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THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk in Insurance Columbia Business School, October 28, 2016

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Page 1: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS

Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016

Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk in Insurance

Columbia Business School, October 28, 2016

Page 2: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Motivation and Main Findings

Page 3: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Motivation (1)

Relative Size of Financial Intermediaries(Percent of GDP)

Insurance sector: Big player in financial markets Important economic functions

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015

United States Canada Euro area United Kingdom Japan Korea

Insurance Banks OFIs Pension funds

Page 4: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

• Two views on systemic risk

Individual insurers

System of insurers

Largecomplex

interconnected

Default,stop

funding, stop

lending, securities.

Correlated sales, fire

sales, stop/reduce

funding.

Distress?…

……

Shock to asset prices

Counter-party

stress …risks to

real activity

Common exposures

Domino View Tsunami View

Motivation (2)

Page 5: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Questions answered in GFSR

Has insurance sector’s systemic importance changed over time/countries?

What explains changes in systemic importance?• Investment

behavior• Maturity

mismatches• Business models• Broader market

dynamics

Implications for insurance regulation?

Page 6: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

• Increased, esp. life, but lower than banks• More homogenous, higher commonalities• Increased market risk and interest rate sensitivities

Systemic importance

• Insurers transmit shocks across financial system• Especially in Europe and North AmericaSpillovers

• No major shift towards “riskier” assets • But assets have become “riskier”• Search for yield among weaker, smaller firms

Life insurers’ assets

• Macro-prudential approach needed• International capital and transparency standards • Focus on smaller and weaker firms

Regulatory implications

Main findings

Page 7: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Insurance Sector: Systemic Importance

Page 8: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Increased price comovement among insurers

Time series clustering(Number of clusters)

Insurers’ Equity Return Due to First Principal Component (Percent)

0

20

40

60

80

100

I II I II I II I II I II

Life Nonlife Life Nonlife Mixed

United States Europe

Page 9: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Systemic Risk – rising CoVaR and capital shortfalls

CoVaR Indices (Normalized, 2006=100)North America Europe Advanced Asia

Conditional capital shortfall (USD trillions)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016

Life insurers

Nonlife insurers

Banks

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016

Life insurers

Nonlife insurers

Banks

0.0

0.4

0.8

1.2

2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016

Life insurers

Nonlife insurers

Banks

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2006 2009 2012 2015

Banks

Nonlife insurers

Life insurers

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2006 2009 2012 2015

Banks

Nonlife insurers

Life insurers

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2006 2009 2012 2015

Banks

Nonlife insurers

Life insurers

Page 10: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Nov-01 Mar-07 Aug-08 Dec-14

Top 25 Top 50 Top 100

-16

-12

-8

-4

0

4

8

Nov-01 Mar-07 Aug-08 Dec-14

Top 25 Top 50 Top 100

A +10 percent value for the top 100 indicates that there are 10 percent more insurance firms among the top 100 than justified by their sample share.

Life insurers Non-life insurers

Forward-Looking Default Correlation Networks(Percent; over- or underrepresentation of insurers)

Systemic RiskDefault Correlation Networks rank Life high

Page 11: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Systemic Risk Spillovers:Insurance is shock transmitter

Page 12: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Systemic Importance Drivers

Page 13: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Investment behavior

• Take on greater asset risk in low interest rate environment? Across asset categories true only for weaker, smaller firms

• Increased similarity in asset composition? Not apparent

• Greater procyclicality in investment behavior? Mixed evidence

• But greater common exposure toaggregate riskinterest rates

Page 14: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

1. More risky investments: at lower cap, smaller firms and those with more annuity/min.return products

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

High interest

Low interest

High interest

Low interest

High interest

Low interest

All

United States Canada Netherlands Germany

With low interest rates, the propensity of lower-capitalized firms to hold riskier assets is strengthened.

-5

0

5

10

15

High interest

Low interest

High interest

Low interest

High interest

Low interest

Guaranteed interest

United States Canada Netherlands Germany

With low interest rates, the propensity of firms with higher annuity product shares to hold riskier assets is strengthened.

Firms with higher guaranteed interest

rates on life insurance offerings

have larger risky asset portfolios.

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

High interest

Low interest

High interest

Low interest

All All All

United States Canada Netherlands Germany Korea

With low interest rates, the propensity of smaller firms to hold riskier assets is strengthened.

1 2

3

In low interest environments, factors that contribute to higher exposure to riskier assets are lower-capitalization ….

… a higher share of annuity products in total liabilities …

… and the size of the firm , with smaller being more exposed

Page 15: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

2. Procyclicality 3. Duration mismatches- Mixed evidence - Higher i-rate sensitivity

U.S. insurers acted countercyclically in 2008 and contributed to stability

US and European Insurers' Equity Returns‘ Interest Rate Sensitivity Increases…and so does their net duration mismatch

But… turnover at firm level did not increase in recent years

-0.80-0.70-0.60-0.50-0.40-0.30-0.20-0.100.000.10

Life Nonlife Life Nonlife Mixed Life Nonlife

U.S. insurers European insurers Asian insurers

Precrisis Postcrisis

Note: For a negative (net) duration, insurers’ liabilities are longer than their assets. Insurers’ future business prospects get better (worse) when interest rates increase (fall).

Page 16: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

4. Liability side developments may also contribute to riskiness…

Life Insurers’ Unit-Linked Products (Percent of assets)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

United States Netherlands

Germany United Kingdom

Korea Scandinavian countries

Switzerland Canada

0

5

10

15

20

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015:H

1

Catastrophe bondsSidecarsIndustry loss warrantiesCollateralized re and otherShare alternative capital (right scale)

(Billions of U.S. dollars) (Percent)

Unit-linked products are a form of long-term insurance whereby the policyholder chooses the investment strategy. These products can, but do not necessarily have to, include guarantees.

Alternative Insurance Risk Capital Instruments

Page 17: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

5. Changed Market DynamicsHigher cross-asset correlations post-2010

• Search for yield• Lower risk aversion

Temporary factors

Increase risk of market illiquidityBenchmarking more widespread

Structural changes

Greater similarity

across insurance

firms’ stock prices

Insurance stocks more affected by

common shocks

Page 18: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Implications for Regulation

Page 19: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Recent Regulatory Developments

• Regulations now more risk-based and accounting principles more market-based– valuations more market-sensitive– investment horizons of risky investments shortened – the maturity of safe assets extended

• Wide variations in capital requirements and the use of internal models – These are among the main problems in developing a global

capital framework– But progress is being made

Page 20: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Compliance with ICPs

1. Selected IAIS Core Principles on Regulation 2. Selected IAIS Core Principles on Business Strategies

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100

AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM

Exit M&A Cond. Enforce. PCA Report MaPru. Groups

Observed Unobserved

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20

40

60

80

100

AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM AE EM

Activity Invest. Liab. Risk Mgt. Cap. Gov. Disclose

Observed Unobserved

Page 21: THE INSURANCE SECTOR · THE INSURANCE SECTOR TRENDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK IMPLICATIONS Based on Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2016 Nico Valckx Workshop on Systemic Risk

Forward looking lessons for Regulation

• Macro-prudential approach– address risks related to common exposures

• Market-consistent valuation standards – enhance transparency– address duration mismatches

• Supervisory follow-up of smaller and weaker firms– Focus should not be restricted to only large firms– Too-many-to-fail problem– Contagion

• Vigilance to avoid regulatory arbitrage