecedented heights. In the 1960s the share of western

    industrialised nations in Germanys external trade also began to expand at the expense of less

    developed markets, which signals the rising importance of intra-industry trade.

    21 Neebe (1989), pp. 58-61.

  • 10

    3. Trade diversion in Fortress Europe

    In this section, I determine econometrically to what extent and in which direction Germanys external trade was reoriented during the 1930s and early 1940s as a consequence of the political reorganisation of Europe. There is a vast literature on trade diversion following the Great Depression caused by the building of currency blocs and by the widespread application of discriminatory trade policies.22 Influenced by the seminal scholarly study of European payments patterns in the 1930s by Howard Ellis, historians have emphasised the importance of the bilateral trade agreements that Nazi Germany had signed with the countries of South-East Europe, commonly referred to as the Reichsmark Bloc.23 Similarly, the tying of occupied lands, with their resources but also productive capacity, to the German war economy has been seen to have played a pivotal role in the German import boom during the war itself.24

    In this paper, I test simple models of trade diversion econometrically, both for the interwar period and for the early 1940s. In my analysis, I focus on German exports and imports with European nations only, partially due to concerns of data scarcity, but essentially because the Allied blockade had effectively prevented Nazi Germany from conducting any overseas trade during the war. Trade diversion is commonly investigated by estimating a gravity model of bilateral trade, pioneered by Linnemann and Bergstrand.25 This approach has already been applied in a study of post-war West German trade by Lindlar and Holtfrerich, the results of which I return to in the next section.26 The theory behind gravity models postulates that bilateral trade between countries is positively influenced by the size of their economies, the similarity of their relative levels of development, and a common border. Larger economies have greater capacity to trade, while similar per capita income levels suggest congruence in demand patterns. A common border creates opportunities for cross-border transactions at the regional level. By contrast, geographical distance is a major obstacle to trade because it increases transport costs. Additionally, gravity models include institutional variables that account for discriminatory trade policies, exchange controls, etc.

    To know whether the latter have made a statistically significant impact on the geography on Germanys external trade after the Great Depression is vital to the understanding of the dynamics of trade diversion during the war years. I apply an approach slightly different from the standard double-log specification used to estimate gravity models. The dependent variable in my model is the share of a particular country in total German exports and imports to and from Europe and it includes the following explanatory variables.

    1. Total GDP of the trading partner expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. 2. The ratio between the per capita GDP of Germany and its trading partner, specified in

    a way to always take a value between 0 and 1. 3. The linear distance between the capital city of the trading partner and Kassel, centred

    between the major industrial agglomerations of Germany within her interwar borders. 4. A dummy variable taking the value of 1 for countries which had signed a bilateral

    clearing agreement with Germany by 1936. 22 See Eichengreen and Irwin (1995), Kitson and Solomou (1995), and Ritschl and Wolf (2011) among others. 23 Ellis (1941). For more recent studies see Volkmann (1975), Neal (1979) and Milward (1981). 24 Buchheim (1986); Boldorf and Scherner (2011); Scherner (2012). 25 Linnemann (1966); Bergstrand (1985). 26 Lindlar and Holtfrerich (1997), p. 226 ff.

  • 11

    I do not include a dummy for countries that shared a common border with the Reich. This

    variable would strongly correlate with distance, which would, in turn, make the coefficients

    unstable due to multi-collinearity. The model is estimated with robust standard errors for a

    cross-section of 24 European countries separately for 1928 and 1936.

    Table 2: Regressions explaining country shares in Germanys trade with Europe

    Variable 1928 (I) 1928 (II) 1936 (I) 1936 (II)

    GDP 0.0349** 0.0337** 0.0209** 0.0225** (7.65) (9.72) (4.12) (4.79) GDP p.c. ratio 0.7901 2.6526 (0.37) (1.51) Distance -0.0034* -0.0037** -0.0020* -0.0028** (-2.85) (-4.62) (-2.35) (-3.92) Clearing 0.4490 1.7423* 2.0117** (0.51) (2.54) (2.95) (constant) 5.3478* 6.4131** 2.5075 4.6681** (2.30) (5.63) (1.62) (5.15) N 24 24 24 24 F 30.08 66.16 11.25 13.24 R2 0.8086 0.7854 0.7198 0.6662

    Notes: GDP is expressed in billion 1990 GK dollars. GDP p.c. ratio is the ratio between the per capita GDP of Germany and its trading partner and always takes a value between 0 and 1. Distance is the linear distance (km) between Kassel and the capital city of the trading partner. Clearing is a dummy for countries who signed bilateral trade agreements with Germany during the 1930s.

    Despite the small number of observations, we obtain statistically significant results.

    Variety in the size of the different economies and in their geographical distance from the heart

    of the Reich can almost fully explain the regional composition of Germanys external trade. By

    contrast, the similarity of per capita income levels does not seem to have been an influential

    factor. Although countries who had signed a bilateral trade agreement with the Third Reich

    carved out, on average, a two percentage-point larger share in German trade than other European

    nations by 1936, we still obtain highly significant coefficients for the standard variables of the

    gravity model. This result confirms that the geographical composition of Germanys external

    trade was not strongly distorted by bilateralism and the building of currency blocs after the Great

    Depression. In other words, prior to World War II, trade diversion in Europe was not driven by

    Hitlers geo-political aspirations.

    This argument receives further support from the results reported in Table 3. The growth

    of country shares in German exports and imports between 1928 and 1936 is regressed on the

    corresponding rate of real GDP growth, geographical distance, and the dummy for bilateral

    clearing. The coefficients suggest a clear conclusion: the restructuring of Germans external

    trade was largely driven by shifts in the relative size of different European economies, and not

    by their trade agreements signed with the Nazi State.

    To model the reorientation of German trade during World War II, I constructed a panel

    dataset representing the 21 European countries that traded with the Third Reich in every year

    during the period 1940-1943. My analysis focuses on the geographical distribution of German

    exports only, due to the serious concerns related to import statistics discussed in the previous

  • 12

    section. As I argued, the prime objective of German exports during the war was to maximise the

    volume of resources the Third Reich could extract from its satellites both in terms of military

    and economic contributions. Therefore, one should expect that the reorientation of German

    exports after 1940 was driven by political rather than economic factors.

    Table 3: Regression explaining the growth of country shares in Germanys trade with Europe

    Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Sig. Level

    GDP growth 0.8324 0.1161 7.17 .000

    Distance -0.0113 0.0053 -1.98 .061

    Clearing -0.7420 4.6550 -0.16 .875

    (constant) 2.5133 7.5223 0.33 .742

    N 24

    F 24.30

    Adjusted R2 0.6868

    Notes: The dependent variable is the proportional growth in the share of a country in German exports and imports between 1928 and 1936. GDP is measured in billion 1990 GK dollars. Distance is the linear distance (km) between the geographic centre of the German economy, Kassel, and the capital city of the trading partner. Clearing is a dummy for countries who signed bilateral clearing agreements with Germany during the 1930s.

    To test this assumption, I estimate a model with country fixed effects. Country shares in

    German exports to Europe are explained by the corresponding country shares in 1936 and two

    dummy variables: one accounting for states that were allied with Germany, the other for

    countries that found themselves in a warzone in the particular year. As I discussed earlier,

    Germany had to export increasing volumes of input materials to its satellites to keep them in the

    war and to maintain their production of war material required by German forces. By contrast

    war activity is conceived as a major obstacle to trade, partially due to security issues, but also

    because of the distortion of production in front economies. Since the 1936 country shares and

    the satellite dummy take time-constant values for each country in the dataset, I had to apply a

    two-stage process to estimate their effect in a panel-data framework.

    The fixed-effects model itself includes interaction variables which multiply the time-

    constant values by 1 to 4, for the years 1940 to 1943 respectively. The coefficients demonstrate

    by how much the impact of these variables on the dependent variable had changed between

    subsequent years. The original effect is left included in the country fixed effects. Therefore, the

    latter are regressed on the actual values of the two time-constant explanatory variables in a

    standard cross-sectional OLS model. To specify the estimated effect of 1936 country-shares and

    the alliance system on wartime trade patterns, the coefficients obtained for the interaction terms

    are added to the coefficients generated by the regression explaining the country fixed effects

    once for 1940, twice for 1941, three times for 1942, and four times for 1943. I did not include

    data for 1944 for two reasons. First, several countries stopped trading with Germany after they

    had been liberated from Nazi occupation or defected from the Axis alliance. Thus, the data in

    relation with these countries does not cover a full year. Second, my model specification cannot

    be extended to 1944, since not all satellites remained allied to Germany until the end of that year.

  • 13

    Table 4: Panel regressions explaining country shares in total German exports 1940-1943

    Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Sig. Level

    Share36*Time -0.0979 0.0235 -4.17 .000

    Allied*Time 0.5907 0.2162 2.73 .008

    Warzone -2.6416 0.4863 -5.43 .000

    (constant) 5.7734 0.3438 16.79 .000

    N 84

    F 12.97

    R2 0.3934

    F (all ui = 0) 21.65

    The results reported in Tables 4 and 5 indicate a sharp decline in the share of all countries

    in German exports between 1936 and the early 1940s which found themselves in a warzone.

    This finding confirms that war activity was highly disruptive to international trade. By contrast,

    the corresponding trade share of Germanys allies expanded significantly. The coefficients on

    the interaction terms demonstrate that these nations absorbed a rapidly increasing proportion of

    German exports at the expense of all other countries during the early 1940s.

    Table 5: Regressions explaining country fixed effects in the geography of German exports

    Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Sig. Level

    Share36 1.0433 0.1519 6.87 .000

    Satellite 2.4748 1.1022 2.25 .038

    (constant) -5.9111 1.0873 -5.44 .000

    N 21

    F 23.71

    Adjusted R2 0.6943

    This trend is depicted in Figures 3 and 4 on the following page which show how

    strongly Nazi Germanys external trade had been reoriented towards the East with the eastbound

    drive of the German war effort until 1943. Hitlers Drang nach Osten proved to be the major

    force of trade diversion within Fortress Europe.

    4. West German foreign trade: Path dependency or trade diversion?

    In this section, I test for alternative explanations of trade expansion in West Germany in the

    post-war era, particularly for the presence and persistence of a reconstruction dynamic. More

    specifically, I aim to determine to what extent and for how long the restoration of pre-existing

    trade patterns shaped the structure of West German exports and imports after 1950 and how

    large an impact new trade promoting institutions, especially the EPU and the EEC, generated. I

    estimate a linear regression model to explain the geographic composition of West Germanys

    external trade, measured by the percentage share of the countries or country groups in total

    German exports or imports, during each of the post-war benchmark years that I selected.

  • 14

    Figure 3: The reorientation of German exports within Europe, 1936-1940

    Figure 4: The reorientation of German exports within Europe, 1936-1943

    My model includes the following list of explanatory variables:

    1. The percentage share of the country in German exports in 1936 and in imports in

    1928, in order to neutralise the impact of bilateralism on the import side.

    2. The interaction of variable (1) with a dummy variable for EPU members

    3. The interaction of variable (1) with a dummy variable for EEC members

    4. The interaction of variable (1) with a dummy variable for members of the Council

    of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), i.e. the state-trading economies of the

    Soviet bloc.

    POL

    BEL

    BUL

    DEN

    FIN

    FRA

    GRE

    ITA

    ALB

    YUG

    NL

    NOR

    POR

    ROM

    SWE

    CH

    SLK

    ESPTUR

    HUN

    USSR

    05

    10

    15

    Co

    un

    try s

    hare

    s in

    Ge

    rma

    n e

    xp

    ort

    s 1

    940

    (%

    )

    0 5 10 15

    Country shares in German exports 1936 (%)

    POL

    BEL

    BUL DENFIN

    FRA

    GRE

    ITA

    ALB

    YUGNL

    NOR

    POR

    ROM

    SWE

    CHSLK

    ESP

    TUR

    HUN

    USSR

    05

    10

    15

    Cou

    ntr

    y s

    hare

    s in G

    erm

    an

    expo

    rts 1

    943

    (%

    )

    0 5 10 15

    Country shares in German exports 1936 (%)

  • 15

    Since I investigate to what extent institutional arrangements aided or prevented the restoration

    of pre-existing trade patterns, I designate all countries as EPU and EEC members that traded

    within the framework of these organisations, i.e. the signatory states in Europe, their overseas

    possessions and the members of their currency blocs. As for the CMEA, I also include China

    and from 1960 onward Cuba, although they were officially not members during the period

    under investigation. However, I exclude Yugoslavia, which only had associate membership and

    remained much more open to trade with the West than other communist countries.

    As the clearing system of the EPU was abolished with the return to full convertibility in

    1958, the interaction term with the EPU dummy is excluded from the model in the 1960s. By

    contrast, I also included the interaction variable with the EEC dummy for all benchmark years.

    By 1955, the ECSC was already established. It replaced the international control of the Ruhr,

    and in general the reparations regime under the aegis of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency

    (IARA). This regime entailed the forced export of coal, coke, scrap iron and other materials well

    under world-market prices to reparations claimants, mainly France and the Benelux countries.27

    Moreover, the very same nations received the bulk of the industrial equipment dismantled in

    West Germany during the late 1940s, which further increased their dependence on German

    machine-tool exports in subsequent years. Finally, just as the annexation of Alsace-Loraine and

    Luxembourg had automatically led to the intensification of trade with France and Belgium in

    the early 1940s, the loss of these territories, which had been integrated into the German

    economy after 1940, could generate the same result in the early post-war years.

    The model is estimated with robust standard errors. Since the values on the share of

    countries in West German exports are not even approximately normally distributed, I need to

    account for heteroscedasticity. The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 for exports and imports

    respectively. The large R2s signal that the independent variables included in the model explain

    the regional composition of West Germanys external trade throughout the post-war period

    almost completely. To begin with, there is a very strong correlation between interwar and post-

    war patterns of trade. Additionally, the interaction variables account for a high percentage of the

    countries represented in my dataset, including almost all of the leading external markets. This is

    especially true for the 1950s, with the inclusion of the EPU dummy, which covers the majority

    of non-communist nations. However, I do not obtain statistically significant coefficients for this

    interaction variable either on the export or the import side. This finding supports the mainstream

    view in the literature that the multilateral clearing system was more of a force for trade creation

    than trade diversion or a mechanism for regional market integration.28 Econometrically, this

    implies that the exclusion of the interaction term with the EPU dummy does not significantly

    influence the size of the remaining coefficients or the R2s. By contrast, it increases the overall

    robustness of the model and the t-statistics on the other explanatory variables.

    The highly significant negative coefficients obtained for the interaction term with the

    CMEA dummy demonstrate that state-trading economies retained only a small fraction of their

    interwar share in German (or at least West German) trade. This was especially the case in the early

    1950s, when cold-war tensions were exceptionally intense, with the Korean War and the brutal

    27 For a detailed history of the international control over the Ruhr, see Bhrer (1986). 28 See Eichengreen (1995), pp. 174-175, 188-189.

  • 16

    Ta

    ble

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    Var

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    1950

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    (4

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    (3

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    (3

    .80)

    (3

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    * C

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    A d

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    .758

    4**

    -0.8

    993*

    * -0

    .712

    3**

    -0.8

    188*

    * -0

    .622

    0**

    -0.6

    628*

    * -0

    .523

    9**

    (-

    3.28

    ) (-

    2.90

    ) (-

    3.78

    ) (-

    4.25

    ) (-

    3.33

    ) (-

    3.45

    ) (-

    2.69

    )

    * E

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    dum

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    -0.0

    460

    -0.1

    023

    (-0.

    16)

    (-0.

    27)

    * E

    CS

    C/E

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    dum

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    0.68

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    0.

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    0.

    6819

    **

    0.26

    83

    0.32

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    0.60

    54*

    0.87

    16**

    (2.9

    1)

    (1.1

    8)

    (3.1

    9)

    (1.2

    2)

    (1.4

    3)

    (2.2

    4)

    (2.8

    1)

    (con

    stan

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    0.05

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    0.15

    97

    0.06

    05

    0.17

    67

    0.13

    83

    0.11

    83

    0.10

    84

    (0

    .070

    ) (1

    .70)

    (0

    .65)

    (1

    .66)

    (1

    .50)

    (1

    .21)

    (1

    .18)

    N

    95

    95

    95

    95

    95

    95

    95

    F 53

    .45

    101.

    12

    68.5

    0 13

    5.13

    37

    .64

    28.5

    6 24

    .83

    R2

    0.90

    66

    0.83

    90

    0.90

    65

    0.83

    81

    0.82

    87

    0.81

    96

    0.81

    54

    Not

    e:

    The

    dep

    enda

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    is t

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    dum

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    and

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    The

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    stat

    isti

    cs a

    re r

    epor

    ted

    in b

    rack

    ets

    belo

    w th

    e co

    effi

    cien

    ts. T

    he s

    uper

    scri

    pt *

    indi

    cate

    s st

    atis

    tica

    l sig

    nifi

    canc

    e at

    the

    5, *

    * at

    the

    1 pe

    rcen

    t lev

    el.

  • 17

    Ta

    ble

    7: R

    egre

    ssio

    ns e

    xpla

    inin

    g th

    e re

    gion

    al c

    ompo

    sitio

    n of

    Wes

    t Ger

    man

    impo

    rts

    (rob

    ust S

    E)

    Var

    iabl

    es

    1950

    19

    55

    1950

    19

    55

    1960

    19

    65

    1970

    Impo

    rt s

    hare

    192

    8 0.

    9338

    **

    0.86

    74**

    0.

    9181

    **

    0.85

    39**

    0.

    7826

    **

    0.70

    39**

    0.

    6021

    **

    (5

    .31)

    (4

    .16)

    (6

    .02)

    (4

    .87)

    (5

    .50)

    (4

    .39)

    (4

    .96)

    * C

    ME

    A d

    umm

    y -0

    .797

    1**

    -0.7

    613*

    * -0

    .775

    7**

    -0.7

    429*

    * -0

    .532

    6**

    -0.4

    794*

    * -0

    .392

    8**

    (-

    4.42

    ) (-

    3.66

    ) (-

    5.25

    ) (-

    4.63

    ) (-

    3.60

    ) (-

    2.92

    ) (-

    3.39

    )

    * E

    PU

    dum

    my

    -0.0

    738

    -0.0

    636

    (-0.

    31)

    (-0.

    28)

    * E

    CS

    C/E

    EC

    dum

    my

    0.64

    05*

    0.65

    72**

    0.

    5861

    0.

    6303

    **

    0.91

    69**

    1.

    4432

    **

    1.89

    42**

    (2.0

    1)

    (3.6

    5)

    (1.8

    9)

    (3.2

    7)

    (6.8

    0)

    (7.3

    9)

    (12.

    64)

    (con

    stan

    t)

    0.11

    91

    0.15

    97

    0.10

    36

    0.15

    85*

    0.14

    50

    0.11

    80

    0.12

    36

    (0

    .060

    ) (1

    .70)

    (1

    .09)

    (2

    .12)

    (1

    .72)

    (1

    .35)

    (1

    .65)

    N

    95

    95

    95

    95

    95

    95

    95

    F 19

    .70

    49.2

    5 20

    .58

    58.0

    2 84

    .27

    94.5

    2 20

    7.06

    R2

    0.83

    35

    0.80

    28

    0.81

    28

    0.80

    21

    0.86

    00

    0.87

    12

    0.91

    45

    Not

    e: T

    he d

    epen

    dant

    var

    iabl

    e is

    the

    sha

    re o

    f a

    coun

    try

    in W

    est

    Ger

    man

    im

    port

    s in

    a g

    iven

    yea

    r. T

    he d

    umm

    y va

    riab

    les

    for

    CM

    EA

    , EP

    U a

    nd E

    CS

    C/E

    EC

    m

    embe

    r st

    ates

    are

    inte

    ract

    ed w

    ith

    thei

    r re

    spec

    tive

    shar

    es in

    Ger

    man

    im

    port

    s in

    192

    8. T

    he m

    odel

    is e

    stim

    ated

    wit

    h ro

    bust

    sta

    ndar

    d er

    rors

    ; t-s

    tatis

    tics

    ar

    e re

    port

    ed in

    bra

    cket

    s be

    low

    the

    coef

    fici

    ents

    . The

    sup

    ersc

    ript

    * in

    dica

    tes

    stat

    istic

    al s

    igni

    fica

    nce

    at th

    e 5,

    **

    at th

    e 1

    perc

    ent l

    evel

  • 18

    suppression of the popular uprising in East Berlin in June 1953. The actual trade data confirms

    that the relations of the Federal Republic deteriorated with all state-trading countries, not just

    with a few important members of the Soviet bloc.

    From the perspective of the regional dynamics of trade expansion in West Germany, the

    most important explanatory variable in my model is the interaction term with the ECSC/EEC

    dummy. Here the coefficients depict a slightly different story on the two sides of Germanys

    external trade. As for exports, the impact of wartime trade integration and the Inter-Allied

    reparations regime was still felt strongly in 1950, but vanished until 1955. The share of ECSC

    member states in West German exports did not differ significantly from their corresponding

    weight in the mid 1930s. This result and the fact that the coefficient on the 1936 country-shares

    is closer to 1 for 1955 than for 1950 confirms that the development of West German exports

    during the early phase of post-war reconstruction was itself driven by a reconstruction dynamic.

    In the late 1950s, the regional distribution of German exports was largely conserved. However,

    this trend changed markedly during the 1960s, when the member states of the EEC absorbed a

    rapidly expanding proportion of West German exports, which by 1965 was already much higher

    than it had been in the interwar period. This shift in the development of regional trade patterns

    was particularly momentous in the late 1960s. In 1970, the EEC accounted for a 65 percent

    larger share of German exports than its constituents had done in 1936. The corresponding share

    of other non-communist countries was, on average, 23 percent smaller.

    By contrast, the relative importance of the ECSC and EEC member states as sources of

    West German imports was substantially greater already in the first half of the 1950s than what it

    had been in the interwar period. It was mostly due to the replacement of East and South-East

    Europe as Germanys main source of food imports by countries in the western half of the

    continent, particularly the Netherlands. In theory, the establishment of the ECSC was also

    expected to increase the share of its member states in German iron-ore imports, but the leading

    steelmakers of the Ruhr continued to prefer higher quality ores imported from Sweden. Despite

    these differences, the launching of the EEC proved to be just as important a threshold as it was

    on the export side. By the end of the period under investigation, the Common Market supplied

    almost two-and-a-half times the proportion of total German imports that its constituents had

    done in 1928. This meant that the corresponding share of other nations in the non-communist

    world shrank, on average, by as much as 40 per cent.

    The econometric results reported in this section do not accord with the findings of

    Lindlar and Holtfrerich, who estimated a gravity model of West German foreign trade with over

    70 countries in the post-war period.29 They found that cross-country variation in the value of

    German exports and imports can be largely explained by the three standard variables: GDP,

    GDP per capita, and distance from the geographical centre of the West German economy. The

    authors confirmed the state-trading countries as outliers, but did not obtain significant coefficients

    for the dummy variable accounting for EEC member states, even after the completion of the

    customs union in the late 1960s. Their results were distorted by strong multi-collinearity, more

    specifically a correlation between the EEC dummy and the distance of the capital city of the

    trading partner from Frankfurt. The big jumps they obtained in the size of the coefficient on

    29 Lindlar and Holtfrerich (1997), pp. 226-228.

  • 19

    distance between the early 1950s and the early 1960s, as well as between the latter and the early

    1970s, effectively picked up the impact of trade integration within the EEC. It is highly unlikely

    that distance-related trade costs increased significantly during this period.

    My findings so far suggest that the understanding of West German trade expansion

    during the 1950s and 1960s requires different explanations at different stages. The largely

    mono-causal interpretations discussed in the introduction are complementary rather than

    exclusive to one another. The impact of forced economic integration in Western Europe within

    the Nazi Growirtschaftsraum during the war and under the aegis of the IARA thereafter

    persisted into the early 1950s. In subsequent years, the expansion of West German exports was

    driven by the restoration of the regional trade patterns which had been established in the

    interwar period. Even on the import side, the moderate diversion we can observe was generated

    by a very clear geographical shift in agricultural imports. The only countries distorting this

    general trend were the state-trading economies of Eastern Europe that pursued a policy of

    national and bloc autarchy. During the 1960s, West Germanys external trade could continue to

    expand at a remarkably high rate due the trade-creating effect of regional market integration

    within the EEC and, as a consequence of that, the enhanced importance of intra-industry trade.

    5. Shifts in the commodity structure of German exports and imports

    The conclusions drawn from the above results can only be confirmed, if we can observe similar

    developments in the commodity structure of West German trade. The restoration of the pre-

    existing geographical patterns of German exports and imports during the early 1950s can only

    be viewed as the product of a reconstruction dynamic, if such a dynamic also manifested itself

    in the commodity structure of Germanys external trade. Similarly, the establishment of the

    EEC could only constitute a structural break in the development of West German exports, if it

    brought about marked shifts in the commodity structure between the 1950s and the 1960s, and

    especially during the late 1960s when the customs union was completed. More precisely, we

    need to see significant changes in the areas of specialisation for German exporters. Otherwise,

    the EEC can be considered as merely a mechanism that conserved and, at most, deepened a

    natural trading bloc. The same argument can be made about wartime trade diversion, which we

    would expect to have produced strong shifts in the structure of both imports and exports in

    accordance with the needs and productive capacity of the German war economy.

    To investigate these hypotheses, I constructed a constant-price dataset on German/West

    German commodity trade in 60 product categories for the benchmark years I have studied in the

    previous sections. Currently, there is no alternative dataset available at any similar level of

    disaggregation that covers the whole period under focus. Therefore, it is reported in its entirety

    in the Appendix, including a detailed list of my statistical sources, for the aid of future research.

    The construction of this dataset required several adjustments. First, the product nomenclature of

    the foreign trade statistics was altered substantially between the 1920s and the 1930s, and to a

    lesser extent also after 1945. I aggregated the industrial commodity groups, which numbered

    at least 148 from 1936 onwards, into 56 categories of goods and classified foodstuffs into 4

    groups. This approach allowed me to aggregate several closely related commodities that alone

  • 20

    would have accounted for negligible shares in German exports and imports. My dataset also

    makes it easier for researchers to analyse structural developments, as the official statistics

    disaggregated machinery into twelve, chemicals into over twenty branches.

    The total volume of exports declined substantially between 1928 and 1936, but was

    maintained at close to peacetime levels during the early 1940s, albeit on an enlarged territorial

    basis. From the post-war nadir of slightly over 8 billion DM, exports grew rapidly, and by 1955

    reached the volume they had attained before the Great Depression. In the subsequent ten years,

    the rate of expansion fell back somewhat, but increased again during the late 1960s. By 1970,

    the volume of German commodity exports was five times as large as it had been in 1928. The

    development of imports showed a similar pattern, although their volume also increased marginally

    during the war and it expanded faster than exports from the late 1950s onward. That West

    German still managed to widen its export surplus was solely due to substantial improvements in

    her commodity Terms of Trade throughout the post-war Golden Age.30

    As shown in Figure 5, until the late 1950s, the volume of industrial exports was in a

    strong positive correlation with the share of finished goods. Following the Great Depression,

    exports in this category contracted much faster than in raw materials and intermediates. The

    share of finished goods dropped even further during the early 1940s. By contrast, it was

    propelled to unprecedented heights on the import side, as demonstrated in Figure 6. This

    finding confirms the general view on the wartime division of labour within continental Europe,

    in which Germany supplied its allies and occupied territories with coal and input materials,

    particularly iron and steel, in exchange for finished goods, both civilian and military products.

    Figure 5: The basic product structure of German industrial exports (%)

    30 The Terms of Trade improved by 35 per cent between 1950 and 1958, and by an additional 15 per cent in the

    following twelve years. See Glastetter et al. (1991), pp. 71-73.

    13.2 14.020.4

    14.96.3 4.8 3.9 3.4

    35.838.7

    42.2

    42.4

    34.2 35.1 37.2 40.5

    51.0 47.437.9

    42.8

    59.4 60.1 59.0 56.1

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    1928 1936 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    Raw materials Intermediary goods Finished goods

  • 21

    The data do not provide evidence for the argument that the outsourcing of war production from

    the Third Reich was facilitated by machinery exports. The share of machine-tools and steel

    constructions in total industrial exports had already been very low in 1936, but declined even

    further in the early 1940s. It needs to be emphasised, however, that shifts in the commodity

    structure of German trade, especially imports, during the war were partially driven by border

    changes. In particular, the annexation of Moravia, Upper Silesia, Luxembourg and Loraine

    substantially enhanced the countrys reserves of hard coal and iron ore as well as its production

    capacity in ferrous metals. While this increased the share of the above goods in industrial

    exports, their corresponding weight on the import side diminished, and German machine-tool

    producers found substantially increased demand for their products within the borders of an

    enlarged empire.

    Figure 6: The basic product structure of German industrial imports (%)

    In 1950, the share of intermediates in industrial exports remained at its wartime high,

    while the share of finished goods increased slightly at the expense of raw materials. Cole, coke

    and metals still accounted for a large proportion of German exports, which underlines the

    impact of the international control of the Ruhr and the IARA reparations regime. By 1955, the

    commodity structure of industrial exports and imports was restored to its peacetime norm. On

    the export side, the share of intermediates was slightly smaller than it had been in the interwar

    period. This was due to the diminished weight of chemical dye-stuffs, which had traditionally

    constituted the largest item in German exports to the United Kingdom. After 1939, the British

    textile industry had to search for alternative suppliers, and West Germany was unable to

    recapture her once dominant position in this market segment during the early post-war period.

    The increased share of intermediary products on the import side reflects the growing dependence

    of West German industry on foreign inputs after the loss of many of its traditional suppliers in

    the East of the former Reich.

    48.0

    60.5

    20.9

    52.843.0

    27.719.7

    15.0

    35.9

    33.1

    28.0

    36.3

    43.1

    42.0

    38.740.2

    16.16.4

    51.1

    10.9 13.9

    30.3

    41.6 44.7

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    1928 1936 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    Raw materials Intermediary goods Finished goods

  • 22

    With the technology-driven switch away from coal to hydrocarbons, the share of raw materials

    in West German industrial exports continued to decline in the late 1950s. After 1960, however,

    the share of finished goods also began to decline, despite the continued expansion in the volume

    of exports, signalling a structural break in the trend which had manifested itself since the late

    19th century. By contrast, the share of finished goods in industrial imports jumped markedly

    between the 1950s and 1960s, mainly at the expense of raw materials but, to a lesser extent, also

    of intermediates. The increasing weight of intermediate inputs in West German exports and that

    of finished products in imports demonstrate the intensification of intra-industry trade within the

    EEC, as input-output networks transcended national borders more than ever before.

    Furthermore, they also mark a clear shift in regional specialisation patterns.

    Figure 7 reports the composition of commodity exports by eight major product groups

    including foodstuffs. While the restoration of Germanys world market position in the 1950s

    followed long-established comparative advantages in quality engineering products, the further

    expansion of her exports after 1960 was driven by chemicals and textiles. Germany had always

    been a leading producer of chemical intermediaries, but the share of textiles in her exports had

    been in constant decline since the Second Industrial Revolution. The composition of chemical

    exports also changed markedly. The once dominant role of dye-stuffs, fertilisers and pesticides,

    and household chemicals was reassigned to synthetic materials, petrochemicals and other

    chemical intermediates, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. Enhanced intra-industry links within

    the EEC also eased the way of textile, chemical and machinery imports from other member

    states into the Federal Republic, as shown in Figure 8.

    Figure 7: The share of major product groups in West German commodity exports (%)

    2.0 5.6 2.3 3.3 3.2 3.7 4.52.8

    5.14.4 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.4

    14.2

    16.716.3

    7.9 5.4 3.9 3.1

    11.3

    15.416.9

    7.8 11.0 9.3 7.0

    9.0

    7.45.3

    6.3 5.7 7.6 13.5

    11.9

    10.311.3

    14.5 16.8 20.8

    24.2

    25.8

    19.6 26.3

    40.040.6 37.9

    32.8

    23.0 19.817.2 17.4 15.0 14.4

    12.6

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    1936 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    Foodstuffs Raw materials Fuels Metals

    Textiles Chemicals Engineering products Other products

  • 23

    The legacy of Fortress Europe for Germanys external trade was very short-lived. The

    commodity structure of imports was rapidly restored to patterns that had prevailed prior to the

    Great Depression. As Hitlers eastbound empire had been dismantled, the dependence of West

    Germany on food and raw-material imports increased substantially, whereas her thirst for

    imported manufactures abated sharply. Therefore, it is difficult to establish a direct link between

    the restructuring of German commodity trade during World War II and the impact of trade

    diversion after the establishment of the EEC, especially as the relative weight of product groups

    within both intermediary and finished goods was markedly different after 1960 compared to

    what it had been in the early 1940s.

    The strong correlation between interwar and post-war patterns in the commodity

    structure of German exports may be surprising at first, given the fact that the West German

    share in the production, and thereby export capacity, of the Third Reich varied strongly across

    different industries. Provincial data collected in the 1936 industrial census conducted by the

    Imperial Office for the Economic Planning of Warfare allowed me to calculate the share of

    West Germany in total export revenue for each of the 56 industrial commodity groups in my

    dataset.31 In several cases, where the industry classifications of the census did not correspond to

    the commodity structure of my dataset, I could only provide crude estimates. The figures are

    reported in the Appendix, Table 1, under the heading FRG (%). These data provide important

    additional information on the development of German industrial exports.

    Figure 8: The share of major product groups in West German commodity imports (%)

    31 Reichsamt fr Wehrwirtschaftliche Planung (1939), pp. 148-159.

    40.8

    23.2

    44.134.3

    27.119.8

    15.0

    26.5

    15.4

    26.5

    23.0

    15.1

    9.2

    6.6

    3.1

    2.4

    4.2

    8.4

    7.1

    8.9

    9.6

    7.8

    5.1

    3.5

    10.8

    9.0

    6.9

    5.6

    5.8

    12.0

    7.66.2

    10.4

    14.0

    16.3

    4.2

    5.3

    2.04.0

    6.6

    9.413.6

    4.1

    18.7

    3.4 5.8

    9.9

    11.9 15.7

    7.9

    17.98.7 7.6

    14.919.8 17.5

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    1928 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    Foodstuffs Raw materials Fuels Metals

    Textiles Chemicals Engineering products Other products

  • 24

    West Germany had a relatively small share in total German exports of finished goods. Thus, raw

    materials and intermediates carved out a larger slice from West German exports in 1950 than

    from German exports during the interwar period. The restoration of traditional patterns during

    the early 1950s was only possible after West German firms had recovered the former export

    markets of their counterparts in East Germany, which had practically withdrawn from

    international trade outside the CMEA. This phenomenon was particularly important in electrical

    and precision engineering, the glass and the pottery industries, paper processing and the printing

    industry, textiles and the clothing industry, which all concentrated strongly in Berlin and/or in

    Saxony until 1945.

    Table 8: Correlations explaining the commodity structure of West German industrial exports

    1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    Germany 1936 0.881 0.901 0.885 0.831 0.720

    West Germany 1936 0.914 0.809 0.796 0.742 0.612

    Note: All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Hard-coal and motor vehicles are excluded from the dataset, as they would otherwise drive the results. The number of observations (N) is 54.

    Table 8 reports correlations between the commodity structure of West German industrial

    exports during the post-war period and that of German or West German industrial exports in

    1936. The share of commodity groups in total West German industrial exports in 1936 are

    computed as the product of their share in total German industrial exports and the share of West

    Germany in the exports of the particular groups. The comparison of the two sets of coefficients

    shows that restoring the regional composition of German exports after 1950 required the

    reconstruction of the commodity structure that had prevailed in Germany as a whole, not in her

    western half in particular. This finding is a novel addition to the historiography of the West

    German export miracle in the early post-war era.

    6. Conclusions

    During World War II, Nazi Germany reorganised intra-European trade in order to maximise her

    war production and to maintain her war effort. The confidential foreign trade statistics of the

    Third Reich demonstrate that the German economy became more eastward oriented with the

    eastward expansion of the Third Reich and the eastbound drive of the Nazi war effort. Germany

    had to increase her exports to her allies constantly to keep them in the war and to secure the

    necessary raw-material supplies they were able to provide. Hitlers Drang nach Osten proved to

    be the major force of trade diversion during the early 1940s. This finding confirms traditional

    accounts and is in contrast with the revisionist view advocated by Ritschl among others.

    The legacy of Fortress Europe, however, was rather short lived. The expansion of West

    German trade in the early phase of post-war reconstruction also demonstrated a reconstruction

    dynamic which, by and large, restored the trade patterns of the interwar period. The post-war

    settlement and the new institutions of a new international order didnt play a major role in

    shaping Germanys external trade during the 1950s, except for the sharp contraction in trade

  • 25

    with Eastern Europe. The regional distribution and the commodity structure of German exports

    and imports only began to deviate from long-established trends after the EEC treaty had come

    into effect. Trade expansion in West Germany during the 1950s and 1960s requires different

    explanations at different stages. The largely mono-causal interpretations introduced in the first

    section of the paper are complementary rather than exclusive to one another, once we realise

    that the dynamics of trade expansion also changed over time.

    Footnote references

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    BArch R 3/1626a. K. Hunscha, Eidesstaatliches Gutachten: Die wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den von ihm besetzten Lndern Kontinentaleuropas 1940-1944, unpublished documents.

    BERGER, H. and RITSCHL, A. O. (1992). Germany and the Political Economy of the Marshall Plan, 1947-1952: A Re-Revisionist View. Discussion Paper 1992-97. Department of Economics, Ludwig-Maximillians University Munich.

    BOLDORF, M. and SCHERNER, J. (2011). Frances occupation cost and the war in the East: The contribution to the German war economy, 1940-1944. Journal of Contemporary History, forthcoming.

    BOLTHO, A. (1982). The European Economy: Growth and Crisis. Oxford: OUP.

    BUCHHEIM, C. (1990). Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. Munich: Oldenburg Verlag.

    (1986). Die besetzten Lnder im Dienste der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft whrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs: Ein Bericht der Forschungsstelle fr Wehrwirtschaft. Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte, 34(1): 117-145.

    BHRER, W. (1986). Ruhrstahl und Europa: Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie und die Anfnge der europischen Integration 1945-1952. Munich: Oldenburg Verlag.

    CARLIN, W. (1989). Economic reconstruction in Western Germany, 1945-55: The displacement of a vegetative control. In I. D. Turner (ed.), Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55. Oxford/NY/Munich: Berg.

    DELHAES-GUENTHER, L. von (2003). Erfolgsfaktoren des westdeutschen Exports in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren. Dortmund: Gesellschaft fr westflische Wirtschaftsgeschichte.

    EICHENGREEN, B. (1995). The European Payments Union: An efficient mechanism for rebuilding Europes Trade. In Idem (ed.), Europes Post-War Recovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    and IRWIN, D. A. (1995). Trade blocs, currency blocs, and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s. Journal of International Economics, 38(1): 1-24.

    EICHHOLTZ, D. (1978). Kriegswirtschaftliche Resultate der Okkupationspolitik des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus 1939-1944. Militrgeschichte, 17(2): 133-151.

    ELLIS, H. S. (1941). Exchange Control in Central Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    GIERSCH, H., PAQU, K. and SCHMIEDING, H. (1992). The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany. Cambridge: CUP.

    GLASTETTER, W., HGEMANN, G. and MARQUARDT, R. (1991). Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der BRD 1950-1989. New York/Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.

    GRENZEBACH, W. S. (1988). Germanys Informal Empire in East Central Europe: German Economic Policy toward Yugoslavia and Rumania, 1933-1939. Stuttgart: Steiner.

  • 26

    HIRSCHMAN, A. O. (1945). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: California University Press.

    KITSON, M. and SOLOMOU, S. (1995). Bilateralism in the interwar world economy. Bulletin of Economic Research, 47(3): 197-219.

    Lnderrat des Amerikanischen Besatzungsgebiets (1949). Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944. Mnich: F. Ehrenwirth.

    LINDLAR, L and HOLTFRERICH, C. (1997). Geography, exchange rates and trade structures: Germanys export performance in the 1950s. European Review of Economic History, 1 (2): 217-246.

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  • 28

    Appendix: The commodity structure of German exports and imports, 1928-1970

    This appendix reports a constant-price dataset on German/West German commodity exports and imports in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. The dataset has been constructed on the basis of the following sources.

    Figures for 1950 and 1955 are drawn directly from Auenhandel, Teil 1 (1951), pp. 6-11 and Ibid (1956), pp. 19-21.

    The values for 1960, 1965 and 1970 were computed by linking different constant price datasets reported in Auenhandel, Teil 1 (1961), pp. 19-21; Fachserie G, Teil 1 (1966), pp. 19-21 and Ibid (1970), pp. 21-23.

    Figures for 1928, 1936, 1941 and 1942 were converted into 1950 DM prices based on the ratio of export/import weights reported in StDR, vol. 383.1 (1930), pp. 10-13; Der Auenhandel Deutschlands, Ergnzungsheft 1941, pp. 10-14; Ibid 1942, pp. 8-12; and Auenhandel, Teil 1 (1951), pp. 7-11. For water vessels, the sources report numbers instead of weights.

    From 1936 onward, the original sources report at least 148 commodity groups. I summarised the data into 56 commodity groups to make the 1928 figures compatible with the later benchmarks and to aggregate closely related commodity groups, which alone accounted for very small fractions of German commodity trade. The conversion of figures into 1950 DM prices was made for all 148 commodity groups, in order to account for differences in unit values between the aggregated groups.

    The share of the later Federal Republic in German industrial exports in 1936 was computed on the basis of provincial data reported in Reichsamt fr Wehrwirtschaftliche Planung (1939), pp. 148-159. The census only reports data on industrial production. Therefore, I had to assume that West Germany had exactly the same share in the export of non-food agricultural raw materials, such as wool and furs, cocoon and textile plant, as well as animal and vegetable fats, as in the exports of the sub-branches which processed them. This approach can be justified on the ground that material-intensive industries tend to locate to their domestic raw-material reserves, if the latter exist.

    I also had to assume equal shares for all types of chemicals, which is realistic because the German chemical industry had long been dominated by giant firms operating in concentrated locations, such as Bayer in Leverkusen or BASF in Ludwigshafen. Finally, I estimated the West German share in the miscellaneous commodity groups of raw materials, intermediaries and finished goods based on census data reported for the sub-branches that did not correspond to any of the commodity groups in my dataset.

  • 282

    Table 1: The structure of German/West German commodity exports in million 1950 DM

    Commodity groups FRG (%) 1928 1936 1941 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    I. Foodstuffs 1196.9 279.1 596.3 647.2 195.7 709.6 1235.2 2172.3 4850.8

    Live animals 34.2 1.2 7.1 29.3 21.8 45.2 38.5 75.4 221.9

    Animal products 38.4 21.5 20.4 44.3 25.9 137.4 211.6 356.9 1053.7

    Crops (raw and processed) 1015.6 153.5 433.5 444.1 70.1 338.7 666.1 1139.3 2828.4 Beverages 108.7 103.0 135.3 129.5 77.8 188.3 319.0 600.6 746.8

    II. Industrial raw materials 76.93 2 695.3 1 898.0 2 156.0 2 169.7 1 218.1 1 309.5 1 830.9 2 191.2 3 457.6

    Wool and furs 65.35 577.1 53.8 33.5 46.4 95.7 129.9 247.7 285.3 381.6 Cocoon, textile plants and rag 75.43 136.7 25.0 130.0 127.7 55.7 177.5 284.1 686.8 1 512.7

    Stump-wood, timber and cellulose 71.66 115.1 116.8 183.3 107.1 82.0 54.6 91.9 87.5 121.3

    Animal and vegetable fats 66.79 50.5 11.2 19.3 40.2 4.9 5.5 4.1 4.2 32.4

    Hard coal 79.95 1 164.5 1 474.1 1 434.6 1 519.70 799.2 660.3 897.9 677.8 809.9

    Brown coal and briquette 90.50 77.6 36.4 24.2 51.4 51.5 53.9 44.4 39.5 32.5

    Crude-oil 100.00 7.1 0.5 10.3 10.5 0.7 0.0 0.1 15.4 13.4

    Metallic ores 5.53 287.7 22.7 141.6 109.9 12.6 67.0 54.2 108.5 121.3

    Rock and potassium salt 45.92 138.6 80.3 128.4 119.6 47.1 21.6 29.7 27.2 35.9

    Other minerals 87.43 111.3 67.1 46.6 33.0 57.7 95.5 117.4 188.8 276.0 Other raw materials and waste 64.10 29.1 10.0 4.3 4.3 11.0 43.7 59.3 70.0 120.6

    II. Intermediary goods 72.82 7 280.9 5 257.2 4 238.1 4 597.4 3 474.1 7 059.6 13 305.3 21 085.9 41 649.3

    Textiles (yarn) 56.83 368.5 292.9 174.0 163.7 103.6 230.3 491.8 1 082.6 5 731.4

    Textiles (cloth) 58.34 998.3 544.5 539.3 433.3 277.1 823.0 1 086.5 2 042.4 3 851.5

    Cured leather and furs 85.07 640.3 269.2 112.2 148.3 24.1 165.5 232.6 335.6 470.2

    Rubber (raw and processed) 77.47 90 79.3 45.1 73.1 54.0 190.7 338.2 473.1 797.3

    Cement, other building materials 78.14 171.9 137.5 102.1 105.3 123.6 190.7 253.0 349.6 571.2

    Paper and pulp 46.54 451.6 387.3 382.5 355.4 61.6 87.7 151.9 235.6 731.5

    Plywood 87.55 19.7 13.5 23.2 19.6 7.0 42.3 86.0 111.8 176.4

    Iron and ferrous alloys 87.91 186.8 108.9 243.6 300.1 341.8 214.2 656.7 840.9 1 047.5

    Non-ferrous metals 83.87 232.3 18.1 103.1 138.7 194.3 184.0 335.8 351.1 466.6

    Coke 95.13 517 417.9 290.7 251.0 474.1 655.7 634.2 568.1 603.3

    Petrochemicals 86.31 45.1 39.8 78.3 100.2 39.8 325.8 553.8 983.8 1 825.6

    Chemical fertilisers and pesticides 74.40 299.2 186.0 71.8 89.3 177.1 461.6 692.0 732.3 801.5

    Glass 55.64 53.3 48.5 55.4 59.6 17.6 74.9 171.8 273.5 569.1

    Technical oils, grease and wax 77.20 43.5 37.8 23.8 42.2 25.1 151.9 182.2 291.6 539.6

  • 283

    Glue and gelatine 85.63 36.2 14.6 12.7 5.2 7.3 50.5 102.0 173.2 170.0

    Dye-stuffs 74.40 789.9 545.9 238.9 275.9 254.6 381.1 622.9 997.5 1 938.2

    Explosives, ammunition, matches 28.59 20.3 29.7 68.3 62.4 5.2 28.5 47.2 42.9 52.8

    Synthetic materials 74.40 35.2 45.9 33.7 47.8 22.5 283.5 953.3 2 540.7 6 739.1

    Other chemical intermediaries 74.40 640.1 522.6 408.0 414.2 340.1 1068.3 2117.6 4012.5 8 124.1

    Iron and steel products 78.78 1 268.6 1 198.1 920.9 1 215.5 773.0 1059.0 2994.2 3693.0 5 004.9

    Non-ferrous metal products 66.07 227.8 245.4 125.8 129.4 111.3 214.2 331.4 585.3 968.0

    Other intermediary products 82.55 145.3 73.8 184.9 167.5 39.4 176.2 270.1 369.0 469.7

    III. Finished goods 59.40 10 375.6 6 444.2 4 176.1 4 134.6 3 510.3 12262.8 22797.1 33435.0 57 717.4

    Clothing, hosiery and napery 25.33 556.6 411.5 340.9 254.2 64.2 287.6 670.5 1356.5 4 958.4

    Leather products (incl. footwear) 77.19 213.2 101.3 69.2 85.4 15.2 140.4 175.9 292.2 521.1

    Stationary products 54.00 317.3 269.4 152.8 212.3 18.5 63.9 119.0 247.8 607.5

    Printed products 43.07 85.2 111.4 111.8 115.9 23.9 135.4 361.7 622.0 1 189.7

    Woodenware (incl. furniture) 69.85 56.7 29.3 18.1 18.3 32.9 76.9 168.4 312.9 728.7

    Pottery (incl. China-ware) 39.11 212.2 169.7 107.4 90.7 61.6 201.7 267.1 324.7 408.1

    Glass products 53.23 127.9 88.6 45.2 60.9 33.8 144.2 173.1 184.6 277.6

    Fabricated metal products 82.23 2 454.6 1 072.9 669.2 624.3 823.5 1514.3 2199.5 2851.1 4 617.6

    Steel constructions 85.25 620.5 371.1 257.8 175.4 206.6 576.5 1 011.2 1 227.5 1 913.7

    Machine-tools 56.29 2 149.3 1 429.6 902.5 827.5 969.9 2977.2 4811.1 6825.8 10 286.3

    Water vessels 75.85 345.1 444.3 176.2 391.7 14.3 465.0 1 344.7 1 112.3 1 108.0

    Motor vehicles 78.92 41.4 186.5 214.1 195.0 404.6 1 761.0 4 038.3 6 971.7 11 472.2

    Other vehicles 71.05 180.1 128.7 120.4 89.3 71.7 207.1 216.4 269.9 390.5

    Electrical equipment 40.30 769.5 698.5 458.3 467.6 308.1 1 805.0 3 277.2 4 408.1 7 982.7

    Watches 95.81 163.4 112.2 27.6 12.4 56.5 172.3 196.7 192.9 278.3

    Optical and precision instruments 47.93 324.5 208.3 125.6 109.5 175.1 570.4 990.9 1 295.8 1 877.8

    Musical instruments 66.23 276.6 84.0 45.4 38.1 28.2 68.7 76.3 89.5 94.2

    Toys and decorations 51.45 348.3 155.6 29.9 23.3 37.5 126.0 114.5 143.9 191.4

    Celluloid and plastic products 74.84 198.7 74.7 34.2 31.1 17.4 118.0 246.2 507.5 1 712.2

    Photochemical products 74.40 96.2 65.7 59.8 65.3 11.0 77.8 131.1 211.9 446.5

    Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics 74.40 279.9 144.5 117.9 131.6 93.3 364.6 939.3 1776.6 3 390.9

    Other chemical products 75.41 231.9 43.5 49.1 74.0 28.9 306.3 843.7 1 420.5 2 866.2

    Other finished products 78.50 326.5 43.0 42.7 40.7 13.7 102.5 424.5 789.2 397.7

    IV. All commodities 65.83 20 351.8 13 599.4 10 570.1 10 901.7 8 202.5 20 631.9 37 933.2 56 712.1 102 824.3

  • 284

    Table 2: The structure of German/West German commodity imports in million 1950 DM

    Commodity groups 1928 1936 1941 1942 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

    I. Foodstuffs 11,001.1 5,890.4 5,286.8 4,494.2 5,013.5 7,922.2 12,596.1 16,857.9 22,150.5

    Live animals 276.4 314.1 458.2 419.8 228.3 260.0 495.1 470.9 257.1

    Animal products 2,320.7 1,262.9 1,213.1 716.8 1,276.9 1,549.6 2,596.7 2,831.3 3,918.8

    Crops (raw and processed) 7,074.1 3,034.2 2,666.1 2,503.8 3,100.5 4,971.6 7,645.0 10,894.5 14,644.5 Beverages 1,329.9 1,279.2 949.4 853.8 407.9 1,141.0 1,859.2 2,661.1 3,330.1

    II. Industrial raw materials 7,671.0 5,545.5 3,894.0 3,111.6 3,359.1 6,523.0 9,371.0 13,473.1 18,813.6

    Wool and furs 2,000.0 1,447.8 593.3 457.6 1,040.3 1,377.4 1,444.5 1,695.2 1,571.2

    Cocoon, textile plants and rag 1,883.4 1,437.7 568.4 287.1 1,054.5 1,352.9 1,699.4 1,453.7 1,889.5

    Stump-wood, timber and cellulose 1,821.1 855.4 1,282.0 898.0 301.5 1,098.4 1,395.9 1,609.9 1,985.7

    Animal and vegetable fats 146.7 241.6 53.8 60.2 55.3 34.6 39.0 57.2 141.1

    Hard coal 270.3 156.3 139.6 80.9 145.1 571.8 242.2 262.4 319.8

    Brown coal and briquette 57.0 35.5 1.2 1.1 22.2 18.9 24.4 20.1 22.0

    Crude-oil 196.8 87.4 29.0 35.2 173.4 631.5 2,069.3 5,312.1 8,767.5

    Metallic ores 623.5 932.2 812.2 857.0 364.3 835.3 1,534.4 1,750.4 2,409.7

    Rock and potassium salt 0.0 2.0 4.3 10.7 0.0 0.1 2.6 6.4 13.7

    Other minerals 450.0 261.1 270.8 316.7 122.6 335.2 609.8 987.6 1,377.2 Other raw materials and waste 222.1 88.5 139.5 107.2 79.8 266.9 309.4 317.9 316.1

    II. Intermediary goods 5,748.0 3,033.6 4,105.4 4,162.2 2,308.6 6,533.8 14,242.1 26,475.5 50,308.2

    Textiles (yarn) 1,042.1 446.1 517.5 356.9 356.0 493.3 1,336.9 2,404.7 4,811.3

    Textiles (cloth) 398.2 149.8 483.3 1,141.1 347.5 733.3 1,974.4 3,677.9 5,965.7

    Cured leather and furs 200.8 107.1 97.0 185.9 98.3 124.9 225.3 376.4 626.9

    Rubber (raw and processed) 153.2 202.1 102.7 105.9 248.1 442.5 662.4 1,313.4 2,884.1

    Cement, other building materials 94.1 9.3 60.9 51.9 21.5 84.8 229.2 467.6 785.0

    Paper and pulp 14.8 6.5 193.6 110.8 50.2 263.8 778.0 1,463.2 2,207.8

    Plywood 60.3 47.9 179.4 151.8 17.2 58.4 165.0 340.0 509.5

    Iron and ferrous alloys 333.6 96.7 250.8 219.2 28.2 401.3 398.4 424.9 794.2

    Non-ferrous metals 1,236.0 727.0 540.8 479.4 295.4 1,190.1 2,220.2 2,417.0 3,085.9

    Coke 8.4 21.2 128.0 96.5 7.6 11.4 17.9 21.3 23.4

    Petrochemicals 302.2 491.0 399.3 242.7 130.9 699.3 927.1 1,996.3 5,068.6

    Chemical fertilisers and pesticides 102.9 63.4 11.1 6.4 25.7 29.1 93.9 270.2 914.2

    Glass 9.7 4.1 1.2 12.3 1.2 47.1 168.8 616.7 1,687.7

    Technical oils, grease and wax 389.7 236.4 110.2 95.6 357.7 27.9 407.7 489.3 566.5

  • 285

    Glue and gelatine 9.2 2.8 8.5 5.7 1.2 9.4 18.6 37.8 72.5

    Dye-stuffs 132.4 64.8 20.6 26.8 16.0 49.0 118.4 306.9 638.8

    Explosives, ammunition, matches 2.3 1.0 27.3 71.8 0.2 1.2 15.7 30.5 66.5

    Synthetic materials 10.7 11.7 11.6 17.5 7.0 139.7 551.2 1,577.2 4,372.8

    Other chemical intermediaries 624.6 156.2 438.9 448.4 122.5 523.5 1,591.5 3,735.2 9,226.8

    Iron and steel products 404.9 108.4 265.4 214.8 74.8 809.4 1,358.5 2,334.4 3,325.3

    Non-ferrous metal products 134.5 27.8 173.7 72.1 5.2 88.2 197.3 662.6 1,062.6

    Other intermediary products 83.4 52.2 83.5 48.7 96.0 306.2 785.6 1,511.8 1,612.2

    III. Finished goods 2,573.4 586.9 2,819.9 7,615.1 692.8 2,100.3 10,269.9 28,413.4 55,973.8

    Clothing, hosiery and napery 114.7 19.4 216.0 833.1 159.7 203.0 1,507.3 5,877.7 13,277.3

    Leather products (incl. footwear) 69.3 15.8 162.4 764.3 26.8 32.4 185.5 575.4 1,462.0

    Stationary products 12.6 5.8 83.7 211.0 3.5 21.2 185.9 490.2 1,058.1

    Printed products 23.9 20.7 19.4 51.4 17.9 50.8 80.6 162.3 309.5

    Woodenware (incl. furniture) 32.4 9.2 117.9 254.7 10.8 33.8 150.3 390.2 670.8

    Pottery (incl. China-ware) 64.5 1.1 11.7 32.9 3.8 5.0 32.7 68.6 103.1

    Glass products 47.8 1.5 32.6 53.1 1.6 24.0 125.4 518.5 1,288.6

    Fabricated metal products 351.2 63.6 378.4 761.9 21.2 161.3 1,143.4 3,589.2 7,273.8

    Steel constructions 208.4 17.3 118.2 241.8 25.8 218.9 445.1 532.5 1,029.1

    Machine-tools 220.1 73.4 282.6 432.5 151.4 558.2 1,652.5 3,283.5 6,038.2

    Water vessels 209.1 30.1 166.1 196.8 55.4 118.2 89.5 231.5 752.0

    Motor vehicles 103.1 23.1 47.9 54.2 62.9 163.2 1,173.1 2,758.4 6,607.7

    Other vehicles 8.3 1.2 49.3 62.1 7.3 12.1 49.9 149.9 293.9

    Electrical equipment 124.5 39.4 209.6 479.1 53.4 186.8 807.1 2,186.6 6,118.9

    Watches 164.5 60.7 397.6 2,095.3 26.7 36.2 75.7 151.0 273.5

    Optical and precision instruments 56.0 7.4 22.4 58.8 4.7 52.4 308.0 886.8 1,984.6

    Musical instruments 15.5 2.1 5.2 6.3 2.0 10.8 8.0 18.5 46.3

    Toys and decorations 5.3 0.5 4.9 27.2 0.5 4.4 45.6 160.9 295.6

    Celluloid and plastic products 6.5 9.4 8.9 17.9 1.2 17.4 166.5 768.4 1,991.3

    Photochemical products 10.1 9.7 67.2 151.0 9.0 21.9 47.0 91.5 239.7

    Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics 202.9 50.7 76.3 268.9 37.0 66.8 291.4 747.9 1,725.4

    Other chemical products 37.2 3.3 19.8 15.8 3.5 64.5 172.1 458.8 827.7

    Other finished products 485.6 121.4 322.0 545.0 6.6 37.0 1,527.3 4,315.1 2,306.6

    IV. All commodities 26,993.5 15,056.3 16,106.1 19,383.1 11,374.0 23,079.3 46,479.1 85,219.9 147,246.1

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